Tag: religion or cult

  • Dui Hua Hits Important Milestone

    Dui Hua Hits Important Milestone

    Image credit: Dui Hua

    Since the Dui Hua Foundation was established in 1999, it has composed and handed over 500 written requests for information on prisoners to the Chinese government. The Chinese government has never refused to accept a list from Dui Hua.

    In the past 25 years, Dui Hua has asked about 2,210 prisoners, of whom 396 were females and 1,316 were males (gender is not known in all cases). The foundation received responses on 1,070 prisoners, of whom 235 were females and 726 were male (gender is not known in all cases). Dui Hua has learned of 454 acts of clemency and better treatment afforded to 294 prisoners on its lists.

    Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database, used to generate prisoner lists, has grown from a few hundred names on notecards in 1999 to 48,699 names at the end of 2023.

    Individuals in the PPDB from 2004-2023. Image credit: Dui Hua

    Prior to Dui Hua’s establishment in 1999, founder John Kamm actively engaged the Chinese government in a dialogue focused on prisoners, submitting hundreds of lists and receiving responses on more than a thousand prisoners. Unfortunately, good records were not kept.

    Dui Hua advocates for at-risk detainees — political and religious prisoners and other individuals facing coercive measures. Individuals have been subjected to coercive measures including detention, arrest, imprisonment, and residential surveillance in a designated location, among others. Most names raised by Dui Hua are largely unknown outside of China.

    Recipients of Dui Hua lists have included the State Council Information Office, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Supreme People’s Court, State Administration for Religious Affairs, provincial and municipal governments, and government backed policy thinktanks.

    As judicial transparency deteriorated, the number of prisoners about whom information has been provided has decreased but has nevertheless continued. In 2024, nine lists have thus far been accepted and two responses on eight prisoners have been received.

    Sample of prisoner lists from August 1999 (left) and June 2000 (right). Image credit: Dui Hua

    Important acts of clemency that Dui Hua has learned of through active interventions include:

    Xu Wenli (徐文立). Xu was a prominent political dissident who was dubbed “China’s special prisoner number one.” Xu co-founded the China Democracy Party (CDP) and organized activities during the 1979 Democracy Wall Movement leading to his sentence of 15 years in prison in 1982. Kamm’s intervention contributed to parole in 1993. Xu was subsequently convicted of subversion and sentenced to 13 years in prison and three years DPR in 1998. This was Xu’s second imprisonment. Dui Hua inquired about his case eight times during 2000 and 2002. China provided eight responses. Those efforts contributed to Xu being granted medical parole in 2002 and receiving permission to seek medical treatment abroad. Kamm and Dui Hua also successfully advocated for other June 4 protesters and members of the CDP, including Wang Youcai (王有才).

    Zhang Lin (张林). A veteran activist, Zhang was tried and convicted in five separate trials between 1991 and 2014. Kamm and Dui Hua raised his name on ten lists and received eight responses. Dui Hua assisted a women’s rights activist to bring Zhang’s daughters to the United States, then with stakeholders to secure his passage to the United States in 2018.

    Jigme Sangpo (晋美桑布). Takna Jigme Sangpo was a Tibetan school teacher and advocate for Tibetan independence. He was believed to be the longest serving prisoner convicted of counterrevolution. Dui Hua assisted in negotiations, one of which took place in Lhasa. Jigme Sangpo was released in 2002 on medical parole and allowed to come to the United States for medical treatment before taking up residence outside Zurich, Switzerland. Dui Hua submitted eight inquiries between 1999 and 2003, and Kamm submitted at least two in 1995 before the foundation’s establishment. He received six responses. Takna Jigme Sangpo passed away on October 17, 2020, at the age of 91.

    Ngawang Sangdrol (阿旺桑珍). At the age of 13, Ngawang Sangdrol was convicted of counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement and sentenced to three years of imprisonment with one year deprivation of political rights (DPR) in 1992. Her sentence was then extended three times to 23 years. Ngawang was the youngest of 13 women known as the “singing nuns of Drapchi.” They secretly recorded and smuggled protest songs out of prison. Ngawang was granted a sentence reduction in 2001 and parole in 2002. John Kamm visited Lhasa in early 2003 and met with Ngawang. Dui Hua helped secure her departure to the United States for medical treatment that same year. Dui Hua made 11 inquiries between 2001 and 2003, either directly to the Chinese government or through governments that held human rights dialogues with China. The Chinese government provided ten responses. Dui Hua also assisted in efforts to secure the early release of another “singing nun,” Phuntsog Nyidron, in 2004.

    Xu Zerong (徐泽荣). Xu, a Hong Kong resident and respected expert on China’s military history, was detained in 2000 and accused of stealing state secrets and illegal business activity. He received a combined sentence of 13 years, with three years of DPR. From 2002 to 2011, Dui Hua raised Xu’s case on 28 lists, directly or through stakeholders, and received 26 responses. Those efforts contributed to three sentence reductions, totaling 24 months. Kamm visited the prison where Xu was first incarcerated and pressed the warden to provide better treatment. Xu was transferred to a “model prison” and released in 2011.

    Rebiya Kadeer (热比亚•卡德尔). A prominent Uyghur businesswoman and representative to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Rebiya was placed in custody in August 1999 after attempting to meet with staff of a US congressional delegation that was visiting Urumqi. She was convicted of illegally providing state secrets to an overseas entity in 2000 and sentenced to eight years in prison and two years of DPR. Dui Hua submitted eight inquiries between 2002 and 2004 to the Chinese government and received more than 20 responses. Dui Hua’s efforts contributed to a one-year sentence reduction in 2004 and medical parole in 2005. She was allowed to seek medical treatment aboard.

    Liang Jiantian (梁鉴添). Owner of a small printing shop in Guangzhou, Liang was convicted of illegal business activities, including publishing Falun Gong materials, and sentenced to life in prison in 2000. Dui Hua put Liang’s name on 20 lists and received 18 responses contributing to seven sentence reductions. Liang was released in October 2021.

    Tenzin Delek Rinpoche (丹增德勒仁波切, 阿安扎西). An influential Tibetan monk from Ganzi, Sichuan. An outspoken advocate for local Tibetan autonomy, he led efforts to provide education to poor children and orphans in the region. The authorities accused Tenzin Delek of involvement in several explosions in Chengdu and Ganzi. He was convicted of inciting splittism and setting off explosions and given a sentence of death with two-year reprieve in 2002. The sentence was later commuted to life in 2005. Dui Hua raised the case directly and through governments on 31 lists and received 31 responses during 2002 and 2015. Despite being in poor health, the prison authorities refused to grant him medical parole. Tenzin Delek Rinpoche passed away in July 2015 at the age of 65. The authorities refused to release the body back to the family for a proper burial, fearing potential social unrest. Dui Hua found and provided the family with government regulations that required the body to be treated with respect for ethnic traditions. The government relented.

    Shi Tao (师涛). Shi was an editor of a provincial newspaper in Hunan. In 2005, he received an internal notice instructing reporters not to cover the upcoming 15th anniversary of the June 4th crackdown, Shi described the post on an overseas website. He was detained in 2004 and sentenced to ten years for providing state secrets to an overseas entity. Dui Hua uncovered the connection between a US internet company and the case and attended a congressional hearing on the case. Shi was released in 2013.

    Yao Wentian (姚文田). Publisher and bookstore owner based in Hong Kong. (He is the father of Yao Yongzhan, John Kamm’s first intervention that took place in 1990.) He was convicted for smuggling common goods and sentenced to ten years in 2013. He received a short sentence reduction in 2019. Although the prison authorities refused to consider medical parole for Yao, he was placed in the medical ward of the prison for most of his sentence, exempted from physical labor, and allowed to receive monthly visits from his wife. Yao returned to Hong Kong on February 27, 2023.

    Li Yan (李彦). A woman from Anyue County in Sichuan was sentenced to death for murdering her abusive husband in 2012. The Supreme People’s Court affirmed the judgment in January 2013. In February 2014, Dui Hua convened an international conference on women in prison in which judges from the Supreme People’s Court took part. Topics of domestic violence were discussed. A judge and another official from the court told Dui Hua that what they heard was helpful in reversing the lower court’s decision. In June 2014, the SPC issued a decision to the Sichuan High Court to hold a retrial. The sentence was changed to death with two-year reprieve in April 2015.

    Chen Taihe (陈泰和). A lawyer in Guilin, Guangxi, an associate professor at Guilin Electronic Technology University Law School, and an advocate of adopting the jury system, Chen was one of more than 300 lawyers and activists interrogated or detained in the “709” a national-wide police action in 2015, later known as the “7.09” crackdown. Dui Hua worked closely with Chinese officials and diplomats from China and the United States to secure a passport and permission for Chen’s departure for the United States in 2016.

  • New Rules on Religion in Xinjiang: Comparing State Council and Provincial Congress Regulations

    New Rules on Religion in Xinjiang: Comparing State Council and Provincial Congress Regulations

    The entrance to Ihlas Supermarket in the Kashgar city center in August 2018. Various banners and posters bearing political slogans in Mandarin and Uyghur, with slogans promoting speaking Mandarin and ethnic unity. Image credit: Kubilayaxun / CC BY-SA 4.0

    Near the end of 2023, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) issued new regulations on administrating religious affairs in the region. The restive province remains a source of international controversy — Western nations have decried widespread surveillance and religious repression while China has refuted these as politically motivated criticisms and pointed to its support from Muslim-majority nations to validate its policies. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 2022 report concluded that “serious human rights violations” that may constitute crimes against humanity have been committed in the region, and the new regulations passed more than a year after that report and China’s rejection of its findings.

    The fourteenth XUAR People’s Congress passed the Religious Affairs Regulation on December 22, 2023, at its seventh session. The new regulations will take effect on February 1, 2024, a week after its human rights record was examined in the United Nations Universal Periodic Review in Geneva. Xinjiang was notably a recurring issue during this review, which took place on January 23, 2024.

    The regional regulations are based in large part on the 2018 National Religious Affairs Regulation issued by the State Council. The Xinjiang regulations introduce several provisions “in consideration of [the] actual circumstances in the autonomous region.” (XJ Article 1)

    Using translations done by the China Law Translation, Dui Hua has put together a side-by-side comparison (link) of the XUAR Religious Affairs Regulations (2024), hereafter referred to as XJ regulations, and the State Council Religious Affairs Regulations (2018), hereafter SC regulations.

    In the XJ regulations, some provisions from the SC regulations are re-arranged and combined. They also omit details of some provisions included in the SC version by simply referring to them as “in accordance with the national laws, regulations, and rules.”

    Such regulations and rules include the Measures for Administration of Religious Venues introduced by the State Religious Affairs Bureau, which went into effect on September 1, 2023. Some of the notable differences between the XJ and SC versions are highlighted below.

    Battling Against Endangering State Security, Extremism, & Ethnic Hatred 

    The stated goal of the XJ regulations is to protect citizens’ freedom of religious worship and to maintain religious and social harmony. Both the XJ regulations and the SC regulations highlight the responsibility of religious groups and believers to fight criminal activities carried out in the name of religion.

    Both regulations reference the need to battle extremism (SC Article 3. XJ Article 4) and activities that might endanger state security (SC Article 4, 63, 64. XJ Article 5), especially splittism (SC Article 4, 63, 73(1). XJ Article 5, 49(2)). While both versions strongly emphasize the importance of promoting and maintaining “ethnic harmony” the XJ regulations also reference “inciting ethnic hatred” in its text (XJ Article 5, 49(2)), which is not mentioned in the SC text.

    XJ expands on the emphasis against religious extremism and includes specific behavior in Article 47:

    • …must not use appearances, apparel, signs, symbols, and so forth to play up religious fanaticism;
    • [must] not coerce or force others to wear religious extremist clothing or wear religious extremist symbols or signs.
    Publishing & Personal Consumption of Religious Materials 
    While SC Article 45 permits religious groups, religious schools, and churches and temples to print materials for internal use (“in accordance with relevant laws on publishing”), XJ Article 48 requires such publications to be reviewed and approved by the regional religious affairs bureau. A printing permit issued by the regional news and press department is required and distribution can only be within the approved scope.
    De-extremization propaganda paintings. Image credit People.com.cn
    SC Article 45 stipulates religious materials cannot contain content:
    1. that undermines harmonious co-existence between religious and non-religious citizens;
    2. that undermines the harmony between different religions or within a religion;
    3. that discriminates against or insults religious or non-religious citizens;
    4. that advocates religious extremism;
    5. that contravenes the principle of religions’ independence and self-governance.
    XJ Article 49 expands on this by prohibiting five more types of illegal content:
    (1) that undermines national unity, social stability, economic development, and scientific and technological progress;
    (2) that incites ethnic hatred, ethnic discrimination, and undermines ethnic unity;
    (3) that promotes ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and violent terrorism;
    (7) that endangers social morality or the traditional culture of China; and
    (8) Other content prohibited by laws, regulations, and state provisions.
    XJ Article 50 further restricts individual consumption of contents that are deemed illegal (as defined by Article 49) on the internet or other digital formats, including mobile phones and portable data storage. The article adds that “Organizations and individuals must not illegally listen to, watch, or transmit overseas religious radio and television programs.”
    However, the XJ version omits SC Article 46 which regulates importing religious materials from overseas for personal use.
    A photo of the Urumqi bazaar taken in 2005. Image credit: 29cm via Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 2.0
    Religious School Appointments & Sinicization 
    The XJ regulations largely follow the SC regulations in “Chapter II: Religious Groups” (on rules for personnel appointments) and “Chapter III: Religious Schools” (on religious training), but it adds the requirement that religious schools and religious training should contribute to social harmony and Chinese culture by incorporating “Chinese characteristics.”
    XJ Article 11(3) stipulates that research on religious culture and texts should:
    “… thoroughly uncover content in religious teachings and rules that are conducive to social harmony, modern progress, and health and civilization; and make interpretations of religious teachings and rules in line with contemporary China’s requirements for development and improvement, and in line with the outstanding traditional Chinese culture.”
    XJ Article 14 also asks religious schools to:
    “…follow the path of school operations with Chinese characteristics, running the school in accordance with law, advancing educational and teaching reforms, and increasing the quality of school operations.”

    Sinicization reappears in “Chapter IV: Religious Activity Sites” which regulates building, renovation, and expansion of religious sites and venues. XJ Article 26 adds that sites that are newly built or renovated, expanded, or rebuilt shall “reflect Chinese characteristics and style in areas such as their architecture, sculptures, paintings, and decorations.”

    Conduct of Religious Professionals 

    While the SC regulations includes brief, generalized provisions regulating the conduct of religious professionals, including the requirement to follow relevant laws and rules and to protect their rites, the XJ regulations call on personnel to also follow orthodoxy and anti-extremism measures.

    XJ Article 38 further defines specific acts that are not permitted, including:

    1. Making “edicts” [DH: Idhn—permission, promise], appointing religious presiding officiants, and restoring or indirectly restoring feudal privileges;
    2. Accepting canonization, appointments, or honorary titles from overseas organizations or individuals;
    3. Accepting instruction on engaging in religious and educational activities from overseas organizations or individuals;
    4. Setting up private meeting places and establishing illegal religious organizations;
    5. Conducting unauthorized “living Buddha reincarnation” activities.

    Of these, (1) is a common practice among Chinese Hui Muslims, and (5) is specific to Tibetan Buddhism.

    A roadside sign in Turpan, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, written in both Uyghur and Chinese with the phrase “I liken the party to my mother.” Image credit: Kubilayaxun / CC BY-SA 4.0 

    An Expansion of Past Regulations 

    It is important to note that the XJ regulations are an expansion of the SC regulations. On the surface, it appears that the XJ regulations include fewer mentions of the phrase “extremism.” However, the regional version refers in places to being “in accordance with the relevant national laws and regulations,” which is a clear reference to the SC regulations. The regional regulations also made combating splittism and extremism a top priority, including allocating these responsibilities to religious schools and religious professionals. Additionally, the XUAR previously passed de-extremification regulations in 2017.

    The XJ regulations build on the SC ones to further dictate how individuals and institutions can engage with state-sanctioned religions. Beyond the restrictions and obligations outlined above, both regulations also place restrictions on adhering to specific pillars of Islam. For example, going abroad for the Hajj is permitted only when organized by a national Islamic group (in this case the Islamic Association of China), and both regulations include rules against accepting overseas funds (SC Article 57; XJ Article 45) with a few exceptions, which may impinge on the third pillar of Islam known as Zakat, or almsgiving).

    Similarly, other regions like Qinghai and the Tibet Autonomous Region have their own religious affairs regulations. Qinghai’s went into effect on October 1, 2021 and Tibet’s a month later on November 1, 2021. The Tibetan regulations also include some provisions specific to Tibetan Buddhist tradition and beliefs, such as reincarnation. The Chinese government’s insistence on controlling all aspects of religious practice, from what materials adherents can possess to transnational processes, reflect how national security and social stability concerns drive policies that demand adherence to the state above all.

    Dui Hua has compiled a side-by-side comparison of the XJ and SC regulations and provided comments where appropriate: Comparison of XJ and SC Regulations

  • New Rules on Religion in Xinjiang: Comparing State Council and Provincial Congress Regulations

    New Rules on Religion in Xinjiang: Comparing State Council and Provincial Congress Regulations

    The entrance to Ihlas Supermarket in the Kashgar city center in August 2018. Various banners and posters bearing political slogans in Mandarin and Uyghur, with slogans promoting speaking Mandarin and ethnic unity. Image credit: Kubilayaxun / CC BY-SA 4.0

    Near the end of 2023, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) issued new regulations on administrating religious affairs in the region. The restive province remains a source of international controversy — Western nations have decried widespread surveillance and religious repression while China has refuted these as politically motivated criticisms and pointed to its support from Muslim-majority nations to validate its policies. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 2022 report concluded that “serious human rights violations” that may constitute crimes against humanity have been committed in the region, and the new regulations passed more than a year after that report and China’s rejection of its findings.

    The fourteenth XUAR People’s Congress passed the Religious Affairs Regulation on December 22, 2023, at its seventh session. The new regulations will take effect on February 1, 2024, a week after its human rights record was examined in the United Nations Universal Periodic Review in Geneva. Xinjiang was notably a recurring issue during this review, which took place on January 23, 2024.

    The regional regulations are based in large part on the 2018 National Religious Affairs Regulation issued by the State Council. The Xinjiang regulations introduce several provisions “in consideration of [the] actual circumstances in the autonomous region.” (XJ Article 1)

    Using translations done by the China Law Translation, Dui Hua has put together a side-by-side comparison (link) of the XUAR Religious Affairs Regulations (2024), hereafter referred to as XJ regulations, and the State Council Religious Affairs Regulations (2018), hereafter SC regulations.

    In the XJ regulations, some provisions from the SC regulations are re-arranged and combined. They also omit details of some provisions included in the SC version by simply referring to them as “in accordance with the national laws, regulations, and rules.”

    Such regulations and rules include the Measures for Administration of Religious Venues introduced by the State Religious Affairs Bureau, which went into effect on September 1, 2023. Some of the notable differences between the XJ and SC versions are highlighted below.

    Battling Against Endangering State Security, Extremism, & Ethnic Hatred 

    The stated goal of the XJ regulations is to protect citizens’ freedom of religious worship and to maintain religious and social harmony. Both the XJ regulations and the SC regulations highlight the responsibility of religious groups and believers to fight criminal activities carried out in the name of religion.

    Both regulations reference the need to battle extremism (SC Article 3. XJ Article 4) and activities that might endanger state security (SC Article 4, 63, 64. XJ Article 5), especially splittism (SC Article 4, 63, 73(1). XJ Article 5, 49(2)). While both versions strongly emphasize the importance of promoting and maintaining “ethnic harmony” the XJ regulations also reference “inciting ethnic hatred” in its text (XJ Article 5, 49(2)), which is not mentioned in the SC text.

    XJ expands on the emphasis against religious extremism and includes specific behavior in Article 47:

    • …must not use appearances, apparel, signs, symbols, and so forth to play up religious fanaticism;
    • [must] not coerce or force others to wear religious extremist clothing or wear religious extremist symbols or signs.
    Publishing & Personal Consumption of Religious Materials 
    While SC Article 45 permits religious groups, religious schools, and churches and temples to print materials for internal use (“in accordance with relevant laws on publishing”), XJ Article 48 requires such publications to be reviewed and approved by the regional religious affairs bureau. A printing permit issued by the regional news and press department is required and distribution can only be within the approved scope.
    De-extremization propaganda paintings. Image credit People.com.cn
    SC Article 45 stipulates religious materials cannot contain content:
    1. that undermines harmonious co-existence between religious and non-religious citizens;
    2. that undermines the harmony between different religions or within a religion;
    3. that discriminates against or insults religious or non-religious citizens;
    4. that advocates religious extremism;
    5. that contravenes the principle of religions’ independence and self-governance.
    XJ Article 49 expands on this by prohibiting five more types of illegal content:
    (1) that undermines national unity, social stability, economic development, and scientific and technological progress;
    (2) that incites ethnic hatred, ethnic discrimination, and undermines ethnic unity;
    (3) that promotes ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and violent terrorism;
    (7) that endangers social morality or the traditional culture of China; and
    (8) Other content prohibited by laws, regulations, and state provisions.
    XJ Article 50 further restricts individual consumption of contents that are deemed illegal (as defined by Article 49) on the internet or other digital formats, including mobile phones and portable data storage. The article adds that “Organizations and individuals must not illegally listen to, watch, or transmit overseas religious radio and television programs.”
    However, the XJ version omits SC Article 46 which regulates importing religious materials from overseas for personal use.
    A photo of the Urumqi bazaar taken in 2005. Image credit: 29cm via Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 2.0
    Religious School Appointments & Sinicization 
    The XJ regulations largely follow the SC regulations in “Chapter II: Religious Groups” (on rules for personnel appointments) and “Chapter III: Religious Schools” (on religious training), but it adds the requirement that religious schools and religious training should contribute to social harmony and Chinese culture by incorporating “Chinese characteristics.”
    XJ Article 11(3) stipulates that research on religious culture and texts should:
    “… thoroughly uncover content in religious teachings and rules that are conducive to social harmony, modern progress, and health and civilization; and make interpretations of religious teachings and rules in line with contemporary China’s requirements for development and improvement, and in line with the outstanding traditional Chinese culture.”
    XJ Article 14 also asks religious schools to:
    “…follow the path of school operations with Chinese characteristics, running the school in accordance with law, advancing educational and teaching reforms, and increasing the quality of school operations.”

    Sinicization reappears in “Chapter IV: Religious Activity Sites” which regulates building, renovation, and expansion of religious sites and venues. XJ Article 26 adds that sites that are newly built or renovated, expanded, or rebuilt shall “reflect Chinese characteristics and style in areas such as their architecture, sculptures, paintings, and decorations.”

    Conduct of Religious Professionals 

    While the SC regulations includes brief, generalized provisions regulating the conduct of religious professionals, including the requirement to follow relevant laws and rules and to protect their rites, the XJ regulations call on personnel to also follow orthodoxy and anti-extremism measures.

    XJ Article 38 further defines specific acts that are not permitted, including:

    1. Making “edicts” [DH: Idhn—permission, promise], appointing religious presiding officiants, and restoring or indirectly restoring feudal privileges;
    2. Accepting canonization, appointments, or honorary titles from overseas organizations or individuals;
    3. Accepting instruction on engaging in religious and educational activities from overseas organizations or individuals;
    4. Setting up private meeting places and establishing illegal religious organizations;
    5. Conducting unauthorized “living Buddha reincarnation” activities.

    Of these, (1) is a common practice among Chinese Hui Muslims, and (5) is specific to Tibetan Buddhism.

    A roadside sign in Turpan, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, written in both Uyghur and Chinese with the phrase “I liken the party to my mother.” Image credit: Kubilayaxun / CC BY-SA 4.0 

    An Expansion of Past Regulations 

    It is important to note that the XJ regulations are an expansion of the SC regulations. On the surface, it appears that the XJ regulations include fewer mentions of the phrase “extremism.” However, the regional version refers in places to being “in accordance with the relevant national laws and regulations,” which is a clear reference to the SC regulations. The regional regulations also made combating splittism and extremism a top priority, including allocating these responsibilities to religious schools and religious professionals. Additionally, the XUAR previously passed de-extremification regulations in 2017.

    The XJ regulations build on the SC ones to further dictate how individuals and institutions can engage with state-sanctioned religions. Beyond the restrictions and obligations outlined above, both regulations also place restrictions on adhering to specific pillars of Islam. For example, going abroad for the Hajj is permitted only when organized by a national Islamic group (in this case the Islamic Association of China), and both regulations include rules against accepting overseas funds (SC Article 57; XJ Article 45) with a few exceptions, which may impinge on the third pillar of Islam known as Zakat, or almsgiving).

    Similarly, other regions like Qinghai and the Tibet Autonomous Region have their own religious affairs regulations. Qinghai’s went into effect on October 1, 2021 and Tibet’s a month later on November 1, 2021. The Tibetan regulations also include some provisions specific to Tibetan Buddhist tradition and beliefs, such as reincarnation. The Chinese government’s insistence on controlling all aspects of religious practice, from what materials adherents can possess to transnational processes, reflect how national security and social stability concerns drive policies that demand adherence to the state above all.

    Dui Hua has compiled a side-by-side comparison of the XJ and SC regulations and provided comments where appropriate: Comparison of XJ and SC Regulations

  • From “Vineyard” to Prison: The House of Joseph

    From “Vineyard” to Prison: The House of Joseph

    A photo of Kunshan, Suzhou, where the House of Joseph has been known to operate. Image credit: Song Sangroov / CC BY 3.0 DEED

    Dui Hua continues to uncover information on Chinese religious groups following the release of its report “The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious Groups in China” in March 2022. Three new groups have been identified including the House of Joseph, or yuesejia (约瑟家) in Mandarin Chinese, Xinling Famen (心灵法门), and Corporate Christ (团体基督).

    The House of Joseph is an indigenous Christian group whose members are at risk of arrest and imprisonment. Founded in 1992 by Wei Zhuxiang (魏柱祥) as an offshoot of the Spirit Church, or linglingjiao (灵灵教), the House of Joseph is sometimes called “the third generation” of the True Jesus Church (真耶稣教会) from which the Spirit Church was splintered in 1986. According to Chinese government sources, Wei predicted an apocalypse in 2000 and said that conversion to the House of Joseph was the only way to salvation. He allegedly “distorted” the Bible by proclaiming himself Joseph, son of Jesus. He claimed that the holy spirit had descended on him and his wife, and the couple became the new god after they united as one. He also stated that he was reincarnated as a shepherd in the earthly world in search of “another flock of sheep.” His goal is to launch an evangelizing mission which he calls “the 6,000-Year Project of the God.”

    Unorthodox religious groups often stand accused of illegally amassing a fortune from superstitious believers through “indoctrination” and “mind control.” The House of Joseph is no exception. The church allegedly asks adherents for donations to repent their sins, and it arranges marriages for male adherents who pay a fee from 5,000-20,000 yuan. Following Wei’s unfulfilled apocalyptic prophecy in 2000, Wei started calling on believers to join settlements or communities that he termed “vineyards” and described as swathes of paradise on earth. Believers were admitted after they paid a fee of 2,000 yuan. Chinese government sources reveal that he used the money to create economic entities in garment processing, engineering construction, planting and breeding, catering services, and trading. Violators of his church rules would be ordered to fast, suspended from employment, and even dismissed from his “vineyards.”

    Wei once claimed that his church had as many as 100,000 members. However, Chinese government sources suggest that the group only has a limited reach in China, with over 1,000 devoted members mostly in Huai’an and Kunshan (in Jiangsu Province), and Shanghai. It is unclear when the Chinese government started labelling the House of Joseph an “evil cult,” but a court judgment Dui Hua uncovered states that Wei was among the 12 leading members detained amid a crackdown in 2005. In 2006, the Kunshan City People’s Court convicted Wei of fraud and sentenced him to 10 years and six months in prison. Wei was released from prison in April 2014. His wife was also sentenced in the same case, but information about the criminal punishment she received is not available.

    Footage of a baptism conducted by the True Jesus Church, which the House of Joseph is thought to have splintered from. Image credit: True Jesus Church live stream
    Re-Indicted in 2020 
    Wei continued to develop his church after he was released from prison. In May 2020, Wei was re-arrested in Suqian, Jiangsu, alongside another leading member Wang Shoucai (王守财) for “organizing a cult to undermine implementation of the law.” Six months later, Wei and Wang were among the 17 House of Joseph members who were indicted for violating Article 300. The procuratorate accused them of “disseminating propaganda materials all over the country to promote the cultic ideology of the House of Joseph, collecting donations from believers, and illegally amassing a fortune” since 2017.
    Dui Hua has not been unable to find a court judgment concerning this case. However, given China’s high conviction rates and that Wei reoffended, it is highly likely that Wei received a lengthy prison sentence and is serving a second prison stint in Jiangsu.
    Suqian, Jiangsu, where the House of Joseph leader Wei was arrested after serving his prison sentence. Image credit: Invercargill City Council
    Other Convictions 
     
        I.    Zhang X 
     
    Besides Wei, Dui Hua found that two other House of Joseph members were convicted prior to his re-indictment in 2020. In the first case, Wei’s nephew surnamed Zhang received a three-year suspended sentence for violating Article 300 in December 2015. Zhang, a farmer, was initially placed under residential surveillance in March 2012. That same month, he was released on bail pending further investigation. He was indicted three years later, in April 2015. The following month, he was released on bail again until the Huaiyin District People’s Court resumed the trial on September 17, 2015.
    Zhang converted to the House of Joseph in 2001 and was appointed by Wei as the head of a Kunshan-based “vineyard” in 2011 while Wei was serving his 10 years and six months’ prison sentence. The court judgment states that Zhang “actively obeyed and earnestly carried out Wei’s orders through letters and verbal messages from prison.” Wei made another prediction of cataclysm which would take place on November 16, 2011 following a nuclear war. Adherents were told that they must seek refuge from three arks (like those used by Noah in religious texts), one of which was in Tibet. Individuals would be denied refuge unless they had been baptized by the House of Joseph by September 12, 2011. Zhang disseminated Wei’s prophecy and continued to help Wei to exert indirect control of church members.
    In preparation for the impending cataclysm, Zhang sold his Jiangsu vineyards and arranged for over a thousand church members to relocate to Xinjiang and Tibet where he intended to re-establish his organizational branch. In Xinjiang, Zhang organized about 60 missionaries to conduct overseas evangelization in Iran and Thailand. Zhang ordered one of the teams to travel to Iran for a religious exchange and requested that church members print 4,000 leaflets with Farsi translations of the church doctrines. In Tibet, Zhang formed four other teams of missionaries to preach domestically. All their activities were funded directly by the House of Joseph.
    In November 2011, one of the missionaries Zhang dispatched to China’s northeast was detained. Foreseeing an imminent risk of police investigation, Zhang deleted all correspondences with the missionary and dismissed all church members who had relocated to Xinjiang and Tibet. Before Zhang was able to transfer out the church funds, police seized over 54 million yuan, 2,100 grams of gold, and an apartment owned by the church in Jiangsu.
    Zhang’s punishment was lenient  because he turned himself in and disbanded his organizational branch in 2011. During the court trial, he claimed to have recanted his religious beliefs by questioning Wei’s unfulfilled prophecy concerning the nuclear war. He also pledged to not join any cult activities. Zhang’s three-year suspended sentence ended in December 2018.
    An image of Huai’an, one of the locations where the House of Joseph has been based. Image credit: Huai’an Economic and Technological Development Zone

        II.    Chen X 

    The House of Joseph continued to operate despite suffering a major blow after Zhang shuttered his Tibet and Xinjiang organizational branches. A court judgment Dui Hua acquired indicated another Jiangsu farmer surnamed Chen was sentenced to three years in prison on October 15, 2015, also for violating Article 300. Chen organized home gatherings with 15 other members despite “knowing full well that the church had been banned by relevant authorities” since February 10, 2010.

    Unlike Zhang, Chen does not appear to have been in close contact with Wei. Chen said all the 16 church members who took part in the home gatherings were God’s descendants and possessed powers to cure sicknesses and cast out demons. The judgment made no mention of Wei’s apocalyptic prediction in 2011. Chen was accused of printing 2,000 leaflets to spread claims that he possessed healing powers and had successfully cured more than 500 patients. Chen is believed to have been released from prison on December 10, 2017, assuming that he did not receive either sentence reduction or sentence extension.

    Dui Hua has been unable to find additional information about the House of Joseph beyond what is stated in the 2020 indictment and the two aforementioned court judgments. China’s Anti-Cult Association, which disseminates propaganda about the harmful nature of evil cults, is not known to have published a single article about the church. The House of Joseph has officially been designated as harmful on the grounds that it is both fraudulent and superstitious. However, as with many of the non-violent unorthodox religious groups in China, it is unclear if this opposition to the group is meant to protect the Chinese people from harmful superstition, or if it is another way to protect the Chinese government from a grassroots group with organizational capacity.

  • Promoter to Pariah: Xinling Famen’s “Unorthodox Buddhism”

    Promoter to Pariah: Xinling Famen’s “Unorthodox Buddhism”

    Junhong Lu giving the “Grand Dharma Talk” in Singapore’s National Stadium in 2017. Image credit: Ginny Gray / CC BY-SA 4.0

    In March 2022, Dui Hua released a study titled “The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious Groups in China” identifying 41 religious groups whose members are at risk of arrest and imprisonment. Dui Hua has since uncovered another unorthodox religious group called Xinling Famen (心灵法门) that is facing similar repression. Other recently uncovered unorthodox groups include Corporate Christ (团体基督), which is thought to have splintered from the Church of Almighty God (全能神), and the House of Joseph (约瑟家), which originated from the Spirit Church (灵灵教).

    Xinling Famen, also known as the Guanyin Citta Dharma Door, is among the newly emerged Buddhist groups which have gained traction in China and overseas. Its founder Lu Junhong (卢军宏, aka Richard Lu) was born in 1959 in Shanghai, studied in Sydney, and eventually obtained Australian citizenship. After graduating from university in the 1990s, Lu promoted Buddhism and traditional Chinese culture while serving as a director of Australia Oriental Media Group, a Chinese-language radio station operated in Sydney. In 2010, Lu founded Xinling Famen. The group has gained popularity among Chinese immigrants in the United States, Canada, Europe, and Southeast Asia.

    According to public statements made by Chinese government agencies, Xinling Famen has attracted three million followers. The group, however, claims to have as many as seven million members worldwide, and hundreds of thousands tune in daily to listen to Lu’s ideas online. Lu’s teachings were reportedly introduced to China in 2009, one year before the group was founded.

    Unorthodox Buddhism

    While Xinling Famen describes itself as a Buddhist group, its worship style is similar to that of some Pentecostal churches and charismatic healing cults, according to Chinese Religions Going Global. Adherents are said to burst into tears with their arms outstretched as Lu performs spiritual healing. Lu instructed his followers to read different combinations of sutras from Buddhist canons known as “little houses” to get rid of bad karma. He also provided a list of specific rules that followers must abide by in order to maximize good karma.

    Nevertheless, China’s anti-cult propaganda accuses Lu of appropriating Buddhist terms to mobilize a cultic movement centered on his personality. Lu called himself a reincarnation of Guanyin Bodhisattva and said that he had divine power to read one’s totems (referring to Chinese zodiac signs) in heaven and see a person’s past, present, and future. Lu is also said to have amassed a fortune by selling “little houses” and charging exorbitant apprenticeship fees. China imposed an entry ban on Lu before he passed away from illness in November 2021.

    A Xinling Famen center in Ashfield, Australia. Image credit: Guan Yin Citta Dharma Door Facebook page

    Xinling Famen also stirred up controversy overseas. Buddhist communities from Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong have claimed that Lu’s healing power is a complete fabrication and that his so-called divine power deviates from mainstream Buddhist ideology. Despite the controversy, China remains the only place in the world where Xinling Famen members are arrested and imprisoned.

    Promoting the “Chinese Dream” 

    Lu’s Australia Oriental Media Group (AOMG) had an intricate relationship with Chinese state media in its infancy. Prior to the radio station’s official launch in December 2007, state media including China News Service lauded it as a new force of the ever-expanding Chinese language media in Australia and the first such radio station operated in Sydney established by a mainland Chinese immigrant. Less than two years later, in the summer of 2009, China National Radio (CNR) announced that it had signed a content collaboration agreement with AOMG, under which AOMG would broadcast some CNR regular programs and conduct local interviews for CNR special programs.

    Agreement signing ceremony between CNR and AOMG on July 4, 2009, in Sydney. Zhao Hui, then vice president of CNR (standing) and Lu (seated left of Zhao) attended. Image credit: CNR

    In October 2013, Lu and Xinling Famen appeared in an interview profile conducted by a former People’s Daily correspondent for Aust333, another Chinese-language media outlet based in Sydney. The profile mentioned that Lu received a “British Community Honours Award” in 2012, repeating Lu’s false claim that it was awarded by the UK House of Lords. In fact, the award is given by a UK-registered charity that holds the ceremony at the House of Lords. The profile also praised Lu for promoting Chinese culture through his radio station and his Buddhist organization.

    The interview ended by asking Lu how Xinling Famen would contribute to Xi Jinping’s idea of the “Chinese Dream.” Lu responded with talking points typically seen in Chinese propaganda, saying that the realization of the dream was “of greater and far-reaching significance to those of us overseas Chinese living overseas and leaders of overseas Chinese circles” and that “only when the country is strong, we overseas Chinese will be prouder and not be bullied.” He further stated that realizing the dream “requires the selfless dedication of Chinese people all over the world” and closed by discussing Xinling Famen’s recent event in Taiwan as an example of how the organization could promote cross-Strait understanding and would contribute to the realization of the “Chinese Dream.”

    Lu (second from left) with a group of Chinese delegates during a visit to Sydney: Zhan Yannong (third from left), then president of People’s Daily; Ambassador Li Huaxin (fifth from left), then Chinese Consul General in Sydney, and Xue Meng (far right), then head of People.cn Australia. Date unknown. Image credit: Aust333

    Within two years of the interview, the relationship had soured. State Media started to label Xinling Famen as a cult, Lu’s books were banned, and his dubious awards came into question.

    Conviction under Article 300 

    The first known case of imprisonment involving Xinling Famen was concluded in Inner Mongolia in 2015. The Ewenki Minority Autonomous Banner People’s Court convicted a woman surnamed Meng of “organizing a cult to undermine implementation of the law,” and gave her to a suspended sentence of three years. This is the only case with information in Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database in which a Xinling Famen member was convicted of Article 300.

    The court judgment stated that Meng converted to Xinling Famen in July 2014. In December, police searched her home and found 133 “cultic” books and 37 copies of CD-ROMS she stored in a refrigerator and a cupboard. That same month, police confiscated 100 copies of publicity materials that Meng was preparing to mail out from a supermarket.

    The punishment in this case is considered lenient because Meng admitted her guilt. The court mitigated her prison sentence also because the books and publicity materials had not yet been publicly circulated.

    Illegal Business Activity Convictions 

    Dui Hua has obtained three more court judgments involving Xinling Famen members. They were convicted not of Article 300, but of conducting illegal business activity which is typically used against the printing of the Bible and other religious publications. The three cases were all concluded in December 2016.

    In the first case, five Xinling Famen members received criminal punishment ranging from suspended sentences to five years in prison in Neixiang County, Henan, for printing 101,480 copies books worth ¥276,494. Although the publishing company owned by one of the defendants only made a profit of ¥28,480, the court ordered that each of the defendants pay a fine of ¥30,000.

    Table 1. Criminal punishment for Xinling Famen members

    The longest prison sentence of five years was given to Zhang Jianping, an apprentice of Lu Junhong. He admitted to printing books without a license. He stated in his defense that his original intent was to promote Buddhism and guide people towards a good path. He pleaded for leniency because his books were not reactionary, nor did he intend to profit from them financially. Guo Hui (郭辉), considered another principal offender in the case, received a four-year prison sentence. All the defendants have completed their prison sentences as of this writing.

    The second case, also concluded in Neixiang County, involved three defendants: Wang Xiaoyan (王小燕), Xia Songzhi (夏松芝), and Li Kehua (栗克华). Only Wang was known to be an adherent of Xinling Famen; she completed a five-year prison sentence on January 5, 2021. She received a remittance of over ¥300,000 from Xinling Famen members across China and entrusted Xia and Li to print 154,230 copies of books.

    Xia and Lu were the print shop owners and each of them received a suspended sentence of three years. Available sources did not state whether Xia and Lu were members of Xinling Famen.

    A screenshot of Xinling Famen materials offered through the organization’s website. Image credit: Xinling Famen eBooks

    The third case in Taiyuan, Shanxi only involved one male defendant. Liu Shuangjian (刘双建), also a printshop owner, was accused of printing 13,260 copies of Xinling Famen sutras and 3,780 copies of Buddhist books which were not related to Xinling Famen. The Taiyuan Intermediate People’s Court ruled that only the Xinling Famen sutras, but not the Buddhist books, were illegal. Liu received a ¥5,000 down payment for the order to print the Xinling Famen sutras. The standard of conviction does not necessarily require an intent to establish a profitable business, but in this case the court did not accept the other Buddhist books he printed as evidence because he did not gain any profit from them. Assuming Liu served his full term without a sentence reduction, Liu was released from prison on July 15, 2018.

    Arrests & Prosecutions 

    Dui Hua’s research into legal documents also found three cases involving Xinling Famen illegal religious books. The fate of these individuals remains uncertain because Dui Hua is unable to confirm whether they were convicted and given fixed-term prison sentences.

    In December 2016, Zhao Kun (赵坤) and Guo Hongmei (郭红梅) were prosecuted for illegal business activity in Tongshan District, Jiangsu. Zhao was accused of printing 30,000 volumes of Xinling Famen books worth approximately ¥60,000, while Guo allegedly printed 20,000 copies also worth around ¥60,000.

    Evidence suggests that Xinling Famen has made inroads with Chinese ethnic minorities. A Hui mother surnamed Ma and her son surnamed Han were indicted in Ji’nan, Shandong, also for illegal business activity on May 17, 2018. The prosecutors alleged that they sold 175,467 copies of Xinling Famen books worth ¥534,889.85 in the 14 months since May 2016. When the duo was detained on July 4, 2017, police also discovered 103,838 copies of Buddhism in Plain Terms, a book authored by Lu Hongjun, in their residence, storeroom, factory, and vehicles. Given the large number of publications which had been in public circulation, they are unlikely to have been given lenient punishment.

    An outreach event in Malaysia. Image credit: Guan Yin Citta Dharma Buddhism Twitter account

    In the third case, Fan, a Han Chinese who resided in Urumqi, was criminally detained for “gathering a crowd to disturb social order” on June 25, 2020, but the charge was changed to Article 300 on July 9. The indictment stated that Fan organized an illegal religious activity for Krishna, a major deity in Hinduism. Police found in his residence 127 copies of Yuandun Famen propaganda and six “cultic” Xinling Famen publications. (Yuandun Famen 圆顿法门 is another unorthodox Buddhist group which has been banned by the Chinese government since December 1999). Available sources did not explain a connection between Xinling Famen and the Hindu deity.

    The cases discussed in this post indicate that Xinling Famen members accused of printing and selling religious books written by Lu Hongjung face criminal charges, including violating Article 300 and illegal business activity. These cases likely only represent a small portion of criminal cases, and Dui Hua believes that many more Xinling Famen members may have been prosecuted and sentenced in China, the only place in the world which criminalizes this unorthodox Buddhist group.

  • UN Submission Focuses on Persecution of Women in Unorthodox Religions

    UN Submission Focuses on Persecution of Women in Unorthodox Religions

    The logo for the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, which monitors compliance with the Convention, both of which are abbreviated as CEDAW. Image credit: UN Office of the High Commission for Human Rights

    The number of women incarcerated in Chinese prisons has grown faster than the population of incarcerated men over the past decade, and women are disproportionately represented in criminal cases involving unorthodox religious groups. These are the main points highlighted by Dui Hua in its submission to the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)’s review of China.

    CEDAW, which also stands for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and is sometimes described as an “international bill of rights for women,” is the treaty and human rights instrument adopted by the United Nations that provides guidance for nations to combat discrimination faced by women. Nations that have signed and ratified CEDAW – which includes all but six UN member states – are required to submit reports to the Committee on their compliance with the Convention every four years. NGOs are invited to make submissions informing country reports, which Dui Hua did for China’s, considered during CEDAW’s 85th session in the week of May 8, 2023.

    Dui Hua’s statement largely focused on female prisoners charged under Article 300, “organizing or using a cult to undermine implementation of the law.” The statement noted that women account for 8 percent of the prison population in China – a figure similar to that of the United States – but are thought to make up more than 40 percent of prisoners incarcerated for violating Article 300 from 1998-2016. More so, court records suggest that sentencing for these cases is comparatively harsh and that instances of clemency are rare. (The statement notes that there may have been an increase in clemency over the last two years but the lack of consistent data and transparency in legal processes makes this difficult to confirm.)

    Charts 1 and 2: Gender breakdown of unorthodox religious prisoners accused of violating Article 300 in the PPDB as of March 31, 2023.*

    *Gender is not known for all cases. Image credit: The Dui Hua Foundation

    The submission builds on the research Dui Hua initially published in its report “The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious Groups in China,” which identified a gender imbalance in sentencing under Article 300. Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database (PPDB) holds records on 11,400 women who have been subject to coercive measures for violating Article 300 due to their participation in unorthodox religious groups, which the Chinese Communist Party regards as cult organizations practicing non-state sanctioned faiths.

    The statement also noted that women are the main target of negative stereotypes in China’s anti-cult propaganda. This messaging often relies on stereotypes of middle-aged, rural women being “weak-willed and psychologically vulnerable” and more vulnerable to “coercion or monetary enticements from cult organizations.” Such messaging, which comes from both national and regional organizations, itself seems to violate Article 5 of CEDAW which mandates that state parties take all appropriate measures to eliminate “prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.”

    An image from the opening session of CEDAW’s 85th session on May 8, 2023. Image credit: UN Web TV

    Another focus of Dui Hua’s submission to China’s state report was the decline in judicial transparency. Dui Hua ended its submissions by recommending that the Chinese government increase the use of non-custodial measures and clemency for women prisoners and improve judicial transparency, writing:

    Dui Hua urges the Chinese government to resume providing meaningful access for the public to judicial documents, including indictments, court judgments, and decisions of all cases, regardless of the criminal offense involved. Transparency is particularly lacking in provinces with high populations of ethnic minorities. It also helps the public understand the reasons why women are placed in custody for peacefully pursuing their religious faith and other criminal offenses.   

    This is not the first time Dui Hua has made a statement to a UN body concerning China’s treatment of female prisoners. Dui Hua previously made submissions to CEDAW during China’s previous review in 2014 and, more recently, to the Working Group on Discrimination Against Women in Law and Practice in June 2019.

    Of the 193 UN member states, 189 have ratified CEDAW, binding them to the treaty and mandating that they participate in regular review every four years. The United States has not ratified CEDAW, placing it among a small group of countries – Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Tonga, Palau – and the Holy See that have yet to bind themselves to the treaty.

    Read the full statement 

    Read the report “The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious Groups in China” 

  • Eleven Years on the Lam: Indictment of a Tibetan “Robber”

    Eleven Years on the Lam: Indictment of a Tibetan “Robber”

    Barkhor Square in Lhasa, Tibet, on 22 September 2008. Image credit: Reurinkjan / CC BY 2.0

    Protests swept across the Tibetan plateau ahead of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. More than a decade later, China continues to track down and punish pro-independence protesters who took part in the unrest, some episodes of which turned deadly. An indictment uncovered by Dui Hua reveals how one protester was ultimately found and punished years after their alleged crime.

    This case revolves around a Tibetan known by the name of Kelsang Cheron (格桑谢郎) who was accused of robbery. He was formally arrested on October 18, 2019 in Zhuoni County, Gansu, for a crime he allegedly committed 11 years ago during the Tibetan protests that began on March 17, 2008. The case was transferred to the procuratorate for prosecution on January 7, 2020.

    Cropped image of the indictment confirming that arrest of Kelsang Cheron in October 2019 for robbery. His name was partially redacted, but the full name was revealed later in the indictment.
    Zhuoni County (Jonê County 卓尼县) is located in the southeast of Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, one of the hardest hit regions during the 2008 Tibetan unrest. State news media reported that as of April 8, 2008 (about three weeks after the outbreak), 2,204 protesters reportedly turned themselves in and 432 people were in criminal detention for “beating, smashing, looting, and burning” (da 打za 砸 qiang 抢 shao 烧) across the prefecture. Derived from the denunciation of the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, the phrase “beating, smashing, looting and burning” is highly ideological and permeates official accounts of popular protests, including June Fourth, regardless of whether violence is involved.
    It is questionable whether the robbery charge against Cheron is justified. Throughout the indictment the prosecutors failed to present evidence of him looting properties by means of force or fear. The allegations focused on his role as the principal organizer of the protests in Zhuoni County. First, he was accused of convening a secret meeting on March 17 with over 60 Tibetan monks in a forest near the Gongba Monastery to discuss the specifics of the protests and their plans to “smash” the public security bureau and county government office. The following morning, he gave Snow Lion flags to a group of 200 Buddhist monks to be used in a Buddhist ceremony. After the ceremony was over, the monks proceeded to march to the public security bureau and county government offices, where they allegedly waved the Snow Lion flags and chanted slogans about independence and “Long Live the Dalai Lama.”
    Cropped image of the indictment showing the facts pertaining to Cheron’s crime of robbery. There is no evidence that Cheron engaged in looting or using force or intimidation, important requirements for the crime in many other jurisdictions outside of China.

    Similarly, the indictment did not say whether the Tibetan monks looted anything valuable. However, evidence is cited of them damaging public property. They allegedly set fire and threw bricks and stones, destroying more than four million yuan worth of property such as fences, gates, computers, televisions, vehicles, and various data files. During the destruction, some protesters entered a primary school where they lowered the Chinese national flag and replaced it with the Snow Lion flag, which remained hoisted for days until police took the flag down on March 20.

    In May 2008, Tibetans in Dharamsala, India, protest China’s occupation while holding the Snow Lion flag. Image credit: Kiran Jonnalagadda / CC BY 2.0
    Cheron was on the run for 11 years until he was apprehended by Zhuoni Public Security on September 11, 2019. The indictment did not say whether he took part in the actual protests when the alleged violence occurred. It is only clear that he was the person who gave the protesters the Snow Lion flags on the morning of March 18 prior to the protests. The prosecutor argued that he was complicit in the commission of robbery with other Tibetan protesters. According to the indictment, Cheron refused to confess to his crimes during interrogation.

    The case of Cheron calls into question of the allegations of robbery, a crime many Tibetan monks were also accused of violating in 2008. Official accounts of his case bear resemblance to some of the problematic evidence about “beating, smashing, looting and burning” by pro-democracy protesters in 1989, with a notable example being Wang Jun (王军). Wang, 18 years old at the time, was caught at the scene during the April disturbance in Xi’an. In May, the Xi’an Intermediate People’s Court convicted Wang for arson and robbery and sentenced him to death for the two crimes. Upon appeal, the Shaanxi High Court, following the review instruction from the Supreme People’s Court, revised the combined sentence to death with two-year reprieve. The crime of robbery, which afforded him a life sentence, stemmed from Wang allegedly “taking advantage of the unrest and stealing an electronic calculator, cassette tapes, and pens.” Wang ultimately spent a total of twenty years in Shaanxi’s Fuping Prison before he was released in May 2009.

    Common charges against Tibetan protesters who participated in the 2008 unrest include robbery, arson, and gathering a crowd to disturb social order or to attack state organs. In the same year, the number of people tried for splittism nationwide doubled from 459 in the previous year to 926. By now, many of these Tibetan protesters are believed to have completed their prison sentences, but the fate of Kelsang Cheron remains shrouded in mystery. Dui Hua has been unable to find the judgment of his case. Given the abysmally low acquittal rates and his refusal to confess, it is likely that Kelsang Cheron is still behind bars for a disputable crime that he committed 14 years ago.

  • Punishing Namāz Prayer in Prison, Part II: “Illegal Religious Activity”

    Punishing Namāz Prayer in Prison, Part II: “Illegal Religious Activity”

    A photo of the Id Kah Mosque, the largest in China, in Kashgar, Xinjiang, taken in 2017. The photographer noted that worshippers had their ID cards recorded. Image credit: David Stanley / CC By 2.0

    Part I of this article discussed existing laws and regulations limiting religious expression in China, and it explored the case of Ismayil Sidiq, a Uyghur farmer serving a 10-year prison sentence for “promoting extremism” whose sentence was doubled after he “used a disguised and simplified method to perform namāz in the prison dormitory.” Namāz, commonly known as salah, refers to the pillar of the Islamic faith that obliges believers to pray five times a day.

    Dui Hua’s research into court judgments, however, found a similar case where a Uyghur prisoner was sentenced in December 2019 to 18 months for Article 315 for conducting “illegal religious activity” on four occasions in Xinjiang’s Shihezi Prison. Prior to this, the Uyghur prisoner was serving his 20 years prison sentence for terrorism and promoting extremism. Despite being accused of conducting “illegal religious activity” on one more occasion, he was given an 18-month prison sentence for Article 315—half the length of Ismayil’s sentence. The judgment did not state whether namāz was involved.

    Ismayil’s case is by no means an isolated incident, although what happened to him might have portended the worst possible outcome for performing namāz in prison. Dui Hua found cases where other Uyghur prisoners, while already serving lengthy prison sentences, were criminally prosecuted for Article 315 because of namāz. In the first case, a Uyghur serving his 10-year sentence for participating in a terrorist organization in Xinjiang’s Bayingolin Prison was found to have performed namāz on four occasions during the week of March 14, 2017. On each occasion, he awoke other cellmates, including those serving their sentences for endangering state security, to join his morning prayer. On May 21, he was put under 15 days of solitary confinement, during which he insisted on performing namāz five times a day and called on other cellmates to join his prayer.

    A picture of Bayingolin Prison. Image credit: Shahit.biz 

    It would be a mistake to assume that prosecution against namāz only targets Uyghurs convicted of endangering state security, terrorism, or religious extremism offenses. In the second case, a Uyghur serving his seven-year sentence for “gathering a crowd to disturb social order,” a public order offense, in Korla Prison was indicted for Article 315 on June 13, 2017. The indictment stated that he refused to repent and that he insisted on performing namāz every day. Originally due for release on July 17, 2021, this Uyghur prisoner is likely to remain incarcerated until at least 2024.

    In these two cases, the trial outcome is unclear. However, given what happened to Ismayil, they are highly likely to have been convicted and sentenced to additional prison terms under Article 315.

    Besides Uyghurs, Muslim prisoners from other ethnic minority groups outside of Xinjiang also receive punishment for performing namāz. However, Dui Hua found that none of them were sentenced or criminally prosecuted like the abovementioned Uyghurs. These cases involved one Hui and two ethnic Dongxiang Muslims who were convicted of theft or drug-related crimes in Linxia, Gansu. The Hui and Dongxiang Muslims were only given warnings by prison authorities in July 2018. The duo allegedly showed remorse by stopping their prayers completely after they were warned.

    Nevertheless, not all prisoners are as obedient. Ma Mene (马么呢), an ethnic Dongxiang Muslim, displayed a “bad attitude” and confronted prison guards after he was found praying in prison. Ma was placed under yanguan jixun (严管集训) for 15 days, a form of strict control for collective discipline training. During this period, he was unable to accrue clemency points to obtain early release.

    A Muslim prisoner in the United States prays on his rug inside his cell at prison. Image credit: Andy Aitchison, PrisonImage / Creative Commons

    China is not alone in denying Muslims their right to pray or worship meaningfully in prison. From reading the Quran to growing beards and restricting daily group prayers, Muslim prisoners in other countries have their religious rights deprived to varying degrees. In the United States, Muslims are overrepresented in state prisons, making up 9 percent of the prison population despite being 1 percent of the general population according to a 2019 report by Muslim Advocates. The report found that prisons in multiple states fail to accommodate Muslim dietary requirements, force male prisoners to shave their beards, and restrict group prayer.

    As recently as April 2022, Muslim prisoners in the United States faced obstacles in accessing halal food, adequate dietary accommodations during Ramadan, and religious materials such as prayer mats and Qurans even as equivalent requirements are met for other faiths. Some progress has been made after civil society organizations filed lawsuits challenging religious restrictions in prison. For instance, federal prisons in the United States changed the national guideline in 2019 to accommodate Muslim congregational prayer services, which was previously restricted to three people, unless there is a security concern.

    The use of “security concerns” to justify restrictions on religious expressions is an oft-used tool of governments. China, too, often cites security concerns to justify its religious crackdowns in- and outside of its carceral system. In a country which adheres so closely to the notion of “stability above all else,” it is unlikely that religious restrictions on namāz in prison will abate. Similarly, the right to free assembly through group prayer, a practice valued by Muslims and only recently permissible in US prisons, is likely to continue amongst China’s repression of religious expression and assembly.

  • Punishing Namāz Prayer in Prison, Part II: “Illegal Religious Activity”

    Punishing Namāz Prayer in Prison, Part II: “Illegal Religious Activity”

    A photo of the Id Kah Mosque, the largest in China, in Kashgar, Xinjiang, taken in 2017. The photographer noted that worshippers had their ID cards recorded. Image credit: David Stanley / CC By 2.0 

    Part I of this article discussed existing laws and regulations limiting religious expression in China, and it explored the case of Ismayil Sidiq, a Uyghur farmer serving a 10-year prison sentence for “promoting extremism” whose sentence was doubled after he “used a disguised and simplified method to perform namāz in the prison dormitory.” Namāz, commonly known as salah, refers to the pillar of the Islamic faith that obliges believers to pray five times a day. 

    Dui Hua’s research into court judgments, however, found a similar case where a Uyghur prisoner was sentenced in December 2019 to 18 months for Article 315 for conducting “illegal religious activity” on four occasions in Xinjiang’s Shihezi Prison. Prior to this, the Uyghur prisoner was serving his 20 years prison sentence for terrorism and promoting extremism. Despite being accused of conducting “illegal religious activity” on one more occasion, he was given an 18-month prison sentence for Article 315—half the length of Ismayil’s sentence. The judgment did not state whether namāz was involved. 

    Ismayil’s case is by no means an isolated incident, although what happened to him might have portended the worst possible outcome for performing namāz in prison. Dui Hua found cases where other Uyghur prisoners, while already serving lengthy prison sentences, were criminally prosecuted for Article 315 because of namāz. In the first case, a Uyghur serving his 10-year sentence for participating in a terrorist organization in Xinjiang’s Bayingolin Prison was found to have performed namāz on four occasions during the week of March 14, 2017. On each occasion, he awoke other cellmates, including those serving their sentences for endangering state security, to join his morning prayer. On May 21, he was put under 15 days of solitary confinement, during which he insisted on performing namāz five times a day and called on other cellmates to join his prayer. 

    A picture of Bayingolin Prison. Image credit: Shahit.biz 

    It would be a mistake to assume that prosecution against namāz only targets Uyghurs convicted of endangering state security, terrorism, or religious extremism offenses. In the second case, a Uyghur serving his seven-year sentence for “gathering a crowd to disturb social order,” a public order offense, in Korla Prison was indicted for Article 315 on June 13, 2017. The indictment stated that he refused to repent and that he insisted on performing namāz every day. Originally due for release on July 17, 2021, this Uyghur prisoner is likely to remain incarcerated until at least 2024. 

    In these two cases, the trial outcome is unclear. However, given what happened to Ismayil, they are highly likely to have been convicted and sentenced to additional prison terms under Article 315. 

    Besides Uyghurs, Muslim prisoners from other ethnic minority groups outside of Xinjiang also receive punishment for performing namāz. However, Dui Hua found that none of them were sentenced or criminally prosecuted like the abovementioned Uyghurs. These cases involved one Hui and two ethnic Dongxiang Muslims who were convicted of theft or drug-related crimes in Linxia, Gansu. The Hui and Dongxiang Muslims were only given warnings by prison authorities in July 2018. The duo allegedly showed remorse by stopping their prayers completely after they were warned. 

    Nevertheless, not all prisoners are as obedient. Ma Mene (马么呢), an ethnic Dongxiang Muslim, displayed a “bad attitude” and confronted prison guards after he was found praying in prison. Ma was placed under yanguan jixun (严管集训) for 15 days, a form of strict control for collective discipline training. During this period, he was unable to accrue clemency points to obtain early release. 

    A Muslim prisoner in the United States prays on his rug inside his cell at prison. Image credit: Andy Aitchison, PrisonImage / Creative Commons 

    China is not alone in denying Muslims their right to pray or worship meaningfully in prison. From reading the Quran to growing beards and restricting daily group prayers, Muslim prisoners in other countries have their religious rights deprived to varying degrees. In the United States, Muslims are overrepresented in state prisons, making up 9 percent of the prison population despite being 1 percent of the general population according to a 2019 report by Muslim Advocates. The report found that prisons in multiple states fail to accommodate Muslim dietary requirements, force male prisoners to shave their beards, and restrict group prayer.  

    As recently as April 2022, Muslim prisoners in the United States faced obstacles in accessing halal food, adequate dietary accommodations during Ramadan, and religious materials such as prayer mats and Qurans even as equivalent requirements are met for other faiths. Some progress has been made after civil society organizations filed lawsuits challenging religious restrictions in prison. For instance, federal prisons in the United States changed the national guideline in 2019 to accommodate Muslim congregational prayer services, which was previously restricted to three people, unless there is a security concern.  

    The use of “security concerns” to justify restrictions on religious expressions is an oft-used tool of governments. China, too, often cites security concerns to justify its religious crackdowns in- and outside of its carceral system. In a country which adheres so closely to the notion of “stability above all else,” it is unlikely that religious restrictions on namāz in prison will abate. Similarly, the right to free assembly through group prayer, a practice valued by Muslims and only recently permissible in US prisons, is likely to continue amongst China’s repression of religious expression and assembly. 

  • Punishing Namāz Prayer in Prison, Part I: “Sabotaging Prison Supervision”

    Punishing Namāz Prayer in Prison, Part I: “Sabotaging Prison Supervision”

    A clock hanging in a Turkish mosque showing Muslim prayer times. Image credit: LooiNL 

    Muslims around the world are obliged to perform five daily prayers at dawn, midday, afternoon, sunset, and night. The ritual, commonly known as salah, is often called namazi (CN: 乃玛孜) in China, a Persian transliteration of namāz. Within China’s carceral system, all forms of religious worship, including namāz, are forbidden. Prisoners who covertly perform namāz are at risk of receiving harsh punishment, with the most serious penalty being a sentence extension.

    This risk is well demonstrated in the case of Ismayil Sidiq. In May 2021, the BBC reported that the now-57-year-old Uyghur farmer was serving a 10-year prison sentence for “promoting extremism” in Kuitun Prison in the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps when he had his sentence doubled after he “used a disguised and simplified method to perform namāz in the prison dormitory.” On May 29, 2018, the Kuitun Reclamation Area People’s Court convicted him of “sabotaging prison supervision” and “provoking ethnic hatred,” and handed down an additional prison term of 13 years. Ismayil has 16 more years to serve before completing his sentence on May 28, 2038. He will be 74 years old.

    The four-page judgment gave a detailed account of what happened in Kuitun Prison. First searchable on China Judgements Online, the judgment is among the tens of thousands of sensitive cases taken offline in mid-2021. The judgment has since been archived and translated into English by the Xinjiang Victims Database.

    A translation of the judgment against Ismayil. Image credit: Xinjiang Victims Database Twitter account

    According to the judgment, Ismayil performed namāz on three occasions in the prison dormitory in early 2018. The first two took place on January 25 and February 17 after he realized that the time displayed on the television was the time for his final daily namāz. On March 3, on the pretext of needing to urinate, he secretly performed wudu, the washing ritual that Muslims perform before praying. After being discovered and stopped by his Uyghur cellmates, he became outraged and shouted at them asking, “Are you Uyghurs? Do Uyghurs enjoy reporting other Uyghurs like this?”

    The court found clear and sufficient evidence of Ismayil sabotaging prison supervision because he “repeatedly engaged in covert religious activities in prison.” This crime alone afforded him a prison sentence of three years – the maximum penalty stipulated in Article 315 of the Criminal Law. Furthermore, he was found guilty of “provoking ethnic hatred” because the remarks he made to other Uyghur cellmates “sowed discord among the ethnic groups and created ethnic antagonism.” This crime also landed him the maximum prison sentence of 10 years as stipulated by Article 249.

    An excerpt taken from academic journal Crime and Corrections reveals that namāz is among the religious activities explicitly banned in prisons and re-education-through-labor facilities through Xinjiang. Image credit: Crime and Corrections, (2001) Issue 4

    While prisoners are allowed to retain their religious faith, prison authorities across China proscribe all forms of religious activities but allow prisoners to read religious books or silently chant scriptures. Article 2 of a provisional regulation issued by the Xinjiang Department of Justice explicitly prohibits all forms of religious activity such as participating in Ramadan, namāz, other forms of worship, or sermons in prisons and reeducation-through-labor facilities. However, many Muslim detainees and prisoners defied this prison rule and “shared a propensity to organize gangs when they perform namāz in groups,” according to an article published in Crime and Corrections in 2001. Congregational prayer, referred to as Salat al-Jama’ah, is highly valued among Muslims and is thought to be more spiritually enriching than solo prayer.

    In Xinjiang, namāz is a matter of concern for managing prisoners serving their sentences for endangering state security. A 2008 policy document examining the challenges faced by Xinjiang prison authorities states that these prisoners not only distort the history of Xinjiang, spread rumors, and incite ethnic hatred, but they also “use acts such as hunger strikes, suicide, namāz and feigned illness to disobey management and refuse reform.”

    Existing laws and regulations, however, have not clearly explained the criminal liabilities for performing namāz in prison. The crime of “sabotaging prison supervision,” defined in Article 315 of the Criminal Law, makes no mention of namāz or any other forms religious activity. It only stipulates that the following acts fall under the crime’s purview: (1) beating supervising personnel; (2) organizing other people under detention to sabotage supervision order; (3) assembling a crowd to make trouble, thereby disturbing normal supervision order; (4) beating, carrying out corporal punishment on or instigating other people to beat, carry out corporal punishment on other people under detention.

    It is not immediately clear whether performing namāz fulfills the criteria of stipulation 2 as stated above. Assuming it does, Ismayil’s case might suggest that the three instances of namāz he performed on January 25, February 17, and March 3 of 2018 were already sufficient to reach the threshold for the maximum prison sentence of three years.

    Read Part II.

  • Punishing Namāz Prayer in Prison, Part I: “Sabotaging Prison Supervision”

    Punishing Namāz Prayer in Prison, Part I: “Sabotaging Prison Supervision”

    A clock hanging in a Turkish mosque showing Muslim prayer times. Image credit: LooiNL 

    Muslims around the world are obliged to perform five daily prayers at dawn, midday, afternoon, sunset, and night. The ritual, commonly known as salah, is often called namazi (CN: 乃玛孜) in China, a Persian transliteration of namāz. Within China’s carceral system, all forms of religious worship, including namāz, are forbidden. Prisoners who covertly perform namāz are at risk of receiving harsh punishment, with the most serious penalty being a sentence extension. 

    This risk is well demonstrated in the case of Ismayil Sidiq. In May 2021, the BBC reported that the now-57-year-old Uyghur farmer was serving a 10-year prison sentence for “promoting extremism” in Kuitun Prison in the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps when he had his sentence doubled after he “used a disguised and simplified method to perform namāz in the prison dormitory.” On May 29, 2018, the Kuitun Reclamation Area People’s Court convicted him of “sabotaging prison supervision” and “provoking ethnic hatred,” and handed down an additional prison term of 13 years. Ismayil has 16 more years to serve before completing his sentence on May 28, 2038. He will be 74 years old. 

    The four-page judgment gave a detailed account of what happened in Kuitun Prison. First searchable on China Judgements Online, the judgment is among the tens of thousands of sensitive cases taken offline in mid-2021. The judgment has since been archived and translated into English by the Xinjiang Victims Database. 

    A translation of the judgment against Ismayil. Image credit: Xinjiang Victims Database Twitter account 

    According to the judgment, Ismayil performed namāz on three occasions in the prison dormitory in early 2018. The first two took place on January 25 and February 17 after he realized that the time displayed on the television was the time for his final daily namāz. On March 3, on the pretext of needing to urinate, he secretly performed wudu, the washing ritual that Muslims perform before praying. After being discovered and stopped by his Uyghur cellmates, he became outraged and shouted at them asking, “Are you Uyghurs? Do Uyghurs enjoy reporting other Uyghurs like this?” 

    The court found clear and sufficient evidence of Ismayil sabotaging prison supervision because he “repeatedly engaged in covert religious activities in prison.” This crime alone afforded him a prison sentence of three years – the maximum penalty stipulated in Article 315 of the Criminal Law. Furthermore, he was found guilty of “provoking ethnic hatred” because the remarks he made to other Uyghur cellmates “sowed discord among the ethnic groups and created ethnic antagonism.” This crime also landed him the maximum prison sentence of 10 years as stipulated by Article 249. 

    An excerpt taken from academic journal Crime and Corrections reveals that namāz is among the religious activities explicitly banned in prisons and re-education-through-labor facilities through Xinjiang. Image credit: Crime and Corrections, (2001) Issue 4 

    While prisoners are allowed to retain their religious faith, prison authorities across China proscribe all forms of religious activities but allow prisoners to read religious books or silently chant scriptures. Article 2 of a provisional regulation issued by the Xinjiang Department of Justice explicitly prohibits all forms of religious activity such as participating in Ramadan, namāz, other forms of worship, or sermons in prisons and reeducation-through-labor facilities. However, many Muslim detainees and prisoners defied this prison rule and “shared a propensity to organize gangs when they perform namāz in groups,” according to an article published in Crime and Corrections in 2001. Congregational prayer, referred to as Salat al-Jama’ah, is highly valued among Muslims and is thought to be more spiritually enriching than solo prayer.  

    In Xinjiang, namāz is a matter of concern for managing prisoners serving their sentences for endangering state security. A 2008 policy document examining the challenges faced by Xinjiang prison authorities states that these prisoners not only distort the history of Xinjiang, spread rumors, and incite ethnic hatred, but they also “use acts such as hunger strikes, suicide, namāz and feigned illness to disobey management and refuse reform.” 

    Existing laws and regulations, however, have not clearly explained the criminal liabilities for performing namāz in prison. The crime of “sabotaging prison supervision,” defined in Article 315 of the Criminal Law, makes no mention of namāz or any other forms religious activity. It only stipulates that the following acts fall under the crime’s purview: (1) beating supervising personnel; (2) organizing other people under detention to sabotage supervision order; (3) assembling a crowd to make trouble, thereby disturbing normal supervision order; (4) beating, carrying out corporal punishment on or instigating other people to beat, carry out corporal punishment on other people under detention. 

    It is not immediately clear whether performing namāz fulfills the criteria of stipulation 2 as stated above. Assuming it does, Ismayil’s case might suggest that the three instances of namāz he performed on January 25, February 17, and March 3 of 2018 were already sufficient to reach the threshold for the maximum prison sentence of three years.  

    Read Part II.

  • Rare Sentence Reduction for Falun Gong Follower

    Rare Sentence Reduction for Falun Gong Follower

    Shaoguan Intermediate People’s Court, which granted Yu a seven-month sentence reduction. Image credit: Baidu Maps
    Acts of clemency for Chinese religious and political prisoners have become increasingly rare in recent years. This decrease is the result of Xi Jinping’s hardline approach to both dissent and unorthodox religions, coupled with a sharp drop in judicial transparency. An exception took place in the summer of 2022 when Yu Rongxin (余荣新), a long-time Falun Gong practitioner in Guangdong, was granted a seven-month sentence reduction by the Shaoguan Intermediate People’s Court in June.
    Yu, born 1972, and wife Xie Qing (谢清), born 1966, were both residents of Jiangmen, Guangdong Province, and Falun Gong practitioners. Their case was highlighted on the Guangdong Province Anti-Cult website as a homepage news item in April 2019.
    The couple were summoned by police on September 18, 2017 and detained the next day for violating Article 300 of the Criminal Law, “organizing or using a cult to undermine implementation of the law.” They were subsequently arrested on October 26 of the same year.
    The Yuan bills with propaganda messages. Image credit: sohu.com
    The anti-cult website reported that Yu and Xie were both long-time Falun Gong practitioners, starting in 1993 and 1997, respectively. Yu was the Falun Gong guidance counselor for the Jiangmen branch during the mid-1990s. For this, he received administrative punishment in 1999.
    The couple’s 2017 legal ordeal started when police searched their residence and found numerous materials with Falun Gong messages. Those included: 3,834 Yuan bills printed with propaganda messages, 425 copies of pamphlets, 68 optical discs, two USB flash drives, two SD cards, one each of an MP3 player and MP4 player pre-loaded with Falun Gong content, and computers and printers.
    According to Falun Gong media, the couple was first tried by the Jiangmen Pengjiang District Court. On December 28, 2018, Yu was sentenced to eight and a half years and Xie to seven and a half years. Both appealed.
    The anti-cult website reported that on March 12, 2019, the Jiangmen Intermediate Court rejected their appeals and upheld the original sentences. The court found that the couple had been spreading cult messages by spending the message-laden Yuan while shopping as well as gathering others to practice Falun Gong. The court deemed those offenses to be “extremely severe.”
     
    Yu, according to the Falun Gong media, was sent to the Beijiang Prison in Shaoguang City; while Xie was sent to the Provincial Women’s Prison. 
    Beijiang Prison. Image credit: Southern Metropolis Daily

    Dui Hua has raised the two names in recent years, pressing for updates.

    According to sources, Yu has behaved well in prison. He and his wife exchanged letters of encouragement with each other. The Beijiang prison looked upon those exchanges favorably and submitted a sentence reduction request for Yu. The women’s prison apparently did not submit a request for a sentence reduction for Xie. Yu will be released in August 2025, while Xie will be released in March 2025.
    Dui Hua’s research into Shaoguan Intermediate Court’s sentence reduction and parole decisions released in 2021 and 2022 revealed that clemency granted to “cult” practitioners is uncommon. There were more sentence reduction approvals for prisoners who committed drug-related crimes and violent crimes than there were for “cult” prisoners, even though those offenses were mostly non-violent. When approvals were given, the courts granted shorter periods of reduction than those recommended by the prisons.