Tag: religion or cult

  • Medical Parole for Li Baocheng: Increasing Judicial Transparency

    Prayers at an underground home church in Beijing. Image Credit: BBC.

    Li Baocheng (李保成), a 79-year-old Christian Church leader from the central province of Henan, is finally being considered for medical parole after receiving a four-year sentence for fraud and “inciting subversion” in December 2015.

    As Dui Hua first reported a year ago, authorities in the city of Nanyang accused Li Baocheng of illicitly collecting “baptism fees” from members of his Huangjinduo Christian Church and organizing a political party aimed at overthrowing the Chinese Communist Party. While awaiting the results of his appeal, Li suffered a brain hemorrhage that left him seriously impaired. Recently published court documents show that judicial authorities have begun deliberating whether Li should serve the remainder of his sentence at home under conditions of medical parole.

    About Li Baocheng

    Li served two earlier prison sentences, one in the 1970s for “counterrevolution” and again in the 1980s for “disturbing social order.” Nonetheless, he went on to become a successful entrepreneur, winning official praise for providing material support in 1987 to Chinese troops at the Sino-Vietnam border.

    Something evidently changed in recent years. Li and four fellow members of his Christian church were taken into custody in April 2015. Their arrest took place just after they led a demonstration of over 200 church members on the streets of Nanzhao County. Demonstrators chanted slogans against the police and judiciary and called for an end to “American imperialism.” Investigators tied the protests to attempts by Li and others to form a new political party that would replace the Chinese Communist Party, which Li allegedly predicted was on its way to “self-destruction.”

    In December 2015, after receiving a four-year sentence followed by two years of deprivation of political rights from the Nanyang Intermediate People’s Court, Li and his defense counsel filed an appeal to the Henan Higher People’s Court. But before the higher court could issue its ruling, Li suffered a cerebral hemorrhage and was transferred from the county detention center to a hospital. In August 2016, after Li’s appeal was rejected, his lawyer filed an application for medical parole with the Nanyang Intermediate Court.

    For reasons that are not immediately clear, Li’s application was reviewed by the court’s juvenile tribunal. Li underwent a court-ordered medical examination in December 2016, which confirmed that he was suffering from the after-effects of an intracerebral hemorrhage (including paralysis on the right side of his body). Li was also diagnosed with dangerously high blood pressure. A court-appointed medical forensics expert submitted an affidavit certifying that Li’s condition was serious enough to qualify him for medical parole in accordance with legal provisions. The reviewing tribunal agreed and filed the case with the court’s adjudication review tribunal at the end of February 2017. At the time the case was filed, Li Baocheng was recuperating at home.

    Medical Parole

    Under the current regulations governing the granting of medical release, parole and other non-custodial enforcement mechanisms, the body responsible for reviewing the request must first post details of the case online for a period of ‘public comment.’ For this purpose, courts use a central online platform hosted by the Supreme People’s Court, which is also used as a space to announce sentence reduction and parole decisions. In Li Baocheng’s case, the period of public review concluded on or about March 15.

    It’s unclear when the court will issue its decision. Provincial rules stipulate a series of additional review steps before a final decision on medical parole can be made. Once the adjudication review tribunal makes its preliminary decision, it submits the case to the court’s adjudication committee for discussion and then to a division of the court at the next administrative level for review (in this case, the Henan Higher People’s Court).

    Assuming that Li Baocheng’s application for medical parole is successful, he will then become the responsibility of the local community corrections unit. Every three months, Li’s health will be monitored to determine whether his condition still qualifies for medical parole. (Typically, release on medical parole is subject to review by the court adjudication committee every six months to assess whether the parolee still qualifies.) All expenses related to medical treatment and care will be Li’s responsibility.

    Li’s four-year sentence is due to expire on April 15, 2019.

    Greater Transparency?

    The procedures surrounding sentence reduction and parole (including medical parole) have tightened considerably in recent years. The process has become more elaborate, with a number of review stages introduced at different administrative levels. In addition, there is an active effort to increase transparency through the use of the Internet and public comment periods. Both these steps have been taken in the interest of reducing the impact of corruption on judicial decision-making and reversing the perception among many in the public that individuals with wealth and power can manipulate the system in their favor.

    Increased disclosure of documents related to prosecution and adjudication along with the wider release of information related to sentence reductions and parole proceedings are examples of how China’s judicial system is gradually becoming more transparent. In the process, the increased transparency helps shed light on a criminal justice system that is still quite opaque—particularly where sensitive crimes such as those falling under the category of “endangering state security” are concerned.

  • Will a New Judicial Interpretation on Cults Lead to Greater Leniency?

    Underground church goers watch a service on a video screen in Beijing. Image Credit: Express UK.

    Since coming into force in October 1997, Article 300 of the Criminal Law “organizing/using a cult to undermine implementation of the law” has been frequently used to suppress groups such as Falun Gong, unofficial Christian groups, Buddhist sects, and over a dozen qigong groups including Zhonggong. Accompanying this law, two judicial interpretations were jointly issued by the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate on October 1999 and June 2001, respectively, to explain the law’s specific application. Effective since February 1, 2017, the latest joint interpretation of Article 300, consisting of sixteen articles, adds a new penalty range based on leniency and serves to redefine the sentencing standard.

    New Sentencing Standard

    The new interpretation incorporates previous changes made to the ninth amendment of the Criminal Law in November 2015 concerning the standard of punishments for cult crimes. Of significance is the elaboration of what is meant by “relatively minor circumstances” that can result in a sentence of three years or less, detention, surveillance, deprivation of political rights, fines, or combined penalties with fines. Such “circumstances” are defined in the interpretation as acts that inflict lighter social harm, which are measured by quantifiable factors such as: the number of cult propaganda materials produced and disseminated, the number of views or downloads of a cult propaganda video, the amount of economic loss caused by cult activity, or the number of members recruited by the cult. An act is considered relatively minor when such an amount or number falls below one-fifth of what is accepted as the new normal standard (see below).

    In the future, we can expect to see more cult offenses deemed as “relatively minor” cases, partly because by raising the benchmark for evidence necessary to imprison cult prisoners for up to three to seven years, the new interpretation has expanded the scope of activities that fall under the category of “minor” cases. For instance, the quantity of print propaganda materials (such as leaflets, banners or newspapers) produced or disseminated for cult purposes that constitute a normal offense has now been raised to 1,000, a significant leap from 300, as stated in the 2001 interpretation. For propaganda in the form of books or publications, the quantity for a normal offence requires evidence of at least 250 materials, again a significant leap from the previous count of 100 publication materials. The interpretation also quantifies a number of additional criminal behavior used to determine sentencing.

    List of criminal behaviors revised in Article 2 of the interpretation:

    • Recruiting over 50 members;
    • Swindling or leading to an economic loss of over one million yuan;
    • Using at least 500 banknotes as a means to disseminate information about a cult;
    • Manufacturing or disseminating cult propaganda over a certain amount:
      • over 1,000 leaflets, spray paints, pictures, banners and newspapers;
      • over 250 copies of books or publications, cassettes or audio-videotapes; or logos or signs;
      • over 100 CD-ROMs, U-disks, memory cards, mobile hard drivers or other mobile storage devices;
      • over 50 banners.
    • Using the Internet to disseminate information about a cult:
      • manufacturing or disseminating over 200 digital pictures or articles, over 50 copies of e-books, publications, audios or videos, electronic files with over five million characters, or electronic files exceeding 250 minutes;
      • composing or making over 1,000 messages or phone calls;
      • using online chatrooms, chat groups, WeChat, microblogs or other social networking services to spread information about a cult involving over 1,000 members or followers;
      • cult messages with over 5,000 views or clicks.

    A circumstance is considered “especially grave” when the quantity is five times more than the numbers stated above, and can lead to imprisonment of seven years or more. Although the ninth amendment to the Criminal Law increased the maximum sentence from 15 years to life, it has not been imposed for the single offense of Article 300. For example, while the Buddhist leader Wu Zeheng (吴泽衡) received a life sentence for charges of fraud and rape, his crime related to cult activity afforded him a sentence of 12 years.

    Greater Leniency Despite a Surge in Cult Cases

    Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database has collected information on over 8,000 individuals convicted of Article 300 of the Criminal Law between 2000-2016. Most convictions in the early years after Falun Gong was labelled an “evil cult” in 1999 are now considered “particularly serious circumstances” under the new interpretation. During that time, a number of high-profile leaders such as Wang Zhiwen (王治文) and Li Chang (李昌) were given lengthy sentences of over 10 years for multiple offenses.

    Image Credit: Dui Hua Foundation.

    Since December 2012, the total number of cult convictions recorded in the database has surged as a result of the nationwide clampdown on the group the Almighty God, and an improved level of judicial transparency due to the more regular online posting of court judgments. Nonetheless, the appearance of a new religious threat does not appear to be met with the same intensity compared to the Falun Gong crackdown of the early 2000s. Most convictions of Almighty God members resulted in sentences of three to four years’ imprisonment, and fewer than 10 percent of all cult sentences in the same period exceeded seven years. Also noteworthy is the surge of cases now considered relatively minor with sentences of three years or less. In 2016, over half of the convictions for cult activity are now considered relatively minor cases according to the new interpretation, superseding the number of ordinary cult cases for the first time since the offense was codified in the Criminal Law.

    Leniency in the form of shorter sentences is a further indication of an overall relaxation of the clampdown on cults. Article 9 of the interpretation states that:

    “a perpetrator can be exempt from indictment or criminal punishment if he or she expresses sincere remorse about his wrongdoing, and exhibits a willingness to leave the cult and cease joining in its activities. Those who are deceived or intimidated into joining the cult will not be handled as criminals.”

    Showing remorse is a prerequisite for prisoners seeking clemency, and it is not uncommon for prisoners charged with cult crimes to receive sentence reductions after expressing remorse for their behavior. Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database recorded over 300 instances of clemency in 2014 for cult prisoners and in 2015, the number surged to nearly 500.

    Deprivation of Political Rights

    Despite the trend towards greater leniency in sentence reductions, public security authorities also appear ready to continue exercising control over cult prisoners even after they have completed their sentences. Article 14 of the interpretation states that a supplemental sentence of “deprivation of political rights” (DPR) up to five years may be imposed on cult prisoners. Prior to the interpretation, only prisoners sentenced for the crime of “endangering state security” and a number of violent crimes were subject to a supplemental DPR sentence, depriving them of the right to vote, the right to stand for office and the right to hold a position in a state-owned company, regardless of the fact their sentences had already been completed. Of particular concern to cult prisoners is that individuals under DPR are prohibited from writing articles or giving interviews.

    Dui Hua will closely monitor the application and impact of this new interpretation for cult prisoners. The new sentencing standards suggest an expansion of crimes considered “minor” and hopefully a reduction of cult prisoners serving long sentences. That said, the enhancement of the use of DPR may present new opportunities for public security authorities to exert control over cult members even after their release.

  • Converting Cult Work: From 610 to Social Service

    Set up by the Gulou District 610 Office in 2009, the Loving Heart Home is a local experiment by Chen Dongxiao and his colleagues to try to raise the reentry rate for detained cult members. Photo credit: An Shu

    For more than 15 years, Chinese politico-legal authorities have carried out a wide-ranging campaign against so-called cult organizations that has been coordinated via a network of dedicated units known as “610” (read “six ten”) offices. (These offices are named after the date of the order that founded them: June 10, 1999.) Although the effort to wipe out organizations like Falun Gong or the Almighty God sect has, from time to time, featured prominently in Chinese news coverage, much less has been written about the anti-cult offices or the often-controversial measures they employ.

    That changed recently with a long feature published in the September 25, 2014, edition of Southern Weekly. The piece focuses on one particular 610 office in an urban district of Nanjing and the innovations its director, Cheng Dongxiao, has introduced to try to make the work of “converting” (or “de-programming”) cult members more effective and less coercive.

    Cheng’s main innovation is the establishment of a center in which “model converts” are responsible for helping to convert exisitng cult members. Mirroring trends in other areas of law enforcement and “comprehensive social management,” this is an example of how China might use a community corrections approach to deal with social problems that in the past have relied on detention measures like reeducation through labor (RTL) or legal education classes. Now that RTL has been eliminated and legal education has come under increased scrutiny for, among other things, its murky legal basis, new approaches like Cheng’s may gain some traction with reformers.

    As Cheng himself admits, even if less coercive measures are adopted, there is still an urgent need for clearer legislation to govern the practices associated with anti-cult “conversions,” particularly insofar as these practices involve deprivation of liberty. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the article pays no attention to the more fundamental question of whether China’s efforts to eliminate “cults” is justifiable from a human rights standpoint. This standpoint demands that freedoms of opinion be given due consideration in dealing with whatever harmful social consequences these organizations and their members may cause.

    As significant as the publication of this unusual article is, it is equally significant to note that it was removed from the Southern Weekly website soon after publication. The reason is not particularly obvious, though there are a number of possibilities. Perhaps this rare look behind the scenes of one of China’s most secretive institutions was simply too daring. Perhaps the softer community-based approach of the Loving Heart Home is considered discordant with recent efforts to strike hard against Almighty God. Perhaps Cheng Dongxiao’s candid assessment of an inconsistent anti-cult system or the article’s description of what takes place in anti-cult “study sessions” was deemed unfit for public consumption.

    Another possibility is that the article was pulled because there is, at present, insufficient consensus among the relevant authorities about the merits of Cheng’s approach to combatting organizations classified as cults. There may exist other competing community-corrections approaches or even more far-ranging proposals that would limit the state’s role in dealing with this issue altogether. Thanks to the story’s deletion, we are left to wonder not only where China’s anti-cult campaign might be headed but how much, if any, further sunlight will be allowed to shine on the issue.

    *
    In Conversion of “Cult Members,” “610” Goes from Secretive to Open

    Southern Weekly, 25 September 2014

    After five years, conversion work has begun to pay off at the Loving Heart Home, as attested by the award banners sent by many of the “cult members” who have graduated from its study classes. Photo credit: Liu Yanxun
    Past: Preaching the law had little effect. When they left the study sessions, they hadn’t changed deep down and remained cult members.
    Later: “Putting cult teachings in context and using cult teachings to undermine cult teachings.” For example, finding weak points and flaws in specific cult scripture and using them as evidence. This collapses a follower’s “sacred beliefs” and achieves double the results with half the effort.
    Present: Establish the Loving Heart Home and focus on the “reentry rate.” Implement “self-education and self-management.” It’s like a doctor treating a patient, a teacher treating a student, and a parent treating a child.
    Future: Conversion needs to be more public, brought out into the community, and turned into a public interest, and the 610 offices need to gradually recede into the background.

    It was raining with low hanging clouds in Nanjing on September 23, 2014. The radio said a typhoon was skirting the region.

    Cheng Dongxiao sat in a government office building just a few kilometers from the Yangtze River, his face sunny and full of laughter. Average in height, he spoke rhythmically and rather quickly. Cheng is the director of the 610 Office in Nanjing’s Gulou District. To the outside world, this is an extremely mysterious unit, the full name of which is the Gulou District Office for Prevention and Handling of Cult Problems.

    Cheng Dongxiao has been working to convert cult members for 15 years. Since 2009, he has been trying to find more effective conversion methods. The “Loving Heart Home,” which has been running for the past five years, is a product of that effort. “There are very few other countries in the world that have a huge, top-to-bottom anti-cult organizational system like we do,” he notes. “But the actual results from these years have demonstrated that severe anti-cult measures have not only failed to turn the problem around, they have actually made it even more serious.”

    “The fight against cults is, in the end, only a contradiction among the people,” Cheng Dongxiao says. “It’s nothing to be ashamed of and ought to be carried out with great fanfare!”

    “I’m Most Opposed to Coercive Methods”

    Cheng Dongxiao looks back fondly to the past: “Chairman Mao’s ideology is our most outstanding, most valuable possession.” But after more than 30 years of reform and opening, the emphasis on economic development has led to a kind of ideological slackening, he says. This, he feels, is unfortunate.

    “When I was first transferred here from the district’s bureau of industry, I didn’t understand at all,” he recalled. “Later, I slowly came to understand the difficult lives these people have experienced.” He said that even though some of them had enjoyed a good life materially, there was something lacking in their spiritual life. Perhaps they encountered some misery or sorrow in their lives and wanted to find a kind of spiritual support.

    On June 10, 1999, China set up a hierarchical system of anti-cult prevention organizations, which became commonly known as “610” offices.

    At that time, Nanjing was one of the areas hardest hit by the cult problem nationwide, and Gulou, Xiaguan, and Xuanwu districts were the areas of Nanjing most affected. There were large numbers of cult members living in these three districts, including many at high levels within cult organizations and many who created disturbances and spread rumors. The first cult organization to appear in Jiangsu originated in Xiaguan District. At that time, a total of eight cult members were coalesced around a university lecturer.

    For the first two years, Cheng Dongxiao says, “all we did was [detain people], and the RTL camps and similar places were all full.”

    Besides detention centers and RTL camps, another place for reforming cult members goes by the name of “study class.” With sessions in the spring and fall, each session of 10–20 people lasts for three months. Responsibility for attending to the students goes to government personnel, as well as laid-off workers who receive 100 yuan per day. Cheng says that before each class begins, “We advise these attendants to remain vigilant and take shifts irregularly.”

    Cult members sent to study classes stay in standard rooms with a toilet, similar to those found in guesthouses. If a cult member becomes over-excited or unruly, the number of attendants will immediately be increased. “To date,” [notes Cheng Dongxiao,] “there have been no homicides, generally only self-harm.” So [they need attendants with them] “24 hours a day, eating with them, living with them, watching television with them.”

    During the daytime, cult members attend classes in their rooms, with one or several instructors for each person. “To make a somewhat inapt comparison,” [Cheng Dongxiao says,] “it feels a bit like a graduate student meeting with his or her advisor.” Sometimes, they may go to a dedicated counseling room, with two instructors generally responsible for counseling as a team. These days, some locations also hold “lecture classes,” but only to deal with issues common to all cult members. Individual problems are harder to resolve, and “individual problems are more pronounced in cult members.”

    Cheng Dongxiao admits that they had little success at first trying to preach law to the cult members. Many former cult members who already been converted told Southern Weekly that merely being locked up and preached to about the law had little effect on them. Li He recalls that she wasn’t the least bit afraid back then: “Group solidarity ran high among us inside the RTL camp. We sang songs and recited our scripture, the sound reverberating in waves so much that we really raised the roof.”

    Generally, the study classes last three months, which can be adjusted according to each individual’s circumstances and consideration of whether they have fully converted and can successfully leave the study class. To date, there is in fact no clear set of quantitative indicators [used to make such determinations].

    For many years, the experience has involved the “three statements and five documents.” The “three statements” refer to the “statement of guarantee, statement of repentance, and statement of severed ties.” The “five documents” require the individual to write clearly on these five subjects: “how I got involved in cult activities in the past,” “past and current views on cults,” “why cults are a danger to society,” “in what ways cults have endangered me,” and “how I have endangered society.”

    Do some people fake it? It’s possible. One reason is “our instructors can’t actually teach.” Some cult members write their three statements and five documents, leave the study class, and go home. But they have not truly changed. They’re still cult members and still believe in those old cult ideas. Some even become more committed to the cult.

    “What I’m most opposed to are coercive methods,” says Cheng Dongxiao.

    Cheng picked up a stack of documents from the table, saying they were quantitative indicators proposed by a group of experts who had recently come up from Xiamen. He said they were currently working on a project to develop a comprehensive assessment form to measure cult-member conversion. The hope was that this would be more scientific and systematic than the artificial and subjective “three statements and five documents” and better at evaluating whether a cult member has truly transformed their thinking and beliefs.

    “It’s Hard to Change Beliefs or Souls”

    Cheng Dongxiao and his colleagues began looking for more effective methods in 2002, including “putting cult teachings in context” and “using cult teachings to undermine cult teachings.”

    “Besides the law, you also have to start from cult doctrines and scriptures,” [Cheng says]. The bookshelves in his office are completely filled with cult literature. “If I want to destroy the cults, I have to understand cult scripture and doctrine better than the cult members themselves, then compare it to orthodox Buddhism or scientific theories and look for weak points and flaws.”

    “I’ve read these several dozen times,” Cheng says. “I’m constantly going back to check things. We can’t neglect any areas.”

    When trying to undermine cult teachings, one ordinarily might seize upon some bad aspect of the cult leader. “On the surface, he’s telling you how to be a good person, but in fact he’s leading you toward a more self-centered, autocratic, and lawless realm in which you separate yourself from the government and society.” Then, you look for weak points in specific scriptural passages to back up your point. This is the way you collapse a follower’s “sacred beliefs” and get double the results with half of the effort.

    But it’s hard to avoid unexpected situations, and Cheng Dongxiao and his colleagues have their own methods for responding to such things. For example, one day when he is trying to break a cult member, he might forget a passage of scripture or get stumped. “I’ll just switch the subject to something else,” he said. “But I’ll remember to go back to that issue and immediately go look it up. You have to understand everything.”

    “It’s hard to change people’s beliefs or their souls,” admits Cheng Dongxiao. “Closed classes are what we’ve found to work the best.” To this date, they’re still in use.

    When they first started the study classes, many government officials looked down on cult members. But once they were sent to classes, these cult members would begin talking non-stop and even tried to “turn” some of the personnel assigned to them. Some of the cult members were intellectuals and could quote from the classics. “Occasionally, we couldn’t out-talk them,” Cheng laughs, “so they forced us to study.”

    As for those cult scriptures and theoretical books, Cheng says: “Once you feel it’s necessary to read these things to do your work, reading them won’t be too much of a headache.” But some personnel found it very difficult. “Once I had a deputy who said he really couldn’t keep reading—every time he tried, he’d doze off,” [recalls Cheng]. “I told him he wasn’t suited for this kind of work and was better off working for the neighborhood committee. Soon afterwards, he was transferred there.”

    “There’s not a lot of novelty in this kind of work,” says Cheng Dongxiao. “It’s not like you reporters, who get a new subject to work on every day. For us, it’s repetitive.”

    “Consolidated Reentry, Coordinated Education”

    The Loving Heart Home and the Care and Concern Association are both located in the same courtyard. There, 55 volunteers work hard together with Cheng Dongxiao to convert “cult members.” Photo credit: An Shu

    Once they leave the study classes, many cult members have nothing to do. They’re basically all theists who see gods and ghosts behind everything. If they get sick or have some complications in their lives, they will turn again to the cult. “It’s easy to relapse,” admits Cheng. The relapse rate among cult members is quite high, basically the same as with drug addicts at 70 to 80 percent.

    Some start reading books on Buddhism or Christianity. Sometimes they’ll get some of their former classmates to read along with them and discuss the books. But if they gather together for too long, outsiders will start to get nervous and report them. Then the neighborhood committee and police come to prevent them from meeting. This leads these former cult members to fall into a new trap of emptiness and depression.

    Cheng Dongxiao and his colleagues thought there had to be a better way than simply dispersing them. As the saying goes, “Damming the flow is not as good as dredging a new channel.” So, they planned to find a place where they could let former cult members openly and freely gather to chat. In the end, that’s why they set up the “Loving Heart Home,” a place inseparable from Zhang Jing’s research project.

    Zhang Jing was one of those “classic cases.” Zhang, 58, is a researcher in sociology at the local academy of social sciences. Around 2000, she lost herself in a cult. Like many other cult members, she went to Beijing to petition and was sent to RTL and study classes. Finally, under Cheng Dongxiao’s efforts to “undermine cult teachings with cult teachings,” she was successfully converted in 2002. After leaving the study class, she made cults the subject of her own research. In 2007, she received support from the Jiangsu 610 Office and the provincial academy of social science to work on a project titled “Present Situation and Countermeasures for Education and Conversion of Cult Members in Jiangsu.”

    Using the methods of sociology, she launched a study of 13 counties and cities in the province, ultimately producing a 50,000-character report of statistics and analysis and identifying several issues. Zhang Jing told Southern Weekly how government officials at all levels use follow-up strategies in which three or four officials take responsibility for individuals who complete study classes and, during major holidays or sensitive periods, go to their homes to follow up or “check in.” These methods make people who have already been “converted” feel uncomfortable. Zhang Jing describes these tactics as “pressure follow-ups” and “charitable check-ins.”

    Besides this, another clear problem is the way that units at all levels pay attention only to the “conversion rate” when it comes to cult members, “which is just like paying attention only to GDP figures in thinking about economic development.” This leads to false reporting and exaggeration of success. Zhang Jing suggests that instead of the “conversion rate,” we should be considering the “reentry rate” which would give a truer measure of effectiveness.

    The “Loving Heart Home,” set up by the Gulou District 610 Office in 2009, is a local experiment by Chen Dongxiao and his colleagues to try to raise the “reentry rate.”

    The Loving Heart Home is located in an abandoned school in Xiaguan District. Passing an alleyway piled high with discarded junk and stepping through a set of large metal double doors, you enter this spacious area, quiet and filled with tall, luxuriant parasol trees.

    Cheng Dongxiao says, “We’re like a doctor treating a patient, a teacher treating a student, a parent treating a child.”

    “Enrich Their Minds So They Won’t Go Back to the Cult”

    When the Loving Heart Home was first set up, Cheng Dongxiao and his colleagues still had their doubts.

    To that point, throughout the country the conversion of cult members had always taken place in closed classes, because the thinking was it was better to keep people separate rather than gather them together. But at the Loving Heart Home, they were actually all gathered together. At the time, some senior officials worried: “What if they repeatedly collude with each other and revolt en masse? What then?”

    Cheng Dongxiao firmly insisted that this would not happen. His confidence came from the “troops under his control,” a group of 22 former cult members whom he had successfully converted.

    “When I started running study classes and converting people in 2002,” [says Cheng,] “these people gradually joined me and started to help.” Back then, they were not called volunteers; instead, they were considered “model converts.”

    “The idea was to have them use their own experiences to illustrate the law,” says Cheng. “You needed to treat them like friends. Most of them were older then me, so I addressed them as ‘Big Sister.’”

    The Loving Heart Home practices “self-education and self-management.” Among the volunteers, a group of seven to nine forms an organization committee responsible for routine daily matters. “General matters are decided on their own, following discussion by the organization committee, while for important matters, they seek guidiance from the relevant government agencies.” Every Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday, a certain number of volunteers remain on duty. Each year, there is a meeting of volunteers and every two to three years there is an election of a new organization committee and revision of the Loving Heart Home charter.

    Li Zhonglan chairs the organization committee. Slightly plump, Li fell into a cult back in 1995 and once was a major figure in the local Nanjing cult organization who traveled widely “propagating the teachings.” When China outlawed the cult in 1999, she had a complete breakdown. Li Zhonglan told Southern Weekly that it was not until 2002, after study classes and “using cult teachings to undermine cult teachings,” that she was finally converted. “Now, at the Loving Heart Home, I can help others to clear up their confusion and help myself as well,” she said.

    Besides the organization committee, ther are three others that Cheng Dongxiao has selected to be permanently stationed at the Loving Heart Home to serve as liaisons between the home and the 610 office. In Cheng Dongxiao’s words, they’re there to “pour some sand in the mix” [that is, to ensure a bit of variety –Trans.].

    Qiao Zhanyu is one of those three. He came to the Loving Heart Home after retiring as principal and party-committee secretary at a middle school. He told Southern Weekly that, back when he was still a principal, there was an art teacher at his school who became mixed up with a cult. He decided to “take charge of his own children” and had teachers at the school rotate in shifts every day, two attendants per shift, to help the teacher convert. It was this experience that made Qiao the most successful candidate for this current work. But he says, “This is harder than managing a school, you know. You can’t rely on issuing compulsory orders or administrative sanctions. You have to put on a kind face and make people see the light through reasoning with them.” He says when he first arrived at the Loving Heart Home, the volunteers there considered him to be a government “mole” or “spy” and they didn’t want to have anything to do with him. But after a while, “I treated people with sincerity and people began to respond to that. Now, they often don’t call me ‘Secretary Qiao,” but call me ‘Brother Qiao’ instead.”

    Often, Loving Heart Home will show movies and programs on traditional culture. “We generally choose sentimental movies, like the Taiwanese movie My Beloved or Jane Eyre,” says Cheng Dongxiao with a laugh. “The cult took them away from ordinary human emotions, so we want to strengthen their sense of ethical sentiment and sympathy.”

    Sometimes they invite experts on religon and Confucianism to give lectures. They also run a quarterly magazine called Spirit Station. Cheng says, “We want to enrich their minds so that they won’t return to the cult.”

    “610 Office Needs to Gradually Recede into the Background”

    All sorts of people become members of cults. There are former senior police officers, a head of a university organization department, civil servants from government departments, and others. At Loving Heart Home, people generally stay for around three months. Once they’re educated and stable, they don’t need to return. Of course, some of those former believers who have been stabilized apply to become volunteers and continue participating in activities at the home.

    To date, the number of volunteers at the Loving Heart Home has grown from 22 to 55. Some of them are not former cult members but university students or concerned members of the public who have come purely to volunteer.

    “Each year we recruit a little, but we don’t dare recruit too much,” says Cheng. “Those who want to be volunteers must be reliable.” Recently, their work has received recognition from senior levels of the national 610 office. At the recent Loving Heart Home fifth anniversary meeting, a central official came to attend. Some of the local officials in attendance were even moved to tears.

    Volunteers don’t receive much remuneration, Cheng says. “Actually, no one is here for money. They’re here to educate and rescue people.”

    “But the current situation remains as serious as ever,” says Cheng. “Besides Falun Gong, Almighty God has become a main force. It is based on Christian scriptures so those doing conversion work must study new material.” Currently, his colleagues and the volunteers need to read the Bible and Almighty God doctrine. “[As Sun Tzu said:] If you know yourself and your enemy, you can win the battle every time.”

    When Cheng Dongxiao says “the current situation remains serious,” he also means “the state needs to standardize its anti-cult work. Currently, each locality has its own way of doing things and it’s all messed up.”

    “For example personnel is complicated, in some places the 610 office operates independently, rather than as part of the local government like we do here,” [he explains]. “In some places, it falls under the politico-legal committee, in others it falls under the public security bureau, and in others still it falls under the domestic security protection unit.” Not long ago, the relevant state authorities gathered directors of local 610 offices for a conference. Cheng Dongxiao was one of them. He said very straightforwardly that China’s current anti-cult efforts need to be regulated through legislation that clarifies the screening criteria for cults and the responsibilities of the governing authorities. “For example,” he asks, “should the the National People’s Congress Standing Committee authorize the Ministry of Public Security to take responsibility?”

    There’s also the problem of funding. “Our anti-cult work in Gulou District is part of the government budget,” he explains. “But many locations lack funding. How can they carry out cult conversion work?” Cheng said the problem is especially serious in northeast China. Once, at a meeting, he shared a room with a prefecture-level 610 Office director from somewhere in the northeast. As they chatted, that director began complaining about how he only had four people working for him in a city where there were more than 60,000 cult members. “In Nanjing,” Cheng notes for comparison “we only have just over 4,000 cult members in the entire city.”

    “The bottom line is [that anti-cult work needs] to be more public, brought out into the community, and turned into a public interest,” [says Cheng.] “As the government pays for more social services, the 610 Office needs to gradually recede into the background.”

    (Li He, Zhang Jing, Li Zhonglan are all pseudonyms)

  • Zhonggong: The Subversive Business of Qigong

    Qigong practitioners “receiving energy (qi)” from a qigong master. During the 1980s and 90s, gatherings like this were popular in China. Image credit: Netease News 

    Qigong—involving mediation, breathing, and movement—is meant to heal, but according to Chinese authorities, it can also harm. The central government has banned 14 “harmful” qigong organizations not including the popularly known Falun Gong, which was outlawed as a “cult.”[1] Though distinctly branded, at least one lesser known qigong organization, Zhonggong, has experienced government suppression similar to that of Falun Gong.

    China’s qigong craze lasted from around 1978 to 1999. Qigong was popularized by the Communist Party as “somatic science” under the banner of the “Four Modernizations,” which included national defense, agriculture, industry, and science and technology. During the 1980s, the homegrown healing practice instilled confidence in Chinese ingenuity at a time when the country was still reeling from decades of internal upheaval.

    Zhonggong, also known as China Healthcare and Wisdom Enhancement Practice (中华养生智能功), was established by Zhang Hongbao (张宏堡) in 1987. Zhang gained popularity by publicly demonstrating his mystical healing powers, and at its peak, Zhonggong claimed to have 38 million members and 100,000 employees nationwide. Some scholars believe that, until about 1995, Zhonggong was more popular in China than Falun Gong.

    However, with qigong popularity, came high-level opposition. In April 1999, state-run media ran an article entitled “I Don’t Support Youth Practicing Qigong,” calling Falun Gong “superstitious” and “harmful.” In response, 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners surrounded Zhongnanhai and demanded an apology. Unwilling to make concessions to a group that threatened party loyalty through mass mobilization, the central government outlawed Falun Gong as a cult in July 1999. Zhonggong was branded a harmful qigong organization later that year and banned for defying leaders; spreading superstition; and engaging in criminal acts such as pyramid schemes, rapes, and murders.

    Shortly after the ban, Zhang Hongbao fled to Guam. China filed a request for his extradition, but the United States declined in accordance with the UN Convention Against Torture. Receiving protective resident status in 2001, Zhang faced a series of civil lawsuits and felony charges in the United States between 2003 and 2005. Some accusations, such as domestic violence, were related to his personal life, while others related to Zhonggong. By the time Zhang died in a car accident in July 2006, however, most of these cases had been withdrawn.

    With the exception of Zhang Hongbao, individual Zhonggong leaders have garnered little international attention. They are generally not viewed as victims of religious or political persecution. This is due in part to the fact that Zhonggong has historically been more commercial than Falun Gong, making it seem at times more akin to a business marketed on its health benefits than a spiritual organization. (Zhonggong members are more or less required to purchase practice sessions and publications to increase their group rank.) It is also important to note that, perhaps influenced by religious persecution during the Mao period and the celebration of somatic science that continued into the 1990s, many qigong practitioners, including Zhonggong adherents, do not identify as religious followers. Still, the focus on qigong’s “extraordinary powers” has led some western scholars to recognize Zhonggong as part of the “new religious movement”—the emergence in China of a number of non-mainstream religious sects after reform and opening began in 1978.

    While official Chinese media often claim that Zhonggong was banned to protect people from social harms (e.g., defiance, superstition, and criminal activity), the crackdown on the group, if not religious, is at least partly political. According to data in Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database, Zhonggong leaders are more likely than Falun Gong leaders to be convicted of endangering state security (ESS) crimes. The database includes information on two dozen Zhonggong leaders detained or sentenced since 1999.

    1999-2002: Early Suppression

    Within the first two years of its banning, Zhonggong saw 600 leaders detained nationwide, according to overseas media reports. Nearly a dozen were sentenced for inciting subversion, an ESS offense. ESS charges stemmed from the distribution of two critical letters about Jiang Zemin, then Chinese president, to thousands of police stations. Written pseudonymously by two people who claimed to be police officers, the letters stated that Jiang’s crackdown on Zhonggong resembled Mao Zedong’s lawlessness during the “Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns” and the Cultural Revolution. Police who received the letter were urged to defy Jiang’s order to arrest Zhonggong practitioners. As a result of the letter campaign, 11 Zhonggong leaders from Henan, Jiangsu, and Qinghai provinces were convicted of inciting subversion and sentenced to 1‒4 years in prison or reeducation through labor (RTL) between 2000 and 2001.

    Perhaps due to the fact that they caused less of a stir, Zhonggong leaders received shorter sentences than Falun Gong leaders in the first years after they were banned. The lengthiest sentence Dui Hua has recorded for a Zhonggong leader during this period is seven years’ imprisonment, handed down to Zhou Xinyang (周新扬) for tax evasion in Hunan. Several other leaders in Hubei, Chongqing, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Zhejiang were sentenced to 1‒3 years in prison or RTL for disturbing social order or illegal medical practice. A number of Falun Gong leaders who participated in the Zhongnanhai protests were sentenced to more than 10 years in prison on cult charges.

    In Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China, sociologist David Palmer argues that unlike Falun Gong, Zhonggong declined swiftly in the face of repression because its leaders were primarily motivated by money. Public security records in Sichuan also suggest that many Zhonggong members stopped holding practice sessions immediately after 1999.

    Some official records indicate, however, that Zhonggong’s influence remained. Dozens to hundreds of active practitioners continued to be found in counties in Anhui, Hebei, Henan, Shaanxi, and Xinjiang. Local governments launched a series of crackdowns on Zhonggong revivals known as the “first reorganization.” For example, in 2000, Sun Haixin (孙海欣) and Hu Wanping (胡皖平) were detained in Anhui for possessing more than 100 tons of Zhonggong books and audiovisual materials and “illegally raised funds” exceeding 4.7 million yuan. In 2002, Hu Suyan (胡素艳) and Ji Sujuan (纪淑娟) were said to have sold dozens of Zhonggong publications and antiseptic products in Gaocheng City, Anhui. Official sources do not mention whether these individuals were convicted of any crimes.

    Sentenced Zhonggong Leaders by Crime, 1999‒2001
    Name Location Sentence Facility
    Inciting Subversion
    Huang Wanping 黄万平Jiangsu4 yearsPrison
    Qin Zhaoyang 秦朝阳Jiangsu3 yearsPrison
    Zhai Xuehai 翟学海Jiangsu3 yearsPrison
    Dong Jielan 董佳兰Jiangsu2 yearsPrison
    Ju De 居德Henan2.5 yearsPrison
    Ye Yaonian 叶耀年Henan2.5 yearsPrison
    Rui Guojie 芮国杰Qinghai1 yearRTL
    Zhao Zegen 赵泽根Qinghai1 yearRTL
    Yang Weihu 杨卫虎Qinghai1 yearRTL
    Xiang Renbo 项仁波Qinghai1 yearRTL
    Chai Jinchun 柴景春Qinghai1 yearRTL
    Disturbing Social Order
    Cheng Yaqin 程亚琴Hebei2 yearsRTL
    Xi Dafang 席大芳Guangxi1 yearRTL
    Illegal Medical Practice
    Chen Jinlong 陈金龙Zhejiang2 yearsPrison
    Tax Evasion
    Zhou Xinyang 周新扬Hunan7 yearsPrison
    Unknown
    Li Xiaoning 李晓宁Chongqing3 yearsPrison
    Wang Xuemei 王雪梅Guangdong2 yearsPrison
    Yan Xiehe 严协和Guangxi3 yearsPrison

    Mid-2000s: “Second Activation”

    Zhonggong Founder Zhang Hongbao. Source: rbw.org.cn

    Around the mid-2000s, the term “second activation” began to appear in government sources to describe Zhonggong’s second revival, and local government records began labelling Zhonggong activities as “anti-China.” This development followed an increase in Zhang Hongbao’s political activism overseas. After taking up residence in the United States, Zhang claimed to have raised $2.7 million for China’s democracy movement. In 2003, he founded Zhonggong’s US headquarters and declared himself president of “China Shadow Government,” an opposition group in exile which advocated for political reform.

    Official yearbooks condemned activities involved in the second activation. In 2005, 20 “reactionary” slogans—“Let’s unite, reclaim our Zhonggong bases, and learn from the Falun Gong spirit”—were discovered in Baoji, Shaanxi. In 2006, Zhonggong leaders reportedly aligned with overseas hostile forces to establish an underground opposition party in Wushan County, Chongqing. That same year, four months after his death, Zhang was labeled by Tianjin’s Anti-cult Association—a non-profit, voluntary group whose members often have government backgrounds—as a traitor who used funding from hostile western forces to divide China.

    During this period, Zhonggong leaders faced harsher punishments than those reported from 1999 to 2001. Li Zhanling (李占领) was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment for inciting subversion in 2004. According to his defense lawyers, Li was appointed a leader during Zhonggong’s first and second reorganizations. He was in charge of organizing practice sessions and training leaders in Cangzhou, Hebei Province.

    In a separate case, an online verdict indicated that seven leaders detained in 2006 in Donggang City, Liaoning, were sentenced to 6‒15 years’ imprisonment in September 2008. Although Zhonggong is not officially classified as a cult, it is often targeted in anti-cult propaganda, and one of the defendants in the Donggang case, Gong Shaohong (宫绍洪), was convicted on cult charges. (The other six leaders in this case were sentenced for illegal business activities.)

    Prosecutors accused Gong of compiling and editing three banned books that “rejected atheism,” widely cited Zhang Hongbao’s theories, and “spread apocalyptical rumors.” Over 6,000 copies of these books were sold as teaching materials in 10 provinces, and the sales of all publications (including but not limited to the book) generated revenues exceeding 7 million yuan. Confessing to tax evasion and illegal business activity, Gong insisted that he was not involved in any cult activity. Nonetheless, he was convicted on all three charges and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment, the longest known sentence for a Zhonggong leader.

    After their release in 2011, some individuals involved in the Donggang case published online posts claiming that they were victims of forced confession. They said the charges were fabricated by a state security officer who confiscated and embezzled their book sale revenues. While admitting to practicing Zhonggong in the past, they claimed to have relinquished it soon after the national ban. They also stated in Gong Shaohong’s defense that his books aimed to cultivate love for the party and the nation.

    Sentenced Zhonggong Leaders by Crime, 2004‒2008
    Name Prison SentenceRelease Date
    Inciting Subversion
    Li Zhanling 李占领10 years2014
    Organizing a cult to undermine implementation of the law
    Gong Shaohong 宫绍洪 †15 yearsApr 5, 2021
    Illegal business activity
    Wang Shujuan 王淑娟6 yearsNov 30, 2011
    Yu Yongxiang 于永香6 yearsNov 30, 2011
    Yu Yongfang 于永芳 ‡8 yearsNov 25, 2014
    Xi Yong 刁勇5 yearsNov 25, 2011
    Gong Shaoying 宫绍英5 yearsNov 25, 2011
    Guo Zhenfeng 郭振凤Suspended—
    † Gong Shaohong was also convicted of illegal business activity and tax evasion.
    ‡ Yu Yongfang was also convicted of tax evasion.

    Post-2006: Lingering Influence

    Internal frictions arising from Zhang Hongbao’s death in 2006 are believed to have further weakened Zhonggong’s influence in China, but Zhonggong groups continue to operate. Local government records still mention crackdowns on Zhonggong alongside suppression of Falun Gong and banned Christian groups such as Almighty God.

    For example, in May 2010, two Zhonggong leaders from Hebei and Sichuan provinces were given admonitions for inviting nearly 500 practitioners from more than 10 provinces to join a secret gathering to celebrate the birthday of another Zhonggong master. A sentence for attempting “to illegally amass vast fortunes” was handed down to the man whose birthday was to be celebrated at a Buddhist temple in Wuxue City, Hubei.

    In January 2011, Ningxia’s government website expounded upon the “reactionary” nature of Zhonggong. It proclaimed that Zhonggong founder Zhang Hongbao had a hidden agenda to turn qigong classes into another Whampoa Military Academy. (The academy produced a number of prominent mainland Chinese revolutionary leaders from its founding in 1924 until it was relocated to Taiwan in 1950.) The article also stated that Zhang urged his followers to be independent of the party’s control and to listen to Zhonggong’s US headquarters. It said some members deemed Zhonggong’s ideology as the only cure to widespread corruption in China. In 2012, multiple townships in Hebei, Hunan, Shanxi, and Sichuan provinces released anti-Zhonggong directives on their government websites.

    The most recently published Zhonggong case involved ESS charges. In 2013, the Hubei High People’s Court sentenced a Zhonggong leader surnamed Wang to three years’ imprisonment for inciting subversion. The court found that Wang had organized two Zhonggong training courses for nearly 40 practitioners in Zhangjiajie and Xiangtan, Hunan. Participants paid 1,200 yuan for each of the courses during which Wang made “slanderous” remarks about the party. (He described it as a “demon” and a corrupt regime that murdered many people during the Cultural Revolution). Witnesses confirmed that Wang gave lectures on how the party persecuted Zhonggong and Zhang Hongbao. In addition to circulating the Nine Commentaries, a banned Falun Gong publication, Wang was also said to have distributed Charter 08, the political manifesto that largely led to the imprisonment of Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波), and materials about June Fourth. At his home, Wang was found to have saved 21 copies of Falun Gong documents on multiple electronic devices.

    Zhonggong is officially “harmful,” but the grounds for its stigmatization are not entirely clear. Is the group too religious or superstitious? Is it violent or fraudulent? Or is it merely defiant? Official media have set the tone by reporting on sensational Zhonggong cases and individuals but could it be, as public records show, that the problem with Zhonggong is not that it is harmful, but that it is political?  


    [1] The Chinese names of the “14 harmful qigong groups” are: 1. 中华养生益智功(简称中功)2. 香功 3. 菩提功 4.元极功 5. 华藏功 6. 中华昆仑女神功 7. 人宇特能功 8. 三三九乘元功 9. 日月气功 10. 万法归一功 11. 慈悲功 12. 沈昌人体科技 13. 一通健康法 14. 中国自然特异功。(Source: Meishan Daily)    ↑ top

  • Identifying Cult Organizations in China

    After a killing by alleged “cult” members, Xinhua published an article on the “truth” about cults in China. Image credit: xinhuanet.com

    Chinese media scrambled to identify “cult” organizations after a woman was reportedly beaten to death by six members of Almighty God at a McDonald’s restaurant in Zhaoyuan, Shandong, on May 28, 2014. Almighty God (also called Real God Church or Eastern Lightning) was outlawed as a cult in November 1995 by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and State Council. As recently as December 2012, the group made headlines when hundreds of members were detained for spreading rumors of apocalypse.

    Back in 1995, the Central Committee, State Council, and Ministry of Public Security identified at least 13 groups as cult organizations. Eleven of them were Christian and two were Buddhist. After the McDonald’s killing earlier this year, at least three “cult” lists began circulating online. The longest list names 20 organizations and was compiled by the China Anti-Cult Association (CACA), whose website calls the group a volunteer-run humanitarian nonprofit. The CACA says the list was drawn up by experts in technology, law, and religion.

    Major Cult Organizations Identified by CACA

    Name CategoryFounder Year & Place FoundedScale & Influence
    Falun Gong
    法轮功
    QigongLi Hongzhi
    李洪志
    1992 JilinBelieved to be the largest “cult” identified by the CACA, particularly active in Shandong and northeastern China.
    Almighty God
    全能神
    Christian (Shouters offshoot)Zhao Weishan
    赵维山
    1989 HenanEstimated to have millions of followers nationwide.
    Shouters
    呼喊派
    ChristianLi Changshou
    李常受
    1962 USIntroduced to China in 1979, by 1983 it had up to 200,000 followers across 360 counties and cities in 20 provinces and autonomous regions.
    Society of Disciples
    门徒会
    ChristianJi Sanbao
    季三保
    1989 Yao County, ShaanxiMore than 350,000 followers across over 300 counties in 14 provinces as of 1995.
    Unification Church
    统一教
    ChristianMun Son-myong
    文鲜明
    1954 South KoreaBelieved to be active among ethnic Koreans in northeast China.
    Guanyin Famen
    观音法门
    BuddhistShi Qinghai
    释清海
    1988 TaiwanIntroduced to mainland China in 1992, it had 500,000 followers across over 20 provinces at its peak.
    Bloody Holy Spirit
    血水圣灵
    Christian (New Testament Church offshoot)Zuo Kun
    左坤
    1988 TaiwanIntroduced to China in 1987, it has been active in 20 provinces and municipalities.
    Full Scope Church
    全范围教会
    ChristianXu Yongze
    徐永泽
    1984 Pingdingshan, HenanTens of thousands of followers across over 88 counties in 15 provinces and autonomous regions as of 1991.
    Three Kinds of Servants Sect
    三班仆人
    ChristianXu Wenku
    徐文库
    1986 HenanClaimed to have a million members, most in Anhui, Sichuan, and northeast provinces.
    True Buddha School
    灵仙真佛宗
    BuddhistLu Shengyan
    卢胜彦
    1979 USIntroduced to China in 1988, it was once active in 13 provinces and municipalities
    Mainland China Administrative Deacon Station
    中华大陆行政执事站
    Christian (Shouters offshoot)Wang Yongmin
    王永民
    1994 AnhuiOver a thousand followers in Anhui, Jiangsu, and Henan as of April 1995.
    Source: CACA, Dui Hua. Note: The other nine groups identified as cults by CACA are: Spirit Sect (灵灵教), South China Church (华南教会), Established King (被立王), Lord God Sect (主神教) (as recently as 2012 three women in Guangxi were sent to prison for their involvement with this group), World Elijah Evangelic Mission (世界以利亚福音宣教会), Yuandun Famen (圆顿法门), New Testament Church (新约教会), Dami Mission (达米宣教会), and Children of God (天父的儿女).

    Under Article 300 of the Criminal Law, individuals who participate in cult organizations may be charged with “organizing/using a cult to undermine implementation of the law” and face prison sentences of 3-7 years. According to a joint interpretation issued by the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate in 1999, cult crimes can be applied when one “resists group bans by relevant departments, resumes banned groups, establishes other sects, or continues [illegal] activities.”

    Falun Gong

    Falun Gong is perhaps the one group identified by Chinese authorities as a cult that is most well-known inside and outside China. It is also the first group on the CACA list. Falun Gong practitioners faced severe persecution in the decade after the qigong group was outlawed by the central government in 1999. But in recent years, police and courts have generally imposed fewer arrests and less severe punishments. According to Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database (PPDB), the number of Falun Gong prisoners known or believed to be in custody has nearly halved since 2009 (see table below).

    Documented Falun Gong Prisoners
    Year No.
    20094,139
    20103,845
    20113,121
    20122,675
    20132,369
    20142,201
    Source: Dui Hua. All figures are as of December 31 except 2014 which is as of June 30.

    Falun Gong is perhaps the one group identified by Chinese authorities as a cult that is most well-known inside and outside China. It is also the first group on the CACA list. Falun Gong practitioners faced severe persecution in the decade after the qigong group was outlawed by the central government in 1999. But in recent years, police and courts have generally imposed fewer arrests and less severe punishments. According to Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database (PPDB), the number of Falun Gong prisoners known or believed to be in custody has nearly halved since 2009 (see table below).

    Almighty God

    As mentioned previously, there was a spike in arrests of Almighty God adherents in December 2012. According to Legal Evening News, more than 1,300 people across 16 provinces had been detained for propagating rumors of impending apocalypse during that month. The majority (800) of the people detained were apprehended in Qinghai and Guizhou. A Xinhua news report from June 2014 says that Ningxia police had detained more than 1,000 members of Almighty God since 2012 and that Liaoning police had arrested 113 leading members since 2013.

    Official sources say that there are millions of Almighty God members nationwide and characterize most members as under-educated rural women around age 50. With the exception of Henan Province, which publicizes most of its court verdicts online, most jurisdictions do not report the names of people detained in Almighty God cases. That said, according to Southern Weekly, of the 161 Almighty God verdicts published online nationwide, 109 were in Henan and 134 involved violations of Article 300. Among the 134 Article 300 cases, which involved 335 defendants, the lengthiest sentence was eight years’ imprisonment, handed down to only one defendant. Most defendants were sentenced to three years’ imprisonment or above, and one third of defendants received suspended sentences. Defense lawyers participated in only one third of these 134 criminal cases.

    Shouters, Society of Disciples, and Spirit Sect

    The Shouters lost much of its popularity when it splintered into several groups including Almighty God. Both it and the Society of Disciples reported having hundreds of thousands of followers in the 1980s or early 1990s. Before Article 300 made it into the Criminal Law in 1997, many leaders of the Shouters and Society of Disciples were convicted of “organizing/using a sect or feudal superstition to carry out counterrevolutionary activities,” indicating a political bent to their persecution.

    Unlike the groups mentioned above, Spirit Sect is not prominently featured on the CACA list. However, Dui Hua has discovered Spirit Sect verdicts on Chinese court websites that are more recent than those of the Shouters and Society of Disciples. The PPDB has information on 25 Spirit Sect members sentenced for cult activities since 2013, compared to only eight members of the Shouters and Society of Disciples combined. (This may indicate that the Spirit Sect is more active or visible or that there is a difference in public reporting regarding these groups due to divergent local practices or otherwise.)

    Common among verdicts for all three groups is that the vast majority of defendants are sentenced to three years’ imprisonment or lesser punishments and that Article 300 is not always applied. A number of defendants are sentenced to administrative punishments or are released after receiving “education.”

    Breakdown of Sentences in PPDB, since 2013

    Sentence Group
    ShoutersSociety of DisciplesSpirit Sect
    Suspended1
    2 years3
    2.5 years14
    3 years314
    3.5 years12
    4 years11
    5+ years11
    Unknonwn1
    Source: Dui Hua

    Other Christian Sects

    Cases involving other Christian sects are much less reported in official media sources today. Throughout the 2000s, Full Scope Church, Three Kinds of Servants Sect, and Bloody Holy Spirit were identified in government records as police targets, but the PPDB contains no sentencing information on members of any of these groups since 2010.

    Information about Mainland China Administrative Deacon Station is even scarcer. Dui Hua research indicates that the sect remained active in Anhui at least until 2002—seven years after it was outlawed by the Central Committee and State Council. In 2002, two of the group’s leaders Teng Binglian (腾丙连) and Wang Qishu (王启书) were detained for investigation, but the outcome of their case is unknown.

    Originating in South Korea, Unification Church is believed to have some influence among ethnic Koreans in northeast China, but as of this writing, no one in China is known to have been convicted for joining this sect. Unification Church is often characterized in official narratives as a source of foreign infiltration largely because its overseas connections are at odds with the “three selfs” principles of China’s officially sanctioned religion: self-governance, self-support, and self-propagation. (Read Uncovering China’s Korean Christians for more information about Korean Christian groups in China.)

    Buddhist Sects

    Guanyin Famen (GYFM) and True Buddha School are highly commercialized Buddhist groups marketed on healthy practices like vegetarianism and meditation. Although both are frequently listed in local records as inspection targets, no one affiliated with True Buddha School is known to have received prison sentences as of this writing.

    GYFM appears to be more suppressed. The PPDB has information on over two dozen GYFM members detained mostly between 1996 and 2005. The most recent conviction reported in Chinese media was in 2012. Two members from Jilin were sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for purchasing 2,600 copies of “cult” books. (Read The Cult of Buddha for more information about Buddhist sects.)

    More than 20?

    The CACA only lists 20 cult organizations nationwide, but Dui Hua has discovered official documents in which local public security offices refer to other groups as cults. Chinese authorities may deem the size and reach of these organizations to be too small to warrant calling them out on the national level. But it is also the case that some local authorities apply different metrics to determine whether groups meet the criteria of a cult: “deifying leaders, deceiving people, and spreading superstitions and heretical beliefs.”

    For example, Kindness Sect (恩惠教) was declared a heretical organization in Urumqi in November 1999, but Dui Hua has not found information about the group’s activities in other locations. Active for two years in rural Xinjiang since its founding in 1997, the sect was led by former assistant village head Pan Wei (潘卫). Official sources say that Pan became fervently involved in illegal religious activities after meeting a Korean American missionary in China. From 1997‒1999, Pan and the missionary attended underground meetings in Harbin and organized 30 house-church gatherings throughout Xinjiang. No information on criminal punishments related to the sect has been discovered.

    In January 1997 the Henan Public Security Bureau banned China Gospel Fellowship (中华福音团契). Headquartered in Tanghe County, the group allegedly spread ideas that its followers could cure illnesses without medicine and that non-members would go to hell. In 2005 over 80 members were detained in Chengcheng County, Shaanxi. Most were released after receiving “education.” Dui Hua has learned of just one conviction of a China Gospel Fellowship member, but it was a suspended sentence, handed down to He Guangming (何光明) by the Henan’s Xiayi County People’s Court in 2002.

    Since 2011, local governments in several provinces including Guizhou, Jiangxi, and Zhejiang have explicitly stated that Amitabha Society (静空学会) is a cult. Despite winning multiple honorary awards overseas, founder Chin Kung (净空), a naturalized Australian citizen born in Anhui in 1927, stands accused by local governments of “deifying” himself through cultural exchanges, trainings, and publications. Expanding into more than 30 provinces since it was introduced to China in the 1990s, Amitabha was initially well-received among religious officials. In February 1998, academic journal Jianghuai Cultural History lauded Chin Kung as a benevolent philanthropist and patriot who supported “the peaceful unification of the motherland.” Today, official sources often accuse Chin Kung of overseas religious infiltration.

    Although Amitabha is frequently mentioned in official records of campaigns against cults and foreign or religious infiltration, none of the individual cases Dui Hua has found have resulted in convictions of cult crimes. Most cases result in property confiscations rather than severe criminal punishments. The only individual known to have been imprisoned in connection with Amitabha is Lin Lidong (林立东), who was sentenced to five years in prison for “illegal business activity” around 2005. Official sources say Lin produced a large number of Chin Kung audio materials and “colluded with Amitabha overseas.”

    There appears to be consensus on the existence of 20 cults in China, but the number of groups that are being targeted in anti-cult campaigns is greater in number and varies from place to place. Although it was a violent incident that sparked the recent uptick in Chinese media reports on cult organizations, Dui Hua research indicates that violence is only rarely involved in cases involving these organizations.

  • China’s “Almighty God” Rises with Threat of Apocalypse

    People in Gansu Province carry a banner warning that Almighty God is coming to save believers and destroy the people and nations that resist, December 11, 2012. Photo credit: gscn.com.cn

    All across the world, people have been anxiously awaiting the arrival of December 21, 2012, a date some believe has been prophesied to mark the end of the world. China has apparently not been immune from these rumors, and a recent report from Shaanxi Province suggests that authorities there are engaged in a serious crackdown against a persistent “cult” organization that has been using the doomsday rumors to recruit new members.

    For several decades, authorities in China have been trying to eliminate a quasi-Christian group that calls itself the “Church of the Almighty God.” Known also as the “Real God” church or “Eastern Lightning,” this group believes that divine revelation has identified a “female Christ” who will reign over a new age in which humankind will be judged and only believers will survive. The group apparently has an extensive organization both inside and outside China and has reportedly been involved in a number of violent attacks on Christian house church organizations. In 2001, Time magazine published a short profile of the organization describing some of these allegations.

    Translated below, the recent report out of Shaanxi does not offer much detail on the group’s latest activities. (According to China Digital Times, propaganda officials have put Chinese media under strict orders not to report on recent cult activities.) It does, however, provide a useful view of how Chinese authorities define “cults” and perceive their various social harms.

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    “Almighty God” Cult Appears in Shaanxi, Incites Believers to Wage Decisive Battle against Party

    Chinese Business View
    December 14, 2012

    Recently in some places in our province, members of the “Almighty God” cult have been taking advantage of the “2012 end-of-the-world prophecy” to gather illegally and disseminate propaganda in the streets to spread the end-of-the-world rumor and claim that “only believers will be saved.”

    Also Known as “Eastern Lightning,” “Real God”

    This reporter has learned that the “Almighty God” cult is also called “Eastern Lightning” and “Real God.” Its doctrines are selections and perversions from the Christian Bible, [and the group] mainly exploits the name of “Christianity” to conduct illegal activities. The State Religious Affairs Bureau first made a note of its cult nature long ago and banned the group in accordance with the law; [the bureau] is now striking hard against [Almighty God].

    This organization originated as an offshoot of the “Shouters,” a cult which entered our country from the United States in the late 1970s. Its founder, Zhao Weishan, was a core member of the “Shouters” who left to set up his own group because of disagreements with fellow members. “Almighty God” carries the banner of Christianity and disseminates absurd, illegal cult teachings adapted from Christianity such as The Word Appears in the Flesh; Lightning from the East; Almighty God, How Great You Are (also known as Sing a New Song with the Lamb); Christ’s Words (also known as Judgment Begins with the Family of God); Works of the Spirit; Kingdom of Praise; Hymns of Truth; and New Songs.

    This group teaches that the “Age of Law” ruled over by Jehovah and the “Age of Grace” ruled over by Jesus have both passed and that the “Age of the Kingdom” ruled over by “Almighty God” is approaching. [It teaches that] God took human form a second time as an Eastern woman and descended to China to pass judgment on humankind. It claims that “the end of the world is approaching” and that only those who believe in “Almighty God” can be saved, whereas all who reject and do not believe will be killed by “lightning.” It says slanderously that “present-day China is a great imperial family in decline that is dominated by a great red dragon (i.e., the Communist Party)” and incites followers to launch a decisive battle against the “great red dragon” under God’s leadership and “to destroy the great red dragon and establish the Kingdom of the Almighty God.”

    Striking Hard against Its Destructive Activities

    “Almighty God,” which originated in Henan in the 1990s and spread to many provinces, is a cult with political overtones.

    There have been instances of the cult’s money-making scams in many places throughout the country, bringing great harm to more than a few members of the public who were “lured” by the cult into joining. The cult even encourages its members to leave their homes, devoting their body, soul, and property to the church leader. This has led to the shattering of many formerly prosperous and happy families and compounded the problems of many families that were already poor and suffering.

    The spread of this cult has seriously interfered with the normal religious beliefs of some members of the public in our province and has disrupted the order of people’s work and daily life. It has deceptively attracted [members of the] public who do not understand the true situation, led to disharmony in many families, and caused great social harm. As December 21, 2012, approaches, the destructive activities of “Eastern Lightning” groups everywhere may grow even more apparent and virulent. The relevant authorities are presently striking hard [against them] and remind the public to resolutely resist.

    Readers who discover illegal or criminal activities of the “Almighty God” [cult] are requested to report them to police immediately by phoning 110 and to assist the public security authorities in combating and punishing [the group].

    Operation Style of the “Almighty God” Cult

    Beginning in the 1990s, “Eastern Lightning” (also known as “Almighty God”) spread northward from Henan. In 1998 it spread to places including Yan’an and Yulin, and in 2004 it reached the region of Inner Mongolia and Shanxi, making pervasive inroads towards Xinjiang, Ningxia, Gansu, and other areas. The group’s internal organizational structure is extremely tight and its ability to resist detection is quite strong. At the very top of its internal organizational structure is a female God, below which are priests. The churches are divided into large-area, small-area, and branch churches, with the persons responsible known as “leaders.” Proselytization is similar to a pyramid marketing scheme, employing “rolling personal networks” and one-way relationships. Once you have joined the church, you are not allowed to ask others’ names. Only pseudonyms such as “Little White Rabbit” or “Doggy” are used in communication with others. Each church member only knows the several other members of their branch church, and members rarely meet in groups exceeding seven. New members are known as “newcomers.” Those who have been discovered by the public security authority or government agencies are said to have “left the surroundings,” and either don’t talk or talk nonsense [to those who discovered them]. Proselytizers are typically not allowed to carry any means of communication and, when they need to make contact, make varied use of local pay-per-use telephone services to call people to meet them.

    How to Identify Cults

    [With respect to] Article 300 of the Criminal Law, cults are defined as “illegal organizations established in the name of religion, qigong, or other pretexts that, having deified its most important members, uses the creation and dissemination of superstition and heresies, among other means, to bewitch and deceive others, recruit and control members, and harm society.” [Note: Article 300 discusses cult-related crimes, but “cults” are not defined anywhere in the Criminal Law—Trans.]

    In other words, [cults] make people miss work, neglect their fields, abandon their homes, and give up their studies to believe in “God”; claim that joining their “religion” can heal the sick and ward off calamity and serve as a refuge; spread word that the “end of the world” is coming and that only those who join their organization can be saved; deceive and coerce women into humiliation by church leaders; say that traditional religion is out of date and that one must believe in a new “God”; hold illegal and furtive gatherings where they shout, sing, and dance wildly; make people use deceptive means to get others to join; refuse to allow [people to] leave the group after joining; incite members to defy the government in the name of “God”; treat society, the government, and ordinary people as “demons”; concoct ridiculous heresies under the guise of religion and science; unscrupulously collect money through fraudulent means; and establish underground organizations and carry out illegal activities.

  • Three Imprisoned in Lord God Sect “Cult” Case

    Youth in Pingnan County, Guangxi, participate in activities as part of a campaign to “Keep Cults Out of My House,” May 31, 2011. Source: China Communist Youth League, Pingnan County Committee

    Before the Falun Gong was banned in 1999, Chinese authorities targeted a wide range of groups and individuals in an on-going “anti-superstition” campaign. Among the targets were several sects based on Christian theology whose beliefs and activities were said to constitute counterrevolution and to undermine social order. The “Lord God Sect” (主神教) is one of these groups. Founded in Hunan Province in 1993, the sect recruited thousands (at least one official source says more than 10,000) of disciples in over 22 provinces, autonomous regions, and cities before it was banned as a “cult” in 1998, and its spiritual leader, Liu Jiaguo (刘家国), was executed in 1999. Like its predecessors the “Shouters” (呼喊派) and “Established King” (被立王), the Lord God Sect features teachings and practices that many Christians find unorthodox or radical—including charismatic leaders who claim divinity and issue sacred teachings—and has been considered by Chinese authorities to be politically subversive. Before “counterrevolution” was removed from the Criminal Law in 1997, people could be charged with “organizing or using a sect to carry out counterrevolutionary activities”; while the existing Criminal Law includes an updated version of the offense in Article 300: “organizing and using a cult to undermine implementation of the law.”

    Translated below is a court report regarding three defendants imprisoned this year for organizing house church activities associated with the Lord God Sect in Teng County, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. The text focuses on the “uncultured” and “wayward” nature of cults and cult members and makes no mention of political motives. All three of the defendants are women with only primary-school education. Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database contains information on 52 individuals who have been incarcerated in relation to the Lord God Sect, 16 of whom are still in prison and were sentenced over the last four years. In instances where the person’s sex is known (14 cases), 86 percent of them are women.

    Although not representative of this case, Dui Hua has collected a number of court verdicts and official documents indicating that members of banned Protestant groups have been more likely to receive suspended sentences in recent years. Moreover, many accused of “cult” activities face administrative punishments, like reeducation through labor, rather than criminal sanctions.


    No Repentance after 15-Day Detention, Three-Year Sentence for Again Spreading Cult
    By: Zhang Minghuan and Wang Li (Reported on ChinaCourt.org)
    October 16, 2012

         Qin Yan, a woman from Teng County with only a primary-school education, was placed under administrative detention by the local public security authority for propagating the “Lord God Sect.” Afterwards, she failed to learn a lesson from her bitter experience and, in fact, became even more unrestrained, joining together with two other women who also only have a primary-school education, Zhang Meiling and Hu Zaiqiong, to spread the cult and organize followers to illegally gather to publically engage in cult activities. Recently, the Teng County People’s Court of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region announced its verdict in the first-instance trial of this cult case, sentencing Qin Yan, Zhang Meiling, and Hu Zaiqiong to three, two, and one year(s) in prison, respectively, for organizing and using a cult to undermine implementation of the law.

         Defendant Qin Yan is a leader and core member of the “Lord God Sect” in Teng County. In November 2009, she was once placed under administrative detention for propagating the “Lord God Sect” in Tianping Town, Teng County, but afterwards she still did not repent. Beginning in August 2011, she continued to spread the cult in Tianping Town, Teng County, and successively recruited defendants Zhang Meiling and Hu Zaiqiong to join the “Lord God Sect.” Thereafter, the three defendants went together to places including Jinji Town, Xiangqi Town, and Xinqing Town to spread the “Lord God Sect” doctrine and establish the house of Hu X in Zhong Village, Lingjing Town, as a fixed venue for illegal meetings of followers of the “Lord God Sect.” When Qin Yan and Zhang Meiling did not come to “teach,” Hu Zaiqiong arranged for followers to meet at her house to study relevant “Lord God Sect” doctrine. On April 26, 2012, as the three defendants were organizing and carrying out an illegal gathering of “Lord God Sect” followers, Teng County police officers took [the defendants] into custody at the scene and seized a large number of manuscripts of cult doctrine and related books.

         In the course of the trial, the court found that after the illegal “Lord God Sect” cult was banned in accordance with the law, the three defendants continued to illegally gather to publically engage in cult activities, undermining implementation of the law. Their actions constitute the crime of organizing and using a cult to undermine implementation of the law. In order to protect social management order and severely punish criminal activities of cult organizations, as well as in comprehensive consideration of the facts, nature, circumstances, and degree of harm in the acts of the three defendants’ crimes and their displays of repentance, etc., the court issued the above verdict in accordance with the law.

         Judge’s Commentary: The seriousness of the threat and evil nature of cults ought to arouse a high level of alert and deep reflection throughout society. In this case, the three defendants all had a primary-school education and a relatively low overall moral character. Lacking correct judgment about some things, it was easy for them to be misled by others and blindly follow the wrong path. Therefore, we must vigorously promote scientific spirit, eschew and resist cults, fully dig up cults’ spreading roots, and create a good atmosphere in which all of society advocates science, opposes cults, and works together towards harmony.

    Chinese Source(原文):
    被拘留15日仍不思悔改 再次传播邪教领刑3年
    作者:张明环、王莉 (中国法院网);发布日期:2012年10月16日
    http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2012/10/id/607760.shtml
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    被拘留15日仍不思悔改 再次传播邪教领刑3年

            一名只有小学文化程度的藤县女子覃燕,因宣传“主神教”被当地公安机关行政拘留后,非但没有吸取教训痛改前非,反而更加肆无忌惮,伙同同样只有小学文化的另外两名女子张美玲、胡在琼在多地继续传播邪教,组织教徒非法聚会公开进行邪教活动。近日,广西壮族自治区藤县人民法院对这起邪教案作出一审宣判,以组织、利用邪教组织破坏法律实施罪分别判处被告人覃燕、张美玲、胡在琼有期徒刑三年、二年和一年。

            被告人覃燕是“主神教”藤县权柄和骨干人员,曾于2009年11月,在藤县天平镇因宣传“主神教”被行政拘留后,仍不思悔改,于2011年8月开始,继续在藤县天平镇传播邪教,并先后发展了被告人张美玲、胡在琼加入“主神教”。之后,三被告一起又在金鸡镇、象棋镇、新庆镇等地宣传“主神教”邪教教条,并将胡某位于岭景镇中村的房屋设为“主神教”信徒非法聚会活动的固定地点。当覃燕、张美玲没有来“授课”时,就由胡在琼组织信徒在其屋内学习“主神教”相关教条。2012年4月26日,三被告在组织信徒进行“主神教”非法聚会时,被藤县公安民警当场抓获,并扣押了大量邪教教条手抄本及相关书籍。

            法院审理认为,三被告在邪教组织“主神教”被依法取缔后,仍非法聚会公开进行邪教活动,破坏法律实施,其行为已构成了组织、利用邪教组织破坏法律实施罪。为维护社会管理秩序,严厉打击邪教组织犯罪活动,并综合考虑三被告的犯罪事实、性质、情节、行为的危害程度及悔罪表现等,法院遂依法作出上述判决。

            法官点评:邪教的危害性、邪情的严峻性应引起全社会的高度警醒和深刻反思,本案中,三被告均是小学文化程度,综合素质较低,对一些事物缺乏正确的判断,容易受人迷惑,盲目跟随而误入歧途。因此,我们要大力弘扬科学精神,远离邪教、抵制邪教,彻底铲除邪教滋生蔓延的根源,在全社会营造崇尚科学、反对邪教、共建和谐的良好氛围。

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