Tag: religion or cult

  • Crimes of Extremism, Part II: Harsh Sentences, Low Transparency in Xinjiang

    Crimes of Extremism, Part II: Harsh Sentences, Low Transparency in Xinjiang

    A Chinese propaganda poster denouncing extremism. In 2018, the poster went viral after a social media user noticed that one of the poster’s images condemning Islamic facial hair featured actor Keanu Reeves, who does not identify as Muslim. Image credit: Reddit via Taiwan News

    Read Part I here.

    Although ethnic minorities make up the majority of the extremism cases, there is a dearth of publicly available information about them, particularly those of the Islamic faith. Court judgments and judicial decisions like this in Xinjiang are deemed to be highly sensitive; they were almost never posted online even before the purge on China Judgements Online started in June 2021. Overseas news media sources have reported on a few cases, but it is impossible to grasp the whole picture due to the tight control on information flows in the region. In most cases, media reports did not explicitly state which specific extremism crimes were invoked.

    Radio Free Asia (RFA) is among the overseas news media groups which have occasionally covered extremism cases over the years. In September 2017, a Uyghur woman named Horigul Nasir was reportedly sentenced to 10 years in prison in Kashgar, presumably for extremism because she allegedly told one of her friends that not wearing a headscarf is sinful. The allegation, however, has been disputed by her brother, who claimed that his sister does not even wear a headscarf or pray five times a day.

    In another case also reported by RFA, a Uyghur businessman named Ekber Imin is serving a 25-year prison sentence for an unspecified extremism crime alongside two of his brothers. They were reportedly convicted for having foreign contacts and spreading extremism by incorporating ethnic and religious elements in the buildings they developed.

    In March 2022, RFA reported that Abdureshid Obul died in 2020 while serving his eight-year prison sentence for an extremism crime. The Uyghur farmer was reportedly jailed for having a fourth child and relocating his pregnant wife to avoid a forced abortion. Ethnic minority families living in rural areas are limited to two children. Authorities considered Abdureshid’s violation of the family planning policy to be an act of extremism.

    (Top) Horigul Nasir’s identification card. (Bottom) A photo of Ekber Imin’s passport page. Image credits: RFA listeners via RFA 
    The harsh punishments given to the aforementioned Uyghurs are by no means isolated incidents. Dui Hua’s research into Chinese government sources found evidence of Muslim minorities receiving excessive punishment for committing extremism crimes in Xinjiang. For instance, Dui Hua discovered a case in which a Uyghur prisoner had his prison sentence extended by 15 years in July 2017 for violating Article 120(3). He was already serving his seven-year prison sentence for Article 300 “organizing or using a cult to undermine implementation of the law.” It is unclear which “cult organization” he had joined leading to his initial conviction. The court ordered him to serve a total prison sentence of 19 years and 8 months, which included the 56-month sentence for Article 300 he had yet to complete. After his prison sentence expires in 2036, he must still serve a supplemental deprivation of political rights sentence of five years.

    It would be a mistake to assume that only Uyghurs are singled out for excessive criminal punishment. An ethnic Dongxiang surnamed Chen received a 10-year prison sentence for Article 120(3) with a deprivation of political rights sentence of three years in Nilka County in July 2018. As with almost all other cases of a similar nature, there is no information about the acts that led to his harsh prison sentence.

    Two Rare Judgments 

    Despite being unable to find an extremism judgment in Xinjiang, where the majority of extremism cases are tried and heavy sentences are meted out, Dui Hua found two rare judgments in other provinces. Dongxiang are among the Muslim communities who have faced restrictions in and outside of Xinjiang, but very little information is known about the crackdown on this ethnic group. The case of Ma Yinglong (马英龙) in Beijing indicates that besides growing beards, conducting regular prayer or unauthorized religious classes, or fasting for Ramadan, Islamic booksellers are another target of China’s crackdown on extremism.

    A picture of the opening ceremony of a Xinjiang re-education camp, posted online by the government in Korla, Xinjiang in June 2018. The partially obscured sign on the left reads “Transformation Through Education Center” (教育转化中心 jiàoyù zhuǎnhuà zhōngxīn). Image credit Korla government via SupChina

    Ma is a native from Xinjiang’s Yining County. He was convicted of Article 120(3) and sentenced to 13 months in prison by Beijing’s Haidian District People’s Court in September 2017. The crime stemmed from him running an Islamic bookstore which sold books about Islam and related topics. Additionally, he administered his IslamBook.net website, which offered a number of Islamic religious items including Malaysian-made hijabs and other clothing, Islamic arts and crafts, and halal food items, according to reporting from unofficial news media sources.

    The court judgment focused on one title he sold: Milestones: Ma’alim Fi’l Tariq. This book was written by Egyptian Islamic author Sayyid Qutb, who calls for the re-creation of the Muslim world on strictly Quranic grounds to counter western influence. Qutb is seen by some observers as one of the formative, leading theorists of violent jihad. Unbeknownst to Ma, the Chinese version of this book had been classified in China as an illegal publication about terrorism and extremism. Ma stated in his defense that he had not read the book; he only procured a total of six copies of Milestones at the request of his customers. The court rejected Ma’s defense because “he should have known about the extremely harmful nature of the book” considering he had many years of experience selling Islamic books.

    In another case, Dui Hua found that Uyghur businessman Erkin Balat was sentenced to 22 months in prison for Article 120(6) in Shandong. Erkin moved to Qufu from Xinjiang to start his jade business in 2007. In early 2017, he was found in possession of 50 Uyghur-language books, one Uyghur-Arabic dictionary and one Arabic-language Quran, which became evidence of him possessing articles to promote extremism. Some of the Uyghur titles touched on topics such as the history of Islam. Other evidence included two Japanese sabres and one Arabian scimitar he displayed in one of his shops. Erkin completed his prison sentence on March 8, 2021.

    Same Acts, Different Outcomes

     
    In Part I, Dui Hua discussed how Han come into conflict with the law for extremism, including by possessing or circulating videos with scenes of violence in connection to the “East Turkestan Independence Movement,” ISIS, or the Taliban. Chinese law criminalizes such behavior regardless of ethnicity, but in practice there is a clear ethnic bias in sentencing. The same acts committed by Uyghurs or other Muslim minority groups are more likely to result in harsher criminal punishments. Precedents indicated that the same audio-visual evidence is almost certainly construed by prosecutors and judges to contain messages about “jihad” and “hijrat” (i.e. migration to another place for the sake of Allah) where the defendants practice Islam. In such cases, other crimes such as splittism, inciting splittism, and/or organizing or participating in a terrorist organization are often tacked on to the allegations of extremism.
    Screenshot from a 2019 CGTN program titled Fighting Terrorism in Xinjiang. Image credit: CGTN
    While Muslims in Western countries have been given prison sentences for viewing, disseminating, or producing films containing extremist material, these cases have typically been handled with greater transparency to hold law enforcements accountable for their decisions and ensure that their counterterrorism measures are non-arbitrary and impartial. In cases where this might not be possible, such as the CIA’s use of black sites to interrogate suspected terrorist actors or other “enemy combatants,” civil society organizations and independent journalism efforts can provide a degree of scrutiny.
    By contrast, cases in China are selectively transparent at best, as in many publicized cases of Han. The vast majority of ethnic minority cases remain shrouded in secrecy. Limited available evidence on Uyghurs and other ethnic groups suggests that the acts are more diverse, but they all resolve around the expression of Islam. Muslims are also much more likely to receive disproportionately severe sentences for the same crimes than the Han counterparts.
  • Crimes of Extremism, Part I: Observations on Use and Sentencing

    Crimes of Extremism, Part I: Observations on Use and Sentencing

    Screenshot from a 2019 CGTN program titled Fighting Terrorism in Xinjiang. Image credit: CGTN

    Extremism, officially defined in Chinese law as the “ideological basis of terrorism”, or more broadly, “inciting hatred, discrimination or agitating violence through distorting religious doctrines or other means, has long been integral to China’s security policy against the “three evil forces” (i.e terrorism, splittism, and religious extremism). However, it was not a precisely defined legal term until the following provisions were added in 2015 under Article 120 of the Criminal Law, “organizing, leading, and actively participating in a terrorist organization:”

    • Article 120(3): Promoting terrorism, or extremism or instigating terrorist activities;
    • Article 120(4): Using extremism to undermine implementation of the law;
    • Article 120(5): Coercing other people into wearing costumes or symbols to promote terrorism or extremism;
    • Article 120(6): Illegally possessing articles to promote terrorism or extremism.

    Reporting by overseas news media sources suggests that the four new crimes are most typically invoked against Uyghurs. The crimes have been criticized by United Nations’ special rapporteurs and working groups for being overly vague with no basis in binding international legal standards. Human rights groups have also said that many of the extremism arrests are made without evidentiary basis and authorities frequently fail to respect the due process rights of detainees.

    This is the first installment in a two-part series which discusses Dui Hua’s observations on extremism, with a focus on Article 120(3) and (6). Part I discusses the extent of the crimes’ application and sentencing trends, drawing on the 2016 statistics released by the Supreme People’s Court. Individuals charged with and convicted of extremism crimes are not exclusively members of ethnic minority groups, despite their accounting for most of the cases. Extremism cases are selectively published in Chinese government sources. Those involving Han are notably well documented, and only rarely do they receive lengthy prison sentences. Part II focuses on cases involving Muslim minorities. Hefty punishments appear commonplace in Xinjiang, but information on prisoners pre- and post-sentencing is extremely limited.

    Court Statistics One Year After Expansion

    According to the 12-volume Records of People’s Courts Historical Judicial Statistics: 1949-2016, China tried 1,403 extremism cases involving 2,463 defendants in 2016. Of them, 2,031, or 82 percent, were ethnic minorities. Additionally, 85 percent of the defendants were farmers. As Xinjiang has been cast as a key battlefield in the fight against extremism, it would be natural to assume that the charges are predominantly leveled against Muslim minorities.

    Table 1. Court statistics on extremism crimes for 2016

    Source: Records of People’s Courts Historical Judicial Statistics: 1949-2016
    Two-thirds of the defendants violated Article 120(3) “promoting terrorism, or extremism or instigating terrorist activities.” Slightly over one quarter were tried for Article 120(6) “illegally possessing articles to promote terrorism or extremism.” About five percent, or 124 people, were tried for Article 120(4) “using extremism to undermine implantation of the law.” Only 18 people were tried in 17 cases of Article 120(5) “coercing other people into wearing costumes or symbols to promote terrorism or extremism” in 2016.
    Of the four extremism crimes, Article 120(3) is most likely to result in lengthy prison sentences. Among the 1,669 people who received criminal punishment for this crime, 1,109, or 66 percent, received prison sentences of five years or more. By contrast, a much bigger portion of people who are tried for Article 120 (4), (5) and (6) received prison sentences below five years. The use of non-custodial punishment in all extremism cases was rare. Only 70 people convicted of the four extremism crimes were given suspended sentences or control (guanzhi).
    Members of China’s largest ethnic group, Han, are not immune to the crackdown on extremism. The court statistics indicated that 422, or 17 percent, of the 2,463 people tried for the new extremism crimes in 2016 were Han. Of them, 198 were tried for Article 120(3) “promoting terrorism, or extremism or instigating terrorist activities,” 172 for Article 120(6) “illegally possessing articles to promote terrorism or extremism,” 59 for Article 120(4) “using extremism to undermine implantation of the law,” and two for Article 120(5) “coercing other people into wearing costumes or symbols to promote terrorism or extremism.”
    Han Cases
     
    Han extremism cases are easily searchable in Chinese government and media sources. Their cases rarely result in lengthy prison sentences. Dui Hua found 18 cases tried in Beijing which invoked Article 120(3) or (6) from 2017-2021. There were 19 defendants, of whom 11 were Han, one ethnic Manchu, and one Dongxiang. Ethnicity is not always specified in the judgments. None of the Han defendants in Beijing received prison sentences of more than one year, and the lengthiest sentence of two years was given to a duo whose ethnicity is not specified.
    The circumstances of the publicly disclosed extremism cases in other Han-majority provinces are almost identical: they are accused of disseminating violent and terrorist videos they downloaded from overseas websites with the use of a VPN. The videos, typically filmed in the Middle East, contain scenes of violence with prisoners of war beheaded or executed, footage of Islamic State or sometimes Taliban attacks, training, and fighting. The defendants unwittingly commit Article 120(3) when they share the videos with their friends, post them on social media, or put them in cloud storage.
    A screenshot of a 2015 tweet from Mashable on Chinese-language ISIS propaganda. Image credit: Mashable Twitter account
    Most Han defendants are not religious, and they are depicted to have been driven by curiosity to download or share the violent videos. In some cases, they are convicted for simply poking fun at terrorist organizations or figures. In December 2019, news media sources reported that a man surnamed Zhang was sentenced to nine months in prison in Beijing for Article 120(3) for sending out a six-word joke in Chinese which can be translated as “follow me and believe in Islam, join the ISIS” to a WeChat group with over 300 people. He also used a photo of Bin Laden as his profile portrait.
    A portion of Han defendants were convicted of Article 120(6) “illegally possessing articles to promote terrorism or extremism” for keeping violent footage on their personal electronic or mobile devices, despite them not having shared anything with other people. None of the Han defendants convicted of this crime in Beijing received prison sentences exceeding one year.
    Targeting Han Dissidents
     
    While most Han defendants in extremism cases are portrayed as thrill seekers who inadvertently violate the law, precedents also show that extremism easily becomes a catch-all offense to be used in politically motivated prosecutions targeting political and religious dissenters. In such cases, prison sentences can be excessive. For instance, Huang Yunmin (黄云敏) is serving his 10-year prison sentence for Article 120(6), one of the longest prison sentences given to a Han dissenter for an extremism crime. Huang was initially detained for provoking ethnic hatred in March 2017 for accompanying farmers and ex-soldiers to Beijing to petition during the “Two Sessions.” Additionally, prosecutors accused Huang of downloading a large number of anti-China footage from overseas websites and audiovisual materials related to the July 5 Urumqi riots. Huang is scheduled for release in 2027.
    (Clockwise top left) Journalist Zhang Baocheng; Huang Yunmin, known for helping petitioners; Zhao Waikei, Xuncheng Reformed Church leader. Image credits: Civil Rights and Livelihood Watch via RFA; Asia News; WeChat via ChinaAid
    Han who express sympathy with the Uyghur cause are at heightened risk of imprisonment for extremism crimes. Zhang Baocheng (张宝成) is serving his 42-month prison sentence in Beijing for Article 120(3) and “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” until November 27, 2022. The extremism charge, which afforded him a prison sentence of eight months, stemmed from one video clip he circulated about “East Turkestan.” In November 2021, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded that Zhang’s detention since 2019 was “arbitrary” and called on China to “release Mr. Zhang immediately,” noting that the prosecution’s main evidence against him related not to violence but to his tweets criticizing the re-education camps in Xinjiang holding Uyghurs. The Working Group’s ruling was made public by one of the plaintiffs on April 25, 2022.
    In a separate case, Hu Xincheng (胡新城) was arrested for Article 120(3) in Taiyuan, Shanxi, in January 2022 because of his journalistic work. Hu became a thorn in the side of local governments after he published hundreds of articles and reports about corruption. Additionally, Hu reportedly gave advice to petitioners on how to find redress for grievances within the petitioning system.
    Extremism is also used to target Christians unwilling to join the state sanctioned Three Self Patriotic Church. In July 2020, police in Taiyuan arrested Zhao Weikai (赵维凯) for Article 120(6). Zhao, a leader of the Xuncheng Reformed Church, repeatedly faces harassment by the authorities because of his insistence on educating his three children at home instead of sending them to a state school to receive atheist education. Zhao was formally arrested in the same month, being accused of possessing extremism materials.
    Part II will be published next week. Subscribe to Dui Hua publications here. 
  • Underground, Not Extinct: South China Church

    Underground, Not Extinct: South China Church

    An open letter from the daughters of Pastor Gong Shengliang to then-President George W. Bush. The letter includes a picture of the Gong family (Gong Shengliang seated bottom left). Image credit: Boxun News
    The lack of recent information about South China Church has led to questions about its continued existence. Dui Hua’s research, including a criminal judgment issued in 2016 involving its members, suggests, however, that the group continues to operate even as its founder remains incarcerated.
    Founded in Hubei Province in 1991 as an offshoot of Full Scope Church, South China Church (华南教会) was designated as an “evil cult” by the Chinese government in 1995. At the time, the church was thought to have 50,000 followers across central China (some sources reported nearly 100,000 members). In 2001, the trial of 17 leaders of this Protestant house church sparked an international outcry. Church members submitted sworn statements to the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention claiming that the church leaders had been tortured into confessing and making false statements prior to and during the trial.
    Among those sentenced was church founder Gong Shengliang (龚圣亮), who initially received a death sentence for “organizing a cult to undermine implementation of the law,” aggravated assault, and rape. Responding to international pressure, the Hubei High People’s Court dropped the death sentence and ordered a retrial. Gong was granted a two-year reprieve from his death sentence in September 2002 after making a successful appeal.
    Reporting on Gong Shengliang’s two-year reprieve from the death penalty: (left) A reprinted Baltimore Sun article from 2002 on Gong; (right) a BBC article mentioning Gong’s case from November 9, 2004. Image credits: The Tech; BBC News
    Gong’s sentence was commuted to life in prison in 2006. Gong was granted a six-month sentence reduction in 2008. As he has been held behind bars for twenty years, updates about him and his church have been sparse. An exception came in December 2012, when his family members spoke to foreign press about Gong’s deteriorating health in prison. Gong was reportedly paralyzed by stroke. He was unable to speak or move the left side of his body and kept drooling from his mouth. However, prison officials have not conceded to his family’s request to release him on medical parole.
    Compared to Falun Gong and Almighty God, South China Church has not been a prime target of attacks by China’s anti-cult propaganda since its 17 church leaders were put on trial in the early 2000s. As recently as March 2020, a county government in Gansu mentioned South China Church only in passing alongside other seemingly inactive unorthodox Christian sects such as Anointed King, New Testament Church, Dami Mission, World Elijah Evangelical Mission, and Buddhist sect Yuandun Famen.
    Partly because of a lack of recent information about South China Church since Gong’s imprisonment, questions have arisen as to whether the group still exists. Some leaders left the church after 2002, while other members have continued to meet and have accepted the teachings of orthodox pastors. In the early 2010s, www.kaiwind.com, a so-called non-governmental website claiming to reveal facts about Falun Gong, ran at least four reports covering South China Church. The interviewees were allegedly abused by South China Church members. The series appears to be a response to the brief foreign media exposure in 2012 resulting from Gong’s family members speaking out about his deteriorating health.
    A screenshot of a search on Kaiwind.com showing reports on South China Church, including alleged abuses. Image credit: Kaiwind.com
    South China Church is a subject of research in at least two academic journals published after 2015. Their findings affirmed the church’s continuing operation. Huang Jianbo, anthropology professor at East China Normal University, wrote in Chinese Journal of Theology in 2015 that South China Church members continued to proselytize and that they administered the now-defunct website www.huananchurch.org. The journal was published by Institute of Sino-Christian Studies in Hong Kong.
    As recently as 2018, Beijing-based Christian Times (基督时报), which claimed to be independent of house churches or other religious organizations, also provided updates about South China Church. The in-depth article, authored by prolific Christian researcher Liu Yanyue, stated that Gong continued to decree that church members must read John Calvin’s seminal work of Institutes of the Christian Religion. The church might soon become marginalized, wrote Liu, but he also cited a church member he had interviewed as saying that many of its members are still longing for Gong’ release.
    (Left) The cover of a 1995 translation of John Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion, said to be required reading for South China Church members; (right) the first page of the book’s first printing, from 1536. Image credits: The Book Depository; Public domain
    Dui Hua’s research into court websites also uncovered a judgment involving seven South China Church members who made an unsuccessful appeal in Jiangxi to overturn their conviction in December 2016. They were sentenced to 20-36 months in prison for “gathering a crowd to disturb social order,” instead of Article 300. One of the defendants was previously sentenced to a 10-year prison sentence in October 2002 for aggravated assault, the same year when Gong’s death sentence was reduced to death with two-year reprieve.
    In May 2015, the defendants organized over 40 church members to travel from their home province Hubei to Gao’an City, Jiangxi, to protest the police’s handling of a traffic accident that had left one of their church members dead. The judgment stated that they chanted slogans, unfurled banners, placed wreathes, and held photos of the deceased while protesting and blocking traffic for four hours. Forty-one protesters were taken away at the scene.
    All the defendants have been released from prison at the time of writing. Two other court rulings Dui Hua uncovered indicated that Ding Zhicheng (丁志成) and Zhang Chengqin (张成勤) completed their sentences about four months early in January-February 2018 after being granted a sentence reduction. Ding and Zhang received the longest prison sentences, consisting of three years each, among the defendants in the case. Another recently uncovered official document from 2015 helped Dui Hua identify another defendant named Mei Yuqing (梅宇清) who received a two-year sentence while defendants Dong Hualing (董华玲), Dong Nengjun (董能军), and Wang Tiantian (万甜甜) both received sentences of one year and eight months in prison.
    Gong is believed to be the only South China Church leader still imprisoned. He has been a source of controversy due to questions concerning the orthodoxy of his teachings and his personal conduct. In 2007, reports by rights monitoring groups overseas found some evidence corroborating accusations against Gong, including that he molested female church members and that he encouraged the use of violence against the church’s perceived enemies. Yet, Dui Hua’s recent research on unorthodox religious groups and their treatment by the CCP suggests that the great majority of unorthodox religious prisoners are nonviolent.
    Like many other unorthodox religious groups suppressed by the Chinese government, South China Church has not been rendered extinct. Many of its activities appear to have been driven underground. With two more years to serve in prison, Gong is scheduled for release in April 2024.
  • The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious Groups in China: A report by Dui Hua

    The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious Groups in China: A report by Dui Hua

    (Clockwise from top left) Chinese government anti-cult propaganda; Tablighi Jamaat members with Hui Muslims at a mosque; practitioners of Yi Guan Dao; promotion for Milky Way Federation; a notice expanding the penalties under Article 300; the Jesus Family. Image credits: The Paper; Umal Al-Dawa Youtube Account; Jin De Fo Tang’s Facebook account; Sohu; Liaoning Pindao; Bridge Magazine

    Dui Hua’s new report “The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious Groups in China” [PDF, 1.4 MB] details and analyzes the Chinese government’s treatment of unorthodox religious groups, listing known banned groups and the actions taken against them. The report, compiled over several months in 2021, offers a view into a substantial and largely unrecognized aspect of the Chinese population.

    “The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious Groups in China” is based on legal documents, media reports, case studies, official publications, Chinese government responses to requests for information on persecuted prisoners, court statistics, and Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database (PPDB).  It provides a comprehensive view of how non-state sanctioned religious practitioners come into conflict with the law, how officials at different levels of government criminalize unorthodox worship, and how past trends can inform future advocacy for those undergoing coercive measures for the non-violent expression of their beliefs.

    As early as 1951, regulations on punishing counterrevolutionaries targeted leaders of reactionary religious organizations. Currently, the Chinese government allows its citizens to take part in the five state-sanctioned patriotic associations of Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism, but many seeking spiritual salvation look beyond government-approved faiths and embrace unorthodox religious groups.

    Graph 1. Defendants and 1st-instance cases accepted and concluded for violating Article 300(1)
    Image credit: The Dui Hua Foundation

    Noting the extensive historical context informing the Chinese government’s approach to religious groups, especially those not sanctioned by the state, Dui Hua found that the 1997 revision to the criminal law placed “cult” trials into the purview of district courts, resulting in less transparency and attention for such cases. By 1999, trials of Article 300 cases—for those accused of organizing and using superstitious sects, secret societies, and religious organizations to undermine the law—soared, largely due to the ban on Falun Gong.

    The report includes an overview of 41 unorthodox religious groups; a summary of laws and regulations targeting unorthodox religious groups; analysis of court statistics from 1979-2016; discussion of deteriorating transparency in the disclosure of information on Article 300 cases; analysis of religious persecution using the PPDB; a summary of Dui Hua’s advocacy for such prisoners using prisoner lists and responses; and recommendations for future advocacy.

    Table 1. Breakdown of unorthodox religious practitioners in PPDB by affiliation
    Source: PPDB

    The objective of the report is to enable more effective interventions on behalf of practitioners of unorthodox religious groups who face coercive measures under Article 300 by providing insight and actionable information. Its main findings include the following:

    • The number of adherents of orthodox religious groups makes up more than 10 percent of China’s population, perhaps as many as 15 percent. Unorthodox religious groups exist in all of China’s provinces and autonomous regions, and many have developed links to international groups. If the number of unorthodox religious adherents was incorporated into official figures, then the number of all religious practitioners in China would far exceed the current government figure of 200 million official practitioners (as of 2018).
    • Adherents of unorthodox religious groups subjected to coercive measures for violating Article 300(1)—“organizing and using a cult to undermine implementation of the law”—and other charges make up 60 percent of all prisoners in the PPDB. Their numbers have swelled in recent years as sentence reductions and paroles have been restricted.
    • The most common crime for which adherents of unorthodox religious groups are imprisoned is covered by Article 300(1) of China’s Criminal Law but other crimes are also used, including endangering state security and economic crimes like committing fraud (Article 266) and operating illegal businesses (Article 225).
    • Falun Dafa (aka Falun Gong) and the Church of Almighty God have the largest number of adherents, but there are many other smaller groups. This report identified 41 unorthodox religious groups operating in China today or during the last two decades.
    • From 1998-2016, women made up 41 percent of those sentenced to prison for violating Article 300, five times the percentage of all women prisoners in China.
    Graph 2. Gender Breakdown of prisoners and unorthodox religious prisoners in PPDB
    Image credit: The Dui Hua Foundation
    • Adherents of unorthodox religions are typically non-violent. Instances of violence are rare; when they occur, the Chinese government features them in “anti-cult” propaganda. Adherents have been convicted of rape and murder. Those so convicted are often executed.
    • The persecution of unorthodox religious groups has existed since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949; adherents were classified as counterrevolutionaries prior to 1997. They have been viewed as threats to the government’s hold on power.
    • Persecution of unorthodox religious practitioners rose sharply following the banning of Falun Gong in 1999. In recent years, practitioners have seen sentences increase and clemency restricted. Persecution shows no sign of abating. In 2018, there were 3,550 people tried for violating Article 300(1), one of the highest numbers of individuals tried for this charge in recent years.
    • Adherents of unorthodox religions rarely make their way onto prisoner lists submitted to the Chinese government in bilateral and multilateral human rights dialogues. Their numbers dwarf those subject to coercive measures for exercising their political beliefs.
    Dui Hua encourages governments to raise the issue of this persecution in formal and informal discussions on human rights with the Chinese government and to include the names of imprisoned practitioners of unorthodox religions to the lists compiled for use in human rights dialogues with China. When, and to the extent possible, governments and NGOs should support appeals of unorthodox religion practitioners to Special Procedures of the United Nations. More so, governments and NGOs should incorporate concerns about the persecution of unorthodox religious groups into submissions to China’s Universal Periodic Review, tentatively scheduled for October 2023.
    Finally, governments should use this report when considering applications of political asylum by practitioners of unorthodox religions. Some governments, particularly in Europe, have become more open to accepting asylum requests for Church of Almighty God members. Dui Hua encourages courts to recognize the persecution of unorthodox religious group members as grounds for asylum and to recognize precedents for such asylum requests.
  • Decoding State Security Trials, Part I: ESS Cases in Tibet Rose Sharply in 2020

    Decoding State Security Trials, Part I: ESS Cases in Tibet Rose Sharply in 2020

    Chinese guard in Potala Square on May 20, 2014. Image credit: Andrew and Annemarie / CC BY-SA 2.0

    Crimes of endangering state security in China achieved international attention in 2021 with high-profile cases related to hostage diplomacy, even as available information about individual trials decreased. Such crimes include subversion, splittism, incitement to subversion/splittism, espionage, and state secrets violations. They carry a mandatory supplemental sentence of deprivation of political rights, precluding individuals from writing articles, giving interviews, voting, standing for office, and working in a state-owned company.

    From 2017-2020, Chinese courts concluded 1,330 trials of endangering state security (ESS), dereliction of military duty, and pre-1997 offenses, according to Dui Hua’s analysis of data published annually in China Statistical Yearbooks (中国统计年鉴) by the National Bureau of Statistics. The yearbooks, accessible on the National Bureau of Statistics website, provide information on the number of first-instance criminal trials accepted and concluded by people’s courts nationwide.

    ESS, dereliction of military duty, and criminal offenses prior to October 1, 1997 are typically included in the category of “other” trials. In 2020, the latest year for which information is available, trials of ESS by Chinese courts appear to have surged. They accepted 417 “other” trials, up from 257 and 317 in 2018 and 2019, respectively. The courts also concluded 382 “other” trials in 2020, an increase from 218 and 283 over the previous two years.

    This post, the first of two, looks at the number of ESS trials in Tibetan areas as well as in Xinjiang. Part II details case numbers for “other” trials such as dereliction of military duty as well as ESS trials in Han-majority provinces and Guangdong.

    Table 1. Number of “other” trials and trials of ESS, dereliction of military duty trials, and pre-1997 criminal cases

    *(a) = (b) + (c) + (d); Sources: China Statistical Yearbooks & Records of People’s Courts Historical Judicial Statistics: 1949-2016

    A fair portion of “other” trials are made up of ESS. Statistics released by the Supreme People’s Court in the 12-volume Records of People’s Courts Historical Judicial Statistics: 1949-2016 confirmed that a total of 1,602 ESS trials were concluded from 2012-2016, making up 40 percent of “other” trials. In 2016, as many as two-thirds of the 285 “other” trials concluded were ESS.

    Tibet

    Tibet covers one-eighth of China’s territory and has a relatively small population of 3.6 million people, but a disproportionately large number of China’s ESS trials are concluded in the region. With a level of transparency not seen in other provinces, the high court of the Tibet Autonomous Region has annually disclosed the number of ESS trials in the region for the years 2018-2020. In 2018, 25 people were tried for inciting splittism and providing funds to entities/individuals to endanger state security. The following year, 37 people were tried in 24 ESS cases involving the same offenses. The latest available 2021 work report stated that the number of ESS cases in 2020 increased to 65 involving 74 defendants.

    Official figures disclosed in Ganzi Prefecture also hint at the extent of crackdown in the Tibetan autonomous region in western Sichuan. Although trial numbers are not available, the prefecture’s procuratorate approved the arrest of nine individuals in seven ESS cases in 2020, according to its 2021 annual work report. That same year, 15 people were indicted in 12 ESS cases. While figures are available for Tibet and Ganzi, it is not known how many people were arrested, indicted, or tried in other Tibetan regions in Sichuan, Gansu, Ningxia, and Yunnan.

    Tibetans stand accused of ESS for sharing news and opinions on social media and for contacting relatives living in exile, sometimes with news of anti-government protests. Chinese authorities maintain tight control over information flows across the Tibetan regions. Dui Hua’s research into court judgments found the names of nine Tibetans who were tried for inciting splittism in Ganzi between June and August 2020. From September to December of the same year, six more Tibetans were tried in Ganzi, and seven Tibetans were tried for the same crime in its neighboring Aba Prefecture. These judgments provided no information beyond their names, the charges against them, and the dates of the judgment.

    Xinjiang

    Dui Hua’s analysis of data published in the annual work reports of the Xinjiang High People’s Court through the mid-2010s found that the autonomous region accounted for the largest percentage of ESS trials of any Chinese region. About 300 ESS trials were held in Xinjiang each year in 2013 and 2014, accounting for three quarters of China’s total ESS trials. The number decreased in 2015, but Xinjiang continued to account for almost half of the 214 ESS trials nationwide. The lack of publicly available data in recent years makes it impossible to ascertain whether the majority of ESS cases continued to be concluded in the region. The use of the vast network of re-education camps beginning in 2017 might have an impact on the number of ESS trials. Authorities in Xinjiang can easily stifle dissent under the pretext of vocational training without invoking ESS crimes.

    In 2021, transparency of ESS cases dipped to a record low. Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database has information on 68 individuals who were sentenced in ESS trials of first instance in 2020. With the mass purge of court judgments online, the Chinese government has undone some of its progress in judicial transparency and, in doing so, possibly harmed its own rule of law.

    Read Part II.

  • Shincheonji Church in China Before & Through the Pandemic

    Shincheonji Church in China Before & Through the Pandemic

    On September 16, 2012, Shincheonji Church hosted the 6th Shincheonji National Olympiad in Olympic Stadium in Seoul. Image credit: Junganghansik / CC BY-SA 3.0

    The Chinese government has long been vigilant of burgeoning Christian groups from South Korea. Of the 12 Christian groups identified as cult organizations in a circular issued by the Ministry of Public Security in 2000, three are from South Korea: The Unification Church, World Elijah Evangelical Mission, and Dami Mission. However, many more South Korean Christian groups have been targeted in religious crackdowns across China. Following its exploration of the case of Cho Young-joo and his Good News Mission, Dui Hua has found ample evidence of a clampdown on the Shincheonji Church of Jesus (新天地教会) by the Chinese government.

    Literally translated as New Heaven and New Earth Church, Shincheonji was singled out for fierce criticism in South Korea in early 2020 while the country was battling its COVID-19 outbreak. The controversy began with a Shincheonji congregant nicknamed Patient 31 who attended several church events in Daegu despite having COVID-19 symptoms. In March 2020, the city became the largest epicenter of the pandemic outside China, with a cluster of infections reportedly linked to this secretive Protestant group. Sincheonji’s founder Lee Man-hee was charged with and acquitted of obstructing efforts to stamp out the pandemic by deliberately withholding information about its membership from health authorities trying to conduct contact tracing. However, Lee was convicted of embezzling billions of Korean won and received a suspended prison sentence.

    Before the pandemic made Shincheonji a target of public scorn, Dui Hua’s research into government records found that China had long perceived the group to be a “cult organization” and source of religious infiltration and heresy. While some Shincheonji activity was identified in China as early as 1993, Chinese government sources say that “religious infiltration” in an organized manner in northeast provinces and eastern coastal regions began around 2010. A state-run media article in 2018 wrote that, “Under the banner of Christianity and being a public welfare organization,” Shincheonji deifies its founder Lee Man-hee and fabricates heresy about the “immortal body.” The article went on to say that by illegally collecting personal information,  Shincheonji  “steals state secrets, amasses vast fortunes, and endangers society.”

    A parked car with signs protesting Shincheonji Church in March 2020. Image credit: MatthieuRicard / CC0 via Wikimedia Commons

    Dui Hua’s research into local government yearbooks found about two dozen instances of religious clampdowns targeting Shincheonji in Beijing, Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Fuzhou, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Henan, Hubei, Hebei, and Shanxi before the pandemic. In 2018, local governments across China began banning Shincheonji in their anti-cult campaigns. The largest raid occurred in November 2018 in Dalian, Liaoning, where the church had grown to 2,000 members. Dozens of core members were admonished after police confiscated all their religious items. In the same year, police in Zhangwan District, Hubei, found that Shincheonji had been actively preaching among students during the summer holiday, and authorities detained 40 people in 11 cult cases involving Shincheonji as well as Falun Gong and Almighty God.

    Shincheonji members in South Korea and China were in frequent communication with each other. On February 29, 2020, South Korea’s Ministry of Justice said that a total of 3,600 Shincheonji followers entered South Korea from China between July 2019 and February 27, 2020. Of them, 42 members had entered the country from Wuhan during this period.

    In February 2020, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Shincheonji had a membership of 20,000 people across China. There were about 200 members in Wuhan when rumors surfaced in late 2019 about an unknown virus in the Chinese city which would become the epicenter of the epidemic. Members continued to hold meetings until December 2019 but stopped after they realized that their congregants had been infected with COVID-19. After December 2019, Shinchoenji moved online, continuing to share sermons and teachings virtually. Most members had returned home at the start of the Lunar New Year holiday in late January 2020.

    The same SCMP report also quoted a former Shincheonji missionary in Shanghai as saying that the church used to hold meetings every Wednesday and Sunday, attracting 300-400 people at a time. Despite multiple raids by police, church members continued to meet in smaller groups of eight to 10 people. The church’s secretive nature made it hard for the authorities to eradicate its activities, said the missionary.

    The first known criminal case involving six members of Shincheonji in Dalian, Liaoning. Image credit: www.12309.gov.cn

    Dui Hua’s research found the two criminal cases involving Shincheongji in China from the procuratorate website. In both cases, the suspects were accused of fraud. A notice posted on November 11, 2020 indicated that six Shincheonji members were detained for “organizing and using a Korean religion to promote feudal superstition” in Dalian, Liaoning, by falsely saying “that Shincheonji and its founder Lee Man-hee can manipulate one’s life and death.” The case was transferred to Dalian High-Tech Industrial Zone Procuratorate for review, but no further information is publicly available.

    A female Shincheonji member in Guiyang, Guizhou, was indicted for fraud on February 3, 2021. Image credit: www.12309.gov.cn

    The second case involves one female criminal suspect surnamed Chu, who was detained in Guiyang, Guizhou, on September 27, 2020 and arrested 37 days later on November 3. According to the indictment issued on February 3, 2021, Chu was appointed by Shincheonji’s Chinese headquarters in Changchun to proselytize in Guiyang, but her status as a cleric had not been recognized by China’s religious bureau. Chu was accused of receiving 11,205-yuan in donations from church members in the two months since April 2020. The prosecutor recommended that the court give Chu a lenient prison sentence of six months because Chu admitted her guilt.

    China is not alone in discrediting minority religious groups like Shincheonji. Mainstream Protestant denominations in South Korea call it a “cult” because of its secretive nature and unconventional beliefs. Lee Man-hee claimed that he is the second coming of Jesus Christ uniquely capable of deciphering the Bible’s Book of Revelation. Despite having been acquitted over the COVID case surge in South Korea, Shincheonji continues to come under fire for spreading the coronavirus. Chinese news media sources have reinforced the notion that Shincheonji is a virus spreader and a fraudulent cult, just as some in South Korea and further abroad continue to regard the group with fear, resentment, and confusion.

  • Article 299: Criminalizing Disrespect of the National Flag, Part II

    Article 299: Criminalizing Disrespect of the National Flag, Part II

    Read Part I here.

    A flag hoisting ceremony in Tiananmen Square in 2005. Image credit: 武当山人 / CC BY-SA 3.0

    The desecration of national symbols is a crime under Chinese law. The National Flag Law was enacted in June 1990 and was extended to cover the national emblem one year later. While the laws were merely codes governing formalities to display the national symbols, a provision to the 1979 Criminal Law added in 1990 made intentionally desecrating the national flag and symbol in public a crime punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment.

    This article explores the often-ignored topic of flag desecration in China. Part I looked at trends in sentencing and the law’s application across different cases. Part II discusses how the law is applied to different groups like Falun Gong, Tibetans, and Uyghurs. While most publicly disclosed cases involve “ordinary” offenders who did not desecrate the flag for political reasons, the same acts committed by practitioners of Falun Gong and ethnic minorities tend to result in lengthier prison sentences.

    Political Cases 

    In cases where national symbols in China are desecrated in protest of public policy, like those of Wang Chunhua (王春花) and Lie Jinjie (刘杰津) discussed in Part I, the starting point for sentencing appears to get noticeably longer. Two other cases, which involved criticism of the CCP and so-called “anti-China elements,” also resulted in lengthier prison sentences. However, the circumstances of these cases have not been made entirely clear in available sources.

    1. Tianjin’s first flag desecration case concerned Wu Zhaoming (吴兆明), who was sentenced to two years in prison in December 2017 for cutting up and damaging a total of 66 national flags, allegedly in a bid to express his discontent with the CCP. Some of the damaged flags and flagpoles were found in garbage bins and on sideroads. Available sources did not explain why Wu became dissatisfied with the CCP.
    2. In a separate case in Changsha, Hunan, Wu Di (吴迪) was sentenced to 18 months in prison in January 2020 for setting fire to four flags with a lighter. Prosecutors alleged that Wu experienced depression due to unemployment and became “thrill-seeking” after he browsed overseas “anti-China” websites. From October 1-2, the 70th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China, he circulated a video to his friends of himself burning the flags on a university campus.

    Falun Gong 

    As shown in the chart below, from 1998-2016, only five people had received the maximum sentences of three years in prison. Of them, Dui Hua found that two were Falun Gong practitioners:

    Chart 1. Sentencing breakdown of defendants convicted of Article 299

    Source: Records of People’s Court Historical Judicial Statistics: 1949-2016
    An early case involved Zhang Jingzhi (张敬之) and Wen Yanyu (文廷玉); each was sentenced to three years in prison for throwing paint-filled eggs at flags at a public memorial in Chongqing in August 2009. The heavy sentences could be attributed in part to the timing and setting of their protest. The flags were displayed at a memorial for “revolutionary martyrs”—300 Communist political prisoners held and then slaughtered by Kuomintang security agents in Chongqing’s notorious Zhazidong Prison Camp on November 27, 1949, as the city fell to the People’s Liberation Army.
    According to media accounts, national and local leaders expressed concern about this flag desecration case, and personal instructions to investigators were reportedly issued by then-Chongqing governor Bo Xilai—whose use of public patriotic campaigns and a heavy-handed crackdown on corruption and organized crime was seen by some as an attempt to generate popular support to become a member of the powerful Politburo Standing Committee.
    Another pair of Falun Gong practitioners, Dong Zhiyong (董志勇) and Zhi Xunlin (茆训林), in Jiangsu were sentenced for both Article 299 and Article 300 on November 2016. Although Article 299 in this case only carried one year in prison, they ended up serving prison sentences of 57-69 months because of Article 300. Chinese government sources said that the duo used sickles to damage 114 flags flown on street lampposts in the run up to the 64th National Day.
    Tibetans 
    From time to time, Tibetans have undertaken flag desecration to express their blatant rejection of Beijing’s repressive religious policy, desire for genuine autonomy, and even independence. In her blog Invisible Tibet, prominent writer Tsering Woeser chronicled multiple instances of what appeared to be flag desecration incidents across the Tibetan plateau amid the 2008 Lhasa Riots. Protesters across cities and townships reportedly raised the “snow lion flag,” a symbol of the Tibetan independence movement, in place of the Chinese national flag just months ahead of the Beijing Summer Olympics.
    The Tibetan flag carried during Olympic torch run demonstrations in San Francisco, California, on April 9, 2008. Image credit: Victor Lee / CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
    However, many flag burning protesters might not have been charged with Article 299. Court statistics indicate that only three ethnic minorities were convicted of flag desecration from 2008-2009. It is possible they were convicted of the more serious charges of splittism or inciting splittism, with the former carrying a potential death sentence.
    Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database has information on two Article 299 cases from 2011-2013. The two cases, both reported by Radio Free Asia, were likely linked to the self-immolation protests involving over a hundred Tibetan women and men who set themselves ablaze to highlight resistance to Beijing’s rule:
    1. Around 2011, Sonam Norgye received a three-year prison sentence in Basu [Pashoe] County, Tibet, for hauling down and soiling with feces a Chinese flag that had been raised by government workers in the area;
    2. In September 2013, a court in Sichuan’s Kardze County reportedly handed prison terms of between one and four years to three monks accused of pulling down the Chinese national flag at a local school. Because Article 299 only carries a maximum sentence of three years, one of the monks might have been convicted of an additional crime.
    Dui Hua previously reported the case of Garab (嘎热) who was accused of desecrating the flag out of frustration over the disaster relief efforts for the devastating 7.8-magnitude earthquake that rocked Nepal on April 25, 2015. The earthquake also brought causalities and widespread damage to southwestern Tibet, including his home in Tingri County.
    According to the court judgment, Garab found an old Chinese national flag in the ruins of his former home weeks after the April quake. Prosecutors alleged that he burned holes in the flag and then used a marker to write “Free Tibet” on it. After allegedly hiding the flag under his mattress for several days, he discarded it along a path where some village children found it. Members of a work group stationed in the village noticed the children playing with the flag and reported the incident to local authorities. Garab received a prison sentence of two and a half years in November 2015.
    Uyghurs
     
    A picture of Jama Mosque in Kargilik County, Kashgar, with China’s flag and propaganda banners that read “Love the Party, Love the Country.” The photo is undated but was published by Radio Free America (RFA) in August 2018. Image credit: RFA via an unnamed RFA listener

     

    The PPDB also has information on two Article 299 cases involving Uyghurs. In both cases, the Uyghur defendants received relatively lengthier prison sentences.
    1. On February 20, 2013, two Uyghurs were sentenced to 24-30 months’ imprisonment in Wensu County, Aksu Prefecture. State news media sources claimed that they refused to perform salah, the obligatory Muslim prayers which are performed five times each day, in mosques where the national flag was displayed. They pulled down and burned the Chinese national flag on December 26, 2012.This trial was attended by a total of 1,208 people, including county congress representatives, religious figures, and villagers. The large size of the court audience suggested that the trial was conducted in the form of a public sentencing rally, which is often held in large outdoor public spaces like plazas and stadiums where the accused are bound and flanked by police in front of crowds of spectators that can number in the thousands. While public sentencing rallies in Xinjiang are typically held in cases involving violence, drugs, and state security, this case indicates that Uyghurs in flag desecration cases can also be brought to a public rally.
    2. Just a month after the flag desecration case in Wensu County, a similar case was concluded in Awat County, also in Aksu Prefecture. According to news media sources, all mosques in the county were required to fly the Chinese national flag after August 2011. A muezzin (the person who performs the call to prayer) put the flag into a fireplace; he blamed the flag for the drop in mosque worshippers. Concerned about the choking smoke, he threw the half-burned flag outside of the mosque. He received a 30-month prison sentence on March 19, 2013. 

    Article 299: Beyond the National Flag


    It is worth noting that the scope of activities punishable under Article 299 is expanding. The tenth amendment to the Criminal Law, which went into force in November 2017, made insults to the national anthem a crime punishable under the same article. Dui Hua previously reported the first known such case involving a female member of Almighty God in Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. She received a 30-month prison sentence for composing “the Song of Satan’s Victory,” similar in tune to the national anthem.
    Effective March 1, 2021, a new provision added to Article 299 extended the same punishment to those who “misrepresent, defame, profane or deny the deeds and spirits of heroes and martyrs.” On the same day, Chinese blogger Qiu Ziming (仇子明) became the first person to be convicted of this new crime over his posts that authorities say demeaned the Chinese military casualties of a border clash with Indian soldiers in June 2020. Qiu, also a victim of China’s practice of airing forced confessions on state television, is serving his eight months’ prison sentence in Jiangsu until October 19, 2021.
    Footage of Qiu’s televised forced confession. Image credit: Hanqiu.com
    China is not alone in taking an aggressive stance towards desecration, but questions remain as to whether sentencing is consistent, appropriate, and fair to all. The cases demonstrated in this post suggest that Falun Gong practitioners, Tibetans, Uyghurs, and those who commit the crime as a symbolic political expression against the CCP are at higher risk of receiving longer prison sentences. As Xi continues to cement the notion that a deep love for the CCP and even himself is the same as a deep love for the nation, it is likely that more people who do not share his version of patriotism will run afoul of an ever-expanding Article 299.
  • Mainland China Administrative Deacon Station: Leaders Receive Lengthy Sentences

    Mainland China Administrative Deacon Station: Leaders Receive Lengthy Sentences

    Xiao County People’s Court in Anhui Province, where Wang Yongmin was convicted of violating Article 300. Image credit: Suzhou Intermediate Court WeChat account

    In 2000, the Ministry of Public Security issued a circular concerning the identification and banning of 14 evil cult or sect organizations. Of them, 12 were unorthodox Christian groups. Following hefty prison sentences given to founders in the 1990s, many of these groups have been severely weakened, driven underground, or have gone extinct. After state repression of religion intensified in late 2012, there appears to be a consensus that Almighty God has become the most suppressed Christian sect in China, but the continuing crackdown on other smaller and lesser-known Christian groups which are similarly considered “unorthodox” has not garnered the same level of scrutiny.

    A few groups have survived the intense government suppression and even resurfaced recently after two decades of inactivity. One of them is the Mainland China Administrative Deacon Station (MCADS 中华大陆行政执事站). Dui Hua’s research into court judgments found that its founder Wang Yongmin (王永民) is serving his second jail term in Anhui for 10 years. The now-67-year-old was found guilty of “organizing or using a cult to undermine implementation of the law” on December 27, 2019 and is scheduled to complete his prison sentence on March 22, 2028. In 1995, Wang began a 20-year prison sentence for “disturbing social order” and “fraud,” serving 17 years before being released early in February 2012.

    MCADS was among the earliest doomsday Christian sects banned by the Chinese government in November 1995. Formerly a core member of the Shouters (呼喊派), founded by Li Changshou in the United States in 1962, Wang set up MCADS as an offshoot in Anhui 1994. According to Chinese government sources, Wang proclaimed himself to be the “one true deacon” to seize power from Satan and create the Kingdom of God.

    A notice circulated in 2000 about banned religious organizations, including the Mainland China Administrative Deacon Station. This notice was recirculated in 2015 after a murder case involving Almighty God. Image credit: China Youth Network

    Additionally, the Chinese government asserts that MCADS members “confront the CCP and government, rape women, and swindle money”—allegations that remain commonplace against many “cult organizations.” At its peak during the early 1990s, thousands of MCADS members distributed “reactionary propaganda” in 69 cities across 20 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions. Wang was sentenced to 20 years in prison for fraud and disturbing social order in 1996, one year after MCADS was banned by the Chinese government.

    Despite being convicted over two decades ago, Wang continues to be prominently featured in China’s anti-cult propaganda. His case is labeled one of the top ten cult cases in China by kaiwind.com, which Global Times describes as a non-governmental website devoted to “revealing facts about Falun Gong.” Also listed as the top ten cases were founders and leading members from other unorthodox Christian and Buddhist groups. Some of them were executed, including:

    1. Wu Yangming (吴扬明), founder of the now seemingly defunct Beili Wang, or Anointed King, was executed in December 1995 for rape;
    2. Liu Jiaguo (刘家国), leader of the Zhusheng Jiao, or the Lord God Sect was executed in October 1999 for Article 300, rape, and fraud;
    3. Xu Wenku (徐文库), who founded sanban furen, or the Three Grades of Servants, was found guilty of murder, fraud, and using a cult to cause death. His execution took place in November 2006.

    Like MCADS, both Beili Wang and Zhusheng Jiao are offshoots of the Shouters.

    A court judgment previously uploaded to China Judgements Online in September 2020—and since removed from the site—indicated that Anhui’s Xiao County People’s Court convicted Wang again on December 27, 2019, alongside four other MCADS leaders who were also accused of violating Article 300.

    Source: China Judgements Online

    The judgment stated that Wang resumed his role as the leader of MCADS upon his prison release in February 2012. After formulating the church’s agenda and programs with the four defendants in the same case, Wang set up service centers in Xiao County and re-established contacts with former members of MCADS. The judgment also stated that another defendant, Li Yuhong, printed 9,000 pamphlets for distribution in Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, and Shandong. However, no information was given about how many people had rejoined the sect.

    One noteworthy allegation against Wang is his effort to gain overseas recognition of MCADS as a religious group. Wang allegedly attempted to contact Living Stream Ministry via a professor at the Nanjing Union Theological Seminary. Living Stream Ministry is a Christian book publisher based in Anaheim, California. It was founded by Shouters’ founder Li Changshou. Wang and the other defendants were detained on March 16, 2018.

    Article 300 mandates a minimum sentence of seven years’ imprisonment for “especially serious” or otherwise grave acts. The sentences given to Wang and Li can be considered severe. A major reason is that Wang reoffended. Although Li was a first-time offender, the 9,000 leaflets he printed were more than sufficient to render the circumstances “especially serious.” Effective since February 1, 2017, the joint interpretation of Article 300 states that a circumstance is considered “especially serious” when a defendant manufactures over 5,000 “cult” leaflets.

    These cases reflect how the CCP’s campaign to control and restrict religious plurality extends to smaller, lesser-known Christian groups. However, some groups like the Mainland China Administrative Deacon Station continue to reemerge despite crackdowns even as hefty prison sentences face the leadership of any group that can be considered “unorthodox.”

  • Chinese Asylum Seekers in Bangkok, Part I

    Chinese Asylum Seekers in Bangkok, Part I

    The United Nations building in Bangkok, Thailand. Image credit: dsin_travel / CC BY 2.0

    China has consistently ranked among the top 20 refugee producing countries every year since 2003, according to statistics published by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The latest statistics published in June 2021 indicated that China was 18th on the UNHCR’s list at the end of 2020. The number of UNHCR-registered refugees originally from China reached 175,585. Additionally, there were 107,864 Chinese asylum seekers around the globe with pending claims. The number of asylum seekers increased nine-fold from just 11,375 in 2011, the year before paramount leader Xi Jinping assumed power.

    Table 1. UNHCR’s Forced Displacement Statistics (Country of Origin: China)

    Source: UNHCR, Refugee Data Finder, 2003-2020
    Many UNHCR-recognized refugees from China consider the West a destination of choice for resettlement. After taking the first step in the long journey to asylum, many refugees from China sojourn in Thailand where they await refugee status determination. It is an administrative process by which the Bangkok-based regional office of UNHCR for Southeast Asia determines whether a person seeking protection qualifies as a refugee under international law. Bangkok is home to an estimated 8,000 urban refugees—hailing from Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

    Dui Hua is not aware of any official statistics about Chinese asylum seekers in Thailand. However, Bei Ling, founder of “Home of Refugees” in Thailand in 2015, estimated that more than 300 Chinese asylum seekers were in the country as of October 2018.

    This is the first entry in a two-part series examining issues facing Chinese asylum seekers in Thailand. This entry explores who they are and why they have fled China. The second entry will look at how and why Thailand falls short of being a safe haven. Prospective refugees with or without valid passports risk criminal detention for overstaying in Thailand. Their predicaments also include indefinite wait times for third country resettlement. The fact that Thailand fails to abide by the principle of non-refoulement also places a heightened risk of repatriation for those seeking protection from persecution at home.

    Why Thailand?

    Thailand started to become a popular place of transit for Chinese refugees about two decades ago. Prior to that, those with a well-founded fear of persecution decamped to colonial Hong Kong to flee political persecution thanks to the lax border controls at the time. Since China resumed sovereignty over the former British colony in 1997, Hong Kong has ceased to be a popular destination for asylum protection.

    For decades, Hong Kong has been a magnet for refugees. It is troubling to see a spiked increase in asylum seekers from Hong Kong since civil unrest triggered first by the now-rescinded extradition bill, and then by the sweeping arrests made under the National Security Law. The law criminalizes secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign forces. At the end of 2020, there were 487 registered asylum seekers from Hong Kong, up from 22 in 2018 before mass protests erupted in June 2019.

    While a portion of those who fled China could be considered “economic migrants” in search of sustenance and a livelihood, China’s much-lauded economic success has fallen short of stopping people from fleeing abroad. Critics of one-party rule, adherents of banned religious groups, civil rights activists, petitioners, and ethnic minority groups are continuing to seek asylum protection abroad via Thailand.

    Chinese nationals find entry to Thailand easier than other neighboring countries or regions including South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, mainly because they benefit from the 15-day visas on arrival available to them (Thailand has suspended this arrangement due to the outbreak of coronavirus). Entry to elsewhere requires obtaining a pre-arranged visa.

    The Thailand-Laos overland crossing checkpoint at Sop Ruak. Image credit: Slleong / CC0 via Wikimedia Commons
    Because of geographical proximity, those without proper legal documents can resort to traveling illicitly overland from Yunnan with the help of smugglers. Chiang Mai, for instance, is reachable by land transport from Yunnan’s border in nine hours. From Chiang Mai, it is another half-day journey to Bangkok, where asylum seekers file their refugee claims at the UNHCR office.

    Why Flee?

    Political Prisoners

    Geng He (耿和), wife of human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng, is arguably the most notable example of a family member of a Chinese political prisoner fleeing political persecution via Thailand. She left for Bangkok with her children in January 2009 while her husband was serving his suspended sentence for inciting subversion. Gao’s entire family faced reprisal because Gao took on controversial cases and publicly called for an end to the persecution of Falun Gong. While in China, Gao’s children were prevented from attending school. Geng and her children stayed in Bangkok for two months before resettling in the United States. However, it must be noted that such speedy granting of asylum by the United States was only expedited by international attention. As will be discussed in Part II, the wait time for third country resettlement is often indefinite. Today, Gao remains under house arrest even after his sentence expired in August 2014.

    Another asylum application involved Hua Yong (华涌), who arrived in Canada in April 2021. Hua is a well-known painter from Beijing who posted videos documenting forced evictions and demolitions in poor neighborhoods. He was placed under residential surveillance at a designated location for three months after meeting with the father of Dong Yaoqiong, a girl who was admitted to a psychiatric facility after she live-streamed a video of herself accusing the Chinese Communist Party of “thought control.” Hua escaped to Thailand in September 2019.

    Dui Hua previously assisted former political prisoner Li Huangming (李焕明) with verifying his claim for political asylum. Before being granted political asylum in Finland in May 2013, Li fled to Bangkok after he completed his nine years’ sentence for inciting subversion in September 2010. The conviction stemmed from him distributing or planning to distribute tens of thousands of “reactionary” flyers in Shenzhen. While awaiting refugee resettlement, Li wrote stories about other Chinese asylum seekers in Bangkok for Boxun and other NGOs. In an article published by Human Rights in China in November 2012, Li wrote that Bangkok’s UNHCR office had a special team of interpreters and officials to handle the surge of applications from Chinese dissidents.

    Li wrote about changing demographics of Chinese asylum seekers. A significant number of applications were submitted by petitioners contrary to the popular belief that most Chinese refugees are supporters of China’s democracy movement, violators of the one-child policy, and adherents of banned religious groups such as Falun Gong and house churches.

    Petitioners

    Li’s observation is in line with what has been reported in unofficial news sources in recent years. Petitioners fled to Bangkok because they face reprisal in China after lodging futile complaints about land expropriation or forced demolition in their home cities.

    Petitioner Zhang Shufeng protests at UNHCR’s Bangkok office while holding a bilingual slogan that says “Request UNHCR help.” Image credit: Mirror Media

    Zhang Shufeng (张淑凤), a native of Beijing, fled to Bangkok in 2014 and obtained refugee status three years later. Taiwan-based Mirror Media reported that Zhang’s family was subjected to house arrest, beatings, and constant surveillance by government-hired thugs in China. Surveillance intensified during the “Two Sessions” (the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) and other political events. In Bangkok, Zhang protested at the UNHCR office while holding a bilingual slogan saying “Request UNHCR help,” in the hope that the UNHCR would expedite her resettlement process.

    In January 2017, unofficial news media reported that Beijing evictee Wang Ling (王玲) joined her son who had arrived in Bangkok in December 2016 to maximize the chance of them both getting through Chinese immigration checks. Wang claimed that she had received death threats from police after pursuing complaints about the forced demolition of her home. In 2008, she was sentenced to 15 months of re-education through labor and had been detained a total of 11 times. The news of abnormal deaths in police custody made Wang fear for her life.

    Religious Persecution

    Falun Gong practitioners still make up a large portion of asylum seekers in Bangkok. Many of them have fled persecution after the suppression of the spiritual sect began in 1999. One widely publicized case concerns Song Zhiyu (宋志宇), who escaped to Thailand in early 2014 via Myanmar after completing his three-and-a-half-year sentence for “organizing a cult to undermine implementation of the law.” In a Reuters interview in 2016, Song recounted how he “was spirited across a river into Thailand and hidden in the luggage hold of a Bangkok-bound bus.” Song claimed that Thailand had about 160 Falun Gong refugees and asylum seekers. The Thai authorities have taken an interest in them owing to the close bond between the military junta and Chinese government since 2014. More than 29 practitioners had been arrested on immigration charges under the military junta, said Song.

    Members of the Early Rain Covenant Church in Chengdu have also made their escapes via Thailand and joined the ranks of asylum seekers before pastor Wang Yi (王怡) was sentenced to nine years in prison for subversion and illegal business activity in December 2019. The crackdown on this prominent house church prompted Liao Qiang (廖强) to travel to Thailand with five of his family members in July 2019. They stayed in Thailand only for three days before transiting to Taiwan. However, their stay in Taiwan was only temporary because Taiwan does not have a refugee law. Liao and his family left for the United States on June 29, 2021 after receiving political asylum there.

    Civil Activism

    New groups of asylum seekers have emerged following Xi Jinping’s sweeping crackdown on civil society since he took power in 2012. Some were participants of the “Southern Street Movement,” a series of small-scale street banner protests that occurred in southern cities such as Guangzhou and Shenzhen from 2012-2013. The movement called for democratic reform and government officials to disclose assets.

    Among the “Southern Street Movement” asylum seekers were Wu Yuhua (吴玉华) and her husband Yang Chong (杨崇). They fled China in early 2015 after being targeted by police for supporting the protests in Guangzhou. Two years later, the couple was granted refugee status in Bangkok.

    Yang Chong holding up a banner calling for human rights and elections in 2015. Image credit: Bnn.co
    Supporters of the New Citizens’ Movement have also sought political asylum. The movement was promoted by prominent legal scholar and civil rights lawyer Xu Zhiyong, who was formally arrested for subversion in January 2021 after calling on Xi Jinping to step down. Sharing similar aspirations with Xu, Yan Bojun (颜伯钧) arrived in Bangkok in early 2015 after several futile attempts to leave China. In 2016, Yan published a book in Japan recounting the suppression he faced after helping Xu provide legal assistance to victims of social injustice. He had been placed under criminal detention several times in China; the longest one lasted 30 days.
    Liu Xinglian (刘兴联), another UNHCR-recognized refugee, was arrested in Hubei for inciting subversion in June 2015 due to his involvement in Qin Yongmin’s “China Human Rights Watch.” The group promoted the idea of a peaceful transformation to a democracy and circulated Qin’s articles about the inevitable demise of China’s autocratic rule. After Liu was released on bail in April 2016, he managed to escape to Bangkok in 2017.

    Uyghurs & Kazakhs

    Pakistan, which borders Xinjiang, was once a popular escape route for Uyghurs seeking to escape Chinese state repression, but its growing economic reliance on China has made Uyghurs fear for their future. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan said as recently as July 2021 that, “What they [China] say about the programs in Xinjiang, we accept it.”  In the mid-2010s, a large group of Uyghurs made a long detour south to Bangkok before human rights abuses associated with the “re-education camps” made international headlines. However, Uyghurs are typically not interested in registering in Thailand as asylum seekers, according to a UNHCR statement in 2015. They were only looking for ways to get to Turkey, a destination of choice with an estimated 50,000 Uyghur residents.

    Thai authorities have confirmed a staggering number of Uyghur escapees in Thailand. In 2014, a group of 424 Uyghurs were detained in Thailand. In July 2015, over 170 Uyghurs were released to start new lives in Turkey, but a week later the Thai government repatriated 109 refugees to China. In July 2017, Thai immigration police said about 60 Uyghurs remained in detention centers across the country. As recently as 2020, their number was down to about 50. They were remnants of the Uyghurs who fled to Thailand in 2014.

    Evidence also suggests that ethnic Kazakhs have fled Xinjiang’s massive surveillance and detention campaign. A recent case involved Qalymbek Shahman, who Uzbek authorities sent back to Thailand after being denied entry to Kazakhstan in January 2019. He was subjected to intense racial profiling in China, making it impossible for him to make a living. “I would have my ID checked every 50 to 100 meters when I was in Xinjiang…Whether it was getting on a plane, on a train or other public transportation, they would spend half an hour checking me out every time.” His clients became concerned as to why he was routinely monitored and consequently stopped doing businesses with him.

    Chinese asylum seekers in Thailand face a number of problems beyond finding safe haven, including the lack of legal recognition. The second instalment will explore why and how Thailand falls short in protecting asylum seekers, and the challenges asylum seekers encounter once in Thailand.

    Read Part II here.

  • Chinese Asylum Seekers in Bangkok, Part I

    Chinese Asylum Seekers in Bangkok, Part I

    The United Nations building in Bangkok, Thailand. Image credit: dsin_travel / CC BY 2.0 

    China has consistently ranked among the top 20 refugee producing countries every year since 2003, according to statistics published by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The latest statistics published in June 2021 indicated that China was 18th on the UNHCR’s list at the end of 2020. The number of UNHCR-registered refugees originally from China reached 175,585. Additionally, there were 107,864 Chinese asylum seekers around the globe with pending claims. The number of asylum seekers increased nine-fold from just 11,375 in 2011, the year before paramount leader Xi Jinping assumed power.  

    Table 1. UNHCR’s Forced Displacement Statistics (Country of Origin: China)

    Source: UNHCR, Refugee Data Finder, 2003-2020 
    Many UNHCR-recognized refugees from China consider the West a destination of choice for resettlement. After taking the first step in the long journey to asylum, many refugees from China sojourn in Thailand where they await refugee status determination. It is an administrative process by which the Bangkok-based regional office of UNHCR for Southeast Asia determines whether a person seeking protection qualifies as a refugee under international law. Bangkok is home to an estimated 8,000 urban refugees—hailing from Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.  

    Dui Hua is not aware of any official statistics about Chinese asylum seekers in Thailand. However, Bei Ling, founder of “Home of Refugees” in Thailand in 2015, estimated that more than 300 Chinese asylum seekers were in the country as of October 2018.  

    This is the first entry in a two-part series examining issues facing Chinese asylum seekers in Thailand. This entry explores who they are and why they have fled China. The second entry will look at how and why Thailand falls short of being a safe haven. Prospective refugees with or without valid passports risk criminal detention for overstaying in Thailand. Their predicaments also include indefinite wait times for third country resettlement. The fact that Thailand fails to abide by the principle of non-refoulement also places a heightened risk of repatriation for those seeking protection from persecution at home. 

    Why Thailand?

    Thailand started to become a popular place of transit for Chinese refugees about two decades ago. Prior to that, those with a well-founded fear of persecution decamped to colonial Hong Kong to flee political persecution thanks to the lax border controls at the time. Since China resumed sovereignty over the former British colony in 1997, Hong Kong has ceased to be a popular destination for asylum protection.  

    For decades, Hong Kong has been a magnet for refugees. It is troubling to see a spiked increase in asylum seekers from Hong Kong since civil unrest triggered first by the now-rescinded extradition bill, and then by the sweeping arrests made under the National Security Law. The law criminalizes secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign forces. At the end of 2020, there were 487 registered asylum seekers from Hong Kong, up from 22 in 2018 before mass protests erupted in June 2019. 

    While a portion of those who fled China could be considered “economic migrants” in search of sustenance and a livelihood, China’s much-lauded economic success has fallen short of stopping people from fleeing abroad. Critics of one-party rule, adherents of banned religious groups, civil rights activists, petitioners, and ethnic minority groups are continuing to seek asylum protection abroad via Thailand.  

    Chinese nationals find entry to Thailand easier than other neighboring countries or regions including South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, mainly because they benefit from the 15-day visas on arrival available to them (Thailand has suspended this arrangement due to the outbreak of coronavirus). Entry to elsewhere requires obtaining a pre-arranged visa. 

    The Thailand-Laos overland crossing checkpoint at Sop Ruak. Image credit: Slleong / CC0 via Wikimedia Commons 

    Because of geographical proximity, those without proper legal documents can resort to traveling illicitly overland from Yunnan with the help of smugglers. Chiang Mai, for instance, is reachable by land transport from Yunnan’s border in nine hours. From Chiang Mai, it is another half-day journey to Bangkok, where asylum seekers file their refugee claims at the UNHCR office. 

    Why Flee?

    Political Prisoners

    Geng He (耿和), wife of human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng, is arguably the most notable example of a family member of a Chinese political prisoner fleeing political persecution via Thailand. She left for Bangkok with her children in January 2009 while her husband was serving his suspended sentence for inciting subversion. Gao’s entire family faced reprisal because Gao took on controversial cases and publicly called for an end to the persecution of Falun Gong. While in China, Gao’s children were prevented from attending school. Geng and her children stayed in Bangkok for two months before resettling in the United States. However, it must be noted that such speedy granting of asylum by the United States was only expedited by international attention. As will be discussed in Part II, the wait time for third country resettlement is often indefinite. Today, Gao remains under house arrest even after his sentence expired in August 2014. 

    Another asylum application involved Hua Yong (华涌), who arrived in Canada in April 2021. Hua is a well-known painter from Beijing who posted videos documenting forced evictions and demolitions in poor neighborhoods. He was placed under residential surveillance at a designated location for three months after meeting with the father of Dong Yaoqiong, a girl who was admitted to a psychiatric facility after she live-streamed a video of herself accusing the Chinese Communist Party of “thought control.” Hua escaped to Thailand in September 2019. 

    Dui Hua previously assisted former political prisoner Li Huangming (李焕明) with verifying his claim for political asylum. Before being granted political asylum in Finland in May 2013, Li fled to Bangkok after he completed his nine years’ sentence for inciting subversion in September 2010. The conviction stemmed from him distributing or planning to distribute tens of thousands of “reactionary” flyers in Shenzhen. While awaiting refugee resettlement, Li wrote stories about other Chinese asylum seekers in Bangkok for Boxun and other NGOs. In an article published by Human Rights in China in November 2012, Li wrote that Bangkok’s UNHCR office had a special team of interpreters and officials to handle the surge of applications from Chinese dissidents.  

    Li wrote about changing demographics of Chinese asylum seekers. A significant number of applications were submitted by petitioners contrary to the popular belief that most Chinese refugees are supporters of China’s democracy movement, violators of the one-child policy, and adherents of banned religious groups such as Falun Gong and house churches. 

    Petitioners

    Li’s observation is in line with what has been reported in unofficial news sources in recent years. Petitioners fled to Bangkok because they face reprisal in China after lodging futile complaints about land expropriation or forced demolition in their home cities.  

    Petitioner Zhang Shufeng protests at UNHCR’s Bangkok office while holding a bilingual slogan that says “Request UNHCR help.” Image credit: Mirror Media 

    Zhang Shufeng (张淑凤), a native of Beijing, fled to Bangkok in 2014 and obtained refugee status three years later. Taiwan-based Mirror Media reported that Zhang’s family was subjected to house arrest, beatings, and constant surveillance by government-hired thugs in China. Surveillance intensified during the “Two Sessions” (the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) and other political events. In Bangkok, Zhang protested at the UNHCR office while holding a bilingual slogan saying “Request UNHCR help,” in the hope that the UNHCR would expedite her resettlement process.  

    In January 2017, unofficial news media reported that Beijing evictee Wang Ling (王玲) joined her son who had arrived in Bangkok in December 2016 to maximize the chance of them both getting through Chinese immigration checks. Wang claimed that she had received death threats from police after pursuing complaints about the forced demolition of her home. In 2008, she was sentenced to 15 months of re-education through labor and had been detained a total of 11 times. The news of abnormal deaths in police custody made Wang fear for her life.

    Religious Persecution

    Falun Gong practitioners still make up a large portion of asylum seekers in Bangkok. Many of them have fled persecution after the suppression of the spiritual sect began in 1999. One widely publicized case concerns Song Zhiyu (宋志宇), who escaped to Thailand in early 2014 via Myanmar after completing his three-and-a-half-year sentence for “organizing a cult to undermine implementation of the law.” In a Reuters interview in 2016, Song recounted how he “was spirited across a river into Thailand and hidden in the luggage hold of a Bangkok-bound bus.” Song claimed that Thailand had about 160 Falun Gong refugees and asylum seekers. The Thai authorities have taken an interest in them owing to the close bond between the military junta and Chinese government since 2014. More than 29 practitioners had been arrested on immigration charges under the military junta, said Song. 

    Members of the Early Rain Covenant Church in Chengdu have also made their escapes via Thailand and joined the ranks of asylum seekers before pastor Wang Yi (王怡) was sentenced to nine years in prison for subversion and illegal business activity in December 2019. The crackdown on this prominent house church prompted Liao Qiang (廖强) to travel to Thailand with five of his family members in July 2019. They stayed in Thailand only for three days before transiting to Taiwan. However, their stay in Taiwan was only temporary because Taiwan does not have a refugee law. Liao and his family left for the United States on June 29, 2021 after receiving political asylum there. 

    Civil Activism

    New groups of asylum seekers have emerged following Xi Jinping’s sweeping crackdown on civil society since he took power in 2012. Some were participants of the “Southern Street Movement,” a series of small-scale street banner protests that occurred in southern cities such as Guangzhou and Shenzhen from 2012-2013. The movement called for democratic reform and government officials to disclose assets.  

    Among the “Southern Street Movement” asylum seekers were Wu Yuhua (吴玉华) and her husband Yang Chong (杨崇). They fled China in early 2015 after being targeted by police for supporting the protests in Guangzhou. Two years later, the couple was granted refugee status in Bangkok.  

    Yang Chong holding up a banner calling for human rights and elections in 2015. Image credit: Bnn.co
    Supporters of the New Citizens’ Movement have also sought political asylum. The movement was promoted by prominent legal scholar and civil rights lawyer Xu Zhiyong, who was formally arrested for subversion in January 2021 after calling on Xi Jinping to step down. Sharing similar aspirations with Xu, Yan Bojun (颜伯钧) arrived in Bangkok in early 2015 after several futile attempts to leave China. In 2016, Yan published a book in Japan recounting the suppression he faced after helping Xu provide legal assistance to victims of social injustice. He had been placed under criminal detention several times in China; the longest one lasted 30 days. 
    Liu Xinglian (刘兴联), another UNHCR-recognized refugee, was arrested in Hubei for inciting subversion in June 2015 due to his involvement in Qin Yongmin’s “China Human Rights Watch.” The group promoted the idea of a peaceful transformation to a democracy and circulated Qin’s articles about the inevitable demise of China’s autocratic rule. After Liu was released on bail in April 2016, he managed to escape to Bangkok in 2017.  

    Uyghurs & Kazakhs

    Pakistan, which borders Xinjiang, was once a popular escape route for Uyghurs seeking to escape Chinese state repression, but its growing economic reliance on China has made Uyghurs fear for their future. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan said as recently as July 2021 that, “What they [China] say about the programs in Xinjiang, we accept it.”  In the mid-2010s, a large group of Uyghurs made a long detour south to Bangkok before human rights abuses associated with the “re-education camps” made international headlines. However, Uyghurs are typically not interested in registering in Thailand as asylum seekers, according to a UNHCR statement in 2015. They were only looking for ways to get to Turkey, a destination of choice with an estimated 50,000 Uyghur residents.  

    Thai authorities have confirmed a staggering number of Uyghur escapees in Thailand. In 2014, a group of 424 Uyghurs were detained in Thailand. In July 2015, over 170 Uyghurs were released to start new lives in Turkey, but a week later the Thai government repatriated 109 refugees to China. In July 2017, Thai immigration police said about 60 Uyghurs remained in detention centers across the country. As recently as 2020, their number was down to about 50. They were remnants of the Uyghurs who fled to Thailand in 2014. 

    Evidence also suggests that ethnic Kazakhs have fled Xinjiang’s massive surveillance and detention campaign. A recent case involved Qalymbek Shahman, who Uzbek authorities sent back to Thailand after being denied entry to Kazakhstan in January 2019. He was subjected to intense racial profiling in China, making it impossible for him to make a living. “I would have my ID checked every 50 to 100 meters when I was in Xinjiang…Whether it was getting on a plane, on a train or other public transportation, they would spend half an hour checking me out every time.” His clients became concerned as to why he was routinely monitored and consequently stopped doing businesses with him. 

    Chinese asylum seekers in Thailand face a number of problems beyond finding safe haven, including the lack of legal recognition. The second instalment will explore why and how Thailand falls short in protecting asylum seekers, and the challenges asylum seekers encounter once in Thailand. 

    Read Part II here.

  • Dueling Statements, and Visions, at UN Human Rights Council

    Dueling Statements, and Visions, at UN Human Rights Council

    United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet makes remarks during the annual high-level panel discussion on human rights mainstreaming at the 46th session of the Human Rights Council on February 22, 2021. Image credit: UN photo by Violaine Martin

    The United Nations Human Rights Council is an ideological battleground between China and its allies and the United States and its allies. Its 47th regular session (hereafter HRC 47) took place from June 21 to July 14, 2021 in Geneva. At the start of the session, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations (UN) in Geneva Leslie E. Norton delivered the Joint Statement on the Human Rights Situation in Xinjiang on behalf of 44 countries. In response, Belarus delivered a joint statement from 69 countries refuting criticisms against China and urging non-interference.

    In recent years, HRCs and other UN sessions have seen dueling statements expressing concern over China’s human rights record on the one hand and lauding it on the other. Two blocs have emerged since a joint letter at HRC 41 in 2019. While each of the UN’s 193 member states has its own motivations, some factors offer insights into how countries are negotiating the US-China relationship and the current human rights climate.

    Dueling Statements

    The Canada statement at HRC 47 expressed concerns about the human rights situation in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), and Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) citing “credible reports” of rights abuses including widespread arbitrary detention, surveillance, restrictions on fundamental freedoms, torture, and gender-based violence by authorities. It urges China to allow “immediate, meaningful, and unfettered access” to the region and to implement the concluding observations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD).

    The signatories to the Canadian statement are predominantly developed democracies in North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific. European states make up the majority. Most of the signatories have been outspoken against China’s human rights record and, as with Asia-Pacific signatories, have geopolitical concerns about China. Ukraine allegedly backed out of signing the statement when China threatened to halt sending vaccines. Israel was reportedly pressured to join by the United States.
    All of the G7 – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States – signed the Canadian statement. In 2020, the G7 countries made up at least a third of China’s foreign trade revenue. Except for Japan and the United States, the G7 countries are also members of the China-launched Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. The countries that signed the Canadian statement likely account for at least 50 percent of China’s export revenue. Trade between the United States and China, meanwhile, has surged to record levels, with some reports writing that it is “as if the protracted tariff war and pandemic never happened.”
    Belarus’ counter statement emphasized the importance of “sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states and non-interference in internal affairs.” It implies that the Canadian statement is politically motivated and based on disinformation and double standards. The statement originally had 65 signatories with four nations joining later, and has broad support among the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Twenty-three of the OIC’s 57 members did not sign the Belarus statement, nor did most of China’s major trading partners.
    Table 1. HRC 47 Statement Signatories
    There were notable omissions. Both Turkey and Kazakhstan have not signed either statement despite cultural links to persecuted groups in China. Multiple ASEAN nations, particularly those that are Muslim-majority and/or have concerns about the South China Sea, have not aligned with either bloc. Several of the world’s largest economies have also been absent, including India and Brazil. South Korea, which enjoys strong economic ties with both but is politically aligned with the United States, refrained from signing, as did Singapore. Finally, four members of the EU have not signed either statement: Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, and Malta.
    As mentioned, HRC 47 was not the first instance of dueling statements on China’s human rights record. At HRC 41 in 2019, 25 nations signed a letter criticizing China while a counter letter garnered 50 signatories. At HRC 44, the UK issued a joint statement signed by 27 nations; in turn, two statements supported China—one on Xinjiang issued by Belarus signed by 53 states and another on Hong Kong issued by Cuba signed by 46 states. At HRC 46, Belarus and Cuba switched: Belarus offered a statement on Hong Kong for 69 states while Cuba’s statement on Xinjiang garnered 64 signatories. There was no joint measure critical of China; instead, 21 member states made 34 separate remarks criticizing China’s human rights record.
    Similarly, in the 74th session of the General Assembly, the UK issued a statement on behalf of 23 states, which was met by a counter statement from 54 member states. In the 75th session, Germany issued a joint statement on behalf of 39 states. Cuba supported Xinjiang policy on behalf of 45 states and Pakistan supported Hong Kong policy on behalf of 55 states.
    Statements critical of China have been issued by the UK, Germany, and Canada while joint actions supporting China have been issued by Belarus, Cuba, and Pakistan. Both Belarus and Cuba are among the last communist dictatorships in their regions, and both have faced political turmoil and threat of regime change in recent months. Should political instability in Cuba result in the fall of the regime, China could lose one of its key supporters.
    Table 2. Selected Actions at the UN
    The joint statements have consistent messaging. Statements critical of China have expressed concern over human rights, noted China’s obligations under international law, recommended that China implement the CERD observations, and urged China to allow meaningful, unfettered access to independent observers. Statements in support of China consistently accuse the other bloc of being politically motivated, commend China’s actions in Xinjiang as human rights achievements through the right to development and, because there have been no terrorist attacks in Xinjiang in three consecutive years, the right to life.
    Regions Beyond the Rhetoric
     
    The most obvious bloc is that of the developed democratic economies of North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific that express concern over human rights in China. Canada’s HRC 47 statement was the most supported statement yet: 44 states signed on, 23 from the EU and 32 in Europe. This corresponds to recent polling in which publics in 17 advanced economies said China does not respect the personal freedoms of its citizens. Of the nations surveyed—all in North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific—13 signed the HRC 47 statement. Several of these nations have designated China’s actions in Xinjiang as genocide in their domestic political bodies. Of the remainder, South Korea, Greece, and Singapore have not signed any statement; the latter two reported favorable views of China, and Singapore was the only public to prefer close economic ties with China and to express confidence in Xi Jinping. However, the United States induces uncertainty. Of the 16 other nations, a third said that the United States considered their foreign policy interests. While most described the United States as a “somewhat reliable partner,” most believe that it is no longer a good model of democracy.
    Much has been made of the Islamic world’s support for China’s actions in Xinjiang. Belarus’ HRC 47 statement was signed by 13 MENA countries and the majority of OIC countries. Only one OIC member, Albania, signed Canada’s statement. Muslim populations’ support for alleged genocide against a Muslim population has been explained as a byproduct of strong-man rule because many MENA, OIC, and Central Asian nations have authoritarian features. However, polling has found consistently positive views of China and Xi Jinping even when support for the United States increased among seven MENA countries. Arab publics consistently view the United States as a larger economic threat than China. Across 13 Arab countries, 58 percent viewed US policy towards the region negatively while a majority held positive views on China’s foreign policy. These views persist even though respondents view China as a less desirable employer and a source of inferior goods, and they express broad support for democracy, which suggests that China’s argument for sovereignty is attractive. Dismissing the Muslim world’s support of China as a product of illiberalism may validate China’s narrative that human rights are individualistic western ideals used to infiltrate and subjugate otherwise sovereign states.
    Among ASEAN countries, seven of its 10 members did not sign either statement. The Philippines stopped supporting China after HRC 41. While sharing the Philippines’ concerns over the South China Sea, Indonesia and Malaysia are also facing pressure, both external and internal, over the situation of the Uyghurs in their country. A 2021 survey of government and civil society experts in ASEAN nations found that support for the United States has increased in recent years. A 2020 poll found 79 percent identified China as the most influential power in the region, with 72 percent expressing wariness over this: “China’s economic influence is deeply felt but not very well received in the country.” Still, China is favored in many ASEAN countries with the United States being the overwhelming preference in the Philippines and Vietnam.
    Africa has been a consistent source of support for China at the UN, even as some of the continent’s largest economies avoid statements. (In a surprise development, Côte d’Ivoire issued a statement expressing concern over actions in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet despite not signing either statement.) A survey of 18 African countries found that while the United States is still the preferred development model, in countries where China had invested mainly in infrastructure, perceptions have held steady or improved. Less than half of those polled said they were aware of Chinese loans or financial assistance to their country but among those who were, 77 percent were concerned about loan repayment and a majority (58 percent) said that their governments had overborrowed. This might indicate that narratives about debt traps and asset seizures are having an effect.
    Like Africa, the region consisting of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has seen hefty Chinese investment. According to the Congressional Research Service, 19 LAC countries have Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in the region and total trade between China and the region reached $316 billion in 2019. Accumulated loans from 2005 to 2020 totaled $137 billion, with top recipients being Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, and Argentina—only one of which signed the Cuba statement. Public polling in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico suggests that people have more positive views of China than negative, and these ratings have improved since 2014; these publics were more likely to name the United States as the top threat but say that they have good economic relations with both countries.
    Trading Onwards
     
    A look at China’s top trading partners suggests that any battle for hearts and minds is occurring separate from trade deals. China’s top 10 countries for imports and exports are dominated by Canada statement signatories—the United States, Germany—and non-signers—Brazil, South Korea. While supporters like Russia and the odd MENA state factor in at lower levels, China’s economy is still supported by the countries it accuses of weaponizing human rights. Amongst ongoing calls for decoupling and an economic reality that suggests the opposite, there are several issues to consider moving forward.
    Investment and attention seem to matter. In public polls, countries that receive investments tend to have more favorable opinions of a country, which sometimes translates into UN support or at least the absence of opposition. The United States and Europe have recently announced initiatives to compete with China’s BRI, and vaccine diplomacy, as seen by the Ukraine case, remains a crucial issue for international engagement.
    Narratives can create opportunities. Narratives on predatory investment may have sway in regions lacking a power monopoly; China-led narratives about sovereignty at the very least provide effective cover for post-colonial societies, some of whom may be truly weary of invasion. Similarly, China’s human rights whataboutism can deflect attention from criticism. It has highlighted the United States’ history of genocide and aggression in the MENA region. At the same time that Canada issued its statement, reports of mass graves at its relocation schools revealed its own human rights abuses. China even issued its own joint statement expressing “deep concerns” on human rights in the United Kingdom largely due to severe systemic racism.
    China’s accusations of political bias might seem contrived to western audiences, but the United States has at times taken a similar approach. The Bush administration declined to join the HRC in 2006 when the HRC replaced the Human Rights Commission, which was widely seen as ineffective and even counterproductive. The Bush presidency also cited anti-Israel bias as a reason for non-involvement, and the United States was one of four nations—with Israel, the Marshall Islands, and Palau—to vote against the HRC’s formation. Belarus, Iran, and Venezuela abstained. During the Obama administration, the United States joined and was elected to the HRC. In 2018, the Trump administration withdrew from the HRC, again citing anti-Israel bias as the reason.
    On June 19, 2018, then-Ambassador to the United Nations announced the US withdrawal from the HRC. Image credit: C-Span
    Similarly, China has used the US-led war on terror to justify its actions. Many Western countries have expressed indignation at China’s actions without acknowledging parallels to US programs of extraordinary rendition, extrajudicial drone killings, and the “off-shoring” of refugees by developed democracy economies. This helps reinforce China’s narrative that human rights are culturally biased, politicized devices. Ignoring these aspects may reinforce China’s notion that the choice between the US and China-led narratives on human rights is a political one, as opposed to one rooted in international law and morality.
    The Biden administration seems to be progressing on some of these fronts. The administration’s statement on key outputs from HRC 47 listed achievements such as co-sponsoring resolutions in human rights in Syria and the human rights of migrants, leading events on Hong Kong’s National Security Law and business and human rights, and cooperating on a new mechanism to combat systemic racism. It also confirmed that the United States will seek election to the HRC leadership for 2022-2024.
  • Hefty Prison Sentences for Selling Audio Bibles

    Hefty Prison Sentences for Selling Audio Bibles

    A selection of audio Bibles currently available on Taobao. Image credit: Taobao.com 

    Dui Hua’s research into court judgments found that four Christians who sold USB flash drives containing encrypted sermons were sentenced to two to six years in prison in Henan Province on December 2, 2020. Three of them were convicted of illegal business activity and another of “concealing crime-related income.” Their trial was concluded just a few days before overseas Christian groups reported another illegal business activity case in Shenzhen where five Christians were facing trial for selling audio Bibles amid China’s campaign to “eradicate pornography and illegal publications.”

    In April 2018, China’s popular online retailers including JD.com, Tabao, and Amazon.cn began pulling Bibles from their stores. Although the Bibles are still printed in China, they are legally available only at state-sanctioned church bookstores and cannot be sold through normal commercial channels. Individuals who breach the rules to sell the Bibles online or in physical bookstores risk being charged with illegal business activity under Article 225 of the Criminal Law.

    New rules aim to restrict the circulation of religious materials. State control has extended to electronic devices containing religious content not censored by the state. Bible audio players have gained popularity because they are easy to use, especially among the elderly, the illiterate, and those who are visually impaired. Apart from Bible verses, these electronic players are also loaded with sermons, hymns, and other religious content. Such devices were once widely available on China’s largest online commercial sites.
    A version of an audio Bible previously available on Taobao, designed for and marketed to elderly customers. Image credit: Taobao

    Four of five Christians facing trial in Shenzhen are employees of the Shenzhen Tree of Life Culture Communication Company, which was established in April 2011 to produce Bible audio players. The company did not run into any legal trouble until the four employees were detained for illegal business activity in July 2020. The trial outcome remains unclear, but available sources show that prosecutors recommended that the court sentence Fu Xuanjuan (傅炫娟), owner of the Shenzhen company, to five years’ imprisonment, and the other three staffers to 18 months to three years.

    Unbeknownst to the outside world, the four sentenced in Henan were also related to the same Shenzhen company. The judgment stated that from June-August 2018, Li Junke (李君科) entrusted the Shenzhen company to produce encrypted USB flash drives loaded with sermons by Li and another defendant Feng Fang (冯芳). During this period, they were said to have made an illegal profit of RMB8,000 from the sale of the encrypted USB flash drives to other Christians through WeChat friend groups.

    Li explored ways to reduce expenses so that he could donate more money to help the elderly and poor families. Instead of outsourcing to the Shenzhen company, he started to produce his own audio Bibles. First, he procured 1,922 blank USB flash drives from a computer wholesaler in his home province of Shaanxi. Additionally, he asked the third defendant, Zhang Haohao (张好好), to encrypt the audio Bibles after she taught herself encryption. The fourth defendant Wang Xuefen (王雪粉) was in charge of promoting the audio Bibles primarily using WeChat and mailing them out. From January 31, 2019, to June 13, 2019, they collected illegal revenue of RMB110,062 from the sale of 639 audio Bibles. After deducting the procurement cost of the 639 USB flash drives, the illegal profit amounted to RMB93,448.

    Li, regarded as the principal offender in the case, received the lengthiest prison sentence among the defendants—six years. The court found that the sale constituted a “particularly grave circumstance,” citing Article 12 of the 1998 judicial interpretation concerning the hearings of illegal publications issued by the Supreme People’s Court. The article states that the circumstances are “particularly grave” where the profit made by an individual from illegal business activities exceeds RMB100,000. The court held that his total profit comprised RMB93,448 from the sale of 639 USB flash drives and RMB8,000 from the sale of USB flash drives manufactured by the Shenzhen company. The total profit amounted to RMB101,448, making Li’s profit barely exceed the “particularly grave circumstance” threshold.

    Li’s prison sentence could have been shorter had the court considered deducting the mailing cost of the 639 USB flash drives. Each of the USB flash drives was mailed at the cost of RMB10. His profit would then have been reduced by RMB6,390 to RMB95,058, just below the “particularly grave circumstance” threshold. This was exactly what Li argued in his defense to mitigate his sentence during the trial. The court refused to accept his defense and instead determined the mailing cost to be part of operation costs for the illegal business activities, although it did deduct the procurement cost of the USB flash drives when calculating the profit. 

    The two other defendants, Zhang and Wang, were also convicted of illegal business activity. They were sentenced to three years and two years in prison, respectively. Feng was convicted of a different crime of “concealing crime-related income” and is now serving her three years’ imprisonment sentence.

    Since China began banning online Bible sales in April 2018, Dui Hua’s research into court websites has found 11 court judgments involving 54 defendants who were convicted for illegally selling Christian books and/or audio Bibles. Among them, 27 received suspended sentences and the prison sentence given to Li was the lengthiest. Li is scheduled for release from prison on June 14, 2025.

    The offence of illegal business activity has typically been applied to those who make a profit to support their churches. However, the standard of conviction does not necessarily require an intent to establish a profitable business. Precedents suggest that Christians can receive prison sentences for printing and giving away religious texts for free. All these indicate the worsening state of religious freedom in China: economic crimes like illegal business activity provide a pretense to suppress religious activities and legitimize criminal punishments against religious groups and private individuals operating beyond the state’s control.