President Trump and President Xi at the start of their bilateral meeting June 29, 2019, at the G20 Japan Summit in Osaka, Japan. Image credit: Official White House photo by Shealah Craighead / Public domain
For more than 40 years, the Gallup organization has polled American opinion on China. The results of its latest poll, published on March 2, 2020, reveal a sharp drop in opinion among Americans towards China. Only one-third of Americans now have a favorable view of China.
This represents a 20-percentage point drop compared to the share of Americans with a favorable opinion of China recorded in Gallup’s 2018 poll. China’s 33 percent favorability rating ties the lowest reading in recent memory and is a point lower than the first poll taken after the Tiananmen killings in 1989. For the first time since polling started, no significant percentage of respondents gave a “No Opinion” answer; unfavorable opinions of China, especially “very unfavorable” ones, are at an all-time high. The graph below depicts the changes in public opinion:
In the most recent Gallup poll, China is tied with Russia as the United States’ greatest enemy. Furthermore, for the first time in 20 years, Americans do not believe that China is the world’s top economy. Half of Americans now hold that the United States is the world’s leading economy with China a distant second, at 39 percent.
Dui Hua believes that the poor view of China in the eyes of Americans is in large part related to the outbreak of the coronavirus in China. The Gallup poll was taken from February 3-16 and surveyed 1,028 American adults. During this two-week period, the number of cases and deaths of the deadly virus in China soared from 20,630 cases and 426 deaths on February 3 to 71,329 cases and 1,775 deaths on February 16. Media coverage was intense, peaking with the news of the death of the whistle-blower doctor Li Wenliang on February 7. The period coincided with the decision by the United States and other countries to bar entry to arrivals from China.
According to an Economist/YouGov poll of 1,500 American adults conducted from February 9-11, 2020, 70 percent of those polled were closely following the news on the coronavirus, and nearly 70 percent believed that the government should bar entry into the United States for foreigners with the virus. In this poll, 40 percent approved of the way Donald Trump is handling China versus 44 percent who disapproved. Weekly Economist/YouGov polls conducted throughout February saw the percentage of Americans who think that the US government should quarantine people who have recently been to China increase from 65 percent to 71 percent.
These frequently conducted Economist/YouGov polls corroborate the general drop in favorable opinion recorded by the Pew Research Center and Gallup. Between July 2016 and March 2020, respondents were asked 125 times whether they viewed China as an ally or enemy of the United States. While the Gallup poll focused on personal opinions toward China, this question gauges perceptions of US-China relations. At several points in 2017, a plurality of respondents assessed the relationship as positive, peaking at 43 percent saying China was a US ally or friend on November 21, 2017. That number has gradually slid, however, and in the latest poll results, on March 3, 2020, an outright majority (61 percent) of respondents deemed China unfriendly or an enemy, as can be seen in the following graph:
While disapproval of China cuts across party lines, opinions about China are especially low among Republicans. According to the Gallup poll, less than a quarter of Republicans view China favorably, and 31 percent consider China to be the United States’ greatest enemy.
In addition to the coronavirus outbreak, Gallup lists allegations of spying by Chinese students and scholars at American colleges, tensions over trade and territorial disputes, and accusations of alleged theft by China of American technology as other possible reasons for China’s dismal performance in the most recent poll. Dui Hua believes that extensive reporting of human rights abuses in China, particularly in Xinjiang, has contributed to the fall in China’s image.
I had already begun working on a juvenile justice program in China when the Dui Hua board approved expanding the foundation’s mission to include at-risk detainees other than political prisoners (read “Li Yan Has Survived!” parts one and two to learn about Dui Hua’s expanded focus). Shortly after board approval, I set in motion a plan to bring a delegation from China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) to visit the United States to study its juvenile justice system. I had already raised this possibility with the Court’s Research Department and the Office of Juvenile Courts in 2007, and they were receptive. We agreed that the delegation would take place in the summer of 2008.
On May 12, 2008, a devasting earthquake, measuring 8.0 on the Richter Scale, took place in Sichuan Province. More than 69,000 people were killed, and all overseas trips by Chinese government officials were put on hold. The Chinese juvenile justice delegation was eventually rescheduled, and it took place in October 2008.
The visit included meetings, presentations, and tours of courts and detention facilities in Chicago, Maryland, Washington, D.C., and San Francisco. A highlight of the two-week trip was a meeting with Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, well known to Chinese legal circles as the justice who wrote the 2005 Roper vs. Simmons decision which declared that executing juveniles (individuals under the age of 18) was unconstitutional. Kennedy referenced China’s own abolition of capital punishment for juveniles in 1997 in his majority opinion.
Associate Justice Kennedy (left) received the delegation and US hosts in Washington on October 16, 2008. Image credit: Dui Hua Foundation
Upon the delegation’s return to China, Senior Judge Hu Weixin, who led the delegation, wrote a report on the visit. The report was widely circulated within the government and court system. On my visit to Beijing in July 2009, I was told by Chinese officials at the SPC and Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the report had been read by Premier Wen Jiabao. The Chinese juvenile justice delegation to the United States was considered one of the most successful programs in the field of legal exchange between the United States and China. It provided impetus for the reform of China’s juvenile justice system.
During the July visit I was invited to organize a return delegation of American juvenile justice practitioners to China. I followed up this visit by traveling to China twice during the first few months of 2010 to prepare. We agreed that the delegation would visit Beijing and Qingdao in May 2010 to make presentations, hold a mock trial, and visit juvenile detention facilities.
Tour of the Beijing Juvenile Reform Center
The delegation, led by Judge Lillian Sing of the San Francisco Superior Court, arrived in Beijing on May 8, 2010. We were met by a senior SPC official and transported to the Jianguo Hotel. We spent May 9 seeing the sites around Beijing (Great Wall, Forbidden City). In the evening we were hosted at a banquet held by SPC Vice President Xi Xiaoming.
On May 10 we set out for rural Daxing County on the outskirts of Beijing. There, surrounded by acres of agricultural land and several other correctional facilities, was the Beijing Juvenile Reform Center. Founded in 1955, the center is the only juvenile prison in Beijing. It is managed by the Beijing Bureau of Prison Administration under the Ministry of Justice. At the time of our visit, it held 470 juveniles (in China, juveniles are 14-18 years old), 60 percent of whom had been sentenced to prison for violent offenses. There are also “work study schools” – now known as “specialized schools” – in Beijing. They are managed by the Public Security Bureau and hold juveniles who have committed less serious offenses but who are not tried by courts. Although 95 percent of those held in the center were males, there were 12 females. They were housed in a cell block separate from the boys.
It took more than an hour to reach the center from our hotel. Our cars encountered a massive traffic jam which necessitated our taking a back road. A colleague quipped, “They must have known you were coming.”
Upon arrival our delegation was met by Madame Sun, a formidable lady who was a senior cadre in the Beijing Prison Bureau, and by the warden and deputy warden of the Beijing Juvenile Reform Center. I had met Madame Sun once before, when I visited Beijing Number Two Prison in 2001.
We were treated to a performance of traditional Chinese drumming by around 100 boys, decked out in colorful peasant garb. The sound was deafening, and it seemed to go on for an eternity. The noise made it impossible to carry on a conversation with the wardens. Finally, SPC Judge Hu, who had accompanied us, stepped in and asked for the performance to end. At this point we were told that the boys were the only inmates that we would see on the visit. Everyone else was required to participate in the center’s annual sports day. It was odd that our visit was scheduled on one of the only days of the year when we could not see, much less interact with, incarcerated young people, something we had arranged for the Chinese delegation when they visited the United States. Sessions between young detainees and the Chinese visitors were among the most valuable experiences of the 2008 delegation’s visit to the United States.
Our group proceeded to visit the empty male and female cell blocks, classrooms and other activity rooms. We were told that the average inmate age was 17 and a half years old. Inmates who turn 18 but who have two years left on their sentences are typically not transferred to adult prisons and instead serve the remainder of their sentences in the juvenile reform center. Two juveniles were serving life sentences at the time of our visit.
The wardens explained the system of awarding points for good behavior. Each month, inmates can earn a maximum of 10 points: one for “showing remorse,” one for performing well in “thought reform,” and eight for general behavior such as observing discipline, classroom performance, good hygiene and so forth. Violations result in the deduction of points. Accumulation of points leads to citations which in turn form the basis of applications for sentence reductions. Every year 20 percent of juveniles in the center are granted parole, a rate much higher than the rate in adult prisons.
Teens incarcerated in the center are entitled to one family visit a month, and unlike inmates in adult prisons, this privilege is not restricted as a form of punishment. Inmates can also make phone calls and send letters to family members. Unlike in the United States, there are no gangs in juvenile prisons in China, and fights are uncommon due to intense monitoring by staff. Although there is a protocol for solitary confinement, it is rarely employed. The biggest problem is that it is difficult to deliver vocational training given the varying ages and sentences of the young people in the center.
After we left the cell block, I tried to find out if any inmates were serving sentences for endangering state security. Madame Sun jumped in before the wardens could answer my question. “You’re always asking about such people,” she exclaimed. I failed to get an answer.
After our second juvenile justice delegation concluded, Dui Hua organized three more delegations, two to China and one to the United States. American experts introduced such practices as “diversion,” the sealing of juvenile records, gender-specific measures, and psychological and behavioral assessments at every stage of adjudication and incarceration. Several of these practices were enshrined in the amended Criminal Procedure Law promulgated in 2012.
In 2010, when I visited the Beijing center with our delegation, 80,000 juveniles were arrested in China. More than 68,000 were given custodial sentences. In 2017, the year our last exchange with the SPC took place, fewer than 33,000 juveniles were given custodial sentences by Chinese courts, a drop of more than 50 percent.
In 2010, when I visited the Beijing center with our delegation, 80,000 juveniles were arrested in China. More than 68,000 were given custodial sentences. In 2017, the year our last exchange with the SPC took place, fewer than 33,000 juveniles were given custodial sentences by Chinese courts, a drop of more than 50 percent.
Beijing Chaoyang District Peoples Court. Image credit: Chinacourt.org
After Minister of Justice Wu Aiying took up her position in 2005, I was barred from visiting Chinese prisons. By 2005 I had been shown around prisons in Beijing, Hebei, Tianjin, Shanghai, Fujian, and Guangdong – nine prisons in all.
Wu Aiying was expelled from the Communist Party for corruption in 2017. Her ceaseless efforts to dismantle my dialogue with the ministry came to a head when a colleague and I were invited to visit Yichang Municipality in Hubei Province in 2007 to make presentations on the American justice system to a large audience of provincial justice officials. We had been promised a prison visit, but after finishing our presentations our hosts confirmed that we would not after all be allowed to visit the prison, on the instruction of the Ministry of Justice in Beijing. We needed to get out of town quickly.
In early 2006, I shifted my attention from visiting prisons to attending criminal trials. In January I wrote to the Supreme People’s Court in Beijing, requesting permission to attend a trial of either endangering state security or disturbing the social order, specifically a “mass incident,” when I visited Beijing the following month. This was a bold request. Although most trials are supposed to be open to the public, trials of endangering state security are usually closed. Trials of disturbing the social order involving dissidents are often closed to outsiders. In general foreigners, other than consular representatives, who are, for the most part, allowed to attend trails of their citizens, rarely get permission to attend trials.
To my surprise, I was told that I could attend a disturbing the social order trial, as the guest of the Beijing High Court, when I visited Beijing the following month. The trial would take place at the Chaoyang District Court, one of the country’s busiest; it had heard 50,000 criminal cases in 2005.
At 9 AM on February 17, 2006, my driver and I arrived at the Chaoyang District Court. I was met by the Chief Judge of the Chaoyang Court’s Criminal Division, the Director of the Court’s General Office, and the Director of the High Court’s Foreign Affairs Office. My driver told me that I was being given great face.
I was ushered into a polyurethane wood-paneled court room where photographers and cameramen were waiting to film my attendance. Other than court officials and police officers, I was the only other person in the room.
Seated at the front of the court was an appropriately robed collegiate panel consisting of two judges and a people’s assessor. In front of them was the court recorder. The defense team sat to my right while the prosecutors sat to my left. The defendant, Mr. Dong, was led into the courtroom in shackles. He stood in a box before the judges, flanked by two sturdy policemen.
Mr. Dong was accused of creating a disturbance, a violation of Article 293 of the Criminal Law, and a crime of disturbing the social order. In October 2005, Mr. Dong had been drinking in a bar. After a bit too much bai jiu, a fiery Chinese liquor, he stumbled into the street, where he began fights with passersby. The police showed up and detained him, somewhat worse for the wear.
I asked a court official seated next to me if this was considered a “mass incident.” He replied yes, “a small-scale mass incident.”
Mr. Dong had already served a two-year sentence for fighting, which meant that as a recidivist he could expect a harsh sentence. He pleaded guilty at this trial. The judges, in a show of leniency, noted his deep remorse and decided to give him a second chance, a suspended sentence. Mr. Dong thanked the court and was led away.
The whole proceeding had taken just 30 minutes. After my visit to the court room I was taken to see the room where copies of judgments are held. I asked to take a look at a few randomly selected judgments, but my request was denied.
On the way back to the car we passed through the court’s atrium. Overhead was a glass ceiling. I was told that this ceiling symbolized the court’s commitment to transparency.
After the trial and before returning to Hong Kong on February 18, 2006, I was hosted to lunch by Swedish Ambassador Borje Ljunggren and dinner by American Ambassador Clark Randt. I also met with the Red Cross and the Swiss Embassy.
A Case of Armed Robbery
I took the afternoon train to Guangzhou from Hong Kong on February 19. I was met at the train station by a professor and his junior colleague who both worked for a research association. They drove me to the White Swan Hotel on Shamian Island, close to the American consulate. We went to dinner at the hotel’s Chinese restaurant.
Over dinner I related my experience at the Chaoyang District Court. I told my friends that I felt that the trial I had attended was choreographed and intended to impress me with how compassionate the judges were. To my surprise I was asked if I’d like to attend a trial in Guangzhou. “We are far more open here. Foreigners can attend trials without prior approval,” I was told. We agreed to try to attend a trial at the Guangzhou Intermediate Court the next day.
We arrived at the court by taxi on the morning of February 20. The court was housed in a large, multi-story building, a hive of 80 court rooms. The ground floor was teeming with family members and others intending to attend trials, as well as judges and bailiffs. After passing through the security check, I went to an unimpressive wooden desk and registered to attend a trial of armed robbery, a capital offense. I presented my passport and was given a pass. Intermediate courts in China are the courts of first instance of trials for crimes that carry the death sentence, so we chose a death penalty trial.
My friend and I went to Courtroom Two on the fourth floor, where the trial was taking place, Judge Jiang Jianxiong presiding. The defendant, 19-year-old Huang Changwei was brought into the courtroom, shackled and accompanied by two blue-suited bailiffs. He stood in the dock shivering with fear. He was flanked by two cops. I thought of my own children. My oldest son was the same age as Huang Changwei, a migrant from a poor family in rural Guangdong. The judge, spying me out of the corner of his eye, asked young Mr. Huang if he needed some time to compose himself.
Mr. Huang was accused of killing his girlfriend, whom he had met on the Internet, in June 2005. The couple had rented a hotel room to negotiate a “breakup fee,” the amount the young woman was to receive for agreeing to separate. She demanded RMB 10,000. The boyfriend refused to pay anything and instead demanded that the girl return the cellphone he had given her. She refused, and when he tried to grab it a struggle ensued. During the fight he grabbed a fruit knife and stabbed her to death, after which he fled the scene, in possession of the cellphone. It was a simple matter for the police to track him down and detain him.
The court room was crowded. In addition to court officials, lawyers, and police, there were people like me (I was the only foreigner) who simply wanted to watch the proceedings. There was a group of relatives of the deceased girl who were there to demand justice. They were armed with a document that apparently allowed them to calculate the amount of compensation to the family that the young man should pay them for killing the girl.
The defendant’s lawyer stated that his client was too poor to pay a large compensation. At this point, the judge moved to adjourn the trial in order that he consider amending the charge to intentional murder. The defendant’s lawyer exclaimed: “Surely your honor wouldn’t sentence my client to death simply because he can’t afford to pay compensation.”
After the trial was adjourned, I went up to the judge and asked him if he cared to join me for a cup of tea and a cigarette. We agreed to do so in a small room off the hallway outside the court. We sat down on a couch to discuss the case. I found myself in the unlikely role of advocating for someone facing the death penalty in a Chinese court of law.
I said that Mr. Huang was a young man (he was 18 years old at the time of the crime) and took the position that this was a crime of passion committed by an immature person. There was no evidence of premeditation. At most this would be second-degree murder in the United States, maybe manslaughter. No way, I opined, could the crime justify his execution.
Judge Jiang seemed to take what I said on board. After finishing the tea and cigarette, I asked if he’d take a picture with me. He agreed and we reentered the courtroom where compensation negotiations between parties were still underway. He shooed them away, and we took a picture together, he in his splendid robes.
Judge Jiang did not amend the charge to intentional murder, keeping it as intentional robbery, a capital crime.
John Kamm with Judge Zhang Jianxiong of the Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court, February 2006
Aftermath
On April 25, 2006 the Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Huang Changwei to death. He was ordered to compensate the girl’s family to the tune of RMB 292,689, the sum total of his assets. Huang appealed the judgment to the Guangdong High Court.
I wrote a letter to Judge Jiang which I asked my Guangzhou friend to deliver. I asked the judge to pass along my comments on the case to the High Court. On November 28, 2006 the High Court amended the sentence to death with two-year reprieve, reasoning that he had just turned 18 (the youngest age at which someone can be executed for a crime committed at or after the age of 18) not long before he committed the crime. He deserved a second chance. My friend wrote me that it was virtually certain that the sentence would be commuted to life in prison, which is what happened on August 8, 2009.
Huang turned out to be a very well-behaved prisoner. His life sentence was reduced to 19 years on July 28, 2011 and further reduced by 17 months on December 31, 2013. He was given an eight-month sentence reduction on May 6, 2016 and a five-month reduction in 2018. After the last reduction this sentence is set to expire on June 27, 2028, 23 years after the death at his hands of his girlfriend.
Wo (center) at the wedding of his daughter Ran Chen (left). His other daughter, Di Chen, is to the right. Source: Ran Chen.
In November 2008 I traveled to the New Jersey shore, where I had grown up. My youngest son, Rene, was with me. We would celebrate Thanksgiving dinner with my brother and his family, and, before leaving the family to return to San Francisco, scatter my mother’s ashes. She had died the previous July, the wife of three World War II veterans. I was with her when she died in a Florida hospice, and I had pledged to scatter her ashes in the place she loved best, off Avon beach, where she had met my father.
The dinner on November 27 was joyous and traditional, turkey with all the trimmings (including copious amounts of the family’s special stuffing), but it was a time of hope as well. Wo Weihan (沃维汉), someone facing imminent execution in China whose case I’d been working on, had met with his family at a detention facility in Beijing, and they had been told by way of the Austrian Embassy that another family visit could take place the next day. When I heard this news, I allowed myself to think that his execution might still be stayed. This extension, if granted, would be beyond the limit for delaying an execution approved by the Supreme People’s Court.
There were many reasons to stay this execution. Perhaps someone in a position of power would realize how this arbitrary, cruel, and unusually extreme punishment would impact China’s relationships with foreign countries and its international image, not long after the positive reaction to the 2008 Olympics.
After dinner, Rene and I drove to our hotel, the Courtyard in Wall Township, where we shared a room. My sleep was fitful. I sensed another person in our room, wandering aimlessly about. In my dreams I saw a ghostly apparition.
Just after 6 AM, my phone rang. It was my colleague Josh Rosenzweig, calling from Hong Kong. Wo Weihan had been executed earlier that day, when it was still Thanksgiving in the United States. Josh asked if I’d give an interview to The Washington Post. I said yes, in 10 minutes. I threw on my clothes and went down to the lobby and then outside where it was cold and foggy. The call came in to my cell phone. The journalist wrote that I reacted with anger and disbelief: “’I have been doing this work for 19 years, and this is the absolute lowest point of those 19 years,” Kamm said. “I am devastated.’”
A Scientist and Entrepreneur
Wo Weihan, a Chinese citizen born in 1949 in Heilongjiang Province, was an accomplished scientist who held several patents. He had founded a biochemical company in Beijing upon his return from studying and working in Germany and Austria, where he lived for several years in the 1990s, and where his two daughters, Ran and Di, live. Wo Weihan was a civilian who had never served in China’s military. His daughters are Austrian citizens. Wo was also a member of the Daur ethnic minority, one of China’s smallest ethnic groups. He had had the opportunity to apply for Austrian citizen but had turned it down. He was proud of his Chinese origins.
In 1984, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued Document Number Five, which set out the principle of “Two Restraints, One Leniency” that was to be applied to ethnic minorities. Law enforcement was to be lenient to offenders from ethnic minorities by making fewer arrests and handing down fewer executions. Executions of ethnic minorities in China were rare at the time of Wo Weihan’s execution. Executions of Uyghurs accused of terrorism-related crimes have taken place in recent years. Executions of members of other minorities remain rare, however. The only known execution of a Tibetan sentenced to death in recent years was that of Lobsang Dhundop, a nephew of Tenzin Delek Rinpoche. He was executed in 2003 after being convicted of involvement in a series of bombings. In 2005, an official of Manchu ethnicity, Tong Daning (佟达宁), was sentenced to death and subsequently executed for spying for Taiwan.
Rarer than executions of members of ethnic minorities are executions of civilians for espionage, as opposed to executions of military officers and government officials. That remains the case in China today. Dui Hua is not aware of an execution of a civilian for espionage since 2000 – with the notable exception of Wo Weihan.
Wo was taken into custody on January 19, 2005 and placed under residential surveillance in a designated location. Shortly thereafter, Guo Wanjun (郭万钧), said to be a distant relative of Wo who worked as a missile expert for a research institute affiliated with the Chinese air force, was taken into custody and placed under residential surveillance in a designated location as well. Both men were taken into custody on suspicion of committing the crime of espionage, a crime of endangering state security that carries the maximum sentence of death.
Not long after being placed under residential surveillance in a designated location, Wo Weihan suffered a stroke, possibly due to mistreatment by his captors. He was granted bail to return to his home to recuperate. Granting bail to an individual accused of a crime that carries the death penalty is highly unusual.
Wo was formally detained on March 30, 2005, accused of spying for Taiwan. He was put in the hospital ward of a state security detention center. He was formally arrested on May 5, 2005. Only after his arrest was Wo allowed a visit by a lawyer; it took place 10 months after his initial detention. Family visits were not permitted until the day before he was executed.
The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) took back the power of final review of death sentences on January 1, 2007. Under pressure from China’s senior leaders, it had delegated this power to lower courts in 1984 at the height of the first “Strike Hard Campaign.” Upon taking back the power of final review, the SPC declared that, henceforth, only the most “vile and serious crimes” would attract the death penalty. In the first year of conducting reviews, the court overturned 15 percent of death sentences.
On May 24, 2007, Wo Weihan and Guo Wanjun were tried by the Beijing Intermediate People’s Court. The two men were sentenced to death in a closed trial. The prosecution introduced a confession from Wo that had been given in the ten months he was denied a lawyer; Wo recanted the confession made under duress without a lawyer present. The court had determined that Wo and Guo had provided Taiwan military intelligence with top secrets but provided few actual details. It was alleged that Wo had provided photocopies of a missile defense system and information on the health of a senior official who was not identified. (According to Wo’s lawyer, the photocopies in question were from an article in a publicly available journal that was subsequently classified.) Providing these secrets apparently constituted a “vile and serious” crime deserving the ultimate penalty.
The Taiwan intelligence agency to which secrets were provided turned out to be the “Grand Alliance for China’s Reunification under the Three Principles of the People,” a Taiwan-based non-governmental organization that promoted Dr. Sun Yatsen’s political philosophy and Chinese culture. It had no known links to Taiwan’s intelligence agency. The group’s contact details had been found in Wo’s diary.
Dui Hua Gets Involved
Dui Hua began working on Wo’s case in January 2008, when Josh Rosenzweig was visited in his Beijing hotel room by Wo’s daughter Ran Chen and an officer of the European Union (E.U.) Mission in Beijing. Josh offered advice and assistance. He was told that, for the time being, the family had decided, on the advice of Wo’s lawyer and the Austrian Embassy in Beijing, to keep a low profile and avoid media coverage.
The Chinese government was preparing to host the Summer Olympics in August 2008. In March 2008 protests erupted in Tibet; they were put down by Chinese police and troops. The world reacted in outrage. The Olympic torch run was beset by protests. On March 26, French President Nicolas Sarkozy suggested that he might boycott the Olympics opening ceremony in Beijing. Not long afterward, American President George W. Bush announced that he would attend the ceremony, and other world leaders fell into line. Beijing was very grateful to President Bush.
On March 28, 2008, the Kuomintang’s candidate for Taiwan president, Ma Yingjeou, won the presidential election. He succeeded Chen Shui-bian, seen by Beijing as a dangerous advocate of Taiwan independence. Ma’s election ushered in an era of good will between the Mainland and Taiwan that would be put at risk if China executed a civilian for allegedly spying for Taiwan.
A day later, on March 29, 2008, Beijing’s High Court rejected the appeals of Wo Weihan and Guo Wanjun. The death sentences were upheld. The cases were sent to the Supreme People’s Court for final review.
After Wo’s appeal was rejected the family decided to step up its effort to save him. I traveled to Beijing, and on April 2, 2008, I met Ran and her husband Michael in my room at the Beijing Renaissance Hotel. Ran, who had just enrolled as an MBA student at the University of California, struck me as an intelligent and courageous young woman determined to do what was necessary to save her father. Michael, an American citizen, was equally determined to fight for his father-in-law’s life. We mapped out a strategy and decided on the role I and Dui Hua would play.
Dui Hua’s advocacy would involve the following:
Raise the profile of the case in international media and alert other human rights group of Wo’s possible execution;
Push the United States government to aggressively lobby the Chinese government to grant clemency to Wo Weihan; and
Use Dui Hua’s extensive contacts with China’s judicial and foreign affairs establishments to advocate for the overturning of Wo Weihan’s death sentence.
Press Conference
On April 3, 2008, I summoned Beijing-based journalists to come to my hotel for an impromptu, unsanctioned press conference on the Wo Weihan case. The hotel management became agitated and tried to stop the journalists from taking the elevator to the seventh floor, where I had been given a junior suite. In response, journalists walked up the stairs, lugging their heavy equipment with them.
At least two dozen journalists from outlets in 10 countries in Latin America, North America, Europe, and Asia attended. I went over the basics of the case and listed the reasons I felt clemency should be granted: the need to project a humane image for the Olympic games; weak evidence and violations of due process rights; the Supreme Court’s overturning of hundreds of death sentences; Wo’s status as a member of an ethnic minority; the fact that executions of civilians for espionage were extremely rare; the prospect of improved relations with Taiwan, on whose behalf Wo allegedly spied.
Articles in papers from Brazil to Austria to Japan began appearing the next day. At the same time, Ran and Michael were giving impassioned interviews to major outlets, including the BBC. Never before had there been so much coverage of an imminent execution in China, the world’s top executioner.
Engaging the American Government
My close friend Clark “Sandy” Randt was American ambassador to China. Sandy and I knew each other in Hong Kong, where we were both heavily involved in American Chamber of Commerce activities; our children grew up together. He proved to be an invaluable resource in the doomed fight to save Wo Weihan.
Sandy Randt was also a close friend of President George W. Bush. The two men had attended Yale together, and after he was elected President Bush chose Sandy as America’s ambassador to China. After taking up his position in 2001, he went on to serve with distinction – he was an outspoken advocate for human rights – stepping down at the end of President Bush’s term of office as the longest serving American ambassador to China in the history of relations between the two countries.
On April 8, 2008, Ambassador Randt raised Wo’s case with China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the months that followed, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Assistant Secretary of State David Kramer, as well as other officials and members of Congress asked the Chinese government to grant clemency to Wo Weihan.
David Kramer’s role was especially important. He was the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, Democracy, and Labor, in which position he was the ranking official tasked with managing the bilateral human rights dialogue with China. After a hiatus of six years, the two countries agreed to hold a round of the dialogue in Washington May 24-28, 2008. Wo Weihan’s name was placed on the list of priority cases that Dui Hua helped draw up. It was accepted by the Chinese representative.
Lobbying the Chinese Government
Unique among human rights groups working on China, Dui Hua maintains open channels of communication with the Chinese government. I decided to bring these into play in the effort to save Wo Weihan’s life. I sent emails to, and met privately with, Chinese foreign affairs and judicial officials.
I concentrated on the SPC, which had been tasked with reviewing Wo’s death sentence passed by the Beijing High People’s Court. Dui Hua had an especially good relationship with the SPC; we had invited them to visit the United States to study the American juvenile justice system in October 2008.
In September 2008 I traveled to Beijing to meet with two senior judges to make final arrangements for the delegation to the United States the next month. I turned the conversation to Wo Weihan and explained that I was a friend of the family. I pointed out that executions for espionage in the United States were very rare. The last time civilians were executed for espionage – Ethel and Julius Rosenberg – was in 1953. Now the trend for the most serious such offenders is a sentence of life in prison.
The senior judge present nodded his head. He had been to Florence Super Max in Colorado and saw the tough conditions “lifers” faced there.
I criticized the lack of detail in the court judgments and queried how someone facing a death sentence could be allowed home to recuperate from an illness. I asked the judge when the SPC would complete its review. He replied that most reviews are completed within six months of the High Court decision. He cautioned that the number of death sentences overturned thus far in 2008 was far fewer than in 2007. He assigned a colleague to be my liaison on the case, but as it turned out the man proved to be of no use.
Family Told to Visit Wo
On the evening of November 17, 2008, Wo Weihan’s wife received a call from the SPC advising her to file an application, with supporting documents, to visit Wo Weihan. The application was to be filed within seven days, and if approved, the family should make the visit as soon as possible. The family’s lawyer saw this as a bad sign: the SPC had approved the execution. Preparations to execute Wo Weihan were underway.
I took action as soon as Ran advised me what happened, sending urgent messages to the Chinese Embassy in Washington, the Chinese Mission in Geneva, the SPC, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and academic and research organizations under the control of the Chinese government and Communist Party.
Complicating Factors
The responses I received were troubling. The Chinese embassy response was terse: the case would be handled in accordance with the law. My liaison at the SPC, which we had just hosted in the United States, washed his hands of the matter. A friend at the Chinese mission in Geneva advised that her ambassador would try to help – in fact he did try, telling me he had sent recommendations to his superiors in Beijing — but warned, somewhat ominously, that the sharp criticism of China’s capital punishment by the just-concluded meeting of the United Nations Committee Against Torture was deeply resented by Beijing: “Therefore it might be bad timing for the West to seek reconsideration of the case.”
Another complicating factor was the unraveling of relations between China and the European Union, which had actively lobbied the Chinese government to grant clemency to Wo Weihan, the father of two E.U. citizens. France, which held the rotating presidency of the E.U., had already drawn the ire of the Chinese government over President Sarkozy’s suggestion that he might boycott the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games.
On August 22, 2008, Sarkozy’s wife, Carla Bruni, joined the Dalai Lama at the inauguration of a Buddhist temple in France. There was speculation that Sarkozy himself would meet the Dalai Lama when the Tibetan spiritual leader visited Europe later in the year. When it became clear that the meeting would indeed take place, China canceled the E.U.-China Summit, shocking E.U. leaders and diplomats.
Nevertheless, E.U. officials traveled to Beijing to take part in the E.U.-China human rights dialogue that opened in Beijing on November 25. It was to run until November 28. The fact that Beijing declined to cancel the dialogue raised hopes that damage from the fracas over the impending Sarkozy-Dalai Lama meeting could be contained.
The Family Visits Wo Weihan
On Tuesday, November 25, Ran Chen received a call from the Beijing Intermediate People’s Court Number Two. The caller advised Ran that the SPC had confirmed the death sentence on her father and told her to come to the court at 9 AM on Thursday November 27 to see her father for what would turn out to be the last time. Ran arrived at the court at the appointed time. Wo’s wife, Ran’s stepmother, arrived and together the two women were taken to a small room. They sat on one side of a glass partition. Wo was brought in, flanked by two guards.
Beijing Number Two Intermediate People’s Court. Image Credit: Xinhua
Wo was surprised to see his visitors. He had no idea that he would soon be executed. He was optimistic that the SPC would overturn the death sentence and expressed confidence in China’s justice system. Ran and his wife read letters from his brother and his wife, and told him that his youngest daughter, who was nine or ten at the time, was doing fine. Wo teared up at the mention of a child he’d never see again.
The tension proved too much for Ran. “This is a terrible injustice. China has a broken justice system and you are a victim of it,” she cried. One of the guards standing behind her reproached her, saying she had no right to criticize the Chinese government and its justice system. Ran shot back. “Why not? I have every right to do so.” At this point Wo Weihan intervened and asked his daughter to calm down.
The meeting lasted 30 minutes. Ran and her stepmother left the room, sobbing. None of the court officials dared to look at them. They returned to a friend’s apartment where they were joined by Di, Wo’s oldest daughter, who had just arrived in Beijing. They held each other and sobbed for a long time. Later that afternoon they received a call from the Austrian Embassy. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) had told the Austrians that the execution would be put off to allow for Di to visit her father the next day.
Execution and Aftermath
That visit would never take place. On the morning of November 28, 2008, as the E.U.-China human rights dialogue was winding down, Wo Weihan and Guo Wanjun were executed by gunshots to the back of their heads. They were promptly cremated. That afternoon the MFA told the Austrian Embassy that the execution had taken place that morning. Senior E.U. officials were still in Beijing.
The response from the E.U. was swift. A statement was issued. “The E.U. condemns in the strongest terms the execution of Mr. Wo. It deeply regrets the fact that China has not heeded the repeated calls for the execution to be deferred and for the death sentence to be commuted. It wishes to express its indignation at this execution which comes just after the conclusion in Beijing of the E.U.-China human rights dialogue.”
Austria’s Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik used even stronger language, saying that the execution “must be considered an intentional affront to the E.U.… China’s approach emphasizes the ruthlessness and coldness of the SPC’s decision.”
Countries weighed in, including the United States, sharply condemning the execution. Human rights groups, including Amnesty International, likewise expressed outrage. Calls were made for the human rights dialogue between China and the E.U. to be permanently cancelled. It has in fact continued to take place every year.
I received a message from a Chinese official, a leading reformer and opponent of the death penalty: “Today I am ashamed to be a Chinese official!” China’s media tried to justify the execution, but China Daily, in a rare admission, noted that the execution had stirred resentment of China in certain countries.
Wo Weihan is Buried
Five days after the execution, the family retrieved Wo Weihan’s remains. They had selected a burial plot at Badaling Cemetery, a peaceful place a mile away from the Badaling Great Wall. They went to the cemetery to purchase the plot, but as the paperwork was being filled in, a manager appeared and told them they would not be permitted to buy the plot, apparently because it would contain the remains of an executed “criminal.” Ran once again exhibited her fearlessness. She accused the manager of being a coward and threatened to call the international press and file a lawsuit if the cemetery refused to let the family purchase the plot. Chastened, the manager backed down and the transaction was completed. Eventually the family bought two other plots for Wo’s father and mother, who were buried in Heilongjiang. The parents and their son were reunited in death.
Wo Weihan’s funeral took place on December 6, 2008. Family members and representatives of the Austrian Embassy attended. It was a moving memorial, a tribute to an extraordinary man who was loyal to family and country.
In December 2008 I went to New York to meet with a Chinese diplomat with whom I had worked on sensitive cases. He tried his best to convince me that the execution of Wo Weihan was justified, providing details of the other secrets Wo allegedly gave to Taiwan. I would have none of it. I told him that I would continue Dui Hua’s work on behalf of prisoners, at the family’s request. He seemed relieved that I would do so.
Today the execution of Wo Weihan, nearly 11 years ago, has largely been forgotten. A blip on the screen of the history of E.U.-China relations on human rights, even less of a blip in the history of U.S.-China wrangling over human rights.
But, as in the case of the Rosenbergs, the international and to some extent domestic outrage seems to have had an effect. Support for capital punishment in China is still strong among the Chinese population, but it has waned. Calls for its abolishment have gained strength among reformers.
Since the execution of Wo Weihan, the number of executions in China has dropped sharply from around 7,000 in 2007 to around 2,000 in 2018, according to Dui Hua estimates. In 2019, 46 crimes carry the death sentence, down from 68 in 2008. There has not been an execution of a civilian for espionage in China since Wo Weihan’s. Nor has there been an execution of a member of an ethnic minority group for the crime of espionage.
Such is the legacy of Wo Weihan, an extraordinary man forgotten by all but his family and those who worked to save him from execution. His brother still visits the place where Wo Weihan and his parents are buried, laying flowers and saying prayers for the repose of their souls.
On June 3, 1998, President Bill Clinton addressed a press conference in Washington D.C. Calling trade “a force for change in China,” Clinton cited “concrete results on human rights” as a result of his administration’s engagement with China, and then announced his intention to renew China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status, set to expire the next day.
Within hours of the press conference, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that President Clinton would make a state visit to China from June 25 to July 3, 1998. He would meet with China’s President Jiang Zemin, and pay visits to Shanghai, Xian, Guilin, and Hong Kong.
President Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin, 1998. Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons
Not unexpectedly, Clinton’s decision to renew MFN and pay a state visit to China was harshly criticized by members of Congress and human rights groups, who challenged the president’s conclusion that there had been positive developments in human rights in China. They claimed that, while there had been a few releases of political and religious prisoners, repression continued apace. Beijing had still not provided an accounting of individuals imprisoned in the Tiananmen protests of 1989 (it has yet to do so), and in October 1997 the head of the underground Catholic Church, Bishop Si Zhimin, had been taken into custody by officials of the Religious Affairs Bureau in Hebei Province. His whereabouts remain unknown more than 20 years later.
The reaction from China’s small dissident community to President Clinton’s decision to visit China was less condemnatory. Many saw the visit as an opportunity to test the limits of China’s strict control over dissent. The year before, in 1997, several dissidents, nearly all of whom had served time in prison for their political activities, had begun working to establish an opposition political party, and the prospect of an American president visiting China encouraged them to speed up their work.
Preparatory committees for the China Democracy Party (CDP), intended to be a national opposition party, were established in different parts of the country. Initially, they were established secretly, but on June 25, 1998, the day President Clinton arrived in China, the Hangzhou Preparatory Committee, led by Wang Youcai, issued an “Open Declaration of the Establishment of the CDP Zhejiang Preparatory Committee.” The declaration, together with a draft party constitution, was circulated on the Internet, and a formal application was filed with the Zhejiang government to register the CDP as a political party.
Soon other CDP preparatory committees were established elsewhere in China. By the end of 1998 there were 24 such committees. The names and details of 200 party members were posted on websites.
President Clinton’s visit to China came off without a hitch. He was criticized for inspecting an honor guard in Tiananmen Square, site of the killings in June 1989 that outraged the world. But afterwards, he met with Jiang Zemin and had what was by all accounts an extraordinary joint press conference with the Chinese president on June 17. The event was broadcast live on Chinese state television. Clinton expressed disapproval of the Tiananmen Square killings and referred to the Dalai Lama as a “holy man” whom President Jiang “would like very much.” President Clinton even referenced my own proposal that China should release all imprisoned counterrevolutionaries since the crime of counterrevolution had been removed from the Criminal Law in 1997.
Clinton’s endorsement of this proposal garnered much attention from Chinese officials, who marveled, in private conversations with me, at the president’s knowledge of the Chinese legal system. Clinton attended services at a Protestant church and gave a speech to Chinese students that was also televised nationwide.
His remarks on the Dalai Lama had a deleterious effect however. Talks were underway in Singapore between representatives of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government. They were abruptly terminated, reportedly due to anger on the part of the People’s Liberation Army with Clinton’s remarks and Jiang Zemin’s failure to push back.
Crackdown
On July 10, 1998, one week after President Clinton left China, the police moved against the CDP, detaining Wang Youcai in Hangzhou. They formally arrested him for inciting subversion on August 7, but in an unusual move, he was released and placed under residential surveillance. The relative freedom of loose house arrest did not last long. He was rearrested and indicted for subversion, tried, and sentenced to 11 years in prison on December 21, 1998.
After the detention of Wang Youcai, the authorities changed their tactics. One by one, the preparatory committees were informed that their applications to register as a political party had been turned down. Leaders were visited by the police and told to desist their efforts or face the consequences.
Undeterred by threats, Xu Wenli, Gao Hongming, and Zha Jianguo established the CDP National Congress Preparatory Committee in Beijing on November 2, 1998. Xu was detained on November 30 and subsequently tried and sentenced to 13 years in prison on December 21, 1998 for the crime of subversion.
On May 7, 1999 NATO fighters under American command bombed China’s embassy in Belgrade, touching off a crisis in US-China relations. China suspendered all discussions on human rights with the United States.
After the bombing, Beijing stepped up its repression of the CDP. On July 5, 1999 Zha Jianguo and Gao Hongming were tried for subversion in Beijing. Zha and Gao were sentenced to nine years and eight years, respectively, on August 2. After a few more weeks in a detention center, both men were placed in Beijing Number Two Prison, a facility in northeast Beijing housing 2,000 inmates. According to my list of political prisoners in Beijing, 26 of the 40 names of prisoners serving sentences for counterrevolution or endangering state security were housed in Beijing Number Two.
Dui Hua was established in April 1999. Its dialogue on human rights with the Chinese government had been suspended that month on account of the tabling of a resolution at the Human Rights Commission in Geneva. Its suspension therefore came before the suspension of the official dialogue on account of the Belgrade bombing in May. This proved to be fortuitous. Dui Hua’s dialogue was resumed well before the official dialogue resumed.
Some of Dui Hua’s earliest cases were those of CDP members, in line with the priorities of Western governments at the time. There were two high-profile successes that Dui Hua contributed to. Xu Wenli was granted medical parole and flown to the United States with his wife on Christmas eve 2002. Wang Youcai was granted medical parole and flown to the United States on March 4, 2004.
Xu Wenli with John Kamm at the Dui Hua Foundation’s San Francisco office.
Gao Hongming, Qin Yongmin, and Zha Jianguo, as well as most of other CDP members who had been imprisoned, served their entire sentences with not a day off. They were mostly forgotten by the West.
Zha Jianguo was an idealistic young man who, heeding Chairman Mao’s call, went down to the countryside in the late 1960s to make revolution. He was 17 years old. He became a village leader in Inner Mongolia, a dirt-poor part of China. Disillusioned with the promises of Maoism, he returned to Beijing, and became passionately involved in the Tiananmen protests of 1989. After the imprisonment of Xu Wenli and the dismemberment of the CDP, Zha Jianguo became the de facto leader of the soon-to-be crushed opposition party.
Zha Jianying
In the summer of 2000 I was contacted by Benjamin Lee, a visiting professor of comparative literature at the University of Hong Kong. Ben was an accomplished scholar. He had taught at the University of Chicago where he had earned his PhD in anthropology. He had also taught at Rice University, where he ran the Transnational China Project at the James A. Baker Institute of Policy Studies. Ben and I had studied Chinese language at Middlebury College in the summer of 1972, immediately before I left the United States for Macau.
Ben had married Zha Jianying, a rising star in contemporary literature on China. Her China Pop, published in 1995, was critically acclaimed. Her facility in the English language was astonishing. When she went for her visa application interview at the United States Embassy in Beijing she hardly spoke a word of English. Within a few years she was writing fluent and evocative prose, glistening with power and emotion.
Zha Jianying’s brother is Zha Jianguo, and Ben had suggested she reach out to me for advice and assistance on how to secure better treatment and clemency for Zha Jianguo.
Ben, Jianying, and I met for lunch in Hong Kong at the Mandarin Hotel’s Grill Room on September 19, 2000. Over the next six months Jianying and I met frequently. She joined me on visits to the Chinese University of Hong Kong’s University Services Centre which, at the time, had an outstanding collection of Chinese government open sources on political crime. Sadly, that is no longer the case.
I accepted her request to act as her advisor on matters relating to Chinese prisons and offered to begin including her brother’s name on prisoner lists submitted to the Chinese government by foreign governments, as well as asking about him directly in my meetings with the Chinese Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
By the time I offered to assist Jianying I had already visited five Chinese prisons and met privately with officials of the Prison Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice more than two dozen times.
I concluded that Chinese prison officials were susceptible to flattery regarding their personal appearance, in particular their smart uniforms, and the physical appearance of their prisons. (This was in part because prison officials, unlike foreign affairs officials, rarely got to meet foreigners.) If prison officials had treated a prisoner well, this should be acknowledged. It was important that visitors dress appropriately. This was not an issue with Jianying, who is an elegant dresser.
I told her that monthly visits and phone calls were critically important, not only because they boosted the prisoner’s morale, but because they sent a strong signal to the prison authorities that people on the outside cared deeply for their imprisoned loved one. I admonished her to be careful what she said to Zha Jianguo during the 30-minute monthly visits; they spoke by phone through a thick plexiglass screen. The calls were monitored and could be cut off at any time. I advised to her to speak with her brother as if Jiang Zemin were in the room.
During monthly visits, friendships could be developed both with guards and wardens, some of whom would drop their guard and reveal important information on the prisoner’s behavior and health. I suggested she ask to meet with one of the wardens of Beijing Number Two Prison.
Jianying advised me that her brother was unrepentant, and since he refused to confess he could never be considered for sentence reduction or parole. She asked me what I would do if I were in her brother’s place. I gave her the same answer I have given to every friend and relative of prisoners who have asked me this question over many years: if I were in prison, I would say or sign anything to win early release, as long as it didn’t hurt anyone else, especially fellow prisoners. In short, I would lie. Confessions made under distress would not be taken as signs of genuine remorse by people familiar with the realities of prison life in China. They were not worth the paper they were written on. Jianying sighed, knowing that her brother would never admit guilt for what he had done or for what he believed.
I also taught Jianying about fen lei gai zao, a Ministry of Justice policy, followed in many prisons, of grouping prisoners together with those who had been sentenced for the same crime. She should ask to have her brother moved to a cell with other political prisoners. At the time he was in a cell with violent offenders who often engaged in fights and petty quarrels. He was left alone, however, due to the respect other prisoners afforded him.
Shortly after our first meeting I put Zha Jianguo’s name on a list of prisoners submitted as part of a bilateral human rights dialogue with a European government. In January 2001, the Chinese government, for the first time, provided written information on Zha Jianguo.
A Conversation with Warden Zhang
On April 10 and 11, 2001, Zha Jianying received phone calls from Zhang Yongsheng, a warden of Beijing Number Two. Her request for a private meeting with the warden had been granted. She was invited to visit the prison on April 13.
Upon her arrival she was brought into the warden’s office. She sat on a sofa opposite Warden Zhang and his assistant Mr. Han. What was supposed to be a 30-minute meeting wound up lasting 90 minutes.
Jianying started by praising Warden Zhang. “I have been quite surprised and impressed by your officers’ courtesy, efficiency, and law-abiding spirit,” she said. She complimented the warden and his assistant’s snappy new uniforms (modeled on Hong Kong prison uniforms) and asked for the meaning of the stars on their epaulets. Warden Zhang smiled broadly.
Jianying then proceeded to make requests. On a recent visit she had noticed that her brother was in poor health. While thanking the warden for arranging Jianguo to receive a spinal CT at a local hospital, she asked that he also be given a heart CT and a brain CT. She expressed concern over an alarming new development: Jianguo’s hands were purple and would turn black at night. This might be a sign of a circulation problem. A heart examination and treatment might be necessary. She worried about her brother’s headaches, and said she feared he might have a brain tumor.
Jianying complained that her brother was in a cell with ruffians who were noisy and argumentative. He was unable to get a good night’s sleep. Would it be possible to move him to a better cell? Perhaps the prison could move him in with other prisoners who were serving sentences for state security offenses.
She lodged a complaint with the warden over the lack of physical exercise for Zha Jianguo. He had fallen down while exercising in the prison yard and had been barred from going outside “for his own good.” All prisoners should do physical labor, the warden said. Zha Jianguo’s job was wrapping chopsticks, a monotonous task involving little physical exercise.
Finally, Warden Zhang told Zha Jianying that all her requests would be considered. “We will do the best we can.” However, the prison did not have enough state security prisoners to fill a cell block, so this request could not be granted. Transfer to another, quieter cell could however be considered.
In the months that followed Jianying’s visit, Zha Jianguo’s treatment improved. He was moved to a better cell and exempted from physical labor. He was allowed to read as much as he wanted; his sister brought piles of books to him on every visit. He was afforded better medical treatment.
A Visit to Beijing Number Two
Two months after Zha Jianying visited Beijing Number Two, I went to Beijing in June on one of my regular missions. I met with the Ministry of Justice and asked for permission to visit the prison. I was told that my request would be considered.
In December 2001, I traveled to Beijing accompanied by Tina Rosenberg, a journalist working for The New York Times who was writing a story about my work. (The story appeared in the March 3, 2002 issue of the Times’ Sunday Magazine under the title John Kamm’s Third Way.) Ms. Rosenberg observed my work (including during a frosty breakfast with the American Chamber of Commerce) and sat in on meetings with the Supreme People’s Court and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but her request for a meeting with the Ministry of Justice was denied, and it was made clear that she would not be allowed into a Chinese prison.
On the morning of December 18, 2001, I was picked up at the Jianguo Hotel and, together with representatives of the Ministry of Justice and the Beijing Prison Administration Bureau, we drove to northeast Beijing, down a dusty exit road off the Beijing-Shenyang expressway. It was familiar terrain for me. The prison sat cheek to jowl with the Beijing Chemical Works, with whom I’d done business 20 years before.
I was bringing with me a list of prisoners in Beijing Number Two. Among the names on the list were Zha Jianguo and Gao Hongming. Others included Hu Shigen, Liu Jingsheng, Chen Yanbin, and Han Chunsheng, all well-known dissidents. There were also two people on my list who had been given long sentences for counterrevolutionary sabotage and hooliganism committed during the June 1989 protests in Beijing, Chang Yongjie and Zhu Gengsheng. They were both released early after multiple sentence reductions.
Beijing Number Two was an old facility, drab and run-down. It had been designated a maximum-security prison in 1990. Among its 2,000 prisoners were many who had committed violent crimes. In the report on my two-hour visit, I noted that “Its facilities, including its clinic, are less extensive and more poorly equipped [than other prisons I had visited], and its cellblocks were more crowded and less well-appointed than those of model prisons. . . . My tour revealed a physical plant badly in need of repair and better maintenance. Foreigners are rarely taken to the prison. I was the only foreign visitor in the last 12 months.”
Beijing Number Two Prison. Photo Credit: Baidu Baike
In my conversation with the warden in his office (a different warden than the one Zha Jianying had met), I went over my list name by name and asked for their current status. The warden said he’d look into my requests. Although they did not have a separate section, those convicted of political crimes were not housed with violent criminals, sex offenders, or those convicted of economic crimes. Prisoners serving sentences for these crimes were housed together in separate cell blocks.
I was given a detailed account of the point system used to reward prisoners with sentence reductions and parole, as well as other benefits like more frequent family visits, conjugal visits, and use of two telephones to receive calls from family members. The prison granted sentence reductions to 25 percent of prisoners every year, though the warden acknowledged that the sentence reduction rate for those convicted of endangering state security was lower.
I asked if prisoners like Zha Jianguo and Han Chunsheng who refuse to “acknowledge guilt, show genuine remorse, obey regulations, and perform manual labor” could ever gain early release. He replied that prisoners who refuse to acknowledge guilt can petition courts for a retrial. And if their petitions are rejected? “Then the prisoner has no way out,” the warden explained.
After our conversation, I toured the prison grounds accompanied by Ministry of Justice officials and the warden. I used the walk-around to pepper them with questions on individual prisoners. I tried to raise as many names as I could before being invited to leave the prison. The visit had lasted two hours.
Of Courage and Devotion
During one of the monthly visits, Zha Jianguo asked his sister to tell me to stop my efforts on his behalf. He was doing fine, and I should focus on other prisoners who were in greater need. I complied with his request and stopped raising his name. He was released on June 29, 2008, having served his entire nine-year sentence. He returned home to a hero’s welcome.
Zha Jianying and Zha Jianguo, Beijing, 2017. Zha Jianguo had just returned to his apartment after spending an evening in a detention center. Photo courtesy of Zha Jianying.
Despite serving a supplemental sentence of “deprivation of political rights,” Zha Jianguo returned to political activism, at one point writing three separate blogs that commented on recent events. From time to time what he wrote got him into trouble. He would be “invited for tea,” his computer and cell phones seized, and, around the time of “sensitive anniversaries” or big meetings like party or legislative congresses, taken out of Beijing on tours of scenic and historic sights.
In her Tides Players, Zha Jianying paints me in heroic terms as someone who uses everything in his power, “hard data, personal connections, cajoling, name-dropping, bargaining, to make sure the issue of Chinese political prisoners does not go away.” She writes that “If Jianguo has been treated better than some political detainees it is probably because of John’s efforts.”
She is too generous. The reasons why Zha Jianguo was treated better than other political detainees were his courage and his sister’s devotion.
Possessed of a charismatic personality, Zha Jianguo refused to admit guilt, to grovel before authority. He was resolute, and held fast to his belief that, someday, China would be a democracy that respects human rights. He earned the respect of inmates and guards alike. He was neither tortured nor mistreated. For the most part he was left alone with his books.
On her monthly visits, Zha Jianying brought him news of home, money to buy extra food, snacks and sweets from the commissary, warm clothes, and, perhaps most important, books. She brought him hundreds of books during the time he was in prison, enough to stock a small library. She mostly visited her brother on her own, but on one occasion she brought along a grandchild he’d never seen. He watched her crawl around the reception room through the thick plexiglass barrier through which Jianying spoke with him by phone.
Abraham Lincoln once said that the power of hope on human exertion, and on happiness, is wonderful. Zha Jianying gave her brother hope, and strengthened his will to carry on. As for me, I was but an instrument of her devotion.
On April 3, 2002, an explosion took place in the central square of Sichuan Province’s capitol, Chengdu, injuring two people. The police moved quickly, detaining Tenzin Delek Rinpoche, a senior Tibetan religious leader, and his nephew Lobsang Dhundop on April 7. They were put in Dartsedo Detention Center. Although there have been improvements in recent years, Chinese detention centers in the early to mid-2000s were credibly accused of using torture to extract confessions, as attested to by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture Manfred Nowak, who visited China in late 2005.
Both Tenzin Delek and Lobsang Dhundop were formally arrested, tried, and convicted of causing explosions, inciting splittism, and illegal possession of firearms; the prosecutors alleged that both men had been involved in a series of explosions. They demanded death sentences.
The trial by the Garze Intermediate People’s Court took place on November 29, 2002. It was a closed trial. Lobsang Dhundop was sentenced to death, and Tenzin Delek Rinpoche was sentenced to death with two-year reprieve, and suspension of political rights for life. Lobsang Dhundop was executed in late January 2003. Tenzin Delek appealed his sentence to the Sichuan High People’s Court, which dismissed it in January 2003, the same day the execution of his nephew took place.
Tenzin Delek was a much-revered and widely respected Tibetan monk who had been recognized as a reincarnated lama by the Dalai Lama in the 1980s. He was much loved by Tibetans – especially among nomads in Lithang, the place of his birth. From Orthok Monastery, he fought for justice, health care, educational opportunities, and especially for a clean environment, in the process making many enemies among mining and logging companies and their political protectors.
The man widely believed to be behind the persecution of Tenzin Delek Rinpoche was then party secretary of Sichuan Province, Zhou Yongkang. Zhou was a hardliner known for cracking down on Tibetans and members of the Falun Gong group. He was promoted to Minister of Public Security in Beijing in December 2002, immediately after the conviction of Tenzin Delek Rinpoche and his nephew and right before the rejection of Tenzin Delek’s appeal and Lobsang Dhundop’s execution.
Once in Beijing, Zhou continued his rapid ascent, eventually becoming a member of the all-powerful Standing Committee of the Politburo with responsibility for overseeing the police and the courts. He was purged by Secretary General Xi Jinping in 2013, becoming one of the most senior victims of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. None of this had an impact on Tenzin Delek or any other political prisoner persecuted by Zhou. They remained in prison, denied any clemency.
Tenzin Delek Rinpoche was put in Sichuan’s Chuandong Prison, a high-security facility located in the remote Dabu Mountains in Dazhu County, a bleak landscape accessible only by car or bus. Chuandong Prison, also known as Sichuan Prison Number Three, is in Chongqing Municipality about 180 kilometres from Chongqing City and a four to five-hour drive from Chengdu. It has for decades been the prison in Sichuan where the most important political prisoners are held. As such it has acquired a well-deserved fearsome reputation.
Tenzin Delek’s sentence of death with two-year reprieve was commuted on January 26, 2005. The sentence was changed to life in prison.
Zhou Yongkang, former Party Secretary of Sichuan Province. Image Credit: TouTai.
Chuandong Prison in Sichuan. Image Credit: Baidu.
The Execution of Lobsang Dhundop
The execution of Lobsang Dhundop marked the first execution of a Tibetan for a political crime in more than 20 years. His death prompted international outrage.
Once I learned of the execution of Lobsang Dhundop I called a Chinese official with whom I had worked on human rights cases. He sounded much besieged. I admonished his government for killing Lobsang Dhondup, reminding him of remarks widely attributed to Chairman Mao Zedong: “We should be careful about killing people. People are not like vegetables. If you cut off their heads, they don’t grow back.” A grim silence followed.
After the execution, international attention turned to Tenzin Delek Rinpoche’s death with two-year reprieve sentence. Governments and human rights groups called for the sentence to be commuted.
I spent little time on this effort. Commutations of these sentences to life in prison or sometimes a lesser fixed term sentence like twenty years are the norm. By some estimates, fewer than 1 percent of prisoners serving sentences of death with two-year reprieve are executed. I assumed that Tenzin Delek’s sentence would be commuted, and it turned out I was right.
I soon set about trying to figure out a way to win Tenzin Delek’s early release. Early release in the Chinese prison system can be achieved by successive sentence reductions, parole, or medical parole. Sentence reduction and parole must be approved by a court. To get a sentence reduction or be paroled, the prisoner must admit guilt and express remorse. This Tenzin Delek refused to do. He pled not guilty at his trial and, while in the detention center, secretly taped a statement proclaiming his innocence. The statement was taped on January 20, 2003 and smuggled out of the detention center the same day. It was broadcast on Radio Free Asia on January 21, 2003. Tenzin Delek resisted his imprisonment, staging a hunger strike that landed him in solitary confinement.
Medical Parole for Political Prisoners
Tenzin Delek Rinpoche Image Credit: FreeTibet.Org
Medical parole for political and religious prisoners is not unusual. It does not require an admission of guilt. Although regulations state that a prisoner serving a life sentence must serve a minimum of seven years in prison before being considered for medical parole, they also state if the medical problem is serious enough, medical parole can be granted at any time. Unlike sentence reduction or parole, courts are not involved. The prison authorities can grant medical parole, though it must be approved by local prison bureaus and, in the case of sensitive prisoners, the Ministry of Justice in Beijing.
Since I began intervening on behalf of political prisoners in 1990, I have worked on more than a dozen cases of medical parole for prominent political prisoners, including Tibetans Jigme Sangpo and Ngawang Sangdrol, the Uyghur businesswoman Rebiya Kadeer, and democracy advocate Xu Wenli. All their medical paroles were approved by the Ministry of Justice, and in every instance the most senior officials in the Chinese government and Communist Party were consulted and gave the go-ahead.
I needed to get information on Tenzin Delek’s health, but I did not have a good channel to his family or to other individuals in Tenzin Delek’s home county who knew him. Dedicated activists for the cause of Tibet, Mandie McKeown and Alison Reynolds of Tibet Information Network (TIN) in London, had excellent contacts in Tibet and within the Tibetan diaspora, including with members of Tenzin Delek’s family. Of special importance was the relationship with Tenzin Delek’s niece, Nyama Lhamo who now lives in India after leaving Tibet in 2003. In a stroke of luck, TIN reached out to me for assistance, beginning more than 10 years of collaboration on the case of Tenzin Delek Rinpoche.
From the outset, I recommended medical parole. Over the years, the family applied for medical parole on several occasions. They never received a response from the prison authorities.
Bilateral Rights Dialogues
Complementing the efforts of international human rights groups, especially those focusing on Tibet, I began lobbying foreign governments that had official bilateral human rights dialogues with China to put Tenzin Delek’s name on the lists of political prisoners submitted at these dialogues. Western politicians and media often referred to Tenzin Delek Rinpoche as China’s top religious prisoner. From March 2003 to April 2011 – a period of eight years — the Chinese government gave written responses to at least 25 requests for information on Tenzin Delek submitted by the United Nations, the United States, the European Union (EU), European governments, Australia, and Canada. Dui Hua also submitted his name directly to the Chinese government, on average at least once a year, receiving both written and verbal responses.
While international efforts were underway to help Tenzin Delek, domestic pressures were building. In an extraordinary act of civil disobedience, 40,000 Tibetans living in Tenzin Delek’s home county of Lithang signed a petition demanding a retrial in 2009; the entire population of Lithang was, at the time, around 45,000. Local Tibetans staged a hunger strike, resulting in the detention of dozens of strikers.
Up until December 2006, China’s responses to foreign governments invariably claimed that Tenzin Delek was healthy, without giving details. Things changed in 2008. A Chinese response to the United States that year stated that Tenzin Delek had an illness prior to being put in prison (significant because prisoners cannot get medical parole if he or she had the medical condition prior to being admitted to prison), but that the condition had been treated and that his health was now okay. The response also said that the Rinpoche undertook light exercise and was sleeping and eating well.
In the November 2009 response to the EU, China repeated that Tenzin Delek’s health was okay, that he was eating well and was observing a strict diet, and that he did light exercise and gardening work. By this time the lama’s family knew that he was in fact seriously ill with high blood pressure and heart disease. He walked with a cane and had troubling spells of dizziness.
One of the last written responses to the list of a bilateral dialogue partner was the Chinese response to the United States in April 2011. After the EU-China human rights dialogue of May 2012 (a written response to a prisoner list was handed over – no information was provided on Tenzin Delek), China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a “policy decision” to resist receiving prisoner lists from foreign governments, and under no circumstances to give written responses. The reason given for this decision was unhappiness over how the blind activist Chen Guangcheng’s case had been handled by the United States. Information on Tenzin Delek through governmental channels dried up.
Chuandong Prison in Sichuan. Image Credit: Baidu.
Exemption from “Policy Decision”
My own inquiries were exempted from the policy decision to refuse prisoner lists and provide responses. I was not after all a foreign government. I could continue to submit lists and get answers to my queries.
In March 2012, just before the “policy decision,” I was told that Tenzin Delek had been allowed family visits and that he would get family visits in the future. In November 2013, Tenzin Delek’s family paid him a visit. This would be the last time the family saw him alive.
The last written response to one of my requests for information on Tenzin Delek Rinpoche was given during my trip to Beijing in August 2014. The response implicitly acknowledged that he was ill but pointed out that “sickness alone is not the only criteria for medical parole.” As the response put it, “Tenzin Delek does not meet other criteria. He is a threat to social stability and to himself.”
I concluded that the Chinese government was worried that Tenzin Delek Rinpoche would commit suicide, perhaps by means of self-immolation. Beginning in 2009, Tibetans burned themselves to death to protest rule by Beijing. By the time I received the response, more than 130 Tibetans had self-immolated. I doubled down on medical parole, arguing that a Rinpoche would never approve of violence of any kind, including self-violence.
I was too late. Before my ideas gained traction, Tenzin Delek Rinpoche passed away.
A Call from London
At 3:30 PM on July 15, 2015, I received an email from Mandie McKeown, Campaigns Coordinator the International Tibet Network in London. “I have been given some worrying news,” she wrote. She hesitated, wanting to verify the news from another source. At 8:46 PM she informed me that Tenzin Delek Rinpoche had died in recent days.
McKeown’s news was current: Tenzin Delek had died on July 12. The lama’s family got the news in a phone call from the prison authorities at 10 PM Tibet time on the 12th. Large-scale protests broke out on July 13 as demonstrators demanded that the prison authorities hand over the Rinpoche’s body to his family and his monastery. The police reportedly beat the protesters and dispersed them with tear gas. Protests and unrest continued in Yajiang County, site of Orthok Monastery, and Lithang County on July 14 and July 15.
On July 15, McKeown advised me that Tenzin Delek’s body had not been handed over to the family, and that the prison authorities were preparing to cremate his remains without allowing the family or monks to view the body or carry out traditional Tibetan funeral rites. On July 15, the family was told that the cremation would take place the following day, July 16, Tibet time.
Acting on a hunch, I asked Dui Hua researchers to look for regulations on how to deal with the death of prisoners in custody. It turned out that regulations had just been jointly issued by the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Civil Affairs in March 2015, four months before Tenzin Delek’s death.
Article 17 of these regulations states that unless relatives had objections to the cremation or questions about the prisoner’s death, the body should be cremated as soon as possible. Article 19 states that the body should be cremated within 15 days after investigation of death is concluded, and that if the relatives request a delay in cremation, the prison should decide on a case by case basis, but the delay should not be more than 10 days.
The results of the prison’s investigation into Tenzin Delek’s death – if indeed there was an investigation – have never been disclosed. No autopsy is believed to have been performed. He was cremated four days after his death over the objections of his family.
Of special significance, Article 24 stipulates that if the deceased prisoner is a member of an ethnic minority, “handling of the body should respect ethnic traditions.”
I immediately informed Mandie McKeown, who confirmed receipt and advised that she would find a way to forward the regulations to the family. She succeeded in doing so. The family contacted the prison authorities right away and demanded that they act in accordance with the regulations. The authorities relented, and early on the morning of July 16, Tenzin Delek’s sister and niece, together with a small group of monks and nuns, were taken by car to Chuandong Prison. They arrived around 9 AM at this dreaded place and were allowed to enter. They were taken to a room near the crematorium.
The monks washed and anointed the body and changed his clothes from prison garb to monk’s robes. The family was able to pay its respects for about 30 minutes. Tenzin Delek was cremated at around 10 AM. The monks were entrusted with the Rinpoche’s ashes and they set out for Orthok Monastery.
They stopped at a hotel along the way to spend the night. Police raided the hotel, barged into the room, and seized Tenzin Delek’s ashes. They told the monks that the ashes would be dumped in a river. The Chinese government was determined not to allow the holy man’s remains to become a focal point of reverence or protest.
Liu Xiaobo
Two years later, almost to the day after Tenzin Delek’s death, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo – widely considered China’s top political prisoner – died of liver cancer on July 13, 2017 in Liaoning Province. He had served nearly nine years of an 11-year sentence in Jinzhou Prison for inciting subversion.
Liu Xiaobo’s final days were very different from the final days of Tenzin Delek Rinpoche. Liu was granted medical parole several weeks before his death, too late to save him as it turned out. He was taken to a hospital in Shenyang where he was afforded the best treatment available. Foreign doctors – one from Germany, one from the United States – were flown in to conduct a diagnosis. His wife and immediate members of his family were permitted to stay by his side to the hour of his death.
Li Yan In Happier Times. Image Credit: Li Yan’s family
The events of June 4, 1989 in Beijing – known in the West as the Tiananmen Massacre – had a catastrophic impact on China’s image around the world, especially in the United States, China’s largest trading partner. By one measure, Gallup’s annual poll of attitudes among Americans to foreign countries, China’s favorability rating among Americans fell by 50 percent between early 1989 and the summer of that year. China went from being the “cuddly Communist” to an international pariah virtually overnight.
Seizing on China’s bad image as a violator of human rights, in 1990 the United States Congress began considering legislation that would strip China of its Most Favored Nation trading status. In May of that year I made my first intervention on behalf of a political prisoner. In the ensuing months and years, I intervened on behalf of hundreds of political prisoners, often with good results. A principal weapon in my arsenal was the argument that by releasing prisoners China’s image in the United States would improve.
After the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush declared a War on Terror. In carrying out that war, the United States took a series of actions that affected its global image. It incarcerated scores of captured Islamic militants without trial at the naval base in Guantanamo, Cuba. It built an extraordinary rendition program under which detainees captured in a foreign country would be transferred to the United States or another jurisdiction, without due process.
In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq, overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein. The United States military, with its new Iraqi allies, undertook “enhanced interrogation techniques” like waterboarding, viewed by many as torture, at the Abu Ghraib Prison in Baghdad. As evidence of these abuses began to become public, many were outraged, and America’s image took another hit.
By the mid-2000s, polling data suggested that China’s image around the world was better than that of the United States. The argument that China should release political prisoners to improve its image lost much of its potency. Beijing had little incentive to deal with me and Dui Hua.
Expanded Mission: Juvenile Justice
Faced with this situation, I decided to find other reasons for the Chinese government to engage with me on human rights. I hit upon the idea that Dui Hua should expand its mission beyond advocating for political prisoners to advocating for other groups of prisoners at risk. One group in particular caught my attention: juvenile offenders. In its third reform plan covering 2004-2008. China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) prioritized the reform of the country’s juvenile justice system. Maybe Dui Hua could help by engaging in expert exchanges with the court’s Office of Juvenile Courts.
In June 2007, I traveled to Beijing to explore the idea of holding expert exchanges on juvenile justice. I had a meeting at the SPC on June 13. Present were three judges from the Office of Juvenile Courts under the SPC’s Research Department. After a review of where things stood insofar as the reform plan was concerned, the Chinese judges said that they would be open to discussing a delegation to the United States to study the American juvenile justice system.
On August 27, 2007, Dui Hua held its annual meeting in Tiburon, California. During my executive director report, I proposed that Dui Hua undertake a new program on juvenile justice. Directors expressed concern that the new program would sow confusion amongst supporters who might see it as diluting Dui Hua’s core mission of helping political prisoners.
According to the minutes of the meeting: “Kamm responded to the concerns, assuring directors that the new initiative would in fact be supportive of the core mission by opening up new relationships, demonstrating to the Chinese government that we’re willing to help in an area identified as a high priority for legal reform.” A consensus was reached that the initiative should only be undertaken if financial support could be secured, and if the initiative did not detract from Dui Hua’s ongoing work identifying and assisting individuals detained in political cases, some of whom, including Tibetan nun Ngawang Sangdrol, were juveniles.
Working with colleagues and partners in Chicago, Washington D.C., and San Francisco, preparations began for hosting a delegation from the SPC in the spring of 2008. Unfortunately, the devastating Sichuan earthquake put paid to those plans, but the visit was rearranged to take place in the autumn. The delegation was a success, and it was followed by a delegation of American experts to China in 2010 and another Chinese delegation to the United States in September 2012.
A few months before the September 2012 delegation, China’s National People’s Congress adopted the amended Criminal Procedure Law. For the first time, the law contained a chapter on the handling of juvenile cases. Many of the ideas explored in Dui Hua’s exchanges with the SPC were included in the chapter, including diversion (referred to as “postponed prosecution” in the law) and sealing of juvenile records.
Women Prisoners and the Bangkok Rules
Chen Min, one of China’s leading experts on domestic violence at the China Institute of Applied Jurisprudence under the Supreme People’s Court delivers a presentation.
Audience members at the International Symposium on the Bangkok Rules held in Hong Kong in February 2014.
In December 2010, the United Nations General Assembly had adopted the United Nations “Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women Offenders.” Reflecting the strong support of the Thai royal family, the rules became popularly known as the Bangkok Rules.
And in early 2011, Dui Hua began covering the plight of Chinese women in prison in its publications. At its annual meeting, held in San Diego in October 2011. Dui Hua’s board endorsed my proposal to expand our work from juvenile offenders to female prisoners in the framework of promoting adoption of the Bangkok Rules in China. We decided that I should explore the idea of holding an international symposium on the Bangkok Rules in Beijing.
Unfortunately, while China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported the idea, China’s Ministry of Justice didn’t. The Justice Minister, Wu Aiying, herself a woman, was dead-set against any form of cooperation with Dui Hua or for that matter other governments and NGOs on issues related to the rights of prisoners. I decided to explore other partners and other venues.
In March 2012, I traveled to Geneva with my colleague Daisy Yau. We were invited to attend a side event on the Bangkok Rules organized by the Thai Mission to the United Nations. After the side event, which was sparsely attended (no one from either the Chinese Mission or the US Mission attended), Ms. Yau and I huddled with Rachel Brett of the Quakers’ Office in Geneva and Andrea Huber of Penal Reform International in London. Both women had played important roles in developing and promoting the Bangkok Rules. We agreed to work together on an international symposium.
It took nearly two years of preparation until the International Symposium on the Bangkok Rules took place in Hong Kong at the end of February 2014. There were four partners: The Centre for Comparative and Public Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong (CCPL); Dui Hua; Penal Reform International; and the Center for Criminal Procedure and Reform (CCPR) at Renmin University of China Law School. The CCPL oversaw logistics, including securing the Law School’s new conference room and arranging rooms for participants. The CCPR undertook field research at five places of detention for women on the mainland and presented its findings at the symposium. PRI lent its expertise in the Bangkok Rules to selecting topics and making suggestions for expert presenters.
Dui Hua was in charge of fundraising and retaining interpreters. In addition to securing support from several individuals, the foundation received grants from the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the Ford Foundation.
Experts from countries in Europe, Asia, and North America attended and made presentations and interventions. Especially gratifying was the high turnout from Mainland China. More than a dozen judges, judicial officials, and scholars came to the symposium. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Justice declined to attend, even though they had been invited a year in advance. The ministry claimed it was too busy. Not only did it refuse to attend, the ministry actively tried to sabotage the symposium by pressuring a presenter from China’s Prison Society to withdraw at the last minute, claiming illness.
After two days of listening to presenters and engaging in lively exchanges on a wide range of issues, the participants toured Hong Kong’s women’s prison at Lo Wu. Hong Kong turned out to be a good choice for the symposium. The territory has one of the highest percentages of women in its prisoner population of any country or territory in the world. The symposium, attended by officers of the Hong Kong Correctional Services, raised questions as to why this was so, and what could be done about it.
Domestic Violence: Li Yan
One of the topics explored at the symposium was violence against women. On the first morning, two experts – Elizabeth Brundige, Executive Director of the Avon Global Center for Women and Justice in the United States, and Chen Min, one of China’s leading experts on domestic violence at the China Institute of Applied Jurisprudence under the Supreme People’s Court – made presentations.
Using national and provincial statistics, Chen Min outlined the stark realities of violence against women in China: in China as a whole, nearly 25 percent of women experience domestic violence during their marriages, and in Shaanxi Province, 171 women were serving time in the provincial women’s prison for violent crimes, more than 90 percent of them had killed their spouse due to prolonged domestic violence.
While there were no national statistics on the reasons for women’s incarceration, Chen Min, drawing on local data, concluded that the main reason for women’s incarceration was their experience of domestic violence and for their fighting that violence with violence.
Chen Min’s presentation was timely. China’s NPC was considering the country’s first domestic violence law. Legislators finished drafting the law in November 2014, and it was passed by lawmakers in July 2015. It took effect on March 1, 2016. Although flawed (the law has been criticized for failing to address violence in relationships other than marriage), the law was an important step in addressing the pandemic of domestic violence in China.
There was another reason why Chen Min’s presentation was timely. In November 2010, a woman by the name of Li Yan, a then 41-year-old resident of Anyue County in Sichuan Province. murdered her husband Tan Yong. The couple, who ran a noodle shop, had married the year before. It was Tan’s fourth marriage. He boasted of abusing his previous wives, and it wasn’t long after his marriage to Li Yan that he began subjecting her to horrific violence, beating her, sexually assaulting her, stubbing cigarettes out on her face, and locking her outside on cold winter nights.
On November 3, 2010, Tan was at home, drunkenly playing with an air rifle. When Li tried to stop Tan, he kicked her and threatened her with the rifle. Li seized the gun and struck Tan in the head twice, killing him. She dismembered his body, boiled the parts, and spread them around the village. She was arrested and sentenced to death by the Ziyang City Intermediate People’s Court. The judgment was upheld by the Sichuan High People’s Court after which it was sent to the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) in Beijing. The SPC confirmed the judgment in January 2013. Tan’s family successfully filed a civil suit against Li Yan’s family to pay 58,212 RMB in compensation – a large sum of money for Li’s working-class family.
Death sentences reviewed and confirmed by the SPC typically take place within days of SPC approval. By the time of our Hong Kong symposium, more than 13 months after the SPC decision, Li Yan had not yet been executed. Her plight had drawn domestic attention as Chinese feminists lobbied the government to stay its hand arguing it had not taken into consideration the violence Li had suffered. More than 400 Chinese lawyers and legal scholars had signed a letter to the SPC pleading for Li Yan’s life to be spared. The case was beginning to draw international attention too. Amnesty International initiated a global signature campaign calling for Li Yan not to be executed.
One of the SPC judges attending the symposium sat on an SPC panel reviewing death sentences, and it emerged that she was one of the judges considering whether to carry out the execution of Li Yan. At the end of the symposium, she thanked me for inviting her to the event, and told me that she had learned a lot from the discussion on domestic violence. “It has changed the way I think about it,” she told me. I stayed in touch with the Chinese participants, and on June 23, 2014, a Chinese official who had been at the symposium and was deeply concerned with Li’s case sent me a short email: “She has survived.” At the same time, Li Yan’s brother was advised that his sister’s death sentence had been overturned by the SPC. A retrial by the Ziyang City Intermediate People’s Court was ordered.
Dui Hua issued a press statement and sent it to journalists covering human rights in China, including many who were based in Beijing. Coverage in the international media was widespread, and the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva issued a statement applauding the decision.
One of the journalists I sent Dui Hua’s statement to was Didi Kirsten Tatlow, a New York Times journalist based in Beijing. Ms. Tatlow had been reporting on the Li Yan case since late 2012 and decided to travel to Chengdu and thence to Ziyang with photographer Gilles Sabrié to attend the retrial in November 2014. Outside the courthouse, she encountered an angry and threatening mob of Tan Yong’s family and friends. In a telephone call to me, Ms. Tatlow remarked that she had rarely welcomed the presence of Chinese police in her work, but she did on this occasion!
During the retrial, more evidence of domestic violence and testimonies from neighbors and witnesses emerged. Witness protection systems had to be set up to protect witnesses from Tan’s family. Inside the courtroom, the mob hurled insults and papers at Ms. Li and her lawyer. Five months later, on April 24, 2015, the court announced it had changed the judgment to death with two years reprieve, a unique Chinese sentence that almost always results in commutation after two years. On September 8, 2017, the intermediate court commuted the sentence and sentenced Li Yan to life in prison. Under Supreme People’s Court regulations that came into effect on January 1, 2017, Li Yan can be considered for a sentence reduction no earlier than September 2020. Her total time served after commutation cannot be less than 15 years, meaning that she will remain in prison until at least 2032, when she will be 62 years old.
Tan Yong’s family confront journalists outside of the Ziyang Intermediate Court. Image Credit: Gilles Sabrié
Relatives of Tan Yong called on the court to reaffirm Li Yan’s death sentence. Image Credit: Gilles Sabrié
“To Ziyang for Li Yan”
Didi Kirsten Tatlow
The reporting trip I made to Ziyang to attend Li Yan’s retrial was one of the most instructive, and frightening, moments of my 14 years reporting in China from 2003 until my departure for Berlin, Germany, in 2017. I had been reporting on women’s and feminist issues including gendered violence for years by the time the retrial was announced, including one heart-breaking magazine story for the South China Morning Post, my employer for the first seven years in China, about Sun Village, a home for children from abuse-filled families whose parents were both dead (often the father killed by the mother with rat poison after years of abuse by him), run by a former correctional officer from Xi’an. Strangely heartbreaking for me was the small fact that the children’s favorite TV show, SpongeBob SquarePants, was moved to late night viewing not long after my visit around 2006, on the grounds that it was an American show and would sully Chinese children’s minds. The kids had lost the cute little sponge and his pink friend Patrick Starfish, who made their often-harsh lives that bit more fun.
I applied to attend Li Yan’s retrial with low hopes – never had I been allowed to enter a Chinese courtroom and this was sensitive stuff. And initially I was put off by the Sichuan authorities, but always with the curious suggestion that I should try again later. I did, and on my third or fourth attempt I was given permission.
The experience was tough. In the small town of Ziyang Mr. Tan’s family seemed to be everywhere; the night before the hearing I met with members of Li Yan’s family in a restaurant, but we had to be careful not to speak loudly and her brother, Li Deshuai, though friendly and hospitable, was anxious. The next morning, I understood why. After handing over my reporter ID to the court front gate in order to enter the grounds, I went to talk to a large group of Mr. Tan’s family members that had gathered outside. They quickly grew hostile and began to pull at my clothes and arm, voices rising. His father waved his crutches at me; his sisters wagged their fingers in my face. Somehow, I was to blame, it seemed. Sensing things were slipping out of hand I moved into the court grounds and called for the police as the atmosphere deteriorated. They however were slow to react, and I wondered – if I, a foreign reporter with the backing of the court authorities to be present that day, could not get timely help from the dozens of court police standing around, how bad must it be for a Chinese, especially one with a grievance with the court?
Eventually the police did intervene. But Tan’s family persisted in their verbal and physical aggression, clearly hoping to influence the judges and the decision. I was shocked, too, that court officials did not order them out of the courtroom for contempt, as they sat there shouting and abusing Li Yan, telling her they hoped she would be raped for her crimes (her former husband had already done that, before she killed him.)
As a journalist, one rarely knows if or how one might have helped someone, though to me this was by far the most important aspect of the job. When John Kamm told me that he thought my work had helped I felt a deep sense of happiness. Li Yan was a petite woman standing alone in the courtroom between the panel of judges and shouting opponents, and I felt sorry for her, knowing also details of the appalling abuse she and her family had endured that had not been publicized out of consideration for the dignity and privacy of other family members (I also agreed not to publicize them, following their wishes.) It was a moment when I knew being a journalist was worth it, despite the strain, and regular fear, of reporting deeply not just on politics but also sensitive social issues like gender, in a complex, repressive and trigger-happy place like China.
Photo by Crystal K. Huie, Courtesy of the Fred T. Korematsu Institute.
In 2018 the international community rebuked both China and the United States (U.S.) for controversial policies affecting Muslim populations. This summer it was reported that China has detained more than a million of its own citizens — Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region suspected of dissident sentiments — in re-education camps. Meanwhile, the U.S. instituted a travel restriction on citizens from eight Muslim majority countries in what was widely viewed as an attempt to prevent Muslims from entering the country. Despite the many differences in these two policies, China and the U.S. offer strikingly similar justifications for their actions. Both countries point to overriding national security concerns and insist that these extreme practices are permissible by law. Although extremist violence is portrayed as a new threat that requires new responses, the legal battle over the U.S. travel ban and the outcry over detention of Muslims in China resurface discussion of a similar policy from a bygone era: the internment of Japanese citizens in the U.S. during World War II.
This summer the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Trump administration’s travel ban is constitutional. In the same decision, the court finally overturned its ruling in United States v. Korematsu, a 1944 case holding it permissible for the military to detain Japanese Americans in internment camps as a preventative safety measure. Although the internment camps were widely condemned in the decades since that decision, the practice officially remained “good law” until this year. The fact that such a flagrant human rights abuse could be found legally permissible—and remain so for so long—offers an important lesson: Although a policy that directly or indirectly targets an ethnic group may be judged lawful in a contemporary court, it may still be overruled in the court of history.
The Internment of Japanese Americans and the Korematsu Decision
More than a half-century ago the U.S. and China united in war against a common enemy: Japan. After years of imperial expansion in Asia, Japan’s incursion into Manchuria led to the formal declaration of war with China in 1937. In 1941 Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, prompting the U.S. to enter the conflict as well. The next year President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which authorized the military to exclude people from geographic areas in the U.S. at their discretion.
Following the executive order, more than 112,000 people in the U.S., primarily people of Japanese ancestry living on the west coast, were relocated from their homes and interned in concentration camps. At least 70,000 of these people were American citizens. Despite a lack of empirical evidence that Japanese-Americans posed a threat to national security, citizens were held against their will for years because of their ethnic background.
Fred Korematsu, an American of Japanese descent who was born in Oakland, California, refused to obey the exclusion order. He was arrested, convicted of violating the order, and sent to a camp in Utah. Korematsu appealed the conviction, arguing that the exclusion order was discriminatory and violated his constitutional rights.
In 1944 the U.S. Supreme Court considered Korematsu’s case. A divided court ultimately upheld the exclusion order and Korematsu’s conviction. Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, argued that while restrictions on the civil rights of a racial group are legally suspect, Roosevelt was justified in his order for reasons of national security. Black opined that “exclusion of those of Japanese origin was deemed necessary because of the presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members of the group.”
Even at the time of the ruling, some members of the Court condemned the exclusion. In a published dissent, Justice Frank Murphy called the order a “legalization of racism.” In the decades following the end of World War II, the U.S. reached a similar national consensus that the internment was a mistake and an injustice. In 1976 President Gerald Ford issued a formal apology, stating that “[w]e now know what we should have known then—not only was that evacuation wrong but Japanese-Americans were and are loyal Americans.” President Jimmy Carter established a commission that debunked the argument that the internment was necessary for national security. Following the recommendations of the commission, the U.S. government subsequently made reparation payments to people who had been interned.
But, despite the widespread recognition by both the public and the U.S. government that the internment was unjust, the Supreme Court’s 1944 Korematsu decision remained the unchallenged law of the land for more than 70 years.
Supreme Court Decision Invokes America’s Past Missteps in Travel Ban Decision
The Supreme Court reconsidered Korematsu this year in light of a contemporary presidential directive. Immediately after assuming office in 2017 President Donald Trump issued an executive order temporarily restricting entry to the U.S. for citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries. Although the Trump administration insisted that the restrictions were intended to prevent terrorist attacks, critics of the proposal pointed to numerous campaign statements by the president that seemed to indicate the order was intended to bar Muslims from entering the country.
The travel restriction order immediately came under judicial scrutiny. Following a series of legal actions and modifications to the order, in April 2018 the U.S. Supreme Court heard opinions in the question of whether the ban violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment, which forms the basis of the constitutional right to freedom of religion. In June the court issued its decision. Justice John Roberts, writing for a narrow majority, <a href=”The Korematsu decision reminds us that while a discriminatory policy may enjoy a veneer of legality, that legality is ultimately no match for the judgment of history. The internment of Japanese Americans was wrong during WWII, despite Supreme Court reasoning to the contrary. China’s efforts to criminalize Muslim expressions of faith today are no less abhorrent, whether or not they find basis in statute. As Justice Murphy wrote in his dissent in Korematsu in 1944, “[s]uch exclusion goes over ‘the very brink of constitutional power,’ and falls into the ugly abyss of racism” Justice John Roberts, writing for a narrow majority, upheld the constitutionality of the Trump order, finding that the president has broad authority over issues of national security.
In two dissents, four of the Supreme Court’s nine justices disagreed with the majority opinion upholding the travel ban. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, wrote that the majority “leaves undisturbed a policy first advertised openly and unequivocally as a ‘total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States’ because the policy now masquerades behind a façade of national-security concerns.”
The ghost of the court’s previous decision in Korematsu haunts both the majority decision and the dissent response to the travel restrictions. In the majority opinion Justice Roberts seemed to finally overturn the 1944 decision, stating that the contemporary debate “affords this Court the opportunity to express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong on the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear— ‘has no place in law under the constitution’.” Meanwhile, Justice Sotomayor wrote that while “[i]n the intervening since Korematsu, our Nation has done much to leave its sordid legacy behind,” in upholding the executive order and sanctioning a discriminatory policy in the name of national security, “the court replaces one ‘gravely wrong decision’ with another.”
The debate over Korematsu shows that even in a country such as the U.S. with a hearty tradition of strong and independent courts, when it comes to questions of national security and minority groups, what is lawful is not always what is right.
Korematsu and Lessons for China
China ought to take note of the legacy of the Korematsu decision. International news outlets reported this year that China has detained as many as a million Chinese Muslims—particularly ethnic minority Uyghurs and Kazakhs in the western autonomous region of Xinjiang—out of national security concerns. In August the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination issued a report expressing concern that these Muslims were being “held incommunicado and often for long periods, without being charged or tried, under the pretext of countering terrorism and religious extremism” and are “forced to spend varying periods in political ‘re-education camps’ for even nonthreatening expressions of Muslim ethno-religious culture like daily greetings.” In November numerous nations raised concerns about China’s treatment of Muslims at the Universal Periodic Review of China’s human rights record at the United Nations. Dui Hua’s submission to the Review highlights the Foundation’s research uncovering discrimination against Muslims in Xinjiang.
China disputes reports on its policies towards Muslims in Xinjiang. At the same time, the government passed a series of laws and regulations purportedly providing a legal basis for targeting Muslims in response to national security concerns. These new legal measures include a 2015 Counterterrorism Law that criminalized a broad range of conduct and expression, including clothes and symbols. And Xinjiang introduced regulations authorizing re-education facilities to combat “religious extremism.” Dui Hua found the first judgment involving the use of “educational placement,” a new coercive measure imposed on prisoners who are considered a danger to society even after completing their sentences for terrorism or extremism offenses. The Foundation also discovered judgments involving violators of the Islamic clothing ban in force throughout Xinjiang. Individuals can be sentenced for “illegal business activity” for selling clothing with the Islamic star and crescent symbol. In one case, a Muslim man, Gong Xiaojun, was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for “disrupting official business” after arguing with cadres over his “abnormal” beard and a black robe his wife was wearing at home. The case indicates that Xinjiang authorities have extended the reach of the ban to peoples’ homes. Across the board, China appears to be using the veil of national security law to justify openly discriminatory practice.
The Korematsu decision reminds us that while a discriminatory policy may enjoy a veneer of legality, that legality is ultimately no match for the judgment of history. The internment of Japanese Americans was wrong during WWII, despite Supreme Court reasoning to the contrary. China’s efforts to criminalize Muslim expressions of faith today are no less abhorrent, whether or not they find basis in statute. As Justice Murphy wrote in his dissent in Korematsu in 1944, “[s]uch exclusion goes over ‘the very brink of constitutional power,’ and falls into the ugly abyss of racism.”
I left America for Macau to take up a teaching position in August 1972. I moved to Hong Kong on Christmas Day, 1972. By the end of 1975 I had lived most of the previous three years in Hong Kong with a spell at Harvard University in late 1974 and early 1975 to earn a Master’s degree. What is now a Special Administrative Region of China, Hong Kong was then a Crown Colony of Great Britain. I worked as a tutor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and, beginning in the summer of 1975, as an assistant editor of Asian Business & Industry, a limited circulation business magazine, published by Far East Trade Press, with readers in every Asian country, including China.
One day in July 1975, as I was walking back to my office in Prince’s Building, I passed by Commercial Press where I purchased a copy of a pamphlet entitled “On Exercising All Round Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie” written by Zhang Chunqiao. Zhang was a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and the theoretician of a leftist faction that would someday come to be known as the Gang of Four. I read the pamphlet and, based on my understanding of its contents, wrote an article for the August issue of Asian Business & Industry. I called out Zhang for his ultra-leftism – identifying him as the principal spokesman for radical economic policy in the Central Committee — and criticized his call for class warfare directed against the “dictatorship of the bourgeoisie,” referring to a passage in his essay in which he calls for the “iron broom of the dictatorship of the proletariat” to sweep away bourgeois rights from China.
A few weeks after publication, I came to the office to find a stack of copies of the magazine wrapped in filthy rags. The China National Publications Import Corporation, the channel through which Far East Trade Press distributed its magazine in China, had returned all the magazines with a letter on its official stationary. The letter accused Asian Business & Industry of having published a counterrevolutionary article that had “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.” The letter concluded by stating that the magazine would no longer be allowed to circulate in China.
I didn’t know it at the time, but my article attacking Zhang Chunqiao had attracted the attention of Zhang and his leftist allies in what was sometimes called “the Shanghai faction.” Public security began a file on me, known in China as a dang’an. Such files are kept on virtually every Chinese citizen as well as on foreigners who visit China on a regular basis. Thirty years after my article appeared, I learned that it was the first item in my dang’an. The diplomat who gave me this information said that I was known in government and party circles as a “target of the Gang of Four.”
Shanghaied at the Feather and Down Fair
Shanghai Mansions.
My chance to visit Mainland China for the first time came in January 1976 when, as a freshly minted representative of the National Council for US-China Trade, I was asked to go to Shanghai to attend the China Feather and Down Garments Minifair (中国羽绒服饰小交易会) put on by the China National Native Produce and Animal By-Products Import and Export Corporation (CHINATUHSHU, 中国土产畜产进出口公司). My visa came through at the last possible moment, enabling me to make the flight to Shanghai from Guangzhou on January 6.
First though I had to get to Guangzhou from Hong Kong. I boarded the Kowloon Canton Railway train that departed from the Tsimtsatsui terminus at 8:24 on January 4, 1976, arriving at Lo Wu station around two hours later.
After crossing the border at Lowu and having a simple but tasteless lunch at the station on the Chinese side, I and other trade fair attendees boarded the 1:00 PM train for Guangzhou. I was accompanied by a young American entrepreneur who had become a leader in manufacturing down garments, then quite the rage in America, and an Australian businessman/scholar and his wife.
From the train windows we could view the countryside, fields left fallow for the spring planting. We passed the small village of Shenzhen, today a major city that is home to China’s first special economic zone. Upon arrival at the Guangzhou train station we hopped into grey Shanghai sedans for the run to the Bai Yun airport. We arrived at Hong Qiao Airport in Shanghai after nightfall, but there was no one to receive me.
Eventually Mr. Ma from the Shanghai Foreign Affairs Bureau showed up and I was taken to the Peace Hotel, the former Cathay Hotel, on the Bund. Mr. Ma was silent for the late-night drive though dark, deserted streets. The next day I moved to Shanghai Mansions, the old Broadway Mansions, where the trade fair was taking place. At the Shanghai Mansions I was given an immense apartment on an upper floor, with balconies overlooking the Huangpu River, Suzhou Creek and the Bund. There was a big radio circa early 1940s in the living room. Radio was the only form of entertainment available to me. I never bothered turning it on.
The next day, January 5, 1976, I visited the trade fair itself, and registered with the liaison office. The office was staffed by cadres from the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), the National Council’s counterpart organization in China. The fair itself was held in four rooms on the second floor of the hotel. Different branches of CHINATUSHU had their own display and negotiation spaces which were fitted out with one or two tables and chairs. A tin of cigarettes was placed on the tables. The exhibition and negotiation hall reeked of cigarette smoke.
“Traffic” on the Bund. Not a single car in sight. Today this thoroughfare is multi-laned and bumper to bumper, one of the busiest streets in China.
One of my tasks was to write an article on the minifair for the National Council’s magazine, China Business Review, so I put in a request for an interview with the trade fair’s leadership. My request received a cool reception. I was told to go to my room and wait for an answer. This was a sensitive time for people doing business in China, and minifairs, an innovation introduced as a modest reform in 1975, were under fire as examples of the “roots of capitalism” being introduced by Deng Xiaoping, arch foe of the Shanghai Faction. I wondered if I would get an interview in Shanghai, or have to wait until I got to Beijing, where a Fur Garments Minifair was about to open.
Rather than heeding the liaison office’s instructions, I decided to take a walk along the Bund and up Nanjing Road. There were few vehicles on the road, the favored mode of transport being the bicycle. I checked out the Shanghai Exhibition Hall, a vast structure built in the Soviet style, and the Shanghai Number One Department Store, said to be the largest in China. Its five floors were stocked with a wide variety of consumer goods, all made in China except foreign watches, the only foreign consumer good allowed for sale in China. I resisted the temptation to buy an Omega for RMB 861.
I have always visited bookstores on trips to China, and my first trip was no exception. I walked into the large Xinhua Bookstore on Nanjing Road, passing through thick canvas curtains meant to shield the building from the bitter cold outside. Upstairs I walked into the room that held internal (nei bu) publications sold only to cadres with the right documents. I was quickly and unceremoniously told to leave.
I wandered back to the hotel, stopping first at the office of the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank, located in a small building on a side street not far from the compound housing the Friendship Store and the Seamen’s Club. The compound had previously served as the sprawling British Consulate in Shanghai. I was greeted by the bank’s British manager with more than the usual British reserve. He and his colleague from the Standard Charter Bank were at the time the only resident foreign businessmen in Shanghai. Unfortunately, they could not conduct business. They were in effect hostages of the Chinese government to ensure that China’s holdings with the banks wouldn’t be expropriated. Their colleagues had in fact been detained during the early years of the Cultural Revolution. They couldn’t leave Shanghai until colleagues arrived to replace them. The fellow I met expressed relief that he would be ending his assignment later that year.
The Shanghai Exhibition Hall.
I decided to stop by the Friendship Store, a dreary place selling shoddy goods far below the quality found in Hong Kong’s Chinese products stores. After examining the wares on display, I walked over to the nearby Seamen’s Club. Both the Friendship Store and the Seamen’s Club were located on the grounds of the old British Consulate in Shanghai.
In those days Seamen’s Clubs were the hubs of entertainment for foreigners in China. They served cold beer and one could always find a sailor willing to tell tall tales of his voyages to China. I struck up a conversation with a young Hong Kong sailor who was working on a tramp steamer registered in Hong Kong and operated under the Chinese flag. Together we went back to the Shanghai Mansions where we had a simple dinner and played pool for several hours, drinking beer and eating peanuts. The young sailor told me of his life on a PRC-owned vessel. He complained about the incessant political study sessions he and his fellow seamen had to endure. I listened attentively. Apparently, others were also listening attentively.
An Interview
A group of mourners assemble for the walk to Zhou Enlai’s funeral in a side hall of the Forbidden City. Photos by author.
On January 8, I was advised that my request for an interview had been granted. I was told to come to a room on the top floor of the Shanghai Mansions at 10 PM, an unusually late hour for meetings in China. I spent some time putting together my questions, and then prepared to join a tour of a Shanghai commune. When I tried to sign up for the tour however I was told that I was not welcome to join. I protested to the liaison office to no avail. I headed out on another walk, this time witnessing the arrest of a Shanghai citizen by a police officer. The officer frog marched the young man down a narrow alley, attracting a throng of curious onlookers.
I went back to the Shanghai Mansions, had dinner, and waited in my room for the interview. At the appointed hour I went to the assigned room and found about two dozen cadres led by “leading Member” Chen Wenhai waiting for me. The interview was a formal affair, no smiles or words of greeting. I was told the ground rules. I would first ask all my questions. Thereafter I would be given a brief introduction to the trade fair. No further questions would be entertained. I must have asked thirty or so questions, after which I was given the brief introduction. It quickly became apparent that few of my questions would be answered. The “brief introduction” started out with words of praise for the wise leader Chairman Mao Zedong and the correct policies of the Chinese Communist Party. I was then given the bare bones facts of the trade fair: how large the exhibition space was, how many provincial animal by-products branches were in attendance, how many traders from which foreign countries were in attendance. That was it.
I tried to slip in one more question. In 1975 China agreed for the first time to sew into garments intended for export the labels of the western company that had ordered them according to their specifications. This was a welcome reform as Chinese labels like Peony, Snowflake, and the like didn’t appeal much to American and European consumers. Suddenly, at this minifair, traders had been advised that this policy had been cancelled. No more foreign labels would be sewn into Chinese made garments. There was much unhappiness among foreign traders about this sudden change, and I wanted to ask a question about why this step had been taken. I never got a chance to do so. I was cut off and reminded that there would be no more questions and told that the interview was over.
Shortly after returning to my room the phone, an old black apparatus with a solid feel, started ringing. It was the young sailor I had befriended the night before. His voice was shaking, and I guessed he had company sitting nearby. Obviously distressed, he told me that he was leaving Shanghai early, and that I was not to try to contact him. He told me he would always remember our friendship. He rang off. A cold shiver ran up my spine.
I went to bed, but had trouble falling asleep. In the early hours of January 9, I heard a great commotion taking place on the barges on Suzhou Creek below me. There were loud voices and the sounds of fighting. I dozed off and when I awoke I saw the streets lined with military vehicles, and all the barges gone. In the distance I could hear the somber music of a funeral dirge. I left my room and encountered an elderly floor attendant. What has happened I asked? He told me that Premier Zhou Enlai had died. He was weeping.
I and other trade fair attendees went to the liaison office to find out more. The official who met us solemnly announced the premier’s passing, and then told us that “the Chinese people will turn grief into strength” and that they would carry on the great traditions of the revolutionary leader. There would be no interruption to the trade fair. Business as usual.
To reinforce this point, the liaison office laid on visits for the attendees and this time I was invited to join the tours. We were offered visits to a well-off commune on the outskirts of the city – one of its production brigades specialized in raising “hairy crabs,” a Shanghai delicacy – and a factory making feather and down garments. Our visits were punctuated by bursts of propaganda praising the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
Upon my return to the hotel I ran into the Australian who I had met on the train up to Guangzhou and his wife. They had just had a harrowing experience. They had gone for a morning walk and saw crowds of people reading newspapers which had been posted on wooden hoardings. They were reading official news of Zhou Enlai’s death, and the couple decided to photograph the scene. Bad move. In those days it was against the law for foreigners to purchase or even read local newspapers like the Wen Wei Bao and Liberation Daily. The couple were swiftly taken into custody by the local neighborhood committee and held in a small room until the police showed up. They were interrogated and lectured at length. Their actions were unlawful and violated the terms of their visit to China. After signing expressions of regret, and apologizing profusely, the couple were escorted back to the Shanghai Mansions.
A small group of us decided to try another restaurant for lunch, having sampled just about everything on the Shanghai Mansions’ menu. We walked to the Peace Hotel and took the elevator up to the dining floor. We chose the Western restaurant. Sitting down, we noticed that the waiters were wearing black arm bands. One of the young men came to our table and explained: “We have been told not to commemorate Zhou Enlai’s death, but we are doing so anyway. We are not afraid. Let them come and try to make trouble.”
The next day I flew to Beijing where I attended the fur garments minifair, and visited one of the model communes on the city’s outskirts as well as, of course, the Great Wall and the Ming Tombs.
On January 12, I took part in the funeral of Zhou Enlai as a member of the American delegation. Diplomats were all dressed in black, thin clothing for the bitter cold. We were received on the dais by Jiang Qing, wife of Chairman Mao Zedong, one of the members of the Shanghai Faction later to be known as the Gang of Four. Zhang Chunqiao was also present.
China would be visited with much more sorrow in 1976: the campaign against the right deviationist wind, the Ching Ming protests and the deadly response, the July earthquake in Tangshan, and much joy when the Gang of Four was overthrown in October. I witnessed all of those events during many visits to the country that year.
Upon my return to Hong Kong after attending Zhou’s funeral I was asked by a friend at Ta Kung Pao, a left-wing newspaper, to write a eulogy for the recently departed premier. I did so, and the piece ran under the Chinese name given to me by a teacher in the United States: Kang Youhan (康又瀚). The eulogy was full of praise for Zhou. A few days after it appeared my friend told me that the article had been removed from the Reference News edition published in Shanghai. My friend suggested that I adopt a new name for any future Chinese language articles I might write. I adopted the name Kang Yuan (康原), and have kept it to the present day.
Postscript: More than 30 years later, I took a small group of businesspeople to Shanghai. We went to the restaurant at the top of the Peace Hotel, and there I recounted the story of the defiant young waiter. Across the room I spied a man of roughly my age who was now the manager of the restaurant. He looked familiar, and I asked him to come to our table. He complied, and we quickly figured out that he was that young waiter I had encountered in January 1976. In excited voices we relived what had happened. Misty eyed, he asked me a favor. Would I be willing to come back and talk to his young charges? “Young people have no idea how we lived then. And they aren’t interested. You can help. Please come back.” I agreed to do so, but when I returned a few months later the restaurant was closed for renovation. I subsequently found out that Mr. Zhang the manager had retired.
Executive Director John Kamm, second to right, at the Hong Kong University and Hong Kong Bar Association’s conference on “Freedom and National Security – Has the Right Balance Been Struck?” June 14-15, 2003. Image: Hong Kong University
Shortly after Tibetan political prisoner Ngawang Sangdrol’s arrival in the United States on March 28, 2003, I began preparing for my next visit to Beijing and Hong Kong, tentatively scheduled for early June, roughly four weeks later. Preparations for these visits, then as of now, take many weeks.
Cases need to be identified, researched, and prioritized. Bilingual prisoner lists for my interlocutors have to be prepared. For this trip I intended to focus on the imprisoned American businessmen Jude Shao and Fong Fuming, as well as prominent Uyghur political prisoner Rebiya Kadeer.
I sought meetings with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and leading Chinese academics who served as advisers to the Chinese government. I asked to visit a prison. I asked for meetings with the American ambassador and other diplomats as well.
I made my preparations with some trepidation. A fatal disease – Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) – was sweeping China. Thousands of infections had been recorded, and many people – including officials – had been placed under quarantine. Guangdong Province was especially hard hit. By early June 2003, the province had recorded more than 1,500 cases and 57 fatalities. SARS had already spread to Beijing, Tianjin, and other provinces and municipalities by April. By early June, there were 5,329 cases and 336 reported deaths nation-wide.
The epidemic reached Hong Kong in March 2003. The first fatality was recorded on March 11. By early June, 1,750 cases had been identified and 286 deaths recorded. The city was in a state of high alert. Disinfectant was applied liberally to every conceivable surface, often several times a day. People wore masks and generally avoided public gatherings. Tourist arrivals dropped precipitously.
In mid-May I was advised that my principal interlocutor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General of the International Department Li Baodong, remained under quarantine. All prisons in the country had been placed off limits to visitors. I decided to cancel my trip to Beijing but to proceed with the visit to Hong Kong. I would meet Chinese officials from an inland province as well as Hong Kong activists, academics, and researchers. As usual, I would conduct research at the University Services Center of the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
“Nest of Spies”
SARS was not the only issue troubling the people of Hong Kong during the early months of 2003. Article 23 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, stated that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) “shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government.” This article had been inserted into the Basic Law after the events of May and June 1989 in Beijing.
By late 2002, the SAR’s Legislative Council (Legco) had failed to enact the legislation called for under Article 23, and Beijing was growing impatient. Chinese officials based in the SAR declared that Hong Kong was a nest of spies; in early 2003 at least three Hong Kong residents, all of whom had worked in China’s Xinhua News Agency, were detained in Guangdong Province for allegedly spying for the United Kingdom during the years leading up to the handover in 1997. They were eventually arrested, tried, and convicted of espionage. Two of them, Chen Yulin and Wei Pingyuan, were sentenced to life in prison. They were still in prison, despite multiple sentence reductions, as of mid-2018 (see this issue’s Prisoner Update).
The Hong Kong official tasked with pushing through Article 23 legislation by Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa was Regina Ip, a career civil servant holding various positions in the Hong Kong government before being appointed Secretary for Security in July 1998. Ms. Ip and I had worked on retaining Most Favored Nation trading status for China in the early 1990s. I knew her as a tough, uncompromising official well versed in issues of trade, industry, and immigration. She had little knowledge of national security however, and had infrequently visited China before 1997 (when she was 47 years old). This was in line with pre-handover British policy which placed restrictions on Hong Kong officials traveling to the People’s Republic.
Regina Ip was also very ambitious. She was determined to eventually become the Chief Executive of the SAR.
Unfortunately for her ambitions, Secretary Ip had developed a reputation for alienating people by making ill-considered remarks. In the run-up to the introduction of the National Security Bill in the Legislative Council’s Bills Committee on February 14, 2003, Secretary Ip had warned against viewing democracy as a panacea. After all, she said, Adolf Hitler had been democratically elected as Germany’s chancellor before embarking on his murderous genocide directed at the Jews. She also disparaged Hong Kong’s taxi drivers and restaurant workers, opining that they weren’t interested in such things as national security.
A Letter from Alan Leong
I arrived in Hong Kong on June 11 and immediately went to the J.W. Marriott Hotel at Pacific Place on Hong Kong Island. After checking in, I went to my room to begin unpacking. While doing so, I noticed a letter that had been slipped under my door. It was from Alan Leong, a leading member of the Article 23 Concern Group and Chairman of the Hong Kong Bar Association. The letter, on Bar Association stationary, invited me to make a presentation to a conference on Article 23 to be held at the Law School of Hong Kong University on June 14-15, 2003. The title of the conference was “Freedom and National Security – Has the Right Balance Been Struck?” I was asked to make a presentation on national security legislation in the People’s Republic of China.
A siege mentality gripped Hong Kong as the death toll from SARS started to rise. Image: timeout.candrholdings.com
I called Mr. Leong at his Chambers. “What’s this all about?” I asked. “The policy governing Hong Kong is ‘One Country, Two Systems.’ What does national security legislation in China have to do with national security legislation in Hong Kong.” At that point I hadn’t even read the National Security Bill being considered by Legco.
Mr. Leong replied, “You are correct. National security legislation in China should have nothing to do with national security legislation in Hong Kong. As it turns out, however, the bill under consideration contains language which links the two systems. In short, if an organization in Hong Kong is subordinate to an organization in China that has been banned by the central government on national security grounds by means of a certificate, the Secretary for Security can ban it in Hong Kong.”
I was intrigued. I had never heard of a Mainland Chinese mechanism for banning an organization on national security grounds by means of a certificate. Prior to 1997, when China’s Criminal Law was amended to remove the crime of counterrevolution, individuals could be sentenced to prison for simply belonging to a counterrevolutionary group. Whether or not a group was a counterrevolutionary group was determined by a court, not by a government agency. After 1997, mere membership in a group no longer constituted a crime. This important 1997 reform of the Criminal Law sought to criminalize acts like drafting manifestos and raising money, not simple association.
I agreed to make a presentation on June 15, the second and last day of the conference. I was told by Mr. Leong that the audience would probably be small. June 15 was Father’s Day in Hong Kong, and mine would be among the last presentations.
After we rang off, I went to the hotel’s concierge level and printed out a copy of the National Security Bill. Part 4, Section 8A (2) (c) provided for the Secretary for Security to proscribe any local organization “which is subordinate to a mainland organization the operation of which has been prohibited on the ground of protecting the security of the People’s Republic of China, as officially proclaimed by means of an open decree, by the Central Authorities under the law of the People’s Republic of China.” The next section (3) stated that conclusive evidence of the prohibition would be “a certificate issued by or on behalf of the Central People’s Government.”
I began preparing a presentation based on points of Chinese law, and on cases of individuals tried by Chinese courts for counterrevolution and endangering state security.
The Conference
I decided not to attend the first day of the Hong Kong University conference on June 14, 2003. That evening though, I was invited to attend a dinner at the Hong Kong Club. In attendance were conference participants including local pro-democracy activists and lawmakers. The mood was grim.
Earlier that day Legco’s Bills Committee had carried out a “clause by clause” review of the National Security Bill, a process that took nearly eight hours. Many of the legislators in the democratic camp chose not to attend the meeting, preferring to attend the Hong Kong University conference instead. After the review, the Legco committee voted to end debate, meaning that debate could not be reopened, and easing the way for the bill’s adoption by Legco.
All seemed lost. What could be done to stop adoption of the legislation by Legco? I weighed in at the dinner, introducing the Cultural Revolution concept of “raising the red flag to oppose the red flag.” It was often used by Red Guard factions against each other; each claimed the mantle of Mao Zedong thought and used quotations from Mao to undermine the arguments of the faction.
In the case of Article 23, Chinese law was a “red flag,” and set against this was another “red flag,” the Hong Kong National Security Bill. What we needed to do was to show how the Hong Kong legislation ran counter to both the spirit and letter of Mainland Chinese law. Instead of pointing out why the legislation was bad for the human rights of the people of Hong Kong, basing our arguments on the Common Law, we needed to show how the legislation was bad for the people of China based on Chinese law. A long shot, but worth a try.
The next day I arrived at the conference hall to find a packed room of leading legal scholars from around the world, a cohort of Democratic legislators, and the Hong Kong Solicitor General Bob Allcock and his subordinates. Mr. Allcock was head of the Legal Policy Division of the SAR Department of Justice.
My panel sat down and shortly thereafter I began my presentation. I went through it point by point, focusing on the 1997 amendment to the Criminal Law that criminalized acts, not association.
I referenced several cases in which individuals had been convicted of subversion after 1997 for undertaking subversive acts. I had been unable to find a single case of someone being subjected to coercive measures for mere membership in an organization. In one case, that of the Chinese Nation’s People’s Party, more than a thousand members of an underground political party had been spared criminal prosecution. Its leaders had been convicted of subversion and sentenced to long prison terms for engaging in activities like organizing meetings, drawing up a manifesto, and raising money.
Reinforcing my point that China did not ban groups on national security groups, I pointed out that it had in fact banned groups like Falun Gong on public order grounds. Article 300 of the Criminal Law made it a crime, punishable by imprisonment, to use a cult to disrupt the administration of the law. If China had banned groups on public order grounds, why hadn’t it banned groups on national security grounds?
I concluded that Hong Kong’s National Security Legislation could not come into force unless and until China’s National People’s Congress amended the criminal law and returned to the “bad old days” of the pre-1997 criminal law, a time-consuming and complicated process that would anger China’s legal reformers who were proud of having removed “membership in a counterrevolutionary group” from the criminal law.
My remarks caused quite a stir. Veteran democratic legislator Martin Lee wondered aloud: “Why didn’t we think of that?” Legislator and union leader Lee Cheuk-yan delivered impassioned remarks: “We Hong Kong people are so selfish. All this time we have been concerned with how this bill will hurt the human rights of the Hong Kong people. Now we learn that it could hurt the human rights of the entire Chinese nation. We will be condemned as criminals for a thousand generations!”
Kamm delivers a talk on Article 23 and national security, Hong Kong University, June 15, 2003.
At this point, Attorney General Allcock addressed me, arguing that there were regulations issued by local authorities that governed registration of organizations. If an organization could not be registered, it was the same as banning the organization. I disputed this. “Refusing to register an organization is not the same as banning it. And, in any event, laws passed by the National People’s Congress take precedence over regulations put out by ministries and local governments. There is nothing in the Criminal Law about banning organizations on national security grounds.”
Albert Chan took the floor. Chan, former dean and current professor of law at Hong Kong University School of Law and a member of the Basic Law Committee, was a respected legal scholar enjoying excellent relations with senior Chinese judicial and government officials. “John Kamm is right,” Professor Chan declared. “For the National Security Bill to be enacted in its present form, Mainland Chinese law would have to be amended. No proscription mechanism as described in the bill exists in Chinese law.”
Bob Allcock was at sixes and nines, the proverbial deer in the headlights. He had lost control of the meeting. He said that the issue I had raised could be discussed at the Legco Bills Committee meeting on June 17. I asked if I could attend the meeting and he said yes.
The next day local newspapers, English and Chinese, were full of stories on what I had done. A headline in the South China Morning Post read “Hong Kong’s Future Autonomy is at Stake, Says Expert.” The stage was set for a showdown between Regina Ip and John Kamm at the Bills Committee meeting on June 17.
Debate in Legco
Kamm surrounded by journalists, Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, June 17, 2003. Image credit: SCMP.com.
I showed up at the Legco Building on June 17 at the appointed hour. I took my seat in the gallery above the ornate chamber, looking down on the legislators. Bob Allcock came up to where I was sitting and gave me a handwritten note. An amendment to the bill would be introduced changing the proscription mechanism from “certificate” to “open proclamation.”
The first order of business at the meeting was an attempt by Democratic legislators to rescind the June 14 decision to close debate. All their motions were voted down. Attention then turned to my objection to the bill as presented at the Hong Kong University conference.
Regina Ip tabled the motion to amend the bill by substituting “certificate” with “open proclamation.” This move was met with derision by the Democratic camp. One legislator remarked that after saying debate could not be reopened the government had in fact done just that. Legislators Emily Lau and Margaret Ng, stalwart campaigners for human rights and democracy, claimed that the amendment didn’t change a thing. What was meant by “open proclamation?” Could a newspaper advertisement placed by a local government be considered an “open proclamation?” The government had muddied the waters.
Finally, Lee Cheuk-yan took the floor. “Secretary for Security, you have said that the bill was subjected to scores of public consultations and 80 hours of debate by Legco. Yet, a foreigner comes to town who has never read the bill, examines it for less than an hour and finds a fatal flaw. What do you have to say to John Kamm?” Pointing at me, he said “Look at John Kamm sitting in the gallery. He is laughing at you!”
This proved too much for Regina Ip. “I am sick and tired of hearing from so-called foreign experts on Chinese law. Sick and tired!” she exclaimed in a high-pitched and agitated voice.
At this point, the Chairman of the Committee meeting stepped in and suggested a brief recess to allow tempers to calm down. I left the gallery and went downstairs to find Martin Lee waiting for me. He ushered me into a room where there were several dozen journalists waiting to pepper me with questions. I made it clear that I was not satisfied with the amendment. The bill was still flawed.
Regina Ip and Bob Allcock. Image credit: HongKongFP.com
At this point I took a gamble. “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds its weekly press conference on Thursday June 19. There are journalists in this room who work for wire services. Why don’t you ask the Foreign Ministry spokesman who is right, John Kamm or Regina Ip?”
In making this move I reckoned that Regina Ip knew as little about Chinese bureaucratic politics as she knew about Chinese law. She had studiously built relations with the Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office, and had largely ignored the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a bad move. In the event, journalists submitted my question at the press briefing on June 19. The spokesman declined to answer. On June 25, 2003, Regina Ip tendered her resignation as Secretary for Security, citing personal reasons. Later that year she entered Stanford University to study for a Master’s Degree.
As I was exiting the Legco conference room on June 17, two journalists from Apple Daily and Ming Pao stopped me at the door. “What do you think of what Regina Ip said about you?” they asked. I played dumb, “What was that?” “She said that she was sick and tired of hearing from so-called foreign experts on Chinese law. She called you a so-called foreign expert.” I quipped: “I thought she was talking about Bob Allcock.” The press loved it.
On July 1, 2003, hundreds of thousands of Hong Kong people took to the streets to protest Article 23. Government officials had predicted that only 30,000 people would participate in the march. The marchers wound through the streets and ended the march by passing by Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa’s office. They carried placards denouncing “Uncle Tung” and calling for his resignation.
With the desertion of James Tien, leader of the Liberal Party which had supported passage of the legislation, the National Security Bill’s fate was sealed. The government removed the bill from consideration by Legco. Citing health issues, Tung Chee-hwa resigned in March 2005. Mr. Tung remains in excellent health. He had apparently contracted a short-term political illness.
Hong Kong residents took to the streets in protest of Article 23 on July 1, 2003.
As for me, I returned to San Francisco, but my job was not complete. I penned an article that ran in both English and Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong outlining how the people of China would be hurt if the National Security Bill was passed by Legco and became law.
In the summer of 2003, a senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came to San Francisco and we agreed to meet. He told me that “We know that the Hong Kong government has made many mistakes, but we don’t appreciate our friends pointing them out!” We had a good chuckle.
Fifteen years after the demise of the National Security Bill, China’s leaders, notably President Xi Jinping, are pushing for the SAR to enact Article 23 legislation, perhaps as early as the end of 2018. Opposition among the public to such legislation remains high – Regina Ip, the face of Article 23, received the lowest number of Election Committee votes for Chief Executive in 2017 – but due to changes in the make-up of Legco brought about by the ousting of several recently elected legislators, sanctioning speech and association under Article 23 could well be in Hong Kong’s future.
In the late Spring of 1990, my family and I lived in an apartment on Hong Kong’s Victoria Peak that looked over a verdant country park to the South China Sea on the near horizon. When visibility was good, one could see junks with red sails and cargo vessels plying the waters off Lamma Island. The outline of Chinese islands loomed on the far horizon. China was near. With the conclusion of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, China was drawing nearer. In 1990, a mere seven years remained before China resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong.
My life in Hong Kong was good. I was a vice president of Dallas-based Occidental Chemical (Oxychem), which paid me a handsome salary and cost-of-living allowance. I enjoyed generous home leave, exclusive use of a 280SE Mercedes, a driver, two maids, school tuition for my first son, and two country club memberships. I ran the Asia Pacific region for the corporation. Oxychem had factories and sales offices in a dozen countries. I spent a lot of time on the road.
That year, I was also the president of the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM) in Hong Kong, the largest American chamber outside of North America with 2,800 members. In fact, I was never meant to be president of the chamber. After the killings in Tiananmen Square in 1989, I used my position as vice-president of the chamber in charge of committees to convene a meeting of members big and small. At that meeting I pushed through a resolution condemning Beijing’s actions against fierce opposition from large corporate members. The resolution was published in AMCHAM’s magazine and placed as an advertisement in a number of Hong Kong newspapers.
Not surprisingly, when it came time for the Nominating Committee, which was dominated by old-timers and representatives of multinational corporations, to vote on the next president, I came in a distant second. My views on human rights and Tiananmen, in the eyes of many AMCHAM leaders, made me unsuitable to be president.
The fellow who came in first called his boss in New York with the good news. His boss told him that he had a choice: He could assume the presidency of AMCHAM and serve his one-year term, or he could continue his career with the firm. The fellow chose to continue his career, and I became president of AMCHAM by default.
I assumed the presidency on January 1, 1990. It was a tough time to be president of an organization that favored strong trade ties with China. After Tiananmen, China had become an international pariah. Calls were mounting to impose sanctions and, in the United States Congress, to strip China of its Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status. China’s trade status had to be renewed every year, ironically no later than June 4.
The first hearings on China’s human rights record and MFN were scheduled to take place before three subcommittees of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on May 16, 1990 in Washington. I was invited to testify by Richard Bush, staff consultant to the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs chaired by Congressman Steve Solarz (D-New York). I accepted the invitation.
Chaucer and Mao Tai
On May 9, a week before I was to testify, I and the leaders of the American business community in Hong Kong were invited to a banquet by Zhou Nan, Director of the New China News Agency (Xinhua) in Hong Kong. Xinhua was the seat of Chinese power in the colony. Zhou was an experienced diplomat. He had served as a vice minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which capacity he had negotiated the joint declaration between China and the United Kingdom on Hong Kong. He spoke flawless English, and loved English literature (he could recite the prologue to Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales in Middle English). He also served as an interpreter for interrogations of American POWs during the Korean War.
Zhou had a fearsome reputation as a hard-liner. He was also very anti-British, stemming from a botched attempt to recruit him by MI6 while Zhou was posted to China’s Mission to the United Nations in New York.
Before heading off to the banquet, my longtime friend and fellow AMCHAM officer Jeff Muir and I had done our daily jog up Black’s Link. We returned to my apartment, showered, and fortified ourselves with ice-cold cans of San Miguels. We left in my car for Zhou Nan’s villa on the south side of Hong Kong Island shortly before 6 PM.
My driver had turned on the radio for the 6:00 PM news on RTHK, the government-run radio station. A few minutes into the broadcast, an interview of the mother of a Hong Kong student, Yao Yongzhan, aired. Yao, a student leader, had been detained in the aftermath of the protests in Shanghai. His mother wept gently. She had heard that her son was being mistreated in a Shanghai detention center. Her tearful plea stuck in my mind.
We arrived at the villa and were led into a room where the rest of the American guests were waiting. These were the leaders of the American business community: Michael Clancy, China Light & Power, a subsidiary of Exxon, and the largest foreign investor in Hong Kong; Lyn Edinger, managing director of Honeywell; Ed Onderko, partner of Arthur Anderson; Jeff Muir, partner of China Consultants International; and Ralph Spencer, executive director of AMCHAM.
We were ushered into the dining room where we took our seats around a large round table. I was seated at the right hand of Zhou Nan. As soon as we sat down, Mao Tai began to be served. Mao Tai is a sorghum-based spirit which is 52 percent alcohol (104 proof). It is the favored banquet drink served at meals with senior officials. It is often chased with cold beer.
Zhou Nan was known as one of China’s best Mao Tai drinkers. I had learned to drink Mao Tai under the tutelage of Wang Yaoting, Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, when I served as the Hong Kong representative of the National Council for US-China Trade from 1975 to 1980. My boss, Ambassador Chris Phillips, wasn’t much of a drinker, so I was called upon to represent him at banquets during visits to Beijing. Wang Yaoting regularly consumed a bottle of Mao Tai at dinner. Each bottle held 32 glasses made exclusively for drinking the fiery spirit.
It wasn’t long before the combination of Mao Tai and cold beer loosened the tongue. I remarked to Zhou Nan that I had heard that one could learn a lot about what kind of person someone is by asking which character in the classic Dream of the Red Chamber the person admired the most, “just like you can learn a lot about someone by finding out which of the pilgrims in Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales he or she likes the most.”
That got Zhou Nan going: “When that Aprile with his shoures soote, The droghte of March hath perced to the roote, And bathed every veyne in swich licour, Of which vertu engendred is the flour . . .”
When he finished his performance to applause, Zhou drew himself up and began his toast. “Mr. Kamm,” he intoned in perfect English, “I would like to thank you, on behalf of the Chinese government and the Chinese people, for all that you have done, and all that you are about to do, to promote friendly relations between the United States and China.”
To this day, I don’t know what got into my head, but I stopped Zhou Nan and asked, “So what are you going to do for me?” The room fell into a stunned silence. You could hear a pin drop. My American colleagues had had no warning. They had no idea where I was heading. Perhaps they thought I would ask that China would buy a boatload or two of caustic soda. No one knew. Neither did I.
Zhou Nan asked what I meant and I replied that many people in Hong Kong hoped that AMCHAM would convince Congress to keep China’s MFN status, “but you are different, Minister Zhou. You can help me.”
Zhou responded: “The Chinese government has done everything possible to improve relations with the United States.” I said I begged to differ. It could do more.
Zhou put down his glass and asked me what I thought the Chinese government should do. I had arrived at that point without thinking what it was I wanted Beijing to do. Then I remembered the voice on the radio. I asked Ji Shaoxiang, head of Xinhua’s foreign affairs bureau who was sitting across the table, what the name of the student leader who was being held in Shanghai. Ji replied “Yao Yongzhan.”
“That’s it!” I declared. “Why don’t you release Yao Yongzhan?”
Zhou exploded. “You have rudely interfered in China’s internal affairs, and committed an unfriendly act that has hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.” he thundered.
In for a dime, in for a dollar, I figured, so I fought back. “A few minutes ago, you treated me as a friend of the Chinese government and people. Now, because I ask you to show mercy to a young man, I’m no longer a friend?”
Zhou Nan, former Director of Xinhua News Agency in Hong Kong and former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs for the People’s Republic of China. Image Credit: South China Morning Post.
I reminded Zhou that “The quality of mercy is not strained,” and asked him if he had ever done something as a young man that he wished he had done differently later in life.
It went on like this for a few minutes. The business leaders were becoming increasingly uncomfortable, and Zhou Nan was becoming more and more upset.
Finally, I told Zhou that whether or not Yao Yongzhan were released I would still go to Congress to testify in favor of retaining China’s MFN status, and asked him if he knew why. “No,” he snarled. “Because I love Hong Kong. Do you love Hong Kong?”
Zhou was speechless. Here was a foreign businessman asking China’s most senior official in Hong Kong whether he loved the city. After a moment’s pause, Zhou said, “Alright, I’ll see what I can do.”
I stood up and told Zhou Nan that I wanted to use the restroom. He snapped his fingers and a young man in a white coat emerged. He led me through a maze of corridors and then, when he knew there were no recording devices in use, he turned and looked at me. He had listened to the exchange with Zhou Nan, and he had tears in his eyes. He hugged me and said, “Thank you for that.”
After visiting the washroom, I returned to the banquet room. The head of China Light & Power, Michael Clancy, was apologizing to Zhou Nan. “Not all Americans are as impertinent as John Kamm,” he intoned. I took my seat and reminded the Americans that I was president of AMCHAM and that they should hold their tongues. The dinner drew to a close and I returned to my apartment on Coombe Road, wondering about what I had just done.
Testifying on China
The next day, May 10, 1990, I left Hong Kong for Washington, stopping first in Seoul and then in Tokyo on Oxychem business. In Tokyo, I composed my testimony in a room at the Okura Hotel. I decided that the focus of my testimony would be the damage that revoking China’s MFN would do to the colony, then grappling with the fact that it would be handed over by the United Kingdom to China. I also decided to confront the issue of human rights head on.
I arrived in Washington via Newark on May 14, 1990. The next day I huddled with AMCHAM’s consultants, representatives of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, and staff of the State Department and Congress dealing with China.
On May 16 at 9:40 AM the hearing on “Most Favored Nation Status for the People’s Republic of China” was called to order by Congressman Solarz in Room 2172 of the House Rayburn Office Building. Members of Congress were invited to make statements. After that, witnesses were called, one by one. First to testify was Winston Lord, former ambassador to China. He was followed by witnesses representing the National Committee on US-China Relations, Human Rights Watch, and the Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars.
Then it was the business panel’s turn. First up was the president of the United States-China Business Council, Roger Sullivan. I followed Mr. Sullivan, representing the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong.
Sticking closely to the five-minute limit for testimonies, I outlined the damage revoking China’s MFN would inflict on Hong Kong and adjacent Guangdong Province and then moved to the subject of human rights. “Americans in Hong Kong abhor the violations of human rights now going on in China, and we condemn them both in public and private sessions with Chinese officials,” I said.
I continued. “Who knows better than the people of Hong Kong how bad the situation is? We are on the front line. There are young Hong Kong people in Chinese jails. I take this opportunity to call once more for China’s leaders to release them to their families in Hong Kong… Whatever capital we might earn by fighting further sanctions we will gladly spend in the effort to free all Chinese prisoners of conscience.”
Chairman Solarz thanked me for my “powerful and eloquent plea,” but then subjected me to sharp questioning. He was followed by Congresswoman Pelosi. The congresswoman had taken office in 1987. Her San Francisco district had a large population of Chinese Americans who had been deeply affected by the events of June 4, 1989. Mrs. Pelosi became a leader in the effort to use MFN to wrest human rights concessions from the Chinese government. Her opposition to China being granted MFN without additional human rights conditions launched her national political career.
My testimony received wide media coverage, including in major American newspapers. It was broadcast in its entirety by a fledgling network known as C-Span. Excerpts were broadcast by CNN, and were viewed in Hong Kong and on the Mainland. Chinese officials were delighted, as was the Hong Kong business community. Everywhere I went in the colony, I was greeted as “Mr. MFN.” The frontpage of USA Today carried a headline: “John Kamm: Hero in Hong Kong.”
I returned to Hong Kong on May 27. I debriefed AMCHAM’s board, the American Consulate General, and the Hong Kong Government. My wife and I were invited to dinner by Ji Shaoxiang, the official who had given me the name of the detained student leader at the May 9 banquet, and his wife. The dinner was to take place on the evening of June 1 in the top-floor restaurant of the China Resources Building.
My wife and I arrived at the restaurant to find a cavernous room empty save for a single table placed under a large chandelier. We took our seats, and the food began to flow. Mercifully there was no Mao Tai. The conversation consisted mostly of pleasantries, but then the tone turned serious.
“Director Zhou very much wanted to attend this evening’s dinner,” Mr. Ji intoned. “Unfortunately, he was called away on urgent business. He asked me to tell you, however, that Yao Yongzhan will be released in four days.” On June 5, Yao walked out of the Shanghai Detention Center a free man. He boarded a flight and returned to Hong Kong the same day. He eventually went to the United States. Yao’s release following my plea marked the first time that Beijing released a political prisoner due to a foreign intervention. It would not be the last.
China’s MFN Status
On June 3, 1990, President George H.W. Bush waived the free-emigration conditions stipulated in the Jackson-Vanick Amendment of the Trade Act of 1974, thereby extending MFN status to China for another year. In his presidential determination, President Bush cited the damage that Hong Kong would suffer if China’s trade status were revoked. Bush’s decision to extend China’s MFN status opened a 60-day window during which Congress could debate a resolution of disapproval which, if passed with enough votes to withstand a presidential veto, would strip China of MFN. Such a resolution was soon introduced by Congressman Jerry Solomon (R-New York), along with another piece of legislation that would place human rights conditions on future renewals of China’s MFN status. This was the US-China Policy Act introduced in the House of Representatives by Congresswoman Pelosi and in the US Senate by Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-Maine).
On June 14, 1990, China’s premier Zhu Rongji visited Hong Kong. AMCHAM was one of the hosts, and we organized a luncheon for him. Prior to the luncheon, attended by hundreds of business people, I was taken aside by a Chinese official and told that one of the reasons Yao Yongzhan was released was that there was concern in Beijing that I would use the occasion of my introductory remarks to call for the student leader’s release. I was asked not to embarrass Premier Zhu.
Congress acted quickly to call hearings on President Bush’s decision to renew China’s MFN status. Hearings were scheduled by both the Trade Subcommittee of the Ways and Means Committee, chaired by Congressman Sam Gibbons (D-Florida) and the Senate Finance Committee, chaired by Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas). The former hearing was to take place on June 19, with the latter hearing to take place the next day. I arrived in Washington on June 18 and testified at both hearings. Before and after the hearings I roamed the halls of Congress. In less than five weeks I had testified three times to Congress and had met dozens of members of Congress and senior staff, as well as administration figures. I gave many interviews to the media.
The House of Representatives eventually passed both the Resolution of Disapproval and the US-China Policy Act, but the Senate failed to consider and vote on the two bills before the clock ran out on the 101st Congress. China’s MFN status was saved, at least for another year. AMCHAM – and Hong Kong – had played a role. This marked the first time in history that Hong Kong had figured in a major American foreign policy decision.
As my term as AMCHAM president drew to a close, I was asked to come to Xinhua’s headquarters on Queen’s Road West, across the street from the Happy Valley Race Track, on December 20, 1990. I was ushered into a room where I was greeted by Director Zhang, vice-director in charge of trade and economic affairs.
Director Zhang expressed the Chinese government’s gratitude for the work I had done on MFN. He wondered if I was interested in expanding my business in China.
I thought about it, and replied “The struggle for MFN is far from over. I would rather invest in the issue than expand my business in China.”
Director Zhang asked, “How can we help?” My response was brief: “Release prisoners held for what they did during the 1989 disturbances. That will help China keep its MFN status.”
In 2017, there were more than 200 sister city and state relationships between the United States and China, ties that bind states and cities. The relationships are handled, on the American side, by offices in state and city governments, often manned by volunteers. The relationships exist primarily to foster economic and cultural ties. They have rarely been used to promote human rights and the rule of law.
In the summer of 2004, I hit upon the idea of utilizing sister city relationships to intervene on behalf of political prisoners in the Chinese cities and provinces that had American partners. There were around 120 sister community relationships at that time. I and my colleagues put together a list of contacts in the governor’s and mayor’s offices who oversaw the relationships with Chinese provinces and cities. Our final list had 83 names and addresses of individuals in charge of the sister community relationship.
On August 18, 2004, Dui Hua sent letters to our list of contacts introducing our work and asking if the sister city would be willing to engage their counterparts in a discussion of human rights, and, in particular, whether the state would be willing to submit a list of political prisoners incarcerated in their Chinese counterpart’s jails and prisons.
The response was underwhelming. Of the 83 letters sent out, we received only one positive response. Lansing, Michigan’s state capital, had a sister city relationship with Sanming Municipality, a prefecture-level municipality with a population of 2.5 million, in Fujian Province. Martha Fujita, the Executive Director in charge of Lansing’s Regional Sister City Commission, housed in the Mayor’s office, replied that she would be willing to help Dui Hua. Ms. Fujita advised that a delegation headed by the mayor of Sanming would visit Lansing on September 19-21, 2004.
It so happened that there was a group of eight labor activists who had been detained in April 2002 and sentenced to prison for subversion by the Sanming Intermediate People’s Court in October 2003. The sentences ranged from two to sixteen years. The 16-year sentence was given to the group’s leader, Li Jianfeng, a former court official who had set up an independent trade union and who, the prosecution alleged, had downloaded materials from the Internet which he compiled into a book entitled “Labor Unions.”
Lansing is a city with deep roots to the automotive industry. It has manufactured automobiles at General Motor’s Lansing Plant for decades. Trade unions are strong. National and local unions as well as the local chapter of Amnesty International had already contacted Mayor Tony Benevides asking him to intervene on behalf of the Sanming Eight.
I composed a “Request for Information” and faxed it to Ms. Fujita on August 31, 2004. She agreed to find a way to hand it over, with a cover letter from Mayor Benevides, to the mayor of Sanming when the right moment presented itself.
The Chinese delegation arrived and were hosted to a “Mayor’s Welcome Dinner” and a Chamber of Commerce luncheon. They visited the General Motors plant, Michigan State University, and Sparrow Health Systems. A highlight of the delegation’s visit was sitting in on a Chinese immersion program at an elementary school where the children greeted the guests in Chinese and performed a Chinese folk song for them. The Chinese guests were thrilled and posed for photographs with the children. They also attended a baseball game and sat in the Mayor’s VIP Skybox.
In short, the Chinese delegation was treated to a hearty dose of Midwestern hospitality, setting the stage for the intervention that was to follow.
On September 21, the Chinese group left from Lansing Capital International Airport to make their way back to China via Chicago. While the group was checking in their bags, Ms. Fujita took the mayor of Sanming aside. She explained that Lansing is a city with deep connections to the labor movement, and that an important base of support for Mayor Benevides was labor unions. She then presented Mayor Benevides’ letter and Dui Hua’s request for information to the Chinese mayor. He accepted them without hesitation.
Over the next few years, two of the three labor leaders, including Li Jianfeng, were given sentence reductions and released early. Li was given sentence reductions totaling five years. He was released in April 2013. His five-year supplemental sentence of deprivation of political rights will expire next month, in April 2018. Huang Xiangwei, who was sentenced to six years in prison, received a 10-month sentence reduction and was released after serving just over five years of his sentence.
The use of sister city relationships to promote respect for human rights in China holds potential, but the relationships are rarely used. Boulder, Colorado has had an active sister city relationship with Lhasa, Tibet for more than 30 years. According to the body’s website, it “promotes and implements non-political exchanges of mutual benefit with Lhasa” including in the fields of health care, education, environmental protection, agriculture, and animal husbandry. No mention of human rights, even though human rights abuses in Tibet are often in the news. Houston, which has a sister city relationship with Shenzhen, did little to assist American businesswoman Sandy Phan-Gillis, even though Ms. Phan-Gillis was the president of the Houston-Shenzhen Sister City Association.
Lansing’s decision to use its relationship with Sanming to help secure the release of the Sanming Eight shows that sister city relationships can play a role in advancing the cause of human rights in China, if city and state governments demonstrate the political will to do so.