Tag: rule of law

  • The “Hidden Rules” of China’s Criminal Justice System

    Rule of Law was a centerpiece of the Fourth Plenum meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP in October 2014. Image Credit: Getty Images.

    Xi Jinping made judicial reform a priority item on his agenda after fully taking power in 2013. He promised to “construct a rule-of-law country” and repeatedly emphasized the need for governing with respect to Chinese law and the constitution. Legal institutions were the focus of the “Fourth Plenum” meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2014, which pledged to “strive to let the popular masses feel justice in every court case.” Since then, efforts have been undertaken to “deepen” reform of the country’s legal institutions and officials have been served notice to achieve their reform targets before the upcoming 19th Party Congress later this year.

    In the run up to the 19th Party Congress, we should expect to hear more talk of the great achievements and successful reforms of China’s judicial system. In February, the Supreme People’s Court released a white paper on judicial reform describing its progress in improving the efficiency, accountability, and transparency of the judicial system and declaring that 63 of the 65 reform goals it had set for itself to achieve by 2018 had already been basically accomplished by the end of 2016.

    The reform of China’s law-enforcement and judicial institutions has certainly made some progress in recent years, but are there problems in the country’s legal system that remain untouched by these reforms and continue to undermine the ability of those institutions to deliver justice?

    According to Professor Chen Ruihua, an expert on criminal procedure law at Peking University Law School, the answer is a resounding yes. In a recent blog post, widely circulated online, Chen observes that there are 17 “hidden rules” that govern how the Chinese criminal justice system “really” operates. These rules describe a system of collusion between institutions intended to check each other’s powers, courts that are fundamentally biased against defendants, and a coordinated effort to limit the impact of defense lawyers.

    A list like this is clearly not meant to be analytical, though Chen has spoken and written quite frankly and at length on the flaws he observes in China’s criminal justice system. At a time of renewed ideological attacks against judicial independence and separation of powers, it takes courage to even raise the possibility that the progress of Chinese legal reform is not everything it’s made out to be.

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    17 “Hidden Rules” of China’s Criminal Justice System

    In the Chinese criminal justice system, the “gong-jian-fa” institutions (public security, procuratorate, and courts) follow a set of “hidden rules” outside of the formal legal system. These “hidden rules” have great vitality and have operated over a long period of time, making it difficult to change them despite revisions to the criminal procedure law or even judicial reforms. Professor Chen Ruihua sums up these “hidden rules” as follows:

    • The investigative organs will only file a case for investigation when that case has already been solved.

    • Most of the public security organ’s criminal investigation activity is completed before issuing the decision to arrest.

    • The vast majority of cases are only solved after obtaining a confession of guilt by the suspect.

    • If it were not for the purposeful restriction of the rights of defense lawyers and the extralegal detention measures against suspects, solving criminal cases would be extremely difficult for the majority of investigative organs.

    • Compared to plaintiffs in civil trials, the public prosecutor in a criminal trial has a far stronger appetite for “winning”.

    • When a case lacks clear facts or evidence, the procuratorate would rather withdraw the prosecution than allow the court to acquit the defendant.

    • Almost all police and procurators treat defense lawyers with a certain degree of hostility.

    • When a case lacks clear facts or evidence, courts will generally issue decisions that “give lenient punishment when there is doubt” or “remand for retrial;” the “presumption of innocence” is an extremely rare exception.

    • Nearly all first-instance trials proceed by reading the record of criminal investigation aloud.

    • In cases where the defendant hasn’t put forward enough exculpatory evidence, the court’s judgement is basically a kind of process to affirm the conclusions of the investigators and prosecutors.

    • The vast majority of criminal judges lean toward the side of prosecution and will do everything they can to avoid allowing a “guilty” defendant to escape justice.

    • Judgments in the vast majority of cases are reached outside of the trial process.

    • The vast majority of judges turn a blind eye to procedural violations of law made by police, procurators, and first-instance trial judges.

    • When a defendant refuses to admit guilt during the investigation or trial phases, it becomes a significant basis for the court to impose a more severe punishment.

    • In the vast majority of cases it is a “responsible” judge that makes the judgement decision.

    • Judges would rather write extremely detailed “trial conclusion reports” than provide detailed reasoning for their judgments.

    • Whether it is the individual police, procurator, judge, or the “gong-jian-fa” organs, each has a direct interest in how criminal cases are decided.
  • The “Hidden Rules” of China’s Criminal Justice System

    Rule of Law was a centerpiece of the Fourth Plenum meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP in October 2014. Image Credit: Getty Images.

    Xi Jinping made judicial reform a priority item on his agenda after fully taking power in 2013. He promised to “construct a rule-of-law country” and repeatedly emphasized the need for governing with respect to Chinese law and the constitution. Legal institutions were the focus of the “Fourth Plenum” meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2014, which pledged to “strive to let the popular masses feel justice in every court case.” Since then, efforts have been undertaken to “deepen” reform of the country’s legal institutions and officials have been served notice to achieve their reform targets before the upcoming 19th Party Congress later this year.

    In the run up to the 19th Party Congress, we should expect to hear more talk of the great achievements and successful reforms of China’s judicial system. In February, the Supreme People’s Court released a white paper on judicial reform describing its progress in improving the efficiency, accountability, and transparency of the judicial system and declaring that 63 of the 65 reform goals it had set for itself to achieve by 2018 had already been basically accomplished by the end of 2016.

    The reform of China’s law-enforcement and judicial institutions has certainly made some progress in recent years, but are there problems in the country’s legal system that remain untouched by these reforms and continue to undermine the ability of those institutions to deliver justice?

    According to Professor Chen Ruihua, an expert on criminal procedure law at Peking University Law School, the answer is a resounding yes. In a recent blog post, widely circulated online, Chen observes that there are 17 “hidden rules” that govern how the Chinese criminal justice system “really” operates. These rules describe a system of collusion between institutions intended to check each other’s powers, courts that are fundamentally biased against defendants, and a coordinated effort to limit the impact of defense lawyers.

    A list like this is clearly not meant to be analytical, though Chen has spoken and written quite frankly and at length on the flaws he observes in China’s criminal justice system. At a time of renewed ideological attacks against judicial independence and separation of powers, it takes courage to even raise the possibility that the progress of Chinese legal reform is not everything it’s made out to be.

    *

    17 “Hidden Rules” of China’s Criminal Justice System

    In the Chinese criminal justice system, the “gong-jian-fa” institutions (public security, procuratorate, and courts) follow a set of “hidden rules” outside of the formal legal system. These “hidden rules” have great vitality and have operated over a long period of time, making it difficult to change them despite revisions to the criminal procedure law or even judicial reforms. Professor Chen Ruihua sums up these “hidden rules” as follows:

    1. The investigative organs will only file a case for investigation when that case has already been solved.
    2. Most of the public security organ’s criminal investigation activity is completed before issuing the decision to arrest.
    3. The vast majority of cases are only solved after obtaining a confession of guilt by the suspect.
    4. If it were not for the purposeful restriction of the rights of defense lawyers and the extralegal detention measures against suspects, solving criminal cases would be extremely difficult for the majority of investigative organs.
    5. Compared to plaintiffs in civil trials, the public prosecutor in a criminal trial has a far stronger appetite for “winning”.
    6. When a case lacks clear facts or evidence, the procuratorate would rather withdraw the prosecution than allow the court to acquit the defendant.
    7. Almost all police and procurators treat defense lawyers with a certain degree of hostility.
    8. When a case lacks clear facts or evidence, courts will generally issue decisions that “give lenient punishment when there is doubt” or “remand for retrial;” the “presumption of innocence” is an extremely rare exception.
    9. Nearly all first-instance trials proceed by reading the record of criminal investigation aloud.
    10. In cases where the defendant hasn’t put forward enough exculpatory evidence, the court’s judgement is basically a kind of process to affirm the conclusions of the investigators and prosecutors.
    11. The vast majority of criminal judges lean toward the side of prosecution and will do everything they can to avoid allowing a “guilty” defendant to escape justice.
    12. Judgments in the vast majority of cases are reached outside of the trial process.
    13. The vast majority of judges turn a blind eye to procedural violations of law made by police, procurators, and first-instance trial judges.
    14. When a defendant refuses to admit guilt during the investigation or trial phases, it becomes a significant basis for the court to impose a more severe punishment.
    15. In the vast majority of cases it is a “responsible” judge that makes the judgement decision.
    16. Judges would rather write extremely detailed “trial conclusion reports” than provide detailed reasoning for their judgments.
    17. Whether it is the individual police, procurator, judge, or the “gong-jian-fa” organs, each has a direct interest in how criminal cases are decided.
  • China: SPC Issues New Regulations on the Release of Court Judgments Online

    Written judgments from criminal and civil cases in a Yunnan court. New regulations now state that digital copies of such judgments must be released online within a week of a court’s decision. Photo credit: ynfy.gov.cn

    [Updated: as of September 30, 2016, Dui Hua has obtained 117 judgments YTD.]

    In a bid to increase judicial transparency, including the adjudication of sensitive political cases, China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) recently released new regulations that unambiguously assign to courts throughout the country the responsibility for publicly releasing judgments (see translation of the regulations below). The SPC released similar regulations in 2013 and 2010, but the new regulations require courts to release more information, and with greater detail.

    Article 1 of the regulations states that “People’s courts should promptly release court judgments online.” The new regulations provide a stronger mechanism for making courts comply with this provision—if the court decides not to release a judgment to the public, it must make public the reasons for not releasing it (Article 6). Courts also have a new deadline for releasing judgments under the new regulations— “Legally effective court judgments should be posted online within seven working days of taking effect” (Article 7).

    The Discretion to Keep Secrets

    The new regulations provide more detailed guidance to courts when they determine that judgments should not be posted online. Article 4 states that judgments are not to be released if they (1) involve state secrets, (2) involve underage suspects, (3) are resolved by arbitration, (4) concern divorce, or (5) involve custody of underage children. The regulations give unfettered discretion to keep judgments secret if the court determines that a judgment is “unsuitable for online posting.” The meaning of “unsuitable” is not clarified in the regulations.

    The language of these regulations provides leeway to courts to restrict the release of court judgments in cases other than prosecutions of state secrets crimes under Article 111 of the PRC Criminal Law. Court cases that are not ostensibly political might be subject to restrictions on posting online, including but not limited to civil cases involving trade secrets (which might also be classified as state secrets), administrative cases of citizens against the government, financial fraud, and disturbing market order. The police or procuratorates, rather than courts, might possess practical authority to decide when certain cases sufficiently “involve” state secrets such that they are withheld from the public.

    Regulations Having the Intended Effect?

    Although the courts possess authority to block public release of judgments if they “involve” state secrets or are otherwise “unsuitable” for online posting, courts have been much more forthcoming with judgments since the previous set of regulations were issued in 2013. During the three-year period those regulations were in effect, the number of judgments involving endangering state security (ESS) cases that Dui Hua obtained from official websites increased each year: in 2014, 27 judgments were obtained, in 2015, 80 judgments, and, so far in 2016, 117 judgments [updated]. ESS crimes, which include subversion, inciting subversion, splittism, inciting splittism, espionage, and state secrets violations, are the most political in China’s Criminal Law. The decision to publicly release ESS judgments serves as a useful touchstone for assessing judicial transparency.

    Considering that the number of ESS trials has declined during the same three-year period, the increase in judgments posted online is all the more surprising. Dui Hua has estimated that Chinese courts concluded more than 500 ESS trials of the first instance in 2015, compared with more than 1,000 ESS trials in 2014 and 893 in 2013. The drop is attributed to judicial authorities trying cases that used to be considered ESS cases as cases of terrorism and disturbing social order.

    Restrictions on Redaction

    In addition to stipulating which judgments can be released, the new regulations provide some guidance on the content that must be provided in court judgments. Article 8 of the regulations states that courts should redact the names of crime victims, juveniles, and parties to certain types of family cases. Article 10 states that courts should redact certain types of information, primarily personal, private information. The rules also give courts broad authority to redact other information that they deem “inappropriate” for public release.

    The regulations’ drafters likely attempted to avoid issues surrounding the redacting of criminal defendants’ and prisoners’ names. In a change from the 2013 version, the new regulations no longer require the redacting of names of people who are not repeat offenders or who have been sentenced to three years in prison or less. Juvenile defendants should have their names redacted in online judgments owing to Article 8’s restriction on publishing juveniles’ names in general. Other than these changes, however, courts receive little guidance on how and when to publish the names of criminal defendants. Although redacting a defendant’s name can mitigate social stigma associated with a conviction, publicly releasing a defendant’s name can also help family and supporters advocate for greater judicial transparency and clemency.

    New Opportunities for Tracking Court Transparency

    On paper, the new regulations appear to be an improvement over the 2013 version, as they identify courts as the specific institution responsible for releasing judgments and require courts to publicly give reasons for refusing to release judgments. Judging by the increased number of ESS cases released to the public since the previous regulations took effect in 2013, regulations governing the release of judgments also appear to increase court transparency, which hopefully encourages public identification of suspects in most cases—including those involving ESS. Over the next months and years, Dui Hua plans to step up its monitoring of court websites to determine the extent to which courts are exercising their responsibility to release judgments online.

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    Regulations of the Supreme People’s Court of China Regarding the Release of Court Judgments Online

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    The Supreme People’s Court of China
    Legal Interpretation No. 19 [2016]

    August 29, 2016

    The “Regulations of the Supreme People’s Court of China Regarding the Release of Court Judgments Online” was passed on July 25, 2016 at the Meeting No. 1689 of the SPC Adjudication Committee, and will become effective on October 1, 2016.

    These regulations are formulated to implement and carry out the principle of public adjudication, standardize the people’s courts’ online judgment-releasing work, promote judicial fairness, raise the level of judicial credibility, bring together the practical experience of people’s courts, and they are in accordance with relevant regulations including the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, the PRC Civil Procedure Law, and the PRC Administrative Litigation Law.

    Article 1: People’s courts should promptly release court judgments online according to law, in a comprehensive manner, and in a standardized fashion.

    Article 2: The China Judgments Online website is the nationwide, centralized platform for releasing court judgments. People’s courts at all levels install links to China Judgments Online on their court political affairs websites and judicial transparency platforms.

    Article 3: The following types of court judgments should be released online:

    1. Criminal, civil, and administrative judgments;
    2. Criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement judgments;
    3. Payment orders;
    4. Criminal, civil, administrative, and enforcement notices rejecting petitions for review;
    5. State compensation decisions;
    6. Decisions for compulsory medical treatment or decisions rejecting applications for compulsory medical treatment;
    7. Decisions to enforce or amend criminal penalties;
    8. Decisions to detain or to issue fines for obstructionist litigation activities and enforcement behavior; decisions for early release from detention; and decisions on applications for reconsideration that have been filed against orders for detentions and fines;
    9. Administrative mediation decisions and civil public interest litigation mediation decisions;
    10. Other court judgments in which there is a discontinuation or completion of the litigation process, there is an influence on a party’s material rights and benefits, or there is a major influence on a party’s procedural rights.

    Article 4: People’s court judgments displaying one of the following types of characteristics should not be released online:

    1. Cases involved with state secrets;
    2. Juvenile crime cases;
    3. Cases resolved through mediation procedures or verifying the people’s mediatory agreements’ effectiveness, but not including those to protect state interests, the public interest, and other legal interests that need to be made public;
    4. Cases involved with divorce litigation or those involving the fostering or guardianship of minors;
    5. Other circumstances which cause people’s courts to believe internet release is not suitable.

    Article 5: People’s Courts should, in their notices accepting cases and responses, inform the parties of the scope of release of judgments online and publicly inform people’s courts, via government affairs websites, electronic touchscreens, litigation guides, and other methods, of the relevant regulations for issuing court judgments online.

    Article 6: Court judgments that are not released online should release the case number, the adjudicating court, the date of judgment, and the reasons for not releasing the judgment, except when releasing the above-described information could reveal state secrets.

    Article 7: Legally effective court judgments should be posted online within seven working days of taking effect. First-instance judgments and judgments which have been appealed, or regarding which a procuratorial protest has been brought according to law, should be released online within seven working days of the second-instance court’s adjudication taking effect.

    Article 8: People’s courts, when they release court judgments online, should redact the names of the following types of persons:

    1. Parties to marriage, family, and inheritance dispute cases, and their legal representatives;
    2. Crime victims and their legal representatives, collateral civil litigation plaintiffs and their legal representatives, witnesses, and expert witnesses;
    3. Juveniles and their legal representatives.

    Article 9: According to Article 8 of these regulations, the redacting of names in the following circumstances should be handled accordingly:

    1. When the surname is kept, replace the given name with “X”;
    2. Regarding the names of ethnic minorities, keep the first character and replace the rest of the name with “X”;
    3. Regarding foreigners and stateless people, keep the Chinese transliteration for the first character, with the rest of the name replaced by “X”; regarding the English names of foreigners and stateless people, keep the first English letter and eliminate the rest of the name.

    For repeat names resulting from redacting, use Arabic numerals after the names to distinguish them.

    Article 10: When people’s courts release court judgments online, they should redact the following kinds of information:

    1. Family addresses, contact information, identification numbers, bank account numbers, health situations, vehicle license plate numbers, movable or immovable property certificate serial numbers, etc., of natural persons;
    2. Information regarding bank accounts, vehicle license plates, moveable or immovable property certificate serial numbers, etc., of legal persons and other organizations;
    3. Information involving corporate secrets;
    4. Private personal information regarding ongoing disputes involving family affairs, individual rights, etc.;
    5. Information that involves technological investigation measures;
    6. Other information that a people’s court believes is not appropriate to make public.

    According to part (a.) of this Article, if redacted information influences the proper understanding of a court judgment, use the letter “X” as a partial replacement.

    Article 11: People’s courts judgments that are released online should contain the following types of information regarding parties, legal representatives, entrusted agents, and defenders:

    1. Other than the handling of redaction under Article 8 of these regulations, if parties and other legal representatives are natural persons, keep the name, date of birth, sex, district and/or the county of residence; regarding parties and their legal representatives, if they are legal persons or other organizations, keep the name, residential address, organization code, and legal representative or primary responsible persons’ name and occupation;
    2. If entrusted agents and defenders are lawyers or grassroots legal service workers, then maintain the name, the professional registration number, and law firm or grassroots legal service institution name; for entrusted agents and defenders that are other types of personnel, keep the name, date of birth, sex, county or district of residence, and relationship to the party.

    Article 12: If the judge handling the case believes that a court judgment involves circumstances pursuant to Article 4(e) of these regulations rendering inappropriate the release of the judgment online, then the judge should issue such opinion and the grounds for it in writing, and responsible staff from the relevant department, after conducting investigation, report to the managing court’s vice president for approval.

    Article 13: The PRC Supreme People’s Court supervises and guides the whole country’s courts in work on releasing court judgments online. High-level and intermediate-level people’s courts supervise and guide district-level people’s courts in their work on releasing court judgments online.

    Adjudication management offices of people’s courts at every level, or other institutions undertaking the function of adjudication management, have responsibility for the work of releasing their court’s judgments online and carry out the following duties:

    1. Organizing and guiding the release of court judgments online;
    2. Supervising and inspecting the work of releasing court judgments online;
    3. Coordinating and handling complaints and opinions from the public and society regarding court judgments;
    4. Coordinating technology departments to provide technological support and safeguarding;
    5. Other relevant management work.

    Article 14: Courts at every level should rely upon information technology to take court judgments and publicly enter them into the procedures for adjudication management, reducing the amount of work in publicizing court judgments, while realizing promptness, comprehensiveness, and streamlining in releasing court judgments.

    Article 15: In court judgments released online, other than the handling of technology implementation according to the requirements of these regulations, there should be consistency with the original court judgments.

    People’s courts that correct the written errors of court judgments should promptly release the corrected judgment online.

    The judge handling the case is responsible for the consistency between the court judgment that is released online and the original judgment, as well as the standardization of the technological processing.

    Article 16: Court judgments released online that are inconsistent with the original judgment or that exhibit inappropriate technological processing should be promptly removed and released again after they have been corrected.

    For court judgments that have been released online, if inspection reveals circumstances listed in Article 4 of these regulations, they should promptly be removed and then handled according to Article 6.

    Article 17: People’s courts information technology service centers are responsible for China Judgments Online’s functional maintenance and upgrading, providing convenience to all of society for the use according to law of this website’s public court judgments.

    In the application of different case numbers for different adjudication procedures, China Judgments Online cross-references court judgments with each other.

    Article 18: These regulations are effective starting October 1, 2016. The Supreme People’s Court previously issued interpretations and standardizing documents, and in case of inconsistency, these regulations will serve as the authoritative version.

  • Will China Retry Gao Qinrong in Light of Anti-Corruption Campaign?

    Gao Qinrong. Photo credit: bbc.com

    The case of Gao Qinrong harkens back to the earliest days of The Dui Hua Foundation, when his name was featured on many prisoner lists ahead of his early release in 2006. Ten years later, Gao is back in the news with a chance at a retrial that could clear his name.

    Gao, a former investigative reporter for the Xinhua News Agency based in Shanxi Province, was sentenced in 1999 to 12 years in prison for taking bribes, soliciting prostitution, and fraud. He has long alleged that he was framed by local officials in the city of Yuncheng in retaliation for his exposure of a corrupt irrigation project. Gao sent hundreds of appeal petitions to central and provincial authorities during his eight years in prison, but he never received a reply. Some even speculated that Gao’s letters might have been intercepted before they ever reached their intended recipients.

    Gao was released in December 2006 after several sentence reductions and was immediately greeted with sympathetic reports and interviews by some of southern China’s bolder news outlets—despite an apparent ban on reporting in Beijing. He continued to proclaim his innocence and petitioned for judicial authorities to reopen his case. Now, there is word that the Yuncheng Intermediate People’s Court has accepted his petition.

    It remains to be seen, however, whether Gao will get that new day in court. As Dui Hua recently wrote, China’s post-conviction appeal mechanism is not clearly defined under the Criminal Procedure Law, and courts have considerable discretion over reopening cases (and often little incentive to do so).

    A combination of factors connected with Xi Jinping’s assumption of power in 2012 may work in Gao Qinrong’s favor. Xi’s high-profile anti-corruption drive has brought down many current and former officials in coal-rich Shanxi, which appears to have been a particular target of the campaign. Officials with powerful backing have fallen in Yuncheng as well, possibly creating opportunities to revisit evidence of past corruption—including possible retaliation against Gao.

    Righting past wrongful convictions has been another theme of Xi Jinping’s administration. But, as noted by a recent Southern Metropolis Daily editorial (translated below), many of these overturned cases have involved death sentences or life imprisonment. The editorial echoes the call of leading Chinese legal scholars for a more formal post-conviction relief system that would make it easier to get cases of all types reviewed. It also points to something that positive coverage of recent retrials fails to acknowledge: given the systemic causes that have contributed to miscarriages of justice in the past, China needs to do much more than reopen a few selected high-profile cases.

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    Gao Qinrong’s Post-Conviction Appeal: Correcting Judicial Errors Should Address More Than Just Life-and-Death Cases

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    Southern Metropolis Daily editorial, July 29, 2016

    Jiemian News recently reported a new development in the case of reporter Gao Qinrong, whose story created quite a stir years ago. After 18 years of petitioning to have his case reopened, Gao Qinrong has had his post-conviction appeal petition accepted by Shanxi’s Yuncheng Intermediate People’s Court: “The case has been reported up the chain of command and is slated for review…The adjudication committee has to discuss whether to initiate a new trial or reject the appeal.”

    The court’s acceptance of Gao’s petition is a procedural development with next to no legal meaning. But to someone who has been unsuccessfully seeking an appeal for 18 years, this change can be seen as an exceptional, perhaps even hopeful, development.

    Gao Qinrong was a reporter for Reporter’s Notes magazine, published out of the Xinhua News Service’s Shanxi bureau. In the 1990s, he exposed shocking details of a scandal involving “fake irrigation projects” in Yuncheng, Shanxi. The story was followed up by CCTV’s “Focus” newsmagazine program and Southern Weekly, and “disciplinary actions” were taken against several local officials.

    Then, in December 1998 Gao Qinrong was arrested and subsequently sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment for taking bribes, soliciting prostitution, and fraud. On December 7, 2006, having lost eight years and four days of freedom, Gao Qinrong left prison insisting that his imprisonment had been an act of “retaliation.” Even in prison, Gao never gave up the effort to petition for post-conviction appeal, and several delegates to the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference put resolutions forward on his behalf. There was media reporting at the time of Gao’s release from prison, with an editorial in Southern Metropolis Daily calling for “truth in support of the right to speak truth.” Now, a decade later, we find that Gao Qinrong’s effort to reopen his case has been unusually difficult and progress has been slow.

    From today’s vantage point, there are still quite a few things that are strange about the circumstances of Gao’s case and uncertainties about the evidence that was brought against him. According to the lawyer handling Gao’s post-conviction appeal: “The evidence used to convict was unreliable and insufficient, and there were contradictions between the main pieces of evidence used to prove the facts in the case.” Key pieces of evidence were never cross-examined in court, and signatures on transcripts of witness testimony are suspected to be forgeries.

    Besides these doubts about the circumstances and evidence, it’s still worth looking into the question of whether Gao’s case had any relation to his exposure of how local government spent hundreds of millions of yuan on “fake irrigation projects.” When the man who tipped Gao off about the projects was released from prison, he was beaten nearly to death less than 100 meters from the prison gate and is still unable to care for himself to this day. The special team investigating Gao Qinrong focused a great deal of its questioning on his source for the “fake irrigation” report, rather than the three crimes for which he was subsequently charged. Li Xiaolin, who served as Gao Qinrong’s defense attorney, recalls: “They dug up some things from years earlier that didn’t amount to crimes and had never been the subject of any police report.” And they really started digging, he recalls, after Gao “uncovered and was the first of many media to report on fake projects that had cost the prefecture 270 million yuan.”

    Doubts about this particular case haven’t dimmed after 18 years. Neither have they been answered. The embarrassment surrounding Gao Qinrong’s case is not an isolated incident. So many miscarriages of justice that were eventually corrected were once mired in this same sort of procedural despair: one of the parties in a criminal case appeals over many years, making repeated claims but failing to make “effective progress” by getting procedurally significant review of his or her case. When it comes to miscarriages of justice, rectification or exoneration has become, to a great degree, an “unexpected moment of joy”—no one has any idea when or if it will ever come.

    It’s obvious that this is not the way that rule of law is supposed to work. Criminal procedure scholar Chen Weidong has proposed reforms based on changes to the case-filing system that require courts to accept cases as long as they meet certain technical requirements. The idea is that, by putting all post-conviction appeal petitions under a formal review procedure, the process would become more litigation-based and procedural and make correction of judicial errors more transparent and predictable. In other words, it would be an attempt to prevent this “late-arriving justice” from being purely a matter of luck.

    The latest round of judicial reforms has brought with it correction of judicial errors in a number of cases. From these cases, the public might get the impression that major criminal cases are being overturned all the time. But a conclusion that is consistent with judicial logic should recognize that errors occur not only in major life-and-death cases. There must also be a certain percentage of wrongly decided cases that are not so life-and-death but have similar implications for the guilt or innocence of citizens and the line between criminal behavior and non-criminal behavior.

    If you consider the imprint that social and judicial standards have left on individual cases during certain periods, wouldn’t you expect there to be similarity between major and minor cases in terms of the rate of judicial error and the particular experiences of procedural injustice on citizens? Does extraction of confessions through torture and falsification of evidence only take place in cases where there’s been loss of life but somehow vanish entirely in other cases? Not all miscarriages of justice involve such life-and-death cases, so when it comes to correcting judicial errors, normal judicial logic dictates that you should correct all errors, both major and minor.

    Rectifying errors in the judicial system is part of the process of seeking justice—an extremely important part. In this area, there should be no differences in the way that major cases and minor cases are handled. The process of correcting errors should look at the judicial errors in a particular case and not base the urgency or degree of rectification on the severity of the original verdict in that case.

    The post-conviction appeal process in cases like Gao Qinrong’s, with its long years of petitioning without initiation of any substantive judicial review procedure, is a good example of why there is urgent need for legal reform to the system of post-conviction relief. As more and more old cases from the past are corrected and the system of correcting judicial errors starts to become more routine and institutionalized, there is one question we must take seriously: can post-conviction appeals by citizens in non-life-and-death cases receive the same sort of timely, fair, and indisputable justice from our legal system?

  • Waiting for Relief: Obstacles to Righting Wrongful Convictions in China

    Chen Man (center) served 21 years in prison for a crime he did not commit. Photo credit: SCMP

    Increased attention to wrongful convictions in recent years has caused Chinese judicial authorities to retry more criminal cases and exonerate greater numbers of long-serving prisoners. What these trends mask, however, are the formidable obstacles of getting a criminal case reopened in China.

    Whether one looks at the case of Chen Man—released earlier this year after serving 21 years for a murder he didn’t commit—or the posthumous exoneration of Huugjilt in 2014—18 years after his execution—it is clear that it takes many years of petitioning just to get authorities to consider reopening a case. After a petition is accepted, it can still take years to decide whether it meets the criteria for retrial, as demonstrated by the ongoing effort to secure posthumous exoneration for Nie Shubin.

    Critics point out that the protracted and arbitrary manner in which these post-conviction appeals are handled is almost as damaging to the credibility of the judicial system as wrongful convictions themselves. Late last month, a group of lawyers and legal experts met in Beijing to discuss ways to address this problem, indicating that reform may be on the horizon.

    Conditions for Relief

    China’s criminal procedure gives both defense and prosecution the right to appeal the verdict of a trial heard in the first instance. If either side exercises this right, the court one level above holds a second-instance proceeding. The outcome of this proceeding is considered final (unless it results in a decision to send the case back for retrial). Defendants who lose their appeals at this stage are required to begin serving their sentences, with the exception of those sentenced to death, who go through another stage of review by the Supreme People’s Court.

    After appeals are exhausted and a verdict becomes final, the only way a case can be reopened is by initiating the process known under the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) as “adjudication supervision.” The law gives convicted persons, as well as their legal representatives and close family members, the right to petition either the court or the procuratorate to seek retrial. The law specifies five conditions under which the court ought to provide relief:

    1. New evidence demonstrates errors in the factual basis of the original decision that could have an impact on conviction or sentencing;
    2. Evidence used to convict or sentence was unreliable, insufficient, or should have been excluded, or contradictions exist between major pieces of evidence used to determine the facts;
    3. The law was applied erroneously;
    4. Procedure was violated in a way that affects the fairness of the adjudication; or
    5. Judicial personnel were corrupt, showed favoritism, or perverted the law.

    The adjudication supervision process also empowers higher courts to order lower courts to reopen cases and permits higher level procuratorates to file post-conviction appeals if they “discover” errors in cases that have already been decided. In practice, this means that individuals (or their advocates) have an incentive to employ a variety of means—such as petitioning through the “letters and visits” (xinfang) system or attempting to get media attention—to make higher level judicial officials aware of their cases. The effort necessary to garner enough attention to initiate a post-conviction appeal is one major reason why the process tends to take so long.

    Lack of Incentives and Clarity

    Experts point to a number of other factors that contribute to the arbitrary and slow nature of this process. First is the simple fact that getting a case reopened relies to a considerable degree on getting judicial authorities to acknowledge the possibility that they made a mistake. Human nature makes this difficult enough, but recent personal accountability measures imposing “lifetime responsibility” for errors in the judicial process may make police and judicial authorities more resistant. This is why lawyer Mao Lixin, who has handled a number of wrongful conviction cases, thinks that such measures need to be calibrated to incentivize individuals and institutions to admit and remedy past mistakes.

    Another factor contributing to the difficulty of initiating the post-conviction relief process is the absence of clear procedures. Though the CPL sets out the criteria under which cases should be reopened and procedures for how new trials should be carried out, there are no procedures for the initiation or review of petitions for post-conviction relief. There is also a lack of clear, formal differentiation in the evidentiary standards used to review petitions for post-conviction relief and those used to overturn convictions. In practice, many courts will only provide new trials in cases where evidence for exoneration is overwhelming—such as when a supposed murder victim turns out to be alive or another person credibly confesses to the crime. Because of the way the current system is designed, courts that decide to retry a case often become the focus of public attention and scrutiny. This creates an expectation for courts to reverse their verdicts that undermines the impartiality of adjudication.

    Calls for Law, Transparency, Oversight

    The way to resolve these problems, legal experts argue, is to formalize the process of post-conviction appeals and define each stage more clearly under the CPL. They point to recent docketing reforms that have simplified individuals’ ability to file lawsuits of all types and suggest that courts also be required to accept petitions for post-conviction relief as long as they meet basic criteria. As for the review process, Renmin University Law School Professor Chen Weidong argues that a formal procedure needs to be introduced that would increase transparency and give petitioners a more meaningful opportunity to participate and air their positions.

    Chen Guangzhong, one of China’s leading procedural law experts, has even proposed setting up an independent body to review petitions for post-conviction relief that would be made up of people’s congress delegates and members of the public. This, he argues, would help overcome the challenges arising from asking courts to find fault with themselves. Though it is hard to imagine such a body playing a direct role in what others are hoping will become a more formal judicial process, some have suggested that a non-judicial body could at least serve to exercise a welcome degree of independent oversight.

    Fear of Retaliation

    Formalizing a judicial process for post-conviction relief could help to greatly reduce the amount of time and effort spent trying to remedy wrongful convictions, but it may not lead to more exonerations. Individuals convicted of endangering state security and other political crimes will likely continue to find it nearly impossible to have their cases retried, even if reforms reduce court discretion over docketing decisions and make review proceedings more transparent.

    In fact, many who are currently serving prison sentences choose not to exercise their right to petition for post-conviction relief because they fear retaliation or negative impacts on their eligibility for sentence reduction or parole. When journalist Gao Yingpu was serving his three-year sentence in connection with critical comments made online about former Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai, his wife reportedly declined to pursue post-conviction appeal for fear that he might be penalized for “refusing to admit guilt.” She changed her mind after Bo Xilai was removed from power. She filed a petition with the Chongqing High People’s Court in January 2013, shortly before Gao was given a sentence reduction and released from prison. As far as anyone knows, that petition—like so many others throughout China—is stuck in bureaucratic limbo.

  • Chinese Court Amends Charges Against Guo Feixiong Before Conviction

    Democracy activists Guo Feixiong (a.k.a., Yang Maodong, pictured left) and Sun Desheng (pictured right) were recently sentenced to prison terms. Credit: Weiquanwang

    On November 27, Guangzhou’s Tianhe District People’s Court sentenced veteran democracy activists Guo Feixiong (a.k.a., Yang Maodong) and Sun Desheng to six years and two and a half years’ imprisonment, respectively. The court convicted Guo and Sun of public order offenses connected to street protests carried out in Guangzhou and other cities in the early days following Xi Jinping’s accession to power. The crackdown on the “Southern Street Movement,” along with the repression of the New Citizens’ Movement, signaled the new leadership’s resolve to curb grassroots activism, clamp down on criticism, and take control over the political agenda.

    As in many other politically motivated criminal cases in China, the allegations appear to exaggerate the social harm caused by the defendants’ actions and ignore rights to free speech and association nominally protected under China’s constitution. Moreover, violations of due process plagued the prosecution of Guo and Sun. These violations include prolonged pre-trial detention, obstruction of defense counsel, and numerous irregularities at trial. There have been allegations of torture and mistreatment.

    There are many grounds upon which to criticize and even condemn the convictions of Guo Feixiong and Sun Desheng. In this essay, we focus on a small, but significant, aspect of the trial process: the court’s modification of charges immediately before conviction. We explain court action and inaction with the aim of further understanding China’s criminal process and some of its many weaknesses and challenges.

    What Did the Prosecution Allege?

    In the indictment submitted to the court in June 2014, prosecutors from Tianhe District charged Guo and Sun with “gathering a crowd to disrupt order in a public place” under Article 291 of the Criminal Law. The allegation was based on two separate sets of material facts and associated evidence.

    The first set concerned three days of protests held outside the offices of the newspaper Southern Weekly in January 2013. These demonstrations followed a decision to censor a closely watched “New Year’s Editorial” that supported constitutionalism. Authorities alleged that Guo Feixiong was a chief organizer of the protests, which included speeches, signs, and banners hailing press freedom, and which attracted hundreds of participants and onlookers.

    The second set of allegations surrounded a series of “flash mob” protests purportedly initiated by Guo and Sun and carried out in eight cities across China in April and May 2013. Protesters held up signs and banners demanding that officials disclose their assets as part of the fight against corruption and that the government ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Images of these street protests were circulated online, leading prosecutors to claim that they “created false impressions.”

    What Did the Court Do?

    Many accounts report that, just before it sentenced the defendants, the Tianhe District People’s Court added a charge of “provoking a serious disturbance,” which carries a heavier penalty than those under Article 291. Perhaps more accurately, the court “modified” or “amended” the prosecution’s charges. No additional facts or evidence were introduced to support the addition of a new charge during the trial. The court did, however, take issue with the prosecution’s characterization of “flash mobs” as “gathering a crowd to disrupt order in a public space.”

    The court found that, based on the facts and evidence presented at trial, the defendants’ actions should have been prosecuted under the offense of “provoking a serious disturbance” pursuant to Article 293(4) of the Criminal Law. Having identified this error, the court proceeded to amend the charges and issue its verdict accordingly.

    Amending the charges meant that the court could impose separate penalties and calculate a combined sentence for the protests outside Southern Weekly (gathering a crowd to disrupt order) and the anti-corruption flash mobs (provoking a serious disturbance). While the maximum penalty under the charges in the prosecution’s original indictment would have been five years’ imprisonment, after modification, the court was able to impose a sentence of between five and ten years—based on a maximum penalty of five years for each charge.

    Did the Court Violate Chinese Law?

    There is no explicit provision in the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) that authorizes courts to modify the prosecution’s charges in this way. Instead, this action seems to follow from the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) Interpretation on the Application of the CPL, Article 241(2):

    When the facts alleged in the indictment are clear and the evidence is reliable and sufficient but there is a discrepancy between the crime alleged and the crime found in the course of the trial, [the court] shall issue a verdict based on the crime found in the course of the trial.

    This provision implies, but does not expressly state, that the court may unilaterally modify the charges under these specified circumstances.

    Of course, the question remains whether it is legitimate for the SPC to broaden its powers in this way. As a constitutional matter, the use of judicial interpretations to supplement and elaborate on existing law in a generalized manner appears to exceed the authority granted to the SPC to answer concrete applications of law. As a matter of practice, however, such legislation-through-interpretation is considered legitimate, and courts treat these interpretations as equivalent to law.

    In short, while the legal basis for the court’s actions is not free from controversy, practically speaking, no appellate court is likely to accept a challenge on the grounds that the court acted contrary to law.

    Did the Court’s Actions Amount to an Unfair Trial?

    There is little question, however, that the effect of the court’s action deprived Guo and Sun of their right to a fair trial, which would make the decision illegitimate under Chinese and international human rights law.

    By unilaterally modifying the charges just before sentencing, the court deprived the defendants of their right to a fair hearing by denying them adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. Though much of the defense lawyers’ detailed statements to the court remained applicable, the lawyers could not have anticipated the court’s modification. Thus they were not prepared to present a thorough challenge to the applicability of Article 293(4). Lawyers were instead asked to deliver opinions on the spot and were interrupted by the court when they protested.

    One of the principles underlying the idea of a fair judicial hearing is the “equality of arms” between prosecution and defense. Given that criminal defendants have the power of the state arrayed against them, adequate time and facilities to prepare is an essential part of guaranteeing some semblance of parity.

    Article 227(3) of the CPL states that where the trial of first instance “deprives or restricts the statutory procedural rights (fading susong quanli) of a party to the case (dangshiren),” the appellate court should remand the case for retrial. Lawyers might try to make this argument when the case is appealed to the Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court, but if the case is retried and the charges are modified in some other way, it seems highly unlikely that the court would reach a different result.

    How to Modify Charges Fairly

    There are many circumstances in which a charge might need to be re-characterized in the course of a trial. A charge of homicide might fall apart on the question of the defendant’s intention and need to be modified to intentional injury. There is often ambiguity about whether a defendant caught carrying drugs was trafficking or merely transporting.

    Note that in both of these examples modifications would likely benefit the defendant, as the modified offenses are less serious than those originally applied. This is not what happened in the case of Guo Feixiong. Nonetheless, even when the defendant stands to benefit from amended charges, fair-trial principles should require the use of a more elaborate procedure with more of a role for both prosecution and defense.

    This is the argument put forward recently by Shandong rights lawyer Xi Xiangdong. He notes that if the prosecution had wanted to modify its indictment, Supreme People’s Procuratorate rules would have required prosecutors to first seek approval from their superiors and submit the amended indictment to the court. Then, the court would notify the defendant, and a new trial hearing would have to be held—complete with investigation of evidence, debate, and final statements from both sides.

    If the court identifies the need to modify the charges, Xi says, it can make this recommendation to the prosecution. If the prosecution agrees, the process would follow as described above. If the prosecution rejected the recommendation, then the court could proceed to amend the charges if it was in the interest of justice and proper application of the law. Xi rightly insists, however, that this ought to be the exception, rather than the rule. Finally, he notes that any such decision should only be made after giving due consideration to both prosecution and defense in the form of a hearing where both sides can confront each other’s opinion.

    To be sure, such procedures would necessitate extra time and complication for all parties involved. Considering that the court let a year elapse between trial and verdict in the case of Guo Feixiong and Sun Desheng, there really is no excuse for not taking even this small step to provide a measure of protection to the fair-trial rights of the defendants.

  • Draft Criminal Law Amendment Takes Aim at Defense Lawyers in China

    China’s National People’s Congress in session in Beijing. Credit: Xinhua

    One of the more controversial parts of the current proposal to amend China’s Criminal Law concerns the possible expansion of Article 309, covering the offense of “disrupting courtroom order.” Lawmakers have argued that new measures are necessary to “ensure the ability of the people’s courts to implement their adjudicatory powers in an independent and impartial manner” by punishing those who might try to use courtroom disruptions to influence judicial decision-making. They are responding to worries about a worsening atmosphere inside China’s courtrooms—particularly the sense that growing antagonism between judges and defense lawyers is helping to undermine the dignity and credibility of the courts in the public eye. Critics, on the other hand, argue that the proposal unfairly targets lawyers and will have a chilling effect on their ability to pursue vigorous defense on behalf of clients.

    Few would challenge the value to society of preserving a substantial degree of courtroom order. A courtroom should be a forum in which opposing sides of a contentious issue may argue in a reasonable, if sometimes heated, manner over important matters of truth and justice. It is thus reasonable to demand that all sides adhere to a set of fair and impartial rules and standards of decorum because respect for the outcome of the judicial process is linked to the respect that all participants demonstrate toward the process itself. If disorder in China’s courts is in fact contributing to a public crisis of confidence, then addressing the problem at its root is an essential step toward furthering the development of rule of law.

    At the heart of the debate over the proposed amendment to Article 309 is disagreement over the root causes of tension in the courtroom. Who is to blame when conflict erupts between the various parties at trial, especially between lawyers and judges? Are unscrupulous lawyers showing brazen contempt for the law and the courts, or are judicial bias and procedural violations forcing some lawyers to adopt more confrontational tactics as a form of protest? Regulating lawyer behavior through the threat of criminal sanctions might lead to a more orderly courtroom, but if defense lawyers become meek participants in judicial proceedings that remain arbitrary and biased, then this is likely to do little to enhance the courts’ reputation for delivering justice. On the contrary, imposing further limits on the fragile rights of lawyers may actually erode public confidence in the Chinese judicial system even further.

    Letter of the Law

    The existing offense under Article 309 imposes a maximum sentence of three years in prison for “gathering people to stir up trouble or attack a courtroom” or “assaulting a judicial officer (sifa gongzuo renyuan),” when those acts “seriously disrupt courtroom order.” The draft amendment proposes to expand the assault clause to include “those participating in the proceedings.” It also adds two new offense categories: “insulting, defaming, or threatening a judicial officer or participant in the proceedings after being told by the court to stop” and “engaging in other acts that seriously disrupt the order of the court.”

    The first of these changes is relatively unproblematic. Liu Renwen, a legal scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, has in fact been quick to point out that expanding the scope of protection against courtroom assaults is aimed at protecting the rights of lawyers. In particular, he believes that the change will help address attacks by victims’ family members against defense lawyers or defendants’ relatives. Such attacks are unfortunately frequent in China, particularly in cases involving the death penalty.

    There is much less support for the two other proposed amendments to Article 309. Critics contend that “insulting,” “defaming,” and “threatening” are acts that can each be defined quite broadly. Professor Qu Xinjiu of China University of Political Science and Law notes that “insult” can include ordinary name-calling, damage to reputation that might be eligible for civil litigation, and a relatively rare degree of offense that might qualify for criminal prosecution. The proposed expansion of Article 309 does not make clear what degree of insult would qualify for criminal prosecution, or why the existing criminal statute covering insult and defamation is insufficient to handle the acts being targeted. Observers similarly note the ambiguous and subjective nature of the word “threaten” (weixie), which has no corresponding criminal offense. To remedy these problems, Professor Chen Xingliang of Peking University Law School has recommended scrapping the “insulting, defaming, or threatening” clause entirely and expanding the assault clause to cover the more menacing act of “intimidating” (konghe) judicial officers and other parties.

    The prospect of sanctions against insult and defamation at trial is particularly troubling to lawyers, who feel unfairly singled out given the way the offense is written to presume the court’s authority. Many have argued that China should in fact adopt measures to give lawyers civil and penal immunity for statements made in connection to a case—a recommendation based on Article 20 of the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers. Otherwise, it is feared, lawyers who dread the consequences of their speech may become “obsequious and servile” and reluctant to express their defense opinions fully, thereby potentially harming the interests of the defendants they represent.

    It is the final clause, known as the “pocket clause” for its ability to contain almost anything, which has generated the most opposition. Lawyers and legal scholars are frequently critical of such legal formulations, considering them to be sloppy, “unscientific,” and open to arbitrary and abusive interpretations. In this instance, critics argue, the inclusion of such a clause is particularly detrimental to lawyers. This is because, as Chen Xingliang explains, both the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate have the power to issue legal interpretations that can shape how provisions like these are applied. In other words, of the three main participants in courtroom proceedings, only lawyers have no say over what “other acts” might be construed as serious disruptions to courtroom behavior—potentially putting them at a serious disadvantage.

    Critics and Crackdowns

    Stepping back from the issue of how the proposed offense would be worded, critics of the amendment also doubt whether an expanded criminal offense is even necessary. In addition to existing offenses covering insult and defamation, Article 194 of the Criminal Procedure Law empowers a presiding judge to forcibly remove a trial participant or spectator for continuing to violate courtroom order after being warned to stop. In serious cases, the judge may also impose a fine of up to 1000 yuan or a jail term of up to 15 days. With respect to lawyers, other disciplinary sanctions—such as formal warnings or suspensions from practice—can be applied to deal with the most serious cases.

    Despite all of these arguments, which were amply presented to lawmakers when the first draft of the Criminal Law amendments was made public in late 2014, the proposed expansion of Article 309 remained essentially unchanged in the second draft presented to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPSC) in late June. Drafters are expected to submit one final proposal for passage later this year.

    Will lawmakers once again ignore the opposition of lawyers and legal scholars?

    They may very well do so, if the recent crackdown on Chinese rights lawyers is any indication. Liang Jianbing, a law professor at Liaoning Normal University in Dalian, believes that there is a clear link between public opposition to the proposed changes to Article 309 and the sweeping detention of lawyers initiated on July 10. He suspects that many members of the NPCSC were swayed by the outpouring of criticism directed at the first draft by lawyers and legal scholars, putting the future of the proposed amendments in jeopardy. In response, law-enforcement institutions and others who want to see this legislation passed have carried out a highly public campaign against a group of rights lawyers, some of whom have been engaged in courtroom confrontations in the past. The media exposure of these lawyers as “criminals,” Liang argues, is a tactical move intended to overcome remaining skepticism and resistance and secure enough support to ensure that the amendment passes.

    Even if the campaign against lawyers is not directly aimed at ensuring passage of an amended Article 309, both threaten to contribute to fragmentation and passivity among lawyers and accentuate divisions between lawyers and other legal professionals. Han Jiayi of the All-China Lawyers Association has warned of lawyers choosing to “stay away from the courts” and instead focusing their practice on matters that do not involve litigation. Those in power might not mind if more lawyers opt to stay out of the courtroom, or if the ones who go to trial are less willing to challenge authority. Nevertheless, these outcomes would create a version of “rule of law” unlikely to satisfy many Chinese citizens.

  • Despite Legal Reform, SPC Still Blocks Lawyer-Client Access

    Defense lawyer Zhang Kai holds a sign outside Zhejiang’s Pingyang County Detention Center requesting that he be able to meet with his client in October 2014. Image credit: Weibo

    Improving criminal defense lawyers’ access to clients was hailed as one of the highlights of the revised Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) that came into force in 2013. Incorporating provisions of the 2007 Lawyers Law that had yet to be universally respected, the new CPL requires detention centers to arrange for access within 48 hours of request by a lawyer upon presentation of his or her license to practice, the certificate of his or her law firm, and power-of-attorney documentation. The only exceptions are cases involving state security, terrorism, or “particularly serious” bribery, for which police investigators can require that a lawyer seek their approval before a meeting can be arranged.

    Although these new provisions have not been implemented perfectly, defense lawyers generally acknowledge that access to suspects has improved in most routine criminal cases. But what recourse is there when these provisions are not strictly enforced?

    Background

    On July 15, 2014, long-time petitioners Zhang Xiaoyu and husband Xu Youchen were formally “reprimanded” (xunjie) by Beijing police for disturbing public order. Two days later, officials from their hometown of Jiaozuo, Henan, accompanied them back home. Upon arrival, Zhang and Xu reportedly resisted attempts to hand them over to local police officers. Xu allegedly attacked a police officer with a small knife, causing a fatal wound. Xu and Zhang were then placed under criminal detention on suspicion of intentional homicide.

    Lawyers for the couple attempted over a period of several days to meet with the detainees, but their multiple requests were refused by the Jiaozuo Detention Center. Finally, on July 25, lawyers got their first opportunity to meet with Zhang and Xu, who each spoke of being beaten by police. The lawyers took photographs of the couple’s bruised and swollen faces and uploaded these to the Internet.

    The next day, detention center officials refused to provide the lawyers with any additional access to Xu and Zhang, saying that the lawyers had violated the rules by releasing photos of the detainees. The officials informed the lawyers that a complaint had been filed with judicial administration authorities in Shandong and that the detention center would not agree to any more visits, pending a decision on sanctions.

    Over subsequent weeks, lawyers for the couple complained repeatedly to local and provincial authorities and attempted to get the official lawyers’ association to intervene on their behalf. When none of these efforts were successful, two of the lawyers—Liu Jinbin and Liu Shuqing—decided to sue the detention center in court.

    Administrative Action or Judicial Process

    Citizens or other parties who wish to challenge the legality of official government actions can do so under the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL). The challenge must involve a concrete administrative action directed against specific individuals or entities, rather than decisions with general applicability. The ALL also explicitly excludes certain areas from challenge, including national defense and foreign affairs, administrative rules and regulations, administrative decisions of an internal nature, and administrative acts that are deemed by the law to be within a particular state organ’s final authority.

    Under the law, administrative actions are generally distinguished from actions related to judicial process. In theory, disputes that private parties may have with public authorities in the course of the judicial process should be dealt with as part of the judicial process itself. For example, unlawful coercion of confessions by investigators can be addressed through a request to have a court rule on exclusion of that confession from evidence. In China, however, many aspects of judicial authority are invested in the procuratorate, rather than the court. For example, procuratorates make decisions about whether suspects may be held under formal arrest pending trial and are generally responsible for ensuring that various parts of the criminal process are lawful.

    China’s public security organs carry out a variety of functions, some of which fall under the category of administrative acts and some of which can be classified as being part of the judicial process. Punishments for public order offenses (such as short-term jailings, property confiscation, or fines) are unquestionably administrative actions and are, therefore, subject to challenge under the ALL. On the other hand, imposition of coercive measures and actions related to criminal investigation are considered to be actions related to the judicial process that are excluded from the purview of the ALL.

    Legal Argument

    In the nearly identical lawsuits that plaintiffs Liu Jinbin and Liu Shuqing brought before the Shanyang District People’s Court in November 2014, the main issue of dispute was whether arrangement of meetings between lawyer and detainee by a detention center should be considered an administrative action or part of the judicial process. The opportunity to argue this point at trial was itself a rarity, as courts throughout the country had basically refused to hear such cases for almost 15 years.

    That hadn’t always been the case. In 1999, a Hunan lawyer named Liao Jianhua successfully sued the Loudi Public Security Bureau for refusing to allow him to meet with a detained suspect. According to Professor Chen Ruihua, there were a few other cases around that time where courts similarly granted relief to lawyers. But that effectively ended in March 2000, when the Supreme People’s Court issued an interpretation of the ALL that explicitly excluded from the purview of administrative litigation all “actions that the Criminal Procedure Law specifically empowers (shouquan) public security, state security [and other] organs to carry out.” With this provision, the SPC eliminated the courts as an avenue for lawyers to challenge decisions over access to detainees, which helped contribute to making the securing of such access one of the “three difficulties” often complained about by Chinese lawyers.

    The lawyers argued that the Criminal Procedure Law only empowers the police to detain people and carry out investigations. Although the Detention Center Regulations issued by the State Council in 1990 gave responsibility over management of detention centers to public security organs and stated their purpose as “guarantee[ing] the smooth progress of the criminal process,” that role as custodian over detainees was merely a managerial function indirectly part of the criminal process. Under the law, the process of arranging meetings between lawyers and detainees was, at least in the case at hand, supposed to be a relatively simple matter of ensuring that the lawyer’s paperwork was in order and did not leave any room for discretion. Despite being set out in the CPL, this amounted to a routine approval process indistinguishable in form from other administrative actions and should, therefore, be subject to challenge under the ALL.

    The court of first instance rejected this argument, finding that decisions over lawyers’ access were acts “empowered” by the CPL and, therefore, outside the purview of the ALL. In an appeal to the Jiaozuo Intermediate People’s Court in February 2015, Liu Jinbin argued that the district court’s conclusion was based on a flawed understanding of the word “empowered” (shouquan). He argued that arranging lawyers’ access to detainees was a responsibility, rather than a right, and could not therefore be the object of the word “empower.” Public security organs were only empowered by the CPL to detain and investigate suspects; if anything, it was lawyers who were empowered by the law with the right to access detainees.

    The Jiaozuo Intermediate People’s Court essentially ignored this argument by noting that laws endow state organs with both powers and responsibilities. Arranging access between lawyers and detainees was a “clearly stipulated responsibility” under the CPL, it found, and if a lawyer believed that the exercise of his or her rights in this regard were being “hindered” (zu’ai), then the proper channel for seeking remedy was through complaint to the procuratorate. Since the matter was outside the scope of the ALL, the matter was dismissed.

    SPC Interpretation Remains Supreme

    Given that guaranteeing suspects’ access to legal assistance from the point of initial detention is an essential part of safeguarding their human rights and preventing torture and other miscarriages of justice, any violations of lawyers’ rights in the criminal process ought to be met with swift and strong consequences in order to ensure compliance. In the current legal environment, however, a lawyer’s only option is to seek intervention by the procuratorate. Notwithstanding that the Supreme People’s Procuratorate recently issued a set of regulations aimed at protecting the rights of lawyers, what happens if the procuratorate refuses or is slow to intervene? Or what if a procuratorate order goes unheeded?

    These scenarios suggest that some form of judicial remedy could be helpful in vindicating lawyers’ rights to meet with detainees. There are, however, few signs that the door to administrative litigation will open anytime soon. A revised version of the ALL took effect on May 1, and even though legislators still have not explicitly excluded acts connected to the criminal process from the scope of administrative litigation, officials at the SPC have made clear that the relevant provision of its previous interpretation remains binding.

    One possible solution would be pending legislation regarding detention center management. Were management of detention centers to be shifted toward the judicial administration authorities that also manage China’s prisons, it would potentially result in a much clearer separation between the administrative management of detainees and the investigative powers associated with the criminal justice process itself. However, even though there has been a great deal of support among legal experts for making such institutional reform part of a proposed Detention Center Law, current indications are that public security authorities will retain power over detention facilities for the time being. This means that, barring change to the SPC interpretation, the boundaries between criminal investigation and detainee management will remain blurred.

  • Justice for Some, Notoriety for Others: Public Law Enforcement in China

    Ten thousand people watched this public sentencing and arrest gathering in Xinjiang’s Tekesi [Tekes] County, Yili [Ili] Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture on June 16, 2014. Image credit: Tekesi County People’s Court

    Part of doing justice in the criminal process is protecting the dignity of people in custody, presuming their innocence, and providing them with the conditions necessary for fair trial. China’s decisions to prohibit public executions, in 1979, and ban “perp walks” for sex workers, in 2010, seemed to acknowledge at least some of these principles, but ongoing public arrests and sentencing and televised confessions indicate that dignity and fairness are not afforded equally to all Chinese citizens.

    Public arrests and sentencing are often held in large outdoor public spaces like plazas and stadiums and feature the accused bound and flanked by police—at times with placards around their necks—in front of crowds of spectators that can number in the thousands. According to Phoenix Weekly, at least 196 “public displays of law enforcement” (i.e., public arrests and sentencing) were reported on by Chinese news media between 2008 and May 2011. More than 90 percent of the gatherings were in smaller cities, i.e., county-level cities and municipally administered districts. The report says that the gatherings aim to “frighten criminals, educate people, and maintain social stability.”

    Historically, public arrest and sentencing rallies were widely used in and outside China to crush political opponents and consolidate the power of royal families. In the first three decades of the People’s Republic of China, mass rallies served to educate the public about the errors of class enemies, including Kuomintang members and landlords.

    Legal experts have spoken out against modern-day public arrests and sentencing, branding them “campaign-style justice” that emphasizes swift and severe punishment. In July 2010, Renmin University of China Law Professor Guo Weidong told Legal Daily that gatherings like these violate the presumption of innocence that requires the court to prove the guilt of a criminal defendant. Several legal experts joined the call for a legislative ban of these public rallies after more than 20,000 spectators witnessed the arrest of about 70 criminal suspects who were paraded in a public plaza in Qidong County, Hunan Province, on April 12, 2011. The rally was held amid a local “strike hard” campaign that began earlier that year.

    Xinjiang and Tibet

    Critics have been less vocal, however, about public arrest gatherings in Xinjiang. There public rallies are often publicized as stern efforts to combat and educate the public about the “three evil forces” of “separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism,” giving them a veneer of legitimacy amid the global “war on terror.” China News Website has called such gatherings “a concrete action to crack down on violent terrorist crimes and to rejuvenate positive energy in society.”

    In May, 7,000 people witnessed the detention, arrest, and sentencing of more than 100 Uyghurs charged with inciting splittism, terrorism, and murder in a stadium in Yili [Ili] Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture. Pictures of the event were widely circulated in official news media.

    That said, public rallies in Xinjiang occur even without allegations of extremism. As recently as June 16, 2014, 15 suspects shackled on blue trucks were condemned in front of 10,000 people in Tekesi [Tekes] County, Yili. They were charged with cult offenses, disrupting official business, and rape.

    In contrast with Xinjiang, Tibet has received little media attention for public arrests and sentencing. The most recent instance of such an event being reported in official media was on March 9, 2012, in Jiulong [Gyezur] County. No information was made public on the allegations against the suspects and defendants but a crowd of more than 5,000 spectators, including cadres and students, watched as 24 people were detained, arrested, and tried.

    In December 2011, Tibetan writer Woeser posted six photos of Tibetan monks captured by armed police during a stability maintenance campaign in Ganzi [Kardze] and Aba [Ngaba] prefectures. The images of people bound and bedecked with placards—some in open trucks beds—were reminiscent of those subjected to public arrests and sentencing but no narrative came with the photos. Some of the placards displayed criminal charges such as splittism and gathering a crowd to attack an organ of the state. Woeser speculated that the photos were taken sometime between March 2008 and 2011.

    TV Set Confessional

    Public arrests and sentencing if concentrated in Xinjiang appear to exist throughout the country and in response to various anti-crime campaigns. Probably due to the nature of their transmission, televised confessions seem to be more commonly applied to celebrities and public figures who have infringed upon the economic and political interests of the party.

    The most recent televised confessions were made by Jaycee Chan, son of Hong Kong action film star Jackie Chan, and Taiwanese actor Kai Ko. (Ko’s detention was reportedly publicized before his family was notified, breaking with a cross straits agreement requiring notification within 24 hours.) Both were detained on drug charges in Beijing on August 14. Their confessions were preceded in early August by that of Internet celebrity Guo Meimei, who has been charged with illegal gambling.

    Confessions on TV: (top left, clockwise) Kai Ko, Guo Meimei, Peter Humphrey, and Gao Yu. Image credit: CCTV

    Foreign nationals have also been compelled to make televised confessions. In August 2013, Briton Peter Humphrey apologized to the Chinese government on Chinese Central Television for illegally obtaining private information. Broadcast narration from the news segment describes China as a country ruled by law where police fight crime regardless of whether it is committed by Chinese nationals or foreigners. Humphrey’s firm conducted investigations for GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) in China; the global drug company is now facing corruption allegations.

    Chinese journalists have also been targeted. Chen Yongzhou (陈永州) was detained in July 2013 on suspicion of damaging business reputation after writing several newspaper articles accusing a listed company of falsifying its sales. Chen’s detention initially triggered a strong backlash in official Chinese media with several critics calling for his immediate release. The tide turned after the Central Publicity Department intervened in the case, and in late October 2013, state television aired Chen’s confession as filmed from a detention center in Changsha, Hunan Province.

    In the lead up to the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen Protest, another journalist, Gao Yu (高瑜), became the subject of televised confession . Gao’s face was blurred as she pled guilty to “illegally procuring state secrets for foreign entities” on May 30, 2014, the day of her formal arrest. Gao was accused of circulating Document No. 9 to an overseas website. The apparently classified document lists “seven perils” threatening the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), including western constitutional democracy, media independence, and civic participation. Gao was previously sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for illegally procuring state secrets in November 1994 for criticizing the violent suppression of the 1989 pro-democracy protests.

    Both forms of public shaming, televised confessions and public arrests and sentencing likely share the same goals: frightening criminals, educating people, and maintaining social stability. Absent from this list of aims is justice, procedural or substantive. Public law enforcement marginalizes lawyers and courtrooms and with them go dignity, presumptions of innocence, and the likelihood of a fair trial. With an emphasis on legal reform in the upcoming plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in October, perhaps one area worth revisiting is the tendency for humiliation to masquerade as justice.

  • Hong Kong Residents Adrift in Mainland Prisons?

    Yang Kuang at Shenzhen No. 1 Detention Center. Photo credit: Sui Muqing

    Hong Kong resident and activist Yang Kuang (杨匡, pictured right) is on trial in Shenzhen for illegal border crossing. He was detained on December 31, 2013, while attempting to return to Hong Kong after visiting his wife in her native Henan Province. Yang’s immigration documents were revoked in March 2013 in retaliation for his attempts to visit Liu Xia (刘霞), the wife of imprisoned Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波), who is under house arrest in Beijing. Yang is reportedly suffering from severe headaches and has been unable to receive treatment outside Shenzhen No. 1 Detention Center, where he is being held.

    Following the recent death in custody of civil society advocate Cao Shunli (曹顺利), the situations of people like Yang Kuang—people who are detained by mainland Chinese authorities and have histories of political activism and indicators of ill health—must be monitored and their rights protected. Which actors and strategies are involved in these interventions depend in no small part on the citizenship and residency status of the detained.

    Unlike foreign governments who are able to visit their foreign nationals, the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) does not have an agreement with mainland China to access Hong Kong residents who are arrested or detained on the mainland. As Hong Kong is a part of China, it cannot have a consular agreement with China. The HKSAR government has been negotiating a prisoner transfer agreement with its mainland counterparts, but little progress seems to have been made.

    At present, the HKSAR government can only assist detained Hong Kong residents by inquiring about and providing advisory services to them upon request by the detained person or their relatives or friends. The numbers of people requesting assistance and of resulting releases, however, have declined in recent years, according to a 2011 report by Voice of America. The report states that in 2008 the HKSAR government received 46 requests for assistance and was able to obtain the release of 12 Hong Kong residents in mainland custody. In 2009 and 2010, those numbers reportedly fell to 35 requests and 11 releases and 27 requests and two releases, respectively. A local rights activist quoted in the report likened the HKSAR government to a “postal worker,” able to deliver messages but not curb prolonged detentions or facilitate family visits.

    In 2011, Xinhua reported that there were 1,250 Hong Kong residents serving sentences on the mainland. Eight hundred of them were in Guangdong Province. When Dui Hua Executive Director John Kamm visited Dongguan Prison in November 2002 he was shown a cell block for Hong Kong residents. The warden told Kamm that there were 400 prisoners from Hong Kong and Macau in Dongguan Prison at that time.

    In 2014, Dui Hua estimates that there are approximately 2,000 Hong Kong residents in mainland prisons and detention centers. (Hong Kong people can also be held in forms of extra-legal detention such as custody and education.) Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database includes information on seven Hong Kong residents currently in mainland prisons and detention centers, including at least two people charged with endangering state security.

    The proper means of intervening on behalf of detained persons is often unclear. The United States and other countries have, however, seen success through the use of consular visits. In the US case, these visits helped improve the situation of American geologist Xue Feng (薛峰), who received a 10-month sentence reduction in 2012. Unfortunately, US businessman Vincent Wu (胡炜升) has been denied consular visits since the mainland does not recognize his US citizenship. Currently standing trial in Guangzhou, Wu entered China using his Hong Kong ID.

    In terms of statements and lobbying, the HKSAR government has been less outspoken than the British government during Hong Kong’s colonial period. British officials called for the release of Luo Haixing (罗海星) after Luo was sentenced to five years in prison for his part in “Operation Yellowbird” in March 1991. (The aim of the operation was to help pro-democracy activists escape from mainland China to Hong Kong in 1989.) Luo, who passed away in 2010, was granted medical parole six months after his conviction.

    British officials also lobbied Beijing to release Ming Pao journalist Xi Yang (席杨), who was sentenced to 12 years in prison for “leaking state secrets” in 1993. He was released on parole in 1997. In these and other cases, Dui Hua played an important role in convincing Beijing to grant clemency.

    Working in conjunction with the US government and local and international advocacy groups, the HKSAR government helped secure the early release of well-known journalist Ching Cheong in 2008. Yet when Ching was sentenced on the mainland on August 31, 2006, the press statement made by Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang seemed to highlight the limited role the HKSAR government could play in prisoner interventions:

    In rendering assistance to residents, the HKSAR Government must respect the “One Country, Two Systems” principle and does not interfere with the law enforcement and the judicial process on the Mainland, just as the Mainland authorities do not interfere with cases that fall within the jurisdiction of the HKSAR.

    The line between interference and assistance can be easily blurred—especially when “interference” is aimed at individuals ensnared in a flawed criminal justice process. Just last month, Hong Kong’s Legislative Council was asking “how to assist in handling an incident of arbitrary detention outside Hong Kong.” At issue was the detention of 73-year-old Yao Wentian (姚文田), head of Hong Kong’s Morning Bell Press, in Shenzhen in October 2013. Yao is being investigated for alleged smuggling activities, but it is no secret that he has assisted in the publication of many books banned in mainland China and suffers from asthma and heart problems.

    Should Hong Kong deem it important to gain access to residents imprisoned on the mainland, perhaps it could work towards implementing agreements with local governments, particularly Guangdong, whereby the departments concerned structure prisoner access between the two parties. Visits and more proactive interventions by Hong Kong officials as well as the publication of relevant statistics may be effective means for Hong Kong to assist its residents. Without proper assistance, Hong Kong residents detained on the mainland appear adrift: without the linguistic and cultural fluency of locals or the consular protections of foreign nationals.

  • Community Correction Expands as RTL Contracts

    People sentenced to community correction take a test on community correction implementation measures in Guangyuan, Sichuan, August 8, 2013. Photo credit: Guangyuan Justice Bureau

    When details of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s latest reform resolution were made public last month, the spotlight focused on the long-awaited announcement that the system of administrative detention known as reeducation through labor (RTL) would finally be abolished. A less noticed clause of the same item in the resolution, which was issued following the Third Plenum of the 18th Congress of the Central Committee, was an imperative to “enhance the community correction system.”

    The juxtaposition of these two items led many observers both inside and outside China to conclude that a system of community correction would at least partially replace RTL—a supposition stoked by the lack of any clear signal regarding what, if anything, might replace the soon-to-be defunct system. Deputy Justice Minister Zhao Dacheng told reporters on November 29 that community correction was not, in fact, being proposed as a replacement. However, if part of the reform process involves expanding the scope of the Criminal Law to absorb some of the illegal behavior formerly handled by RTL, this will likely mean an expansion in use of community correction.

    While relatively little is known about this newer system—first introduced to China through pilot projects in select locations in 2003—the number of people affected by it is growing fast. The number of people in community correction in China has more than tripled from about 400,000 in May 2012 to 1.4 million in 2013 (the latest figure appeared in China’s national report to its 2013 Universal Periodic Review).

    Community correction is an important part of the “lenience” side of the current penal policy known as “combining lenience with severity” (kuan-yan xiangji). Currently, the system is applied to people sentenced to parole, suspended sentences, or “control” (guanzhi) in accordance with provisions introduced into the Criminal Law in 2010, as well as to people granted approval to temporarily serve custodial sentences outside a facility in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Law. The system is also seen as an important part of dealing with juvenile offenders without resorting to incarceration.

    Before the implementation of the community correction system, parolees or those serving suspended sentences were subject to supervision by their local police station. Now, judicial administrative departments supervise the community correction system that relies in part on “social organizations,” contractors, and volunteers. Targets remain in the community but must report on their activities; get approval to travel or receive visitors; attend study sessions related to public morality, current affairs, and legal knowledge; and perform social service. Notably, while local community correction authorities are required to ensure that those under their supervision complete minimum monthly quotas of study and community service, the implementation measures do not set any maximum limits for either requirement.

    People sentenced to deprivation of political rights (DPR) are also subjected to community corrections, not in accord with either of the aforementioned laws, but as a result of implementation measures (translated below) that took effect in March 2012. Citizens serving DPR—a supplemental sentence which is invariably applied to persons convicted of “endangering state security” crimes—cannot write articles or give interviews, cannot vote, cannot stand for office, and cannot hold a position in a state-owned company.

    The Ministry of Justice is currently in the process of drafting a proposed Community Correction Law that would presumably incorporate and elaborate on the provisions of these national implementation measures as well as the many local implementation rules that have been put into place to govern this developing institution. Community correction will be an area to watch as China’s system for maintaining social order and stability continues to evolve.

    *
    Notice of the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate,
    Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of Justice Regarding Issue of
    Implementation Measures for Community Correction

    To: The High People’s Courts, People’s Procuratorates, Public Security Departments (Bureaus), and Justice Departments (Bureaus) of each province, autonomous region, and directly administered municipality, the Production and Construction Corps Branch Court of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and the People’s Procuratorate, Public Security Bureau, Justice Bureau, and Prison Administration Bureau of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps:

    In order to further standardize community correction work, strengthen and innovate in the management of special populations, according to the overall arrangements made by the Center with respect to deepening reform of the legal system and mechanisms of legal work, and on the basis of deeper research and demonstration and broad solicitation of opinions, the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of Justice have jointly enacted these Implementation Measures for Community Correction. We hereby issue and distribute [these measures] and request their earnest and thorough implementation. Please report promptly to the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, or Ministry of Justice, respectively, regarding implementation or if you encounter any problems.

    Supreme People’s Court
    Supreme People’s Procuratorate
    Ministry of Public Security
    Ministry of Justice
    January 10, 2012

    Article 1: To standardize the implementation of community correction in accordance with the law and allow those under community correction to reform themselves into law-abiding citizens, these measures are enacted based on the Criminal Law of the PRC, Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC, and other relevant laws and regulations and in light of the realities of community correction work.

    Article 2: Judicial administration organs shall be responsible for guidance, management, organization, and implementation of community correction work.

    People’s courts shall issue verdicts, rulings, or decisions in accordance with the law with respect to defendants or offenders who meet the conditions for use of community correction.

    People’s procuratorates shall conduct legal oversight in accordance with the law with respect to all areas of implementation of community correction.

    Public security organs shall handle individuals sent to community correction in a timely manner and in accordance with the law when they violate public order management regulations or re-offend.

    Article 3: Community correction units of county-level judicial administration organs shall supervise, manage, educate, and assist individuals sent to community correction. Judicial affairs centers shall be responsible for the daily work of community correction.

    Social workers and volunteers shall participate in community correction work under the organization and guidance of community correction units.

    The relevant departments, village (neighborhood) committee, and the work unit or school of the person under community correction, as well as his or her family members, guardians, or guarantors, shall assist the community correction unit in carrying out community correction.

    Article 4: In considering whether to send a defendant or offender to community correction, the people’s court, people’s procuratorate, public security organ, or prison shall investigate what impact doing so would have on the community where the individual resides; to do this, they may enlist the county-level judicial administration organ to conduct an investigation and assessment.

    A judicial administration organ enlisted [to carry out an investigation and assessment] shall, according to the request of the initiating organ, thoroughly investigate the residential circumstances of the defendant or offender, his or her family or social relations, consistent behavior, the consequences and impact of his or her criminal behavior, the views of the village (neighborhood) committee in his or her place of residence, the views of the victims, and the things he or she has been prohibited from doing and put together an assessment opinion to be delivered to the initiating organ in a timely manner.

    Article 5: When community correction is used for a criminal offender, the people’s court, public security organ, and prison shall verify his or her place of residence and, at the time of sentencing or prior to his or her departure from the place of detention, notify him or her in writing regarding the deadline for reporting to the county-level judicial administration organ in his or her place of residence and the consequences of reporting late; the county-level judicial administration organ in his or her place of residence should also be notified. Within three working days of the verdict or ruling taking effect, copies of the verdict, ruling, or decision, enforcement notice, certificate of parole or other [relevant] legal documents shall be delivered [to the local judicial administration organ] and copies sent to the county-level people’s procuratorate and public security organ in his or her place of residence. A receipt shall be sent by the judicial administration bureau within three working days of receiving the legal documents.

    Article 6: A person under community correction shall report to the county-level judicial administration organ in his or her place of residence within 10 days of a people’s court verdict or ruling becoming effective or leaving the place of detention. The county-level judicial administration organ shall promptly carry out intake registration procedures and notify him or her to report to a specified judicial affairs center to undertake community correction. If it is discovered that a person sent to community correction fails to report at the appointed time, the county-level judicial administration organ shall immediately organize a search and notify the deciding authority.

    Individuals under community correction while temporarily serving their sentences non-custodially, shall be delivered to their place of residence by the responsible prison or detention center and handed over to the county-level judicial administration organ in accordance with procedures. When the offender’s place of imprisonment and place of residence are not in the same province, autonomous region, or municipality, and it is necessary for him or her to temporarily serve his or her sentence non-custodially under community correction, the prison administration bureau or detention administration unit at the provincial level in the place of imprisonment shall notify the prison administration bureau or detention administration unit at the same level in the place of residence [so that it may] appoint a prison or detention center to receive the offender’s case file and take responsibility for handling the intake and release procedures for the offender. When a people’s court decides on a sentence involving temporary non-custodial enforcement, it shall notify the county-level judicial administration organ in the individual’s place of residence to dispatch personnel to handle transfer paperwork with the court.

    Article 7: After the judicial affairs center takes in a person for community correction, it shall promptly read aloud the main parts of the verdict, ruling, decision, enforcement notice, or other relevant legal documents; the time limits for community correction; the rules that the person under community correction shall obey; the things he or she has been prohibited from doing and the legal consequences for violating the rules; the rights that a person under community correction has and the rights that have been restricted in accordance with the law; and the composition of the corrections team and its responsibilities.

    These announcements shall be led by an employee of the judicial affairs center in the presence of members of the corrections team and other relevant personnel and in accordance with regulations and procedures.

    Article 8: The judicial affairs center shall confirm a special corrections team for the person under community correction. The corrections team shall be headed by an employee of the judicial affairs center and composed of other persons listed in Articles 3(2) and 3(3) of these measures. When the person under community correction is female, the corrections team shall have female members.

    The judicial affairs center shall establish a corrections responsibility agreement with the corrections team, setting out the responsibilities and duties of each team member according to his or her work-unit and background and ensuring that each corrections measure is carried out.

    Article 9: The judicial affairs center shall devise a corrections plan for each individual under community correction and, on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation of the type of offense the person under community correction was convicted of, the circumstances of his or her crime, his or her display of remorse, personality traits, and daily life environment, establish targeted measures for monitoring, education, and assistance. The corrections plan shall be adjusted in a timely manner based on its effectiveness.

    Article 10: The county-level judicial administration organ shall establish a community-corrections enforcement file for each person under community correction, including the legal documents applying community correction and other legal documents related to the enforcement of community corrections, such as those related to intake, monitoring approval, punishment, remand to custodial enforcement, and lifting of community correction.

    The judicial affairs center shall establish archives related to community correction work, including records of the community correction work carried out by the judicial affairs center and corrections team and relevant documents related to the community correction undergone by individuals sent to community correction. It shall also maintain copies of the community correction enforcement files.

    Article 11: Persons under community correction shall report to the judicial affairs center at the appointed time; obey disciplinary rules and laws; submit to monitoring and control; and participate in education, study, community service, and social activities. When there are changes in residence or work, major unforeseen events in the family, or encounters with persons with harmful influence on his or her correction, the person under community correction shall report this at once.

    Persons in community correction while under medical parole shall provide a health report to the judicial affairs center once per month. Every three months, he or she shall present the results of a medical checkup to the judicial affairs center.

    Article 12: When a person under community correction has a legitimate need to enter an area or location subject to an “entry-by-permission-only” prohibition order of a people’s court, he or she shall enter only after approval from the county-level judicial administration organ and notice shall be given to the people’s procuratorate.

    Article 13: Persons under community correction may not leave the city, county, or banner of their residence.

    When a person under community correction has a legitimate need to leave the city, county, or banner of his or her residence in order to seek medical treatment, or because of family emergency or other reason, he or she shall seek approval from the judicial affairs center if the absence is for seven days or less. For absences exceeding seven days, approval shall be sought from the county-level judicial administration organ after getting a signed opinion from the judicial affairs center. Upon returning to his or her place of residence, he or she shall immediately report to the judicial affairs center. Persons under community correction may not leave the city, county, or banner of their residence for more than one month.

    Article 14: A person under community correction may not move his or her residence to another county, city, district, or banner.

    When a person under community correction has a legitimate need to move his or her residence, he or she shall make written application one month in advance for approval of the county-level judicial administration organ after getting a signed opinion from the judicial affairs center. The county-level judicial administration organ shall make its decision after seeking input from the county-level judicial administration organ in the new place of residence.

    For those with approval to move their place of residence, the county-level judicial administration organ shall transfer all legal documents and corrections files to the county-level judicial administration organ in the new place of residence within three working days of issuing a decision. Copies of the relevant legal documents shall be sent to the people’s procuratorates and public security organs in both the current and new places of residence. The person under community correction shall report to the county-level judicial administration organ in the new place of residence within seven days of receiving the decision.

    Article 15: Persons under community correction shall participate in educational study activity related to public morality, legal knowledge, and current affairs in order to improve their legal understanding, moral character, and thinking about remorse and rehabilitation. Persons under community correction shall participate in no less than eight hours of educational study each month.

    Article 16: Persons under community correction who are able to work shall participate in community service in order to re-establish social ties and cultivate a sense of social responsibility, the collective, and discipline. Persons under community correction shall participate in no less than eight hours of community service each month.

    Article 17: Based on the psychological status and behavioral characteristics of each person under community correction, targeted measures shall be taken to carry out individualized educational and psychological counseling to correct his or her law-breaking or criminal mindset and enhance his or her ability to adapt to society.

    Article 18: The judicial administration organ shall, according to the needs of the person under community correction, coordinate between the relevant departments and work units to undertake vocational training and employment guidance and assist in the arrangement of social security measures.

    Article 19: The judicial affairs center shall, based on the actual circumstances of the life, work, and community of the individual under community correction, employ targeted measures such as on-the-spot inspection, correspondence and contact, or information verification in order to remain actively aware of the activities of the person under community correction. During key periods or times around major events, or under other special circumstances, the judicial affairs center shall immediately ascertain the relevant circumstances of persons under community correction and may, according to necessity, require persons under community correction to report to its office and provide explanations.

    When a person under community correction evades supervision, the judicial affairs center shall immediately report to the county-level judicial administration organ to organize a search.

    Article 20: Judicial affairs centers shall periodically visit the homes, work units, schools, and communities of individuals under community correction in order to investigate and check the thinking and actual behavior of individuals under community correction.

    For individuals under community correction who are on medical parole, the judicial affairs center shall periodically make contact with the hospital providing treatment and promptly understand his or her physical condition and illness treatment and check-up and communicate this information back to the prison or detention center that issued the approval or decision [for medical parole].

    Article 21: Judicial affairs centers shall promptly record details of how individuals under community correction accept oversight and control and participate in educational study and community service and periodically evaluate how well they are accepting correction. Individuals under community corrections shall be managed differently according to the results of their evaluations.

    Article 22: When a person under community correction is found to have violated the regulations for oversight and control or a prohibition ordered by a people’s court, the judicial administration organ shall promptly send someone to investigate the situation, collect relevant evidence, and make a recommendation for handling the matter.

    Article 23: When a person under community correction commits one of the following infractions, the county-level judicial administration organ shall give a warning and produce a written decision:

    1. Failure to report at the appointed time;
    2. Violation of the provisions regarding reporting, meeting with visitors, travel, or change of residence;
    3. Failure to participate in educational study or community service according to regulation despite repeated attempts at correction;
    4. Failure by individuals under community correction who are on medical parole to provide details of their illness or medical checkups without legitimate reason or engaging in social activities other than medical treatment despite repeated attempts at correction;
    5. Violation of a prohibition ordered by a people’s court, when the circumstances are minor;
    6. Other violations of regulations on oversight and control.

    Article 24: When a person under community correction violates a regulation on oversight and control or a prohibition made by a people’s court and that violation ought to be punished with a public-order management penalty in accordance with the law, the county-level judicial administration organ shall promptly request the public security organ at the same level to issue the penalty. The public security organ shall notify the county-level judicial administration organ of its decision.

    Article 25: When a person under community correction who is serving a suspended sentence or who has been granted parole commits one of the following infractions, the county-level judicial administration organ in his or her place of residence shall issue a written recommendation to revoke the suspension or parole to the people’s court that made the original ruling and attach relevant supporting documents. The people’s court shall issue a ruling in accordance with the law within a month of receiving [the recommendation]:

    1. Violation of a prohibition ordered by a people’s court, when the circumstances are serious;
    2. Failure to report at the appointed time or eluding control during the period of community correction for longer than one month;
    3. Failure to correct behavior after having been given a public order management penalty for a violation of regulations on oversight and control;
    4. Failure to correct behavior after having been given three warnings by the judicial administration organ;
    5. Other violations of the relevant laws, administrative regulations, or rules on oversight and control, where the circumstances are serious.

    The judicial administration organ’s recommendation to revoke suspension or parole shall be sent together with the people’s court ruling to the people’s procuratorate and public security organ at the same level in the place of residence of the person under community correction.

    Article 26: When a person under community correction who is temporarily serving outside of custody commits one of the following infractions, the county-level judicial administration organ in his or her place of residence shall send a written remand recommendation to the unit that approved or decided the non-custodial enforcement and attach relevant supporting documents. The approving or deciding unit shall issue its decision within 15 days of receiving [the recommendation]:

    1. Discovery that the individual does not meet the conditions for non-custodial enforcement;
    2. Unauthorized departure from the city, county, or banner that is the place of residence without prior permission from the judicial administration organ and refusal to correct after being warned or refusal to report whereabouts and evasion of supervision;
    3. Failure to correct behavior after having been given public order management penalty for a violation of regulations on oversight and control;
    4. Failure to correct behavior after having been given two warnings by the judicial administration organ;
    5. Failure to provide details of illness and checkup in accordance with the rules during the medical parole period and refusal to correct this behavior after being warned;
    6. When the circumstances justifying temporary non-custodial enforcement no longer exist and the sentence has not concluded;
    7. When the guarantor ceases to meet the conditions of a guarantor or has had his or her qualifications as a guarantor cancelled for failure to fulfill his or her duties and a new guarantor cannot be produced within the statutory time period;
    8. Other violations of the relevant laws, administrative regulations, or rules on oversight and control, where the circumstances are serious.

    Copies of the judicial administration organ’s recommendation to remand for custodial enforcement shall be sent together with the decision from the deciding unit to the people’s procuratorate and public security organ at the same level in the place of residence of the person under community correction.

    Article 27: When a people’s court rules to revoke a suspended sentence or parole or decides to remand to custody an offender who had temporarily been serving a non-custodial sentence, the county-level judicial administration organ in the individual’s place of residence shall, with the assistance of the public security organ, promptly deliver the offender to the prison or detention center.

    When the prison administration organ decides to remand to custody an offender who had temporarily been serving a non-custodial sentence, the prison shall immediately go to the place of custody and return the offender to prison to serve his or her sentence.

    When the public security organ decides to remand to custody an offender who had temporarily been serving a non-custodial sentence, the detention center in the offender’s place of residence shall take custody of the offender.

    Article 28: When a person under community corrections meets to statutory conditions for sentence reduction, the county-level judicial administration organ in his or her place of residence shall prepare a written recommendation for sentence reduction and attach related evidentiary documents and, after the prefectural judicial administration organ inspects and approves, submit the request for a ruling by the intermediate people’s court in the individual’s place of residence. The people’s court shall issue its ruling in accordance with the law within one month of receiving the request; when the case involves sentence reduction for a person serving a non-custodial sentence and the circumstances are complex or special, the deadline may be extended by one month. Copies of the judicial administration organ’s recommendation for sentence reduction and the people’s court ruling on sentence reduction shall be sent together to the people’s procuratorate and public security organ at the same administrative level for the place of residence of the person under community correction.

    Article 29: Prior to the end of their community correction period, individuals under community correction shall produce a personal summary report and the judicial affairs center shall prepare a written evaluation based on his or her behavior during the period of community correction, assessment results, and community opinions, and make recommendations for placement, help, and education.

    Article 30: At the end of an individual’s period of community correction, the judicial affairs center shall arrange to announce the lifting of community correction. The announcement shall be led by an employee of the judicial affairs center and carried out publicly and in accordance with statutory procedures.

    The judicial affairs center shall, based on the different circumstances of each person under community correction, notify the relevant departments, village (neighborhood) committee, local public representatives, the individual’s work unit, members of his or her family or guardian or guarantor to attend the announcement proceedings.

    The announcement proceedings shall include: a reading of the evaluation of the person under community correction; an announcement that the community correction period has concluded and community correction is being lifted in accordance with the law; for those sentenced to public surveillance, an announcement that the sentence has concluded and public surveillance is being lifted; for those sentenced to suspended sentences, an announcement that the period of suspension and probation is complete and the original sentence will no longer be enforced; for those who were released on parole, an announcement that the period of probation has concluded and the original sentence has been fully served.

    The county-level judicial administration organ shall issue a certificate of completion of community correction to the person under community correction and notify the deciding organ in writing and send a copy to the county-level people’s procuratorate and public security organ.

    When the sentence has concluded for a person under community correction serving a temporary non-custodial sentence, the prison or detention center shall carry out sentence-completion and release procedures in accordance with the law.

    Article 31: Community correction shall terminate when a person under community correction dies, is remanded for custodial enforcement, or is sentenced to a custodial penalty.

    When a person under community correction dies during the period of community correction, the county-level judicial administration organ shall promptly give written notice to the unit that approved or ordered [the community correction] and notify the county-level people’s procuratorate.

    Article 32: For offenders who have been sentenced to deprivation of political rights as a stand-alone punishment, the judicial administration organ shall assist the public security organ in monitoring compliance with Article 54 of the Criminal Law and keeping abreast of relevant information promptly. Offenders who have been deprived of their political rights may voluntarily participate in psychological counseling, vocational training, and employment guidance activities organized by the judicial administration organ.

    Article 33: When carrying out community correction for juveniles, the policy of education, reform, and rehabilitation shall be followed and correction enforced according to the following provisions:

    1. Community correction for juveniles shall be conducted separately from that for adults;
    2. To protect the identities of juveniles under community correction, decisions to impose correction shall not be announced publicly and their correction files shall be kept confidential;
    3. Correction teams for juveniles under community correction shall include members who are familiar with the special characteristics of adolescent development;
    4. Measures taken for monitoring and controlling juveniles shall be beneficial to their physical and mental health and take his or her age, psychological characteristics, and needs of physical and mental development into consideration;
    5. Provide ideological, legal, and moral education and psychological counseling in a manner that is easy for juveniles to accept;
    6. Coordinate with the relevant departments to provide juveniles under community correction with education and employment assistance;
    7. Urge the guardians of juveniles under community correction to carry out their guardianship responsibilities and assume their custodial and disciplinary duties;
    8. Employ other necessary measures that will help juveniles under community correction to mend their ways and re-enter normal social life.

    The above provisions apply to individuals under community correction who were under 18 years old at the time of their criminal offense and were sentenced to penalties of five years’ imprisonment or less.

    Article 34: When the period of community correction is finished, the judicial affairs center shall notify the person under community correction of the relevant regulations concerning placement, help, and education, liaise with the units responsible for placement, help, and education and transfer the relevant files.

    Article 35: Judicial administration organs shall set up systems for regular meetings, circular notices, professional training, information reporting, statistics, records management, as well as systems for evaluating law-enforcement, open law-enforcement, and oversight and investigation in order to ensure that community corrections work is carried out in a standardized manner.

    Judicial administration organs shall establish mechanisms for handling emergency situations. When individuals under community correction are found to have died unnatural deaths, engaged in criminal activity, or participated in mass incidents, [judicial administration organs] shall immediately coordinate efforts with public security organs and other relevant departments to handle the matter appropriately and promptly report all relevant details to their superior judicial administration organ and other relevant departments.

    Judicial administration organs shall, together with public security organs, people’s procuratorates, and people’s courts, establish a platform for information exchange regarding individuals under community correction in order to promote sharing of data on developments in community correction work.

    Article 36: Persons under community correction may not suffer any infringement of their personal safety, lawful property, rights to defense, appeal, complaint, and impeach, or any other rights that have not been subject to deprivation or restriction in accordance with the law. Persons under community correction shall suffer no discrimination with regard to education, employment, or enjoyment of social security benefits.

    Judicial administration personnel shall conscientiously listen to and appropriately handle problems raised by persons under community correction in order to protect their lawful rights and interests in accordance with the law.

    Article 37: When a people’s procuratorate discovers that community correction work violates the law or these measures, it may, based on different circumstances, issue verbal rectification opinion or issue a written notice to correct illegality or a procuratorial recommendation. The sending organ and the enforcement organ shall make corrections at once and give appropriate notice to the people’s procuratorate.

    Article 38: In the course of community correction work, judicial administration personnel who engage in behavior that violates the law such as dereliction of duty, favoritism, or abuse of office shall be given the appropriate punishment in accordance with the law; when the behavior constitutes a criminal offense, criminal responsibility shall be pursued.

    Article 39: People’s courts, people’s procuratorates, public security organs, and judicial administration organs at all levels shall earnestly strengthen their organizational leadership over community correction work, strengthen work mechanisms, clarify work structures, provide personnel, ensure funding, and ensure that community correction work is able to be undertaken smoothly

    Article 40: These measures take effect from March 1, 2012. In case of any conflicts between these measures and provisions concerning community corrections previously issued by the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, or Ministry of Justice, these measures shall take precedence.

  • Politico-Legal Committee Issues Rules to Prevent Injustice

    Four well-known miscarriages of justice befell (from left) Zhao Yanjin (in prison nearly a decade), Nie Shubin (executed, 1995), She Xianglin (in prison 11 years), Hugejiletu (executed, 1996). Photo credits: Sanlian Life Weekly, xinhuanet.com, sohu.com

    A series of high-profile cases involving wrongful conviction and other miscarriages of justice has increasingly forced China’s top law-enforcement officials to address this troubling issue head-on. In March, the president of Zhejiang’s High People’s Court placed much of the blame for wrongful convictions on the extraction of confessions through torture. President Xi Jinping has spoken prominently about the need for “the popular masses to feel fairness and justice in every judicial case,” and new Supreme People’s Court President Zhou Qiang has called on lawyers and scholars to help reform the criminal justice system.

    Then, in mid-August, the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Politico-Legal Commission (CPLC) issued a set of 15 provisions aimed at systemic changes that could help prevent future injustice. Met with considerable fanfare by Chinese media, the provisions included a call to establish a new responsibility system in which judges, prosecutors, and police would be held accountable for life for negligent or wrongful acts that result in wrongful conviction.

    Over the past two months, judicial and law-enforcement bodies throughout China have been studying the CPLC pronouncements. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate has already issued provisions for implementation. Despite all the attention, copies of the provisions have not been widely circulated. In fact, Dui Hua has only been able to find one copy online (translated below) as circulated by a local party branch politico-legal committee in Jining, Shandong Province.

    On one level, much of the CPLC guidelines reiterate provisions and principles that are already part of China’s Criminal Procedure Law and related regulations. The emphasis on fully recording interrogations and excluding illegally obtained evidence reflect the growing recognition of the need to protect the rights of criminal suspects and defendants, but implementation of these important protections has yet to become routine. Likewise, the CPLC provisions emphasize the importance of keeping channels of communication open within the criminal process and acting on information in a timely manner, whether it be the opinions of defense lawyers or allegations of wrongdoing made by convicted persons.

    Besides the proposed responsibility system, another theme of note in the CPLC provisions is the need to insulate the judicial process from external interference. Public opinion, petitioning, and “stability preservation” are all cited as sources of external pressure that should not be allowed to influence decisions made during the criminal process. By the same token, the guidelines also point to the possibility of less interference by local party and government officials by limiting the scope of politico-legal committees’ guiding opinions and efforts to “coordinate” opinions between law-enforcement bodies when there are disagreements about how a case ought to be handled.

    There is much in these guidelines that sounds positive from the perspective of promoting procedural fairness and rule of law in China. The ultimate impact of these pronouncements, however, is likely to depend on how much weight they are given vis-a-vis other, well-established imperatives to pursue stability in the interest of the overall socio-political order, for it is the perception that these interests can trump the law and political and civil rights that contributes most to miscarriages of justice in China.

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    Provisions on Earnest Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice

    In order to give thorough implementation to the spirit of the important written instructions given by General Secretary Xi Jinping and Comrades Meng Jianzhu and Guo Shengkun, fully realize the spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Politico-Legal Commission, punish crime in accordance with the law, respect and safeguard human rights, increase the credibility of the judicial system, and uphold social fairness and justice, we hereby enact the following provisions on the subject of strict adherence to legal procedure and holding firm to the bottom line on prevention of miscarriages of justice.

    1. Except in emergencies when it is necessary to conduct on-the-spot questioning, questioning of criminal suspects or defendants ought to be carried out in case-handling locations provided for [by law and regulation]. After a criminal suspect has been transferred to a detention center for custody, questioning shall be carried out in the detention center interrogation room with simultaneous audio- or video recording of the entire process. The investigating organ may not use reasons such as recovering stolen goods or [conducting an] identification [procedure] to remove suspects from the detention center in order to conduct questioning outside the facility.
    2. When the investigating organ transfers a case [to prosecutors], it ought to include all evidence of the guilt or innocence of the suspect or defendant as well as of the severity of the crime. It is strictly forbidden to withhold or fabricate evidence.
    3. When evidence that ought to be excluded is discovered during investigation, prosecutory review, or trial, it ought to be excluded in accordance with the law and may not serve as the basis for requesting arrest approval, approving or issuing an arrest decision, transferring the case for prosecutory review, making a decision to prosecute, or issuing a verdict. Suspect or defendant confessions obtained through torture or other illegal means, or witness testimony or victim statements obtained through violence, threats, or other illegal means may not be used as the basis for conviction.
    4. People’s procuratorates shall conduct oversight in accordance with the law as to whether investigation activities are lawful; provide opinions and recommendations as to the collection, securing, and perfection of evidence; and, when necessary, appoint procurators to take part in discussions with the investigating organs concerning major or serious cases and re-testing or re-examination of crime scenes or items, persons, or corpses associated with a crime.
    5. People’s procuratorate shall strictly ensure the standards for arrest review, prosecutory review, and prosecutory appeal. In cases that do not meet the statutory requirements for arrest or prosecution, it shall withhold arrest approval or issue a decision not to prosecute in accordance with the law. Appeal shall be made in accordance with the law in cases that meet the conditions for prosecutory appeal, especially when the innocent are found guilty, the guilty are found innocent, or the sentence is either unusually light or unusually heavy.
    6. Firmly adhere to the principle of judgment on the basis of evidence. When a witness who ought to appear in court in accordance with the law refuses to appear or appears but refuses to testify without good reason and the court has no way to confirm the veracity of his or her testimony, the testimony of that witness may not be used as the basis for conviction. Any evidence that has not been presented, examined, and cross-examined in court and verified through these court investigation procedures may not be used as the basis for conviction.
    7. Strictly implement the legal standard of proof. When there is only a defendant’s confession and no other evidence, the defendant cannot be convicted or given criminal punishment. In cases where there is insufficient evidence to convict, the presumption of innocence shall be adhered to and the defendant pronounced innocent in accordance with the law, standards cannot be lowered to issue a verdict with a “margin of error.” When evidence to convict is truthful and sufficient but there are doubts concerning evidence with implications for sentencing, a sentence favoring the defendant shall be issued.
    8. When people’s courts, people’s procuratorates, or public security organs handle criminal cases, they must take facts as the basis and law as the criterion and cannot issue judgments or decisions that violate the provisions of the law due to pressure caused by public-opinion hype, disruptive petitioning by a parties to the case or their relatives, “case-solving deadlines,” or local “stability preservation.”
    9. Earnestly safeguard the rights of defense lawyers to meet [with clients], read case files, carry out investigations, and obtain evidence, and to raise questions, cross-examine evidence, and debate in court. During the phases of concluding the investigation, prosecutory review, and final review of death sentences, people’s courts, people’s procuratorates, and public security organs ought to hear defense lawyers’ opinions in accordance with the law. With respect to the defense arguments and evidentiary materials submitted in defense by defendants and their defense counsel, people’s courts ought to give them serious review and provide an explanation in the court decision as to why they were accepted or rejected.
    10. People’s procuratorates and people’s courts ought to conduct timely review in accordance with the law when receiving allegations or petitions that may truly involve miscarriage of justice. After review, if a criminal verdict or decision is found to be in error, prosecutory appeal or request for retrial shall be made in accordance with the law. People’s procuratorates shall immediately rectify mistaken decisions made in a criminal case by itself or by its subordinate procuratorates in accordance with statutory procedures.
    11. Prisons or other penalty-enforcement organs may not withhold petitions, allegations, or accusation materials made by offenders and ought to transmit them or request the relevant authority to handle them in a timely manner. The relevant authority ought to conduct a serious review and handle [the petition, allegation, or accusation] in a timely manner and notify the prison or other penalty-enforcement organ of its decision. When offenders make petitions or allegations, it shall not affect their eligibility for sentence reduction or parole.
    12. Establish a strong case-management responsibility system in which the collegiate bench as well as individual judges, procurators, and police officers are held equally accountable and judges, procurators, and police officers are held accountable for life for the quality of the way a case is handled insofar as the purview of their duties is concerned. Responsibility for unlawful acts related to the handling of cases by judges, procurators, and police officers shall be pursued in accordance with the relevant laws and provisions.
    13. Clarify the standards for [what constitutes] a miscarriage of justice as well as procedure for and agent who can initiate remedial action and establish a strong mechanism for pursuing responsibility in miscarriages of justice. Acts such as coercion of confession through torture, use of violence to obtain evidence, and withholding or fabricating evidence shall be severely punished in accordance with the law.
    14. Establish a strong, scientific, and rational system for case-management performance evaluation that adheres to judicial rules; do not one-sidedly pursue targets such as a case-solution rate, arrest rate, prosecution rate, or conviction rate.
    15. Party politico-legal committees at all levels ought to support the independent and fair exercise of judicial and procuratorial powers by the people’s courts and people’s procuratorates and support each politico-legal unit in carrying out its work in an independently responsible and coordinated manner in accordance with the constitution and laws. In cases where the facts are unclear or the evidence is insufficient, do not coordinate [opinions between law enforcement bodies]; when coordinating [opinions regarding] cases, generally refrain from making specific opinions regarding the determination or substantive handling of a case.