Tag: rule of law

  • Court Discipline Rules Hype Up Judge-Lawyer Conflict?

    Before recently passed revisions to China’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) take effect on January 1, 2013, four of the main bodies affected by the law—the Ministry of Public Security, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Supreme People’s Court, and Ministry of Justice*—are expected to issue implementation regulations or interpretations governing how each will internally carry out the revised provisions. Unlike the formal legislative process, these interpretations and regulations—which could have significant consequences for the way the CPL is enforced—are not expected to go through any kind of formal public consultation.
    But if the Supreme People’s Court expected that discussions surrounding its 560-article draft judicial interpretation would remain out of the public eye, it was surely disappointed when details of some of the proposed provisions leaked last month. Two items concerned with maintaining courtroom order during criminal trials have elicited howls of protest from Chinese lawyers in particular. The first provision would bar them from using email, blogs, or social media to report on trial proceedings from the courtroom, whereas the second would give judges the ability to sanction lawyers who breach court rules by prohibiting them from appearing in court for up to one year.
    Critics see these provisions—particularly the latter—as further evidence of efforts by Chinese authorities to rein in defense lawyers and prevent those who engage in activism from interfering with the “efficiency” of the judicial process. Tensions between lawyers and judges have been on the rise in recent years, with the two sides going head to head in trials both big and small. Lawyers who refuse to cooperate can find themselves expelled from trial, deprived of their licenses to practice, or even subject to retaliatory prosecution.
    A recent article (translated below) appearing in the Guangzhou newspaper Southern Weekly reviews the confrontational atmosphere inside the courtroom and concludes that the situation may not be as dire as some have suggested. Frustration on the part of both lawyers and judges is largely to blame for emotions running high, and, if cooler heads prevail, extreme (and impractical) measures to sanction “troublemaking” lawyers should not be necessary.
    * Note: The Ministry of State Security is another key body that will be affected by the law, but it is not expected to release relevant regulations to the public.
    *
    Judges vs. Lawyers: An Imaginary Showdown
    Liu Chang
    Southern Weekly, September 4, 2012
    A knowledgeable source has confirmed to Southern Weekly that Zhang Jun did in fact mention a few lawyers disrupting court order but never used the phrase “stirring up trouble in the courtroom.”
    “There are definitely two sides to the problem: lawyers have shortcomings, and judges also have shortcomings; that’s how I’d put it.”
    “During these difficult times, every legal professional needs to do more soul-searching.”
    Every time lawyer Si Weijiang appears in court, he always brings with him a white digital clock from Ikea. One afternoon in June 2012, at the Xiaohe District People’s Court in Guiyang, a court police officer suddenly took it and dismantled it for inspection. Fortunately, this was only an ordinary digital clock; it didn’t have a recording function.
    If new provisions being considered by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) take effect, this digital clock may not even make it through the main entrance of the court.
    The (Consultation Draft) of the SPC Interpretation on Certain Issues Regarding Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC (hereafter “Draft Interpretation”) is being circulated for opinions within the national court system.
    Two provisions are brand new: First, trial participants are prohibited from using email, blogs, microblogs, or other means to report on trial activity while inside the courtroom. Second, where defense lawyers and legal counsel have been expelled from the court or otherwise punished for serious violations of courtroom order, the court may bar them for between six months and one year from appearing in court as defense lawyers or legal counsel and can even recommend to the justice bureau that they be punished with measures such as suspension or even license-revocation.
    There is more controversy over the second provision, since the power to punish lawyers professionally belongs to judicial administration departments. Even judges interviewed believe there is no legal basis for courts to bar lawyers from carrying out their profession and that the provision is unfeasible and merely “words spoken in anger.”
    These two new provisions have led many to reflect on some recent conflicts that have occurred between lawyers and judges. However, most judges, lawyers, and scholars interviewed believe that the antagonism between the two sides is not nearly as serious as the Internet makes it seem. Mainly, it reflects short-term, emotional confrontations between the two sides since lawyers began banding together to take a stand. [Those interviewed] call on the members of both groups of legal professionals to be more self-reflective and be more sympathetic and understanding to the other side as they drive forward together along the road towards rule of law.
    Speaking to Southern Weekly, two authoritative scholars of criminal procedure expressed criticisms of the Draft Interpretation, each saying that they felt that the wording regarding courtroom discipline was inappropriate.
    According to the SPC’s plans, opinions are presently being sought from within the court system through the middle of September. Then, “after further revision and request for comment from relevant departments,” [the SPC] will formally issue [the interpretation] at the end of the year.
    An Overreaction?
    Some lawyers have linked these two provisions on courtroom discipline to a speech given by Zhang Jun, the vice-president at the SPC responsible for criminal adjudication work.
    According to a report in the Economic Observer, at the end of April 2012 Zhang Jun went to Beijing to give a lecture at one of the rotating training sessions for vice-presidents of high- and intermediate-level courts nationwide, during which he criticized a handful of “no-good” lawyers who disrupted courtroom order and some lawyers whose words served to diminish public trust in the court’s judicial process.
    Not long afterwards, in early May, Zhang Jun convened a meeting of chiefs from the SPC criminal divisions, adjudication supervision division, research office, and other departments along with a group of experts and academics to discuss the first draft of the judicial interpretation of the CPL. After this meeting, the SPC Research Office put together a second draft.
    On July 5, the second draft of the judicial interpretation of the CPL was sent to Xining, Qinghai, where the National Court Criminal Adjudication Work Conference was being held. There, the draft was submitted for discussion by vice-presidents responsible for criminal adjudication and criminal division heads from high-level courts nationwide.
    Based on discussions at the Qinghai meeting, in mid-July Zhang Jun again held a meeting and revisions were made to the second draft. On July 30, this third draft was submitted for comment to courts throughout the country.
    It is unknown how the new provisions on courtroom discipline that are now under scrutiny came to be included in the judicial interpretation currently under revision. The amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law that were passed on March 14, 2012, are the first major revision since the one in 1996 and brought changes to more than 50 percent of the law’s provisions. But not a word was changed in the section on courtroom discipline. Why weren’t these issues raised during the legislative process? It’s worth pondering the attitude of the SPC.
    “The SPC’s decision may have been an intense reaction to the Xiaohe case,” was the analysis a vice-president of a basic-level court in Shandong offered Southern Weekly. The Draft Interpretation shows that on some level the SPC is backing up lower-level courts, but it may have “overreacted.”
    A vice-president of a basic-level court in Hubei thinks that the most recent Draft Interpretation “is connected to the peculiar environment of the last year or so.” The “rebellious” nature of some lawyers is also due to this environment. “During this time,” [he says,] “even if what you say is correct you might be opposed, because the time is not right.”
    According to the report in the Economic Observer, in Zhang Jun’s controversial speech he mentioned three cases since 2011 in Beihai, Changshu, and Guiyang. [In each case,] lawyers worked collectively to provide defense in major criminal trials.
    At the Li Qinghong organized crime trial in the Xiaohe District People’s Court in Guiyang, during the first set of hearings from January 9 to 14, 2012, a new record was set for conflict between judges and lawyers: more than 10 lawyers were reprimanded, four lawyers were thrown out of the courtroom, and a National People’s Congress delegate fainted in the courtroom … [Note: Ellipsis appears in original—Ed.] The trial, which had been set to conclude before the lunar new year holiday, had to be suspended.
    In Beijing, the SPC, Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP), and Ministry of Justice (MOJ) met to view an edited video from the Xiaohe District People’s Court. Lawyer Tian Wenchang, chair of the All-China Lawyer’s Association (ACLA) Criminal Defense Committee, says, “After the conflict, the court cut five days of hearings into a 16-minute video that showed lawyers with rather intense attitudes. Watching this led officials concerned to believe that there was a problem with lawyers stirring up trouble in the courtroom.”
    After ACLA’s Criminal Defense Committee reviewed the [unedited] video footage, it produced a 30-minute version in which Tian Wenchang personally added narration and commentary and sent it to the SPC. The video revealed many problems in the courtroom, such as “not letting lawyers speak, saying either that it was irrelevant to the case or that it was repetitive; failing to acknowledge you when you raised your hand; refusing requests to speak; and kicking you out when you insisted on speaking anyway.” As China’s most prestigious criminal defense lawyer, Tian has experienced all of these situations.
    Perhaps because video doesn’t do justice to reality, from June 8 to July 19, 2012, the Xiaohe court held another hearing lasting more than 40 days, and a “Central Supervisory Group” made up of individuals from the SPC, SPP, MOJ, and ACLA not only showed up but also insisted on observing the entire proceeding.
    The SPC sent the head of one of its criminal divisions. According to a report in Caijing magazine, an SPC representative confirmed that their main goal was to “investigate the new Criminal Procedure Law.”
    “There are definitely two sides to the problem with the Xiaohe court,” says Tian Wenchang. “There are indeed lawyers who are rather intense, but there are inevitably reasons for this. Surely, lawyers don’t go around stirring up trouble in courtrooms without reason?” He says that sometimes lawyers lose their cool, but it’s also true that some judges do not allow lawyers to speak or treat them roughly and that this makes lawyers furious: “Lawyers have shortcomings and judges also have shortcomings; that’s how I’d put it.”
    Lawyer Zhang Qingsong is a representative sent by the ACLA to observe in Xiaohe. To his understanding, this draft judicial interpretation makes the SPC’s position clear: a show of support for the Xiaohe judge.
    People inside the court system do not find anything unusual about many of the provisions in the Draft Interpretation regarding courtroom discipline, including having to get permission from the court to record, videotape, or film. “Courts in many countries do this,” [they say.] But most judges believe that it goes beyond the authority of judicial interpretation to have courts be able to punish lawyers by barring them from appearing in court.
    “Could a prohibition imposed by a Shandong court be applicable to courts in Yunnan?” asked a vice-president of a basic-level court in Shandong. Even if the provision is passed, there are still technical issues that haven’t been resolved.
    Weaklings Bullying Each Other?
    From the beginning of the Beihai case, lawyers used new media to broadcast details of the case. As for so-called “live microblogging,” in fact many lawyers post to microblogs after trial hearings conclude, but this has caused great headaches for the courts.
    According to the report in the Economic Observer, in that internal speech Zhang Jun complained bitterly about some “lawyers talking nonsense.”
    A knowledgeable source has confirmed to Southern Weekly that in that internal speech Zhang Jun did mention a few lawyers disrupting court order but never used the phrase “stirring up trouble in the courtroom.”
    Other views raised by the top judge in his speech actually closely resonate with the expectations of lawyers, but this has gotten lost in the heat of the rhetoric.
    According to the Economic Observer report, Zhang Jun was emphasizing how judges should have a trial-centered consciousness when he mentioned the problem of lawyers’ so-called “stirring up trouble in the courtroom.” He said that the facts show that one reason that judges do not have a high degree of control over trials is that judges still think and operate like inquisitors and are unable to adapt to the adversarial trial system. A second reason is that presiding judges lack relative independence.
    According to the aforementioned report, what leads a few lawyers to stir up trouble is, in Zhang Jun’s view, “the lack of fair procedure and failure to do what was expected” in a few cases, “including some unfairness towards lawyers.”
    However, the proposals in the Draft Interpretation regarding trial powers have been seen as showing a lack of self-reflection on the part of the courts.
    “Judges first need to reflect upon whether they are being good judges, only then [should they focus on] the work of enforcing the law,” says lawyer Zhang Peihong. For example, although a lot of courtroom disciplinary measures appear to be “international norms” and their limitations applicable to “all trial participants,” if lawyers are always the ones being punished, in reality, they’re still essentially unjust.”
    “The biggest problem in China’s courtrooms right now is that judges really want to be like judges in countries with mature rule of law—enjoying absolute authority and respect in the courtroom,” says lawyer Zhang Peihong. “What they don’t understand is that such authority and respect doesn’t come from the rules that [judges] themselves enact; they are earned through generation after generation of judges being more knowledgeable, more reasonable, and more humble than the other participants in the litigation process.”
    Zhang Peihong has noticed an interesting phenomenon in recent years: In Chinese criminal trials, the conflicting sides in the courtroom seem to have increasingly shifted from prosecution versus defense to judges versus lawyers. Judges want to control order in the courtroom, whereas lawyers feel this leaves no way to ensure equal treatment. Lawyers feel that “live microblogging” promotes oversight of the judicial process in individual cases, but judges worry about too much interference from public opinion. Judges criticize an extremely small number of lawyers for “stirring up trouble in the courtroom” and creating hype, while lawyers take to the media and Internet to complain about judges’ unfairness in trying cases.
    Judges and lawyers are oriented similarly in their struggles: it has always been difficult to achieve breakthrough in lawyers’ right to carry out defense—it must be accomplished through convincing the court—and there’s a common consensus that the status of the courts needs to be elevated.
    In the view of Sichuan Judge Gao Hui [pseudonym], looking at current problems by considering the relationship between judges and lawyers only scratches the surface. At root is the problem of public trust in the judicial process. If courts and judges could have a high level of universal support from the public, then “relations between judges and lawyers would not be an issue.”
    “In a country with rule of law, it’s not considered excessive to emphasize discipline in the courtroom and the authority of judges in the courtroom,” said Judge Gao Hui. “In a country that has already established modern rule of law, authority must be given to judges. But we currently lack this kind of authority.”
    Lawyer Tian Wenchang has also seen signs of worsening relations between lawyers and judges. In a society under rule of law, judges and lawyers are inextricably linked. The current situation makes him worry.
    “Every legal professional needs to do more soul-searching,” sighed Liu Guofeng, vice-president of the Lichuan City People’s Court in Hubei, after seeing the war of words between lawyers and judges on Weibo [a micro-blog service similar to Twitter].
  • “Mafia” Crackdown Jettisons Judge for Discretion, Lawful Parole

    Liu Deshan is out of a job after nearly 30 years as a judge in Henan province. In 2010, the provincial politico-legal committee (政法委) started investigating him for a sentence reduction he had approved six years earlier. The sentence reduction was for Bai Yugang. According to Xinhua, a sentence reduction led to Bai’s early release in December 2004, but Bai was arrested again in 2009 for additional crimes, including “organizing and leading a mafia-like organization,” during a nationwide crackdown on organized crime and illegal “cults.”
    Defendants in the Bai Yugang trial make their final statements.
    Source: Nanyang Intermediate People’s Court

    Investigation

    According to the Southern Weekly report detailing his story, Liu Deshan was targeted after the Office of the National Coordinating Group for the Campaign to Crack Down on Organized Crime and Cults (全国打黑除恶专项斗争协调小组办公室) wrote in a report on Bai Yugang’s trial that “[Bai’s] protective umbrella has not been wiped out.” That report spurred the leaders of the Ministry of Public Security and the Office of the Central Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security (中央社会治安综合治理委员会办公室) to issue instructions to “actively correct” outstanding problems. These instructions prompted the provincial politico-legal committee to create a special group of 50 people to investigate.
    The Southern Weekly report says that in the spring of 2010, Liu was investigated by the special group for eight days in a windowless room in a restaurant in Zhumadian city. He was then reportedly moved to another restaurant and held for 21 days under residential surveillance, where he was “deprived of sleep and seriously tortured.” On May 31, Liu was taken to a detention center where he would stay for 15 months before being released on bail.
    Liu Deshan kept a journal on scraps of paper during his detention.
    Source: Liu Chang, Southern Weekly
    Liu’s allegations—detailed in the Southern Weekly report—involve several procedural flaws and illegal practices. They also raise doubts about successful implementation of revisions to the Criminal Procedure Law, effective in 2013. For example, Article 121 of the revised law is meant to prevent the torture of people charged with “serious crimes” through the use of video and audio recording during interrogation. In 2006, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate released trial rules establishing synchronous audio and video recording for the interrogation of suspects in “duty crimes” (职务罪), which appear to have been loosely applied in Liu’s case. Discussing his experience during interrogation, Liu said: “It’s all an act. First they got me to totally submit … then they turned on the equipment to go through the formality.”

    Trial

    At the criminal tribunal of the people’s court in October 2010, the prosecutor claimed that Liu had violated an internal document of the provincial politico-legal system, which states that “in general, sentence reduction can only be given after the original sentence has been implemented for more than one and a half years.” In response, Liu argued that judges have discretionary power, and his decision was fully compliant with the Criminal Procedure Law and relevant judicial interpretations issued by the Supreme People’s Court.
    Following a lengthy process of “internal instruction” that dragged on for nearly a year after his second court hearing, Liu received what he called a “flawed acquittal.” The verdict stated that though Liu’s conduct did not constitute a crime, he was “negligent” and “abused his power.” Despite his dissatisfaction with the verdict, the former judge believes that he is unlikely to win an appeal given the amount of high-level involvement in the case.

    Emphasizing Severity

    Liu’s career was apparently ruined for approving a sentence reduction that was in accordance with the law (as indicated by his acquittal) but out of step with a political campaign to “strike black and eliminate evil.” Although the Southern Weekly report does not provide details on Liu’s indictment or on the reasons for Bai’s sentence reduction, Liu may have found himself on the wrong side of the policy of combining leniency with severity (宽严相济).
    Sentence reductions for people convicted of organized crime are to be “strictly handled,” according to Paragraph 34 of the Supreme People’s Court “Opinions on Implementing the Policy of Combining Leniency with Severity” (February 2010). Dui Hua has written about the opinion as a basis for leniency for juveniles and the elderly, but the list of people targeted for severity runs much longer. The first group named in Paragraph 34 is people convicted of “endangering state security” crimes, and thousands of political prisoners routinely face restricted access to sentence reduction and parole. For example, Dhondup Wangchen was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for “inciting splittism” in 2009 and has been unable to obtain medical parole despite suffering from hepatitis B. Before his arrest, Wangchen produced a film in which he interviewed Tibetans about their lives under Chinese rule and their views on the then upcoming 2008 Olympics.
    In this context, Liu’s case could be a warning that sentence reduction in sensitive, or potentially sensitive, cases is unacceptable regardless of procedural validity. Though found not guilty, Liu ultimately lost his job, demonstrating that Party discipline blocks the path to judicial independence with episodic crackdowns and politico-legal committees.
  • He Weifang: Legal Reform, Resolve, and Lawyers (Part III of III)

    Professor He Weifang. Photo credit:
    China Business View
    There is perhaps no better example of a public intellectual in China than He Weifang (贺卫方), professor of law at Peking University Law School and avid promoter of legal reform and judicial independence. In part two of a three-part translation of an interview He gave Xi’an newspaper China Business View, he discusses the role of lawyers in legal reform and the benefits judicial professionalization brings to the public. Click here to read part one of the translation on reform and professionalization and part two on the reformer’s need for resolve.
    *
    Reform Itself Changes National Circumstances [Excerpt]
    China Business View, May 19, 2012
    Interview with He Weifang

    Lawyers Can Bring Public Discontent into the Realm of Rationality

    CBV: Discuss the importance of civil society to reform.
    He: Chinese society has never resolved the problem of the structure in the middle of society: besides the state, there are only individuals who are like a sheet of loose sand. For 2,000 years it’s been like this. So, we need to fight against these 2,000 years of history. We know that the bar in the UK is an extremely independent organization that experiences no interference from the state. On the contrary, they nibble away at state power. In the 17th and 18th centuries, British lawyers monopolized entry for judges and judges had to be reputable members of the legal profession. This meant that the strength of society had entered into state power and a portion of the power of the state had been transformed by the logic of society. In my view, this is what civil society is. When society is filled with a variety of forces, the state cannot do whatever it wants.
    CBV: Lawyers play a very important role in the democratic process, as they can minimize the intensity of conflicts and promote moderate progress. But in practice, lawyers are less effective than hoped for and they are heavily restricted.
    He: Lawyers as a profession have decided that they must struggle against public power. In today’s China, when we glance behind us we can see lawyers “banding together for support” and continually demonstrating their strength. Lawyers are determined to struggle against public power and think of ways to use norms to shape state power. But in another sense, they are also using norms to shape public sentiments and bring public discontent with the government into the realm of rationality so that it can be resolved reasonably. So, when ordinary people hire a lawyer to represent them in a lawsuit, the clearest symbolic significance is that they still respect the state. Can you still attack lawyers at that point? A history lesson from France teaches us that if you always attack lawyers, it forces lawyers to become the leaders of a great revolutionary era. Silver-tongued lawyers are good at argument at court and they can also be terrific at inciting people. Weren’t Danton and Robespierre both lawyers? So, I am always calling on officials both directly and indirectly to change their prejudices and stereotypes about lawyers.
    CBV: Often during some high-profile individual cases the arguments that develop in public opinion and the media cannot be bridged, such as in the case of Li Changkui. What is the significance of a society’s culture to the law?
    He: Some decisions are clearly unreasonable or, perhaps, flawed. Take the case of Li Changkui: sentenced to death by the court of first instance, the death sentence suspended on appeal. I felt the reasoning used by the appeal court to change the verdict was not convincing, but I said we should respect the court’s final judgment because we must support the determinacy and stability of judicial decisions. We cannot allow judicial decisions to be like baking a pie, because if decisions are not determinate, it means power is not determinate and we’ll forever live in a state of uncertainty. The security of a rule-of-law society relies to a great degree on the stability of judicial decisions. This is what we commonly refer to as the ultimate nature of judicial decisions.
    Cicero said that extreme justice is extreme injustice. Humans cannot achieve absolutely perfect justice. [So] we [shouldn’t] concentrate the limited financial and human resources of the legal system on those errors that should not be corrected—that’s the primary lesson of the Li Changkui case. This kind of sense is what Chinese legal culture lacks most. I’ve been trying everything I can to use weibo [a Twitter-like service] and the Internet to express this kind of idea. I will continue to say that if ordinary people don’t understand a judge’s decision, it doesn’t mean it does not benefit them. On the contrary, the more one pursues professionalism, the more benefits it brings to ordinary people. Admittedly, ordinary people don’t really understand what [judges] are doing, but despite not understanding, these things are still valuable and must be subject to checks and balances from within the profession. Of course, what sort of force can constrain the actions of jurists? This requires a slow growth process for the legal profession, as well as rationalization of the legal profession’s internal mechanisms. I’ve discovered an interesting paradox: The more emphasis is placed on maximizing the value of one’s own industry, sometimes it actually brings the most benefits to ordinary people.

    Related links:

  • He Weifang: Legal Reform, Resolve, and Lawyers (Part II of III)

    Professor He Weifang. Photo credit:
    China Business View
    There is perhaps no better example of a public intellectual in China than He Weifang (贺卫方), professor of law at Peking University Law School and avid promoter of legal reform and judicial independence. In part two of a three-part translation of an interview He gave Xi’an newspaper China Business View, he discusses the need for resolve in the pursuit of legal reform. Click here to read part one of the translation on legal reform and judicial professionalization.
    *
    Reform Itself Changes National Circumstances [Excerpt]
    China Business View, May 19, 2012
    Interview with He Weifang

    Steely Resolve Needed to Push Forward Reforms

    CBV: There are many differences of opinion within academia about legal reform. Some scholars hope to find a safer path.
    He: I always feel that sometimes you need to have a kind of steely resolve in order to push forward reforms. That is to say, when you push for reform in the correct direction, sometimes things might actually get worse for a while, rather than reform fixing everything all at once. So, you need to have a certain degree of patience with respect to reform. But these days there are many people without enough patience, people who think that they need to compromise and consider the degree to which [reform ideas] are acceptable to powerful departments and whether they have a way of backing down [from proposals]. I think that academics should remain loyal to truth and express their research outcomes in full; only then can official decision-making avoid being particularly confused with respect to logic and pace. Otherwise, reform cannot be successful. Of course, I personally believe that there should be a division of labor among scholars. I’m often criticized for being too idealistic and too much of a purist. Some say I should make some compromises and concessions and that one can only map out the path of reform in accordance with national circumstances. But I think that reform is about changing the national circumstances. Sometimes I think I have to express myself; if I can’t express myself, I’d rather not say anything at all.
    CBV: In today’s discourse, on a certain level the opposite of reform has become a return to the “Cultural Revolution.” But it seems that contemporary intellectuals are also clearly divided and opposed on this question.
    He: I can never understand why some intellectuals who themselves experienced the great calamity of the “Cultural Revolution” would say that we have to “see both good and bad” in the “Cultural Revolution.” And these people are very influential among university students. I think that perhaps you can find some kind of explanation if you analyze their psychology. For example, some of those who still sing the praises of the “Cultural Revolution” might be detached, like some overseas scholars. Or take Li Ao, who is very critical of the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek because of the suffering he experienced but who has no painful experience of the “Cultural Revolution.” Perhaps there’s a difference between those who have personally experienced suffering and those who have not. It is even more impressive when a person who has not personally experienced suffering can understand that suffering and produce a good theoretical analysis of it. We say that the tragedy of the “Cultural Revolution” could reappear because we have never allowed younger citizens to see the truth about the “Cultural Revolution.” The Cultural Revolution museum that Ba Jin called for has still never been built. I feel we ought to reflect honestly on history and use tangible objects to tell each generation of citizens that our nation once experienced a decade of insanity. For example, Germans place extraordinary emphasis on reflecting on the Nazis. In the prime area next to the Brandenburg Gate there is there is actually a large spot devoted to a memorial for the Jews. People say now that “praising the Cultural Revolution” is free expression, but this is something that perplexes me a bit. It’s like the way that praise for the Nazis does not fall under the scope of free expression in Germany.
    CBV: Intellectuals are a knowledge repository for society and continued speech is beneficial toward leading society in the correct direction. Can today’s intellectuals ever develop a group voice?
    He: People who study the humanities and social sciences rarely ever join together, and it’s the characteristics of their profession that make them unwilling to join together. This is related to the special characteristics of the profession of intellectuals and scholars. Of course, intellectuals may to some degree discover the existence of certain [common] interests or enemies. For example, during the height of McCarthyism, American intellectuals sensed that this was a great threat to society and they joined together at the time to oppose it so that the height of McCarthyism did not last long. At the same time, this kind of opposition led intellectuals to feel that they were a unit or a group, but in reality it is difficult for intellectuals to exist as a “group.” It’s best when they debate each other, when there is free expression, and when everyone is trying to influence society and society makes certain choices.

    Related links:

  • He Weifang: Legal Reform, Resolve, and Lawyers (Part II of III)

    Professor He Weifang. Photo credit:
    China Business View
    There is perhaps no better example of a public intellectual in China than He Weifang (贺卫方), professor of law at Peking University Law School and avid promoter of legal reform and judicial independence. In part two of a three-part translation of an interview He gave Xi’an newspaper China Business View, he discusses the need for resolve in the pursuit of legal reform. Click here to read part one of the translation on legal reform and judicial professionalization.

    *
    Reform Itself Changes National Circumstances [Excerpt]
    China Business View, May 19, 2012
    Interview with He Weifang

    Steely Resolve Needed to Push Forward Reforms

    CBV: There are many differences of opinion within academia about legal reform. Some scholars hope to find a safer path.

    He: I always feel that sometimes you need to have a kind of steely resolve in order to push forward reforms. That is to say, when you push for reform in the correct direction, sometimes things might actually get worse for a while, rather than reform fixing everything all at once. So, you need to have a certain degree of patience with respect to reform. But these days there are many people without enough patience, people who think that they need to compromise and consider the degree to which [reform ideas] are acceptable to powerful departments and whether they have a way of backing down [from proposals]. I think that academics should remain loyal to truth and express their research outcomes in full; only then can official decision-making avoid being particularly confused with respect to logic and pace. Otherwise, reform cannot be successful. Of course, I personally believe that there should be a division of labor among scholars. I’m often criticized for being too idealistic and too much of a purist. Some say I should make some compromises and concessions and that one can only map out the path of reform in accordance with national circumstances. But I think that reform is about changing the national circumstances. Sometimes I think I have to express myself; if I can’t express myself, I’d rather not say anything at all.

    CBV: In today’s discourse, on a certain level the opposite of reform has become a return to the “Cultural Revolution.” But it seems that contemporary intellectuals are also clearly divided and opposed on this question.

    He: I can never understand why some intellectuals who themselves experienced the great calamity of the “Cultural Revolution” would say that we have to “see both good and bad” in the “Cultural Revolution.” And these people are very influential among university students. I think that perhaps you can find some kind of explanation if you analyze their psychology. For example, some of those who still sing the praises of the “Cultural Revolution” might be detached, like some overseas scholars. Or take Li Ao, who is very critical of the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek because of the suffering he experienced but who has no painful experience of the “Cultural Revolution.” Perhaps there’s a difference between those who have personally experienced suffering and those who have not. It is even more impressive when a person who has not personally experienced suffering can understand that suffering and produce a good theoretical analysis of it. We say that the tragedy of the “Cultural Revolution” could reappear because we have never allowed younger citizens to see the truth about the “Cultural Revolution.” The Cultural Revolution museum that Ba Jin called for has still never been built. I feel we ought to reflect honestly on history and use tangible objects to tell each generation of citizens that our nation once experienced a decade of insanity. For example, Germans place extraordinary emphasis on reflecting on the Nazis. In the prime area next to the Brandenburg Gate there is there is actually a large spot devoted to a memorial for the Jews. People say now that “praising the Cultural Revolution” is free expression, but this is something that perplexes me a bit. It’s like the way that praise for the Nazis does not fall under the scope of free expression in Germany.

    CBV: Intellectuals are a knowledge repository for society and continued speech is beneficial toward leading society in the correct direction. Can today’s intellectuals ever develop a group voice?

    He: People who study the humanities and social sciences rarely ever join together, and it’s the characteristics of their profession that make them unwilling to join together. This is related to the special characteristics of the profession of intellectuals and scholars. Of course, intellectuals may to some degree discover the existence of certain [common] interests or enemies. For example, during the height of McCarthyism, American intellectuals sensed that this was a great threat to society and they joined together at the time to oppose it so that the height of McCarthyism did not last long. At the same time, this kind of opposition led intellectuals to feel that they were a unit or a group, but in reality it is difficult for intellectuals to exist as a “group.” It’s best when they debate each other, when there is free expression, and when everyone is trying to influence society and society makes certain choices.

    Related links:

  • He Weifang: Legal Reform, Resolve, and Lawyers (Part I of III)

    Renowned legal scholar and Peking University Professor He Weifang discussing
    legal reforms. Photo credit: China Business View
    There is perhaps no better example of a public intellectual in China than He Weifang (贺卫方), professor of law at Peking University Law School and avid promoter of legal reform and judicial independence. Since 1998, when Southern Weekly published his article entitled “Ex-Servicemen Enter the Court,” He has been well-known for his insightful combination of legal analysis and criticism of contemporary social and political issues. Unabashedly liberal, his positions on legal reform have been under attack in recent years from those who believe that China should forsake foreign models of legal development and pursue its own path toward rule of law that considers “national circumstances.” In a recent interview with Xi’an newspaper China Business View, He responds by stating that reform is about changing national circumstances. In part one of a three-part translation of this interview, He discusses the importance of pursuing legal reform as a proxy for political reform and urges a return to professionalization within the legal system.
    *
    Reform Itself Changes National Circumstances [Excerpt]
    China Business View, May 19, 2012
    Interview with He Weifang
    Multilateral Consensus on Reform Clearest in 1980s
    China Business View (CBV): People conventionally treat 1978 as a turning point in China’s rule of law. How do you evaluate the past 30-plus years of China’s rule-of-law construction?
    He Weifang: In the exactly 30 years from 1949 until 1979, this country produced only a constitution and a Marriage Law. After 1979, we began to enact a series of laws. This period of legal-system construction is inextricably linked to the “bitterness of lawlessness” that national leaders like Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen experienced during the “Cultural Revolution.” You can say that during the reforms of the 1980s the consensus formed at all levels [of society] was clearest because everyone at the time felt that the “Cultural Revolution” needed to be left behind. So, in 1979 we enacted a Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, in 1987 we had the General Principles of Civil Law, and in 1989 we had the Administrative Litigation Law. These were all terrific milestones. By the early 1990s, we had a few years of initial hesitation, but after Deng Xiaoping’s speeches during his 1992 Southern Tour, it was made clear that [China] would follow the path of socialist market economy. And in order to build a market economy, executive power needed to withdraw from the market, and another kind of power was needed in order to adapt to the current situation and that was judicial power. And so, at that time there was a resounding slogan: “The market economy is a rule-of-law economy.” However, over time, [the system of] norms became more and more complete but enforcement was very disappointing. If you look for the reason, you’ll find that we once believed that enacting a law was enough to guarantee its implementation, but it actually is not the case. This is a situation of concern to the present day.
    CBV: What’s the solution? What needs to be done to establish a rule-of-law society?
    He: Everyone came to recognize that the problem of building a rule-of-law society cannot be solved without good legal institutions, so we began legal reforms. During that period, I personally threw myself into study of contemporary legal systems and promotion of reforms. Suddenly, 20 years has gone by. When I look back, legal reform was extremely active during the first decade and there was a relatively clear consensus about values: namely, that it was necessary to raise the quality of legal personnel, to raise consciousness of procedure, to reform litigation models in order to have fairer dispute resolutions, and that the law should not be applied within a black box. At that time, the Supreme People’s Court also called for judicial decisions to explain their reasoning. During this process, the academic community commonly believed that legal reform might be a good angle [from which to pursue] reform of the political system.
    CBV: Reform must involve top-level design. Why did you think that reform of the legal system would be easier?
    He: I once wrote an article arguing that legal reform was potentially a way of achieving benefits at very little cost. For example, by raising the quality of judges, reforming the financial and personnel systems [of the courts], and separating judicial and executive [powers], it would ultimately [serve] to continuously improve judicial authority and continuously increase the level of fairness. In this way, through the resolution of judicial problems, we could ultimately realize reform of the political system. Actually, as I see it, politics is nothing more than a problem of the arrangement of authority and rights. Politics is [a question of] what kind of power we obey and what kind of power can shape stronger social relations. If people increasingly feel that you need to rely on true administration of justice, that other power is not important as long as there are fair courts, and that you go to court when you have a dispute, then that would be following a very good path. But looking at this now, that path is becoming narrower and narrower.
    CBV: What’s the Problem?
    He: Unless we resolve the basic problem of judicial independence, then it will be impossible to improve judicial fairness. On the other hand: the legal system itself wants to solve the problem of fairness, but this internal force cannot overcome external interference. So, at that time ordinary people were seriously “deceived” by legal scholars. Readers welcomed media reports on major cases and analysis of cases, but the overall level of fairness in society has not improved and public trust in the legal system has not increased. So, the public felt a bit tricked, and in legal circles there were those who began to feel the need to go back and resort to the rule of man—like we needed a good leader with abundant kindness and insight and far-reaching power.
    Just like that, the status of law began to decline and legal reform continually ran into obstacles. On the one hand, the initiative for reform by institutions of power grew weaker. In some places, one felt that there were indications that [these institutions] wanted to get rid of the system of checks and balances between public security, procuratorates, and courts and use the kind of non-adjudicative model of “establishing special case units”—and all of this was practically being done out in the open. We truly need to reflect on which direction society needs to go. In the course of reflecting on this, we naturally need to consider the direction of rule-of-law construction and legal reform, both of which are components of political reform.

    Judges Should Only Express Themselves to Society Through Judgments

    …

    CBV: Everyone knows you’re a firm supporter of judicial professionalization and advocate for judicial meritocracy. How do you think professionalization of the judicial system can be realized?
    He: So-called judicial professionalism, or professionalization, should be realized in several respects. For example, we should really treat judicial power as a special kind of power, one different from executive or legislative power. First of all, those who exercise this power should possess good specialized training and excellent abilities in legal thinking and analysis, as well as an ability to use the law to respond to society’s needs. Second, we should make efforts to have judicial power be able to operate independently. This not only means that courts should be independent from external interference, but also that there should be internal regulations to ensure the independence of each judge. That’s the time to look at the way that power operates inside courts and how the power framework ought to be designed.
    CBV: How do you think we should understand the role of judges? In the real world, judges have many complaints about their own role, and there is widespread public dissatisfaction with judges.
    He: It’s particularly important [to figure out] how to prevent officials from interfering in the exercise of power by ordinary judges within courts. Reform must bring about a better unity between court power and responsibilities. Judges deciding a case cannot be allowed to say: “Actually, it wasn’t I who decided this case. Even though my name’s [on the decision], it really doesn’t have much to do with me.” There are currently too many cases like this, where those who try the case don’t make the decisions and those who make the decisions don’t try the case. Authority must be attributed more clearly. Only if we do this can we pursue judicial responsibility. Next, we need to construct ways to professionalize how court power is exercised. When judges sit in judgment of a case, the result must be based on evidence and theoretical argumentation. That is, a suit must be about the evidence and about [legal] theory. Only through this kind of outcome where the facts naturally become clear can we minimize to the greatest extent the possibility of judicial decisions being criticized. Even parties who lose their cases will accept the decisions because they’ll believe [they lost] because their evidence wasn’t strong enough. Moreover, this kind of professionalism also must be expressed through independent decision-making in the relationship between higher and lower courts. If higher courts participate in specific adjudication work of lower courts, then the appellate system is useless.

    …

    CBV: The public worries that if judges are independent in the current environment they will make even more trouble.
    He: Of course we all worry about the problem of judges’ professional ethics. What sort of person or behavior can pass [for a] judge? In a rule-of-law country, one with rigorous judicial professionalism, professional ethics demand that judges cannot interact unilaterally with one party in a case, even if it doesn’t involve economic bribery. These days we have judges who like to go to the media and speak freely about why they decided a case in a certain way. This is extremely out of line with judges’ professional ethics because anything that judges have to say to society should be said through their decisions; aside from this, they should not use the mass media to comment on cases. If this would gradually become the standard, this would also be a direction for judicial professionalism. In some western countries, there are thick books on judges’ professional ethics that tell you very clearly how power should be exercised. If we could truly achieve independent adjudication of cases and the name of the judge on the decision were the same person who made the actual decisions about the case, that would mean that there would be no way for judges of record to evade responsibility when miscarriages of justice were discovered—their names would forever be linked to that miscarriage of justice and the [associated] shame. “The wild goose leaves behind its cry, while a man leaves behind his name.” What judge would want to leave behind such a bad reputation?
    CBV: But, in order to prevent miscarriages of justice and wrongly decided cases, some local courts have put forth a system of lifetime responsibility for judges, something that seems to have gotten a favorable response from a segment of the public. What’s your opinion?
    He: I am firmly opposed to these so-called “reforms” that masquerade as professionalization. I wrote an article entitled “Legal Reform Must Proceed According to Legal Principle.” It seems that over the past eight or nine years we’ve seen a number of anti-professional “legal reforms,” and the more they tinker, the more varieties there are. When the public hears about this lifetime responsibility system for judges, they think it’s great. But they don’t realize that under the backdrop of the current [system], the more vigorously you pursue [responsibility], the more people form a conspiracy of silence and mistakes don’t get remedied. In the end, the victim is still the public.

    Related Links

    • He Weifang: Legal Reform, Resolve, and Lawyers Part II of III
    • He Weifang: Legal Reform, Resolve, and Lawyers Part III of III
  • Premier’s Support for Rule of Law Prompts Candid Critique

    December 4 is “National Legal Publicity Day” in China, an occasion for the Chinese government—especially those within the country’s legal system—to promote China’s successes in law enforcement and the administration of justice.This year the Legal Daily, a newspaper published by the Ministry of Justice, gave a prominent position on its front page to a talk given by Premier Wen Jiabao in May 2008 at China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL), one of the nation’s premier law schools and an elite breeding ground for both law enforcement officials and legal practitioners. In his discussion with students, Wen gave strong backing to the promotion of rule of law in China, acknowledging that China faced big challenges in terms of enforcing existing laws and ensuring that justice is “not only done, but also seen to be done.”

    While there’s nothing surprising about the publication of a senior leader’s views in a central government newspaper, publishing those views for the first time more than 18 months after being first articulated is rather unusual. This curious situation is alluded to in an editorial (translated below) published in the December 8 edition of Southern Daily (南方日报), the official newspaper of the Guangdong Province Branch of the Chinese Communist Party and part of a family of publications known for in-depth reporting and outspoken views.

    The editorial, which was widely republished on official media websites throughout China, focuses on Wen’s explication of one of the mottoes of CUPL, “Governing by law” (法治天下), which he equates with the idea of “supremacy of the law” (法比天大)—literally, “the law is greater than heaven.” Bluntly acknowledging that abuses of power by officials have hindered the development of faith in China’s legal system, the editorial urges readers to reflect on this failure and stresses the importance of enforcement, transparency, and participation as keys to building a society under rule of law.

    “Supremacy of the Law”: The Essence of Society Under Rule of Law
    Southern Daily editorialist, December 8, 2009

    Legal Daily recently featured the full transcript of a talk that Premier Wen Jiabao gave on May 4, 2008, to students at China University of Political Science and Law. Premier Wen said, “The importance of the law can simply not be overemphasized,” “ ‘Governing by law’ means ‘the law is supreme’” and “The difficulty of ruling lies not in making laws, but in making others follow the law. It is better to have no laws than laws that are not followed.”

    It is unclear why, after a year and a half, Legal Daily was so late to publish the transcript of Premier Wen’s talk. Perhaps it is simply to re-emphasize the importance of the law. [As for] the law being “greater than heaven,” first one must be clear about what is meant by “heaven.” To some people, especially officials, “heaven” seems to be authority, either those people who allow them to have power or the myriad advantages that power brings. Within the jurisdictions of some people [whose ethos is] “I am number one” and “I am the law,” neither the law nor heaven is of any use; only they themselves are effective.

    The more common this phenomenon, the more inevitably it causes people to develop many doubts about rule of law. If ordinary people have problems, the first thing they think of is not taking the matter to court, but rather going to Beijing to petition. The dramatic increase in the number of petitioners in recent years is not just a result of economic development bringing about more social conflict; we also need to look at the problem of insufficient development of rule of law. Over the years, more and more laws have been established, but what truly defines a society under rule of law is not how many laws there are but, rather, whether people act in accordance with legal norms, whether those with power respect the law, and whether the law rules supreme over authority. Unfortunately, the administration of justice continues to encounter pressure from all sorts of public power, as evidenced by the fact that lawsuits against the government rarely succeed, [because] judges sometimes do not decide cases on the basis of the law, but on the basis of official instructions. After years of this, why should ordinary people have faith in the law? Why shouldn’t officials see the legal system as their plaything? We often say that the administration of justice is the baseline for fairness, but then why are there judgments that pervert the law and interference in the administration of justice? Doesn’t this show that society still suffers from the stubborn disease of authority being above the law?

    Such stubborn diseases must be eliminated, even if it means paying a high price. For if authority being above the law is allowed to spread further, [the idea of] “society under rule of law” will be reduced to nothing but a tattered fig leaf, and the resulting weakening of social restraint will be a cost far greater than that which accompanies curing a stubborn disease. In fact, “supremacy of the law” is only the essence of a society under rule of law, something that could not be more a matter of common sense. That it sounds so enlightening when uttered by the premier just shows how lacking we are in common sense. We should reflect on why a truly common faith in the law has not yet been established. Why is the administration of justice faced with all sorts of constraints? Why is the legal system itself designed in ways that do not fully adhere to legal common sense? In analyzing this question, we cannot simply look at external factors but must examine internal ones as well. More effective construction of rule of law, opening up the legislative process and oversight of the law, and promoting a democratic judicial system—all of these would be welcome measures.

    The “supremacy of the law” of which Premier Wen spoke is one founded on the premise of a rule of law. Some intentionally twist the phrase to mean that the law is so supreme that it does not have to consider or care about anything else. This is clearly an unreliable interpretation. Premier Wen’s “supremacy of the law” is one in which laws must be observed, one in which there is respect for the law—and especially respect for good laws. This does not mean that all laws are legitimate and constitutional: the former system of “custody and repatriation” is a classic example of a bad law. In addition, recent years have witnessed the phenomenon of “departmental legislative guidance” in the legislative process, something that needs to be guarded against. Government ministries, commissions, and departments that are prevented from participating in the drafting of legislation concerning them have not only insisted on participating but have even played a leading role in guiding the legislative process, with the result that too many departmental interests are manifested in the laws themselves, to the detriment of the public interest. These kinds of laws are the result of a closed-door legislative process, one that ultimately leads to social injustice and hinders the establishment of judicial authority.

    “Supremacy of the law” tells us that we must establish faith in the administration of justice in all sectors of society. In order to establish such faith and give the justice system the authority to oversee all matters, we must further reform the external and internal environment for the legal system, curb inappropriate interference in the administration of justice, and promote a democratic judicial process.

  • Commentary & Translations: “Online Post Case” Stirs Outrage in China Over Government Crackdown on Free Expression, Weak Rule of Law

    A recent incident in China—with a defamation charge levied against Wang Shuai of Lingbao City, Henan, who satirically criticized his local government in an online post—has provoked heated public discourse around the country. In his post, the 24-year-old Wang suggested that Lingbao officials were misappropriating funds while supporting policies to increase drought to cut land values, which would then allow the government to offer less compensation for requisitioned farmland. Arrested for libel due to his comments but later released when the charge was dropped, Wang posted his remarks only after provincial authorities did not respond to his petition requesting them to investigate land deals in Lingbao.Wang was taken into custody on March 6 in Shanghai, 1,200 kilometers from Lingbao, by police from his hometown. He was detained in Shanghai for three days and then brought back to Lingbao, where he was held for five more days before finally being released on bail after he signed a written confession. On April 8, the China Youth Daily reported on Wang’s case, setting off public outrage in China, with both common citizens and legal scholars expressing sympathy for Wang while vilifying the Lingbao City government. Moved to action by this show of support, provincial officials in Henan took some measures; they issued a public apology, suspended four police officers, and compensated Wang a total of 783.93 yuan (approximately US$115) for his eight days of incarceration. They also ordered an investigation into Wang’s original allegations that led to various punishments for local officials.

    Even though the libel charge against Wang was dropped and some efforts were made to “redress” the situation, the furor that erupted over his case and its aftermath shows Chinese citizens’ concern over the excessive power wielded by local governments, which are often believed to be out to protect themselves instead of lawfully defending the public interest. The case also exposes the potential hazards of open expression over the Internet for the increasing numbers of Chinese who view online communication as an effective method for sharing opinions about the world around them—even on subjects as sensitive as alleged wrongdoing by government officials.

    Translated by Dui Hua, the two commentaries below by Chinese scholars—about pervasive problems of rule of law and the limits of free expression exposed by Wang Shuai’s case and other libel cases—have recently appeared in the official Chinese press. The first article, ‘“Lingbao post case”: Who should apologize more?,” was written by Dr. Yu Jianrong, a prominent scholar with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The piece (original Chinese text) critiques the issue of legal responsibility in such cases and emphasizes the importance of being persistent in taking on local government corruption.

    The second translation is of an article (original Chinese text) just published on April 30, “The Winner in the ‘Wang Shuai Post Case’ is ‘Power,’ not ‘the Law,’” by Sheng Dalin, a well-known lawyer, media critic, and writer. In his commentary, Sheng decries that even the “resolution” of the case was orchestrated by the main local power brokers—the Lingbao Party Committee and city government—and, as such, an appropriate procedure that recognizes tenets of law was not followed.

    “Lingbao post case”: Who should apologize more?
    Yu Jianrong
    April 17, 2009

    Yesterday, Qin Yuhai, Henan vice governor and chief of the provincial public security department, visited with the People’s Daily website to discuss the incident of the “cross-provincial arrest in Lingbao, Henan, of Wang Shuai, the online poster.” He indicated that local public security organs had made mistakes in enforcing the law, that Wang Shuai’s case did not conform to conditions of the crime of defamation, and that [Wang] had already received state compensation. Qin Yuhai also apologized for the incident and said the Henan Province Public Security Department had sent a team to Lingbao to conduct an investigation (April 16 People’s Daily website). On April 10, when Wang Shuai and I agreed to be interviewed together by the People’s Daily website, I was still concerned about whether he would be arrested and taken into custody again. Now, with Qin Yuhai having taken this position, we can rest assured, but the matter cannot end here.

    Although Qin Yuhai also serves as vice governor of Henan Province, his statement mainly is made from the perspective of the public security system, and criticism is being directed at the problem of arbitrary law enforcement by public security departments. But there has yet been no clear answer regarding whether the Lingbao public security departments got involved in the case because of pressure or direct instructions from the local government.

    A public security organ should carry out the sacred duties as major enforcers of the nation’s laws and the protectors of society, work in accordance with the law, and place the interests of the masses first. But it also is a government department, [and] its personnel matters, finances, and operations must be subject to the jurisdiction of government at the same level. So it is inevitable at times that a number of local political interests creep in. Police power is often abused not by local police themselves, but by those who use their authority to employ police power. In dealing with thorny issues such as land requisition, some local governments force police to overstep their authority.

    The “Pengshui poem case” in Chongqing, the “Jishan document case” in Shanxi, the “Zhidan SMS case” in Shaanxi, and the “Gaotang Internet case” in Shandong—a lot of behavior clearly falling within the scope of freedom of speech has been pinned with the label of “defamation,” and public power has been employed abusively in carrying out interrogation, arrest, and prosecution, all for “causing a [negative] impact on local economic development” or “damaging the local image.” It’s clearly unimaginable that all of this can take place without specific power-holders in the background deliberately “governing illegally and abusing office,” “suppressing criticism and controlling public opinion,” or “perverting the law to suit one’s own selfish needs.” In Wang Shuai’s case, the public has reason to question the role the Lingbao City government played and whether or not there was abuse of police power, and [the public] even hopes to see someone held responsible for the incident. Besides the apology by Qin Yuhai, an even more standard way of doing things for a society with rule of law would be for the Lingbao City government or a higher-level government to officially publicize the details of Wang Shuai’s case, including the entire process of its occurrence up to the recognition that the case was faulty, the specific staff who must take responsibility, and the handling of decisions by relevant departments and staff. [These actions] will make the conduct of those in power more open and transparent.

    The Wang Shuai “defamation case” simply should never have happened, and withdrawing the faulty case now only solves a derivative problem. The incident emerged as a response to unlawful land use by the Lingbao City government, and this is where [our] attention should return. Since Wang Shuai did not commit libel, the Lingbao City government should provide a clear response to Wang Shuai and the public regarding the issue of illegal land requisition that he raised. If the public has misunderstandings because of Wang Shuai’s post and if the Lingbao City government thinks the image of the local government has been tarnished, then the government is obliged to clarify the actual situation, respond to the suspicions of netizens, and dispel their doubts. Without effective communication, the masses who don’t know the truth will never understand [the situation]. If the issues in Wang Shuai’s case are valid (on April 16, the China Youth Daily reported the requisition of over 27 square kilometers [of land]), the Lingbao City government should not conceal this, but instead acknowledge the problem, take responsibility, and seek an effective solution. Whether through restoration of farmland, remedial measures, or pursuit of greater land compensation, [the government] needs to provide a clear response to those affected and to members of society who care about this issue.

    After attracting so much attention, if this matter simply went away without being resolved, it would actually do great damage to the image of the local government. It would seem to send the message that whatever local governments want to do—legal or not and regardless of whether a citizen who voices criticism is sent to prison or if farmers are pushed off their land at a low price [in compensation]—can be achieved through a variety of methods. Even if [such actions] bring about serious consequences, the government also can pass the buck for various reasons, with its own illegal acts falling outside the bounds of the law.

    *
    The Winner in the “Wang Shuai Post Case” is “Power,” not “the Law”
    Sheng Dalin
    April 30, 2009

    According to an April 29 report in The Beijing News, the Sanmenxia Party Committee and city government held a meeting to “seriously punish” the illegal occupation of land in Lingbao City that had been exposed in the “Wang Shuai post case.” The Lingbao City Party Committee and city government were ordered to carry out a thorough investigation for the Sanmenxia Party Committee and city governmnent, and Lingbao City Party Secretary Lü Junping and Mayor Qiao Changqing were ordered to carry out a thorough investigation for the Sanmenxia Party Committee and city government. It was decided to punish those officials who were found to be responsible.

    So now, the “Wang Shuai post case” that has made such a stir throughout the nation can be said to have come to a close. No doubt many citizens who offered encouragement and support to Wang Shuai will be very happy with this result, but I can’t help but feel that the conclusion is less than perfect.

    The final outcome of the “Wang Shuai post case” is certainly just as we had hoped. But did we only want to see the outcome? No—outcomes are important, but the process is important, too. We wanted to see substantive justice done, but we also wanted to see procedural justice as well. However, looking back at the entire course of the “Wang Shuai post case,” we must admit that the course of action taken was not the ideal choice.

    Actually, there are many paths that could have been taken to achieve a just outcome. For example, the public security bureau could have strictly handled the case in accordance with the law and refused to file the case for investigation or withdrawn the case in accordance with the law after public opinion pointed out that the charge of “defamation” was completely untenable. But it did neither of these. After the storm of public opinion, not only did Lingbao City have no intention of rectifying the case, it actually fought back hard against public opinion. Only intervention by the Henan Province Public Security Department and Vice Governor and Public Security Department Chief Qin Yuhai’s public admission that “defamation is untenable” was there a sudden shift in their course.

    It’s a clear fact that, from start to finish, the main actor in handling this case, the Lingbao City Public Security Bureau, was secondary to the Lingbao City Party Committee and city government, which was in the driver’s seat. It was the party committee and government that made public statements, and it was always the publicity department of the city party committee, speaking on behalf of the city party committee and government, that gave media interviews. Obviously, the “filing” in this case was a result of the intervention of power and its “withdrawal” was a result of the intervention of power as well. From the beginning, what the city public security bureau was enforcing was not the “law,” but rather “orders” from superiors. Even though the oversight of public opinion played an important role, what ultimately brought about a reversal in these events was power. In other words, the winner in the “Wang Shuai post case” was “power,” not “the law.”

    This is not an isolated situation. From the “Pengshui poem case” to the “Jishan document case,” in recent years there have been several “defamation” cases that were nothing more than the result of “power overshadowing the law.” In the Wu Baoquan case in Hohhot [sic, should be Ordos], Inner Mongolia, there have even been a few judges and prosecutors handling the case who have openly expressed their frustration at being unable to handle the case in accordance with the law.

    “Supremacy of the law” is the first tenet of the rule of law. “Power overshadows the law” is a vestige of the rule of man. Even though the “Wang Shuai post case” was recently overturned and the responsible people concerned have received “serious punishments,” not a single hair has been harmed on the “chief culprit” in this case and others like it—namely, the idea that “power overshadows the law.” Unless we eradicate this “chief culprit,” individual rights such as freedom of speech can never be protected and cases involving the punishment of free speech will never cease.