Tag: rule of law

  • Politico-Legal Committee Issues Rules to Prevent Injustice

    Four well-known miscarriages of justice befell (from left) Zhao Yanjin (in prison nearly a decade), Nie Shubin (executed, 1995), She Xianglin (in prison 11 years), Hugejiletu (executed, 1996). Photo credits: Sanlian Life Weekly, xinhuanet.com, sohu.com

    A series of high-profile cases involving wrongful conviction and other miscarriages of justice has increasingly forced China’s top law-enforcement officials to address this troubling issue head-on. In March, the president of Zhejiang’s High People’s Court placed much of the blame for wrongful convictions on the extraction of confessions through torture. President Xi Jinping has spoken prominently about the need for “the popular masses to feel fairness and justice in every judicial case,” and new Supreme People’s Court President Zhou Qiang has called on lawyers and scholars to help reform the criminal justice system.

    Then, in mid-August, the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Politico-Legal Commission (CPLC) issued a set of 15 provisions aimed at systemic changes that could help prevent future injustice. Met with considerable fanfare by Chinese media, the provisions included a call to establish a new responsibility system in which judges, prosecutors, and police would be held accountable for life for negligent or wrongful acts that result in wrongful conviction.

    Over the past two months, judicial and law-enforcement bodies throughout China have been studying the CPLC pronouncements. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate has already issued provisions for implementation. Despite all the attention, copies of the provisions have not been widely circulated. In fact, Dui Hua has only been able to find one copy online (translated below) as circulated by a local party branch politico-legal committee in Jining, Shandong Province.

    On one level, much of the CPLC guidelines reiterate provisions and principles that are already part of China’s Criminal Procedure Law and related regulations. The emphasis on fully recording interrogations and excluding illegally obtained evidence reflect the growing recognition of the need to protect the rights of criminal suspects and defendants, but implementation of these important protections has yet to become routine. Likewise, the CPLC provisions emphasize the importance of keeping channels of communication open within the criminal process and acting on information in a timely manner, whether it be the opinions of defense lawyers or allegations of wrongdoing made by convicted persons.

    Besides the proposed responsibility system, another theme of note in the CPLC provisions is the need to insulate the judicial process from external interference. Public opinion, petitioning, and “stability preservation” are all cited as sources of external pressure that should not be allowed to influence decisions made during the criminal process. By the same token, the guidelines also point to the possibility of less interference by local party and government officials by limiting the scope of politico-legal committees’ guiding opinions and efforts to “coordinate” opinions between law-enforcement bodies when there are disagreements about how a case ought to be handled.

    There is much in these guidelines that sounds positive from the perspective of promoting procedural fairness and rule of law in China. The ultimate impact of these pronouncements, however, is likely to depend on how much weight they are given vis-a-vis other, well-established imperatives to pursue stability in the interest of the overall socio-political order, for it is the perception that these interests can trump the law and political and civil rights that contributes most to miscarriages of justice in China.

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    Provisions on Earnest Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice

    In order to give thorough implementation to the spirit of the important written instructions given by General Secretary Xi Jinping and Comrades Meng Jianzhu and Guo Shengkun, fully realize the spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Politico-Legal Commission, punish crime in accordance with the law, respect and safeguard human rights, increase the credibility of the judicial system, and uphold social fairness and justice, we hereby enact the following provisions on the subject of strict adherence to legal procedure and holding firm to the bottom line on prevention of miscarriages of justice.

    1. Except in emergencies when it is necessary to conduct on-the-spot questioning, questioning of criminal suspects or defendants ought to be carried out in case-handling locations provided for [by law and regulation]. After a criminal suspect has been transferred to a detention center for custody, questioning shall be carried out in the detention center interrogation room with simultaneous audio- or video recording of the entire process. The investigating organ may not use reasons such as recovering stolen goods or [conducting an] identification [procedure] to remove suspects from the detention center in order to conduct questioning outside the facility.
    2. When the investigating organ transfers a case [to prosecutors], it ought to include all evidence of the guilt or innocence of the suspect or defendant as well as of the severity of the crime. It is strictly forbidden to withhold or fabricate evidence.
    3. When evidence that ought to be excluded is discovered during investigation, prosecutory review, or trial, it ought to be excluded in accordance with the law and may not serve as the basis for requesting arrest approval, approving or issuing an arrest decision, transferring the case for prosecutory review, making a decision to prosecute, or issuing a verdict. Suspect or defendant confessions obtained through torture or other illegal means, or witness testimony or victim statements obtained through violence, threats, or other illegal means may not be used as the basis for conviction.
    4. People’s procuratorates shall conduct oversight in accordance with the law as to whether investigation activities are lawful; provide opinions and recommendations as to the collection, securing, and perfection of evidence; and, when necessary, appoint procurators to take part in discussions with the investigating organs concerning major or serious cases and re-testing or re-examination of crime scenes or items, persons, or corpses associated with a crime.
    5. People’s procuratorate shall strictly ensure the standards for arrest review, prosecutory review, and prosecutory appeal. In cases that do not meet the statutory requirements for arrest or prosecution, it shall withhold arrest approval or issue a decision not to prosecute in accordance with the law. Appeal shall be made in accordance with the law in cases that meet the conditions for prosecutory appeal, especially when the innocent are found guilty, the guilty are found innocent, or the sentence is either unusually light or unusually heavy.
    6. Firmly adhere to the principle of judgment on the basis of evidence. When a witness who ought to appear in court in accordance with the law refuses to appear or appears but refuses to testify without good reason and the court has no way to confirm the veracity of his or her testimony, the testimony of that witness may not be used as the basis for conviction. Any evidence that has not been presented, examined, and cross-examined in court and verified through these court investigation procedures may not be used as the basis for conviction.
    7. Strictly implement the legal standard of proof. When there is only a defendant’s confession and no other evidence, the defendant cannot be convicted or given criminal punishment. In cases where there is insufficient evidence to convict, the presumption of innocence shall be adhered to and the defendant pronounced innocent in accordance with the law, standards cannot be lowered to issue a verdict with a “margin of error.” When evidence to convict is truthful and sufficient but there are doubts concerning evidence with implications for sentencing, a sentence favoring the defendant shall be issued.
    8. When people’s courts, people’s procuratorates, or public security organs handle criminal cases, they must take facts as the basis and law as the criterion and cannot issue judgments or decisions that violate the provisions of the law due to pressure caused by public-opinion hype, disruptive petitioning by a parties to the case or their relatives, “case-solving deadlines,” or local “stability preservation.”
    9. Earnestly safeguard the rights of defense lawyers to meet [with clients], read case files, carry out investigations, and obtain evidence, and to raise questions, cross-examine evidence, and debate in court. During the phases of concluding the investigation, prosecutory review, and final review of death sentences, people’s courts, people’s procuratorates, and public security organs ought to hear defense lawyers’ opinions in accordance with the law. With respect to the defense arguments and evidentiary materials submitted in defense by defendants and their defense counsel, people’s courts ought to give them serious review and provide an explanation in the court decision as to why they were accepted or rejected.
    10. People’s procuratorates and people’s courts ought to conduct timely review in accordance with the law when receiving allegations or petitions that may truly involve miscarriage of justice. After review, if a criminal verdict or decision is found to be in error, prosecutory appeal or request for retrial shall be made in accordance with the law. People’s procuratorates shall immediately rectify mistaken decisions made in a criminal case by itself or by its subordinate procuratorates in accordance with statutory procedures.
    11. Prisons or other penalty-enforcement organs may not withhold petitions, allegations, or accusation materials made by offenders and ought to transmit them or request the relevant authority to handle them in a timely manner. The relevant authority ought to conduct a serious review and handle [the petition, allegation, or accusation] in a timely manner and notify the prison or other penalty-enforcement organ of its decision. When offenders make petitions or allegations, it shall not affect their eligibility for sentence reduction or parole.
    12. Establish a strong case-management responsibility system in which the collegiate bench as well as individual judges, procurators, and police officers are held equally accountable and judges, procurators, and police officers are held accountable for life for the quality of the way a case is handled insofar as the purview of their duties is concerned. Responsibility for unlawful acts related to the handling of cases by judges, procurators, and police officers shall be pursued in accordance with the relevant laws and provisions.
    13. Clarify the standards for [what constitutes] a miscarriage of justice as well as procedure for and agent who can initiate remedial action and establish a strong mechanism for pursuing responsibility in miscarriages of justice. Acts such as coercion of confession through torture, use of violence to obtain evidence, and withholding or fabricating evidence shall be severely punished in accordance with the law.
    14. Establish a strong, scientific, and rational system for case-management performance evaluation that adheres to judicial rules; do not one-sidedly pursue targets such as a case-solution rate, arrest rate, prosecution rate, or conviction rate.
    15. Party politico-legal committees at all levels ought to support the independent and fair exercise of judicial and procuratorial powers by the people’s courts and people’s procuratorates and support each politico-legal unit in carrying out its work in an independently responsible and coordinated manner in accordance with the constitution and laws. In cases where the facts are unclear or the evidence is insufficient, do not coordinate [opinions between law enforcement bodies]; when coordinating [opinions regarding] cases, generally refrain from making specific opinions regarding the determination or substantive handling of a case.
  • Government Notice Fuels Crackdown on Assembly as Subversion

    Xu Zhiyong (top) & Guo Feixiong are among the recent arrested for “disrupting social order”.
    Photo credit: VOAChinese.com

    Over the past several months, Chinese authorities have been cracking down on peaceful assembly and association. As of August 14, more than 50 individuals had been detained, arrested, or disappeared. Among the most prominent are Xu Zhiyong, chief proponent of the “New Citizens’ Movement” and co-founder of the Open Constitution Initiative—a legal aid and rights-protection organization shuttered under government pressure in 2009—and veteran rights activist Guo Feixiong. Both were detained on charges of “gathering a crowd to disrupt social order”; Xu on July 16 and Guo on August 8. Many of those detained were active in calling on Chinese government leaders to disclose their assets and make good on promises to combat official corruption.

    An internal notice issued by China’s Supreme People’s Procuratorate in June may be one impetus for this crackdown. The notice called on prosecutors (who also investigate corruption and approve arrests in criminal cases) to support the ongoing propaganda effort to “build a peaceful China” by paying special attention to certain types of criminal cases seen as particularly disruptive to political stability and social order. One thing this notice calls for is resoluteness in combatting criminal activity such as “illegal assembly and gathering a crowd to disrupt social order” where there is a “goal of subverting state power.” It is likely no coincidence, then, that the charges of illegal assembly and gathering a crowd to disrupt social order have been widely used against those detained in this latest crackdown.

    In the August 11 edition of Caijing magazine, constitutional law professor Zhang Qianfan published an essay expressing serious reservations about this notice and the latest campaign against assembly and association. In this essay (translated below), he argues that peaceful assembly should be seen as a form of speech and subject to the protections of China’s Constitution. Protecting citizens from punishment for peaceful assembly or legitimate criticism and exposure of government wrongdoing should be, he argues, a key component in pursuing the goal of social stability and security. Though he does not mention the recent detentions specifically, his linkage between clear channels for free public expression and the effectiveness of China’s fight against corruption makes it clear that he is not simply speaking in abstractions.

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    How to Build a Peaceful China

    Zhang Qianfan
    Caijing, August 11, 2013

    On June 20, 2013, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate issued a “Notice on Making Full Use of the Procuratorial Functions to Thoroughly Promote the Building of a Peaceful China” (hereafter the “Notice”). On the one hand, the Notice calls for severity in combatting especially major and serious criminal cases involving safety and accidents, such as those involving threats to food or pharmaceutical safety, public health, environmental pollution, damage to natural resources or fires, mining disasters, or serious traffic accidents. On the other hand, the Notice calls for severity in accordance with the law in combatting crimes that endanger state security, earnest support for political security, and resoluteness in combatting criminal activity such as illegal assembly and gathering a crowd to disrupt social order or a public place with the goal of subverting state power.

    The criminal activities in the first provision produce social harm and are related to public safety, so the procuratorates truly need to exercise their powers to approve arrest and prosecute in order to effectively combat them. As for the latter provision, activities that damage state security such as espionage, inciting defection, and disclosure of legitimately and lawfully classified state secrets truly need to be combatted in accordance with the law. But in order to be compatible with the constitutional goals of ruling the nation in accordance with the law and protection of human rights, there is a need for strict interpretation of broad concepts such as “subversion of state power,” “illegal assembly,” and “disturbing social order”; otherwise, if handled inappropriately, it will not only potentially infringe on citizens’ constitutional rights but may also run contrary to the idea of building a peaceful China.

    Part Two, Chapter One of the Criminal Law provides for “Crimes of Endangering State Security,” among which Article 105 punishes the acts of “organizing, plotting or carrying out” or “using rumor, slander or other means to incite the subversion of state power or overthrow of the socialist system.”

    According to the definition in Article 4 of the State Security Law, “endangering state security” is an offense based on actions. For example, in “plotting to subvert the government, split the nation, or overthrow the socialist system,” the words “subvert,” “split,” and “overthrow” are all action verbs. In other words, only actual illegal activity such as plotting an armed rebellion, engaging in espionage activity, or disclosing state secrets can possibly constitute actions that endanger state security. Of course, Article 105 of the Criminal Law broadens the crime to speech such as rumor or slander that “incites subversion of state power,” but this broadening must be treated with caution.

    In order to charge a particular mode of speech as constituting “inciting subversion of state power,” one must prove that the speech intended to subvert state power and also that it really had the potential to cause subversion of state power. This is because the object of Article 105 is not to restrict speech; rather, it is to prevent the act of subversion. If inciting speech is actually able to cause subversion, it ought to be forbidden in accordance with the law. But unlimited expansion makes it easy to exaggerate and prosecute and repress legitimate criticism of the government as criminal speech “inciting subversion of state power,” thereby trampling on citizens’ right to free speech and right to criticize and make recommendations as granted by Articles 35 and 41, respectively, of the Constitution.

    The reason why the Constitution protects citizens’ freedom of speech and especially provides citizens with the “right to criticize and make suggestions to any state organ or functionary,” the “right to make to relevant state organs complaints and charges against, or exposures of, violation of the law or dereliction of duty by any state organ or functionary,” and [states] “no one may suppress [such complaints, charges, and exposures] or retaliate [against the citizens making them]” is because freedom of speech is critical to maintaining the security and stability of the entire society.”

    It’s worth emphasizing that the “ordinary mechanism” for maintaining state security and social stability is not the frequent use of the Criminal Law to punish those citizens who dare to speak out; rather, it is actually in the protection of citizens’ freedom of speech. This point is especially important to a great nation. The main source of a variety of sources of instability in Chinese society at present is the uncontrolled abuse of state power. Up to this point, China’s main mechanism for checking official corruption is top-down organizational control. However, China is so large and has so many localities and complex administrative hierarchy that it is difficult for the central government to keep an eye on all the provincial and ministerial-level officials, difficult for provincial government to keep an eye on officials in each of its cities, counties, townships, and towns, and so on. Since top-down organizational oversight is of limited effectiveness and bottom-up democratic oversight is, for many reasons, unable to play a full role, corruption and abuse of power have become rampant.

    But with the rise of the Internet in recent years, the citizen voices have played an increasingly big role in oversight over the government, and much corrupt behavior has been exposed through channels like the Internet, providing an opening for the top-down legal- and disciplinary oversight.

    But without strict definition of the scope of the crime of “endangering state security,” the social consequences of inappropriate use of those laws may run counter to the intent of protecting state security. For example, if charges are cooked up to punish speech, then the channels for citizen expression and oversight by society will be blocked, corrupt officials will run wild until seething popular resentment shakes the central government, causing irreparable damage to society, more acute social unrest, and accumulated dangers.

    By the same logic, there should also be strict interpretation of the “Crimes of Disturbing Public Order” set out in Part Two, Chapter Six, Section One of the Criminal Law. Among these, Article 290 establishes the “crime of gathering a crowd to disturb social order.” So-called “gathering a crowd to disturb social order” means acts “to such a serious extent that work in general, production, business operation, teaching, or scientific research are unable to go on and heavy losses are caused.” From this, it is clear that if one only gathers a crowd but the extent is not serious and it does not lead to work, production, business operation, or teaching being “unable to go on” or “cause heavy losses,” then it is insufficient to constitute “disturbing social order” and the Criminal Law should not be applied as one pleases. If citizens gather together merely to articulate a particular demand and do not attack government offices, obstruct traffic, or negatively affect other people’s work or daily life in any other way, then they should be allowed to speak their minds.

    Related to this, Article 291 [sic, should be 296] of the Criminal Law provides for the “crime of illegal assembly,” to be used “where social order is seriously disrupted because an assembly, procession, or demonstration is held with no application made in accordance with the law or regulations, where no permission was granted for the application, or where it is held not in accordance with the time for start and stop, venue, and routes permitted by the competent authorities and the order of dismission is disobeyed.” On this point, “serious disruption of social order” should follow the understanding of “disrupting social order” given in the provision discussed above; namely, its key constitutive criteria should include “work in general, production, business operation, teaching, or scientific research are unable to go on and heavy losses are caused.” If it is merely an assembly without a permit but this does not cause any heavy losses, it cannot constitute “serious disruption of social order” and the crime of “illegal assembly” will also be untenable.

    It is especially necessary to point out that citizen assemblies are one form of expression protected under Article 35 of the current Constitution and do not fall under the scope of actions that the law may ordinarily restrict or punish; therefore, use of the Criminal Law to punish assembly ought to be done with the utmost caution. Under general circumstances, peaceful assembly is one manner of rational expression of citizen’s demands, especially small-scale assembly that cannot lead to any serious consequences on society. Therefore, these cannot constitute the key criterion of the crimes of “illegal assembly” or “gathering a crowd to disturb social order”—serious disruption of public order—and even less can they be considered acts of endangering state security such as “inciting subversion of state power.”

    At present, there is a common misperception that assembly is an “action” and thus substantially distinguishable from ordinary speech. [In this view,] once citizens assemble, it constitutes an “action” and the relevant authorities can use the Criminal Law to suppress it severely. This understanding does not comport with the provisions of Article 35 of the Constitution: “Citizens have the freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, procession, and demonstration.” Clearly, assembly, procession, and demonstration are listed alongside speech and publication, making them all “speech” or “expression” in the broader sense and enjoying the Constitution’s protection for freedom of speech in this broad sense. Of course, if during an assembly there are violent incidents like riots, arson, or attacks, this clearly enters the realm of action and the state has both the power and the obligation to prohibit these actions. But peaceful assembly is clearly speech, so even if the legal process is flawed the Criminal Law cannot be used to punish it.

    Article [296] of the Criminal Law requires assemblies to apply for permission in accordance with law and regulation and treats assembly without requesting or receiving permission to be “illegal assembly.” Applying for permission is indeed a statutory condition for lawful assembly, and just about all countries with rule of law make similar requirements.

    But it needs to be pointed out that the goal of this requirement is to ensure that citizen assembly is carried out peacefully and in an orderly manner so that it does not have a negative impact on others’ work, transportation, or rest, and is not a disguised way to deprive [citizens] of their freedom of assembly. Those who give permission may not refuse their approval because they do not agree with the views that those assembled want to express or out of some inexplicable fear of citizens gathering; otherwise, this is an abuse of the permit authority. This is why in countries with rule of law applications for permission to assemble are a formality, with those giving approval simply conducting a procedural review of the time, location, and manner of the assembly and not a substantive review of the content of the assembly. Any assembly without violent tendency will be approved, making assembly a common way in which citizens peacefully express their demands and gather popular support. One could even say that the more orderly a society, the more common citizen assembly is.

    It cannot be denied that the reason why the citizen “strolls” and other activities taking place in many parts of China today are treated as “illegal assembly” is to a great extent because local authorities view ordinary assembly as a plague and very rarely approve requests by citizens to assemble. They routinely refuse to approve assemblies on the grounds that they will “seriously disrupt social order,” without ever giving any specific explanation or reasoning—often without even any written decision. Even though under the provisions of the Law on Assembly, Procession, and Demonstration, failure to respond by the statutory deadline can be seen as approval, once citizens take to the streets, police are mobilized to counter the “illegal assembly.” Not only does this not serve to maintain true public order, it even artificially intensifies social contradictions.

    Clearly, Article [296] of the Criminal Law cannot be based simply on whether an assembly is “illegal” but must consider whether an assembly constitutes a “serious disruption to social order” and especially needs to review whether the relevant authorities exercised their power to approve the assembly in accordance with the law.

    In sum, enforcing the Criminal Law certainly is the mandate of the public security and procuratorial authorities, but this important mandate must be exercised appropriately. First, we must establish a professional habit of respect for the Constitution, because only the freedom of speech provided by Article 35 of the Constitution can serve as the main path toward true social peace.

    The Notice requires investigation and punishment in accordance with the law of the corruption behind especially major and serious criminal cases involving safety and accidents and the serious investigation of crimes of office such as corruption, bribery, and malfeasance. This is commendable, but the experience of past years has taught us that corruption and malfeasance cannot be fully investigated only by the procuratorate’s efforts. Especially in a broader context in which independent procuratorial authority does not enjoy full protection, exposure of the corruption and other crimes of many officials has relied on public whistleblowers. If the public’s channels of expression are blocked or the Criminal Law is used to punish the public-spirited, conscientious, and courageous expression of responsible citizens, then the only result will be a chilling effect on the people of noble character in this realm, people of base character will increasingly have nothing to fear, and it will be difficult to realize “peaceful China.”

    The author is a professor of constitutional law at Peking University.

  • Corruption, Shuanggui and Rule of Law

    The psychological examination room of a shuanggui facility.

    In the course of China’s recent transition of power from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, there has been much talk about the need to curb corruption and restore popular trust in the government. “Power should be reined by the cage of regulations,” Xi announced in a speech earlier this year, adding that “party cadres at various levels should keep in mind that no one can enjoy absolute power outside of the law.” Although the fall of several high-profile officials has illustrated the new administration’s anti-corruption resolve, the arrest of citizens who call on authorities to make good on their pledges about transparency and rule of law has sent troublingly mixed signals.

    Both the anti-corruption effort and the notion of enhancing rule-based governance converge in a recent article (translated below) in the Guangzhou magazine South Reviews by legal journalist Ye Zhusheng. Ye looks at the practice of shuanggui—a form of investigative custody used against Communist Party members accused of serious disciplinary violations such as corruption or dereliction of duty—and how the recent passage of regulations within the party might be a sign of efforts to bring this controversial corruption-fighting measure under rule of law.

    Of course, one way to “integrate” shuanggui with Chinese law is to adapt the law so that it better accommodates some of shuanggui’s features. Many argued that the 2012 Criminal Procedure Law’s provisions concerning “residential surveillance”—permitting detention of suspects in state-security, terrorism, or corruption cases in “designated locations” for up to six months—were a way of enabling the law to encompass investigative practices that have heretofore existed outside of the law. This would facilitate an eventual convergence in which extralegal measures would no longer be necessary, but it also entails expanding the scope of shuanggui practices to new targets under the aegis of law.

    This particular understanding of rule of law, one that treats “law” as the main criterion of what is right and just, fails to address what, if any, higher-order principles guide the formation of rules in a society. As the commentators in the article below suggest, the preservation of shuanggui and the practices associated with it ultimately appears to be premised on consequentialist, utilitarian arguments—shuanggui is the most powerful means of extracting information about corruption. Is the merging of extralegal measures like shuanggui and legal measures like residential surveillance aimed at protecting the rights of officials accused of wrongdoing—people for whom the public has very little sympathy—or is it, rather, aimed at producing a more rational and efficient system of investigation that can eliminate some of the more egregious errors of the current system? The answer to that question is key to understanding what shuanggui’s future portends for rule of law development in China.

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    Shuanggui: Between Discipline and the Law

    Ye Zhusheng, South Reviews
    June 10, 2013

    On May 27, the Communist Party of China (CPC) Regulations for Drafting Internal Party Regulations and CPC Provisions for Placing Internal Party Regulations and Normative Documents on File were promulgated, forming the first formal, open “legislation laws” inside the party. The institutional provisions associated with shuanggui are mainly expressed in the form of internal party regulations, so the appearance of these two sets of regulations may be an overture to bringing shuanggui under rule of law.

    The Complex Face of Shuanggui

    Many years from now, for [those] looking back at China’s anti-corruption history, shuanggui will definitely be a keyword. There are mainly two occasions when this word comes into public view. The first is when relevant authorities announce that some official is “suspected of a serious breach of discipline and undergoing investigation by the [party] organization.” This usually means the end of an official’s political career and the beginning of imprisonment. This situation is often greeted by the public with “great cries of rejoicing.” The second is whenever an official under shuanggui dies for whatever reason and the official’s relatives, scholars, and lawyers raise all sorts of questions, but the public’s attitude ranges somewhere between “he got what he deserved” to “complete disregard.”

    Recently, shuanggui has again entered the public view in these two diametrically opposite ways, first through the Liu Tienan case and then through the Yu Qiyi case. Late last year, journalist Luo Changping made corruption accusations on Weibo naming Liu Tienan, the former deputy director of the National Development and Reform Commission and director of the National Energy Administration. After waiting for nearly half a year and after all sorts of public conjecture, news of shuanggui was formally announced. Soon thereafter, the public “cheered” the fact that the “tiger-killing” anti-corruption momentum had not slackened, and the media began taking a careful inventory of the “course” of Luo Changping’s legendary [act of] naming names on Weibo.

    In April of this year, Yu Qiyi, chief engineer at Wenzhou Industry Investment Group Ltd, died suddenly while under shuanggui. One explanation was that he died because he “fell while showering.” Another was that he “drowned.” Relatives discovered “widespread injuries” all over his body. Afterwards, the local party committee formed a special task force to investigate the incident further.

    The institutional definition of shuanggui [or dual stipulateds] comes from the Administrative Supervision Regulations, issued by the State Council in 1990, which state that inspection authorities investigating a case have the power to “order relevant individuals to provide explanations and justifications on matters related to the matter under investigation at a stipulated time and stipulated place.” In formal documents, shuanggui is also known as lianggui [or two stipulateds]. In 1997, the Administrative Supervision Law was passed, changing the “stipulated” of the original regulations to “appointed,” leading to the phrase liangzhi [or two appointeds]. In 1993, the Central Commission on Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and the Ministry of Supervision came to operate under one roof, so that in practice it is generally difficult to distinguish between shuanggui and liangzhi.

    In a series of major anti-corruption cases, shuanggui has been clearly effective: The cases of Chen Xitong, Hu Changqing, Cheng Kejie, and Chen Liangyu were all easily resolved using the “anti-corruption weapon” of shuanggui.

    According to Li Yongzhong, an expert on the anti-corruption efforts of the CCDI, shuanggui is necessary in the current battle against corruption. It is a “unique” anti-corruption tactic created to accommodate China’s serious corruption problem: “There are no methods more powerful than lianggui.” Li Yongzhong once spent eight years heading a local discipline inspection office and used shuanggui in about 10 to 20 percent of cases, all of which were “solved.”

    On the one hand, it’s an “anti-corruption weapon.” On the other hand, it’s a “deadly black hole.” Since the 1990s, shuanggui began showing its complex face to the public from behind its mysterious veil.

    Forging of an “Anti-Corruption Weapon”

    So, how does shuanggui—distinct from the legal process—achieve such legendary success in the anti-corruption effort? First of all, this is related to the secret case-handling locations used under shuanggui.

    In 1998, the CCDI and Ministry of Supervision issued the Notice on Several Questions Regarding the Use of Liangzhi and Shuanggui Measures by Discipline Inspection and Supervision Organs, which stipulated that shuanggui facilities could neither be set up in offices of judicial organs, places of detention, or facilities for custody and repatriation [a form of extrajudicial detention abolished in 2003 following the death of Chinese citizen Sun Zhigang] set up by administrative authorities, nor could dedicated liangzhi or shuanggui facilities be built. In 2001, the CCDI again issued a document requiring that shuanggui locations “must be selected so as to ensure safety and should generally be selected from one-story houses or the first floor of multi-story buildings meeting adequate security and prevention criteria.”

    Sources say that hotels, guesthouses, military bases, and even ordinary residences may be used as locations for shuanggui. South Reviews (SR) interviewed several criminal attorneys who have represented officials in corruption cases, the majority of whom were held under shuanggui in special rooms in hotels or guesthouses.

    Central Party School Professor Lin Zhe has visited a local discipline inspection committee’s shuanggui facility. According to her, the set-up of this shuanggui location resembled a standard hotel room, except that all sharp corners in the room were covered with rubber in order to prevent accidents. People’s Daily Online previously published a set of photographs taken by someone who had visited a “base of operations” set up by the CCDI deep in the mountains, which revealed that the high-security location included an interrogation room, a room for psychological testing, and a room for coordinating investigations.

    A second characteristic of shuanggui is that the discipline inspection team has relative independence compared to judicial organs. This is primarily because most team members are temporarily drawn from different units and mostly are not previously familiar with one another. This works to eliminate the interference that can come from things like personal relationships.

    According to the CCDI’s Notice on Further Standardizing the Use of Lianggui Measures: “Attendants shall be selected from employees of party and state organs, and, as necessary, state organs can be requested to appoint them. Attendants must receive rigorous training, clearly understand their responsibilities, and be strictly disciplined.” According to previous media reports, “every time a person is placed under shuanggui, at least six to nine people attend to him in three shifts around the clock, and those on the night shift cannot sleep.”

    A discipline inspection committee employee who did not want his name revealed told SR that if the regulations were strictly adhered to, the time limit for shuanggui could not exceed the time limit for investigating the case, extraction of confessions through torture would not be allowed, and a degree of openness would be required, such as the provision for “notice after 24 hours.” In that case, the shuanggui methods would not be that different from those used by the procuratorate under legal provisions and thus the results would basically be the same. But why hasn’t shuanggui been discarded? This source’s view is that, first, shuanggui enjoys much greater secrecy than judicial process, so that even when “extraordinary” measures are employed, it’s difficult to discover [them] or pursue responsibility. Even more importantly, “If the procuratorate handles the case, there are certain things for which the degree [to which they are used] is more difficult to control.”

    Li Yongzhong summarized for SR the reasons why shuanggui is such a great deterrent. Based on his own experience handling cases and the results of his research, he has concluded that there is one major principle and three major laws of shuanggui. The principle is that corrupt people become associated with each other out of economic interests, but “they have no lasting friends, only lasting interests.” As for the three major laws, the first is the “toilet law”: once an official leaves his position of power, it’s like standing up after using the toilet—the stench immediately begins to spread, and the signs of criminality then become apparent. The second is the “law of when the tree falls, the apes scatter”: once an official under shuanggui is isolated from other persons associated with the case, the “apes” start to panic and it’s easy to divide and conquer. The third is the “law of asymmetric information”: after being put under shuanggui, an official loses contact with the outside world and the conspiracy of silence surrounding his corruption begins to fall apart on its own.

    The deterrent effect of shuanggui is enough to make officials blanch as soon as they hear the word. This has even been used to extort officials. In March 2009, the head of a government bureau in a district of Chongqing was taken for “questioning” in a hotel room by three unemployed vagrants who disguised themselves as “discipline inspection personnel” carrying out shuanggui. During this “fake shuanggui” period, the official gave a full account of his crimes and even handed over the bank card he was carrying and gave up his password. Similarly, in May 2010, the head of a government bureau in Quanjiao County, Anhui, was also taken away for investigation by people masquerading as “discipline inspection personnel” before being successfully rescued by police more than 40 hours later. According to media reports, that bureau head “displayed obedience” as he was being led away.

    These two major tactical advantages of shuanggui, the secrecy of locations and the independence of the investigation team, combined with the ease with which the discipline inspection work team can handle “certain things,” is the basis upon which Li Yongzhong’s three major laws can have their impact. These characteristics enable shuanggui to become an “anti-corruption weapon,” but the problems buried underneath cannot be overlooked.

    Integration under Rule of Law

    Cheng Wenhao, director of the Anti-Corruption Research Center at Tsinghua University [School of Public Policy and Management], participated in an anti-corruption forum last November chaired by CCDI Secretary Wang Qishan. Cheng believes that as far as the real needs of the battle against corruption are concerned, there is a certain necessity for shuanggui. However, the majority of scholars also believe that shuanggui should be integrated under rule of law and, once the legal system matures, this transitional measure should be abandoned. Although Li Yonghao has praise for the effectiveness of shuanggui, he also believes that institutionally speaking shuanggui is “not without its conflicts with the law” and ought to be used carefully and rarely until the conditions are right for it not to be used at all.

    Currently, the institutional nature of shuanggui has gradually become more certain and rule-of-law elements have increased. For example, in the CCDI’s 2001 Notice on Further Standardizing the Use of Lianggui Measures, it states that serious consequences caused by dereliction or abuse of duty or instances of forced or induced confession or corporal punishment during lianggui or any unauthorized use of lianggui shall result in serious pursuit of responsibility for those directly responsible. Moreover, the CCDI’s 2005 “Document 7” makes clear that the rights of a shuanggui target under investigation should be safeguarded, including the right to defend oneself, right of appeal, right of personhood, right to know, and right to property. In practice, however, just as in the Yu Qiyi case, there are still many circumstances in which shuanggui has not yet been integrated under rule of law.

    In March 2005, the discipline inspection committee of the Hebei Province State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SOASAC ) placed former party secretary and chairman of the Hebei International Trust and Investment Company Liang Yuncai and others under shuanggui. During the shuanggui period, three investigators selected by the discipline inspection committee from companies under the aegis of the Hebei SOASAC beat Liang Yuncai on multiple occasions, resulting in his death. The interesting thing is that the of the three people selected, one was a police officer for the security section of a state-owned enterprise, while the other two were an officer in the armed services department with no investigative experience or qualifications and a “part-time” driver.

    Media reports on the Liang Yuncai case cited the Indictment Opinion Report in the case: “Attendants” beat Liang Yuncai multiple times “for not sitting up straight, failing to follow instructions” and “having a poor attitude and failing to honestly confess.” During [the beatings], “Zuo Shuping (the aforementioned police officer) used a mop handle to beat Liang Yuncai’s back, causing the handle to break, and used a stool to strike Liang’s back and upper torso, causing Liang’s ribs to break in several places and widespread subcutaneous tissue and muscle to bleed in the upper torso, shoulders, and legs, leading to substantial soft tissue damage and bleeding leading to hemorrhagic and traumatic shock.”

    After the incident, the three men were respectively handed sentences of life imprisonment, 15 years’ imprisonment, and 10 years’ imprisonment for the crime of intentional injury. Moreover, two other discipline inspection personnel who participated in the investigation were sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment and three years’ imprisonment, suspended for five years, respectively, for dereliction of duty because they had “clear knowledge that the attendants carried out beatings and yet did nothing to stop them.”

    The verdict in the Liang Yuncai case shows that shuanggui is not a law-enforcement procedure, otherwise the crime ought to have been “coercing confession through torture.” Xu Songlin, a professor of criminal law, told SR that the crime of intentional injury applies to ordinary actors and does not require them to be employees of state organs, whereas dereliction of duty applies to employees of state organs and is a crime of negligence with a maximum prison term of seven years. In contrast, when coercion of confession through torture leads to bodily injury or death and heavy punishment is imposed for intentional injury or intentional homicide, the maximum penalty is death, but [the offense of coercing confession through torture] is only applicable to law-enforcement personnel. Even though the Liang Yuncai case involved a police officer, he ultimately was treated as an ordinary actor in the sentencing for the crime of intentional injury.

    Just two weeks after the death of Yu Qiyi, news emerged that Jia Jiuxiang, the vice president of the Sanmenxia Intermediate People’s Court in Henan Province, had died while under shuanggui. Officially, his death was attributed to a “heart attack,” but relatives countered that Jia had no heart problems. There have been frequent reports of similar incidents involving death under shuanggui in recent years, most of which are ruled accidental. After many inquiries, SR has discovered extremely few cases like that of Liang Yuncai in which shuanggui investigators were ultimately held accountable.

    In 1997, Wang Jinying, a judge at Tianjin’s Baodi County People’s Court, was accused of the crime of self-seeking misconduct and investigated first by the discipline inspection committee and then by the procuratorate. Because of a lack of evidence, Wang was released. After his release, Wang applied for state compensation. In its decision, the Tianjin No.1 Intermediate People’s Court wrote that the discipline inspection committee “is a party organization, not a state organ, and China’s State Compensation Law requires that the body violating rights must be a state organ.” Therefore, the time spent under investigation by the discipline inspection committee could not be included in the calculation of state compensation.

    Liu Jianlong, law lecturer at the China Youth University for Political Sciences, points out that even though state compensation cannot be applied in cases of shuanggui, there are provisions in the Administrative Procedure Law for holding state organs accountable for “inaction” and, in principle, one could pursue claims of responsibility against state supervision organs.

    In a speech early this year, CCDI Secretary Wang Qishan said: “The current anti-corruption [effort] must primarily treat the symptoms in order to buy more time to treat the causes.” In Li Yongzhong’s view, the use of shuanggui at the tactical level is necessary to treat the symptoms in the “battle to annihilate” corruption, but looking long-term, treating the causes can only rely on a “systematic anti-corruption” [effort] not a “power-based anti-corruption” [effort].

    On May 27, CPC Regulations for Drafting of Internal Party Regulations and CPC Provisions for Placing Internal Party Regulations and Normative Documents on File were promulgated, forming the first formal, open “legislation law” inside the party. According to these two sets of regulations, regulations issued by party organs including the discipline inspection organs must go through a process of prior review, during which one of the review standards is [to ask] “is it in accord with the constitution and the law.” The institutional provisions associated with shuanggui are mainly expressed in the form of internal party regulations, so the appearance of these two sets of regulations may be an overture to bringing shuanggui under rule of law.

  • How Many More Sacrifices until Rule of Law Reigns?

    Zhao Yanjin and her husband read her acquittal verdict in their home after her release. She had spent 10 years in custody. Photo credit: dfdaily.com

    On May 6, the China Youth Daily reported on the case of a Hebei woman, Zhao Yanjin, who had stood accused of murdering a neighbor’s child in 2001. In May 2011, after a series of trials, appeals, and conflicting court decisions, the Hebei Higher People’s Court finally acquitted her on the grounds of insufficient evidence. By that time, she had spent nearly 10 years in police custody.

    This might have been just one more case of belated exoneration for a suspect victimized by a criminal justice system that too often rushes to solve murder case. But there was an added twist: in Zhao’s case, it took six months for the court’s decision to reach the Baoding Intermediate People’s Court, which was responsible for announcing Zhao’s innocence, and after the decision was announced authorities in Baoding delayed her release for more than a year while they took steps to ensure that the murdered child’s relatives would not protest the decision.

    Meanwhile, unaware of the acquittal, Zhao’s husband continued to protest her innocence by petitioning, which landed him in a reeducation through labor (RTL) facility for nearly 10 months—his second RTL sentence for petitioning on his wife’s behalf. In the weeks leading up to her release, court officials repeatedly met with Zhao and had her write a statement promising to remain “low-key” after her release.

    Chinese media has recently reported several stories similar to Zhao Yanjin’s. In late April, two men in Zhejiang submitted a claim for 7.02 million yuan (US$1.1 million) in state compensation after a court retrial found insufficient evidence to support their conviction on rape charges nearly 10 years ago. The men say that they had been tortured into confessing. Then on May 3, five men were acquitted of charges stemming from the bombing of a government office in Fujian province—charges for which they, too, had spent a decade in custody while court proceedings stalled because local law-enforcement authorities were unwilling to acknowledge that they had no case beyond confessions coerced through torture.

    In the wake of these and other cases, the problem of wrongful convictions has been in the spotlight in recent months. In March, the president of the Zhejiang Higher People’s Court blamed pressure to deal with murder cases and other serious crime for the frequent use of torture to extract confessions. Earlier this week, Shen Deyong, a vice-president at the Supreme People’s Court, warned in an essay in China Court News that mounting wrongful convictions posed an “unprecedented challenge” to China’s court system.

    In a commentary posted on a major news portal in Henan Province (where authorities recently announced that judges will held accountable for wrongful convictions), Ning Xinchun reflects on the way that Zhao Yanjin’s husband describes their sacrifices as necessary to promote rule of law development in China. Ning rejects this interpretation, writing that Chinese citizens are much too easily sacrificed to the largely indifferent power of the state. Instead of forgiveness and a willingness to sacrifice oneself in the interest of eventual progress, Ning suggests that such progress is not inevitable and that outrage at the unacceptability of such sacrifices is instead needed to change a criminal justice system that makes people live in fear.

    *
    Citizen Sacrifice Doesn’t Represent Rule of Law Progress

    Ning Xinchun
    May 6, 2013 dahe.cn

    “Without sacrifice, we can’t further the promotion of rule of law,” said Li Jianjun. Li is Zhao Yanjin’s husband. In an effort to proclaim his wife’s innocence, he went all over to engage in petitioning and was sent to re-education through labor more than once. In September 2001, Zhao Yanjin got caught up in a murder case. Over 12 years, she was twice sentenced to life in prison and twice acquitted. Before fully recovering her freedom, she had spent a total of 10 years in a detention center. After the Hebei high court issued its acquittal decision, she was kept in custody for an additional 20 months before she regained her freedom. (Source: China Youth Daily, May 6)

    A close look at the news reveals that the experience of Zhao Yanjin and her family is not unique. First, there was the She Xianglin case. Then there was the reversal of the case in Zhejiang of the uncle and nephew surnamed Zhang who had been wrongly convicted for more than 10 years. Then there was the Henan case of the “guaranteed death sentence” for defendant Li Huailiang. In terms of the time involved and the experience of having finally been acquitted and released on grounds of insufficient evidence after going through seven court hearings and three verdicts, the case is much more similar to the case of the bombing at the Fuqing, Fujian, discipline inspection committee office, where five defendants languished for 12 years in prison only to be acquitted and released.

    Without doubt, human life cannot be recovered. More than a decade passed in jail, with no career advancement, loss of health, and even changing the fate of the entire family. Under the giant wheels of the state machine, lowly individuals wind up being ground up into scattered dust. Perhaps it’s out of a sorrowful choice to “forgive” or an intentional exaggeration of consciousness [that leads them to say]: “Without sacrifice, we can’t further the promotion of rule of law.”

    What this news shows is that, the reality of the justice system is not only a host of procedural problems but the fact that the presumption of innocence is often set aside. Pursuing responsibility in these individual cases perhaps won’t have huge significance for a country’s legal system. But to each citizen, there is nothing in the world more significant. Faced with a shattered family or loss of life, any so-called “huge compensation” is really quite insignificant. In this respect, fairness and transparency of the legal system, adherence to basic legal rationality such as “no crime without sufficient evidence” is the most valuable thing in the lives of ordinary people because it protects people from malicious prosecution under the law.

    In Hugo’s masterpiece Les Misérables, there is a representative of the legal system, Javert, who spends his entire life pursuing the main character, Jean Valjean. Here, the law almost becomes a force of evil used to attack ordinary people. Just like these innocent Chinese citizens who have spent long years locked up in jail, Jean Valjean lives his life in the shadow of this kind of evil law, living a life of continual setbacks, vagrancy, jail, and persecution. The only beauty in his life is in his imagining the kingdom of heaven.

    Only through strict observance of legal procedure and adherence to legal rationality can we prevent the way that the machinery of state has for a long time waged mistaken wars against citizens. From another perspective, this raises a question that urgently needs to be answered: when citizens fall into deliberate legal traps, how should they use everything from state institutions to civil society to mobilize and organize forces to remedy the situation and clear channels for relief? We’ve seen that when there is no [means to seek] immediate remedy, any person can fall victim to this kind of evil legal system. If you have good luck, you can wait until the facts of the case clear your name; if not, you can spend your life in jail.

    But we know that justice is not a matter of hitting the jackpot.

    In his brilliant work of philosophy, The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu holds rationality to be the first criterion and maintains that ordinary laws are [reflections of] human rationality and that law is the application of human rationality in special circumstances. Today, people do not lack in expectations for rationality, but the progress of a country’s rule of law, besides being built upon the foundation of people’s rationality, must also [be based in] the state’s adherence to rationality, including a pursuit of procedural legality, improving channels for relief, etc.

    At the beginning of the essay, the party to the case said that without sacrifice, we can’t further the promotion of rule of law. But society should not take comfort in this kind of magnanimous forgiveness. Instead, we should always bear in mind: citizen sacrifice does not represent social progress; it represents the shame of our rule of law, and nothing more.

  • How Many More Sacrifices until Rule of Law Reigns?

    Zhao Yanjin and her husband read her acquittal verdict in their home after her release. She had spent 10 years in custody. Photo credit: dfdaily.com

    On May 6, the China Youth Daily reported on the case of a Hebei woman, Zhao Yanjin, who had stood accused of murdering a neighbor’s child in 2001. In May 2011, after a series of trials, appeals, and conflicting court decisions, the Hebei Higher People’s Court finally acquitted her on the grounds of insufficient evidence. By that time, she had spent nearly 10 years in police custody.

    This might have been just one more case of belated exoneration for a suspect victimized by a criminal justice system that too often rushes to solve murder case. But there was an added twist: in Zhao’s case, it took six months for the court’s decision to reach the Baoding Intermediate People’s Court, which was responsible for announcing Zhao’s innocence, and after the decision was announced authorities in Baoding delayed her release for more than a year while they took steps to ensure that the murdered child’s relatives would not protest the decision.

    Meanwhile, unaware of the acquittal, Zhao’s husband continued to protest her innocence by petitioning, which landed him in a reeducation through labor (RTL) facility for nearly 10 months—his second RTL sentence for petitioning on his wife’s behalf. In the weeks leading up to her release, court officials repeatedly met with Zhao and had her write a statement promising to remain “low-key” after her release.

    Chinese media has recently reported several stories similar to Zhao Yanjin’s. In late April, two men in Zhejiang submitted a claim for 7.02 million yuan (US$1.1 million) in state compensation after a court retrial found insufficient evidence to support their conviction on rape charges nearly 10 years ago. The men say that they had been tortured into confessing. Then on May 3, five men were acquitted of charges stemming from the bombing of a government office in Fujian province—charges for which they, too, had spent a decade in custody while court proceedings stalled because local law-enforcement authorities were unwilling to acknowledge that they had no case beyond confessions coerced through torture.

    In the wake of these and other cases, the problem of wrongful convictions has been in the spotlight in recent months. In March, the president of the Zhejiang Higher People’s Court blamed pressure to deal with murder cases and other serious crime for the frequent use of torture to extract confessions. Earlier this week, Shen Deyong, a vice-president at the Supreme People’s Court, warned in an essay in China Court News that mounting wrongful convictions posed an “unprecedented challenge” to China’s court system.

    In a commentary posted on a major news portal in Henan Province (where authorities recently announced that judges will held accountable for wrongful convictions), Ning Xinchun reflects on the way that Zhao Yanjin’s husband describes their sacrifices as necessary to promote rule of law development in China. Ning rejects this interpretation, writing that Chinese citizens are much too easily sacrificed to the largely indifferent power of the state. Instead of forgiveness and a willingness to sacrifice oneself in the interest of eventual progress, Ning suggests that such progress is not inevitable and that outrage at the unacceptability of such sacrifices is instead needed to change a criminal justice system that makes people live in fear.

    *
    Citizen Sacrifice Doesn’t Represent Rule of Law Progress

    Ning Xinchun
    May 6, 2013 dahe.cn

    “Without sacrifice, we can’t further the promotion of rule of law,” said Li Jianjun. Li is Zhao Yanjin’s husband. In an effort to proclaim his wife’s innocence, he went all over to engage in petitioning and was sent to re-education through labor more than once. In September 2001, Zhao Yanjin got caught up in a murder case. Over 12 years, she was twice sentenced to life in prison and twice acquitted. Before fully recovering her freedom, she had spent a total of 10 years in a detention center. After the Hebei high court issued its acquittal decision, she was kept in custody for an additional 20 months before she regained her freedom. (Source: China Youth Daily, May 6)

    A close look at the news reveals that the experience of Zhao Yanjin and her family is not unique. First, there was the She Xianglin case. Then there was the reversal of the case in Zhejiang of the uncle and nephew surnamed Zhang who had been wrongly convicted for more than 10 years. Then there was the Henan case of the “guaranteed death sentence” for defendant Li Huailiang. In terms of the time involved and the experience of having finally been acquitted and released on grounds of insufficient evidence after going through seven court hearings and three verdicts, the case is much more similar to the case of the bombing at the Fuqing, Fujian, discipline inspection committee office, where five defendants languished for 12 years in prison only to be acquitted and released.

    Without doubt, human life cannot be recovered. More than a decade passed in jail, with no career advancement, loss of health, and even changing the fate of the entire family. Under the giant wheels of the state machine, lowly individuals wind up being ground up into scattered dust. Perhaps it’s out of a sorrowful choice to “forgive” or an intentional exaggeration of consciousness [that leads them to say]: “Without sacrifice, we can’t further the promotion of rule of law.”

    What this news shows is that, the reality of the justice system is not only a host of procedural problems but the fact that the presumption of innocence is often set aside. Pursuing responsibility in these individual cases perhaps won’t have huge significance for a country’s legal system. But to each citizen, there is nothing in the world more significant. Faced with a shattered family or loss of life, any so-called “huge compensation” is really quite insignificant. In this respect, fairness and transparency of the legal system, adherence to basic legal rationality such as “no crime without sufficient evidence” is the most valuable thing in the lives of ordinary people because it protects people from malicious prosecution under the law.

    In Hugo’s masterpiece Les Misérables, there is a representative of the legal system, Javert, who spends his entire life pursuing the main character, Jean Valjean. Here, the law almost becomes a force of evil used to attack ordinary people. Just like these innocent Chinese citizens who have spent long years locked up in jail, Jean Valjean lives his life in the shadow of this kind of evil law, living a life of continual setbacks, vagrancy, jail, and persecution. The only beauty in his life is in his imagining the kingdom of heaven.

    Only through strict observance of legal procedure and adherence to legal rationality can we prevent the way that the machinery of state has for a long time waged mistaken wars against citizens. From another perspective, this raises a question that urgently needs to be answered: when citizens fall into deliberate legal traps, how should they use everything from state institutions to civil society to mobilize and organize forces to remedy the situation and clear channels for relief? We’ve seen that when there is no [means to seek] immediate remedy, any person can fall victim to this kind of evil legal system. If you have good luck, you can wait until the facts of the case clear your name; if not, you can spend your life in jail.

    But we know that justice is not a matter of hitting the jackpot.

    In his brilliant work of philosophy, The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu holds rationality to be the first criterion and maintains that ordinary laws are [reflections of] human rationality and that law is the application of human rationality in special circumstances. Today, people do not lack in expectations for rationality, but the progress of a country’s rule of law, besides being built upon the foundation of people’s rationality, must also [be based in] the state’s adherence to rationality, including a pursuit of procedural legality, improving channels for relief, etc.

    At the beginning of the essay, the party to the case said that without sacrifice, we can’t further the promotion of rule of law. But society should not take comfort in this kind of magnanimous forgiveness. Instead, we should always bear in mind: citizen sacrifice does not represent social progress; it represents the shame of our rule of law, and nothing more.

  • Tang Hui Case: Why the Focus Should Be on Judicial Independence

    Tang Hui weeps outside the courtroom after her lawsuit was rejected. Photo credit: Ycwb.com

    Last Friday, the Yongzhou Intermediate People’s Court in Hunan Province rejected a much-anticipated administrative lawsuit brought by “Petitioning Mother” Tang Hui against the local reeducation through labor (RTL) management committee. Tang is seeking a written apology and about 2,500 yuan (approximately US $400) in compensation and damages for the controversial RTL decision issued against her in August 2012. The decision sentenced her to one and a half years of RTL in response to the tenacious petitioning she lodged to bring perpetrators and police to justice in her daughter’s case of sexual abuse and exploitation.

    Influenced by strong public sympathy for a mother whose 11-year-old child was repeatedly raped and forced into prostitution, the provincial RTL Committee annulled the local committee’s decision shortly after Tang applied for administrative reconsideration. The annulment was issued on the grounds that, under the circumstances, admonition and education would be “more appropriate.”

    At issue during this month’s trial was whether the Hunan Province RTL Committee’s revocation of the RTL decision against Tang means that the original decision should be considered “unlawful,” and therefore eligible for compensation. Tang’s lawyers argued that the annulment clearly implied that the decision was unlawful. Although the Yongzhou RTL Committee acknowledged in court that the RTL decision had been “clearly inappropriate,” it countered that the decision to release Tang had been made out of “humanitarian concern” (namely, in light of her need to care for her traumatized daughter), without questioning the legality of the underlying RTL decision.

    If the Yongzhou RTL Committee’s action against Tang Hui was “clearly inappropriate,” then it could be argued that the RTL decision represented an abuse of official power, which would be grounds for compensation under Chinese law. But instead of undertaking its own examination of the legality of the original RTL decision—an authority it has under the revised State Compensation Law—the court ultimately accepted the argument that the decision had been “inappropriate,” but not “unlawful.” The result is a seemingly paradoxical conclusion in which both the RTL decision against Tang and the subsequent revocation of that decision were found to be proper and lawful.

    Images of an inconsolable mother circulated widely on the Internet after the intermediate court’s decision, followed by numerous expressions of public sympathy and outrage at the perceived unwillingness of local authorities to admit their mistakes. The inability of the judicial system to achieve a just outcome in Tang’s case threatens to lead to further erosion of trust in the judicial system, a dangerous loss of legitimacy, and a potential source of instability.

    But whereas the majority of commentators see Tang’s case as a consequence of the flawed RTL system, Hainan University Law School Professor Wang Lin, a frequent commentator on legal matters, places blame on the strained relationship between China’s judiciary and the system of “letters and visits” (or xinfang, a system that gives Chinese citizens an extra-judicial channel through which to make complaints and petition for redress of grievances). Lack of faith in the judicial system’s ability to produce justice leads people like Tang Hui to petition, but seeing them as threats to social stability, authorities take measures against petitioners and thereby exacerbate a broader sense of injustice.

    This vicious cycle exists independently of specific countermeasures, meaning that reform or abolition of RTL is unlikely to break the cycle. Writing in Monday’s Oriental Morning News, Wang opines that the solution lies in the promotion of an independent judiciary, one that would restore citizens’ faith and confidence in the legal system and make alternative channels like petitioning less necessary.

    *
    Use Tang Hui Case to Rebuild Relationship of Judiciary, Petitions
    Wang Lin, Oriental Morning News
    April 15, 2013 

    On March 25, the first-instance decision was issued in the suit brought by Lanzhou’s “Petitioning Mother” Zhao Meifu[*] against the Lanzhou RTL Committee. The court rejected Zhao’s litigation demands on the grounds that the deadline for litigation had already passed. On April 12, a first-instance decision was issued in the suit brought by Yongzhou, Hunan’s “Petitioning Mother” Tang Hui against the Yongzhou RTL committee. The court found that plaintiff Tang Hui’s demands could not be accepted because they lacked a factual and legal basis.

    It is no coincidence that both of these “petitioning mothers” lost their respective lawsuits against RTL committees. Public opinion expects the tears of these “petitioning mothers” to be the final blow prevailing over the RTL system. Judging from the statements made by the relevant central authorities, this is no extravagant hope. Major changes are in the works for RTL; it’s just a matter of time.

    With the Tang Hui and Zhao Meifu cases as points of departure, attention to the reform or even abolition of the RTL system is a natural public reaction. But hidden in the background of these two cases is not simply a debate over the legality of the RTL system, but [a need to] rethink the relationship between petitioning and the judicial system. Why were the “petitioning mothers” sent to RTL? Because of their “petitioning.” Why did they “trust the petitioning system rather than the judicial system”? Because they believed that they had already exhausted all channels for a judicial remedy and felt that they were unable to defend their rights effectively. So, they tied their hopes to the petitioner’s path.

    For example, in the Tang Hui case, this mother was an ordinary citizen who became a “victim’s relative” because of a sudden calamity from heaven. In October 2006, her 11-year-old daughter was repeatedly raped and then forced into prostitution. Ordinarily, in a society with rule of law, the police ought to launch an investigation soon after receiving a report [of a crime]. But, ironically, in this major case, it was the victim’s mother who went undercover to collect evidence and then asked two relatives to pose as brothel customers in order to save her daughter. Afterwards, only after Tang Hui threatened to kill herself were the police motivated to file the case for investigation. Then after that, at many key stages in the judicial process, action was only “compelled” through some stirringly desperate rights-defense measures pursued outside the legal system. Whenever there are problems with the rule of law, petitioning naturally replaces rule-of-law channels.

    And as we can observe from media descriptions [of the case], it wasn’t actually the “petitioning” that led to the case being handled in accordance with the law; rather it was the “impact” that impelled the relevant accommodations. That “impact” Tang Hui made by petitioning was also the cause of her being sent to RTL.

    Let’s look at how the “case of the Yongzhou girl forced into prostitution” evolved into the “case of Tang Hui v. Yongzhou RTL Committee”: On August 2 of last year, the Yongzhou RTL Committee decided to send Tang Hui to one and a half years of RTL for disturbing social order. Tang Hui did not accept the RTL decision and applied for administrative reconsideration by the Hunan Province RTL Committee on August 7. Three days later, amid the focus of public opinion, the Hunan Province RTL Committee annulled the RTL decision.

    After being released from RTL, Tang Hui then applied for state compensation. On January 5 of this year, the Yongzhou RTL Committee rejected her request and issued a decision not to pay state compensation. On January 22, Tang Hui sued the [committee] in the Yongzhou Intermediate [People’s] Court. After losing in the court of first instance, media flocked to report that Tang Hui would appeal the case to the Hunan High People’s Court.

    Assuming that rejection is still the ultimate outcome of this case, will Tang Hui accept the decision and drop her lawsuit? If Tang Hui does not accept the final verdict, at that point the only channel for judicial remedy would be the even more uncertain path of appealing to reopen the case. This could perhaps send Tang Hui once more on the old path of petitioning.

    If the judicial system is unable to end disputes, then the path of abnormal petitioning becomes viable again, and in the worst case scenario, RTL measures that exist out of a need to maintain stability would inevitably befall Tang Hui yet again. In order to prevent petitioners from falling into this vicious cycle, it is imperative to reconsider the petitioning system. Even if the RTL system is brought to an end within the year, if profound reforms aren’t made to the petitioning system, then replacement measures will inevitably be put in [RTL’s] place. This is practically a vicious cycle.

    Thus it is just as important to use Tang Hui’s case as an opportunity to reconsider the relationship between the judiciary and petitioning as it is to reconsider the RTL system. If it is rare that a person sent to RTL is successful in a suit against an RTL committee, it’s definitely not solely because of “malicious litigation”; in reality, much of the time it’s because of the “mutual cooperation” of relevant departments.

    If rights defenders are deprived of their personal liberty because they use “inappropriate” measures to “force state organs to perform their duties in accordance with the law,” I fear this will only force rights defenders onto the path of no return. As a victim, Tang Hui did not set out to choose petitioning. She once believed in the local police and judicial bodies and exhausted her energies urging the local functional departments to perform their duties in accordance with the law. Her “petitioning” was because the actions at the “lower levels” made her lose that belief.

    Resolving this difficult situation rests on rebuilding the relationship between the judiciary and petitioning and making it ordinary for parties’ lawful rights and interests to be protected within legal channels. It is essential to let judicial independence pave the way for judicial fairness. Only by protecting citizens’ lawful rights and interests can we ensure the stability of localities and rights; this is an undisputable truth.

    (The author is an assistant professor at Hainan University Law School.)


    * Zhao Meifu has reportedly been involved in petitioning activities for 20 years. In November 2012, she went to Beijing to visit her son, a postgraduate student studying in the capital, and was intercepted by police under suspicion for petitioning. Lanzhou, Gansu, police escorted Zhao back home where, without being granted access to her family, she was sentenced to one year of RTL. The case received media attention after Zhao’s son posted it on Weibo (a Chinese version of Twitter), and 18 days after being sent to RTL, Zhao was released citing medical reasons. ⇑

  • Tang Hui Case: Why the Focus Should Be on Judicial Independence

    Tang Hui weeps outside the courtroom after her lawsuit was rejected. Photo credit: Ycwb.com

    Last Friday, the Yongzhou Intermediate People’s Court in Hunan Province rejected a much-anticipated administrative lawsuit brought by “Petitioning Mother” Tang Hui against the local reeducation through labor (RTL) management committee. Tang is seeking a written apology and about 2,500 yuan (approximately US $400) in compensation and damages for the controversial RTL decision issued against her in August 2012. The decision sentenced her to one and a half years of RTL in response to the tenacious petitioning she lodged to bring perpetrators and police to justice in her daughter’s case of sexual abuse and exploitation.

    Influenced by strong public sympathy for a mother whose 11-year-old child was repeatedly raped and forced into prostitution, the provincial RTL Committee annulled the local committee’s decision shortly after Tang applied for administrative reconsideration. The annulment was issued on the grounds that, under the circumstances, admonition and education would be “more appropriate.”

    At issue during this month’s trial was whether the Hunan Province RTL Committee’s revocation of the RTL decision against Tang means that the original decision should be considered “unlawful,” and therefore eligible for compensation. Tang’s lawyers argued that the annulment clearly implied that the decision was unlawful. Although the Yongzhou RTL Committee acknowledged in court that the RTL decision had been “clearly inappropriate,” it countered that the decision to release Tang had been made out of “humanitarian concern” (namely, in light of her need to care for her traumatized daughter), without questioning the legality of the underlying RTL decision.

    If the Yongzhou RTL Committee’s action against Tang Hui was “clearly inappropriate,” then it could be argued that the RTL decision represented an abuse of official power, which would be grounds for compensation under Chinese law. But instead of undertaking its own examination of the legality of the original RTL decision—an authority it has under the revised State Compensation Law—the court ultimately accepted the argument that the decision had been “inappropriate,” but not “unlawful.” The result is a seemingly paradoxical conclusion in which both the RTL decision against Tang and the subsequent revocation of that decision were found to be proper and lawful.

    Images of an inconsolable mother circulated widely on the Internet after the intermediate court’s decision, followed by numerous expressions of public sympathy and outrage at the perceived unwillingness of local authorities to admit their mistakes. The inability of the judicial system to achieve a just outcome in Tang’s case threatens to lead to further erosion of trust in the judicial system, a dangerous loss of legitimacy, and a potential source of instability.

    But whereas the majority of commentators see Tang’s case as a consequence of the flawed RTL system, Hainan University Law School Professor Wang Lin, a frequent commentator on legal matters, places blame on the strained relationship between China’s judiciary and the system of “letters and visits” (or xinfang, a system that gives Chinese citizens an extra-judicial channel through which to make complaints and petition for redress of grievances). Lack of faith in the judicial system’s ability to produce justice leads people like Tang Hui to petition, but seeing them as threats to social stability, authorities take measures against petitioners and thereby exacerbate a broader sense of injustice.

    This vicious cycle exists independently of specific countermeasures, meaning that reform or abolition of RTL is unlikely to break the cycle. Writing in Monday’s Oriental Morning News, Wang opines that the solution lies in the promotion of an independent judiciary, one that would restore citizens’ faith and confidence in the legal system and make alternative channels like petitioning less necessary.

    *
    Use Tang Hui Case to Rebuild Relationship of Judiciary, Petitions
    Wang Lin, Oriental Morning News
    April 15, 2013 

    On March 25, the first-instance decision was issued in the suit brought by Lanzhou’s “Petitioning Mother” Zhao Meifu[*] against the Lanzhou RTL Committee. The court rejected Zhao’s litigation demands on the grounds that the deadline for litigation had already passed. On April 12, a first-instance decision was issued in the suit brought by Yongzhou, Hunan’s “Petitioning Mother” Tang Hui against the Yongzhou RTL committee. The court found that plaintiff Tang Hui’s demands could not be accepted because they lacked a factual and legal basis.

    It is no coincidence that both of these “petitioning mothers” lost their respective lawsuits against RTL committees. Public opinion expects the tears of these “petitioning mothers” to be the final blow prevailing over the RTL system. Judging from the statements made by the relevant central authorities, this is no extravagant hope. Major changes are in the works for RTL; it’s just a matter of time.

    With the Tang Hui and Zhao Meifu cases as points of departure, attention to the reform or even abolition of the RTL system is a natural public reaction. But hidden in the background of these two cases is not simply a debate over the legality of the RTL system, but [a need to] rethink the relationship between petitioning and the judicial system. Why were the “petitioning mothers” sent to RTL? Because of their “petitioning.” Why did they “trust the petitioning system rather than the judicial system”? Because they believed that they had already exhausted all channels for a judicial remedy and felt that they were unable to defend their rights effectively. So, they tied their hopes to the petitioner’s path.

    For example, in the Tang Hui case, this mother was an ordinary citizen who became a “victim’s relative” because of a sudden calamity from heaven. In October 2006, her 11-year-old daughter was repeatedly raped and then forced into prostitution. Ordinarily, in a society with rule of law, the police ought to launch an investigation soon after receiving a report [of a crime]. But, ironically, in this major case, it was the victim’s mother who went undercover to collect evidence and then asked two relatives to pose as brothel customers in order to save her daughter. Afterwards, only after Tang Hui threatened to kill herself were the police motivated to file the case for investigation. Then after that, at many key stages in the judicial process, action was only “compelled” through some stirringly desperate rights-defense measures pursued outside the legal system. Whenever there are problems with the rule of law, petitioning naturally replaces rule-of-law channels.

    And as we can observe from media descriptions [of the case], it wasn’t actually the “petitioning” that led to the case being handled in accordance with the law; rather it was the “impact” that impelled the relevant accommodations. That “impact” Tang Hui made by petitioning was also the cause of her being sent to RTL.

    Let’s look at how the “case of the Yongzhou girl forced into prostitution” evolved into the “case of Tang Hui v. Yongzhou RTL Committee”: On August 2 of last year, the Yongzhou RTL Committee decided to send Tang Hui to one and a half years of RTL for disturbing social order. Tang Hui did not accept the RTL decision and applied for administrative reconsideration by the Hunan Province RTL Committee on August 7. Three days later, amid the focus of public opinion, the Hunan Province RTL Committee annulled the RTL decision.

    After being released from RTL, Tang Hui then applied for state compensation. On January 5 of this year, the Yongzhou RTL Committee rejected her request and issued a decision not to pay state compensation. On January 22, Tang Hui sued the [committee] in the Yongzhou Intermediate [People’s] Court. After losing in the court of first instance, media flocked to report that Tang Hui would appeal the case to the Hunan High People’s Court.

    Assuming that rejection is still the ultimate outcome of this case, will Tang Hui accept the decision and drop her lawsuit? If Tang Hui does not accept the final verdict, at that point the only channel for judicial remedy would be the even more uncertain path of appealing to reopen the case. This could perhaps send Tang Hui once more on the old path of petitioning.

    If the judicial system is unable to end disputes, then the path of abnormal petitioning becomes viable again, and in the worst case scenario, RTL measures that exist out of a need to maintain stability would inevitably befall Tang Hui yet again. In order to prevent petitioners from falling into this vicious cycle, it is imperative to reconsider the petitioning system. Even if the RTL system is brought to an end within the year, if profound reforms aren’t made to the petitioning system, then replacement measures will inevitably be put in [RTL’s] place. This is practically a vicious cycle.

    Thus it is just as important to use Tang Hui’s case as an opportunity to reconsider the relationship between the judiciary and petitioning as it is to reconsider the RTL system. If it is rare that a person sent to RTL is successful in a suit against an RTL committee, it’s definitely not solely because of “malicious litigation”; in reality, much of the time it’s because of the “mutual cooperation” of relevant departments.

    If rights defenders are deprived of their personal liberty because they use “inappropriate” measures to “force state organs to perform their duties in accordance with the law,” I fear this will only force rights defenders onto the path of no return. As a victim, Tang Hui did not set out to choose petitioning. She once believed in the local police and judicial bodies and exhausted her energies urging the local functional departments to perform their duties in accordance with the law. Her “petitioning” was because the actions at the “lower levels” made her lose that belief.

    Resolving this difficult situation rests on rebuilding the relationship between the judiciary and petitioning and making it ordinary for parties’ lawful rights and interests to be protected within legal channels. It is essential to let judicial independence pave the way for judicial fairness. Only by protecting citizens’ lawful rights and interests can we ensure the stability of localities and rights; this is an undisputable truth.

    (The author is an assistant professor at Hainan University Law School.)


    * Zhao Meifu has reportedly been involved in petitioning activities for 20 years. In November 2012, she went to Beijing to visit her son, a postgraduate student studying in the capital, and was intercepted by police under suspicion for petitioning. Lanzhou, Gansu, police escorted Zhao back home where, without being granted access to her family, she was sentenced to one year of RTL. The case received media attention after Zhao’s son posted it on Weibo (a Chinese version of Twitter), and 18 days after being sent to RTL, Zhao was released citing medical reasons. ⇑

  • Targeting Evidence to End Wrongful Execution

    NPC delegate and Zhejiang High People’s Court President Qi Qi. Photo credit: China.org.cn

    Although frequently criticized for being relatively powerless “rubber-stamp” bodies, China’s national legislative body, the National People’s Congress, and its main consultative body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, provide delegates from throughout the country a forum to make policy and legislative proposals targeting some of China’s most pressing problems. Most of these proposals are fruitless, but with hundreds of domestic and foreign journalists covering these important annual events, some of these proposals ultimately have the opportunity to gain a wider audience that might result in more broad-based pressure to put actions behind all the talk.

    In the March 11 edition of the influential newspaper The Beijing News, NPC delegate and Zhejiang High People’s Court President Qi Qi speaks about his proposal to issue regulations that would govern a new system for the additional investigation of problematic evidence in death penalty trials. In this interview, Qi speaks frankly about the relationship between torture and wrongful conviction. Having spent much of his career as an administrator in the court and procuratorial systems, Qi has a broad perspective on the pressures faced by law enforcement and judicial authorities that make it difficult to eliminate torture completely. Qi has clearly given much thought to these questions recently, as his court is in the process of reviewing a case in which five men have spent nearly 18 years behind bars for homicides that fingerprint evidence now suggests was committed by someone else.

    This case, like the Zhao Zuohai case in 2010, highlights the way in which pressure to solve homicide cases leads to an over-reliance on confessions with investigators framing innocent people and courts turning a blind eye to problematic evidence. Fortunately for the defendants in this case, initial death sentences were later suspended on appeal, for, as Qi notes, under the circumstances of the time it would have been easy and expected for these young men to be put to death in order to address the social harm caused by the murders.

    *
    Zhejiang High Court President: Basis of Wrongful Convictions Relates to Torture

    NPC Delegate Qi Qi recommends public security, procuratorates, and courts jointly issue
    regulations to improve procedures for additional investigation of evidence in death penalty cases

    Song Shijing, The Beijing News
    March 12, 2013

    National People’s Congress (NPC) delegate and Zhejiang High People’s Court President Qi Qi presented a proposal at the First Plenary Session of the 12th NPC, recommending that the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and Ministry of Public Security jointly enact regulations governing the procedure for additional investigation of evidence during the trial period for death penalty cases in order to resolve problems in the operational mechanisms of the criminal procedure; establish a “trial-centered” system for evidence collection, production, examination, certification and review; and establish corresponding provisions to pursue responsibility for violations of the law and prevent wrongful death penalty convictions.

    Qi Qi says that problems with evidence are encountered from time to time in trying death penalty cases. In order to ensure conviction, some investigation authorities do not fully submit evidence that is beneficial to the defendant. Some investigators and prosecutors believe that their investigation work is over and are indifferent to or delay the work of additional investigation. This puts courts in a difficult position between “conviction and sentencing” and “acquittal and release” and directly affects the quality of death penalty trials.

    Qi Qi also indicates that wrongful criminal convictions are basically all related to coercion of confessions through torture.

    According to media reports, there were two robbery-homicides of two taxi drivers in Xiaoshan, Zhejiang, in 1995. Lacking murder weapons or fingerprint evidence and primarily relying on confessions, four people were sentenced to suspended death sentences and one person was sentenced to life imprisonment. Last December, it was proven that another person may have been the culprit. Currently, the Zhejiang high court has already launched a review of the case.

    “Pursuing a 100-Percent Solution Rate is Unrealistic”

    The Beijing News [hereafter, “BN”]: In your recommendation, you listed 11 circumstances in which the evidence in death penalty cases may be problematic.

    Qi Qi [hereafter, “QQ”]: These circumstances can all lead to mistaken judgements, so it’s necessary for investigative authorities to strengthen their work in these areas.

    BN: Sometimes coercion of confessions through torture is used in order to obtain evidence. How do you view [this problem]?

    QQ: Objectively speaking, police and crime are antagonistic. Despite this opposition, even when a suspect disavows and denies [criminal activity], his human rights still need to be protected. But sometimes police will get emotional and use brute force or even torture. Even if this brute force leads to confessions that solve some cases, it still can lead to some major negative side effects and forced admissions that lead to wrongful convictions. So, the law in all countries takes a negative view toward the coercion of confession and prohibits it.

    BN: Why has it still not been eliminated?

    QQ: In the past, there was a one-sided saying that “confession is the king of evidence.” Once there’s a confession, finding some evidence to prove the crime based on that confession seems to have relatively few costs. Moreover, police are often under pressure to solve cases as quickly as possible, and it’s very difficult to go around searching for traces and remnants when time is relatively short. Now we ask police not to be over-reliant on confessions and place more emphasis on using detection and technical methods to gather objective evidence. Confessions are also important, but they must accord with the truth.

    BN: Where does the pressure on public security to solve cases come from?

    QQ: For example, if there has been a series of major cases involving serious threats to social order, there will be great pressure on public security. When there’s great pressure to solve cases, sometimes one may be misled and biased in the collection of evidence.

    In the past, there was a saying that “murder cases must be solved.” This actually was a kind of idealistic target, but blindly pursuing a 100-percent solution rate is unrealistic. From their perspective, courts cannot approve this “murder cases must be solved” notion because it doesn’t accord with [the principle of] seeking truth from facts. The ability to maintain a relatively high solution rate is already pretty good.

    BN: If there are problems with the evidence provided by the investigating authority, is it difficult for the court to discover them?

    QQ: Besides sending along evidence of the defendant’s criminal charges, [investigators] also must send along any mitigating or exculpatory evidence. When evidence that doesn’t support conviction is not sent, it becomes a choice between subjective and objective evidence. If they don’t submit it, it becomes much harder for us to discover, because there’s no way for us to know about the evidence they haven’t submitted. If we haven’t even seen any evidence that benefits the defendant, this can lead to mistaken judgments.

    “Court Acquittals Pressure Police, Prosecutors”

    BN: Who should be held responsible for wrongful convictions?

    QQ: If one of our judges handled a case improperly, we first need to look at whether he intentionally concealed evidence or there was gross negligence. If [there was], then [the judge] bears major responsibility. If there wasn’t this sort of intent or gross negligence, then mainly we need to analyze the lessons learned, learn from this case, and work hard to raise the level of professionalism.

    BN: Can’t lawyers put forward evidence that benefits the defendant?

    QQ: If a lawyer discovers evidence that is beneficial to the defendant—including the belief that the defendant was tortured—he or she will provide it. But lawyers don’t have the means to conduct criminal investigations and are generally only able to provide assistance on the basis of the existing evidence.

    BN: Can [defendants] afford to retain lawyers in all criminal cases?

    QQ: In most instances, no. In recent years, Zhejiang courts have taken the lead in expanding the scope of legal aid. Defendants who face sentences of three years’ imprisonment or more but cannot afford a lawyer are all provided with legal aid. Last year alone, we added more than 10,000 people to the ranks of those getting criminal defense.

    In the past, the proportion of indigent defendants who got legal aid was very low because they had to go through a tedious process of providing all sorts of documentation to prove their financial need. Then, we talked things over with the [provincial] justice department, [noting that] anyone whose family had the least bit of economic means would certainly do their best to hire a lawyer. If someone didn’t hire a lawyer, generally it was because their family was poor. Later, the justice department supported legal aid in criminal cases.

    BN: Isn’t it more trouble for judges when there is greater participation from lawyers?

    QQ: Yes, it’s somewhat troublesome for judges. When defense counsel is present, court hearings are a bit longer. But without defense counsel, there is an imbalance between prosecution and defense in the criminal court. Some say that more than 95 percent of criminal cases are merely a formality [because] the evidence is basically on file and clear and it doesn’t matter whether there’s a defense lawyer or not.

    I tell judges that even if 99 out of 100 cases are merely a formality, if we can stop one case where there are real problems with the evidence that may even lead to wrongful conviction, then that would be terrific and protective of human rights.

    BN: What is the impact of an acquittal?

    QQ: Acquittals are a common occurrence in some developed countries with Anglo-American legal systems. For a long time, based on the inertia of our criminal process, if a court acquits then the public might put a lot of pressure on the prosecutors and the police because it seems really serious. Actually, when a court rules against the procuratorate it doesn’t mean that it is indulging criminals.

    If this time the evidence at court wasn’t enough to trap you, we’ll continue to keep an eye on you and when we collect enough evidence we’ll eventually bring you to justice. If only the public thought this way! Now, [judges] are only allowed to be right; they can’t make mistakes. When faced with obstacles, we have very little leeway.

    “Conclusions of Xiaoshan Case Review Can’t Be Put Off Indefinitely”

    BN: In the Xiaoshan case, there were suspended death sentences instead of immediate death sentences. Why was there no “presumption of innocence”?

    QQ: Looking at it from a professional standpoint, at the time it was unthinkable not to impose the death penalty for the murder of two taxi drivers, so it wasn’t easy to suspend those three death sentences. Under the conditions of the time, [death with reprieve] was the only available leeway. If those people had been executed, then now there would be even less ability to remedy the situation. In all fairness, the evidence at the time perhaps wouldn’t have [triggered] a “presumption of innocence.”

    BN: How much longer will it take for conclusions in the review of this case?

    QQ: I think this case won’t be put off indefinitely, and we won’t have to wait very long. I understand that the media wants things to move more quickly. But I want to explain to the media that conviction of crime needs to be done carefully. It shouldn’t be done in the campaign style of “shooting tigers.” Correcting errors also needs to be done carefully and mustn’t be done in the campaign style of following herd mentality. Give us a bit of time. We’re very serious [about this case].

    BN: Do you feel that there are any patterns behind wrongful convictions?

    QQ: Wrongful criminal convictions are basically all related to the coercion of confessions through torture. The majority likely involve eagerness to solve the case, following preconceived notions, subjective judgment, listening only to one side, relying on torture to obtain confessions, and confessions made under duress. Recently, an American prosecutor published a book called False Justice: Eight Myths that Convict the Innocent. We have already distributed copies to judges in the higher court and intermediate courts.

    BN: What do you hope they’ll learn from this book?

    QQ: This book’s author [The book is authored by Jim and Nancy Petro; Mr. Petro is the former attorney general of Ohio—Ed.] uses his experience as a prosecutor to educate legal professionals about how to prevent miscarriages of justice. There are many patterns, and he summarizes 17 common mistakes that are made. For example, don’t assume that only the guilty confess to crimes, don’t assume that miscarriages of justice occur because of rational human error, and don’t assume that all false convictions get corrected during the appellate process.

  • Rule of Law: From Official Rhetoric to Public Participation

    As a new Chinese leadership takes office at the beginning of 2013 there has been much discussion and speculation about what might be in store for reform of China’s legal system. One place to look for signs of things to come might be in official rhetoric, which has shown signs of moderating the rigid “stability maintenance” policies of recent years in favor of policies that relax some political control over the legal system and place more emphasis on rule of law development.

    Hainan University Law School Professor Wang Lin.
    Photo credit: jcrb.com

    In assessing the prospects for legal reform, law professor Wang Lin, who frequently comments on legal affairs for a number of Chinese newspapers, looks not only at official pronouncements but also at the role played by social pressure and public opinion in shaping the reform agenda. In an article published recently in The Beijing News, Wang notes that controversy surrounding the handling of individual cases has energized the public’s enthusiasm for participation in the process of legal reform. This controversy can sometimes be noisy and contentious, but, he argues, it is ultimately a positive force—especially in its tendency to focus on problematic aspects of the legal system. Rather than attempt to steer the public away from discussion of these shortcomings, Wang suggests (in a theme he has discussed in detail before) that the government and legislators would be better off formalizing channels for public participation in the drafting of legislation and planning of new legal institutions.

    This does not necessarily shed any light on what future legal reforms might be, but it does point to the links between legal reform and political reform in China and raises the possibility that growing public expectations and demands rule of law might have implications that are broader than legislation and legal institutions themselves.

    *
    Pace of “Rule of Law Construction” Can’t Keep Up With “Rule of Law Demand”

    Wang Lin, The Beijing News
    February 2, 2013

    In terms of building rule of law in China, 2012 was a year to remember. That year was the 30th anniversary of the promulgation of the current constitution as well as the 100th anniversary of the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China. Reviewing what has been more than a century of Chinese constitutionalism, reveals a time of many re-tunings and repeated twists and turns.

    Perhaps because there are still many gaps between the current rule of law situation and society’s rule of law demands, the report [delivered by General Secretary Hu Jintao] at the 18th Party Congress placed particular emphasis on [the need to] “accelerate construction of a socialist country based on the rule of law” and “place greater emphasis on the important role the rule of law plays in the country’s governance and in social management.” The phrase “accelerate construction” clearly reveals the urgency of rule of law to China.

    As for how to “accelerate construction,” the report of the 18th Party Congress placed special stress on: “ensur[ing] that leading officials are guided by law in both thinking and action in their effort to deepen reform, promote development, solve problems, and maintain stability.” In order to draw a clear distinction with rule by man, the ruling party repeated its warning that “no organization or individual has the privilege of overstepping the constitution and laws, and no one in a position of power is allowed in any way to take one’s own words as the law, place one’s own authority above the law or abuse the law.”

    Legislative Progress: Reform of the Criminal and Civil Procedure Laws, Enactment of a Mental Health Law…
    Public Enthusiasm for Legislative Participation Continues to Surge

    The best way for those in power and legislators to reduce contention and soothe public sentiment is to be more humble, respect democratic rights, and maintain positive interaction with public opinion. Compared to “guiding opinion,” paying attention to legislative bills themselves is the foundation and core.

    Another important influence that the 18th Party Congress will have on China’s future can be seen in the new guiding policy for building rule of law: “Make laws in a scientific way, enforce them strictly, administer justice impartially, and ensure that everyone abides by the law.” According to Aristotle’s classic theory, the two basic key elements of rule of law are that there be widespread obedience to laws that have already been enacted and that the laws that everyone obeys be good laws. In order to have “good laws,” we must “make laws in a scientific way.” Given the present degree of social stratification and frequent conflict and somewhat obstructed channels for policy entrepreneurship and interest competition in the legislative process, debate over the enactment and revision of legislation has become unprecedentedly fierce.

    The most important legislative events in 2012 were, by far, the revision of the two major procedural laws—the Criminal Procedure Law and the Civil Procedure Law. Although these were only revisions, when you consider it in terms of institutional evolution or look at the number [of provisions] revised, the significance of the revisions to the two major procedural laws far exceeds that of any other legislation last year. The revision of the Criminal Procedure Law covered nearly all aspects of the criminal process: from case-filing to investigation; then to prosecution, defense, adjudication, and implementation; plus a system [covering] evidence. Revision of the Civil Procedure Law covered seven major areas, ranging from the first inclusion of “public interest litigation” in the law and establishment of “small-claims litigation” to things like further definition of adjudication jurisdiction, enactment of property preservation measures, and optimization of a party’s right to request a retrial—none of these is insignificant.

    Although revisions to the two major procedural laws were widely different in terms of specific content, there was a shared pursuit of safeguarding human rights. The revised Criminal Procedure Law included the phrase “respect and safeguard human rights” in its section on general principles, and human rights thinking was also expressed in the provisions of the Civil Procedure Law. Even though “respect and safeguard human rights” was already a constitutional principle and lower-order legislation is expected to abide by the constitution, this principle of “safeguarding human rights” would run the risk of being put aside and forgotten about if it were not given particular shape and detail in the legal system through the two major procedural laws, which act as “laws for the application of the constitution.”

    Laws are revised to change with the times, and once a revised law takes effect it brings new impetus for social development. For example, the establishment of rules to exclude illegal evidence will directly bring about changes to methods of investigation. Legislation allowing public interest litigation will directly or indirectly promote the development of social organizations.

    In 2012, public enthusiasm for participating in the legislative process continued to surge. In a related development, splits in public opinion during the legislative process remained as visible as ever. For example, during revision of the Criminal Procedure Law online public opinion was focused on Article 73, which was labeled the “secret arrest” [provision], and the focus of online opinion for the Mental Health Law was how to deal with “forced psychiatric treatment.” But in the field of official opinion, these worries about individual provisions were considered to be “making mountains out of molehills”; [officials] were more interested in looking at accomplishments and progress. The stark difference between these two fields of opinion is obvious. For the public, which places more emphasis on “participation,” discussion and criticism should, of course, focus on “problem provisions.” Passage of unproblematic provisions about which there is already consensus should be automatic—why even discuss it?

    So, the best way for those in power and legislators to reduce contention and soothe public sentiment is to be more humble, respect democratic rights, and maintain positive interaction with public opinion. Compared to “guiding opinion,” paying attention to legislative bills themselves is the foundation and core.

    Unsolved Problems: Adding “Crime of Child Abuse,” Abolishing “Crime of Prostitution with Underage Girls,” RTL System Reform…
    Public Still Has Many Expectations for Systemic Change

    For China in “the period of advancing rule of law construction,” the “Bo-Gu Kailai murder case” and the associated “Wang Lijun case” make clear to all that “all problems are, in the end, problems for the judicial system.”

    In the legislative memory of 2012, the equally fierce debates over adding a “crime of child abuse,” abolishing the “crime of prostitution with underage girls,” and reform of re-education through labor (RTL) each remain problems unsolved. Behind each of these public debates is the shadow of individual cases.

    In October 2012, after the “Wenling kindergarten teacher child abuse case,” the public security organ placed suspect Yan X under criminal detention for creating a serious disturbance. This caused a fierce debate within legal circles over crime and punishment for Yan. Of particular note is that, at least in the print media, no legal professionals ever expressed the customary concern that “the people of the nation want this person dead.” On the contrary, discussion and analysis of “statutorily prescribed punishment for a crime” occupied the mainstream. This individual case quickly transformed from a “legal discussion” into a “legislative discussion.” This shows that the media’s oversight over [the handling of] individual cases is increasingly rational and cautious.

    Whether to retain or abolish the “crime of prostitution with underage girls” is a longstanding topic of discussion. In 2012, two “underage prostitution cases” (one in Yongkang, Zhejiang, and the other in Yongcheng, Henan) brought this debate to the fore once again, where it stayed through the end of the year. And in 2012 calls for abolition of the RTL system reached a new peak, with the flames fanned by influential individual cases like the “Tang Hui case” and “Ren Jianyu case.” Reform of RTL has already reached “a point of no return.”

    In the age of social media, [the number of] cases that can be called “influential cases” increases by the day. In selections of the “Top Ten Influential Cases of the Year,” the “Bo-Gu Kailai and Zhang Xiaojun murder case” made the lists of Southern Weekly and other institutions. For China in “the period of advancing rule of law construction,” this case and the associated “Wang Lijun case” make clear to all that “all problems are, in the end, problems for the judicial system.”

    More proof of how “individual cases have become public events” would be the “Wu Ying case.” After the Supreme People’s Court remanded this case for retrial, the Zhejiang Province High People’s Court issued a final decision on May 21, 2012, sentencing Wu Ying to death, suspended for two years, for the crime of fundraising fraud, and depriving her of her political rights for life and confiscating all of her personal assets. But the distinction between illegal fundraising and private lending still remains unclear. The greatest significance of Wu Ying’s case is the way it has sped up the pace of reform of private financing and led to the creation of a specific “Wenzhou Pilot Zone for Comprehensive Financial Reform.” There will probably be many more “Wu Yings” in the future, but no one hopes to see any more “Wu Ying cases.”

    On October 5, 2011, 13 Chinese crew members were shot and killed by armed attackers while on a boat in the waters of the Mekong River. The “Mekong River Massacre” that took place outside of China’s borders ultimately became the “Mekong River Special Case” under China’s jurisdiction and Naw Kham and others were charged with crimes including intentional homicide, transporting narcotics, kidnapping, and hijacking a ship. On November 6, the Kunming Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Naw Kham and three other principal defendants to death. In this way, the “Mekong River Special Case” became “China’s first case of judicial sovereignty.”

    Events in Focus: Shooting of Violent Criminal Zhou Kehua, Wang Lijun’s “Shift from Red to Black,” Li Yapeng Becomes a “Rule of Law Personality”…
    Debate over Personalities and Incidents Promotes Progress toward Rule of Law

    The judicial process should be authoritative, and it is unnecessary for rule of law to have role models. We should not be concerned if the field of public opinion becomes too contentious or too negative. Debate over personalities and incidents is a positive force for promoting progress toward rule of law.

    In this age of deconstruction, authority is weakening and role models are faint and dim. What we remember is the violent criminal Zhou Kehua’s destiny with death, the “narrow escape from death” of the controversial young woman Wu Ying, and “Ph.D. Advisor” Wang Lijun’s shift from red to black. But we probably don’t remember the police officer who shot down Zhou Kehua, the judges who sent Wu Ying back for retrial, or the prosecutors who brought Wang Lijun to trial.

    It is difficult to make a list of positive people [involved with] rule of law during the year. For the inclusion of [actor] Li Yapeng on the [list of] “CCTV Rule of Law Personalities of 2012” received a lot of criticism. This doesn’t mean that Li Yapeng’s private philanthropy activities don’t merit praise; what the public questions is what this person and his affairs have to do with “rule of law for the year.”

    Returning to common sense, as far as public power is concerned, the goal of rule of law is to place limits on its exercise; as far as specific individuals are concerned, rule of law is aimed at “living proper lives, not harming others, and each receiving what they deserve.” The judicial process should be authoritative, and role models are unnecessary for rule of law. We should not be concerned if the field of public opinion becomes too contentious or too negative. Debate over personalities and incidents is a positive force for promoting progress toward rule of law.

  • Kneeling Down to Stand Up: Petitioning China’s Premier

    Petitioners kneel on a highway in Yunnan Province in 2010. Photo credit: Xinhua

    Earlier this month, the national newspaper Legal Weekly published an essay by commentator Xie Yuhang that reflects on the phenomenon of “kneeling petitions” in light of a recent incident involving Premier Wen Jiabao.

    Following a deadly September earthquake in Yunnan Province, Wen visited the epicenter in Yiliang County to inspect the damage and recovery efforts. There, his motorcade was blocked by a group of farmers seeking redress for local land seizures. Wen reportedly stopped to speak with the petitioners and promised that their concerns would be handled to their satisfaction. More than two months later (shortly after the close of the 18th Party Congress), one of the petitioners, Liang Yonglan, was abruptly taken into custody by local police and given a seven-day administrative detention for “disrupting public order.” She was released the following day after paying a 1,000 yuan bond, but soon thereafter the detention order was revoked and the county police chief dispatched to deliver an apology.

    Xie’s essay follows a conventional praise-and-blame model in which the patient and generous manner displayed by China’s premier is contrasted with not only the particular attempts by Yiliang police to punish Liang but also with the more general tendency of some local officials to punish petitioners on the pretext of “abnormal petitioning.”

    Aside from its rather fawning portrayal of Premier Wen, Xie’s essay accepts, rather uncritically, the value of petitioning as an institution. The system of “letters and visits,” which offers citizens a chance to protect their rights by communicating grievances to higher authorities, serves many functions in the Chinese governance system. As one of many alternative channels for dispute resolution, the petitioning system helps reduce the burden on China’s courts. In theory, it can also help to resolve disputes before they turn into violent or destructive “mass incidents.” And by channeling information about local corruption or misconduct upward through the bureaucracy, it gives senior officials an opportunity to deal with problematic cadres.

    But the petitioning system is also widely seen as being overburdened and ineffective. Observers have long noted that the system tends to push petitioners towards larger and more dramatic actions in hopes of getting the attention of high officials, a tendency reflected in the popular saying: “A big disturbance leads to a big solution, a small disturbance leads to a small solution, and no disturbance leads to no solution.” And because petitioning activity tends to reflect badly on the performance of local officials, there is a natural incentive for them to use a mixture of “carrot and stick” techniques to prevent local grievances from reflecting poorly upon their chances of promotion.

    In practice, the petitioning system serves more often as a way of containing grievances (rather than resolving them), in part by fostering expectations of the possibility for official intervention and remedy. If the system functioned as intended, it might not be necessary for someone like Liang Yonglan to take the drastic step of blocking the premier’s motorcade to resolve local problems. Xie may be right that kneeling petitions are designed to minimize risks of retaliation and that Liang’s “kneeling petition” (and the act of petitioning in general) reflects a degree of faith in senior leaders, but one can also read the incident more cynically as a calculated strategy designed to maximize publicity and pressure. As another commentator opined in response to a previous case of kneeling petitioner Zhang Yanhui: “good fortune wasn’t won through her humiliating kneeling but relied instead on the expanded channels for online oversight and the questioning of government brought about by the microblog era.”

    *
    Full Trust Lies Behind Kneeling Petitions

    Xie Yuhang, Legal Weekly
    December 4, 2012

    When Premier Wen Jiabao arrived in Yiliang County, Yunnan, to inspect the damage after the September earthquake, Liang Yonglan and dozens of other local residents knelt at the village entrance to petition and present their complaints about land seizures to the premier. On November 19, Liang Yonglan was given a seven-day administrative detention by local police on what was called suspicion of disrupting public order. Afterwards, on the 20th, she was released ahead of schedule. Recently, the Zhaotong Public Security Bureau revoked the administrative detention order against Liang Yonglan, and Yiliang County Deputy Mayor and Public Security Bureau Chief Li Jiajun went to Liang Yonglan’s home to apologize.

    Kneeling in petition is also a kind of petitioning. Petitioning makes many people unhappy, and thus makes the fate of petitioners rather unfortunate. If you want to petition but also minimize as much risk as possible, kneeling in petition may be a way to make the best of a bad situation.

    It’s easy for petitioners to get hit with all sorts of “labels.” Certain locations have issued comprehensive regulations concerning various types of “abnormal petitioning” behavior—such as wearing clothing upon which one’s grievances are written, holding sit-ins, self-maiming, attempting suicide, carrying banners, and displaying petition documents—all of which are equated with deliberately causing trouble and are prohibited. Given this exhaustive list, as long as one petitions, it will be difficult not to “step on a landmine.” Kneeling in petition is probably the best way of avoiding punishment on pretext because it doesn’t come across as malicious or confrontational and shows respect and trust in leaders. Perhaps it’s because of this that Zhang Yanhui, a woman from Huaiyang, Henan, who knelt in petition before [her local] county party secretary, was to some extent “successful.”

    But kneeling in petition before the premier is not a small matter. Even if Liang Yonglan were bolder, she wouldn’t dare kneel before the premier’s vehicle if she didn’t have a deep trust in Wen Jiabao.

    The facts prove that Liang Yonglan and the others made the right judgment and their trust was not mistaken. Faced with Liang and the other farmers kneeling in petition, the premier not only got out of his car himself, [he also] shook hands with the farmers, asked them about their problems, and indicated that a satisfactory response would be given. Most importantly, it should be pointed out that in judging the nature of the kneeling petitioners’ actions, the premier said: “This is the farmer’s fundamental right and should not be obstructed.”

    However, some people have different ideas. They think that blocking the premier’s motorcade obstructs the premier’s official business and “disrupts public order.” To be sure, the premier’s vehicle cannot be blocked for any old reason. A country’s highest administrative leader has many important responsibilities that most of the time cannot afford the least bit of delay. If ordinary people were to block [the premier’s] vehicle over every little matter, how could he handle larger national affairs? But [these defenders of public order] perhaps overlook the special nature of the premier’s itinerary on this occasion—the premier went to inspect Yiliang precisely in order to understand the [local] people’s situation. Even though he went on account of an earthquake, this does not mean that he can only understand the situation relating to the disaster and that other matters cannot be raised. What’s more, Liang Yonglan and the others were not completely ignorant of the “rules”: their kneeling petition only took just over two minutes of the premier’s time.

    If the kneeling petition by Liang Yonglan and the others had any adverse effect, it was a loss of face for local officials. If ordinary people resort to kneeling petitions, it shows that they have major grievances—if there is local disharmony, it is because [local] officials have not governed well. That ordinary people don’t turn to local officials when they have grievances shows that they either have no way to protect their rights or do not trust local officials. This is perhaps why some local officials are particularly unwelcoming towards petitioning. In some places, local officials even take repressive measures against petitioners, mobilizing public power to strike back against petitioners on all sorts of pretexts in an effort to “kill a chicken to warn the monkeys.”

    Actually, it’s extremely unwise to try to eliminate petitioning through repression. Repression carries extremely high costs. Whether it’s enacting all sorts of rules against petitioners so that they will be punished at the slightest move or tracking and intercepting petitioners … all of these require huge investments of human and material resources. Moreover, even if these prevention measures are stronger, it’s hard to avoid loopholes. One ought to realize that if ordinary people have grievances, there must be some way to resolve them. Either officials keep rights-protection channels open in the localities they govern so that ordinary people’s rights get sufficient relief, or ordinary people will petition—petitioning is a good thing, because it shows that [people] believe in the government and believe in the ability of the vertical oversight system to resolve problems.

    Different attitudes toward petitioning will result in different outcomes. Being generous like the premier and showing a bit more tolerance, more understanding, and, when possible, more patience will not only help to resolve conflicts in a timely manner and preserve social harmony but also help to garner positive credibility and win the respect and trust of average people. [Acting] conversely may add insult to injury, allowing the situation to continue to get worse, and as was the case among some people in Yiliang County, infringing upon the rights and interests of petitioners will only make one more reactive.

    The Zhaotong Public Security Bureau’s revocation of the administrative detention order against Liang Yonglan and the Yiliang County Public Security Bureau’s personal apology have already rejected the methods earlier applied by certain people. This acknowledgement of fault and willingness to change has earned much praise. But a more ideal situation would be to avoid making mistakes as much as possible, especially mistakes that could have been avoided in the first place.

  • Kneeling Down to Stand Up: Petitioning China’s Premier

    Petitioners kneel on a highway in Yunnan Province in 2010. Photo credit: Xinhua

    Earlier this month, the national newspaper Legal Weekly published an essay by commentator Xie Yuhang that reflects on the phenomenon of “kneeling petitions” in light of a recent incident involving Premier Wen Jiabao.

    Following a deadly September earthquake in Yunnan Province, Wen visited the epicenter in Yiliang County to inspect the damage and recovery efforts. There, his motorcade was blocked by a group of farmers seeking redress for local land seizures. Wen reportedly stopped to speak with the petitioners and promised that their concerns would be handled to their satisfaction. More than two months later (shortly after the close of the 18th Party Congress), one of the petitioners, Liang Yonglan, was abruptly taken into custody by local police and given a seven-day administrative detention for “disrupting public order.” She was released the following day after paying a 1,000 yuan bond, but soon thereafter the detention order was revoked and the county police chief dispatched to deliver an apology.

    Xie’s essay follows a conventional praise-and-blame model in which the patient and generous manner displayed by China’s premier is contrasted with not only the particular attempts by Yiliang police to punish Liang but also with the more general tendency of some local officials to punish petitioners on the pretext of “abnormal petitioning.”

    Aside from its rather fawning portrayal of Premier Wen, Xie’s essay accepts, rather uncritically, the value of petitioning as an institution. The system of “letters and visits,” which offers citizens a chance to protect their rights by communicating grievances to higher authorities, serves many functions in the Chinese governance system. As one of many alternative channels for dispute resolution, the petitioning system helps reduce the burden on China’s courts. In theory, it can also help to resolve disputes before they turn into violent or destructive “mass incidents.” And by channeling information about local corruption or misconduct upward through the bureaucracy, it gives senior officials an opportunity to deal with problematic cadres.

    But the petitioning system is also widely seen as being overburdened and ineffective. Observers have long noted that the system tends to push petitioners towards larger and more dramatic actions in hopes of getting the attention of high officials, a tendency reflected in the popular saying: “A big disturbance leads to a big solution, a small disturbance leads to a small solution, and no disturbance leads to no solution.” And because petitioning activity tends to reflect badly on the performance of local officials, there is a natural incentive for them to use a mixture of “carrot and stick” techniques to prevent local grievances from reflecting poorly upon their chances of promotion.

    In practice, the petitioning system serves more often as a way of containing grievances (rather than resolving them), in part by fostering expectations of the possibility for official intervention and remedy. If the system functioned as intended, it might not be necessary for someone like Liang Yonglan to take the drastic step of blocking the premier’s motorcade to resolve local problems. Xie may be right that kneeling petitions are designed to minimize risks of retaliation and that Liang’s “kneeling petition” (and the act of petitioning in general) reflects a degree of faith in senior leaders, but one can also read the incident more cynically as a calculated strategy designed to maximize publicity and pressure. As another commentator opined in response to a previous case of kneeling petitioner Zhang Yanhui: “good fortune wasn’t won through her humiliating kneeling but relied instead on the expanded channels for online oversight and the questioning of government brought about by the microblog era.”

    *
    Full Trust Lies Behind Kneeling Petitions

    Xie Yuhang, Legal Weekly
    December 4, 2012

    When Premier Wen Jiabao arrived in Yiliang County, Yunnan, to inspect the damage after the September earthquake, Liang Yonglan and dozens of other local residents knelt at the village entrance to petition and present their complaints about land seizures to the premier. On November 19, Liang Yonglan was given a seven-day administrative detention by local police on what was called suspicion of disrupting public order. Afterwards, on the 20th, she was released ahead of schedule. Recently, the Zhaotong Public Security Bureau revoked the administrative detention order against Liang Yonglan, and Yiliang County Deputy Mayor and Public Security Bureau Chief Li Jiajun went to Liang Yonglan’s home to apologize.

    Kneeling in petition is also a kind of petitioning. Petitioning makes many people unhappy, and thus makes the fate of petitioners rather unfortunate. If you want to petition but also minimize as much risk as possible, kneeling in petition may be a way to make the best of a bad situation.

    It’s easy for petitioners to get hit with all sorts of “labels.” Certain locations have issued comprehensive regulations concerning various types of “abnormal petitioning” behavior—such as wearing clothing upon which one’s grievances are written, holding sit-ins, self-maiming, attempting suicide, carrying banners, and displaying petition documents—all of which are equated with deliberately causing trouble and are prohibited. Given this exhaustive list, as long as one petitions, it will be difficult not to “step on a landmine.” Kneeling in petition is probably the best way of avoiding punishment on pretext because it doesn’t come across as malicious or confrontational and shows respect and trust in leaders. Perhaps it’s because of this that Zhang Yanhui, a woman from Huaiyang, Henan, who knelt in petition before [her local] county party secretary, was to some extent “successful.”

    But kneeling in petition before the premier is not a small matter. Even if Liang Yonglan were bolder, she wouldn’t dare kneel before the premier’s vehicle if she didn’t have a deep trust in Wen Jiabao.

    The facts prove that Liang Yonglan and the others made the right judgment and their trust was not mistaken. Faced with Liang and the other farmers kneeling in petition, the premier not only got out of his car himself, [he also] shook hands with the farmers, asked them about their problems, and indicated that a satisfactory response would be given. Most importantly, it should be pointed out that in judging the nature of the kneeling petitioners’ actions, the premier said: “This is the farmer’s fundamental right and should not be obstructed.”

    However, some people have different ideas. They think that blocking the premier’s motorcade obstructs the premier’s official business and “disrupts public order.” To be sure, the premier’s vehicle cannot be blocked for any old reason. A country’s highest administrative leader has many important responsibilities that most of the time cannot afford the least bit of delay. If ordinary people were to block [the premier’s] vehicle over every little matter, how could he handle larger national affairs? But [these defenders of public order] perhaps overlook the special nature of the premier’s itinerary on this occasion—the premier went to inspect Yiliang precisely in order to understand the [local] people’s situation. Even though he went on account of an earthquake, this does not mean that he can only understand the situation relating to the disaster and that other matters cannot be raised. What’s more, Liang Yonglan and the others were not completely ignorant of the “rules”: their kneeling petition only took just over two minutes of the premier’s time.

    If the kneeling petition by Liang Yonglan and the others had any adverse effect, it was a loss of face for local officials. If ordinary people resort to kneeling petitions, it shows that they have major grievances—if there is local disharmony, it is because [local] officials have not governed well. That ordinary people don’t turn to local officials when they have grievances shows that they either have no way to protect their rights or do not trust local officials. This is perhaps why some local officials are particularly unwelcoming towards petitioning. In some places, local officials even take repressive measures against petitioners, mobilizing public power to strike back against petitioners on all sorts of pretexts in an effort to “kill a chicken to warn the monkeys.”

    Actually, it’s extremely unwise to try to eliminate petitioning through repression. Repression carries extremely high costs. Whether it’s enacting all sorts of rules against petitioners so that they will be punished at the slightest move or tracking and intercepting petitioners … all of these require huge investments of human and material resources. Moreover, even if these prevention measures are stronger, it’s hard to avoid loopholes. One ought to realize that if ordinary people have grievances, there must be some way to resolve them. Either officials keep rights-protection channels open in the localities they govern so that ordinary people’s rights get sufficient relief, or ordinary people will petition—petitioning is a good thing, because it shows that [people] believe in the government and believe in the ability of the vertical oversight system to resolve problems.

    Different attitudes toward petitioning will result in different outcomes. Being generous like the premier and showing a bit more tolerance, more understanding, and, when possible, more patience will not only help to resolve conflicts in a timely manner and preserve social harmony but also help to garner positive credibility and win the respect and trust of average people. [Acting] conversely may add insult to injury, allowing the situation to continue to get worse, and as was the case among some people in Yiliang County, infringing upon the rights and interests of petitioners will only make one more reactive.

    The Zhaotong Public Security Bureau’s revocation of the administrative detention order against Liang Yonglan and the Yiliang County Public Security Bureau’s personal apology have already rejected the methods earlier applied by certain people. This acknowledgement of fault and willingness to change has earned much praise. But a more ideal situation would be to avoid making mistakes as much as possible, especially mistakes that could have been avoided in the first place.

  • Call for Constitutionalism at the 18th Party Congress

    18th National Party Congress Press Conference Center. Photo: Xinhua

    At a press conference on the eve of the 18th Party Congress, a spokesman told reporters that the delegates assembled in Beijing to select China’s newest leadership group “brought with them the wishes of the Chinese people.” Indeed, as they did at the time of China’s last leadership transition 10 years ago, many in and outside China have high expectations for China’s incoming leadership, looking to them to push forward all sorts of much-needed economic, legal, and political reform.

    In a recent interview with the Economic Observer newspaper, Shanghai-based constitutional scholar Tong Zhiwei expresses his own hopes that China’s coming decade will bring a renewed commitment to the principles of constitutional governance. As Tong explains, such a commitment to limiting state power and protecting individual rights would have profound ramifications for China’s economy, its legal institutions, and especially its political system.

    *
    Constitutional Rule: Current Realities and Future Visions
    Meng Lei
    Economic Observer, November 3, 2012

    Conscientiously Protect Citizens’ Fundamental Rights

    Economic Observer [hereafter, EO]: A few days from now, the Chinese Communist Party will hold its 18th Party Congress and there will be a transition of the party’s central leadership. This year is also the 30th anniversary of the promulgation of the 1982 constitution. As a constitutional scholar, what prospects do you see for “ruling the country according to the constitution” in the coming decade?

    Professor Tong Zhiwei. Photo: 21CCOM.net

    Tong Zhiwei: It’s great that you’ve chosen to discuss things from the angle of ruling the country according to the constitution! To rule according to the constitution is a concrete requirement of constitutionalism; ruling according to the constitution means implementing constitutionalism, and implementing constitutionalism requires ruling according to the constitution. Governance is not an issue for ordinary citizens; it’s only a problem for state leaders and the ruling party. So, during the 18th Party Congress, it is necessary to discuss this fundamental issue.

    Essentially speaking, the most important aspects of constitutionalism are, first, the need to implement the restrictions and checks on [the exercise of] supreme power provided for in the constitution and, second, the need to conscientiously protect all of the fundamental rights of citizens that are affirmed by the constitution.

    In the 30 years since the current constitution took effect, constitutional implementation has made major achievements overall, but has also encountered some fairly major problems. We don’t lack for self-praise, so with respect to ruling according to the constitution I think I’ll focus on what hasn’t been done well and where it is necessary to exert significant effort to improve.

    Whether one is talking about rule according to the constitution or constitutionalism, the first requirement is the need to place all public power under the regulation or restriction of the constitution and not allowing [the existence of] any power that is unchecked or not subject to restriction by the constitution. But in our country, there are some basic issues of constitutionalism that have yet to be resolved. For starters, have a look at the power [enjoyed by] the party secretaries in some cities and counties—how are they restrained by the constitution? The most extreme [example] is Bo Xilai when he was in Chongqing. There he was called a leader of the ruling party, but the constitution and laws that were established in accordance with party proposals were simply unable to restrain him. He was called the leader of the municipal party committee, but in fact [he ran] a personal dictatorship where local institutions of state power and other state institutions set forth in the constitution were only for show. Under these circumstances, how can it be acceptable not to reform?

    Another requirement of rule according to the constitution or constitutionalism is the conscientious protection of citizens’ fundamental rights. Citizens’ fundamental rights refer to those individual rights affirmed in the constitution; rights that the state is obliged to protect. Over the past 30-plus years, our citizens’ fundamental rights have received fuller protection than they ever did in the past, but unfortunately, obvious defects exist. China is a country that strictly adheres to a statutory-law system in which the fundamental rights provided in the constitution generally must first be expressed through legislation before they can actually be protected. In reality, it remains an open question how to implement and how to use the law to protect these constitutional rights of citizens.

    EO: Without special legislation, these specific constitutional rights cannot be protected. In other words, when these rights are subjected to restriction, the constitution is not enough to be used as a “shield.”

    Tong: You’re a reporter, you’ve certainly heard sayings such as “there is freedom to research, but expression must be disciplined.” But can citizens’ fundamental rights be restricted through discipline? If so, it is the same as the deprivation of relevant fundamental rights.

    Citizen’s fundamental rights can only be restricted by laws. Moreover, laws restricting fundamental rights cannot protect these fundamental rights in form but negate them in practice. Also, laws restricting citizens’ fundamental rights cannot violate the constitution, because laws that violate the constitution are invalid. Of course, this necessitates an effective system of constitutional review, or, as our constitution puts it, a system to “oversee constitutional enforcement.”

    Here, it’s crucial to understand why all norms that are not laws, like administrative regulations, have no power to restrict citizens’ fundamental rights. The logic is simple. Taking China’s constitution as an example, if a fundamental right affirmed in a constitution that was passed by more than two thirds of all of the delegates to the National People’s Congress (NPC) could be restricted arbitrarily by central state organs like the State Council or by local state organs, it would effectively mean a veto over this right’s essence as a fundamental right and be no different in consequence from the constitution not affirming this right.

    Of course, this is not to say that without legal protections citizens are entirely unable to enjoy these rights. Without corresponding legal provisions, citizens more or less still enjoy some fundamental rights affirmed in the constitution, but this kind of enjoyment lacks stable, reliable protection.

    EO: Just now you were discussing constitutional rights that are not yet protected through specific laws. But in reality, there are some fundamental rights for which there is already specific legislation but the protection [of these rights] is still not ideal. What causes this?

    Tong: There are many reasons that can lead to this kind of situation.

    The first situation is that the legislation itself is problematic. Even though there are legal protections, things like violations of the principles of rule of law mean that the legislation doesn’t meet the standards of effective protection that are commonly necessary. For example, there are procedures in the Criminal Procedure Law that protect the right to personal liberty. According to rule-of-law principles, criminal coercive measures and investigative methods taken by investigative departments should be reviewed and approved by a court. But in the majority of situations our laws do not require review or approval by a court; rather, the public security departments decide and implement [these decisions] on their own. This is the case for residential surveillance, release on guarantee pending further investigation, seizure of property, monitoring, etc.

    The second scenario is when laws exist but are not followed. This has been particularly noticeable in recent years. I won’t discuss this in detail; readers can recall some of the more notorious cases from recent years.

    The third situation is when laws or administrative regulations violate the constitution. From a certain perspective, the system of reeducation through labor, which we have all had enough of, can be put in this category.

    The fourth situation is when a law’s derivative laws or normative documents violate the constitution or the law but cannot be reviewed in order to remedy the situation.

    Aside from this, there are also outrages committed by state agencies or officials who don’t follow any rules at all. These are even more terrifying.

    Exercise Power, Rule in Accordance with the Constitution

    EO: Besides protection through dedicated legislation, I’d like to ask you to discuss why courts can’t directly apply the constitutional provisions protecting fundamental rights. In this regard, didn’t we once discuss “judicialization of the constitution”?

    Tong: Constitutional adjudication is different from ordinary judicial discretion. Valid constitutional rulings must effectively restrain all state agencies and officials, otherwise they cannot be considered constitutional rulings and would have no significance. Our courts have a lower status than the people’s congresses and their standing committees. It would be unimaginable for a Chinese court ruling to restrain the NPC and its standing committee or even the people’s congress and standing committee at its own administrative level. So, there is no way to accomplish this so-called “judicialization of the constitution.” However, even if we cannot judicialize the constitution, it is possible to implement constitutional review, or, as provided for in our constitution, the oversight of constitutional enforcement. Oversight of constitutional enforcement is a power of the NPC and its standing committee. A dedicated body ought to be established to deal with this matter. We’ve discussed this issue for decades, ever since 1982 when the constitution was promulgated. Unfortunately, it has yet to be resolved. What we can strive for at the moment is to establish a dedicated constitutional oversight body.

    There has been much discussion of this subject. One of the more radical ideas is to have the NPC establish a constitutional committee, equal in status to the NPC Standing Committee, that would be able to review the constitutionality of all legislation except that passed by the NPC. A more moderate proposal is to establish a dedicated state agency under the NPC and its standing committee equal in rank to the State Council and the Supreme People’s Court. The most modest reform would involve setting up a special committee under the NPC, not an independent organ of the state, that would carry out specific review work related to oversight of constitutional enforcement and provide consultative opinions to the NPC and its standing committee. Whether it’s a constitutional court or constitutional committee, the most important thing is that it must not be all talk and no action.

    EO: On September 15, 2004, Comrade Hu Jintao said in a speech at the “50th anniversary commemoration of the establishment of the National People’s Congress”: “In order to rule the country in accordance with the law, we must first rule in accordance with the constitution. In order to exercise power in accordance with the law, we must first exercise power in accordance with the constitution.” Nevertheless, when Lu Yongxiang, vice chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, said last week that China’s fundamental [task] going forward would be to “exercise power and rule the country in accordance with the constitution,” the media and the public still treated it as a major, noteworthy event. Why do you think that some comrades, like theoreticians and leading cadres, treat this subject as taboo?

    Tong: If the constitution and laws are properly utilized, they can be used to resolve all problems. However, because many leading cadres are not familiar with the constitution, they don’t have a clear understanding about how to resolve problems within the framework of the constitution or law. When there is no effective implementation of the constitution or laws, much of the time it is mainly because of poor use by institutions of public power and their officials.

    Moreover, it’s much easier to talk about doing things or governing in accordance with the constitution than it is to have correct understandings. A fundamental requirement of ruling in accordance with the constitution is, first, that those bodies that exercise constitutional state authority are themselves based in the constitution. In other words, the name of that body or official position can be found in the constitution. Bodies or official positions that are not named in the text of the constitution cannot exercise constitutional state power—that is most important. A big problem we currently face is that some party and governmental bodies commonly exceed their authority and exercise state power. All state power derives from the people, and the people express themselves legally through voting. Only organizations or persons that are directly or indirectly elected by voters are those that have been granted state power by the voters. At present, there are still many matters with which there is a gap from this standard.

    EO: Returning to the constitution itself, how do you assess the results of constitutional amendments over the years?

    Tong: I normally divide constitutional amendments into comprehensive and partial amendments. The 1982 constitution was a comprehensive amendment of the 1978 Constitution, while since 1982 the constitution has undergone four partial amendments. Without question, the 1982 Constitution is more advanced than the 1978 Constitution, and the current constitution is a relatively good one.

    No matter whether one is talking about comprehensive or partial amendments, the biggest problem that has emerged in our country over the course of all previous amendments remains an insufficient mentality regarding constitutional enforcement. The constitution is emblematic of [the state of] democracy and rule of law, and without a constitution you cannot even speak of these things. So, in the past, consideration mostly went to creating a constitution in order to represent [these things], whereas relatively little consideration was given to how to seriously enforce it. This can be seen in the way that amended constitutions have immediately taken effect after their promulgation. Never once at the time of promulgating and implementing a new constitution was a thorough constitutional review of existing law, regulations, and other normative documents conducted and the results of it released.

    The 1954 constitution was like this, and the 1982 constitution and the four subsequent amendments were each handled this way as well. In order to seriously enforce the constitution, there definitely needs to be a transitional period before it takes effect, during which time two things must be done in earnest: first, the enactment of necessary laws as concrete protections of the new fundamental rights affirmed in the new constitution; and, second, the weeding out of legal and regulatory provisions that contradict [the new constitution] and the announcement of [these provisions] as in violation of the constitution and abolished. You cannot say that this kind of new basic law can take effect immediately after it is announced. That’s impossible.

    EO: Can you give a few examples of old laws or regulations that were in conflict with the new constitution or constitutional amendments at the time they were announced that should have been reviewed and abolished but never were?

    Tong: There are too many. For example, the Methods for Custody and Repatriation of Urban Migrants and Beggars that led to the Sun Zhigang affair count as an administrative regulation that should have been sorted out and abolished at the time the 1982 constitution was promulgated and implemented, but it never was. Similarly, the State Council Decision on the Issue of Reeducation through Labor and its Supplementary Regulations, as well as the NPC Standing Committee’s Decision Regarding the Handling of Offenders Undergoing Reform through Labor and Persons Undergoing Reeducation through Labor who Escape or Commit New Crimes are normative documents that should at least have already been sorted out and abolished when constitutional amendments were promulgated to respect and protect human rights [in 2004] and to establish a socialist country under rule of law [in 1999].

    EO: Just now you mentioned institutional regulations, which definitely include administrative regulations. This makes me think of some rules of government and administrative bodies, such [as those involving] so-called property tax, about which there has been furious speculation of late. I’d like your opinion: if the State Council or local governments pass new rules or revise old rules to levy a tax, would it satisfy constitutional principles?

    Tong: The State Council is a state administrative body. Even though it is the highest state administrative body, for it to decide to levy a tax would not satisfy constitutional principles. The right to private property is a citizen’s fundamental right protected in the constitution. Moreover, the levying of taxes on citizens is a major state issue. Looking from these two perspectives, levying of taxes can only be decided through legislation passed by the NPC. I believe that the next amendment to the constitution should add some new provisions regarding taxation and financial budgeting in order to more fully protect citizens’ private property rights and the effective control over budgeting by people’s congresses at all levels.

    Constitutionalism and the Economy

    EO: Turning to look at economic development, how do you see the relationship between constitutionalism and economic development?

    Tong: There is an extremely close relationship between constitutionalism and economic development. We need long-term, sustainable development. The American legal scholar [Richard] Posner once suggested that a state structured on separation of powers and the principle of checks and balances is the lowest-cost, most efficient constitutional system there is. In saying this he pretties-up their political system, but he makes a significant point about the relationship between constitutionalism and healthy, sustainable economic development. Historically, some totalitarian, dictatorial governments have sometimes appeared more efficient and able to make rapid and timely decisions about various matters. But they often make big mistakes and, once having made them, it is extremely difficult to rectify them, which leads to especially major economic waste. With a system of constitutionalism and rule of law, the situation is precisely the opposite. These days, we all talk about “low-carbon economics” and “green economics.” I think that constitutionalism is the rule-of-law low-carbon and green environment that most suits economic development.

    There are many counterexamples in China. For example, during our history the Great Leap Forward and “Cultural Revolution” were economic disasters seldom seen in world history. Everyone knows that more than 10 million people starved to death during the Great Leap Forward and that the “Cultural Revolution” brought China’s national economy to the brink of disaster. These problems were all caused by China’s lack of constitutionalism and rule of law. They were economic disasters caused by flaws in the political and legal [systems].

    EO: Since reform and opening, some constitutional changes such as provisions to establish a market economy and emphasize the status and role of the non-state-sector economy have fundamentally pushed forward our country’s economic development or, at least, played an irreplaceable role.

    Tong: The state-sector economy certainly played an important role in the rapid economic development over the past 30 years, but first and foremost we must recognize that it was [the introduction of] new elements that brought about this sort of high-speed development, starting with the private economy and then the market economic system and the introduction of foreign capital through reform and opening. Under 30 years of the state-owned, planned economy, things didn’t go well. Then, after the constitution provided for the co-existence of a variety of economic actors and the implementation of the market economy, growth immediately picked up. But after things picked up, many people forgot [the reasons for this]. The [policy of] advancing the state sector and shrinking the private sector is, on some level, that is, to a real degree, following the old path and, it ought to be said, has no future. We will see that none of the modern economic powers with reasonably balanced development rely on a state-run economic sector, and some countries, such as the United States, can almost be said to have no state-sector economy. These are things we should consider but not necessarily replicate. I’m not advocating privatization but advancing the state sector and shrinking the private sector is definitely no good. China’s economic future mainly rests on the strong growth of the non-state economy. Our current economy is still a kind of “identity economy” in which things are unequal and [success] depends on the identity of the actor. We need to devise a way to fix this.

    EO: What concrete reform measures could be [implemented] next to realize rule and governance according to the constitution? Put another way, in the next 10 years, in what areas should constitutional rule and governance be promoted?

    Tong: I’ll make a few simple points:

    1. Institutions of the state and ruling-party organization, along with their powers, should return to the constitution. The ruling party ought to use its political leaders to have its positions written into the constitution and the laws, and recommend its trusted party-member cadres to positions in state organs through legal procedures. State institutions must truly take up the duties of state institutions and handle matters strictly according to the constitution and laws, rather than doing things according to speeches or temporary [policy] documents issued by one body or another. There should be a true separation.

    2. Enact necessary constitutional legislation. First of all, this includes a News Law and Publication Law to protect citizens’ freedom of speech and publication, an Association Law to protect the people’s right to form associations, and a Protection of Religious Freedom Law to protect citizen’s freedom of religious beliefs. The highest organ of state power should establish legislation to protect the fundamental citizens’ rights provided for in the constitution.

    3. Step-by-step, planned implementation of direct, competitive elections of people’s congress delegates at all levels. Even if for the time being we still cannot have direct elections of NPC delegates, we should at least gradually introduce direct election of local people’s congresses at all levels. There should be no problems with having direct competitive elections for local people’s congress delegates. If there are no competitive elections, the people’s congresses serve no representative function.

      Presently, people’s congresses clearly serve no representative function. For instance, consider the example of the recent incident in Ningbo, as well as those in Qidong and Shifang. We can see that in these incidents, people’s congresses did not participate substantively in making major local decisions, not to mention make those decisions themselves. Even if they had participated, they wouldn’t reflect public opinion. When there are matters that ought to be discussed before decisions are made and people’s congresses don’t even engage in substantive discussion, the results will be conflict appearing in the streets.

    4. Effective protection of judicial independence. An independent judicial system is an important sign of a modern nation. All types of disputes in society ultimately rely on resolution through the judicial system, but today, because courts and judges are not independent, judicial rulings lack the authority they ought to have. For this reason, the party and government always have to face social conflicts directly. This is extremely harmful to China’s stability and sustained development.

    5. Set up a body dedicated to constitutional review (or constitutional oversight and protection) and properly deal with review of the constitutionality and legality of derivative legislation and normative documents. It is because the 1954 constitution had no system for constitutional review that [the idea] silently died. In response to this lesson, the 1982 constitution specially enacted some provisions with the hopes that they would remedy the unfortunate deficiencies of the 1954 constitution. However, because for more than 30 years it has been all talk and no action, constitutional review today remains something relegated to paper only. In more than 30 years the highest organ of state power has not enacted the necessary procedural law and has not carried out a thorough review of the constitutionality or legality of laws or relevant administrative regulations. This is a major problem that concerns the unity of the state legal institutions, and one that ought to be resolved in a timely manner.

      I hope that the 18th Party Congress can set out an encouraging blueprint for the construction of constitutionalism for the coming decade. This would have profound significance for China.

    Tong Zhiwei: Vice president of the China Constitutional Studies Association and professor at East China University of Political Science and Law