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Liu Zhengqing and Huang Qi’s mother outside the Mianyang Detention Center. Image credit: Radio Free Asia. |
Rights lawyer Wang Yu outside the San He City Court. Image credit: Radio Free Asia. |

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Liu Zhengqing and Huang Qi’s mother outside the Mianyang Detention Center. Image credit: Radio Free Asia. |
Rights lawyer Wang Yu outside the San He City Court. Image credit: Radio Free Asia. |

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Yin Chuji was investigated in 2016 for handling cases as a defense attorney while also serving as a Hunan Taojiang Party official. Source: ifeng. |
| Jurisdiction | Body Managing Pilot Projects | Reported Date | Official Pilot Project location Under Article 26 Regulations? | Status of Defense Counsel Pilot Projects |
| Bao’an District, Shenzhen, Guangdong | Bao’an courts and Bao’an Justice Bureau | June 2018 | Yes | Achievement of “complete criminal defense coverage” in Bao’an District |
| Guangzhou, Guangdong | Guangzhou courts and Guangzhou Justice Bureau | May 2018 | Yes | Implementation of local regulations |
| Henan province | Henan Justice Bureau | June 2018 | Yes | Implementation of local regulations |
| Wujin District, Changzhou Jiangsu | Wujin Court and Wujin Justice Bureau | May 2018 | No | Complete criminal defense coverage underway |
| Hebei province | Henan Party General Office and Henan Government General Office | June 2018 | No | Criminal defense reform is part of a broader anti-crime agenda |
| E’zhou, Hubei province | E’zhou Justice Bureau | May 2018 | No | City Ministry of Justice unit advances criminal defense reform as part of a broader anti-crime agenda |
“Hunan Has Executed its First Criminal in a ‘Zero Confession’ Case; The Female Drug Lord Went to Her Death Refusing to Admit to Drug Trafficking” reads a recent Chinese news headline. The coverage suggests that Yang Kelian—a middle-aged woman with an elementary school education—thought that she could get away with her crimes if she did not confess, but she was nonetheless found guilty and put to death. Dui Hua has uncovered similar recent reports of “zero confession” capital convictions and executions for non-violent drug crimes in Sichuan, Jiangsu, and Hubei.
In a healthy legal system, the presence or absence of a confession does not bear on the fairness and accuracy of judicial proceedings. Sometimes the guilty confess and sometimes they do not; sometimes the innocent insist on their innocence, but sometimes they admit to crimes they did not commit. Unfortunately, in China suspects are often pressured to confess, and face consequences if they do not. In recent years China has embarked on criminal procedure reform aimed at addressing these concerns. Insofar as recent “zero confession” headlines herald a departure from a singular focus on self-incrimination, these reports signal a laudable development. However, upon closer inspection, these cases depict a legal process in which the role of confession remains problematic.
The tone, timing, and facts of these reports on zero confession cases send ambiguous signals about the rights of defendants and the role of evidence in capital cases today. In tone, defendants are portrayed as obstinate or foolhardy in their refusal to admit guilt. With respect to timing, state media tends to report these cases in the run-up to high-profile and heavily politicized anniversaries such as China’s June 26 International Anti-Drug Day. The evidence in these cases is impossible to judge independently, because these verdicts are not being posted online, despite the Supreme People’s Court’s professed commitment to release case documents on its new central database. Altogether, despite invoking improvements in criminal procedure, these reports serve as veiled warnings about the consequences for any criminal suspect who might wish to stay silent.
“Zero Confession”
What is a “zero confession” (零口供) case? In a widely cited 2001 article published in the People’s Procutorial Monthly, criminal law scholar He Jiahong describes “zero confession” as a legal standard used by Chinese law enforcement in deciding whether to pursue prosecution. When a defendant has not confessed, He writes, the procuratorate should view the lack of a confession as having zero or nil confessions—that is, the lack of a confession is indicative of neither guilt nor innocence. The procuratorate should therefore rely on the sufficiency of other evidence in deciding whether to proceed with the case.
While the term zero confession was originally limited to charging decisions, it is now a catch-all term for defendants who do not confess at later stages of adjudication as well. In a zero confession drug trafficking case from Hubei, defendants Long and Hong (both are presumably pseudonyms) did not confess during the trial. And in the case from Hunan, Yang Kelian was convicted and executed without ever making a confession.
The zero confession standard emerged as a response to a Chinese criminal procedure culture in which nearly all cases include confessions and virtually all prosecutions result in convictions. This system has long been criticized for both incentivizing coerced confessions and producing wrongful convictions and wrongful executions. In 2012, China amended its China’s Criminal Procedure Law to better safeguard the rights of criminal defendants and improve the rules of evidence, particularly in capital cases. While the 2012 Amendment (which took effect on January 1, 2013) was a step forward for criminal procedure reform, the language of the Amendment is in some places contradictory, and fails to establish an unambiguous “right to silence” for criminal defendants. The amendment also falls short in establishing rules of exclusion that prevent the introduction of confessions obtained through coercion. In practice, it is widely reported that law enforcement still coerces confessions in many criminal cases, including through the use of torture. In 2008, a grocery shop owner named Nian Bin was sentenced to death for allegedly poisoning his neighbors. Nian claimed he confessed to the crime under the duress of police torture. Years later, Nian’s lawyers proved that the police had fabricated evidence against Nian and withheld information that would have proven his innocence. One of most famous cases of forced confession involving torture and resulting in execution is the case of Nie Shubin. In 1995, Nie was sentenced to death for murder, even after rights groups and fellow inmates argued that Nie’s confession was forced under torture. More than twenty years later it was discovered that Nie was in fact wrongfully convicted when the real perpetrator came forward to admit guilt. In Nian’s case, the Fujian high court upheld the death sentence despite also finding that the case had “unclear facts and insufficient evidence.” In Nie’s case the only evidence was the confession he gave under police torture.
A common theme in zero confession case coverage is the sufficiency of evidence in the absence of confession. In this regard, media coverage shines a welcome light on the legal and practical requirements of substantiating a case without the words of the defendant. In the case of Wei and Quan, two defendants from Jiangsu (who are only identified by last names), reports go to great pains to enumerate the evidence: including cell phone records, eye witness testimony, confessions from other defendants, and bank records. Ultimately, this evidence was deemed sufficient to sentence the two people to death for sale and transport of drugs.
Recalcitrant Defendants
Although the term zero confession was originally intended as a value-free description of a defendant’s decision not to confess, state media reports of zero confession convictions universally portray a defendant’s lack of confession as evidence of conniving or bad faith, rather than an assertion of rights or a sincere avowal of innocence. In describing the motivations of defendants in a case from Hunan, the reporter asserts that the two individuals, Long and Hong, believed that so long as they did not confess, they would not be convicted of a crime. Similarly, defendant Yang Kelian is described as thinking that as long as she didn’t confess, she would get away unpunished. In a zero confession case of drug manufacturing in Sichuan, state media reported that a Mr. Liu (full name withheld) was trying to “escape the crackdown of public security agencies. In the face of the interrogation of the police, Liu, a suspect in drug crimes, was not only deaf and mute, but also refused to sign all legal documents.”
Nowhere in this coverage of zero confession cases is it suggested that these defendants have a right to stay silent, or that they might choose to do so because they believe themselves to be innocent. As is often the case in China, neither the condemned nor their representatives are interviewed or quoted in the coverage; in some of the reported cases defendants have already been executed. Reporters based their stories exclusively on law enforcement officials and investigators.
Non-Violent Drug Crimes
Although zero confession cases occur for other types of criminal charges, there appears to be a trend in state media reports that link zero confession cases with capital drug crimes in particular. This trend is likely due to both an underlying rise in capital drug cases and a Chinese state policy to combat drug crimes with harsh punishment.
China has a drug problem. By the country’s own account, drug users, drug cases, and drug seizures have all increased dramatically in recent years. The increasing ease of manufacturing synthetic drugs has also dramatically scaled up drug operations and diffused drug enforcement challenges from border regions into the nation’s interior.
China’s response to the drug epidemic has been to continue a course of punitive measures for narcotics, even as the state has reportedly eased off capital punishment for other types of crimes. Today, four types of drug crimes—manufacturing, trafficking, sale, and smuggling—are eligible for the death penalty in China. It is estimated that drug crimes make up a large portion of China’s annual executions. China is one of a small minority of countries that imposes the death penalty for drug crimes, a practice that violates both international laws and norms (although US President Donald Trump has recently voiced support for executing those convicted of drug crimes).
China does not seem to be moving away from imposing capital punishment for drug offenses. Indeed, state media reports of zero confession convictions reflect not only the underlying phenomenon of capital drug cases, but also state efforts to publicize a crackdown on drugs. Two of the cases highlighted here, from Hubei and Jiangsu, were published in the week leading up to China’s June 26 International Anti-Drug Day. State media traditionally announce harsh punishments for drug offenders during this anniversary. Coverage of zero confession cases seems designed to make a public example of defendants who do not confess. One story about the Yang Kelian case from Hunan sums up, “presently, the number of drug cases is increasing. The quantity of drugs is increasing. Drug networks are becoming increasingly widespread. The age of participants is getting younger. Connecting drug crimes is becoming easier. This case has a deterrent effect.” A story about the Jiangsu case concludes in a similar way, stating that sentencing the two defendants to death “is of great significance for cracking down and preventing drug-related crimes.”
Transparency and Rule of Law
Ultimately the fairness of a conviction in any capital case—regardless of whether a confession is involved—can only be assessed through a public judicial process and a transparent court record. The Supreme People’s Court has made valuable steps in this direction by launching a central website hosting judgments from China’s courts. A review of the documents in zero confession cases is a necessary check on the claims about these cases published in state media.
Dui Hua conducted a search on the central court website for records related to six defendants sentenced to death in four zero confession cases in four different provinces over the last year. Each case was reported in some detail by state media, (although in the cases from Sichuan, Hubei and Jiangsu just the defendants’ surnames or pseudonyms were provided). Dui Hua was able to locate a record related to only one the six defendants, Yang Kelian, the “Female Drug Lord” mentioned at the beginning of this article. That record is from the case of a co-defendant; it is a Hunan High Court second instance trial verdict from 2017 for defendant Chen Wenxin. The record indicates that Chen, who was given a suspended death sentence for drug trafficking, named Yang in a confession he provided to the court. Despite the detailed media accounts of Yang’s case, the judgment in her own case has not been published.
Dui Hua calls on China’s Supreme People’s Court to publish all death penalty case records online. As a first step, the court should consider making public any cases that have been reported in state media. That way, even if those put to death will remain silent forever more, the public may still have the information necessary to make up its own mind about a defendant’s choice not to confess.

Dui Hua’s research into online judgments has uncovered the first known case of “educational placement” (安置教育, anzhi jiaoyu), a measure imposed on prisoners who are considered “a danger to society” even after they have completed their sentences for terrorism or extremism offenses. Educational placement is a new measure included in the Counterterrorism Law which took effect on January 1, 2016. The measure is classified as a subcategory of a criminal case – carrying its own legal codes and procedures, standardized and stipulated by the Supreme People’s Court.
The uncovered judgment states that the Urumqi Intermediate People’s Court approved a recommendation from Xinjiang No. 5 Prison to order a Uyghur prisoner from Shache County to be placed in educational placement on August 30, 2017, 18 days before his 10-year prison sentence for inciting splittism was due to expire. The court believed that the prisoner, Ismaili Rozi (伊斯马伊力·如则), continued to pose a threat to society because he “refused to admit guilt during imprisonment, refused to accept education and reform, and was deeply influenced by extreme religious thoughts.” The judgment did not state the length of his educational placement. However, it did indicate that Ismaili had the right to lodge a review of the court order to the Xinjiang High People’s Court within 10 days of receiving it.
At present, information about educational placement exists mostly on paper and how it has been implemented remains largely unclear. Article 30 of the Counterterrorism Law states that it is organized and carried out by provincial-level people’s governments. The measure remains effective until the individual is no longer considered a risk to society by the educational placement institute. The implementation measures issued in Xinjiang on August 1, 2016, provide some details about what the “at-risk” prisoners are obliged to learn once they are committed to the institutes. These include “laws and regulations, ideology and morality, psychological health, modern culture, scientific education, religious orthodoxy and vocational trainings.” The implementation measures also state that prisons and detention centers shall submit recommendations for educational placement to the intermediate people’s courts six months prior to the scheduled release of the prisoners sentenced for terrorism or extremism offenses.
A few Chinese scholars have spoken out on the custodial nature of educational placement. In an article published in the Jilin Province Law Society Journal in May 2017, legal scholar Xu Chi described the measure as both a coercive and custodial measure aimed to prevent released prisoners from re-offending, and as the most severe existing form of post-imprisonment security punishment. Another legal scholar, Zhou Zhenjie, described educational placement as an extension of a criminal sentence and as a security measure independent of the Criminal Law.
Despite scarcely available information, the first-known judgment about educational placement raises several alarming issues. First, the measure was applied beyond the legal scope stipulated by the Counterterrorism Law. The Counterterrorism Law stipulates that educational placement is applicable only to prisoners sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment for terrorism or extremism offenses. However, Ismaili was sentenced for neither of these offenses, but for inciting splittism, which is a crime of endangering state security. When he was sentenced in 2010, the offenses of extremism did not even exist until five years later when they were codified during the ninth amendment to the Criminal Law. The judgment suggests that the scope of offenses for those serving educational placement is likely much greater than the Counterterrorism Law mandates. Educational placement also creates more risks for the arbitrary denial of rights for political prisoners who have already completed their sentences. Ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, who comprise the majority of the country’s endangering state security prison population, are particularly vulnerable to falling prey to this measure.
Another troubling aspect is that it is unclear when Ismaili’s educational placement will end, if ever. The Counterterrorism Law provides no time limit for how long someone can be held in educational placement, meaning that the length of punishment can be indefinite. Xu described it as having “the same punitive effect as fixed-term or life imprisonment.” Zhou does not share Xu’s optimism that an indeterminate punishment could be effective in combating terrorism and extremism. Rather, he expressed concerns that it leaves open the possibility of de facto life imprisonment – an individual can be deprived of their lifelong freedom so long as the educational placement facility considers him or her a risk to society.
Another cause for concern is how prisons and detention centers evaluate the risk levels of soon-to-be released prisoners when they make their initial recommendations to the courts for educational placement. Zhou criticized the procedure for being opaque and opening up risk to the notion that all prisoners convicted of terrorism or extremism offenses are predisposed to being perpetually “at risk.” Although the Counterterrorism Law mandates prisons to “hear opinions from grassroots organizations and organs that initially handled the case,” they have never made public how these opinions are accepted, or even considered, when forming their recommendations. Zhou also questioned how they assessed the impact of prisoner releases on the wider community. Do they conduct interviews and surveys? The evaluation process prisons use to decide whether prisoners should be held in educational placement after serving their sentences is highly subjective, wrote Zhou, and how decisions are reached likely depends more on the current political atmosphere and fears surrounding terrorism in a particular region at a given time than on any real indication of potential threat posed by an individual prisoner.
While Ismaili can appeal the educational placement order to the Xinjiang High People’s Court in theory, it remains to be seen how he can go about exercising this right. Zhou wrote that it is unclear whether the appellant is allowed under the current law to entrust a third party to challenge the evaluation conducted by the prisons or detention centers.
Zhou questions what the likelihood is of overturning recommendations made by the educational placement bodies to keep an individual incarcerated. Once admitted, an individual will be released only when the institute no longer considers him or her a threat to society, or when their application to lift the educational placement order has been approved by the court. Zhou remarked that the current law does not provide a clear review procedure. Should the application be submitted directly to the court, or indirectly through the educational placement institute? If it is the latter, the institute may censor applications submitted by those it considers a threat to society.
Two years since its formal introduction, educational placement remains a measure shrouded in secrecy. Whether the measure is applied beyond its legal limits, and whether the evaluation mechanisms and review procedures are fair and transparent are not the only issues emanating from the discovered judgment. As Uyghurs in Xinjiang are disproportionately incarcerated for splittism, terrorism and extremism offenses, they are more likely than Han Chinese and other ethnic groups to bear the brunt of this post-imprisonment measure that could put their personal liberty at risk for life. China should promote judicial transparency by making judgments about its use more readily available on its online platforms.

In April 2011, France became the first Western country to ban the wearing of full-face veils in public. Similar national and regional bans in other secular Western countries soon followed, including in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Austria, and Canada. In Australia, there is ongoing legislative debate on the issue. Under these bans, anybody caught wearing a burka (a veil covering the full face and body) or a niqab (a veil covering the face except the eyes) in public can face fines and in some cases even imprisonment.
China is an officially atheist country. Civil servants and teachers across the country have long been prohibited from participating in religious activities or wearing religious clothing in public. In schools, students can be disqualified from scholarships, government subsidies, attending their graduation ceremonies and even face expulsion if found wearing religious clothing on campus. Around the same time when many in the West were busy passing anti-Islamic legislation, China was rocked by the Urumqi Riots of July 2009. Shortly after, the Xinjiang government began tightening restrictions on Islamic clothing on security grounds in the autonomous region, home to a Muslim population of over 13 million.
In enforcing restrictions on Islamic clothing, Chinese officials have denied that veils are a part of Uyghur culture and have attempted to stigmatize wearers as uneducated and sharing a propensity towards religious extremism. A Phoenix News Media article in 2014 reported that veils had historically never been part of Uyghur culture and only first gained traction in southern Xinjiang in the 1980s. While officials argue that veils are unique to uneducated Uyghurs who share a propensity towards extremism, they also blame religious extremism in Xinjiang as deriving from overseas forces – a line of argument frequently used to justify the forced deportations of overseas Uyghurs. A Uyghur researcher from the Xinjiang Academy of Social Science’s Institute of Sociology opined that the phenomenon of religious extremism was largely driven by the high and disproportionate rates of poverty and unemployment among the Uyghur population. As Xinjiang becomes increasingly dominated by a market-oriented economy run by the Han population, Uyghurs feel they face greater economic, cultural, religious, and political marginalization. The same Uyghur scholar stated that the local Uyghurs’ disillusionment with their future in Xinjiang has led more Uyghur women to adopt the black veil and jilbab in place of their traditional headscarves, especially after the 2009 attacks and the ensuing incidents of ethnic unrest in the region.
Not only has Xinjiang outlawed the wearing of veils in public, but Dui Hua has also uncovered cases of individuals facing criminal charges for wearing veils in their own homes and for selling the banned clothing items.
The “Five Abnormalities”
The restrictions on Islamic clothing in Xinjiang first emerged in a number of localities in province’s southern region. However, after the 2009 Urumqi attacks, similar regulations were implemented in northern Xinjiang. Restrictions in the north remained relatively lax until 2013, when the Xinjiang government issued a provisional-wide directive known as Document No.11. In a question and answer format, the document serves as a set of guidelines for local authorities and as a warning to the public on how “illegal religions and extremism” will be handled; there are three mentions of the ban on the jilbab in the text. The document does not specify what the punishment for wearing a jilbab is. It merely calls on officials to “resolutely handle” violators.
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The “Five Abnormalities” in Karamay, Xinjiang. August 2014. Image credit: ifeng.com |
It should be noted that the translation of terms used to describe Islamic clothing under Chinese regulations differ from what is generally used in Islamic communities. In August 2014, authorities in Karamay, a city in northern Xinjiang, banned those wearing Islamic clothing and those with beards from boarding a public bus, including women and girls who were wearing what authorities call a jilbab. In Islamic communities, a jilbab refers to a long and loose-fitting garment or cloak designed to cover the entire body while leaving the face visible, whereas under Chinese regulations they use the word jilbab for what would be considered a burka or a niqab in most Islamic communities, which covers the body and the face. The first category of women shown in the “Five Abnormalities,” with veils covering their face and hair but not their eyes, are wearing what would be considered a niqab outside of China, but is called a jilbab in China.
The ban also prohibits young women from wearing what China calls a niqab, a garment that would generally be referred to as a hijab (a headscarf covering the hair and neck while leaving the face visible) in most Islamic communities.
As a provincial-wide directive, Document No.11 has been introduced in localities across Xinjiang. In Karamay, authorities have banned the jilbab, the niqab, all face-covering veils, as well as young men from growing “big beards.” The ban has also outlawed clothes featuring the Islamic star and crescent symbol.
Also in 2013, Xinjiang’s Ili Prefecture issued a provisional rule to proscribe the “five abnormalities” from all public spaces. The 2014 Ili Yearbook reported investigating nearly 1,000 violators and confiscating 7,364 jilbabs and garments with the star and crescent symbol. The following year, the capital of Urumqi followed suit. Instead of using the term jilbab, which opens room for debate about what constitutes a jilbab, the Urumqi regulation has added the more secular-sounding but even vaguer term – “face-masking robes” (蒙面罩袍) – to the Chinese legal lexicon, giving authorities even greater power to determine what garments can be considered illegal.
Effective April 1, 2017, Xinjiang’s “Anti-Extremism Regulations” claimed that the wearing of “face-masking robes” and “abnormal beards” symbolized extremism. The regulations also officially expanded the administrative ban to the entire autonomous region.
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The five main categories of Islamic clothing in the Islamic world. Image credit: ABC News |
Criminalization of Islamic Clothing
Violators of the aforementioned bans can face criminal prosecution under a number of offenses. One can be prosecuted for “forcing others to wear terrorism, extremism clothes or symbols,” a new offense that carries a maximum sentence of three years’ imprisonment. It was added to the Criminal Law in November 2015 and can be used in cases where violence or coercion is involved. Dui Hua is unable to find online judgments to understand how often this offense is being used by authorities. Unofficial news media has reported on cases of Uyghur women sentenced for promoting the wearing of headscarves, but the exact charges remain unknown.
Dui Hua has found one case where the charge of illegal business activity was used to prosecute an individual for selling banned Islamic clothing. Yang Bao’an (杨宝安), a Han Chinese man who originally migrated to Xinjiang from Hunan, was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment in April 2015 in Ili Prefecture for selling a hundred niqabs in a shopping center in Korgas (China’s westernmost port bordering Kazakhstan). Twenty-four of the niqabs carried the star and crescent symbol. The court found that Yang violated the “five abnormalities” ban that had been widely enforced in Ili Prefecture. Yang pled innocent on several grounds – 1. He was not aware of the meaning behind the star and crescent symbol; 2. Nobody had purchased any of the garments from him; 3. He did not know about the local rules since he had only just arrived in Xinjiang. Given that he had obtained a university education, the court found that Yang should have been aware and cautious about local regulations and that his actions had adversely affected the social stability of the area.
There is also evidence that wearing banned Islamic clothing can fall under the purview of the crime of “picking quarrels and provoking troubles.” In September 2014, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security jointly issued a judicial interpretation to expand the applicable scope of this “pocket crime” in cases related to terrorism and extremism. An individual is now punishable for this offense if they disrupt social order by “willfully attacking, chasing, intercepting, and insulting others” while calling others “infidels or religious traitors.”
In March 2015, China Youth Online reported that a court in Kashgar sentenced a group of religious extremists for “picking quarrels and provoking troubles.” The report cited one case in which a Uyghur couple repeatedly refused to comply with “Project Beauty,” a campaign to discourage men from keeping long beards and women from wearing veils and headscarves. The husband was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for “ignoring the national law.” Not only was he punished for keeping a long beard, but he was also punished for encouraging his wife to wear a veil. As his wife was said to have shown remorse, she was given a relatively lenient two-year imprisonment sentence. The original report was removed the day after it was originally posted. An anonymous source who proclaimed to have written the article allegedly sent an apology statement via WeChat for misreporting the case. Critics remain skeptical of its authenticity, with some suspecting that the apology was made under duress. The article has since been widely circulated online and remains accessible on official news websites.
Banning Islamic Clothing in the Home
Although the ban on Islamic clothing has been enforced in the name of “maintaining public order,” Dui Hua has found cases where authorities in Xinjiang have enforced the ban in people’s homes.
Dui Hua uncovered a judgment in which a Muslim man, Gong Xiaojun (龚小军, ethnicity unknown), was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for “disrupting official business” in Urumqi after arguing with community cadres in December 2014. When the community cadres paid Gong a home visit in June 2014, they found that Gong had grown an “abnormal beard.” The cadres admonished Gong for his beard and Gong allegedly responded with “extreme language” insisting that he grew the beard because he simply liked the way it looked.
The cadres informed Gong and his wife about the ban on “black religious clothing,” and accused his wife of wearing a jilbab. Gong argued that his wife was wearing a long loose black robe, not what the cadres were calling a jilbab and that the cadres had no right to intervene in what his family chose to wear at home. He claimed that he had requested his wife to wear the robe and his wife agreed that she had done so voluntarily. Gong was first indicted for “picking quarrels and provoking troubles,” but was convicted of a different charge – “disrupting official business.” The judgment did not explain in what ways Gong’s language was “extreme,” it only vaguely stated that his language was “extreme” and provocative enough to disrupt law enforcement.
Beyond Xinjiang
For Muslims who belong to China’s Hui minority, reports suggest that they currently do not face the same intensity of restrictions as Muslims in Xinjiang do. In a propaganda film entitled Leaving Heart in Hezhou (情定河州) about China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative, the Hui women of Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture in Gansu Province are portrayed in long black garments covering their bodies, hair, and necks. While the same clothes are banned in public and private spaces in Xinjiang and violators can face imprisonment, in Linxia, also known as “China’s Little Mecca,” Hui women are currently free to wear veils in public. However, given the growing restrictions on religious freedom in Linxia, the question remains for how long this freedom will last.
Xinjiang’s ban on Islamic clothing is no less controversial than the anti-Islamic legislation we see in the West and is no less discriminatory to Muslims. Since joining the global ranks of countries that impose restrictions on the appearance of its Muslim citizens, China has been under fire by human rights groups for intruding on its citizens’ religious freedoms. Although transparency of criminal cases involving the ban on Islamic clothing leaves much to be desired in Xinjiang, given what we know about how the sellers of Islamic clothing and those who wear Islamic clothing in their homes have fared, it is likely that those caught wearing Islamic clothing in public are facing increasing risks.

Dui Hua examines the stories of dissidents held under the coercive measure “residential surveillance in a designated location” in Michael Caster’s The People’s Republic of the Disappeared: Stories from Inside China’s System for Enforced Disappearances (Safeguard Defenders, 2017).
As the waves of repression in China have intensified over the past decade, one encounters the strange phrase “residential surveillance in a designated location” (RSDL) with greater frequency.
It was memorably employed (though by no means for the first time) against the late Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, after the publication of “Charter 08” in December 2008. Later, it was used in the crackdown against the so-called “Jasmine Revolution” in the spring of 2011. Most recently, it has been a prominent feature of the ongoing crackdown against rights lawyers and activists that began in July 2015.
This measure, with its relatively benign-sounding name, has been examined critically before, both inside and outside China. The new book The People’s Republic of the Disappeared makes an important contribution to this critique by collecting vivid accounts from those who have been subjected to the measure. Together, these accounts paint a damning portrait of how Chinese law enforcement agents are using the power they have been given under the law to violate human rights with impunity in the name of safeguarding state security.
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What exactly is RSDL? At first glance, it looks like it might be a form of house arrest, although “designated location” suggests that it might involve something other than being confined in one’s own home. “Surveillance” only adds to the mystery, suggesting some sort of monitoring without making exactly clear how intrusive it might be.
In China’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), RSDL is what’s known as a “coercive measure.” Simply put, coercive measures authorize law enforcement agents to restrict a person’s liberty in the course of a criminal investigation. The degree and duration of that restriction depends on a variety of factors, but coercive measures are meant to serve a rather limited set of aims: preventing suspects from posing further threats to society or obstructing the investigation process and ensuring their availability to face questioning or stand trial. Coercive measures are not meant to be punitive or to be used as tools of investigation in their own right.
In Chinese criminal procedure, “residential surveillance” exists alongside other coercive measures such as custodial detention (seen as the most restrictive measure) and “release on guarantee pending further investigation” (qubao houshen, which is much less restrictive). The ordinary form of residential surveillance—which, as the name suggests, permits suspects to remain in their homes under certain restrictions—is a relatively lenient, non-custodial measure. For that reason, the CPL allows it to be imposed for up to six months.
Six months spent under house arrest is no picnic, but it is likely to be a more comfortable experience than being sent to a detention center. For this reason, reformers have promoted the greater use of non-custodial measures like residential surveillance as a way of reducing overuse of custodial detention.
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The book features eleven accounts, all but one of them presented in the first-person, from lawyers and political activists who were subjected to RSDL or similar measures between 2011 and 2016. These include well-known human rights lawyers, such as Tang Jitian, Liu Shihui, Sui Muqing, and Wang Yu. It also includes an account by Peter Dahlin, a Swedish human rights activist detained in 2016 for his connection with some of these lawyers and activists. Though each account is distinct, the victims’ experiences under RSDL share some key features. It is difficult to ignore how the measure of RSDL has become an integral part of a systematic regime used by authorities to target particular individuals.
Though regulations require that the locations used for RSDL “possess conditions for ordinary living and rest,” it is clear from these accounts that disruption of routine daily activities is key to how the system operates. Sleep deprivation and the withholding of food and personal hygiene products are common practice. Detainees are cut off from communication with family, friends, and lawyers. Guards and interrogators use humiliation, enforced discipline, physical and verbal abuse, and threats to friends and family members. Family members of victims are also subject to varying degrees of surveillance, including house arrest, such as in the case of Wang Yu’s family. International law recognizes family members of victims of enforced disappearances as full victims.
The victims’ accounts of confinement and interrogation becomes at times indistinguishable, since most detainees are subjected to questioning in the same place they are held—contrary to the provisions of RSDL. Invisible, alone, and at the mercy of guards and investigators who act with impunity, it is unsurprising that, in almost every case included in this book, involuntary confession is what brings the ordeal to an end.
Lawyer Liu Shihui, who describes his 2011 confinement under RSDL, calls the measure “a system designed for prisoners of conscience [and] a place designed for torture.” Time and torment essentially ensure that any resistance gives way to capitulation. However, some accounts reveal that even in their acts of forced “confessions”, victims attempt to resist the abuse of state power. For example, lawyer Sui Muqing recounts the importance he placed in maintaining a degree of personal integrity and dignity by refusing to incriminate others in his confession.
In reading these accounts one cannot escape the recurring sense that authorities use the brutal conditions of confinement in RSDL for the purpose of obtaining these confessions—the veracity and voluntariness of which does not necessarily matter. In this sense, one can certainly see how useful investigators would find RSDL—especially as a tool in sweeping crackdowns with multiple, linked suspects. Even if, as in most of the cases in this book, confessions do not lead to direct criminal prosecution, the authorities can still use them against other suspects. And by recording and broadcasting these forced confessions, the authorities can attempt to bring public discredit on both the individuals and the causes they promoted.
Beyond confessions, the brutal confinement of RSDL constitutes a form of punishment in itself, especially when stretched to its six-month limit. Even the mere existence of RSDL seems designed to spread fear, and threat of its use can be enough, in some cases, to achieve the desired outcome.
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Of course, no matter how well RSDL might serve the aims of the Chinese authorities in terms of maintaining stability and political control, it doesn’t justify the use of torture and many other violations of individual human rights that it enables. Liu Shihui’s judgment that RSDL is a “place where law doesn’t exist” is amply backed up by the other accounts in this book.
The similarities in these accounts unquestionably demonstrate a pattern of abuse. Yet, there may still be some who will claim that these stories are exceptional and do not represent the entirety of RSDL. For every instance of abuse under RSDL, there are sure to be examples in which the measure is being used in more benign ways. Even if these cases are exceptional, this is precisely why RSDL is so insidious. By labeling these acts a form of “residential surveillance,” Chinese authorities are engaged in a deliberate effort to obscure their use of torture and enforced disappearance. Through publishing these accounts, The People’s Republic of the Disappeared is attempting to shatter the veneer behind which these severe violations have tried to hide and expose them for the world to see. And given that the accounts are diverse in both the time frames and geographical regions they represent, it is unlikely that they are simply exceptional cases. The accounts come from two separate sweeps, one carried out in 2011 and the other in 2015-2016 and they take place across four distinct locations: Beijing, Guangzhou, Tianjin, and Changsha.
Of all the people who should read this book, which has also recently been released in Chinese, it can only be hoped that it will be read by all of the Chinese academic legal experts who have been so instrumental in directing the reform of China’s criminal justice system. In the past, many of these experts had publicly criticized the ways Chinese investigators used residential surveillance. Yet these same experts stood by and even defended the inclusion of RSDL measures in the most recent revision to the CPL, rejecting predictions that the measure would be abused. In a perfect world, this book would prod their consciences and, in the name of human rights and rule of law, lead these influential experts to turn their efforts to stopping the outrageous abuses exercised under RSDL.

The promotion of Mandarin as China’s lingua franca, commonly referred to as “tuipu,” has been one of the most sweeping initiatives implemented by the Chinese government. Tuipu serves the dual purpose of forging a sense of national identity based on Han culture and weakening regional and ethnic loyalties. Some regional dialects and ethnic minority languages have largely died out in China because of tuipu propaganda that portrays them as “uncivilized” and “barbaric.” The use of regional dialects and ethnic minority languages (e.g. Mongolian, Tibetan, Uyghur) is banned in many government offices and schools, and on television programs. According to the latest official statistics, the literacy rate of Mandarin in urban China has reached 90 percent, however in rural areas it remains around 40 percent.
Within the carceral system, prisoners are not required to speak Mandarin among their peers, but the use of dialects and minority languages are subject to varying degrees of restrictions when it comes to family visitation rules. It should be noted that at the national level neither the Prison Law nor the visitation and correspondence regulations issued by the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) on December 5, 2016, contain provisions restricting the use of dialects or minority languages. However, in practice many local prisons have taken it upon themselves to mandate the use of Mandarin during family visitations, with varying degrees of enforcement. As many of those who come into conflict with the law are from rural areas, it comes as little surprise that many of those subject to prison surveillance have limited economic means and educational opportunities to learn Mandarin. Prisoners and their family members, especially older generations, who can only speak their regional dialects or their minority languages are consequently deprived of their visitation rights. Dui Hua’s research has found that those who fail the “Mandarin only” visitation requirement also have slimmer prospects for obtaining clemency.
Domestic news media in China occasionally report stories about the use of regional dialects during prison visitations to showcase the more “human” side of prison management. A news article in 2004 reported a story from Shanghai’s Tilanqiao Prison where well-behaved prisoners were allowed to speak in their local dialects when making phone calls to family members. A Xinhua article in 2014 covered a story about a prisoner serving time in Guangdong’s Jieyang Prison who spoke in a local dialect during a video call with his mother in Guangxi, who he had not seen in three years.
In Sichuan’s Jinjiang Prison, visitation rules state that prisoners and their family visitors can speak in Mandarin or Sichuanese during visitations. However, such leniency is not extended to many other prisons around the country. In Guangdong, Zhuang Songkun (庄松坤) is one of the Wukan villagers who was sentenced in December 2016 for allegedly instigating protests against local government corruption. When Zhuang’s wife tried to visit him at Guangdong’s Wujiang Prison on February 23, 2017, she was not allowed to speak in her Chaozhou dialect. As she was unable to speak Mandarin, the prison officers confiscated her microphone, which had been attached to a video recording device, cutting short the whole visit to a mere five minutes. Henan-based lawyer Ren Quanniu publicly remarked that such a policy is an abuse of power, especially given that there is no written provision prohibiting the use of regional dialects. The MOJ regulation entitles prisoners to up to one monthly visit from family members or guardians in the form of telephone calls, face-to-face meetings, or video calls. (In some parts of China, visits from family members take place less frequently.) Meetings are not supposed to exceed 30 minutes, though sometimes more time is given as a reward for good behavior. Even during court proceedings, defendants, police, prosecutors, and judges often communicate in regional dialects. It is unlawful to deprive prisoners such as Zhuang of their visitation rights just because prison staff cannot understand them, says Ren.
Wujiang Prison is not alone in prohibiting regional dialects; similar visitation restrictions are commonplace across China. A guide issued by Guangdong’s Gaoming Prison in December 2015 states that a family visit will be cancelled unless both prisoners and visitors speak Mandarin. The same policy is enforced in Fujian’s Qingliu Prison as part of the campaign to “cultivate civilization.” In the same province, an exception is made at Putian Prison, but only for elderly prisoners who cannot speak Mandarin and who are meeting with a relative who can provide translation for the supervising guard.
Despite the generally lower Mandarin proficiency among many ethnic minority groups in China, there are still language restrictions in prisons located in provinces with large ethnic minority populations. In Guizhou province, where one-third of the population is non-Han Chinese, minority languages spoken in prisons are strictly regulated. A provincial visitation guide issued in 2015 bans ethnic minority languages and the use of any “secret languages” during visitations to the provincial judicial police hospital that caters to prisoners in need of medical treatment. The restriction aims to cultivate “linguistic civilization” and maintain “one’s dignified demeanor.” The same restrictions apply to Wenshan Prison and Yiliang Prison in Yunnan province, which has an ethnic minority population of over 15 million. Yiliang Prison does not explicitly forbid the use of Yunnanese among local prisoners, but all other regional dialects and minority languages are prohibited. Violators of the rule can have their family visitation rights taken away for six months and in serious circumstances a case can be filed to investigate the matter.
Sichuan appears to be one of the few exceptions. Given that Sichuan has a non-Han population of approximately five million, the Sichuan Prison Administrative Bureau permits the use of minority languages like Tibetan in prisons throughout the province. Shandong province, although not nearly as ethnically diverse as Sichuan, permits minority language use during visitations, albeit with some restrictions. For instance, Shandong’s Luning Prison only allows the use of minority languages when prisoners have obtained prior police approval.
In China’s autonomous regions of Tibet and Xinjiang, regulations on prison visitation rules could not be found by Dui Hua researchers. However anecdotal evidence from formerly incarcerated individuals suggests that these regions are not unlike the rest of China when it comes to enforcing Mandarin during prison visitations. Circumstantial factors such as the particular prison, the language ability of the guards on duty, and the political climate at the time can impact whether and how language and dialect restrictions are enforced.
Dui Hua’s research into clemency judgments found that the practice of speaking regional dialects also has a significant impact on a prisoner’s chances of gaining sentence reductions and parole. The judgments reveal that speaking dialects can be considered evidence of not “showing remorse,” a prerequisite for obtaining early release. Sentence reductions and parole are granted to those who have accrued a certain number of points for good behavior. Between 2013-2016, prisoners in Fujian and Shanghai received point deductions ranging from 0.5 to 2 points for each instance of speaking regional dialects during family visitations. In December 2016, the Fujian Bureau of Justice implemented new measures for assessing clemency points, drastically increasing the penalty for speaking dialects to a deduction of 30-100 points. In accordance with the new provincial directive, Wuyishan Prison deducted 30 points from a prisoner because he did not speak Mandarin on just one occasion during a family visit in March 2017.
The impact these rules have on prisoners who are ethnic minorities or who come from rural areas with limited opportunities to learn Mandarin, or those who come from both backgrounds is significant. The rules not only deny these groups precious contact with their families and opportunities to gain early release but they also function to further stigmatize and criminalize these groups because of their ethnicity and limited economic means.
It is not uncommon for prisons to impose restrictions on communication within prisons for security purposes, such as to guard against distribution of printed materials that can be used to plan escapes or other crimes. However, language restrictions on visitations are now widely uncommon. (In the United States, Utah was the last state to drop the “English only” visitation requirement in August 2013.) While the promotion of Mandarin has been crucial to China’s development, punishments in the form of denying visitation rights and equal opportunities for clemency due to language ability deprive prisoners of their constitutional rights (Article 4 “All nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages.”)
Dui Hua has found some cases where prisoners earn points towards clemency as a result of learning Mandarin. In some rare cases, rewards are given to those who learn minority languages and contribute to “bilingual education classes” offered to prisoners to learn both Mandarin and ethnic minority languages in autonomous regions. However, these cases are rare and resources for Mandarin education in prisons are by no means comprehensive.
The suppression of regional dialects and ethnic minority languages that has accompanied tuipu has long been a source of social and ethnic tension, sparking incidents of unrest across China. Learning Mandarin can better equip prisoners with skills for post-release integration and opportunities for clemency provide prisoners with a strong incentive to learn and a chance at earlier reintegration. Rather than directing resources to support prisoner’s education and rehabilitation, the punitive “Mandarin only” visitation rules serve instead to undermine inter-ethnic relationships and run counter to the ideal of the “harmonious society” that the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government strive to achieve.

At the 35th session of the Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva in June 2017, the European Union (EU) was unable to make a statement criticizing China’s human rights record under Item 4 of the Council agenda, “Human Rights Situations that Require the Council’s Attention.” The EU works under the consensus principle, meaning that all 28 member countries must agree on important foreign policy statements, and Greece, which has received massive investments and aid from China (China Cosco Shipping owns a controlling stake in the Greek port of Piraeus), refused to endorse the EU’s statement, effectively killing the initiative.
Diplomats and representatives of human rights groups were outraged. Rubbing salt into the wound, China thanked Greece. The German foreign minister accused China of trying to undermine “One Europe.”
Media coverage was intense. In one of many articles in American and European media that covered the debacle, The Washington Post, in an article entitled “Europe divided, China gratified, as Greece blocks EU statement over human rights,” wrote that “Money really can buy love, and in China’s case, it appears to be helping to keep the EU divided and ineffective.”
In a stunning reversal, the EU made an Item 4 statement at the 36th session of the HRC that ended in Geneva on September 29. The EU statement was accompanied by Item 4 statements by Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Czech Republic. (Switzerland, which is not a member state of the EU, made a statement on Liu Xia, the widow of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, under Item 2 of the agenda.) The EU regretted the death in prison of Liu Xiaobo and called on Beijing to lift restrictions on Liu Xia. It expressed concern over the lack of transparency and respect for due process in the cases of detained human rights lawyers and called on China to ensure fair trials for individuals detained for their human rights activities, including Jiang Tianyong, Wang Quanzhang, Tashi Wangchuk, and Wu Gan. It also called on China to respect cultural diversity and freedom of religion in Tibet and Xinjiang.
Germany expressed deep worries over widespread human rights abuses in China, especially in Tibet and Xinjiang. It cited infringements on the freedom of religion witnessed at the Larung Gar monastery in Sichuan Province, and urged China to immediately release all human rights defenders, including Jiang Tianyong, Wang Quanzhang, Wu Gan, Liu Feiyue, Huang Qi, Li Tingyu, Lu Yuyu, and Tashi Wangchuk. It asked China to allow visits of the UN Special Procedures.
The United Kingdom (UK) registered sadness over the death of Liu Xiaobo, and concern over the handling of his case. It too called for the lifting of all restrictions on Liu Xia.
Dui Hua has failed to find a single media article on the EU’s about-face. Nor has the foundation received an explanation of how it came about. The final decision was said to have been reached by foreign ministers in New York for the United Nations General Assembly meeting. It was also claimed that the final decision was reached in Brussels hours before the statement was delivered. One European diplomat said that Germany in particular was incensed by the Greek scuttling of the EU statement at the 35th session of the HRC, and let Greece know “which side of their bread was being buttered by whom,” a reference to the bailout of cash-strapped Greece by the European Commission and EU member states. Another official cited widespread disappointment with the bilateral human rights dialogue held between China and the EU on June 22-23, 2017. Despite questions by the EU on Liu Xiaobo, the Chinese side said nothing in reply, even though it has emerged that the Chinese side was aware at the time that Liu was gravely ill.
The statements under Item 4 by the EU, Germany, and the UK could impact the holding of future bilateral human rights dialogues between the countries and China. Prior to the June 22-23, 2017 dialogue, China warned the EU that the dialogue would be cancelled if it made an Item 4 statement at the 35th session of the HRC. Now that the EU, Germany, and the UK have defied China, it may well turn out that sessions of human rights dialogues expected to be held in 2018 will not take place, dealing a fatal blow to the practice of holding human rights dialogues with China.
The United States Issues Sharp Criticisms at HRC 36
As if to challenge the narrative, advanced by critics, that the Trump administration does not care about human rights abuses in China, the US Mission in Geneva made three statements that sharply criticized aspects of China’s human rights behavior. Statements were made under Items 3 (“disappearances”), 4 (“situations requiring attention”), and 5 (“human rights bodies and mechanisms.”) No other country made three critical statements.
The Item 4 statement accuses China of arbitrary detentions, torture, and forced confessions on state media of lawyers and activists. Both Item 4 and Item 5 cite retaliations against family members and others who cooperate with UN Special Procedures. Item 4 says that conditions in Tibet and Xinjiang are akin to martial law.
Of particular note is language on Hong Kong in the U.S. Item 4 statement: “We are concerned by the decision of the Hong Kong authorities to seek tougher sentences for activists after they served their original sentences.” This is a rare instance of U.S. criticism of Hong Kong at a session of the HRC.
Another first for the U.S. was the issuance of a statement under Item 3 of the agenda. The statement criticized China for detaining the Hong Kong Causeway Bay booksellers in 2015, and the alleged kidnapping by Chinese security agents of billionaire businessman Xiao Jianhua in a Hong Kong hotel earlier this year. The US Item 3 statement registered concern over enforced disappearances in only two countries, China and Syria, in that order.
China Reacts
China’s mission in Geneva issued furious rebuttals to the US and EU Item 4 statements, accusing the countries of widespread and serious human rights abuses. It singled out racism and white supremacism in the United States and the rise of neo-Nazis and xenophobia in Germany. The UK was called out for “the phenomenon of modern slavery in which tens of thousands of migrant household workers suffer ill treatment.”
China was especially angered by the US statement under Item 3. Not only did the Americans criticize Chinese actions involving Hong Kong, the Chinese side was given only 20 minutes to craft a reply. In one respect, however, the Chinese government was relieved by the action in Geneva. It had been rumored that another joint statement like the one made by the United States and 11 “like-minded countries” under Item 2 at the 31st session of the Human Rights Council would be delivered at the 36th session. It appears that the strategy by Western countries has shifted from making joint statements to making individual statements. Whether this strategy holds going forward remains to be seen.

He Jiahong is a special kind of Chinese legal expert. He is a well-known legal scholar at Renmin University Law School in Beijing, where he specializes in criminal justice and the issue of wrongful convictions. He is also the author of detective novels and writes prolifically on legal subjects for popular audiences. He reportedly likes to describe himself as: “I am not only a jurist but a novelist, so I often have novel ideas about law.”
One of the ways in which He Jiahong expresses those ideas is through his public WeChat channel—a blog distributed to anyone who subscribes via the social media platform. Recently, he posted a piece with the rather provocative title: “The Number of Executions Should be Made Public.”
In China’s criminal justice discourse, public calls for greater transparency around the use of the death penalty are not unheard of but are nevertheless eye-catching when they do appear, especially from well-known legal experts such as He. Information related to the death penalty, including the number of executions carried out each year, continue to be treated as a closely guarded “state secret.” This is despite the fact that there are many indications that China has significantly reduced its use of capital punishment over the past decade—though it is still generally believed to be the world’s top executioner—and continues to face pressure from NGOs and United Nations human rights bodies to be more transparent about its use of the death penalty.
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Changsha Court public announcement of death sentences. Source: Hu Guiyun. |
He Jiahong raises some familiar arguments in support of greater transparency about capital punishment in China, including the importance of preventing wrongful executions, demonstrating the progress made in reducing the use of the death penalty, and the value of facilitating public discussion about the future of capital punishment. He clearly believes that openness and greater transparency will help build public trust in the judiciary and show respect for the public’s right to access such information.
He notes that the trend towards online publicization of court documents is making secrecy about capital punishment irrelevant. On this point, he is perhaps overly optimistic. Dui Hua and other organizations that have tried to use online platforms like the Supreme People’s Court’s national database of court judgments have found it seriously lacking when it comes to information about cases involving the death penalty and other “sensitive” subjects.
This suggests that the trend toward judicial transparency is already bound by pre-set limits on what information is considered “appropriate” for public disclosure. If the Chinese government were to do as He Jiahong recommends and make data about capital punishment public, it would first have to make the top-down decision to lift secrecy restrictions. The hope of a shortcut to judicial transparency through the release of court data is unlikely given such secrecy restrictions.
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The Number of Executions Should be Made Public
He Jiahong
He Jiahong, professor at Renmin University School of Law. Source: Financial Times. |
On April 27, 1987, a dismembered female corpse was found in the Mianjiang River of Mayang County, Hunan. After searching missing-person’s reports, identification by family members, and blood-type analysis, the police confirmed that the deceased was a woman from Guizhou named Shi Xiaorong who had been missing for a month after working at a local hotel.
After several months of investigation, police determined, based on the manner in which the culprit had dismembered the corpse that the killer was a butcher named Teng Xingshan… On December 6, police placed Teng Xingshan under custody and investigation. Following continuous interrogation, Teng finally “confessed.” On December 13, 1988, the Huaihua Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Teng Xingshan to death. On January 19, 1989, the Hunan Higher People’s Court rejected Teng’s appeal, upheld the original verdict, and approved his death sentence.
In order to ensure that the death penalty is applied impartially and correctly, Chinese law mandates a special review and ratification procedure for death penalty cases, on the principle of a two-stage judicial process of trial and appeal. According to the provisions of the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law, death sentences with two-year reprieve were to be reviewed by high people’s courts and death sentences with immediate execution were to be reviewed by the Supreme People’s Court. Regardless of whether or not the defendant filed an appeal, cases involving the death penalty would all be subject to an automatic review process. In 1983, in an effort to “strike hard and fast” against criminal acts that seriously endangered public security and social order, the Supreme People’s Court delegated the power to review death sentences for homicide, rape, robbery, setting explosions, and other serious crimes to high people’s courts. To a certain degree, this led to a loosening of the review and control procedures over the death penalty. Since high people’s courts in provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions were generally the courts hearing appeals in death penalty cases, delegation of the power to review these cases meant that the same court became responsible for hearing the appeal and carrying out the final review. The review and ratification process that had been originally intended as a way to strictly control use of the death penalty became effectively meaningless.
Teng Xingshan’s case was handled under the combined “two-in-one” process of appeal trial and death sentence approval that existed during that particular period of Chinese law. On January 28, 1989, Teng Xingshan was executed by gunshot. However, that wasn’t the end of the case, because the so-called “victim” was still alive and would later “come back to life.”
In 1993, Shi Xiaorong finally made it home to Guizhou after having been abducted and trafficked to Shandong. When she heard about the Teng Xingshan case, she said that she didn’t even know Teng, and certainly did not have any “dubious relationship” with him. She even wrote to the Hunan court, asking it to revoke its mistaken judgment that she had “dubious relations” with Teng Xingshan, had been “murdered” by him, and demanded compensation for her reputation damage. But there was no response from the court. Shi now has a new life and no longer cares about an old case that has nothing to do with her.
News that the “dead had come back to life” eventually reached Teng Xingshan’s family. Teng’s parents had both died not long after their son had been executed. His brother figured that because their family was poor and ordinary they should not oppose the government. Not wanting to make trouble for himself, he decided not to mention the matter to anyone outside the family. In 2004, Teng Xingshan’s daughter Teng Yan had already grown up and worked as a migrant laborer for many years. After she learned the truth about what had happened, she and her younger brother Teng Hui, with help from a lawyer, filed a motion for appeal with the Hunan Provincial Procuratorate and Hunan High People’s Court. On October 25, 2005, the Hunan Higher People’s Court ordered a retrial in Teng Xingshan’s homicide trial and formally acquitted him of the charges. Teng Yan and Teng Hui received state and other compensations in the amount of 666,660 yuan (approximately US$85,000 at the time).
At the time, the National People’s Congress Legislative Affairs Commission was organizing experts and scholars to study ways of reforming the Criminal Procedure Law, and the death penalty review procedure was one of the areas that everyone was paying close attention to. There’s no question that the Teng Xingshan case played a role in pushing forward reform of the death penalty review system. The Supreme People’s Court decided from January 1, 2007, to take back the authority to review death sentences in all cases.
It’s now been 10 years since the reform of the death penalty review system. I was recently asked how I’d evaluate this reform. I said that it’s certainly been very positive, but I would have a hard time saying for sure. I believe that, since the power to review death sentences was returned to the Supreme People’s Court, the death penalty has definitely been applied with much greater strictness, in greater accordance with the rules, and in a more uniform manner. And the number of executions has certainly also decreased by a great deal. But because I don’t know the specific details, it’s impossible to comment in an objective and precise way.
In China, the number of executions seems to be treated as a kind of “state secret”. Those in the know remain tight-lipped on the subject, while those on the outside let their imaginations run wild. In my opinion, there’s no reason to treat the number of executions as a “state secret.” All death sentences in China are handed down and executed openly and in accordance with the law. It’s all perfectly open and aboveboard—executions are not carried out in secret or indiscriminately. Why does the government choose to be so secretive and why is it afraid of keeping the public informed? Disclosing the number of executions will not stain the reputation of the judicial organs or lead to social unrest. Tempered by their experience of numerous wars and disasters, Chinese people surely are psychologically resilient enough to face up to the number of executions!
On this point, policymakers ought to abandon their antiquated ideas of closed-door justice and embrace the modern judicial norms of transparency. Practical experience shows that openness is the best publicity and offers the best route to foster public trust. Publishing execution numbers also demonstrates judicial organs’ respect for citizens’ right to access information (zhiqingquan).
Actually, the Chinese judiciary has already made progress on this front, as court verdicts have begun to be published online! As a technical matter, when court verdicts are all online it won’t be that difficult to use “big data” technology to tally up the number of executions. Even if officials don’t make it public, the public can still find out. Therefore, I recommend that the Supreme People’s Court choose the right moment to begin publishing the number of executions. This can demonstrate the Chinese government’s resolve and sincerity in facing up to capital punishment and promoting civilized justice.
At the present time, there are more than 140 countries and regions in the world that have abolished the death penalty either by law or in practice. This shows that abolishing the death penalty is the general trend of human society because it is in line with the general spirit of humanitarianism and civilized justice. Furthermore, abolishing the death penalty is an effective way to prevent wrongful executions of innocent people. For judicial personnel, “no unjust treatment, no indulging wrongdoings” is but a beautiful tale/lore. Police, prosecutors and judges aren’t supernatural beings, and making the incorrect decisions when evidence is lacking is something that cannot be entirely avoided. Therefore, to prevent further miscarriages of justice in which innocent people are mistakenly put to death, we should seriously consider abolishing capital punishment.
I am deeply aware that China cannot abolish the death penalty at the current time, but we should have an earnest discussion about the issue and, through our efforts, make more of our fellow Chinese understand that the death penalty is not perfectly justified. Our government ought to make a solemn pledge to the world that China will make an effort to abolish the death penalty and that it will start by making the number of executions public so that the world can see the progress of China’s death penalty policies. After several years of continued hard work, China will go from “executing fewer” to “no executions” to full abolition of capital punishment, once again making China one of the most civilized, humane, and harmonious countries in the world!

| State | Confinement Rate, 2013 (per 100,000 juveniles) | Defendant Age, Sex, Crime | State Laws on Waiver into Adult Court | Case Prosecuted in Adult Court? |
| Wisconsin | 109.5-173 | 12-year-old girl defendants; attempted homicide, stabbing | WI law requires children as young as 10 to be charged as adults for homicide crimes | Yes |
| Massachusetts | 46-109.5 | 15-year-old boy defendant; homicide, stabbing | Juveniles 14 and older accused of homicide are automatically tried as adults | Yes |
| California | 173-366.5 | 14-year-old girl defendant; homicide, gunshot (participant) | Mandatory adult court jurisdiction for violent crimes committed by person 14 or older | Yes |
| South Dakota | 366.5-560 | 14-year-old defendant, homicide, gunshot | Discretionary waiver | Yes; defendant sentenced to LWOP in 2000, later commuted to 92 years |

| State | Confinement Rate, 2013 (per 100,000 juveniles) | Defendant Age, Sex, Crime | State Laws on Waiver into Adult Court | Case Prosecuted in Adult Court? |
| Wisconsin | 109.5-173 | 12-year-old girl defendants; attempted homicide, stabbing | WI law requires children as young as 10 to be charged as adults for homicide crimes | Yes |
| Massachusetts | 46-109.5 | 15-year-old boy defendant; homicide, stabbing | Juveniles 14 and older accused of homicide are automatically tried as adults | Yes |
| California | 173-366.5 | 14-year-old girl defendant; homicide, gunshot (participant) | Mandatory adult court jurisdiction for violent crimes committed by person 14 or older | Yes |
| South Dakota | 366.5-560 | 14-year-old defendant, homicide, gunshot | Discretionary waiver | Yes; defendant sentenced to LWOP in 2000, later commuted to 92 years |

