450 Sutter, the site of the San Francisco office. Image credit: The Dui Hua Foundation
When Senator Orrin Hatch visited China in 1997, he was accompanied by a leading scholar of contemporary China Michel Oksenberg, and a former senior staff member of Senator Hatch who had recently joined a private foundation, based on the East Coast, that supported both domestic and international projects with grants. A few months after the senator’s visit, I was contacted by the foundation to see if I’d be interested in applying for a grant.
The experience of working on the Northeast China Autonomous People’s Republic – in which I had uncovered the names of three hitherto unknown political prisoners in a provincial newspaper – convinced me that one could find names of political and religious prisoners whose names were not known outside China by scouring “open sources:” official publications – in particular – provincial newspapers. I submitted a proposal for a research grant to find these names.
At the time, my work on political and religious prisoners was supported entirely by the profits of my consulting business. I had never received a grant from either a government or private group and I had no idea how to go about winning one. I did a bit of research and learned that to receive a grant from a non-profit foundation I would need to use a “pass through” organization that was also a non-profit. I discussed the situation with my wife and a close friend. We looked into what it would take to create our own “pass through,” our own private foundation. We settled on a name – Dui Hua, which means dialogue 对话 in Mandarin Chinese – and applied to the State of California to begin operations as a non-profit foundation. Our application was accepted, and Dui Hua was incorporated in April 1999. After that we applied to the Internal Revenue Service for 501(c)(3) status which would enable us to operate as a non-profit exempt from federal taxes. This application was accepted in July 1999.
The Centre’s current office at Tin Ka Ping Building, CUHK. Image Credit: CUHK.
After the East Coast foundation received Dui Hua’s proposal, it forwarded it to three Sinologists for peer reviews. The responses were not very encouraging. Aside from being an unknown quantity insofar as research into contemporary China was concerned, there was skepticism that my research would find anything. As one reviewer put it, “The Chinese government does not make the names of political prisoners available in publications available to the public.” I was asked how many names of prisoners I expected to find. I answered I’d be satisfied if I could find 100 hitherto unknown names. The foundation decided to take a chance, and Dui Hua received the grant and began operations in August 1999.
With Dui Hua established and our first grant in hand, I headed for Hong Kong. I hired a couple of research assistants and together we went to the University Services Centre (USC) at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, one of the world’s premier repositories of materials on contemporary China. The USC has three floors of newspapers, journals, and books. The newspapers were held in the basement, in stacks arranged by province. I started by looking at newspapers published around the time of the Spring 1989 protests that culminated in the killings in Tiananmen Square. I focused on the newspapers of cities most affected by what the Chinese government referred to as a “counterrevolutionary uprising” – Beijing, Changsha, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.
After four hours of eye-straining research, I had turned up virtually nothing. Not a single story, even those that reported on the protests, yielded the name of a detainee. Maybe the critics were right – the Chinese government didn’t publish such information. Maybe the Jilin newspaper report was a fluke. Discouraged, I took the elevator to the eighth floor.
The eighth floor is where books are held in open stacks. I headed for the section that held judicial books. There I found several hundred yearbooks and records (multi-year collections) put out by public security bureaus, courts, procuratorates, and prisons. I had struck gold. In four hours of work I unearthed more than a hundred names of individuals detained for political crimes.
Two of my most important finds were found in publications put out by the Shanghai Public Security Bureau.
The December 1997 issue of Shanghai Public Security Journal revealed details of the case of Jiang Cunde. Jiang was a worker at a tool repair factory who plotted with other workers to set up an organization – “China Human Rights Committee” – modeled on Poland’s Solidarity Trade Union. Their activities took place in 1985 and 1986, and they were arrested and charged with counterrevolution in 1987. Jiang was sentenced to life in prison.
After discovering Jiang’s name, I began putting him on prisoner lists submitted to the Chinese government and have continued doing so up to the present day. I have been told that Jiang was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1993 and released on medical parole. He returned to political activities and was put back in prison in 1999. In 2004 his sentence was commuted to 20 years. Despite being awarded several citations for good behavior, Jiang has yet to receive another sentence reduction. He is imprisoned in Tilanqiao Prison and is said to suffer from severe mental illness characterized by psychotic episodes. He is due for release in 2024, by which time he will have served 31 years in prison.
The other case I found on my first foray into the holdings at USC was that of a disaffected young man by the name of Yu Rong. According to the 1990 Shanghai Public Security Yearbook and the popular magazine China Police, Yu Rong was responsible for printing and distributing 1,450 reactionary leaflets in Shanghai over a four-month period beginning in June 1989, not long after the suppression of the democracy protests in Beijing. Then-Mayor Zhu Rongji declared Yu’s action the biggest case of counterrevolutionary incitement in the history of Shanghai. He ordered the mobilization of hundreds of police officers to catch the culprit.
Most of Yu’s leaflets were dropped from tall buildings in Shanghai. By the time the leaflets reached the ground and had been collected and read, Yu had left the top of the buildings from where he had dropped the leaflets. After Yu was finally captured, the police accused him of committing 20 acts of arson and of dropping bricks from tall buildings, causing serious injuries and three deaths.
Since discovering Yu’s name in 1999, I have put him on 14 prisoner lists, but I have only received one written response. In April 2006 I was told that Yu was in a psychiatric detention center, also known as Ankang. If he is alive he is likely to still be there.
As China’s influence in Hong Kong has grown, the usefulness of the University Services Centre’s holdings has diminished. Recent publications with information on sensitive political crimes are rarely found on the centre’s shelves. The centre has been “harmonized.” For several years however the centre was an unrivaled source of the names of mostly unknown political prisoners about whom Dui Hua submits inquiries to the Chinese government. The USC’s role as a resource for our work has largely been taken over by Internet research, including surveying judgments in criminal cases posted on the Supreme People’s Court judgment websites.
I left America for Macau to take up a teaching position in August 1972. I moved to Hong Kong on Christmas Day, 1972. By the end of 1975 I had lived most of the previous three years in Hong Kong with a spell at Harvard University in late 1974 and early 1975 to earn a Master’s degree. What is now a Special Administrative Region of China, Hong Kong was then a Crown Colony of Great Britain. I worked as a tutor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and, beginning in the summer of 1975, as an assistant editor of Asian Business & Industry, a limited circulation business magazine, published by Far East Trade Press, with readers in every Asian country, including China.
One day in July 1975, as I was walking back to my office in Prince’s Building, I passed by Commercial Press where I purchased a copy of a pamphlet entitled “On Exercising All Round Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie” written by Zhang Chunqiao. Zhang was a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and the theoretician of a leftist faction that would someday come to be known as the Gang of Four. I read the pamphlet and, based on my understanding of its contents, wrote an article for the August issue of Asian Business & Industry. I called out Zhang for his ultra-leftism – identifying him as the principal spokesman for radical economic policy in the Central Committee — and criticized his call for class warfare directed against the “dictatorship of the bourgeoisie,” referring to a passage in his essay in which he calls for the “iron broom of the dictatorship of the proletariat” to sweep away bourgeois rights from China.
A few weeks after publication, I came to the office to find a stack of copies of the magazine wrapped in filthy rags. The China National Publications Import Corporation, the channel through which Far East Trade Press distributed its magazine in China, had returned all the magazines with a letter on its official stationary. The letter accused Asian Business & Industry of having published a counterrevolutionary article that had “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.” The letter concluded by stating that the magazine would no longer be allowed to circulate in China.
I didn’t know it at the time, but my article attacking Zhang Chunqiao had attracted the attention of Zhang and his leftist allies in what was sometimes called “the Shanghai faction.” Public security began a file on me, known in China as a dang’an. Such files are kept on virtually every Chinese citizen as well as on foreigners who visit China on a regular basis. Thirty years after my article appeared, I learned that it was the first item in my dang’an. The diplomat who gave me this information said that I was known in government and party circles as a “target of the Gang of Four.”
Shanghaied at the Feather and Down Fair
Shanghai Mansions.
My chance to visit Mainland China for the first time came in January 1976 when, as a freshly minted representative of the National Council for US-China Trade, I was asked to go to Shanghai to attend the China Feather and Down Garments Minifair (中国羽绒服饰小交易会) put on by the China National Native Produce and Animal By-Products Import and Export Corporation (CHINATUHSHU, 中国土产畜产进出口公司). My visa came through at the last possible moment, enabling me to make the flight to Shanghai from Guangzhou on January 6.
First though I had to get to Guangzhou from Hong Kong. I boarded the Kowloon Canton Railway train that departed from the Tsimtsatsui terminus at 8:24 on January 4, 1976, arriving at Lo Wu station around two hours later.
After crossing the border at Lowu and having a simple but tasteless lunch at the station on the Chinese side, I and other trade fair attendees boarded the 1:00 PM train for Guangzhou. I was accompanied by a young American entrepreneur who had become a leader in manufacturing down garments, then quite the rage in America, and an Australian businessman/scholar and his wife.
From the train windows we could view the countryside, fields left fallow for the spring planting. We passed the small village of Shenzhen, today a major city that is home to China’s first special economic zone. Upon arrival at the Guangzhou train station we hopped into grey Shanghai sedans for the run to the Bai Yun airport. We arrived at Hong Qiao Airport in Shanghai after nightfall, but there was no one to receive me.
Eventually Mr. Ma from the Shanghai Foreign Affairs Bureau showed up and I was taken to the Peace Hotel, the former Cathay Hotel, on the Bund. Mr. Ma was silent for the late-night drive though dark, deserted streets. The next day I moved to Shanghai Mansions, the old Broadway Mansions, where the trade fair was taking place. At the Shanghai Mansions I was given an immense apartment on an upper floor, with balconies overlooking the Huangpu River, Suzhou Creek and the Bund. There was a big radio circa early 1940s in the living room. Radio was the only form of entertainment available to me. I never bothered turning it on.
The next day, January 5, 1976, I visited the trade fair itself, and registered with the liaison office. The office was staffed by cadres from the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), the National Council’s counterpart organization in China. The fair itself was held in four rooms on the second floor of the hotel. Different branches of CHINATUSHU had their own display and negotiation spaces which were fitted out with one or two tables and chairs. A tin of cigarettes was placed on the tables. The exhibition and negotiation hall reeked of cigarette smoke.
“Traffic” on the Bund. Not a single car in sight. Today this thoroughfare is multi-laned and bumper to bumper, one of the busiest streets in China.
One of my tasks was to write an article on the minifair for the National Council’s magazine, China Business Review, so I put in a request for an interview with the trade fair’s leadership. My request received a cool reception. I was told to go to my room and wait for an answer. This was a sensitive time for people doing business in China, and minifairs, an innovation introduced as a modest reform in 1975, were under fire as examples of the “roots of capitalism” being introduced by Deng Xiaoping, arch foe of the Shanghai Faction. I wondered if I would get an interview in Shanghai, or have to wait until I got to Beijing, where a Fur Garments Minifair was about to open.
Rather than heeding the liaison office’s instructions, I decided to take a walk along the Bund and up Nanjing Road. There were few vehicles on the road, the favored mode of transport being the bicycle. I checked out the Shanghai Exhibition Hall, a vast structure built in the Soviet style, and the Shanghai Number One Department Store, said to be the largest in China. Its five floors were stocked with a wide variety of consumer goods, all made in China except foreign watches, the only foreign consumer good allowed for sale in China. I resisted the temptation to buy an Omega for RMB 861.
I have always visited bookstores on trips to China, and my first trip was no exception. I walked into the large Xinhua Bookstore on Nanjing Road, passing through thick canvas curtains meant to shield the building from the bitter cold outside. Upstairs I walked into the room that held internal (nei bu) publications sold only to cadres with the right documents. I was quickly and unceremoniously told to leave.
I wandered back to the hotel, stopping first at the office of the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank, located in a small building on a side street not far from the compound housing the Friendship Store and the Seamen’s Club. The compound had previously served as the sprawling British Consulate in Shanghai. I was greeted by the bank’s British manager with more than the usual British reserve. He and his colleague from the Standard Charter Bank were at the time the only resident foreign businessmen in Shanghai. Unfortunately, they could not conduct business. They were in effect hostages of the Chinese government to ensure that China’s holdings with the banks wouldn’t be expropriated. Their colleagues had in fact been detained during the early years of the Cultural Revolution. They couldn’t leave Shanghai until colleagues arrived to replace them. The fellow I met expressed relief that he would be ending his assignment later that year.
The Shanghai Exhibition Hall.
I decided to stop by the Friendship Store, a dreary place selling shoddy goods far below the quality found in Hong Kong’s Chinese products stores. After examining the wares on display, I walked over to the nearby Seamen’s Club. Both the Friendship Store and the Seamen’s Club were located on the grounds of the old British Consulate in Shanghai.
In those days Seamen’s Clubs were the hubs of entertainment for foreigners in China. They served cold beer and one could always find a sailor willing to tell tall tales of his voyages to China. I struck up a conversation with a young Hong Kong sailor who was working on a tramp steamer registered in Hong Kong and operated under the Chinese flag. Together we went back to the Shanghai Mansions where we had a simple dinner and played pool for several hours, drinking beer and eating peanuts. The young sailor told me of his life on a PRC-owned vessel. He complained about the incessant political study sessions he and his fellow seamen had to endure. I listened attentively. Apparently, others were also listening attentively.
An Interview
A group of mourners assemble for the walk to Zhou Enlai’s funeral in a side hall of the Forbidden City. Photos by author.
On January 8, I was advised that my request for an interview had been granted. I was told to come to a room on the top floor of the Shanghai Mansions at 10 PM, an unusually late hour for meetings in China. I spent some time putting together my questions, and then prepared to join a tour of a Shanghai commune. When I tried to sign up for the tour however I was told that I was not welcome to join. I protested to the liaison office to no avail. I headed out on another walk, this time witnessing the arrest of a Shanghai citizen by a police officer. The officer frog marched the young man down a narrow alley, attracting a throng of curious onlookers.
I went back to the Shanghai Mansions, had dinner, and waited in my room for the interview. At the appointed hour I went to the assigned room and found about two dozen cadres led by “leading Member” Chen Wenhai waiting for me. The interview was a formal affair, no smiles or words of greeting. I was told the ground rules. I would first ask all my questions. Thereafter I would be given a brief introduction to the trade fair. No further questions would be entertained. I must have asked thirty or so questions, after which I was given the brief introduction. It quickly became apparent that few of my questions would be answered. The “brief introduction” started out with words of praise for the wise leader Chairman Mao Zedong and the correct policies of the Chinese Communist Party. I was then given the bare bones facts of the trade fair: how large the exhibition space was, how many provincial animal by-products branches were in attendance, how many traders from which foreign countries were in attendance. That was it.
I tried to slip in one more question. In 1975 China agreed for the first time to sew into garments intended for export the labels of the western company that had ordered them according to their specifications. This was a welcome reform as Chinese labels like Peony, Snowflake, and the like didn’t appeal much to American and European consumers. Suddenly, at this minifair, traders had been advised that this policy had been cancelled. No more foreign labels would be sewn into Chinese made garments. There was much unhappiness among foreign traders about this sudden change, and I wanted to ask a question about why this step had been taken. I never got a chance to do so. I was cut off and reminded that there would be no more questions and told that the interview was over.
Shortly after returning to my room the phone, an old black apparatus with a solid feel, started ringing. It was the young sailor I had befriended the night before. His voice was shaking, and I guessed he had company sitting nearby. Obviously distressed, he told me that he was leaving Shanghai early, and that I was not to try to contact him. He told me he would always remember our friendship. He rang off. A cold shiver ran up my spine.
I went to bed, but had trouble falling asleep. In the early hours of January 9, I heard a great commotion taking place on the barges on Suzhou Creek below me. There were loud voices and the sounds of fighting. I dozed off and when I awoke I saw the streets lined with military vehicles, and all the barges gone. In the distance I could hear the somber music of a funeral dirge. I left my room and encountered an elderly floor attendant. What has happened I asked? He told me that Premier Zhou Enlai had died. He was weeping.
I and other trade fair attendees went to the liaison office to find out more. The official who met us solemnly announced the premier’s passing, and then told us that “the Chinese people will turn grief into strength” and that they would carry on the great traditions of the revolutionary leader. There would be no interruption to the trade fair. Business as usual.
To reinforce this point, the liaison office laid on visits for the attendees and this time I was invited to join the tours. We were offered visits to a well-off commune on the outskirts of the city – one of its production brigades specialized in raising “hairy crabs,” a Shanghai delicacy – and a factory making feather and down garments. Our visits were punctuated by bursts of propaganda praising the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
Upon my return to the hotel I ran into the Australian who I had met on the train up to Guangzhou and his wife. They had just had a harrowing experience. They had gone for a morning walk and saw crowds of people reading newspapers which had been posted on wooden hoardings. They were reading official news of Zhou Enlai’s death, and the couple decided to photograph the scene. Bad move. In those days it was against the law for foreigners to purchase or even read local newspapers like the Wen Wei Bao and Liberation Daily. The couple were swiftly taken into custody by the local neighborhood committee and held in a small room until the police showed up. They were interrogated and lectured at length. Their actions were unlawful and violated the terms of their visit to China. After signing expressions of regret, and apologizing profusely, the couple were escorted back to the Shanghai Mansions.
A small group of us decided to try another restaurant for lunch, having sampled just about everything on the Shanghai Mansions’ menu. We walked to the Peace Hotel and took the elevator up to the dining floor. We chose the Western restaurant. Sitting down, we noticed that the waiters were wearing black arm bands. One of the young men came to our table and explained: “We have been told not to commemorate Zhou Enlai’s death, but we are doing so anyway. We are not afraid. Let them come and try to make trouble.”
The next day I flew to Beijing where I attended the fur garments minifair, and visited one of the model communes on the city’s outskirts as well as, of course, the Great Wall and the Ming Tombs.
On January 12, I took part in the funeral of Zhou Enlai as a member of the American delegation. Diplomats were all dressed in black, thin clothing for the bitter cold. We were received on the dais by Jiang Qing, wife of Chairman Mao Zedong, one of the members of the Shanghai Faction later to be known as the Gang of Four. Zhang Chunqiao was also present.
China would be visited with much more sorrow in 1976: the campaign against the right deviationist wind, the Ching Ming protests and the deadly response, the July earthquake in Tangshan, and much joy when the Gang of Four was overthrown in October. I witnessed all of those events during many visits to the country that year.
Upon my return to Hong Kong after attending Zhou’s funeral I was asked by a friend at Ta Kung Pao, a left-wing newspaper, to write a eulogy for the recently departed premier. I did so, and the piece ran under the Chinese name given to me by a teacher in the United States: Kang Youhan (康又瀚). The eulogy was full of praise for Zhou. A few days after it appeared my friend told me that the article had been removed from the Reference News edition published in Shanghai. My friend suggested that I adopt a new name for any future Chinese language articles I might write. I adopted the name Kang Yuan (康原), and have kept it to the present day.
Postscript: More than 30 years later, I took a small group of businesspeople to Shanghai. We went to the restaurant at the top of the Peace Hotel, and there I recounted the story of the defiant young waiter. Across the room I spied a man of roughly my age who was now the manager of the restaurant. He looked familiar, and I asked him to come to our table. He complied, and we quickly figured out that he was that young waiter I had encountered in January 1976. In excited voices we relived what had happened. Misty eyed, he asked me a favor. Would I be willing to come back and talk to his young charges? “Young people have no idea how we lived then. And they aren’t interested. You can help. Please come back.” I agreed to do so, but when I returned a few months later the restaurant was closed for renovation. I subsequently found out that Mr. Zhang the manager had retired.
In the late Spring of 1990, my family and I lived in an apartment on Hong Kong’s Victoria Peak that looked over a verdant country park to the South China Sea on the near horizon. When visibility was good, one could see junks with red sails and cargo vessels plying the waters off Lamma Island. The outline of Chinese islands loomed on the far horizon. China was near. With the conclusion of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, China was drawing nearer. In 1990, a mere seven years remained before China resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong.
My life in Hong Kong was good. I was a vice president of Dallas-based Occidental Chemical (Oxychem), which paid me a handsome salary and cost-of-living allowance. I enjoyed generous home leave, exclusive use of a 280SE Mercedes, a driver, two maids, school tuition for my first son, and two country club memberships. I ran the Asia Pacific region for the corporation. Oxychem had factories and sales offices in a dozen countries. I spent a lot of time on the road.
That year, I was also the president of the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM) in Hong Kong, the largest American chamber outside of North America with 2,800 members. In fact, I was never meant to be president of the chamber. After the killings in Tiananmen Square in 1989, I used my position as vice-president of the chamber in charge of committees to convene a meeting of members big and small. At that meeting I pushed through a resolution condemning Beijing’s actions against fierce opposition from large corporate members. The resolution was published in AMCHAM’s magazine and placed as an advertisement in a number of Hong Kong newspapers.
Not surprisingly, when it came time for the Nominating Committee, which was dominated by old-timers and representatives of multinational corporations, to vote on the next president, I came in a distant second. My views on human rights and Tiananmen, in the eyes of many AMCHAM leaders, made me unsuitable to be president.
The fellow who came in first called his boss in New York with the good news. His boss told him that he had a choice: He could assume the presidency of AMCHAM and serve his one-year term, or he could continue his career with the firm. The fellow chose to continue his career, and I became president of AMCHAM by default.
I assumed the presidency on January 1, 1990. It was a tough time to be president of an organization that favored strong trade ties with China. After Tiananmen, China had become an international pariah. Calls were mounting to impose sanctions and, in the United States Congress, to strip China of its Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status. China’s trade status had to be renewed every year, ironically no later than June 4.
The first hearings on China’s human rights record and MFN were scheduled to take place before three subcommittees of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on May 16, 1990 in Washington. I was invited to testify by Richard Bush, staff consultant to the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs chaired by Congressman Steve Solarz (D-New York). I accepted the invitation.
Chaucer and Mao Tai
On May 9, a week before I was to testify, I and the leaders of the American business community in Hong Kong were invited to a banquet by Zhou Nan, Director of the New China News Agency (Xinhua) in Hong Kong. Xinhua was the seat of Chinese power in the colony. Zhou was an experienced diplomat. He had served as a vice minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which capacity he had negotiated the joint declaration between China and the United Kingdom on Hong Kong. He spoke flawless English, and loved English literature (he could recite the prologue to Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales in Middle English). He also served as an interpreter for interrogations of American POWs during the Korean War.
Zhou had a fearsome reputation as a hard-liner. He was also very anti-British, stemming from a botched attempt to recruit him by MI6 while Zhou was posted to China’s Mission to the United Nations in New York.
Before heading off to the banquet, my longtime friend and fellow AMCHAM officer Jeff Muir and I had done our daily jog up Black’s Link. We returned to my apartment, showered, and fortified ourselves with ice-cold cans of San Miguels. We left in my car for Zhou Nan’s villa on the south side of Hong Kong Island shortly before 6 PM.
My driver had turned on the radio for the 6:00 PM news on RTHK, the government-run radio station. A few minutes into the broadcast, an interview of the mother of a Hong Kong student, Yao Yongzhan, aired. Yao, a student leader, had been detained in the aftermath of the protests in Shanghai. His mother wept gently. She had heard that her son was being mistreated in a Shanghai detention center. Her tearful plea stuck in my mind.
We arrived at the villa and were led into a room where the rest of the American guests were waiting. These were the leaders of the American business community: Michael Clancy, China Light & Power, a subsidiary of Exxon, and the largest foreign investor in Hong Kong; Lyn Edinger, managing director of Honeywell; Ed Onderko, partner of Arthur Anderson; Jeff Muir, partner of China Consultants International; and Ralph Spencer, executive director of AMCHAM.
We were ushered into the dining room where we took our seats around a large round table. I was seated at the right hand of Zhou Nan. As soon as we sat down, Mao Tai began to be served. Mao Tai is a sorghum-based spirit which is 52 percent alcohol (104 proof). It is the favored banquet drink served at meals with senior officials. It is often chased with cold beer.
Zhou Nan was known as one of China’s best Mao Tai drinkers. I had learned to drink Mao Tai under the tutelage of Wang Yaoting, Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, when I served as the Hong Kong representative of the National Council for US-China Trade from 1975 to 1980. My boss, Ambassador Chris Phillips, wasn’t much of a drinker, so I was called upon to represent him at banquets during visits to Beijing. Wang Yaoting regularly consumed a bottle of Mao Tai at dinner. Each bottle held 32 glasses made exclusively for drinking the fiery spirit.
It wasn’t long before the combination of Mao Tai and cold beer loosened the tongue. I remarked to Zhou Nan that I had heard that one could learn a lot about what kind of person someone is by asking which character in the classic Dream of the Red Chamber the person admired the most, “just like you can learn a lot about someone by finding out which of the pilgrims in Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales he or she likes the most.”
That got Zhou Nan going: “When that Aprile with his shoures soote, The droghte of March hath perced to the roote, And bathed every veyne in swich licour, Of which vertu engendred is the flour . . .”
When he finished his performance to applause, Zhou drew himself up and began his toast. “Mr. Kamm,” he intoned in perfect English, “I would like to thank you, on behalf of the Chinese government and the Chinese people, for all that you have done, and all that you are about to do, to promote friendly relations between the United States and China.”
To this day, I don’t know what got into my head, but I stopped Zhou Nan and asked, “So what are you going to do for me?” The room fell into a stunned silence. You could hear a pin drop. My American colleagues had had no warning. They had no idea where I was heading. Perhaps they thought I would ask that China would buy a boatload or two of caustic soda. No one knew. Neither did I.
Zhou Nan asked what I meant and I replied that many people in Hong Kong hoped that AMCHAM would convince Congress to keep China’s MFN status, “but you are different, Minister Zhou. You can help me.”
Zhou responded: “The Chinese government has done everything possible to improve relations with the United States.” I said I begged to differ. It could do more.
Zhou put down his glass and asked me what I thought the Chinese government should do. I had arrived at that point without thinking what it was I wanted Beijing to do. Then I remembered the voice on the radio. I asked Ji Shaoxiang, head of Xinhua’s foreign affairs bureau who was sitting across the table, what the name of the student leader who was being held in Shanghai. Ji replied “Yao Yongzhan.”
“That’s it!” I declared. “Why don’t you release Yao Yongzhan?”
Zhou exploded. “You have rudely interfered in China’s internal affairs, and committed an unfriendly act that has hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.” he thundered.
In for a dime, in for a dollar, I figured, so I fought back. “A few minutes ago, you treated me as a friend of the Chinese government and people. Now, because I ask you to show mercy to a young man, I’m no longer a friend?”
Zhou Nan, former Director of Xinhua News Agency in Hong Kong and former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs for the People’s Republic of China. Image Credit: South China Morning Post.
I reminded Zhou that “The quality of mercy is not strained,” and asked him if he had ever done something as a young man that he wished he had done differently later in life.
It went on like this for a few minutes. The business leaders were becoming increasingly uncomfortable, and Zhou Nan was becoming more and more upset.
Finally, I told Zhou that whether or not Yao Yongzhan were released I would still go to Congress to testify in favor of retaining China’s MFN status, and asked him if he knew why. “No,” he snarled. “Because I love Hong Kong. Do you love Hong Kong?”
Zhou was speechless. Here was a foreign businessman asking China’s most senior official in Hong Kong whether he loved the city. After a moment’s pause, Zhou said, “Alright, I’ll see what I can do.”
I stood up and told Zhou Nan that I wanted to use the restroom. He snapped his fingers and a young man in a white coat emerged. He led me through a maze of corridors and then, when he knew there were no recording devices in use, he turned and looked at me. He had listened to the exchange with Zhou Nan, and he had tears in his eyes. He hugged me and said, “Thank you for that.”
After visiting the washroom, I returned to the banquet room. The head of China Light & Power, Michael Clancy, was apologizing to Zhou Nan. “Not all Americans are as impertinent as John Kamm,” he intoned. I took my seat and reminded the Americans that I was president of AMCHAM and that they should hold their tongues. The dinner drew to a close and I returned to my apartment on Coombe Road, wondering about what I had just done.
Testifying on China
The next day, May 10, 1990, I left Hong Kong for Washington, stopping first in Seoul and then in Tokyo on Oxychem business. In Tokyo, I composed my testimony in a room at the Okura Hotel. I decided that the focus of my testimony would be the damage that revoking China’s MFN would do to the colony, then grappling with the fact that it would be handed over by the United Kingdom to China. I also decided to confront the issue of human rights head on.
I arrived in Washington via Newark on May 14, 1990. The next day I huddled with AMCHAM’s consultants, representatives of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, and staff of the State Department and Congress dealing with China.
On May 16 at 9:40 AM the hearing on “Most Favored Nation Status for the People’s Republic of China” was called to order by Congressman Solarz in Room 2172 of the House Rayburn Office Building. Members of Congress were invited to make statements. After that, witnesses were called, one by one. First to testify was Winston Lord, former ambassador to China. He was followed by witnesses representing the National Committee on US-China Relations, Human Rights Watch, and the Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars.
Then it was the business panel’s turn. First up was the president of the United States-China Business Council, Roger Sullivan. I followed Mr. Sullivan, representing the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong.
Sticking closely to the five-minute limit for testimonies, I outlined the damage revoking China’s MFN would inflict on Hong Kong and adjacent Guangdong Province and then moved to the subject of human rights. “Americans in Hong Kong abhor the violations of human rights now going on in China, and we condemn them both in public and private sessions with Chinese officials,” I said.
I continued. “Who knows better than the people of Hong Kong how bad the situation is? We are on the front line. There are young Hong Kong people in Chinese jails. I take this opportunity to call once more for China’s leaders to release them to their families in Hong Kong… Whatever capital we might earn by fighting further sanctions we will gladly spend in the effort to free all Chinese prisoners of conscience.”
Chairman Solarz thanked me for my “powerful and eloquent plea,” but then subjected me to sharp questioning. He was followed by Congresswoman Pelosi. The congresswoman had taken office in 1987. Her San Francisco district had a large population of Chinese Americans who had been deeply affected by the events of June 4, 1989. Mrs. Pelosi became a leader in the effort to use MFN to wrest human rights concessions from the Chinese government. Her opposition to China being granted MFN without additional human rights conditions launched her national political career.
My testimony received wide media coverage, including in major American newspapers. It was broadcast in its entirety by a fledgling network known as C-Span. Excerpts were broadcast by CNN, and were viewed in Hong Kong and on the Mainland. Chinese officials were delighted, as was the Hong Kong business community. Everywhere I went in the colony, I was greeted as “Mr. MFN.” The frontpage of USA Today carried a headline: “John Kamm: Hero in Hong Kong.”
I returned to Hong Kong on May 27. I debriefed AMCHAM’s board, the American Consulate General, and the Hong Kong Government. My wife and I were invited to dinner by Ji Shaoxiang, the official who had given me the name of the detained student leader at the May 9 banquet, and his wife. The dinner was to take place on the evening of June 1 in the top-floor restaurant of the China Resources Building.
My wife and I arrived at the restaurant to find a cavernous room empty save for a single table placed under a large chandelier. We took our seats, and the food began to flow. Mercifully there was no Mao Tai. The conversation consisted mostly of pleasantries, but then the tone turned serious.
“Director Zhou very much wanted to attend this evening’s dinner,” Mr. Ji intoned. “Unfortunately, he was called away on urgent business. He asked me to tell you, however, that Yao Yongzhan will be released in four days.” On June 5, Yao walked out of the Shanghai Detention Center a free man. He boarded a flight and returned to Hong Kong the same day. He eventually went to the United States. Yao’s release following my plea marked the first time that Beijing released a political prisoner due to a foreign intervention. It would not be the last.
China’s MFN Status
On June 3, 1990, President George H.W. Bush waived the free-emigration conditions stipulated in the Jackson-Vanick Amendment of the Trade Act of 1974, thereby extending MFN status to China for another year. In his presidential determination, President Bush cited the damage that Hong Kong would suffer if China’s trade status were revoked. Bush’s decision to extend China’s MFN status opened a 60-day window during which Congress could debate a resolution of disapproval which, if passed with enough votes to withstand a presidential veto, would strip China of MFN. Such a resolution was soon introduced by Congressman Jerry Solomon (R-New York), along with another piece of legislation that would place human rights conditions on future renewals of China’s MFN status. This was the US-China Policy Act introduced in the House of Representatives by Congresswoman Pelosi and in the US Senate by Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-Maine).
On June 14, 1990, China’s premier Zhu Rongji visited Hong Kong. AMCHAM was one of the hosts, and we organized a luncheon for him. Prior to the luncheon, attended by hundreds of business people, I was taken aside by a Chinese official and told that one of the reasons Yao Yongzhan was released was that there was concern in Beijing that I would use the occasion of my introductory remarks to call for the student leader’s release. I was asked not to embarrass Premier Zhu.
Congress acted quickly to call hearings on President Bush’s decision to renew China’s MFN status. Hearings were scheduled by both the Trade Subcommittee of the Ways and Means Committee, chaired by Congressman Sam Gibbons (D-Florida) and the Senate Finance Committee, chaired by Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas). The former hearing was to take place on June 19, with the latter hearing to take place the next day. I arrived in Washington on June 18 and testified at both hearings. Before and after the hearings I roamed the halls of Congress. In less than five weeks I had testified three times to Congress and had met dozens of members of Congress and senior staff, as well as administration figures. I gave many interviews to the media.
The House of Representatives eventually passed both the Resolution of Disapproval and the US-China Policy Act, but the Senate failed to consider and vote on the two bills before the clock ran out on the 101st Congress. China’s MFN status was saved, at least for another year. AMCHAM – and Hong Kong – had played a role. This marked the first time in history that Hong Kong had figured in a major American foreign policy decision.
As my term as AMCHAM president drew to a close, I was asked to come to Xinhua’s headquarters on Queen’s Road West, across the street from the Happy Valley Race Track, on December 20, 1990. I was ushered into a room where I was greeted by Director Zhang, vice-director in charge of trade and economic affairs.
Director Zhang expressed the Chinese government’s gratitude for the work I had done on MFN. He wondered if I was interested in expanding my business in China.
I thought about it, and replied “The struggle for MFN is far from over. I would rather invest in the issue than expand my business in China.”
Director Zhang asked, “How can we help?” My response was brief: “Release prisoners held for what they did during the 1989 disturbances. That will help China keep its MFN status.”
In 2017, there were more than 200 sister city and state relationships between the United States and China, ties that bind states and cities. The relationships are handled, on the American side, by offices in state and city governments, often manned by volunteers. The relationships exist primarily to foster economic and cultural ties. They have rarely been used to promote human rights and the rule of law.
In the summer of 2004, I hit upon the idea of utilizing sister city relationships to intervene on behalf of political prisoners in the Chinese cities and provinces that had American partners. There were around 120 sister community relationships at that time. I and my colleagues put together a list of contacts in the governor’s and mayor’s offices who oversaw the relationships with Chinese provinces and cities. Our final list had 83 names and addresses of individuals in charge of the sister community relationship.
On August 18, 2004, Dui Hua sent letters to our list of contacts introducing our work and asking if the sister city would be willing to engage their counterparts in a discussion of human rights, and, in particular, whether the state would be willing to submit a list of political prisoners incarcerated in their Chinese counterpart’s jails and prisons.
The response was underwhelming. Of the 83 letters sent out, we received only one positive response. Lansing, Michigan’s state capital, had a sister city relationship with Sanming Municipality, a prefecture-level municipality with a population of 2.5 million, in Fujian Province. Martha Fujita, the Executive Director in charge of Lansing’s Regional Sister City Commission, housed in the Mayor’s office, replied that she would be willing to help Dui Hua. Ms. Fujita advised that a delegation headed by the mayor of Sanming would visit Lansing on September 19-21, 2004.
It so happened that there was a group of eight labor activists who had been detained in April 2002 and sentenced to prison for subversion by the Sanming Intermediate People’s Court in October 2003. The sentences ranged from two to sixteen years. The 16-year sentence was given to the group’s leader, Li Jianfeng, a former court official who had set up an independent trade union and who, the prosecution alleged, had downloaded materials from the Internet which he compiled into a book entitled “Labor Unions.”
Lansing is a city with deep roots to the automotive industry. It has manufactured automobiles at General Motor’s Lansing Plant for decades. Trade unions are strong. National and local unions as well as the local chapter of Amnesty International had already contacted Mayor Tony Benevides asking him to intervene on behalf of the Sanming Eight.
I composed a “Request for Information” and faxed it to Ms. Fujita on August 31, 2004. She agreed to find a way to hand it over, with a cover letter from Mayor Benevides, to the mayor of Sanming when the right moment presented itself.
The Chinese delegation arrived and were hosted to a “Mayor’s Welcome Dinner” and a Chamber of Commerce luncheon. They visited the General Motors plant, Michigan State University, and Sparrow Health Systems. A highlight of the delegation’s visit was sitting in on a Chinese immersion program at an elementary school where the children greeted the guests in Chinese and performed a Chinese folk song for them. The Chinese guests were thrilled and posed for photographs with the children. They also attended a baseball game and sat in the Mayor’s VIP Skybox.
In short, the Chinese delegation was treated to a hearty dose of Midwestern hospitality, setting the stage for the intervention that was to follow.
On September 21, the Chinese group left from Lansing Capital International Airport to make their way back to China via Chicago. While the group was checking in their bags, Ms. Fujita took the mayor of Sanming aside. She explained that Lansing is a city with deep connections to the labor movement, and that an important base of support for Mayor Benevides was labor unions. She then presented Mayor Benevides’ letter and Dui Hua’s request for information to the Chinese mayor. He accepted them without hesitation.
Over the next few years, two of the three labor leaders, including Li Jianfeng, were given sentence reductions and released early. Li was given sentence reductions totaling five years. He was released in April 2013. His five-year supplemental sentence of deprivation of political rights will expire next month, in April 2018. Huang Xiangwei, who was sentenced to six years in prison, received a 10-month sentence reduction and was released after serving just over five years of his sentence.
The use of sister city relationships to promote respect for human rights in China holds potential, but the relationships are rarely used. Boulder, Colorado has had an active sister city relationship with Lhasa, Tibet for more than 30 years. According to the body’s website, it “promotes and implements non-political exchanges of mutual benefit with Lhasa” including in the fields of health care, education, environmental protection, agriculture, and animal husbandry. No mention of human rights, even though human rights abuses in Tibet are often in the news. Houston, which has a sister city relationship with Shenzhen, did little to assist American businesswoman Sandy Phan-Gillis, even though Ms. Phan-Gillis was the president of the Houston-Shenzhen Sister City Association.
Lansing’s decision to use its relationship with Sanming to help secure the release of the Sanming Eight shows that sister city relationships can play a role in advancing the cause of human rights in China, if city and state governments demonstrate the political will to do so.
Gallup’s annual survey of American attitudes towards foreign countries has been released. It shows that 53 percent of Americans have a favorable opinion of China, versus 45 percent who have an unfavorable view of the country. This marks the first time that the long-running poll has yielded in a majority favorability rating for China since the events of June 1989 nearly 30 years ago.
According to Gallup polling, China’s image in the United States has risen 10 points since Xi Jinping assumed leadership of the Communist Party in late 2012.
The result is surprising given rising tensions in the relationship over trade, the South China Sea, and other security concerns, as well as a steady diet of negative news on the human rights front.
The poll also recorded that 11 percent of Americans view China as the greatest threat to the United States, down from 12 percent in 2016. There is significant difference between Republicans and Democrats on this issue, with 15 percent of Republicans versus seven percent of Democrats viewing China as the greatest threat to the United States.
The reasons for China’s uptick in popularity are difficult to discern. Given President Trump’s low approval rating, his bashing of China over trade may help actually help China: “The enemy of your enemy is your friend.” According to the RealClear average of polls on President Trump’s handling of foreign policy, 40.4 percent of Americans approve versus 53.6 percent who disapprove.
It might also be that Americans see China as having helped contain North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs by supporting tough sanctions against the regime. The Gallup poll reveals that 92 percent of Americans have an unfavorable view of North Korea, while 51 percent see the reclusive state as America’s biggest enemy, up from 16 percent in 2016.
The poll was conducted February 1-10, 2018. It was based on random telephone interviews with 1,044 adults in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. It has a margin of error of plus/minus four percent.
As 2002 drew to a close, I travelled to Beijing again to make the final arrangements for the release of Ngawang Sangdrol. It had been a busy year. Dui Hua had announced the release of two other Tibetan political prisoners earlier that year, Jigme Sangpo and ethnomusicologist Ngawang Choephel.
On March 3, I was featured in a cover story in The New York Times Sunday Magazine and in April 11, I delivered testimony to the Congressional Executive Commission on China — “An Arsenal of Human Rights.”
I had travelled to China a number of times that year, including in June to Beijing and Lhasa where I visited Jigme Sangpo, in the home of his niece, at the tail end of my efforts to secure his release and safe passage to the United States. In September, I had visited Beijing shortly after the release of American businessman David Chow from a prison in Harbin after serving eight years of a 15-year sentence. I had worked hard on Chow’s case for several years. His release, together with that of Ngawang Sangdrol on October 17, were intended to lay the groundwork for Jiang Zemin’s state visit to the United States in late October 2002.
On October 9, 2002, I met with officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice the day after I arrived in Beijing. Joint meetings with different ministries are rare, then as now. In addition to discussing Ngawang Sangdrol’s imminent release, I asked that I be allowed to visit a prison before the end of the year. I was told that my request would be considered, and that I should return to Beijing later that month to get an answer.
I returned to Beijing on October 26. I was told that I would be allowed to visit Dongguan Prison in Guangdong Province, one of China’s largest prisons, in two weeks. I would be accompanied by Mr. Zhang Yi, a ranking official of the Ministry of Justice’s Department of Judicial Assistance and Foreign Affairs.
I flew back to Hong Kong to research the prison and to speak to NGOs to ascertain if there were political prisoners incarcerated there. It turned out that Chen Meng, a Shenzhen-based musician, was serving a 12-year sentence in Dongguan Prison for trafficking in state secrets. In November 1994, Chen had faxed to two Hong Kong human rights groups a “blacklist” of political activists barred from leaving or entering China. He had obtained the list from his brother-in-law who worked for the border control police. Chen’s identity was quickly uncovered. Chen, his sister, and his brother-in-law all went to prison. In Chen Meng’s case, that meant entering Dongguan Prison.
On November 10, 2002, I boarded the direct train from Hong Kong to Guangzhou, arriving in Guangdong’s capital city in the late morning. I was met by local officials, with whom I had lunch. After lunch, I was driven to the White Swan Hotel, considered one of the best hotels in the city. (It is situated on Shamian Island, site of the pre-1949 foreign concessions.) Zhang Yi had already arrived. I called his room and we settled on the next day’s program. Afterwards I called John Norris, the American Consul General in Guangzhou.
The next day, November 11, Zhang Yi and I left the hotel after breakfast for the 90-minute drive on the expressway to the prison. Dongguan Prison is situated in Gaobu Township on the outskirts of Shijie village in Dongguan Municipality. We arrived at the prison shortly before 10 AM.
By the time I visited Dongguan Prison, I had already toured six prisons in China, in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangdong. I knew the routine. Upon arrival, I would be met by a phalanx of officers in full uniform, after which the warden would take me to his conference room where he would deliver a “brief introduction” to the prison. From there, depending on the prison’s layout, one would tour the hospital, kitchen, exhibition space for products made by prisoners, and a cellblock (but almost never solitary confinement cells). Sometimes you could witness prison labor, and, even rarer, one might see performances laid on by prisoners for visitors.
Afterwards everyone would go to a local restaurant where much eating and drinking took place. Those occasions proved to be a good opportunity for effective advocacy, so I reluctantly joined in.
A Brief Introduction
Upon arrival at the prison, Zhang Yi and I were greeted by the warden, Mr. Li Jianping. He introduced us to two senior members of the provincial prison administration bureau, as well as his deputy wardens. Mr. Li, who was to be my guide during the two-hour tour, escorted us to his office, where the group sat down at a mahogany table in his conference room.
Dongguan Prison, Warden Li explained, was established in 1988. In November 1998, it was designated a “ministry level” model prison, a status which enabled it to host high-level central and provincial government officials. At the time of my visit, it housed 5,200 inmates in 15 cell blocks. It held the largest population of Hong Kong-Macau-Taiwan residents and foreigners in China – 700 inmates from 20 territories and countries. Each block had 30 cells (six cells on each of the five floors) measuring 30 square meters each. The cells housed 10-12 inmates each. The prison was overcrowded, well above design capacity.
Foreign prisoners in Dongguan Prison, Guangdong. Image Credit: WenXueCity.Com
Most individuals convicted by courts in Shenzhen and Dongguan Municipalities served their sentences in Dongguan Prison. Those whose household registrations were in those two municipalities but who were convicted by Beijing courts served their sentences in Dongguan Prison. Most foreigners and Hong Kong-Macau-Taiwan residents convicted by Guangdong courts were housed there.
Warden Li explained the management system of the prison. There were four types of prisoners and four types of punishment. The four types of prisoners were those who were serving sentences for violent crimes, smuggling, other economic crimes, and sexual crimes. Well-behaved prisoners would be treated leniently, “ordinary” prisoners would be treated according to standard policies, prisoners whose behavior was sub-standard would be placed under observation (one-third of Hong Kong prisoners were under observation at the time of my visit), and prisoners who violated prison regulations, including violent and dangerous prisoners, would be “strictly managed.” They could be subjected to solitary confinement.
The warden extolled the results achieved by the prison’s management system: 35 percent of all prisoners receive a sentence reduction or parole every year, there was a low recidivism rate of 3.2 percent, and there had been no prison escapes. Because of the high level of care available in the prison’s “Grade A” hospital, medical parole was rarely granted, I was told.
All prisoners were required to do manual labor, except those who were old, weak, or sick, who were placed in their own cell block (prisoners over the age of 55 were considered elderly). The prison made toys and plastic flowers. Since November 1991, none of their products had been exported. (In 1992, the United States and China signed a memorandum of understanding prohibiting trade in products made with prison labor.)
A Performance
When the briefing was over, our party went to the prison courtyard to watch a program of performances by prisoners, passing along the way the Grade A Prison Hospital. There were many pieces of advanced medical devices in evidence, though not in use.
Anticipating the performance, I sat in the front row, next to Warden Li. We were serenaded by an 18-piece band under an energetic conductor. I was told that this man, dressed in standard prison garb save for a red coat and a jaunty navy cap, was a Hong Kong person serving a life sentence. Throughout the band’s performance, the conductor would turn his head and flash a toothy smile.
One performance in particular stood out. A prisoner from Ghana serving a sentence of death with two-year reprieve performed a skit in which he, dressed as a peasant woman with a rag doll strapped to his back, leapt about the stage singing a plaintive Mandarin song. It bore a striking resemblance to an Al Jolson routine. He looked at me with vacant eyes.
The warden jabbed me with his elbow. “Pretty good, eh?” he said under his breath. “I think we’ll keep him.” I was outraged. The warden was seeking my opinion as to whether this man’s life should be spared based on an offensive performance with strong racist overtones.
As we left the courtyard and headed for one of the cell blocks, I admonished Warden Li. He responded, in a matter-of-fact way, “Don’t worry about it. No one serving a death with two-year reprieve at my prison has ever been executed. In 2002, 100 prisoners serving sentences of death with two-year reprieve had their sentences commuted, including eight Hong Kong people.”
I replied: “Let me give you a piece of advice. If ever you host a delegation of African-Americans don’t lay on that performance. You will regret doing so. They will not be as polite as me.
Cell Block Nine
As we approached Cell Block Nine, Warden Li informed me that this block was used to house Hong Kong and Macau prisoners. There were more than 300 such prisoners spread across five floors of cells. The rest of the Hong Kong-Macau prisoner population – totaling around 400 inmates – was placed among the general population, or were in the prison hospital. Most of the Hong Kong-Macau prisoners were serving sentences for drug trafficking and smuggling of common goods. A few of them were serving sentences for espionage. On the wall of the cell block were lists of prisoners whose behavior was “exemplary, normal, and sub-standard.”
The prisoners could receive monthly visits from members of their families living in the two special administrative regions, Taiwan, and overseas. Although representatives of civil society had visited, no Hong Kong official had ever visited a Hong Kong person in Dongguan Prison.
Dongguan Prison in Guangdong Province. Image Credit: Baidu.com
Our small party entered the cell block and walked up a flight of stairs to the second floor. The cells were oblong, opening onto a hallway where there were chairs and a television set on which inmates could watch the seven o’clock news. There was a telephone where prisoners could receive calls from relatives. Each cell had a small balcony. I noticed the smell of cigarette smoke. Contrary to practice in every other prison I have visited in the world, prisoners were apparently permitted to smoke. Each cell had six bunk beds. Space was at a premium.
We left the cell block and headed for the product exhibition hall. Before we got there, I asked about Chen Meng. The warden recognized his name. Chen, he said, was in the general population, when he wasn’t in a hospital bed. His medical expenses were borne by the hospital, and he was exempt from physical labor. Family members paid regular visits. He had not received any sentence reductions, and was not being considered for medical parole. (Chen Meng served his entire sentence. He was released on March 13, 2007).
The exhibition of arts and crafts products contained a wide variety of items, ranging from models made with wooden sticks, to plastic flower displays, to paintings. I was asked to sign the visitor’s comments book, and given a Chinese calligraphy brush to do so. I found the brush unwieldy, so I jotted down a few phrases: “Nice work! Congratulations!” and signed the book using my Chinese name, Kang Yuan.
Years later, an assessment of Dongguan Prison attributed to me appeared in a local Chinese newspaper, much to the amusement of friends. “Even John Kamm, head of the American Human Rights Dialogue Foundation, who has consistently been a critic of China’s prisons, sighed with emotion.” The article went “Your work inspires confidence. I am a fairly serious person who rarely writes inscriptions when visiting prisons, but I was happy with everything I saw today, for which I express my thanks.”
After the visit to the exhibition hall, we left the prison for lunch at a local seafood restaurant. We dined on rice sparrows, a delicacy during cold weather, washed down by beer and maotai. After lunch, I was driven to the train station, where I boarded the express train to Hong Kong, arriving at my hotel in the early evening.
Xu Zerong
I didn’t know it at the time of my visit, but Xu Zerong began serving his sentence for endangering state security in Dongguan Prison in the first half of 2002.
Xu was a respected scholar and historian who resided in Hong Kong but who, because of his distinguished family background (his father and mother were senior officials in the People’s Liberation Army and Zhongshan University, respectively), traveled to Guangzhou frequently. Xu, aka David Tsui, earned his PhD from Oxford University in 1999, after which he returned to China where he assumed positions at the Guangzhou Academy of Social Sciences and Zhongshan University. Xu’s area of specialization was China’s role in the Korean War. He also studied and wrote articles on China’s support for communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia, a sensitive topic.
Xu was detained on June 24, 2000, accused of having photocopied and sent out of China excerpts from books on China’s military strategy during the Korean War, which had ended in 1953. Although marked internal (nei bu), Xu believed the books had been declassified. He was also accused of running an illegal publishing business. He was placed in the Guangzhou State Security Bureau Detention Center, and formally arrested on July 29, 2000. He was tried on August 7, 2001 by the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court and sentenced to 13 years in prison and three years subsequent deprivation of political rights on December 12, 2001. His appeal was rejected and he was moved from the detention center to Dongguan Prison sometime in the first half of 2002.
Not long after he was detained, Xu’s friends at universities in the United Kingdom and the United States asked me to help. I began making inquiries. I was finally told that he was serving his sentence in Dongguan Prison.
Since I had already established a good relationship with Warden Li Jianping, I decided to try a novel approach to helping Xu Zerong. I would write letters to the warden asking him to look after Xu Zerong. On March 14, 2003, I mailed a letter to Warden Li from Hong Kong.
The first thing I did in the letter was to establish a personal connection to Xu. The two of us had worked together on Professor Ezra Vogel’s One Step Ahead in China. I had contributed a chapter while David had helped with translation for the Chinese edition. Vogel’s work on Guangdong over many years had resulted in his having many friends in the provincial government. The professor gave me permission to use his name in making appeals on Xu’s behalf.
In my letter, I pointed out that Xu had a number of medical conditions, and asked that he be placed in the prison hospital. “Because Dr. Xu is a scholar, it would help if he could receive books and scholarly journals,” I wrote. “You might also consider exempting him from physical labor and employing him, if he is not too ill, as a librarian or teacher.”
To my surprise, Warden Li replied on April 15, 2003 to my letter. The letter was written in English. He confirmed that Xu Zerong had been taken into custody at Dongguan Prison. Li said that the prison would look after his health and “dispose him to rational labor work required by rehabilitation.”
I wrote a second letter to Warden Li on May 28, 2003. By then, the SARS epidemic was raging in China. I offered to donate to the prison’s medical fund to help combat SARS. I again recommended that Xu be placed in the medical ward and be employed teaching English to his fellow inmates. “I think being able to receive letters and reading material . . . would help his morale and assist his rehabilitative progress,” I wrote.
Warden Li replied on June 11, 2003. He thanked me for my concern over SARS, and said not a single case had been diagnosed in the prison. As for Xu Zerong, “he is now emotionally stable and physically healthy (and) makes use of his advantage of English language helping the other inmates with the English classes.”
Teaching English to prisoners constitutes meritorious service, and qualifies the prisoner doing the teaching to receive points that can be used to obtain sentence reductions.
In his June 11 letter, Warden Li confirmed that Xu had the right to receive a small quantity of commodities including books, but pointed out that the books would be examined by prison administrators before they reach prisoners “to safeguard the security of the prison.”
I immediately set about trying to mail books to Xu in Dongguan Prison. I quickly discovered, from friends with ties to the provincial prison bureau, that books in English would have to be translated into Chinese! (One of the books I sent to Xu was the English-language translation of Tolstoy’s War and Peace.) I subsequently discovered that books published in Hong Kong and sent from the Special Administrative Region attracted extra scrutiny. Finally, on a trip to Shanghai, I purchased books and sent them via domestic mail to Dongguan. Those books made it to Xu Zerong.
I sent my third letter to Warden Li on July 25, 2003, but I never got an answer. Xu Zerong was transferred in November 2003 to Xicun Prison, also known as Guangzhou Prison. Xicun Prison is considered the best prison in Guangdong, and Xu was treated well there.
Xu received a nine-month sentence reduction in 2006. This was followed by a 10-month sentence reduction in 2008 and a five-month sentence reduction in 2011. He was released two years early on June 23, 2011. Despite having a supplemental sentence of three years deprivation of political rights, Xu was allowed to return to Hong Kong.
Not long after he arrived in Hong Kong, Xu gave an interview to Open Magazine. In the interview, published on August 6, 2011, Xu credits my efforts on his behalf – visiting the prison in the company of an official from the Ministry of Justice, mailing him books, frequently submitting lists with his name on them – for his better treatment and early release. My visit was covered in the prison newspaper. Xu claimed that with my attention, “prison conditions improved, and all prisoners benefited.”
A few years after Xu’s release, I was told by one of my interlocutors in the Guangdong government that Warden Li Jianping had been criticized for engaging in the exchange of letters with me. He was transferred to another prison, but otherwise was not punished.
Guangdong Jiangmen Detention Center. It is divided into 79 cells and the buildings form a large enclosed space in the middle. In 2013, the facility held about 1,600 detainees. One of them was Mark Swidan. Image: nandu.com.
A troubling feature of China’s criminal justice system is that a judgment in a criminal trial can be postponed indefinitely after the trial concludes. American citizen Mark Swidan was formally detained on drug charges on November 14, 2012. He was tried in 2013 by the Guangdong Jiangmen Intermediate People’s Court. The court has yet to announce its judgment; the Supreme People’s Court in Beijing has extended the deadline for the court to render a judgment at least a dozen times. The most recent extension was granted on October 14, 2017. This extension, as with the others, is for three months. A judgment must be announced or another extension must be applied for by January 14, 2018. January 14 is Mark Swidan’s birthday.
In the meantime, Mark Swidan remains held in the Jiangmen Detention Center run by the Jiangmen Public Security Bureau. He receives monthly visits from an officer at the American Consulate in Guangzhou.
Mark Swidan in happier days. With mother, Katherine, in Houston, 1991. Image credit: Katherine Swidan
Mark Swidan was taken into custody during a police raid on his hotel room on November 12, 2012. He was on a business trip. Two individuals – an interpreter and a driver – had come to his room. Police reportedly found drugs on their persons. No drugs were found on Mr. Swidan or in his room. Drugs were found in the room of another suspect. No forensic evidence has been produced – no drugs in his system, no DNA on the packages, no fingerprints on the packages or drug paraphernalia – tying Mr. Swidan to the drugs. No emails, letters, or phone calls have been found that link Mr. Swidan to any drug transaction. The indictment states that Mr. Swidan played a secondary role in the alleged crime. Prosecutors recommended a lesser sentence. Mr. Swidan has no history of criminal behavior, including using or trafficking in drugs.
The alleged crime involved 11 people, including, in addition to American citizen Mark Swidan, four Mexicans, one Canadian, one Hong Kong resident, and four Chinese citizens. It is believed that some of defendants have pointed the finger at Mr. Swidan, who comes from a Texas family of limited means. He is unable to hire good legal counsel. Mr. Swidan refuses to admit guilt. He is said to rather die than admit to a crime he didn’t commit.
Reports given to the family over the years suggest that Mr. Swidan has suffered during his five years in the detention center. He has had his art supplies seized. He has been shackled, bullied, and denied medical treatment. His mother is often unable to have her letters delivered. He has threatened suicide. Detention centers are often accused of being carceral facilities where torture is common place.
According to a human rights officer working for the United Nations in Geneva, the way Mr. Swidan’s case has been handled is a “cut and dry case of arbitrary detention.” In perhaps the best known case of someone determined by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to have been arbitrarily detained in part because of a long delay in announcing a verdict, the WGAD found that the failure to announce a verdict in the case of American journalist Jason Rezaian, detained in Iran in 2014 and tried in the summer of 2015, was a violation of Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
It is not unheard of for Chinese defendants to have their judgments delayed for a period of several months. Prominent dissidents like Gao Yu, Guo Feixiong, and Pu Zhiqiang all had their judgments delayed for many months. But holding a foreigner for five years without adjudication is unheard of. No Chinese official has given an explanation for this interminable delay, merely stating that the case is “complicated.”
Article 202 of China’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) states that a people’s court should announce judgment within two months of the completion of the trial, and no more than three months can pass without a judgment being announced. If the crime can result in a death sentence or if there are complicating factors, then the higher court can extend the time for rendering a judgment by three months. “If there are special circumstances requiring additional extensions, the court must apply to the Supreme People’s Court for approval.” There is no statutory limit for the number of times a judgment can be extended.
Complicating factors leading to an extension of the judgment include 1) if the offense involves both criminal and civil penalties (Article 202); 2) if the case is an important or complicated one in rural areas with inconvenient transportation; 3) if the case involves large criminal organizations; 4) if it is an important case involving crimes committed in multiple locations; and 5) if collecting evidence is difficult (2-5 are covered by Article 156.) In short, there are many reasons why a Chinese court can extend a judgment for as long as it wants, and there are no means to force a decision.
“Justice delayed is justice denied” is a legal maxim, widely ascribed to the British jurist William Gladstone, that is the basis of a fundamental due process right, the right to a speedy trial and judgment. Another legal maxim is that a suspect is innocent until proven guilty. In the eyes of the law, Mark Swidan is an innocent man.
Justice has been denied to Mark Swidan and he and his family have suffered greatly. But China’s reputation as a country that respects the letter and spirit of law and protects fundamental rights has also suffered. The Jiangmen Court needs to announce its judgment, a judgment which will hopefully result in Mark Swidan going home without further delay.
Statements delivered at the Human Rights Council 36th Session; clockwise from top left: the US, China, Germany, and Estonia (representing the EU). Image Credit: UN Web TV.
At the 35th session of the Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva in June 2017, the European Union (EU) was unable to make a statement criticizing China’s human rights record under Item 4 of the Council agenda, “Human Rights Situations that Require the Council’s Attention.” The EU works under the consensus principle, meaning that all 28 member countries must agree on important foreign policy statements, and Greece, which has received massive investments and aid from China (China Cosco Shipping owns a controlling stake in the Greek port of Piraeus), refused to endorse the EU’s statement, effectively killing the initiative.
Diplomats and representatives of human rights groups were outraged. Rubbing salt into the wound, China thanked Greece. The German foreign minister accused China of trying to undermine “One Europe.”
Media coverage was intense. In one of many articles in American and European media that covered the debacle, The Washington Post, in an article entitled “Europe divided, China gratified, as Greece blocks EU statement over human rights,” wrote that “Money really can buy love, and in China’s case, it appears to be helping to keep the EU divided and ineffective.”
In a stunning reversal, the EU made an Item 4 statement at the 36th session of the HRC that ended in Geneva on September 29. The EU statement was accompanied by Item 4 statements by Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Czech Republic. (Switzerland, which is not a member state of the EU, made a statement on Liu Xia, the widow of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, under Item 2 of the agenda.) The EU regretted the death in prison of Liu Xiaobo and called on Beijing to lift restrictions on Liu Xia. It expressed concern over the lack of transparency and respect for due process in the cases of detained human rights lawyers and called on China to ensure fair trials for individuals detained for their human rights activities, including Jiang Tianyong, Wang Quanzhang, Tashi Wangchuk, and Wu Gan. It also called on China to respect cultural diversity and freedom of religion in Tibet and Xinjiang.
Germany expressed deep worries over widespread human rights abuses in China, especially in Tibet and Xinjiang. It cited infringements on the freedom of religion witnessed at the Larung Gar monastery in Sichuan Province, and urged China to immediately release all human rights defenders, including Jiang Tianyong, Wang Quanzhang, Wu Gan, Liu Feiyue, Huang Qi, Li Tingyu, Lu Yuyu, and Tashi Wangchuk. It asked China to allow visits of the UN Special Procedures.
The United Kingdom (UK) registered sadness over the death of Liu Xiaobo, and concern over the handling of his case. It too called for the lifting of all restrictions on Liu Xia.
Dui Hua has failed to find a single media article on the EU’s about-face. Nor has the foundation received an explanation of how it came about. The final decision was said to have been reached by foreign ministers in New York for the United Nations General Assembly meeting. It was also claimed that the final decision was reached in Brussels hours before the statement was delivered. One European diplomat said that Germany in particular was incensed by the Greek scuttling of the EU statement at the 35th session of the HRC, and let Greece know “which side of their bread was being buttered by whom,” a reference to the bailout of cash-strapped Greece by the European Commission and EU member states. Another official cited widespread disappointment with the bilateral human rights dialogue held between China and the EU on June 22-23, 2017. Despite questions by the EU on Liu Xiaobo, the Chinese side said nothing in reply, even though it has emerged that the Chinese side was aware at the time that Liu was gravely ill.
The statements under Item 4 by the EU, Germany, and the UK could impact the holding of future bilateral human rights dialogues between the countries and China. Prior to the June 22-23, 2017 dialogue, China warned the EU that the dialogue would be cancelled if it made an Item 4 statement at the 35th session of the HRC. Now that the EU, Germany, and the UK have defied China, it may well turn out that sessions of human rights dialogues expected to be held in 2018 will not take place, dealing a fatal blow to the practice of holding human rights dialogues with China.
The United States Issues Sharp Criticisms at HRC 36
As if to challenge the narrative, advanced by critics, that the Trump administration does not care about human rights abuses in China, the US Mission in Geneva made three statements that sharply criticized aspects of China’s human rights behavior. Statements were made under Items 3 (“disappearances”), 4 (“situations requiring attention”), and 5 (“human rights bodies and mechanisms.”) No other country made three critical statements.
The Item 4 statement accuses China of arbitrary detentions, torture, and forced confessions on state media of lawyers and activists. Both Item 4 and Item 5 cite retaliations against family members and others who cooperate with UN Special Procedures. Item 4 says that conditions in Tibet and Xinjiang are akin to martial law.
Of particular note is language on Hong Kong in the U.S. Item 4 statement: “We are concerned by the decision of the Hong Kong authorities to seek tougher sentences for activists after they served their original sentences.” This is a rare instance of U.S. criticism of Hong Kong at a session of the HRC.
Another first for the U.S. was the issuance of a statement under Item 3 of the agenda. The statement criticized China for detaining the Hong Kong Causeway Bay booksellers in 2015, and the alleged kidnapping by Chinese security agents of billionaire businessman Xiao Jianhua in a Hong Kong hotel earlier this year. The US Item 3 statement registered concern over enforced disappearances in only two countries, China and Syria, in that order.
China Reacts
China’s mission in Geneva issued furious rebuttals to the US and EU Item 4 statements, accusing the countries of widespread and serious human rights abuses. It singled out racism and white supremacism in the United States and the rise of neo-Nazis and xenophobia in Germany. The UK was called out for “the phenomenon of modern slavery in which tens of thousands of migrant household workers suffer ill treatment.”
China was especially angered by the US statement under Item 3. Not only did the Americans criticize Chinese actions involving Hong Kong, the Chinese side was given only 20 minutes to craft a reply. In one respect, however, the Chinese government was relieved by the action in Geneva. It had been rumored that another joint statement like the one made by the United States and 11 “like-minded countries” under Item 2 at the 31st session of the Human Rights Council would be delivered at the 36th session. It appears that the strategy by Western countries has shifted from making joint statements to making individual statements. Whether this strategy holds going forward remains to be seen.
On November 12, 2003, I received a detailed response from my interlocutor. It confirmed much of what I had been told by Congressman Tierney, but added new details. The picture of Liang Shaolin that emerged from this response was of a strong-willed, defiant woman fiercely devoted to Falun Gong.
From June 1996 to June 1997, such letters were sent to Chinese Ambassador Li Daoyu by Senator Craig Thomas (D-Wyoming), Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-Indiana), Congressman Matt Salmon (R-Arizona), Senator Max Baucus (D-Montana), Senator Paul Wellstone (D-Minnesota), and Congressman Doug Bereuter (R-Nebraska). Congressman Ed Royce (R-California) sent a detailed letter to Chinese Premier Li Peng asking him to instruct the Ministry of Justice to resume cooperation with me.
Thanks to these letters, and the support of the White House, the “prisoner information project” resumed in 1998 following Jiang Zemin’s state visit in 1997. While it was no longer necessary to ask members of Congress to write letters to the Chinese government on my behalf, I stayed in close contact with members, attending congressional hearings, roundtables, and forums at their invitation.
One such event that I participated in was a breakfast meeting with members of the House of Representatives organized by the Aspen Institute on July 17, 2002. One of the congressmen attending the breakfast was Congressman John Tierney (D-Massachusetts).
An Email from Congressman Tierney
On January 28, 2003, I received an email from Congressman Tierney asking for assistance on behalf of a constituent whose older sister, Ms. Liang Shaolin, had been detained in a Chinese labor camp for practicing the banned spiritual practice known as Falun Gong.
In his email, Congressman Tierney described Liang Shaolin’s situation:
“In September 1999, Shaolin is reported to have been detained in her workplace, the Maoming Oil Company, and not allowed to return home. She is said to have continued working but escaped after one month and seized as she made her way to Beijing ‘to appeal on behalf of Falun Gong.’ The police in Guangzhou sent her to a local detention center from where she was released after a seven-day hunger strike. Not long after, she was again detained by police and in January 2000 was sentenced without trial to two years in Sanshui Labor Camp; (she was) denied visitors, including family members. In 2002, the family received a phone call saying she had been transferred to the Legal School of Maoming City, yet to this day she is not allowed contact.”
Congressman Tierney then asked if I could find a way to obtain some relief for Liang Shaolin. I was familiar with Falun Gong, but had never heard of a “Legal School” used as a carceral facility.
Falun Gong
Falun Gong is a popular spiritual movement that arose in the early 1990s, initially in China’s northeastern region. The practice involves a mix of beliefs and practices that combine Buddhism and Taoism with qigong, defined by Wikipedia as “a holistic system of coordinated body posture and movement, breathing and meditation, natural products, spirituality, and martial arts training.”
Falun Gong spread rapidly in China in the 1990s, and by the end of the decade the movement reportedly had a following of tens of millions of Chinese practitioners. The rapid growth and popularity of the movement alarmed China’s top leaders. In April 1999, as many as 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners traveled to Beijing where they surrounded the central leadership compound, Zhongnanhai, in a mass demonstration calling for the release of imprisoned Falun Gong practitioners. The event had an immediate impact, and soon many more practitioners and their leaders were detained by authorities. In July 1999, Falun Gong was classified by the government as an “evil sect,” and repression intensified, repression that has continued to the present day.
Heilongjiang Legal Education Campus
After receiving Tierney’s email, I began looking into “legal schools,” but could find little information about schools being used as detention sites. I found one or two references to “legal education schools” or “legal education bases” as places where petitioners and adherents of unauthorized religious groups were placed for indeterminate periods of time.
I phoned Congressman Tierney’s office and we agreed that we would meet on my next visit to Washington in April 2003. When I arrived at his office I couldn’t help but notice the striking painting that hung behind his desk. It was a large oil painting of a scene from the Salem Witch trials, a troubling page in American history. In colonial Massachusetts in 1692 and 1693, twenty people, mostly women, were prosecuted and executed for practicing witchcraft. Salem, a city in Congressman Tierney’s district, was famous for being at the center of the mass hysteria which resulted in the executions. The congressman told me that the painting served to remind visitors that religious persecution was no stranger to the US, and that Americans should reflect on their own past before criticizing others for human rights violations.
A Plan to help Liang Shaolin
We settled on a plan to help Liang Shaolin. I would try my best to put Liang’s name on all requests for information on prisoners submitted by the US government to China, and I would activate my relationship with a provincial research association based in Guangzhou to seek information on Liang Shaolin. Congressman Tierney’s staff would help by composing a letter on the case that I could send to my Guangdong interlocutors.
Upon my return from D.C., I received the letter on Liang’s case by fax. The letter provided helpful information including the name, address, and telephone number of the legal education school in Maoming, the names and phone numbers of the officials in charge of the legal education school, the name and address of Liang Shaolin’s former employer, Maoming Oil Company, and the names and phone numbers of the officials in charge of the company’s “610 Office,” a specialized unit established in offices and enterprises across China in charge of suppressing Falun Gong practitioners. In the following months, I managed to get this letter into the hands of my Guangzhou interlocutor and put Liang Shaolin’s name on a prisoner list submitted by the International Commission on Religious Freedom.
Unfortunately, I wasn’t able to visit Guangzhou until September 18, 2003. I took the train up to Guangzhou from Hong Kong and met with my interlocutor that same day. Liang Shaolin’s case was raised. I included it on a new list of five prisoners in Guangdong Province about whom I was concerned. I followed up the meeting with an email sent on October 15, 2003 . In less than a month, I would receive a response from my interlocutor.
A Response from Guangdong
On November 12, 2003, I received a detailed response from my interlocutor. It confirmed much of what I had been told by Congressman Tierney, but added new details. The picture of Liang Shaolin that emerged from this response was of a strong-willed, defiant woman fiercely devoted to Falun Gong.
The email stated that Liang began practicing Falun Gong in 1996. After the government officially declared Falun Gong to be an “evil cult,” Liang “confronted the government” and conducted activities that violated the law including “gathering crowds and making a disturbance,” promulgating Falun Gong teachings, and collecting and distributing propaganda and publications banned by the government. For these reasons, Liang was sentenced to two years and three months in a reeducation through labor (RTL) camp.
The email went on to say that, after entering the RTL camp, Liang continued her activities, which now included secretly distributing subversive messages written on small strips of paper. Because of this, when her RTL sentence ended, she was sent to the Maoming Legal Education School “to continue her education.” Liang had stayed in the school for a fairly long time because she had continued to try to influence and incite other students. “Recently, she started shouting slogans supporting Falun Gong three times a day. Because the school is in a residential area, her actions have had a negative influence on nearby residents.”
The response concluded by outlining an arrangement under which Liang Shaolin would be freed. Liang, it was claimed, was healthy – aside from an eye infection that she refused to have treated, citing Falun Gong beliefs – and not being tortured. She had received visits by family members, but because of the SARS epidemic, which hit Southern China particularly hard, family visits to the Maoming Legal Education School had been suspended. Liang Shaolin’s husband, who was not a Falun Gong practitioner, had filed for divorce. The school had hired a lawyer to help her.
“The school has indicated to Ms. Liang that if she promises to be a law-abiding citizen after leaving the school, she can leave. The school does not forbid her to believe in and practice Falun Going, so long as she does not practice in public and endanger social stability. She not only refuses to make such a promise, but has also indicated that she wants to continue popularizing and propagating Falun Gong to the society at large.”
A Meeting in Guangzhou
I decided to travel to Guangzhou to explore the proposed arrangement under which Liang Shaolin could be released. I left for Beijing on December 1, and after meetings with Chinese government officials and foreign diplomats, I traveled via Hong Kong to Guangzhou, arriving on December 11, 2003. My interlocutor, a professor affiliated with the research association who held relatively liberal views, and his assistant met me at the train station. It was a cold and overcast day.
We went to a restaurant in the Pearl Island Hotel, a location favored by provincial party and government officials. After settling into a well-appointed private room for a ten-course “light” lunch, we immediately began discussing the Liang Shaolin case.
“Legal Education Schools have been built to house ‘seriously poisoned’ Falun Gong practitioners,” I was told. “There are two things you need to know about them. First, the Maoming Legal Education School is by no means the only such school in China. There are many of them. Second, legal education schools have no basis under Chinese law. This is a problem that must be addressed.” (The professor made clear that he favored the abolition of all forms of arbitrary detention.)
The professor and his assistant had previously traveled to Maoming Legal Education School, to look into Liang Shaolin’s situation. The response they had sent me earlier in November was an account of their visit to Maoming. Although they did not directly speak to Liang, they were able to observe her. She appeared thin and her eyes swollen, but aside from this she appeared healthy and energetic. They reported that “Three times a day – in the morning, in the afternoon, and in the evening – Liang Shaolin shouts in a loud voice: ‘Long Live Li Hongzhi (the founder of Falun Gong), Down with Jiang Zemin (China’s president who initiated the crackdown against Falun Gong).’
If Liang Shaolin were to be released and she took to the streets and shouted such things, I was told she’d be arrested and sentenced to prison under Article 300 of the Criminal Law, which criminalizes organizing religious groups that the Chinese government considers “cults.” “We are prepared to release her and allow her to return home where she can practice Falun Gong,” I was told. “But under no circumstances will the police allow her to publicly propagate Falun Gong. If you were in our shoes, what would you do Mr. Kamm?”
I replied that I did not believe in placing restrictions on free speech. On the other hand, I did not want Liang to be put in prison. I suggested that the authorities continue to practice gentle persuasion, and under no circumstances should she be mistreated. I wondered aloud whether she could be given a passport to travel to the United States to join her brother who lived in Congressman Tierney’s district. The response: “Possible, but not likely. If she were given a passport and allowed to leave, other Falun Gong practitioners would see this as a reward. It might encourage them to behave like Liang Shaolin.”
After we concluded our lunch, I took the train back to Hong Kong, and soon was homebound to San Francisco. I summarized the meeting held in Guangzhou and sent a memo to Congressman Tierney. He replied by email on January 28, 2004: “As a result of your attention and the intervention of some of your friends in the Guangdong government, Liang Shaolin appears to be receiving better treatment.” Congressman Tierney encouraged me to “do everything possible to insure her safety and good treatment. . . I respectfully renew my request for a member of Liang Shaolin’s family in the United States to contact her at the Maoming Legal Education School via telephone.”
Over the next 14 months I continued to communicate and meet with my Guangdong interlocutor. I submitted two more written requests for information in February and June 2004. In these I asked that Liang Shaolin be allowed to return home and be allowed to communicate with her family in the United States. In January 2005 at a meeting with my interlocutor in Hong Kong, I pointedly asked if it were legal to hold Liang Shaolin indefinitely.
Finally, in early April that year, I was advised that, while Liang Shaolin remained unrepentant, she had been allowed to return home. The authorities in Maoming had presented her with an agreement for her release: if she agreed not to go to the streets and practice Falun Gong and shout slogans, she would be allowed to leave the school. I was told that she tore up the agreement, crumpled it, and threw it back at the authorities. Finally, her sister in Guangzhou, who was not a Falun Gong practitioner, had to be brought to the school and to sign the agreement on Liang Shaolin’s behalf.
Aftermath
In July 2016, an article appeared on a Falun Gong website with Liang’s name. It said that Liang Shaolin had been detained in September 2009 and subsequently sentenced to nine years in prison for “organizing a cult to sabotage implementation of the law.” Another source claimed that her date of release would be September 9, 2018.
I immediately put her name on a list of Guangdong prisoners and submitted it to my interlocutor, and in January 2017 I was advised that Liang Shaolin had been convicted and sentenced to nine years in prison on May 18, 2010. She was in Guangdong Women’s Prison (said to be the largest women’s prison in the world). I was told that Liang Shaolin is due for release on December 23, 2017.
Congressman John Tierney lost his bid for reelection in November 2014. In February 2016, he was appointed the executive director of the Council for a Livable World and the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation based in Washington D.C. Dui Hua remains actively engaged with its Guangdong interlocutor, and is monitoring Liang Shaolin’s release.
In China, prisoners serving sentences for counterrevolution and endangering state security who commit political crimes while behind bars make up a special group of political prisoners. They are treated especially harshly. For committing “counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement” while in Drapchi Prison, Tibetan nun Ngawang Sangdrolhad her sentence extended three times. Omer Akchi, a Uyghur farmer sentenced to 14 years in prison in 1997 for forming the “Islamic Party of Allah,” a counterrevolutionary group, had his sentence extended to life imprisonment in 2006 for committing the crime of “splittism” while serving his sentence.
In the early 1990s, Robin Munro, a China specialist working for Human Rights Watch and a friend of American businessman John Kamm, came into possession of a collection of model cases of June 4, 1989 offenses compiled by China’s Supreme People’s Court. One of the cases in the collection was that of a young man, Liu Baiqiang, who had been sentenced by a Guangdong Province court in 1988 to 10 years in Shaoguan Prison for robbery.
In June 1989, pro-democracy protests erupted in Beijing and other cities. Liu and his fellow inmates heard news of the protests.
According to the account of the case in the Supreme Court compilation, translated by Robin Munro and published in his and Mickey Spiegel’s Detained in China and Tibet (1994), “Liu secretly wrote out three leaflets bearing the words ‘Down with Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng,’ ‘Long Live Freedom,’ ‘Deng Xiaoping Should Step Down,’ and ‘Tyranny.’ After showing these to his cellmates, Liu attached them to the legs of locusts and released the insects from his prison cell.
Liu was subsequently convicted of “counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement” by the Jiangmen Intermediate People’s Court. Eight years were added to the remaining nine years of his sentence for a combined total of 17 years, followed by five years’ deprivation of political rights. His new date of release was set at June 5, 2006.
Shortly after publication of Detained in China and Tibet, Kamm began putting Liu Baiqiang—dubbed “The Locust Man”—on prisoner lists. He raised the case at both central and local levels, and in June 1995, Liu received his first sentence reduction of one year and three months. In April 1998 Kamm learned that Liu had not received any further sentence reductions. The businessman pushed harder, and the following year Liu’s sentence was reduced another 15 months. By that time, his sentence was due to expire on December 5, 2003.
On June 2, 1999, in hopes of securing another sentence reduction, Kamm boarded a train from Hong Kong to Guangzhou where he was received by a small group of senior party reformers at the Pearl Island Guest House. (Designed by Chairman Mao’s wife Jiang Qing in the early 1970s, by the late nineties it was still the Communist Party’s principal venue for receiving guests.)
Kamm’s visit coincided with a difficult period in US-China relations. Less than a month before his trip to Guangzhou, the United States had bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese journalists. China exploded in anger. The US Embassy in Beijing was trashed, and Beijing announced it would suspend all discussions with the US about human rights.
At the Pearl Island Guest House meeting, Kamm pressed hard for the early release of Liu Baiqiang whose name topped the list of 20 Guangdong prisoners that Kamm presented to the party seniors that day. Within three months after Kamm’s visit to Guangzhou, Liu was granted another sentence reduction, this one for 18 months. His new date of release was fixed at June 5, 2002.
In July 2001, American Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Beijing. As a result of the visit, the two countries agreed to resume their bilateral human rights dialogue. Dates were set for October, and despite the 9/11 terrorist attacks—perhaps because of them—a Chinese delegation arrived in Washington. (For an account of President Jiang Zemin’s strategic decision to use the 9/11 attacks to improve China’s relations with the United States, see “To Lhasa for Jigme Sangpo.”)
Prior to their departure from Beijing, the Chinese side accepted a list of more than 90 names of political prisoners from the US Embassy in Beijing. More than half of the names had been contributed by Kamm’s Dui Hua Foundation, all of them counterrevolutionaries. Among the names was Liu Baiqiang.
During the bilateral talks the Chinese side presented a written response to the prisoner list, providing information on nearly all the names. In April 2001, Liu Baiqiang, by then serving his sentence in Meizhou Prison. had been granted a one-year sentence reduction. The Locust Man had been released on June 5, 2001, five years before the end of his extended sentence.
Kamm with Ngawang Sangdrol. Image credit: Dui Hua Foundation
In February 2002, President George W. Bush visited Beijing and met with President Jiang Zemin. Their discussions covered the world’s hotspots, with a special focus on events in Iraq and North Korea. President Bush, in an unscripted moment, thanked President Jiang for the releases of Hong Kong resident and bible smuggler Li Guangqiang and the Tibetan musicologist Ngawang Choephel. Bush also invited Jiang to make a working visit to the United States in October, on his way to the APEC Summit in Mexico City. Perhaps they might meet at his famous ranch in Crawford, Texas. Jiang happily accepted the invitation.
The group advising Jiang on which prisoners to release was convened. There were a number of good candidates for early release, including, first off, school teacher Jigme Sangpo, but also Democracy Party Chairman Xu Wenli and Uyghur businesswoman Rebiya Kadeer. There was no shortage of others worthy of clemency.
Jigme Sangpo was released on March 31, 2002, six weeks after the Bush-Jiang summit. He flew to the United States on July 13, a month after I had visited him in Lhasa.
I left on a tour of European capitals in late August 2002, being received at senior levels by governments in London, Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, and Geneva. My last stop was Bern. I arrived at around 10 AM on September 11, the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. I checked into the Savoy Hotel in the Old City and, at 11 AM, walked the short distance to the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs where I was received by Ambassador Peter Maurer, head of Political Section IV. We had a working lunch of traditional Swiss cuisine at a nearby restaurant. (Maurer went on to become Switzerland’s first ambassador to the United Nations. He is now the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, based in Geneva.
A Divination in Lhasa
In October 2002, Jiang Zemin and his wife Wang Yeping joins George W. Bush and his wife Laura Bush in Crawford, Texas. Jiang toured the Bush family ranch by truck and dined on Texas barbecue. Image Credit: China File.
During the lunch, Ambassador Maurer asked me if I would be willing to meet a prominent Tibetan living in Switzerland by the name of Tsultim Tersey that evening. I said fine, and around 6 PM Mr. Tersey and his daughter showed up at my hotel. They gave me a special khata, a ceremonial Tibetan scarf, and we went out to find a restaurant. It was a cold and wet night. We found a quiet place.
As soon as we sat down, Tsultim Tersey pulled out a thick sheath of paper. It was a petition signed by 300 Tibetan Swiss citizens asking that I seek the release from prison of Ngawang Sangdrol, the young leader of a group known as the Singing Nuns of Drapchi. At the age of thirteen, Ngawang Sangdrol was detained and subsequently sentenced to three years in prison for counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement in November 1992. In October 1993, she and 13 other nuns secretly recorded 27 songs of devotion to their homeland and the Dalai Lama. The cassette recording was smuggled out of prison; it circulated widely among Tibetans in Tibet and overseas. For this act, the nuns had their sentences extended. Maintaining a spirit of defiance, Ngawang Sangdrol had her sentence extended again in 1996 and 1998. What had been a three-year sentence became a 23-year sentence. Her plight received the attention of many governments and friends of Tibet overseas, especially in Switzerland which is home to a large ethnic Tibetan population.
I accepted the petition and said that I would do what I could to press for her release, but that there were no guarantees that I would succeed. Tsultim Tersey replied: “You will succeed, you must succeed.”
Schedule in Lhasa, February 28 – March 1, 2003. Image Credit: Dui Hua Foundation.
He told me that, after Jigme Sangpo’s release, he traveled to Lhasa and met with the elderly former prisoner at his niece’s residence. While in Lhasa, Tersey also met with Tibetan officials and asked them to release Ngawang Sangdrol. He felt he was making progress, but at his last meeting with the officials he was told that Ngawang Sangdrol would not be released. He was very upset, and sought the advice of a shaman.
He asked the shaman if his effort to secure the release of Ngawang Sangdrol would eventually succeed. The shaman performed a divination. The answer was no. He then asked the shaman whether an American businessman by the name of John Kamm would succeed. The shaman once again performed a divination. The answer: “She will be released within six months.”
Tsultim Tersey then told me that a kind and generous couple who lived in Geneva, Mrs. Maria José Rossotto and Professor Paolo Rossotto, had a strong interest in Tibet and in the Ngawang Sangdrol case in particular, and that if I needed their help I should contact them.
I left the next day for Hong Kong. On the flight I decided to concentrate my efforts on securing the release of Tibetans convicted of counterrevolutionary crimes who were still serving their sentences. Upon my arrival in Hong Kong I briefed American officials and made calls to Beijing. On September 23, I spoke to my principal interlocutor with whom I had worked on the Jigme Sangpo case. He told me that progress was being made on the cases of Xu Wenli and Rebiya Kadeer. There was no mention of Ngawang Sangdrol.
By that time, I had learned from other contacts in Beijing that Jiang Zemin, whose trip to Crawford was a month away, wanted to have a very special visit. He would be the fourth foreign leader to visit Crawford (Vladimir Putin of Russia, Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, and Prime Minister Tony Blair had all spent time with President Bush at his ranch). President Jiang would be the first Asian leader to be accorded this honor, and he wanted it to be memorable.
I called Lorne Craner, who was then Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Democracy, Rights, and Labor at the State Department. Without detracting from the importance of securing the release of Xu Wenli and Rebiya Kadeer, I lobbied to include the release of Ngawang Sangdrol on the list of “deliverables” for the Jiang visit to Texas. Craner bought in.
Aerial Shot of Drapchi Prison, in Lhasa, Tibet. Image Credit: Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy.
Shortly after, I flew to Beijing where I met with my principal interlocutor. As tea was being served, he looked at me and said. “There’s a prisoner you’ve asked about. I have some news, but I can’t recall the prisoner’s name.” His colleague reminded him: “Ngawang.” I jumped in. “Ngawang Sangdrol?” My interlocutor replied “Yes, she can be released. We have discussed her case, and senior leaders were surprised to learn that someone so young has been serving such a long sentence.” We agreed to hold a three-way meeting the next day: I could make my pitch directly to the Prison Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice, with my interlocutor present.
The pitch went well and the following day, October 10, I had a wrap-up meeting with my principal interlocutor’s deputy. I was told that Ngawang Sangdrol would be released before the end of October. As in the case of Jigme Sangpo, I could travel to Lhasa at a future date, meet with Ngawang Sangdrol, and determine for myself if she wanted to leave China for medical treatment.
I left Beijing and flew home to San Francisco. Following back and forth calls with Beijing and Washington, I was called by my principal interlocutor’s deputy at 10 PM on October 16, San Francisco time, and told that Ngawang Sangdrol had just been released and that she was on her way to her sister’s home in Lhasa. I was told that I could release a statement to the press. I demurred. I wanted to be sure that she arrived safely at her sister’s home before announcing the news. Finally, at 1:30 AM on October 17, I got the call. Ngawang Sangdrol was safe at her sister’s home.
To Lhasa for Ngawang Sangdrol
In November and December, I struggled to fix a date for my visit to Beijing and Lhasa. In a letter to my principal interlocutor’s deputy faxed on December 30, I suggested dates in January 2003. I was told my visit was inconvenient in January. Opposition to letting Ngawang Sangdrol leave Lhasa had grown, and local officials did not want to see me. I surmised that, with Jiang Zemin having stepped down as Communist Party Secretary in November 2002, and with his successor Hu Jintao opposed to releasing prisoners for favors, prospects looked bleak. I pressed on, arguing that a promise is a promise, and that since Jiang Zemin would stay on as president of China, the capacity in which he had visited George Bush, until March 2003, surely he would approve my trip.
I tried again on January 21, suggesting dates of February 27 to March 5 for my visit to Beijing and Lhasa. This time I got the green light. After meetings in Washington with Lorne Craner and his colleagues in the Bureau of Democracy, Rights, and Labor and Mike Meserve, deputy director of the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, I returned to San Francisco where I drafted and mailed a letter to Losang Geleg, deputy director of the Prison Administration Bureau of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Attached to the letter was a list of 30 Tibetan political prisoners.
I had met Losang Geleg on my visit to Lhasa in June 2002. Like other foreigners who had met him, I was struck by this man’s openness and willingness to share information on prisoners. (In an article published by the official Xinhua news agency on January 21, 2003, Losang Geleg stated that there were 2,300 prisoners in Tibet, of whom “less than five percent” were serving sentences for crimes of counterrevolution and endangering state security.) In the letter I asked for clemency for three Tibetan prisoners serving sentences for counterrevolution: Phuntsog Nyidron, Jampel Changchub, and Ngawang Oezer. Phuntsog Nyidron was, like Ngawang Sangdrol, a “Singing Nun of Drapchi.” The other two prisoners were serving long sentences, passed down in 1989, for counterrevolutionary crimes (they had translated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into Tibetan and had attempted to popularize it). Because the prison bureau was no longer responsible for Ngawang Sangdrol, I did not bring up her name, nor did I mention my imminent visit to Lhasa, in the letter to Losang Geleg.
I flew to Beijing on February 26, arriving on February 27. I departed Beijing for Lhasa via Chengdu on CA4112 on February 28, 2003. The night before I had dined with my principal interlocutor at the residence of American Ambassador Clark Randt. I was told that, despite opposition, my visit to Lhasa would go ahead as planned. I would be accompanied by a middle-ranking Ministry of Foreign Affairs official. I was asked not to say anything to anybody in Lhasa about a possible trip to the United States by Ngawang Sangdrol.
It was a smooth flight, notwithstanding a brawl involving angry Sichuanese in the seats right behind me. Too much baijiu, too early. The crew moved in quickly, and the plane, which was rocking in mid-air, stabilized.
Ngawang Sangdrol and her Niece
I arrived with my companion at Lhasa Airport at 4:00 PM on February 28. Unlike what happened when I had flown to Tibet’s capital in June 2002 for Jigme Sangpo, we were met at the appropriate level – a deputy director of the TAR Foreign Affairs Office greeted us. We were driven to the hotel, where we dropped off our bags, and taken to the FAO office in downtown Lhasa. This was to be a lightning visit; I would leave Lhasa the next day, 24 hours after I had arrived.
The meeting began at 6 PM. Officials on the TAR side included senior officials of the TAR foreign affairs and police organizations involved in the Ngawang Sangdrol case. I was pleasantly surprised to see Losang Geleg seated at the table. He agreed to see me for a few minutes after the meeting.
Nima Tsering of the TAR Public Security Bureau opened the meeting by welcoming me to Lhasa. He then briefed me on Ngawang Sangdrol’s situation. Her parole had been approved by the Lhasa Intermediate Court on October 17, 2002, and her parole was being managed by the local public security office of the district where she lived. Mr. Tsering said she was allowed to travel around Lhasa, and that she had visited monasteries in the area around the city. She was required to report to public security once a month.
The Singing Nuns of Drapchi Reunite in Amsterdam in 2015. Phuntsog Nyidron (second on the left) and Ngawang Sangdrol (fourth on the left). Image Credit: International Campaign for Tibet.
I worked with Chinese, American, and Swiss officials in Beijing and with American officials in Washington and Swiss officials in Bern to bring about Ngawang Sangdrol’s safe passage to the United States and Switzerland. Not long after my visit to Lhasa, she was granted medical parole by the warden of Drapchi Prison. (Parole and sentence reductions are approved by courts, medical parole is approved by prison wardens.) She boarded a plane to Beijing and, accompanied by an officer of the American Embassy, flew to the United States, arriving on March 28, 2003. She then went to Switzerland where, with the assistance of the Swiss government and the generous support of the Rossottos, she settled in Rikon, together with Jigme Sangpo in exile. Ngawang Sangdrol eventually settled in the United States.
China’s longest serving political prisoner, Jigme Sangpo, and John Kamm. Tibet 2002.
In the aftermath of 9/11, Chinese President Jiang Zemin resolved to use the attacks to fundamentally improve relations with the United States. In doing so he ignored Vladimir Putin’s entreaties and the advice of several close aides to distance China from the United States. The principal goal of Jiang’s strategic move was to drive a wedge between Taiwan, then headed by Chen Shuibian, and the United States, led by George W. Bush. Shortly after taking office President Bush had pledged to do whatever it would take—perhaps including the use of nuclear weapons—to help Taiwan defend itself.
Jiang sought the advice of his soon-to-be-appointed foreign minister Li Zhaoxing who had recently returned to Beijing from Washington D.C. where he served as China’s ambassador to the United States. Li was impressed by how deeply members of Congress cared about the welfare of China’s political prisoners. Concern for one prisoner in particular, Ngawang Choephel, an ethnomusicologist who had studied at Vermont’s Middlebury College, made a big impact on the ambassador. Citing China’s treatment of Ngawang, then serving an 18-year sentence for espionage, Senator Jim Jeffords, a pro-trade Republican representing Vermont, had voted against renewing China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status.
As part of the effort to improve relations with the United States, Jiang Zemin decided to start releasing high-profile political prisoners.
Who to Release?
Ngawang Choephel, released in January 2002. Image: tradartsteam.co.uk
By the end of 2001, I had been intervening on behalf of political prisoners for more than 10 years and had helped around 250 prisoners gain early release (according to a rough count by The Sunday New York Times Magazine for a 2002 profile on me). My greatest assets in these efforts were skills and relationships developed over a 25-year business career in China. Once the decision was made to release political prisoners, China’s leadership turned to me for advice and assistance regarding who should be released.
We agreed that the first to be released should be Ngawang Choephel. On January 20, 2002, he was released on medical parole from De Yang Prison in Sichuan Province and flown to the United States.
As anticipated, the reaction in Washington was positive.
In March, 2002 I flew to Beijing for discussions on prisoner releases. My interlocutor was a member of a five-man group of senior officials headed by Jiang Zemin that was responsible for determining which prisoners would be released, when, and by what means. It was decided that medical parole was the best option since prison authorities could grant it without having to go through a court. I suggested releasing the elderly Tibetan schoolteacher Takna Jigme Sangpo who was believed to be the longest serving prisoner convicted of counterrevolution. (His sentence had been extended twice for staging protests in Drapchi Prison.)
For Tibetans living overseas, gaining Jigme Sangpo’s release was a high priority. Every China-related human rights group, including those that focused on Tibet, had lobbied hard for his release; my foundation and I had included his name on numerous prisoner lists submitted to Beijing and, in August 2001, just weeks before the 9/11 attacks, Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama, had urged a group of leading business leaders, celebrities, and athletes, who had convened in Los Angeles, to press for Jigme Sangpo’s release.
Negotiations
Shortly after I arrived in Beijing on March 10, 2002, detailed negotiations began. At my first meeting with my interlocutor, I was told that Jigme Sangpo did not want to leave prison where he was highly respected and looked after by his fellow prisoners. (I’d heard the same thing from Congressman Tom Lantos who had received a letter from the Chinese embassy in Washington DC to that effect.) When I said that I found it hard to believe that the elderly Tibetan preferred to remain incarcerated, my host offered to make arrangements for me to go to Drapchi Prison, on the outskirts of Lhasa, so that I could ask him myself.
Naturally, I was eager to meet Jigme Sangpo, but not in prison. In the past, he had staged protests when foreigners—notably the Swiss ambassador—visited Drapchi. In each case, the resulting punishment was harsh and added many years to his prison term. Despite assurances that, whatever happened, the Tibetan prisoner would not be mistreated, I held firm. I suggested that Jigme Sangpo be granted medical parole and placed in a monastery, a hospital, or in the house of a relative.
Discussions were put on hold and resumed two days later. No monastery or hospital would shelter the elderly teacher, fearing the consequences of a huge security presence. Likewise, no relatives dared take him in. Having heard that Jigme Sangpo had a niece living in Lhasa who was a Communist Party cadre, I suggested that she be ordered to temporarily house her uncle; surely, as a loyal party member, she’d be willing to do so.
That did the trick. Details of Jigme Sangpo’s release and my visit to Lhasa were hammered out. I asked for permission to bring my own translator (I speak passable Chinese, no Tibetan.), which was denied—the explanation being that, as a teacher, Jigme Sangpo would know at least some Mandarin. I also asked to visit the U.S. consulate in Chengdu before or after my visit to Lhasa. (In those days, all flights to Lhasa from Beijing passed through the Sichuan capital.) This was also denied. However, the Chinese government placed no restrictions on Jigme Sangpo’s eventual choice of foreign residence. (Switzerland, with its large Tibetan population, had expressed an interest in hosting the Tibetan prisoner.) Its only condition was that he fly to the United States first.
Before the meeting broke up, we agreed that I would return to Beijing in two months, then fly to Lhasa with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to meet Jigme Sangpo.
Two weeks later, on April 1 at 1 AM, as I drove from Orlando to Port Saint Lucie, Florida to visit my ailing mother, I received the news on my cellphone that Takna Jigme Sangpo had been released from prison on medical parole on March 31, 2002. His niece had taken him in.
Getting to Lhasa
Before returning to China in June, I prepared for my trip to Lhasa by buying a disposable camera and a bottle of Jack Daniel’s (for medicinal purposes!). I also needed a picture of Jigme Sangpo, whom I’d never laid eyes on. Without it, how could I be sure I was meeting the right man? By then I was working with Tibetans living abroad, one of whom sent me a photograph taken in Jigme Sangpo’s cell at Drapchi Prison. It pictured the elderly prisoner sporting a long white beard, huddled in a corner. Because of his deteriorating eyesight, he wore his glasses at a tilt.
I also wanted to confirm with a relative of Jigme Sangpo living in Washington that the Tibetan could indeed communicate in Chinese. And, I needed confirmation of the Swiss government’s willingness to care for him. Unlike the American government, which typically does not give financial support to political prisoners admitted into the country, Switzerland provides a generous monthly stipend. The country is home to a large Tibetan community, and houses a place of worship and study in the small village of Rikon on the outskirts of Zurich.
On June 6, I arrived in Beijing. Over the next nine days I had three meetings with my interlocutor and his deputy and was introduced to my traveling companion, a third secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I met with senior officials of the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court, as well as diplomats of the American and Swiss embassies.
Visiting the Potala with a TAR official.
On June 16, my companion and I flew to Lhasa via Chengdu. Late that afternoon we arrived at Gonggar Airport and found no one there to greet us. This was my first taste of the hospitality of my Tibetan government hosts, who clearly wanted nothing to do with me. Gonggar Airport is almost 100 kilometers from Lhasa. My companion found a phone and organized a car to come get us. More than two hours later we arrived at the Lhasa Hotel where an official from the Tibet Autonomous Region’s (TAR) Foreign Affairs Bureau met us. He placed khatas around our necks and briefly went over the program. There was no invitation to dinner.
The next day a car came to fetch us and take us to the office of the Foreign Affairs Bureau for a 9:30 AM meeting. In attendance were officials from the TAR Political and Legal Committee of the Communist Party, the TAR Prison Administration Bureau, the Foreign Affairs Bureau, and the Lhasa Public Security Bureau (PSB) which was responsible for monitoring Jigme Sangpo’s medical parole.
I began by asking if the hosting officials would like to say a few words of welcome, but they all declined. For my opening question, I asked if a foreigner had ever been allowed to interview a prisoner on medical parole, to which the PSB official answered no. When I asked if they knew whether or not Jigme Sangpo would like to go abroad for medical treatment, they said I could ask him myself.
I was then advised that medical parole is granted for an initial period of six months, after which the parolee’s condition is reviewed. If the parolee is deemed not seriously ill, he or she is returned to prison to serve the remainder of his or her term. It was clear to me that this is what TAR officials intended to do.
After the meeting I was taken on a tour of the city’s notable sites. When I thanked the official accompanying me, I was told very pointedly that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had paid for the tour, not the TAR government; thanks weren’t necessary.
The Meeting
On the afternoon of June 17, 2002, my companion and I were driven to the home of Jigme Sangpo’s niece. As we approached, I noticed an iron chain across the road leading into the residential compound and security was everywhere, with armed police on the rooftops and a PSB guard post near the front door. As we entered, the niece stuck out her tongue in the traditional Tibetan greeting. We went into a room that was filled with officials and uniformed and plain clothes police, and I was told to take a seat on a couch against the wall, directly in front of the audience.
Then Jigme Sangpo was led into the room. Wearing his glasses at a tilt, he matched his photo. This was the frail old man for whom so much security had been laid on. He sat down next to me on the couch.
I immediately asked him if he spoke Chinese, to which he shook his head no. I didn’t know how to proceed. How could I be sure that my questions and Jigme Sangpo’s answers were rendered accurately? Then a young woman in the room stepped forward and volunteered to translate. The atmosphere was tense and there was an air of displeasure within the group.
With no time for pleasantries, I asked Jigme Sangpo about his health and whether he wished to seek treatment abroad. Though he suffered from multiple ailments and hoped to go to the U.S. for treatment, he’d been told that approval would only be granted if he promised never to return to Tibet. “This,” he said, “I am not willing to do.”
At this point the interview came to an abrupt halt. Guards came in and, as they took Jigme Sangpo away, he broke loose and put his head on my chest. There were tears in his eyes. Addressing the room, I said that I had been told Jigme Sangpo did not want to leave prison; now that I knew the truth, I planned to return to Beijing and work with the central government to arrange Jigme Sangpo’s travel to the United States for medical treatment.
With that, I got up to leave. Waiting outside was the director of the public security bureau who asked me what Jigme Sangpo had said. When I told her that he wanted to go to the U.S., and that I was going to make it happen, she blurted “You can’t do that! He’s old. He needs to be taken care of.” I told her that she and her colleagues had been taking care of him for long enough, and that now it was someone else’s turn.
Leaving Lhasa
That night I shared a simple meal with my traveling companion in the hotel coffee shop. After our yak burgers arrived, she told me that her colleagues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were jealous that she had gotten to accompany me on this historic trip. She continued: “We debate among ourselves why you chose to give up your business career to do this kind of work, to travel so far to help an old Tibetan you’ve never even met.” I asked her what she thought, and I appreciated her answer: “We think that you believe there are more important things in life than making money.”
On July 13, 2002, one month after my meeting with Jigme Sangpo in Lhasa, the elderly Tibetan boarded United Flight 850 in Beijing, bound for Chicago. Accompanied by an officer of the American Embassy, he arrived in Chicago that afternoon (local time) and immediately flew to Washington, where he took up residence in the home of a relative. Tibetans around the world celebrated.
Aftermath
Rene Kamm with Jigme Sangpo in Rikon, Fall 2014. Image: Jakob Hochendoner
Jigme Sangpo eventually settled in Rikon, Switzerland, where I have visited him on several occasions and where my youngest son Rene spent several weeks with him in the summer of 2010. He has thanked me on behalf of Tibetan and Han prisoners. This kind and gentle man bears no ill will against Han Chinese.
Ever since Jigme Sangpo’s release, Tibetans around the world have gone out of their way to express their gratitude. On one occasion, I was hosted to a fine meal and plenty of drink in London by a former prisoner who was in Drapchi Prison when Jigme Sangpo was there. He told me this story:
“On socialist education days in the prison, we were gathered together to hear speeches by the wardens. Seated on a stool was Jigme Sangpo. The warden would tell us: ‘If you want to get out of here, you will admit guilt, accept reform, obey all instructions, and perform manual labor. If you do so to our satisfaction you will be released. On the other hand, if you’re like this old fox (Jigme Sangpo) and don’t accept reform and admit guilt, you will never get out of here. The only way Jigme Sangpo will leave Drapchi is in a box.”
My drinking companion finished up by saying that, “with Jigme Sangpo’s release, every prisoner in Drapchi experienced a great sense of joy, of hope, knowing that if the Chinese government could free him, they could free anybody.” In the following months, the Chinese government granted early release to a number of Tibetan political prisoners, including Ngawang Sangdrol and Phuntsog Nyidron, leaders of the Singing Nuns of Drapchi.