Tag: human rights

  • Justice for Some, Notoriety for Others: Public Law Enforcement in China

    Ten thousand people watched this public sentencing and arrest gathering in Xinjiang’s Tekesi [Tekes] County, Yili [Ili] Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture on June 16, 2014. Image credit: Tekesi County People’s Court

    Part of doing justice in the criminal process is protecting the dignity of people in custody, presuming their innocence, and providing them with the conditions necessary for fair trial. China’s decisions to prohibit public executions, in 1979, and ban “perp walks” for sex workers, in 2010, seemed to acknowledge at least some of these principles, but ongoing public arrests and sentencing and televised confessions indicate that dignity and fairness are not afforded equally to all Chinese citizens.

    Public arrests and sentencing are often held in large outdoor public spaces like plazas and stadiums and feature the accused bound and flanked by police—at times with placards around their necks—in front of crowds of spectators that can number in the thousands. According to Phoenix Weekly, at least 196 “public displays of law enforcement” (i.e., public arrests and sentencing) were reported on by Chinese news media between 2008 and May 2011. More than 90 percent of the gatherings were in smaller cities, i.e., county-level cities and municipally administered districts. The report says that the gatherings aim to “frighten criminals, educate people, and maintain social stability.”

    Historically, public arrest and sentencing rallies were widely used in and outside China to crush political opponents and consolidate the power of royal families. In the first three decades of the People’s Republic of China, mass rallies served to educate the public about the errors of class enemies, including Kuomintang members and landlords.

    Legal experts have spoken out against modern-day public arrests and sentencing, branding them “campaign-style justice” that emphasizes swift and severe punishment. In July 2010, Renmin University of China Law Professor Guo Weidong told Legal Daily that gatherings like these violate the presumption of innocence that requires the court to prove the guilt of a criminal defendant. Several legal experts joined the call for a legislative ban of these public rallies after more than 20,000 spectators witnessed the arrest of about 70 criminal suspects who were paraded in a public plaza in Qidong County, Hunan Province, on April 12, 2011. The rally was held amid a local “strike hard” campaign that began earlier that year.

    Xinjiang and Tibet

    Critics have been less vocal, however, about public arrest gatherings in Xinjiang. There public rallies are often publicized as stern efforts to combat and educate the public about the “three evil forces” of “separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism,” giving them a veneer of legitimacy amid the global “war on terror.” China News Website has called such gatherings “a concrete action to crack down on violent terrorist crimes and to rejuvenate positive energy in society.”

    In May, 7,000 people witnessed the detention, arrest, and sentencing of more than 100 Uyghurs charged with inciting splittism, terrorism, and murder in a stadium in Yili [Ili] Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture. Pictures of the event were widely circulated in official news media.

    That said, public rallies in Xinjiang occur even without allegations of extremism. As recently as June 16, 2014, 15 suspects shackled on blue trucks were condemned in front of 10,000 people in Tekesi [Tekes] County, Yili. They were charged with cult offenses, disrupting official business, and rape.

    In contrast with Xinjiang, Tibet has received little media attention for public arrests and sentencing. The most recent instance of such an event being reported in official media was on March 9, 2012, in Jiulong [Gyezur] County. No information was made public on the allegations against the suspects and defendants but a crowd of more than 5,000 spectators, including cadres and students, watched as 24 people were detained, arrested, and tried.

    In December 2011, Tibetan writer Woeser posted six photos of Tibetan monks captured by armed police during a stability maintenance campaign in Ganzi [Kardze] and Aba [Ngaba] prefectures. The images of people bound and bedecked with placards—some in open trucks beds—were reminiscent of those subjected to public arrests and sentencing but no narrative came with the photos. Some of the placards displayed criminal charges such as splittism and gathering a crowd to attack an organ of the state. Woeser speculated that the photos were taken sometime between March 2008 and 2011.

    TV Set Confessional

    Public arrests and sentencing if concentrated in Xinjiang appear to exist throughout the country and in response to various anti-crime campaigns. Probably due to the nature of their transmission, televised confessions seem to be more commonly applied to celebrities and public figures who have infringed upon the economic and political interests of the party.

    The most recent televised confessions were made by Jaycee Chan, son of Hong Kong action film star Jackie Chan, and Taiwanese actor Kai Ko. (Ko’s detention was reportedly publicized before his family was notified, breaking with a cross straits agreement requiring notification within 24 hours.) Both were detained on drug charges in Beijing on August 14. Their confessions were preceded in early August by that of Internet celebrity Guo Meimei, who has been charged with illegal gambling.

    Confessions on TV: (top left, clockwise) Kai Ko, Guo Meimei, Peter Humphrey, and Gao Yu. Image credit: CCTV

    Foreign nationals have also been compelled to make televised confessions. In August 2013, Briton Peter Humphrey apologized to the Chinese government on Chinese Central Television for illegally obtaining private information. Broadcast narration from the news segment describes China as a country ruled by law where police fight crime regardless of whether it is committed by Chinese nationals or foreigners. Humphrey’s firm conducted investigations for GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) in China; the global drug company is now facing corruption allegations.

    Chinese journalists have also been targeted. Chen Yongzhou (陈永州) was detained in July 2013 on suspicion of damaging business reputation after writing several newspaper articles accusing a listed company of falsifying its sales. Chen’s detention initially triggered a strong backlash in official Chinese media with several critics calling for his immediate release. The tide turned after the Central Publicity Department intervened in the case, and in late October 2013, state television aired Chen’s confession as filmed from a detention center in Changsha, Hunan Province.

    In the lead up to the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen Protest, another journalist, Gao Yu (高瑜), became the subject of televised confession . Gao’s face was blurred as she pled guilty to “illegally procuring state secrets for foreign entities” on May 30, 2014, the day of her formal arrest. Gao was accused of circulating Document No. 9 to an overseas website. The apparently classified document lists “seven perils” threatening the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), including western constitutional democracy, media independence, and civic participation. Gao was previously sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for illegally procuring state secrets in November 1994 for criticizing the violent suppression of the 1989 pro-democracy protests.

    Both forms of public shaming, televised confessions and public arrests and sentencing likely share the same goals: frightening criminals, educating people, and maintaining social stability. Absent from this list of aims is justice, procedural or substantive. Public law enforcement marginalizes lawyers and courtrooms and with them go dignity, presumptions of innocence, and the likelihood of a fair trial. With an emphasis on legal reform in the upcoming plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in October, perhaps one area worth revisiting is the tendency for humiliation to masquerade as justice.

  • International Opinion of China’s Rights Record Sours, Poll

    Chinese President Xi Jinping (left) and US President Barak Obama at the Sunnyland Summit in June 2013. Image credit: AP

    An annual poll published this week by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project (PDF) includes for the first time year-on-year data on how sample populations in 34 countries view the Chinese government’s human rights record. When asked whether “the government of China respect[s] the personal rights of its people,” a majority or plurality of populations in 18 of the countries said “no.” In 21 countries, the percentage of negative responses increased over the last year.

    Views of China’s human rights record are worst in Europe and the Americas. A staggering 91 percent of German respondents said the Chinese government does not respect the personal freedoms of its people. In every Latin American country, with the exception of El Salvador, where views stayed the same, perceptions have soured. In South Africa, opinions of China’s human rights record have also worsened.

    In contrast, perceptions of the Chinese government’s human rights record have held up well in the Middle East and Asia, with the notable exceptions of South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines.

    In the United States the percentage of people saying that the Chinese government does not respect the personal rights of the Chinese people rose seven percentage points to 78 percent. This shift may be contributing to a decline in China’s overall popularity. The Pew poll indicates that the percentage of Americans who hold a “favorable” view of China is at 35 percent, the lowest percentage since the poll was first taken in 2005. Meanwhile, “unfavorable” views are at an all-time high of 55 percent.

    Among Republicans unfavorable views jump to 65 percent of respondents—a data point that may be significant if the GOP regains control of the Senate in November. Among Democrats and Independents, unfavorable views accounted for 53 and 51 percent of respondents, respectively.

    Based on the poll data, this decline in popularity does not appear to be related to the economy, but may be related to other issues including China’s growing bellicosity. In 2014, Americans were less likely to see China’s economic strength as a threat. Forty-nine percent of Americans said that China’s growing economy was a “good thing” for the United States, compared with 37 percent who felt that way when the poll was last conducted in 2011. Similarly, the percentage of Americans who called China’s growing economy a “bad thing” fell to 42 percent in 2014 from 53 percent in 2011.

    Source: Pew Research Center, 2005-2014. Chart compiled by Dui Hua.

    In terms of military threats, two-thirds of American respondents expressed concern that China’s territorial disputes with its neighbors could lead to military conflict, and nearly 20 percent of Americans named China as their country’s greatest threat, second only to Russia. One year after the Sunnylands Summit between presidents Xi Jinping and Barack Obama, only 28 percent of Americans have confidence in Xi’s ability to “do the right thing in world affairs,” versus 58 percent who have little or no confidence in the Chinese president.

    The latest Pew survey was conducted among 48,643 individuals in 44 countries from March 17 to June 5, 2014. Only 34 countries were polled in both 2013 and 2014 on whether the Chinese government respects the personal rights of its people. The survey of 1,002 American adults was conducted from April 11 to May 10, 2014. It has a margin of error of 3.5 percent.

  • Hong Kong Residents Adrift in Mainland Prisons?

    Yang Kuang at Shenzhen No. 1 Detention Center. Photo credit: Sui Muqing

    Hong Kong resident and activist Yang Kuang (杨匡, pictured right) is on trial in Shenzhen for illegal border crossing. He was detained on December 31, 2013, while attempting to return to Hong Kong after visiting his wife in her native Henan Province. Yang’s immigration documents were revoked in March 2013 in retaliation for his attempts to visit Liu Xia (刘霞), the wife of imprisoned Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波), who is under house arrest in Beijing. Yang is reportedly suffering from severe headaches and has been unable to receive treatment outside Shenzhen No. 1 Detention Center, where he is being held.

    Following the recent death in custody of civil society advocate Cao Shunli (曹顺利), the situations of people like Yang Kuang—people who are detained by mainland Chinese authorities and have histories of political activism and indicators of ill health—must be monitored and their rights protected. Which actors and strategies are involved in these interventions depend in no small part on the citizenship and residency status of the detained.

    Unlike foreign governments who are able to visit their foreign nationals, the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) does not have an agreement with mainland China to access Hong Kong residents who are arrested or detained on the mainland. As Hong Kong is a part of China, it cannot have a consular agreement with China. The HKSAR government has been negotiating a prisoner transfer agreement with its mainland counterparts, but little progress seems to have been made.

    At present, the HKSAR government can only assist detained Hong Kong residents by inquiring about and providing advisory services to them upon request by the detained person or their relatives or friends. The numbers of people requesting assistance and of resulting releases, however, have declined in recent years, according to a 2011 report by Voice of America. The report states that in 2008 the HKSAR government received 46 requests for assistance and was able to obtain the release of 12 Hong Kong residents in mainland custody. In 2009 and 2010, those numbers reportedly fell to 35 requests and 11 releases and 27 requests and two releases, respectively. A local rights activist quoted in the report likened the HKSAR government to a “postal worker,” able to deliver messages but not curb prolonged detentions or facilitate family visits.

    In 2011, Xinhua reported that there were 1,250 Hong Kong residents serving sentences on the mainland. Eight hundred of them were in Guangdong Province. When Dui Hua Executive Director John Kamm visited Dongguan Prison in November 2002 he was shown a cell block for Hong Kong residents. The warden told Kamm that there were 400 prisoners from Hong Kong and Macau in Dongguan Prison at that time.

    In 2014, Dui Hua estimates that there are approximately 2,000 Hong Kong residents in mainland prisons and detention centers. (Hong Kong people can also be held in forms of extra-legal detention such as custody and education.) Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database includes information on seven Hong Kong residents currently in mainland prisons and detention centers, including at least two people charged with endangering state security.

    The proper means of intervening on behalf of detained persons is often unclear. The United States and other countries have, however, seen success through the use of consular visits. In the US case, these visits helped improve the situation of American geologist Xue Feng (薛峰), who received a 10-month sentence reduction in 2012. Unfortunately, US businessman Vincent Wu (胡炜升) has been denied consular visits since the mainland does not recognize his US citizenship. Currently standing trial in Guangzhou, Wu entered China using his Hong Kong ID.

    In terms of statements and lobbying, the HKSAR government has been less outspoken than the British government during Hong Kong’s colonial period. British officials called for the release of Luo Haixing (罗海星) after Luo was sentenced to five years in prison for his part in “Operation Yellowbird” in March 1991. (The aim of the operation was to help pro-democracy activists escape from mainland China to Hong Kong in 1989.) Luo, who passed away in 2010, was granted medical parole six months after his conviction.

    British officials also lobbied Beijing to release Ming Pao journalist Xi Yang (席杨), who was sentenced to 12 years in prison for “leaking state secrets” in 1993. He was released on parole in 1997. In these and other cases, Dui Hua played an important role in convincing Beijing to grant clemency.

    Working in conjunction with the US government and local and international advocacy groups, the HKSAR government helped secure the early release of well-known journalist Ching Cheong in 2008. Yet when Ching was sentenced on the mainland on August 31, 2006, the press statement made by Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang seemed to highlight the limited role the HKSAR government could play in prisoner interventions:

    In rendering assistance to residents, the HKSAR Government must respect the “One Country, Two Systems” principle and does not interfere with the law enforcement and the judicial process on the Mainland, just as the Mainland authorities do not interfere with cases that fall within the jurisdiction of the HKSAR.

    The line between interference and assistance can be easily blurred—especially when “interference” is aimed at individuals ensnared in a flawed criminal justice process. Just last month, Hong Kong’s Legislative Council was asking “how to assist in handling an incident of arbitrary detention outside Hong Kong.” At issue was the detention of 73-year-old Yao Wentian (姚文田), head of Hong Kong’s Morning Bell Press, in Shenzhen in October 2013. Yao is being investigated for alleged smuggling activities, but it is no secret that he has assisted in the publication of many books banned in mainland China and suffers from asthma and heart problems.

    Should Hong Kong deem it important to gain access to residents imprisoned on the mainland, perhaps it could work towards implementing agreements with local governments, particularly Guangdong, whereby the departments concerned structure prisoner access between the two parties. Visits and more proactive interventions by Hong Kong officials as well as the publication of relevant statistics may be effective means for Hong Kong to assist its residents. Without proper assistance, Hong Kong residents detained on the mainland appear adrift: without the linguistic and cultural fluency of locals or the consular protections of foreign nationals.

  • Government Notice Fuels Crackdown on Assembly as Subversion

    Xu Zhiyong (top) & Guo Feixiong are among the recent arrested for “disrupting social order”.
    Photo credit: VOAChinese.com

    Over the past several months, Chinese authorities have been cracking down on peaceful assembly and association. As of August 14, more than 50 individuals had been detained, arrested, or disappeared. Among the most prominent are Xu Zhiyong, chief proponent of the “New Citizens’ Movement” and co-founder of the Open Constitution Initiative—a legal aid and rights-protection organization shuttered under government pressure in 2009—and veteran rights activist Guo Feixiong. Both were detained on charges of “gathering a crowd to disrupt social order”; Xu on July 16 and Guo on August 8. Many of those detained were active in calling on Chinese government leaders to disclose their assets and make good on promises to combat official corruption.

    An internal notice issued by China’s Supreme People’s Procuratorate in June may be one impetus for this crackdown. The notice called on prosecutors (who also investigate corruption and approve arrests in criminal cases) to support the ongoing propaganda effort to “build a peaceful China” by paying special attention to certain types of criminal cases seen as particularly disruptive to political stability and social order. One thing this notice calls for is resoluteness in combatting criminal activity such as “illegal assembly and gathering a crowd to disrupt social order” where there is a “goal of subverting state power.” It is likely no coincidence, then, that the charges of illegal assembly and gathering a crowd to disrupt social order have been widely used against those detained in this latest crackdown.

    In the August 11 edition of Caijing magazine, constitutional law professor Zhang Qianfan published an essay expressing serious reservations about this notice and the latest campaign against assembly and association. In this essay (translated below), he argues that peaceful assembly should be seen as a form of speech and subject to the protections of China’s Constitution. Protecting citizens from punishment for peaceful assembly or legitimate criticism and exposure of government wrongdoing should be, he argues, a key component in pursuing the goal of social stability and security. Though he does not mention the recent detentions specifically, his linkage between clear channels for free public expression and the effectiveness of China’s fight against corruption makes it clear that he is not simply speaking in abstractions.

    *
    How to Build a Peaceful China

    Zhang Qianfan
    Caijing, August 11, 2013

    On June 20, 2013, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate issued a “Notice on Making Full Use of the Procuratorial Functions to Thoroughly Promote the Building of a Peaceful China” (hereafter the “Notice”). On the one hand, the Notice calls for severity in combatting especially major and serious criminal cases involving safety and accidents, such as those involving threats to food or pharmaceutical safety, public health, environmental pollution, damage to natural resources or fires, mining disasters, or serious traffic accidents. On the other hand, the Notice calls for severity in accordance with the law in combatting crimes that endanger state security, earnest support for political security, and resoluteness in combatting criminal activity such as illegal assembly and gathering a crowd to disrupt social order or a public place with the goal of subverting state power.

    The criminal activities in the first provision produce social harm and are related to public safety, so the procuratorates truly need to exercise their powers to approve arrest and prosecute in order to effectively combat them. As for the latter provision, activities that damage state security such as espionage, inciting defection, and disclosure of legitimately and lawfully classified state secrets truly need to be combatted in accordance with the law. But in order to be compatible with the constitutional goals of ruling the nation in accordance with the law and protection of human rights, there is a need for strict interpretation of broad concepts such as “subversion of state power,” “illegal assembly,” and “disturbing social order”; otherwise, if handled inappropriately, it will not only potentially infringe on citizens’ constitutional rights but may also run contrary to the idea of building a peaceful China.

    Part Two, Chapter One of the Criminal Law provides for “Crimes of Endangering State Security,” among which Article 105 punishes the acts of “organizing, plotting or carrying out” or “using rumor, slander or other means to incite the subversion of state power or overthrow of the socialist system.”

    According to the definition in Article 4 of the State Security Law, “endangering state security” is an offense based on actions. For example, in “plotting to subvert the government, split the nation, or overthrow the socialist system,” the words “subvert,” “split,” and “overthrow” are all action verbs. In other words, only actual illegal activity such as plotting an armed rebellion, engaging in espionage activity, or disclosing state secrets can possibly constitute actions that endanger state security. Of course, Article 105 of the Criminal Law broadens the crime to speech such as rumor or slander that “incites subversion of state power,” but this broadening must be treated with caution.

    In order to charge a particular mode of speech as constituting “inciting subversion of state power,” one must prove that the speech intended to subvert state power and also that it really had the potential to cause subversion of state power. This is because the object of Article 105 is not to restrict speech; rather, it is to prevent the act of subversion. If inciting speech is actually able to cause subversion, it ought to be forbidden in accordance with the law. But unlimited expansion makes it easy to exaggerate and prosecute and repress legitimate criticism of the government as criminal speech “inciting subversion of state power,” thereby trampling on citizens’ right to free speech and right to criticize and make recommendations as granted by Articles 35 and 41, respectively, of the Constitution.

    The reason why the Constitution protects citizens’ freedom of speech and especially provides citizens with the “right to criticize and make suggestions to any state organ or functionary,” the “right to make to relevant state organs complaints and charges against, or exposures of, violation of the law or dereliction of duty by any state organ or functionary,” and [states] “no one may suppress [such complaints, charges, and exposures] or retaliate [against the citizens making them]” is because freedom of speech is critical to maintaining the security and stability of the entire society.”

    It’s worth emphasizing that the “ordinary mechanism” for maintaining state security and social stability is not the frequent use of the Criminal Law to punish those citizens who dare to speak out; rather, it is actually in the protection of citizens’ freedom of speech. This point is especially important to a great nation. The main source of a variety of sources of instability in Chinese society at present is the uncontrolled abuse of state power. Up to this point, China’s main mechanism for checking official corruption is top-down organizational control. However, China is so large and has so many localities and complex administrative hierarchy that it is difficult for the central government to keep an eye on all the provincial and ministerial-level officials, difficult for provincial government to keep an eye on officials in each of its cities, counties, townships, and towns, and so on. Since top-down organizational oversight is of limited effectiveness and bottom-up democratic oversight is, for many reasons, unable to play a full role, corruption and abuse of power have become rampant.

    But with the rise of the Internet in recent years, the citizen voices have played an increasingly big role in oversight over the government, and much corrupt behavior has been exposed through channels like the Internet, providing an opening for the top-down legal- and disciplinary oversight.

    But without strict definition of the scope of the crime of “endangering state security,” the social consequences of inappropriate use of those laws may run counter to the intent of protecting state security. For example, if charges are cooked up to punish speech, then the channels for citizen expression and oversight by society will be blocked, corrupt officials will run wild until seething popular resentment shakes the central government, causing irreparable damage to society, more acute social unrest, and accumulated dangers.

    By the same logic, there should also be strict interpretation of the “Crimes of Disturbing Public Order” set out in Part Two, Chapter Six, Section One of the Criminal Law. Among these, Article 290 establishes the “crime of gathering a crowd to disturb social order.” So-called “gathering a crowd to disturb social order” means acts “to such a serious extent that work in general, production, business operation, teaching, or scientific research are unable to go on and heavy losses are caused.” From this, it is clear that if one only gathers a crowd but the extent is not serious and it does not lead to work, production, business operation, or teaching being “unable to go on” or “cause heavy losses,” then it is insufficient to constitute “disturbing social order” and the Criminal Law should not be applied as one pleases. If citizens gather together merely to articulate a particular demand and do not attack government offices, obstruct traffic, or negatively affect other people’s work or daily life in any other way, then they should be allowed to speak their minds.

    Related to this, Article 291 [sic, should be 296] of the Criminal Law provides for the “crime of illegal assembly,” to be used “where social order is seriously disrupted because an assembly, procession, or demonstration is held with no application made in accordance with the law or regulations, where no permission was granted for the application, or where it is held not in accordance with the time for start and stop, venue, and routes permitted by the competent authorities and the order of dismission is disobeyed.” On this point, “serious disruption of social order” should follow the understanding of “disrupting social order” given in the provision discussed above; namely, its key constitutive criteria should include “work in general, production, business operation, teaching, or scientific research are unable to go on and heavy losses are caused.” If it is merely an assembly without a permit but this does not cause any heavy losses, it cannot constitute “serious disruption of social order” and the crime of “illegal assembly” will also be untenable.

    It is especially necessary to point out that citizen assemblies are one form of expression protected under Article 35 of the current Constitution and do not fall under the scope of actions that the law may ordinarily restrict or punish; therefore, use of the Criminal Law to punish assembly ought to be done with the utmost caution. Under general circumstances, peaceful assembly is one manner of rational expression of citizen’s demands, especially small-scale assembly that cannot lead to any serious consequences on society. Therefore, these cannot constitute the key criterion of the crimes of “illegal assembly” or “gathering a crowd to disturb social order”—serious disruption of public order—and even less can they be considered acts of endangering state security such as “inciting subversion of state power.”

    At present, there is a common misperception that assembly is an “action” and thus substantially distinguishable from ordinary speech. [In this view,] once citizens assemble, it constitutes an “action” and the relevant authorities can use the Criminal Law to suppress it severely. This understanding does not comport with the provisions of Article 35 of the Constitution: “Citizens have the freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, procession, and demonstration.” Clearly, assembly, procession, and demonstration are listed alongside speech and publication, making them all “speech” or “expression” in the broader sense and enjoying the Constitution’s protection for freedom of speech in this broad sense. Of course, if during an assembly there are violent incidents like riots, arson, or attacks, this clearly enters the realm of action and the state has both the power and the obligation to prohibit these actions. But peaceful assembly is clearly speech, so even if the legal process is flawed the Criminal Law cannot be used to punish it.

    Article [296] of the Criminal Law requires assemblies to apply for permission in accordance with law and regulation and treats assembly without requesting or receiving permission to be “illegal assembly.” Applying for permission is indeed a statutory condition for lawful assembly, and just about all countries with rule of law make similar requirements.

    But it needs to be pointed out that the goal of this requirement is to ensure that citizen assembly is carried out peacefully and in an orderly manner so that it does not have a negative impact on others’ work, transportation, or rest, and is not a disguised way to deprive [citizens] of their freedom of assembly. Those who give permission may not refuse their approval because they do not agree with the views that those assembled want to express or out of some inexplicable fear of citizens gathering; otherwise, this is an abuse of the permit authority. This is why in countries with rule of law applications for permission to assemble are a formality, with those giving approval simply conducting a procedural review of the time, location, and manner of the assembly and not a substantive review of the content of the assembly. Any assembly without violent tendency will be approved, making assembly a common way in which citizens peacefully express their demands and gather popular support. One could even say that the more orderly a society, the more common citizen assembly is.

    It cannot be denied that the reason why the citizen “strolls” and other activities taking place in many parts of China today are treated as “illegal assembly” is to a great extent because local authorities view ordinary assembly as a plague and very rarely approve requests by citizens to assemble. They routinely refuse to approve assemblies on the grounds that they will “seriously disrupt social order,” without ever giving any specific explanation or reasoning—often without even any written decision. Even though under the provisions of the Law on Assembly, Procession, and Demonstration, failure to respond by the statutory deadline can be seen as approval, once citizens take to the streets, police are mobilized to counter the “illegal assembly.” Not only does this not serve to maintain true public order, it even artificially intensifies social contradictions.

    Clearly, Article [296] of the Criminal Law cannot be based simply on whether an assembly is “illegal” but must consider whether an assembly constitutes a “serious disruption to social order” and especially needs to review whether the relevant authorities exercised their power to approve the assembly in accordance with the law.

    In sum, enforcing the Criminal Law certainly is the mandate of the public security and procuratorial authorities, but this important mandate must be exercised appropriately. First, we must establish a professional habit of respect for the Constitution, because only the freedom of speech provided by Article 35 of the Constitution can serve as the main path toward true social peace.

    The Notice requires investigation and punishment in accordance with the law of the corruption behind especially major and serious criminal cases involving safety and accidents and the serious investigation of crimes of office such as corruption, bribery, and malfeasance. This is commendable, but the experience of past years has taught us that corruption and malfeasance cannot be fully investigated only by the procuratorate’s efforts. Especially in a broader context in which independent procuratorial authority does not enjoy full protection, exposure of the corruption and other crimes of many officials has relied on public whistleblowers. If the public’s channels of expression are blocked or the Criminal Law is used to punish the public-spirited, conscientious, and courageous expression of responsible citizens, then the only result will be a chilling effect on the people of noble character in this realm, people of base character will increasingly have nothing to fear, and it will be difficult to realize “peaceful China.”

    The author is a professor of constitutional law at Peking University.

  • International Opinion of China’s Human Rights Largely Negative

    UN Human Rights Council. Photo credit: UN

    Despite some modest improvements over the past five years, international opinion of China’s human rights record remains largely negative, according to a just released poll taken by the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project. Majorities or pluralities in 18 countries out of 38 polled answered “yes” to the question “Does the Chinese government respect the personal freedoms of its people,” while majorities or pluralities in 20 countries answered no.

    The poll on global attitudes towards China and other major countries including the United States was conducted from March 2 to May 1 in 39 countries covering a total of 37,653 respondents (the margin of error varies between three and five percent). Results from China are excluded on the personal freedoms question as the Chinese government objected to asking its citizens their opinions on its human rights performance. The median score of those saying the Chinese government respects the rights of its people was 36 percent. The median score among the 20 countries for which tracking data is available was 26 percent, up from 23 percent when Pew last asked this question in 2008.

    Opinions of the Chinese government’s human rights record are lowest in North America, Western Europe, Australia and China’s neighbors South Korea and Japan. Among these countries more than 70 percent of respondents think the Chinese government does not respect the personal freedoms of its people. Opinions of the Chinese government’s human rights performance are highest in Africa, the Middle East (except in Egypt, Israel and Turkey), Latin America and traditional allies with large Muslim populations—Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia.

    The American people’s negative assessment of the Chinese government’s human rights performance has remained consistent for the last 15 years. In 1997 and 1999, Gallup/CNN/USA Today polls asked Americans to rate the Chinese government’s performance in respecting its citizens’ human rights. In both years, 69 percent responded “mostly bad or very bad.” In the just completed Pew poll, 71 percent of Americans held the view that the Chinese government does not respect the personal freedoms of its people.

    Overall, China’s “favorability” numbers in the Pew poll—i.e. the percentage of respondents who have a favorable impression of the country—follow the downward trajectory of China’s “positive influence” numbers as recorded in the BBC/Globescan poll released earlier in May. In the latter poll, respondents in 15 of 21 countries gave lower marks to China in 2013 than they did in 2012. In the Pew poll, respondents in 12 of 19 countries for which year-by-year data is available had less favorable opinions of China in 2013 than they did in 2012. The percentage of Americans holding a favorable opinion of China in 2013—37 percent—is the lowest since the Pew poll was first taken in 2007. In general, countries with the least favorable opinions of China are the same countries that give the Chinese government the lowest marks on respecting the rights of its people.

  • China’s Human Rights Plan Downplays UN, Western Cooperation

    Dalian Evening News coverage of China’s National Human Rights Action Plan (2012–2015) highlights publicizing cadre job vacancies, public complaint mechanisms, detainees’ rights, death penalty, and torture.
    China released its second National Human Rights Action Plan (NHRAP) in June covering the period from 2012–2015. Compared with China’s first plan spanning 2009–2010, the new NHRAP signals a cooling of human rights exchanges with the United Nations and Western countries, a shift towards cooperation with developing nations, and little movement on ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

    UN, Organizational Relations Strained

    China’s first NHRAP was issued during the last year of a three-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on technical cooperation between the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). China and the OHCHR signed their first MOU on technical cooperation in 2000, during a visit to Beijing by Mary Robinson, then High Commissioner for Human Rights. According to the MFA, successful cooperation led to the three-year MOU and an agreement to “carry out a range of cooperation programs in the areas of educating on human rights, enhancing capacity building and constructing a country governed by law.”
    The 2009 NHRAP alludes to these MOUs by stating that “China continues technical cooperation” with the OHCHR, but this year’s plan replaces “technical cooperation” with “good cooperation.” The change reflects the expiry of the latest MOU and a lack of interest among both parties in renewal.
    Although the MFA and OHCHR jointly held a seminar on the death penalty in December 2011—leading to an unrefuted estimate of the number of executions in China—senior Chinese diplomats have warned that future programs won’t take place until “finger pointing” and “confrontational attitudes” cease. Officials were alluding to statements issued by High Commissioner Navanethem Pillay and Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council since late 2011. Pillay condemned the sentencing of human rights defenders Liu Xianbin (刘贤斌), Chen Wei (陈卫), and Chen Xi (陈西); the revocation of Gao Zhisheng’s (高智晟) suspended sentence; and the disappearance of Chen Guangcheng (陈光诚)—when Chen was already in the US Embassy in Beijing—and wrote a letter to Tibetan hunger strikers camped outside UN headquarters in New York. The Special Procedures also issued statements highly critical of China’s human rights situation. For example, the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances stated that the “disappearance clauses” in China’s draft amended Criminal Procedure Law violate international law.
    Although the Chinese government had previously indicated its willingness to host Pillay on a visit to China, by early 2012, enthusiasm waned. Chinese diplomats now indicate that an invitation will not be extended in the near future. Since the OHCHR was established in 1994, every high commissioner has made an official visit to China. In contrast, Pillay made official visits to all Perm Five and BRICS countries except China during her first term, and a visit to China is far from certain during her truncated second term. (China—along with other countries—refused to endorse the extension of Pillay’s mandate for four years and only agreed to an unprecedented two-year extension in May after strong lobbying by the South African government.)

    UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navanethem Pillay expresses deep concern over the sentencing of rights activist Chen Wei. Source: UN Photo
    Invitations for UN special rapporteurs (SR) also appear unlikely in the short term. In 2005, then SR on Torture Manfred Nowak conducted his mission to China, noting “widespread” torture and a “palpable level of fear.” Five years passed before China hosted its next, and seemingly less controversial, SR. The 2009 NHRAP states that China “considers inviting a special rapporteur,” and, in December 2010, SR on the Right to Food Olivier De Schutter conducted his mission. But while praising China for “lifting several hundred millions out of poverty,” De Schutter also mentioned Tibetan nomadic herders as a “vulnerable group” and recommended that China “suspend” their non-voluntary resettlement. Perhaps in light of the sensitive topics raised after the last two missions, China’s 2012 NHRAP does not specify how many SRs it will consider inviting, despite having about a dozen requests pending. Meanwhile, although the 2012 NHRAP does not alter China’s commitment to “answer letters” from Special Procedures, the information China provides is becoming more limited and polemical. China has also become more active in rejecting Special Procedures’ opinions on cases—such as the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention’s opinion on the case of Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波)—and seeking to have them overturned.
    The 2012 NHRAP omits mention of exchanges and cooperation with international organizations. While much of the language on international exchange found in the 2012 NHRAP is clearly modeled after that of the 2009 plan, for reasons unclear, the following was not carried over: “China continues to strengthen exchanges and cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), International Labor Organization and other relevant international organizations.”

    Human Rights Dialogues

    For human rights dialogues and exchanges, language in the 2012 plan strays from that of the 2009 NHRAP in two places. First, the word “bilateral” is removed as a descriptor for “dialogues and exchanges” that China continues to hold. Second, a sentence is added to include increased “consultation and cooperation with developing countries.” The 2012 NHRAP also adds mention of the Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights as an example of China’s continued participation in “the Asian-Pacific Region and Sub-region.”
    Over the last two years, China has reduced the number of bilateral human rights dialogues and exchanges it holds with Western countries while decreasing the frequency and length of those conducted. China put an end to human rights talks with Norway—once considered among the best bilateral dialogues—because the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded Liu Xiaobo the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize. China then cancelled the 2011 Sino-Australian dialogue apparently over Australia’s decision to host American marines at a base outside Darwin, and indefinitely terminated bilateral consultations with the Netherlands and Sweden. These decisions came after the Dutch foreign ministry awarded a human rights prize to Chinese lawyer and housing activist Ni Yulan (倪玉兰) and Sweden released a critical report on China’s human rights record.
    The EU-China human rights dialogue has been reduced in frequency, at China’s insistence, from twice to once a year. As in other dialogues, China’s representatives resist accepting long lists of “cases of concern” and now give information on a relatively small number of the cases raised. Chinese representatives are also increasingly vocal in blasting the human rights records of their Western counterparts.
    Selected Text from China’s National Human Rights Action Plans
    Topic
    2009-2010
    2012-2015
    Dialogue
    Continues to hold bilateral dialogues and exchanges on human rights with various countries concerned on the basis of equality and mutual respect
    Continues to hold dialogues and exchanges on human rights with various countries on the basis of equality and mutual respect. China also increases consultation and cooperation on human rights with developing countries
    ICCPR
    China … will continue legislative, judicial and administrative reforms to make domestic laws better linked with this Covenant, and prepare the ground for approval
    China has continued to carry out administrative and judicial reforms and prepare the ground for approval
    International Exchange
    China continues to participate in human rights activities in the framework of the Asian-Pacific Region and Sub-region.
    Continues to participate in human rights activities in the framework of the Asian-Pacific Region and Sub-region, including the Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights
    International Organizations
    Continues to strengthen exchanges and cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), International Labor Organization (ILO) and other relevant international organizations
    [no parallel statement]
    Special Procedures
    China continues its cooperation with the Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council, answers letters from it, and considers inviting a special rapporteur to visit China while taking into account the principle of balancing various human rights and China’s reception abilities
    China continues its cooperation with the Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council, answers letters from it, and considers inviting special reporters to visit China while taking into account the principle of balancing various human rights and China’s reception abilities
    UN OHCHR
    Continues technical cooperation
    Continues its good cooperation
    Note: All bold text has been added for the purpose of comparison.
    Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese government, sometimes through the China Society for Human Rights Studies (CSHRS), has discussed human rights with developing countries and former Eastern bloc countries. (Beijing has had a human rights dialogue with Hungary for more than 10 years, although little is known about the dialogue and issues discussed therein.) There was an uptick in Chinese human rights diplomacy with developing countries in 2012, with June visits by the CSHRS to Belarus—a country ostracized by the West for its poor human rights record—and by Premier Wen Jiabao to Chile—where the two sides agreed to “informal consultations and contacts on issues of human rights and the judiciary.”
    China’s dissatisfaction with human rights exchanges with Western countries and the United Nations has been building most notably since the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, but internal factors appear to play an important role in the ongoing chill. A once-in-a-decade leadership change has begun, and China is struggling to present a smooth transition and downplay human rights abuses. Moreover, Vice President Xi Jinping, expected to be named secretary general of the Communist Party at the 18th Party Congress later this year, is no fan of China’s foreign critics. In 2009, he derided them as “foreigners, with full bellies, who have nothing better to do than to try to point fingers.” The 2012 NHRAP indicates that it may be some time, if ever, before China returns to the days when human rights exchanges with the UN and the West were an important feature of the country’s foreign policy.

    ICCPR

    Despite being a key goal of Chinese reformers and the international human rights community, ratification of the ICCPR is not a priority for the Chinese government. China signed the ICCPR in 1997 and is still committed to eventual ratification, but as a Chinese official told Dui Hua in March 2012: “There is no timetable for ratification.” (Until recently, Chinese diplomats confidently predicted that China would be quicker to ratify the ICCPR than the United States, suggesting that China would ratify before June 8, 2013.)
    The ICCPR comes last on the list of international covenants mentioned in the 2012 action plan, which states: “China has continued to carry out administrative and judicial reforms and prepare the ground for approval.” This removes the legislative reference found in the 2009 NHRAP, which states that China “will make domestic laws better linked with the Covenant.”
    As written into its earlier action plan, China has taken some steps to align its domestic laws with the ICCPR, like increasing due process rights for the majority of criminal defendants and sharply reducing the number of executions. But in some areas—like reform or abolition of the system of reeducation through labor—no progress has been made, while in others—such as the codification of the “disappearance clauses”—China has moved backwards.

    Related links:

  • Observations Before US & China Talk: “Critical Moment for China Rights Dialogue”


    The opinion piece below by Joshua Rosenzweig, Dui Hua’s senior manager of research and Hong Kong operations, assesses the state of human rights engagement with China prior to the US-China human rights dialogue, scheduled for May 13-14 in Washington, DC. An abridged version (PDF) was published in the April 26 edition of the South China Morning Post.

    *
    Critical Moment for China Rights Dialogue

    Joshua Rosenzweig
    Senior Manager, Research & Hong Kong Operations
    The Dui Hua Foundation

    In a few weeks, China and the United States will sit down in Washington for bilateral discussions on human rights. But until both sides are willing to bring clarity to core principles rather than just rely on empty process, the potential for true dialogue on this sensitive issue will forever be in doubt.

    It’s been decades since China routinely condemned human rights in campaigns against “spiritual pollution” and “bourgeois liberalization.” Facing international isolation for its crackdown against protest on June 4, 1989, Chinese leaders began taking numerous steps to better engage with the world on human rights issues. Beijing has been signalling its intention to adopt international norms for years through signing major human rights covenants, actively participating in the human rights institutions of the United Nations, and engaging in numerous bilateral dialogues and consultations with Western governments like the United States.

    These dialogues have provided Western governments with opportunities to express concern about individual rights by pressuring Beijing to account for individuals jailed on political and religious grounds. But more tangible results have been few and far between. After many rounds of dialogue, violations continue unabated, and changing global dynamics are prompting more questions about whether such engagement is capable of achieving anything.

    China’s importance as a trading partner and key player in diplomatic trouble spots like North Korea and Iran provides it with many opportunities to push back against Western criticism. Multilateral human rights mechanisms like the UN’s “universal periodic review” have become a safe place for rights abusing states to hide behind expressions of “unique national circumstances” and the notion that some human rights are more fundamental than others. And further enabling both processes has been Western hypocrisy on human rights, particularly the loss of US moral leadership as a consequence of the “war on terror.”

    Western governments must recognize that they have limited influence over the development of human rights and democratization in China and that progress there ultimately depends on the efforts of Chinese people themselves, both inside and outside government. Both sides need to be clear that the goal of dialogue with China is realizing universal human rights as agreed upon by international law in all countries—including Western countries—and not the imposition of a particular system of government.

    Western participants in this process must acknowledge China’s progress, avoid double-standards, and not say one thing and then do another. For its part, China’s commitment to universal human rights must be substantive, with more than lip service paid to addressing its deficiencies in the area of civil and political rights. “National circumstances” should no longer be allowed to be used as an excuse to avoid taking bigger steps to tackle remaining problems, and Beijing must resist the tendency to view criticism—both domestic and international—in terms of politicization and conspiracy.

    Engagement can only be worthwhile if it is critical engagement that understands that progress blooms from argument and debate. Western governments cannot avoid addressing the most serious human rights violations in China for fear of appearing too confrontational, and Beijing must stop responding with angry rhetoric every time it hears something it doesn’t like. There will be disagreements, to be sure, but engagement must be about more than simply “agreeing to disagree.” It should involve recognizing the value of substantive, critical discussion in which all parties are held equally accountable for their commitments to human rights under international law. In this vein, Western governments should also expect to listen more to Chinese critiques of human rights problems in their own countries.

    If China and its dialogue partners can agree on these principles, bilateral engagement on human rights might yet bear fruit. If not, then much more is at stake than just the value of bilateral dialogue. With no state required to do more than profess pro-forma adherence to its principles and covenants and multilateral institutions left with little credibility to hold violators accountable, the future of the entire international human rights regime is in serious jeopardy. That is a fate that leaders in Washington, Brussels, Beijing, and elsewhere should be doing more to avoid.

  • China’s Human Rights Plan Met With Mixed Reactions

    On Monday, China unveiled with great fanfare its National Human Rights Action Plan for 2009–2010 (full text available in English | Chinese). This plan, the first of its kind for China, is intended to set goals and measures for all of China’s government to follow in the next two years in its efforts to better protect and respect human rights.

    The plan, which was greeted with great enthusiasm by the China’s domestic media, received a more lukewarm reception outside the country. Although the plan contained several important expressions of support for the protection of human rights and some specific proposals, skeptics question whether the plan contained enough concrete benchmarks against which to measure achievements, particularly in the area of civil and political rights, and whether China’s system was transparent enough to allow for independent verification of progress.

    The following essay, published on the website of the Changjiang Daily in Wuhan (and reprinted by several major Chinese-language news portals), argues strongly that China’s ambitious plans need to be accompanied by sufficient action, else its goals will be in danger of not being realized. The author also reminds us that human rights are “naturally inherent” and “sacred” and not to be doled out by the state as it sees fit “according to national circumstances.” Progress in the protection of human rights should move forward in all areas simultaneously: economic, social, cultural, civil, and political.

    Safeguard Human Rights with Sufficient Action
    Li Qiong
    April 14, 2009

    Yesterday, the State Council authorized the State Council Information Office to issue the “National Human Rights Action Plan (2009–2010)” (NHRAP). This is the first time China has established a national program focused on human rights, and its action plan clearly sets out the Chinese government’s goals and concrete measures for the promotion and protection of human rights during the coming two years.

    From 1991, when the Chinese government published the “Chinese Human Rights Situation” white paper, the first government document to positively affirm the status of the concept of human rights in China’s political development, to 2004, when the phrase “the state protects and respects human rights” became part of the constitution, there has been increasingly clear and resolute identification of human rights as a common achievement of human civilization and a mainstream value of international society.

    On the level of theory and perception, the concept of human rights has already cast off the cloak of ideological struggle, and in speech it is no longer a sensitive or taboo subject. A whole series of legal provisions have reflected elements of the protection of human rights. The positive significance of the NHRAP lies in its clarification of the basic elements of the protection of human rights in China and turning these national values and strategic goals into a roadmap for the near term.

    In addition to progress on the level of ideas and perception, we cannot deny the accomplishments China has made in the area of action on human rights protection. But compared to the human rights content found in the NHRAP and in our various laws, we remain deeply concerned about the protection of human rights in practice.

    Looking at the reality of present-day Chinese society, many aspects of respecting and protecting human rights have yet to reach the ground, and there is much that remains unfinished with regard to upholding and protecting people’s rights. In some areas, whenever there is an accident involving major loss of life, the first thing that local government and enterprises think to do is conceal and cover up. In some management of society at the grassroots level, the difficulties people face in expressing and upholding their rights end up turning into intense popular confrontations or conflicts with officials or the police. In all areas of law enforcement and the administration of justice, there often appear flashes of the dark shadows of torture, prison bullies, and miscarriages of justice. In the hospitals of every major city, many parents of children with leukemia fiercely hope for a chance meeting with the Premier. The lack of basic cultural facilities in rural areas, the detention and even incarceration in psychiatric hospitals of those who make complaints and petitions—these facts make it clear that there remains a long way to go before realizing civil, cultural, and political rights.

    These hard realities that run through our rule of law and human civilization remind us that it is precisely at the level of implementation that human rights continue to be in danger of being ignored, neglected, distorted, and emptied of all meaning. Government and society continues to bear an enormous responsibility to respect, protect, and improve human rights.

    To be sure, it is even more difficult to break through barriers at the level of action and implementation than it is at the level of thought and speech. After 30 years of rapid economic expansion, the human rights issues we face are no longer limited to the single element of the right to life. The times are changing, and people’s knowledge of and desire for rights is growing stronger and more varied. The types of rights-protection problems that need to be resolved are increasingly complex as well. In the broader context of social transformation, respect and protection of human rights means increasing public investment to strengthen important social services, overcoming institutional inertia and improving the work of government, and sweeping away unreasonable vested interests and bringing fairness and justice to society in return. Improving these areas of implementation requires sufficient political awareness, a courage to reform, and sufficient mechanisms and platforms for the expression and interplay of interests.

    Human rights is something naturally inherent, something sacred; it is not a favor to be bestowed on the people or something that can be arbitrarily taken from them. We have already firmly established a national vision and system, but what we hope to see even more is respect, protection, and improvement of human rights in actual practice. When the promotion and protection of human rights is realized in practice, when it can be seen in every action taken by the government everywhere—only then can we really say that the citizens become the masters of the state and “putting people at the center” becomes the core of development.

  • China’s Human Rights Plan Met With Mixed Reactions

    On Monday, China unveiled with great fanfare its National Human Rights Action Plan for 2009–2010 (full text available in English | Chinese). This plan, the first of its kind for China, is intended to set goals and measures for all of China’s government to follow in the next two years in its efforts to better protect and respect human rights.The plan, which was greeted with great enthusiasm by the China’s domestic media, received a more lukewarm reception outside the country. Although the plan contained several important expressions of support for the protection of human rights and some specific proposals, skeptics question whether the plan contained enough concrete benchmarks against which to measure achievements, particularly in the area of civil and political rights, and whether China’s system was transparent enough to allow for independent verification of progress.

    The following essay, published on the website of the Changjiang Daily in Wuhan (and reprinted by several major Chinese-language news portals), argues strongly that China’s ambitious plans need to be accompanied by sufficient action, else its goals will be in danger of not being realized. The author also reminds us that human rights are “naturally inherent” and “sacred” and not to be doled out by the state as it sees fit “according to national circumstances.” Progress in the protection of human rights should move forward in all areas simultaneously: economic, social, cultural, civil, and political.

    Safeguard Human Rights with Sufficient Action
    Li Qiong
    April 14, 2009
    Yesterday, the State Council authorized the State Council Information Office to issue the “National Human Rights Action Plan (2009–2010)” (NHRAP). This is the first time China has established a national program focused on human rights, and its action plan clearly sets out the Chinese government’s goals and concrete measures for the promotion and protection of human rights during the coming two years.From 1991, when the Chinese government published the “Chinese Human Rights Situation” white paper, the first government document to positively affirm the status of the concept of human rights in China’s political development, to 2004, when the phrase “the state protects and respects human rights” became part of the constitution, there has been increasingly clear and resolute identification of human rights as a common achievement of human civilization and a mainstream value of international society.

    On the level of theory and perception, the concept of human rights has already cast off the cloak of ideological struggle, and in speech it is no longer a sensitive or taboo subject. A whole series of legal provisions have reflected elements of the protection of human rights. The positive significance of the NHRAP lies in its clarification of the basic elements of the protection of human rights in China and turning these national values and strategic goals into a roadmap for the near term.

    In addition to progress on the level of ideas and perception, we cannot deny the accomplishments China has made in the area of action on human rights protection. But compared to the human rights content found in the NHRAP and in our various laws, we remain deeply concerned about the protection of human rights in practice.

    Looking at the reality of present-day Chinese society, many aspects of respecting and protecting human rights have yet to reach the ground, and there is much that remains unfinished with regard to upholding and protecting people’s rights. In some areas, whenever there is an accident involving major loss of life, the first thing that local government and enterprises think to do is conceal and cover up. In some management of society at the grassroots level, the difficulties people face in expressing and upholding their rights end up turning into intense popular confrontations or conflicts with officials or the police. In all areas of law enforcement and the administration of justice, there often appear flashes of the dark shadows of torture, prison bullies, and miscarriages of justice. In the hospitals of every major city, many parents of children with leukemia fiercely hope for a chance meeting with the Premier. The lack of basic cultural facilities in rural areas, the detention and even incarceration in psychiatric hospitals of those who make complaints and petitions—these facts make it clear that there remains a long way to go before realizing civil, cultural, and political rights.

    These hard realities that run through our rule of law and human civilization remind us that it is precisely at the level of implementation that human rights continue to be in danger of being ignored, neglected, distorted, and emptied of all meaning. Government and society continues to bear an enormous responsibility to respect, protect, and improve human rights.

    To be sure, it is even more difficult to break through barriers at the level of action and implementation than it is at the level of thought and speech. After 30 years of rapid economic expansion, the human rights issues we face are no longer limited to the single element of the right to life. The times are changing, and people’s knowledge of and desire for rights is growing stronger and more varied. The types of rights-protection problems that need to be resolved are increasingly complex as well. In the broader context of social transformation, respect and protection of human rights means increasing public investment to strengthen important social services, overcoming institutional inertia and improving the work of government, and sweeping away unreasonable vested interests and bringing fairness and justice to society in return. Improving these areas of implementation requires sufficient political awareness, a courage to reform, and sufficient mechanisms and platforms for the expression and interplay of interests.

    Human rights is something naturally inherent, something sacred; it is not a favor to be bestowed on the people or something that can be arbitrarily taken from them. We have already firmly established a national vision and system, but what we hope to see even more is respect, protection, and improvement of human rights in actual practice. When the promotion and protection of human rights is realized in practice, when it can be seen in every action taken by the government everywhere—only then can we really say that the citizens become the masters of the state and “putting people at the center” becomes the core of development.

  • Olympics Six Months On: No Lift for China’s Image

    Six months after the dazzling ceremony that opened the Summer Olympics in Beijing, the first post-Games poll of international opinion toward China has been released by the BBC World Service. The results indicate that China’s image has worsened over the past year among most countries polled. The release of the poll coincides with the first Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of China’s human rights record this week at the United Nations in Geneva.According to the BBC poll of views in 21 countries released on February 6 this year, the percentage of people outside China who think the country exerts a positive influence in the world has slipped six percentage points to 39 percent from 45 percent a year earlier. Forty percent think China exerts a negative influence, up from 32 percent in 2008. Last year, 16 countries had a predominantly positive view of China and five held a negative view. In the most recent poll, 10 countries have a negative view and 10 countries have a positive view.

    The most recent poll indicates a modest improvement in the United States’ image since the low point recorded in late 2006, when only 30 percent of those polled outside the United States thought that the country wielded a positive influence. Those who have a positive view of the United States now account for 40 percent of those polled, while those who hold a negative view stand at 43 percent—a decrease from 51 percent in late 2006. The most recent poll was conducted after the November 2008 election of the first black US president, who campaigned on a platform of taking steps to improve America’s battered image by closing Guantánamo’s detention center, outlawing torture of detainees, and promoting better relations with countries that have strained ties with the United States.

    Over the past year, positive opinion toward China has dropped sharply in Europe and in parts of Asia (including in the Philippines, where China’s negatives rose from 30 percent to 52 percent) and the Muslim world (with double-digit drops in positive ratings recorded in Egypt, Indonesia, and Turkey). It has remained negative in the United States and Canada, but has improved in Latin America and Africa. Opinion toward China in Russia remains positive. In sharp contrast to international opinion, more and more Chinese—92 percent in the most recent poll—believe that China exerts a positive influence in the world.

    The recent poll reveals views of China from eight of the 12 top medal-winning countries at the 2008 Olympic Games. Excluding responses from China, an average of 52 percent of those polled among the top medal winners felt that China exerts a negative influence—up from 44 percent a year ago—and the percentage of those who think that China has a positive influence dropped to 28 percent from 37 percent. Among audiences likely to have watched the Games, China’s image appears to have deteriorated.

    Opinion toward China suffered some of its biggest losses in countries that hosted a leg of the around-the-world torch run. Positive views of China dropped to 39 percent from 48 percent in Great Britain, and negative views rose to an astonishing 70 percent in France (up from 46 percent a year ago). In Turkey, where sympathy for the Uyghur people is high, 64 percent now have a negative view compared to a mere 18 percent who see China in a positive light. In Australia, where a year ago 60 percent of the population felt that China exerted a positive influence, the number which does so now has dropped to 47 percent. The Japanese already had a very negative opinion of China’s role in the world, but even here the country’s positive numbers dropped from 12 percent in the 2008 report to 8 percent in this year’s report.

    This week in Geneva China’s human rights record is being examined by the UN’s Human Rights Council. The Chinese government will field many questions about its human rights record, but one question should be directed at to the Chinese people: Why do an increasing number of people around the world view China so negatively, even after the hard-won triumph of the Summer Olympics, the outpouring of international support after the Sichuan earthquake in May and the realization that China’s economy and foreign exchange reserves are vital to repairing the damaged world economy?

    A principal reason is doubtless the perception that the human rights situation in China is worsening, with reports of a sharp increase in arrests for political crimes, tightened controls over expression on the Internet, increased repression in Xinjiang and Tibet, and continued support for some of the world’s worst rights abusers in Sudan, Myanmar, and North Korea. As the United States and others have learned the hard way, the way power treats people, at home and abroad, counts heavily in the court of public opinion.

    Related Links:

  • Op-Ed: “Blinded by the Firewall”

    Executive Director John Kamm submitted an op-ed to The Washington Post that was published on August 7. Entitled “Blinded by the Firewall,” the op-ed makes use of a recent survey of world opinion conducted in 24 countries by the Pew Global Attitudes Project to explore the disconnect between the way Chinese citizens think the world sees China and the far more negative opinions of the country actually held by many people around the globe. Kamm touches on factors that underlie the vast difference in responses, and argues that the positive view of how Chinese people think the world sees the country works against efforts to persuade China’s leaders to take steps to improve human rights.