Tag: human rights

  • How Transparency in Death Penalty Cases Can Reduce Wrongful Convictions

    He Jiahong (right) speaking on a forum at the “World Day Against Death Penalty”, October 2014.

    He Jiahong is a special kind of Chinese legal expert. He is a well-known legal scholar at Renmin University Law School in Beijing, where he specializes in criminal justice and the issue of wrongful convictions. He is also the author of detective novels and writes prolifically on legal subjects for popular audiences. He reportedly likes to describe himself as: “I am not only a jurist but a novelist, so I often have novel ideas about law.”

    One of the ways in which He Jiahong expresses those ideas is through his public WeChat channel—a blog distributed to anyone who subscribes via the social media platform. Recently, he posted a piece with the rather provocative title: “The Number of Executions Should be Made Public.”

    In China’s criminal justice discourse, public calls for greater transparency around the use of the death penalty are not unheard of but are nevertheless eye-catching when they do appear, especially from well-known legal experts such as He. Information related to the death penalty, including the number of executions carried out each year, continue to be treated as a closely guarded “state secret.” This is despite the fact that there are many indications that China has significantly reduced its use of capital punishment over the past decade—though it is still generally believed to be the world’s top executioner—and continues to face pressure from NGOs and United Nations human rights bodies to be more transparent about its use of the death penalty.

    Changsha Court public announcement of death sentences. Source: Hu Guiyun.

    He Jiahong raises some familiar arguments in support of greater transparency about capital punishment in China, including the importance of preventing wrongful executions, demonstrating the progress made in reducing the use of the death penalty, and the value of facilitating public discussion about the future of capital punishment. He clearly believes that openness and greater transparency will help build public trust in the judiciary and show respect for the public’s right to access such information.

    He notes that the trend towards online publicization of court documents is making secrecy about capital punishment irrelevant. On this point, he is perhaps overly optimistic. Dui Hua and other organizations that have tried to use online platforms like the Supreme People’s Court’s national database of court judgments have found it seriously lacking when it comes to information about cases involving the death penalty and other “sensitive” subjects.

    This suggests that the trend toward judicial transparency is already bound by pre-set limits on what information is considered “appropriate” for public disclosure. If the Chinese government were to do as He Jiahong recommends and make data about capital punishment public, it would first have to make the top-down decision to lift secrecy restrictions. The hope of a shortcut to judicial transparency through the release of court data is unlikely given such secrecy restrictions.

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    The Number of Executions Should be Made Public

    He Jiahong

    He Jiahong, professor at Renmin University School of Law. Source: Financial Times.

    On April 27, 1987, a dismembered female corpse was found in the Mianjiang River of Mayang County, Hunan. After searching missing-person’s reports, identification by family members, and blood-type analysis, the police confirmed that the deceased was a woman from Guizhou named Shi Xiaorong who had been missing for a month after working at a local hotel.

    After several months of investigation, police determined, based on the manner in which the culprit had dismembered the corpse that the killer was a butcher named Teng Xingshan… On December 6, police placed Teng Xingshan under custody and investigation. Following continuous interrogation, Teng finally “confessed.” On December 13, 1988, the Huaihua Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Teng Xingshan to death. On January 19, 1989, the Hunan Higher People’s Court rejected Teng’s appeal, upheld the original verdict, and approved his death sentence.

    In order to ensure that the death penalty is applied impartially and correctly, Chinese law mandates a special review and ratification procedure for death penalty cases, on the principle of a two-stage judicial process of trial and appeal. According to the provisions of the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law, death sentences with two-year reprieve were to be reviewed by high people’s courts and death sentences with immediate execution were to be reviewed by the Supreme People’s Court. Regardless of whether or not the defendant filed an appeal, cases involving the death penalty would all be subject to an automatic review process. In 1983, in an effort to “strike hard and fast” against criminal acts that seriously endangered public security and social order, the Supreme People’s Court delegated the power to review death sentences for homicide, rape, robbery, setting explosions, and other serious crimes to high people’s courts. To a certain degree, this led to a loosening of the review and control procedures over the death penalty. Since high people’s courts in provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions were generally the courts hearing appeals in death penalty cases, delegation of the power to review these cases meant that the same court became responsible for hearing the appeal and carrying out the final review. The review and ratification process that had been originally intended as a way to strictly control use of the death penalty became effectively meaningless.

    Teng Xingshan’s case was handled under the combined “two-in-one” process of appeal trial and death sentence approval that existed during that particular period of Chinese law. On January 28, 1989, Teng Xingshan was executed by gunshot. However, that wasn’t the end of the case, because the so-called “victim” was still alive and would later “come back to life.”

    In 1993, Shi Xiaorong finally made it home to Guizhou after having been abducted and trafficked to Shandong. When she heard about the Teng Xingshan case, she said that she didn’t even know Teng, and certainly did not have any “dubious relationship” with him. She even wrote to the Hunan court, asking it to revoke its mistaken judgment that she had “dubious relations” with Teng Xingshan, had been “murdered” by him, and demanded compensation for her reputation damage. But there was no response from the court. Shi now has a new life and no longer cares about an old case that has nothing to do with her.

    News that the “dead had come back to life” eventually reached Teng Xingshan’s family. Teng’s parents had both died not long after their son had been executed. His brother figured that because their family was poor and ordinary they should not oppose the government. Not wanting to make trouble for himself, he decided not to mention the matter to anyone outside the family. In 2004, Teng Xingshan’s daughter Teng Yan had already grown up and worked as a migrant laborer for many years. After she learned the truth about what had happened, she and her younger brother Teng Hui, with help from a lawyer, filed a motion for appeal with the Hunan Provincial Procuratorate and Hunan High People’s Court. On October 25, 2005, the Hunan Higher People’s Court ordered a retrial in Teng Xingshan’s homicide trial and formally acquitted him of the charges. Teng Yan and Teng Hui received state and other compensations in the amount of 666,660 yuan (approximately US$85,000 at the time).

    At the time, the National People’s Congress Legislative Affairs Commission was organizing experts and scholars to study ways of reforming the Criminal Procedure Law, and the death penalty review procedure was one of the areas that everyone was paying close attention to. There’s no question that the Teng Xingshan case played a role in pushing forward reform of the death penalty review system. The Supreme People’s Court decided from January 1, 2007, to take back the authority to review death sentences in all cases.

    It’s now been 10 years since the reform of the death penalty review system. I was recently asked how I’d evaluate this reform. I said that it’s certainly been very positive, but I would have a hard time saying for sure. I believe that, since the power to review death sentences was returned to the Supreme People’s Court, the death penalty has definitely been applied with much greater strictness, in greater accordance with the rules, and in a more uniform manner. And the number of executions has certainly also decreased by a great deal. But because I don’t know the specific details, it’s impossible to comment in an objective and precise way.

    In China, the number of executions seems to be treated as a kind of “state secret”. Those in the know remain tight-lipped on the subject, while those on the outside let their imaginations run wild. In my opinion, there’s no reason to treat the number of executions as a “state secret.” All death sentences in China are handed down and executed openly and in accordance with the law. It’s all perfectly open and aboveboard—executions are not carried out in secret or indiscriminately. Why does the government choose to be so secretive and why is it afraid of keeping the public informed? Disclosing the number of executions will not stain the reputation of the judicial organs or lead to social unrest. Tempered by their experience of numerous wars and disasters, Chinese people surely are psychologically resilient enough to face up to the number of executions!

    On this point, policymakers ought to abandon their antiquated ideas of closed-door justice and embrace the modern judicial norms of transparency. Practical experience shows that openness is the best publicity and offers the best route to foster public trust. Publishing execution numbers also demonstrates judicial organs’ respect for citizens’ right to access information (zhiqingquan).

    Actually, the Chinese judiciary has already made progress on this front, as court verdicts have begun to be published online! As a technical matter, when court verdicts are all online it won’t be that difficult to use “big data” technology to tally up the number of executions. Even if officials don’t make it public, the public can still find out. Therefore, I recommend that the Supreme People’s Court choose the right moment to begin publishing the number of executions. This can demonstrate the Chinese government’s resolve and sincerity in facing up to capital punishment and promoting civilized justice.

    At the present time, there are more than 140 countries and regions in the world that have abolished the death penalty either by law or in practice. This shows that abolishing the death penalty is the general trend of human society because it is in line with the general spirit of humanitarianism and civilized justice. Furthermore, abolishing the death penalty is an effective way to prevent wrongful executions of innocent people. For judicial personnel, “no unjust treatment, no indulging wrongdoings” is but a beautiful tale/lore. Police, prosecutors and judges aren’t supernatural beings, and making the incorrect decisions when evidence is lacking is something that cannot be entirely avoided. Therefore, to prevent further miscarriages of justice in which innocent people are mistakenly put to death, we should seriously consider abolishing capital punishment.

    I am deeply aware that China cannot abolish the death penalty at the current time, but we should have an earnest discussion about the issue and, through our efforts, make more of our fellow Chinese understand that the death penalty is not perfectly justified. Our government ought to make a solemn pledge to the world that China will make an effort to abolish the death penalty and that it will start by making the number of executions public so that the world can see the progress of China’s death penalty policies. After several years of continued hard work, China will go from “executing fewer” to “no executions” to full abolition of capital punishment, once again making China one of the most civilized, humane, and harmonious countries in the world!

  • The “Hidden Rules” of China’s Criminal Justice System

    Rule of Law was a centerpiece of the Fourth Plenum meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP in October 2014. Image Credit: Getty Images.

    Xi Jinping made judicial reform a priority item on his agenda after fully taking power in 2013. He promised to “construct a rule-of-law country” and repeatedly emphasized the need for governing with respect to Chinese law and the constitution. Legal institutions were the focus of the “Fourth Plenum” meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2014, which pledged to “strive to let the popular masses feel justice in every court case.” Since then, efforts have been undertaken to “deepen” reform of the country’s legal institutions and officials have been served notice to achieve their reform targets before the upcoming 19th Party Congress later this year.

    In the run up to the 19th Party Congress, we should expect to hear more talk of the great achievements and successful reforms of China’s judicial system. In February, the Supreme People’s Court released a white paper on judicial reform describing its progress in improving the efficiency, accountability, and transparency of the judicial system and declaring that 63 of the 65 reform goals it had set for itself to achieve by 2018 had already been basically accomplished by the end of 2016.

    The reform of China’s law-enforcement and judicial institutions has certainly made some progress in recent years, but are there problems in the country’s legal system that remain untouched by these reforms and continue to undermine the ability of those institutions to deliver justice?

    According to Professor Chen Ruihua, an expert on criminal procedure law at Peking University Law School, the answer is a resounding yes. In a recent blog post, widely circulated online, Chen observes that there are 17 “hidden rules” that govern how the Chinese criminal justice system “really” operates. These rules describe a system of collusion between institutions intended to check each other’s powers, courts that are fundamentally biased against defendants, and a coordinated effort to limit the impact of defense lawyers.

    A list like this is clearly not meant to be analytical, though Chen has spoken and written quite frankly and at length on the flaws he observes in China’s criminal justice system. At a time of renewed ideological attacks against judicial independence and separation of powers, it takes courage to even raise the possibility that the progress of Chinese legal reform is not everything it’s made out to be.

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    17 “Hidden Rules” of China’s Criminal Justice System

    In the Chinese criminal justice system, the “gong-jian-fa” institutions (public security, procuratorate, and courts) follow a set of “hidden rules” outside of the formal legal system. These “hidden rules” have great vitality and have operated over a long period of time, making it difficult to change them despite revisions to the criminal procedure law or even judicial reforms. Professor Chen Ruihua sums up these “hidden rules” as follows:

    1. The investigative organs will only file a case for investigation when that case has already been solved.
    2. Most of the public security organ’s criminal investigation activity is completed before issuing the decision to arrest.
    3. The vast majority of cases are only solved after obtaining a confession of guilt by the suspect.
    4. If it were not for the purposeful restriction of the rights of defense lawyers and the extralegal detention measures against suspects, solving criminal cases would be extremely difficult for the majority of investigative organs.
    5. Compared to plaintiffs in civil trials, the public prosecutor in a criminal trial has a far stronger appetite for “winning”.
    6. When a case lacks clear facts or evidence, the procuratorate would rather withdraw the prosecution than allow the court to acquit the defendant.
    7. Almost all police and procurators treat defense lawyers with a certain degree of hostility.
    8. When a case lacks clear facts or evidence, courts will generally issue decisions that “give lenient punishment when there is doubt” or “remand for retrial;” the “presumption of innocence” is an extremely rare exception.
    9. Nearly all first-instance trials proceed by reading the record of criminal investigation aloud.
    10. In cases where the defendant hasn’t put forward enough exculpatory evidence, the court’s judgement is basically a kind of process to affirm the conclusions of the investigators and prosecutors.
    11. The vast majority of criminal judges lean toward the side of prosecution and will do everything they can to avoid allowing a “guilty” defendant to escape justice.
    12. Judgments in the vast majority of cases are reached outside of the trial process.
    13. The vast majority of judges turn a blind eye to procedural violations of law made by police, procurators, and first-instance trial judges.
    14. When a defendant refuses to admit guilt during the investigation or trial phases, it becomes a significant basis for the court to impose a more severe punishment.
    15. In the vast majority of cases it is a “responsible” judge that makes the judgement decision.
    16. Judges would rather write extremely detailed “trial conclusion reports” than provide detailed reasoning for their judgments.
    17. Whether it is the individual police, procurator, judge, or the “gong-jian-fa” organs, each has a direct interest in how criminal cases are decided.
  • The “Hidden Rules” of China’s Criminal Justice System

    Rule of Law was a centerpiece of the Fourth Plenum meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP in October 2014. Image Credit: Getty Images.

    Xi Jinping made judicial reform a priority item on his agenda after fully taking power in 2013. He promised to “construct a rule-of-law country” and repeatedly emphasized the need for governing with respect to Chinese law and the constitution. Legal institutions were the focus of the “Fourth Plenum” meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2014, which pledged to “strive to let the popular masses feel justice in every court case.” Since then, efforts have been undertaken to “deepen” reform of the country’s legal institutions and officials have been served notice to achieve their reform targets before the upcoming 19th Party Congress later this year.

    In the run up to the 19th Party Congress, we should expect to hear more talk of the great achievements and successful reforms of China’s judicial system. In February, the Supreme People’s Court released a white paper on judicial reform describing its progress in improving the efficiency, accountability, and transparency of the judicial system and declaring that 63 of the 65 reform goals it had set for itself to achieve by 2018 had already been basically accomplished by the end of 2016.

    The reform of China’s law-enforcement and judicial institutions has certainly made some progress in recent years, but are there problems in the country’s legal system that remain untouched by these reforms and continue to undermine the ability of those institutions to deliver justice?

    According to Professor Chen Ruihua, an expert on criminal procedure law at Peking University Law School, the answer is a resounding yes. In a recent blog post, widely circulated online, Chen observes that there are 17 “hidden rules” that govern how the Chinese criminal justice system “really” operates. These rules describe a system of collusion between institutions intended to check each other’s powers, courts that are fundamentally biased against defendants, and a coordinated effort to limit the impact of defense lawyers.

    A list like this is clearly not meant to be analytical, though Chen has spoken and written quite frankly and at length on the flaws he observes in China’s criminal justice system. At a time of renewed ideological attacks against judicial independence and separation of powers, it takes courage to even raise the possibility that the progress of Chinese legal reform is not everything it’s made out to be.

    *

    17 “Hidden Rules” of China’s Criminal Justice System

    In the Chinese criminal justice system, the “gong-jian-fa” institutions (public security, procuratorate, and courts) follow a set of “hidden rules” outside of the formal legal system. These “hidden rules” have great vitality and have operated over a long period of time, making it difficult to change them despite revisions to the criminal procedure law or even judicial reforms. Professor Chen Ruihua sums up these “hidden rules” as follows:

    • The investigative organs will only file a case for investigation when that case has already been solved.

    • Most of the public security organ’s criminal investigation activity is completed before issuing the decision to arrest.

    • The vast majority of cases are only solved after obtaining a confession of guilt by the suspect.

    • If it were not for the purposeful restriction of the rights of defense lawyers and the extralegal detention measures against suspects, solving criminal cases would be extremely difficult for the majority of investigative organs.

    • Compared to plaintiffs in civil trials, the public prosecutor in a criminal trial has a far stronger appetite for “winning”.

    • When a case lacks clear facts or evidence, the procuratorate would rather withdraw the prosecution than allow the court to acquit the defendant.

    • Almost all police and procurators treat defense lawyers with a certain degree of hostility.

    • When a case lacks clear facts or evidence, courts will generally issue decisions that “give lenient punishment when there is doubt” or “remand for retrial;” the “presumption of innocence” is an extremely rare exception.

    • Nearly all first-instance trials proceed by reading the record of criminal investigation aloud.

    • In cases where the defendant hasn’t put forward enough exculpatory evidence, the court’s judgement is basically a kind of process to affirm the conclusions of the investigators and prosecutors.

    • The vast majority of criminal judges lean toward the side of prosecution and will do everything they can to avoid allowing a “guilty” defendant to escape justice.

    • Judgments in the vast majority of cases are reached outside of the trial process.

    • The vast majority of judges turn a blind eye to procedural violations of law made by police, procurators, and first-instance trial judges.

    • When a defendant refuses to admit guilt during the investigation or trial phases, it becomes a significant basis for the court to impose a more severe punishment.

    • In the vast majority of cases it is a “responsible” judge that makes the judgement decision.

    • Judges would rather write extremely detailed “trial conclusion reports” than provide detailed reasoning for their judgments.

    • Whether it is the individual police, procurator, judge, or the “gong-jian-fa” organs, each has a direct interest in how criminal cases are decided.
  • Chinese Court Decision Highlights the Need for Full Implementation of Anti-Domestic Violence Law

    The Ordos Intermediate People’s Court in Inner Mongolia recently convicted a local government official of battering his wife—the journalist Hong Mei—to death. The case has received significant attention largely due to Hong’s standing as a successful journalist who had been reporting on domestic violence and the implementation of China’s year-old Anti-Domestic Violence Law. Major Chinese news organizations covering Hong’s death include Xinhua, Caixin, Sina, and Tencent News. Digital media outlets Quartz and Sixth Tone also reported the story.

    Brutal Death of a Promising Woman Journalist Strikes a Nerve

    Hong’s death touches a raw nerve with the many Chinese citizens who recognize domestic violence as a major social problem. As described in a mournful report published shortly after her death, Hong was an especially poignant victim. Personal artifacts remaining in her office at the Hangjinqi Broadcasting and Television Bureau speak to a respected journalist devoted to her work and family.

    While China’s post-1978 reform era has brought about a degree of economic and social liberalization that has created greater opportunities for women, according to The New York Times it “has also fostered a resurgence of long-repressed traditional values. More and more men and women say a woman’s place is in the home, wealthy men take mistresses in a contemporary reprise of the concubine system, and pressure for women to marry young is intense.” Increasing numbers of professional women in China, such as Hong, encounter obstacles to professional achievement stemming from domestic violence and a male-dominated workplace culture. Although China’s Anti-Domestic Violence Law came into effect on March 1, 2016 and receives strong support from the public, it still suffers from weak implementation, and the number of domestic violence cases continue to be alarmingly high. The All-China Women’s Federation found that a quarter of all married women in China experience some form of domestic violence.

    Domestic Violence and Women in Prison

    Women make up an overwhelming majority of the victims of domestic violence. While spousal abuse perpetrated against women is often trivialized or ignored by local law enforcement, survivors’ defensive strategies are routinely criminalized. In some provinces, the number of female offenders who are in prison for committing crimes related to domestic violence (such as fighting back to defend themselves or their children) can account for up to 22% of the total serious female offender prison population. Recognizing the gendered nature of domestic violence and the importance of putting in place preventative and interventionist measures to protect potential victims and survivors would go a long way in reducing China’s female prison population, which has been on the rise in recent years.

    The Anti-Domestic Violence Law rightly addresses the issue. Of special significance is the introduction of “personal safety protection orders.” The law marks the first time on a national legislative scale that protection orders (essentially a restraining order) can be issued by a court without the need for a lawsuit to be filed. Alongside the orders, the law also emphasizes the importance of public education and a community-based approach towards intervention whereby groups such as schools, medical facilities, and neighborhood committees are responsible for reporting cases of domestic violence. With the rising number of women in prison and the fact that their crimes are often the last resort of an abuse victim, preventative measures not only ensure that victims are protected as early as possible, they also have the long-term collateral impact of reducing a woman’s risk of incarceration.

    However, preventative measures can only be successful if implemented. It is crucial that police and courts are responsive and protective of victims before domestic violence cases escalate. Currently, even with the Anti-Domestic Violence Law well into its first year of implementation, numerous women’s rights groups have expressed disappointment in law enforcement and judicial handling of domestic violence cases—the former for failing to intervene and provide refuge for victims, and the latter for the long turnaround time in issuing protection orders.

    Court Decision Documents a Sad History of Abuse

    If Hong’s story generates sympathy among Chinese citizens and women’s rights advocates, the background of her abuser, Jin Zhu, likely also taps into the broader societal anger directed at government officials within China. Jin was a government official in Ordos, giving Chinese citizens yet another example of a lawbreaking official to rail against (according to a Pew Global Attitudes survey, four out of five Chinese citizens consider malfeasance in office by government officials a big problem).

    The facts of the case indicate that Jin is a serial domestic abuser who showed no remorse for his criminal actions. In its decision, the court made clear that Jin’s violence against Hong was hardly an isolated incident—it not only detailed Jin’s terrorizing Hong over the several hours that led to her death on April 6, 2016, but also noted specifically that Jin physically attacked Hong many times throughout their relationship. A Caixin summary of the court’s full opinion recounts that in 2013, Jin battered Hong so badly she had to go to the hospital; she initially refused to return home, but finally did so after Jin promised that he would not batter her again.

    Jin showed no remorse in court, offering a flimsy intoxication defense: according to Cao Chunfeng, the lawyer representing Hong’s family, Jin blamed his actions on “getting blackout drunk” and stated that, as such, “it couldn’t be ruled out that another person committed the crime.” Jin never admitted guilt in court.

    Did Local Procuratorates Pursue the Correct Charges Against Jin?

    The court found Jin guilty of “intentional injurious assault” (guyi shanghai zui) and ordered a suspended death sentence (which can be commuted to life in prison after two years). It isn’t clear why an intentional homicide (guyi sharen) conviction was not pursued since the court stated that Jin “battered victim Hong Mei on the evening of April 5, 2016 because she went to a social event, and after getting drunk he battered her until she was dead.” The definitions of these crimes are simple, and under Article 232 of the Criminal Law “anyone who intentionally kills a person” is guilty of intentional homicide, liable for punishment ranging from three years in prison to the death penalty.

    Under Article 172 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, the people’s procuratorate possesses authority to bring specific crimes to court for criminal prosecution. Although the specific factors considered by the procuratorate in its charging decision are unclear, it would be a poor precedent if the court was persuaded by Jin’s intoxication defense and found that he lacked the requisite criminal intent to commit homicide. In its full opinion, the court emphasized that Jin’s intoxication was wholly voluntary and that he exhibited a long history of physically assaulting Hong. His intent to kill can be deduced from his actions over several years. If China’s legal authorities refrained from prosecuting Jin to the fullest extent of the law, they risk sending the message that alcohol intoxication is at least a partial defense to domestic violence charges.

    Leniency for domestic abusers like Jin might also contribute to rising numbers of incarcerated women in China. Domestic violence is a major contributing factor to crime among women, as women who fight back against their abusers can receive severe prison sentences and heavy criminal charges. The Supreme People’s Court has recognized the importance of this issue by developing national sentencing standards for cases involving domestic violence and women. The case of Li Yan (李彦), who had been beaten and tortured by her spouse, is perhaps the most famous example of violent self-defense by a victim of domestic abuse. Li was initially sentenced to death for killing her husband in self-defense before her sentence was reduced in the wake of mounting public pressure in 2015.

    China’s Anti-Domestic Violence Law Must Be Fully Implemented

    Unfortunately, China’s Anti-Domestic Violence Law came too late for Hong Mei. She was killed on April 6, 2016, just a few short weeks after the law took effect on March 1. Had the law been passed earlier, Hong might have obtained a “personal safety protection order” against her husband in 2013 after she was hospitalized for injuries he inflicted on her during a violent beating. As it was, Hong sought a divorce, but abandoned her effort “under pressure from those around her.” The new law is designed to make it easier for victims of domestic abuse to overcome societal pressure that makes it difficult for women to protect themselves against male perpetrators of domestic violence.

    According to the Anti-Domestic Violence Law, victims can apply for personal safety protection orders through their local courts, which must respond within 72 hours, or 24 hours in the case of emergencies. If an application is successful, protection orders can forbid contact between the victim and their abuser and demand that the abuser move out of their residence. If a victim of domestic violence is unable to apply for protection orders on their own, relatives or welfare organizations can apply for the orders on the victim’s behalf. The efficacy of protection orders in stopping domestic violence has already been proven in China. In 2008, the Supreme People’s Court experimented with allowing local courts to use protection orders in lawsuits involving domestic violence; over 90% of the orders proved successful in stopping the violence. However, prior to the introduction of the Anti-Domestic Violence Law, getting a protection order required filing a lawsuit, which took time and placed the burden of proof on the victim. Under the new law, the court can grant a protection order without bringing a lawsuit.

    Now that the Anti-Domestic Violence Law has taken effect, proper implementation is key. Hopefully, Hong’s case will inspire tougher enforcement and greater societal support of victims. Although a promising first step, handing down harsh punishment to perpetrators of domestic violence does not address the root causes nor the rising number of women such as Li Yan who, after years of suffering domestic abuse, end up in prison. That said, the Anti-Domestic Violence Law has the potential to make a difference, particularly in the lives of female victims of domestic violence. If fully implemented, it offers them, their children, and other victims of domestic abuse a legal way out of a dangerous situation. For some of these women, it may also mean the difference between freedom and incarceration.

  • China Scores Low Marks on Human Rights in 14 Democracies

    A recent Pew survey finds that China’s favorability rating among Americans is at its lowest level since Pew began polling attitudes towards China in 2005. Photo Source: telegraph.co.uk

    According to a June report from the Pew Research Center, more than 60 percent of respondents in 14 democratic countries across North America, Europe, and Asia believe that the Chinese government does not respect the personal freedoms of its people. In France, Germany, and Sweden, as many as nine out of ten people surveyed hold this view. The report comes on the heels of a Joint Statement criticizing China’s human rights record, signed by several of the countries surveyed in the poll, that was released at the meeting of the Human Rights Council in Geneva in March.

    General attitudes towards China were also starkly negative—in the United States, where 80 percent of people polled think that the Chinese government does not respect the personal freedoms of its people, only 37 percent of those surveyed have a favorable opinion of China. This figure represents the lowest favorability rating since Pew began polling attitudes towards China in 2005.

    Unfavorable Five-Year Trend

    Negative feelings towards China have risen sharply since 2011, the year before Xi Jinping took over as chairman of China’s Communist Party. The figure below shows that in five major global powers—US, UK, France, Germany, and Japan—survey respondents with unfavorable views of China have increased since 2011.Since Xi has come to power, China’s relations with neighboring countries have likewise deteriorated—Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, for example, have all drawn closer to the US.

    Percentage of Respondents with Unfavorable View of China, 2011 and 2016, by Country

    Source: Pew Research Center Reports, 2011 and 2016.

    These results cast doubt upon Xi’s approach to international affairs, evidenced most recently by China’s decision to refrain from any participation in the South China Sea arbitration case brought against it by the Philippines at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. Not only did the PCA reject China’s “nine-dash line” claim to rights over the South China Sea, “the ruling was unanimously in favor of the Philippines on every issue. The result is widely seen as a blow to China’s prestige, and to Xi’s leadership skills as well.

    On specific issues, Pew respondents also tended to hold negative opinions of the Chinese economy. Of the ten European countries surveyed, all but one (France), now see the United States as the world’s leading economic power. In 2015, those surveyed in France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom held the opinion that China was the world’s leading economic power. Competing with China-related economic fears, increasing numbers of Americans are “most concerned” with China’s growing military might. (Economic concerns outweigh military concerns, however, though the percentage of those who are most concerned by China’s economic might is dropping.)

    The Pew results were not entirely grim for China, however. A majority of people in Australia have a favorable view of China. According to a poll conducted by the Lowy Institute that was released in June, Australians now view China as their best friend in Asia, and 43 percent feel that Australia’s relationship with China is the country’s most important relationship, tied with the percentage who hold that the relationship with the United States is the country’s most important relationship. Nevertheless, 86 percent of Australians surveyed in the Lowy poll stated that “China’s human rights record” exerted a negative influence on their views of the country.

    Finally, in a finding that might have implications in the American presidential campaign, there is a wide disparity in American views about China based on respondents’ political affiliation and age. Republicans tend to have more negative feelings towards the country than Democrats, and young people tend to view China more favorably than older people.

  • Can Recognizing Poverty Reduce Executions in China?

    Photo credit: sn.ifeng.com

    Dui Hua has obtained 525 reviews of death penalty decisions by China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) between 2013 and 2015. Of the 525 SPC reviews in the Dui Hua sample, only two percent were reversed–a figure considerably lower than that provided by SPC officials in 2014, when it was estimated that the SPC reversal rate was near 10 percent.

    In carrying out its reviews, the SPC may consider several mitigating factors, including the defendant’s remorse, good behavior, and role in the crime, as well as the severity of the crime. Poverty is another mitigating factor that, while sometimes ignored, has the potential to decrease the number of executions China carries out each year. A collection of drug-related death penalty cases the SPC overturned between 1997 and 2015 demonstrates the court’s willingness to take economic factors into account.

    In 2007, Li Budu (李补都), a native of Sichuan Province, was sentenced to death for transporting over 1,000 g of heroin—20 times the 50 g threshold making drug transport a capital crime. After Li’s loss on appeal, the SPC ultimately found that, while Li should be severely punished due to the quantity of drugs involved in his case, the poverty level of Li’s family and other mitigating factors were sufficient to reverse the sentence.

    In advocating leniency in Li’s case, the SPC noted that the people sentenced for transporting drugs—as opposed to smuggling, trafficking, or manufacturing them—are usually “farmers, people living in border regions [which have higher rates of poverty], or people experiencing unemployment, whose motives are to solve economic difficulties.”

    Recognizing poverty in death penalty decisions is just and equitable because it takes into account the circumstances affecting individuals’ choices to engage in criminal activity. It is also economical: as an infographic from Chinese news portal NetEase makes clear, the cost of the death penalty is rising. These costs include travel reimbursements for SPC judges’ traveling from Beijing to local jurisdictions to interview defendants, defense attorney fees, equipment necessary to shift from firing squad to lethal injection as the preferred method of execution, and state compensation in the event of wrongful execution.

    Costs are likely to add up during the period before a capital case ever reaches the SPC for final review. It now it takes an average of six months for a death sentence to reach the SPC after pronouncement by an Intermediate People’s Court and review by a High People’s Court.

    China has committed to gradually reducing use of the death penalty, but downward trends have stalled in recent years. Dui Hua estimates that China executed about 2,400 people per year in 2013, 2014, and 2015, after marking annual declines in the previous three years and a precipitous drop from 6,500 executions per year in 2007—the year the SPC regained final authority to review death sentences.

  • Growing Number of Women in Prison in China

    Women prisoners in China. Photo source: gucheng.com

    China may soon surpass the United States in the number of women it puts behind bars. The Asian Pacific Conference of Correctional Administrators finds that by the middle of last year, China had more than 107,000 women in prison, up 3.2 percent from the previous year. By comparison, federal and state facilities in the US housed just over 110,000 women in prison at the beginning of 2015 (according to the US Bureau of Justice Statistics’ analysis tool).

    The number of women in Chinese prisons has now risen more than 50 percent since 2003. These figures exclude women held in detention centers or other facilities run by China’s public security bureaus (e.g., custody and education, mandatory drug rehabilitation, and legal education). If these facilities were included, the number of women China incarcerates would likely have already exceeded that of the United States.

    Women now make up 6.5 percent of China’s general prison population, compared with 7.2 percent of total prisoners in the United States. Hong Kong and Macau—special administrative regions which are not included in China’s statistics—have the largest portions of incarcerated women in the world. As of mid-2014, the World Prison Brief noted that Hong Kong imprisoned the largest proportion of women (19.4 percent) within its total prison population than any other country with a population of at least 60,000. In the past year, however, Hong Kong was surpassed by Macau, whose prison population as of mid-2015 is comprised of 21 percent women.

    Sources: Dui Hua, China Statistical Yearbook, APCCA

    Promoting the Bangkok Rules

    Worldwide, the number of women in prison has increased 50 percent since 2000, compared with 18 percent growth for men, according to the Institute for Criminal Policy Research. As more women enter the criminal justice system, the UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (Bangkok Rules) become increasingly important as a framework for meeting the physical and psychological needs of women in penal systems built for men.

    Aiming to improve legal outcomes for women in Chinese-speaking areas of the world, Dui Hua has just released a Chinese translation of an e-course on sections of the Bangkok Rules regarding non-custodial measures. Starting in 2016, Dui Hua began distributing the translation as a training guide for legal officials in China. The translation is based on Penal Reform International’s e-course “Women in Detention: Putting the UN Bangkok Rules into Practice,” already available in English, Arabic, and Russian.

    Non-custodial measures help reduce the social and psychological repercussions of legal sanctions by keeping families together and reducing the risk of additional trauma for women who are survivors of gender-based violence.

  • Growing Number of Women in Prison in China

    Women prisoners in China. Photo source: gucheng.com

    China may soon surpass the United States in the number of women it puts behind bars. The Asian Pacific Conference of Correctional Administrators finds that by the middle of last year, China had more than 107,000 women in prison, up 3.2 percent from the previous year. By comparison, federal and state facilities in the US housed just over 110,000 women in prison at the beginning of 2015 (according to the US Bureau of Justice Statistics’ analysis tool).

    The number of women in Chinese prisons has now risen more than 50 percent since 2003. These figures exclude women held in detention centers or other facilities run by China’s public security bureaus (e.g., custody and education, mandatory drug rehabilitation, and legal education). If these facilities were included, the number of women China incarcerates would likely have already exceeded that of the United States.

    Women now make up 6.5 percent of China’s general prison population, compared with 7.2 percent of total prisoners in the United States. Hong Kong and Macau—special administrative regions which are not included in China’s statistics—have the largest portions of incarcerated women in the world. As of mid-2014, the World Prison Brief noted that Hong Kong imprisoned the largest proportion of women (19.4 percent) within its total prison population than any other country with a population of at least 60,000. In the past year, however, Hong Kong was surpassed by Macau, whose prison population as of mid-2015 is comprised of 21 percent women.

    Sources: Dui Hua, China Statistical Yearbook, APCCA

    Promoting the Bangkok Rules

    Worldwide, the number of women in prison has increased 50 percent since 2000, compared with 18 percent growth for men, according to the Institute for Criminal Policy Research. As more women enter the criminal justice system, the UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (Bangkok Rules) become increasingly important as a framework for meeting the physical and psychological needs of women in penal systems built for men.

    Aiming to improve legal outcomes for women in Chinese-speaking areas of the world, Dui Hua has just released a Chinese translation of an e-course on sections of the Bangkok Rules regarding non-custodial measures. Starting in 2016, Dui Hua began distributing the translation as a training guide for legal officials in China. The translation is based on Penal Reform International’s e-course “Women in Detention: Putting the UN Bangkok Rules into Practice,” already available in English, Arabic, and Russian.

    Non-custodial measures help reduce the social and psychological repercussions of legal sanctions by keeping families together and reducing the risk of additional trauma for women who are survivors of gender-based violence.

  • China Issues Oversight Rules for “Non-residential” Residential Surveillance

    The Supreme People’s Procuratorate building in Beijing.

    Not long after the draft of the amended Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) was released by China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) for public comment in August 2011, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances expressed concern that the provisions relating to the coercive measure known as “designated-location residential surveillance” (zhiding jusuo jianshi juzhu) would legalize enforced disappearances. In late 2015, the United Nations Committee against Torture (CAT) went further and called on China to abolish the measure.

    The Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) subsequently issued trial rules for determining the necessity of detention and rules to govern oversight of “designated-location residential surveillance” (DLRS), which had leapt back into the headlines in 2015 as part of a police crackdown against Chinese rights lawyers that intensified in July.

    A Coercive Measure

    Custodial detention or arrest takes place in detention centers, ordinary residential surveillance in one’s residence. DLRS happens someplace else, perhaps in a hotel or guesthouse, where law enforcement agents hold criminal suspects or defendants for up to six months while they investigate alleged crimes or prepare a case for trial.

    Authorities justify the lengthy six-month period by stating that residential surveillance is relatively lenient—not depriving people of their liberty, but merely restricting it. Nonetheless, individuals held under DLRS face an environment ripe with potential abuse and rights violations.

    When law enforcement uses the practice against people charged with endangering state security (ESS), terrorist activity, or serious corruption, the outcome is hard to distinguish from enforced disappearance or incommunicado detention. In these types of cases, investigators may use the law to deny families the knowledge of where their loved ones are being held and to deny detainees’ access to a lawyer. Within 24 hours of carrying out DLRS, investigators are only required to provide families with notice of detention and of the alleged offense.

    What a Difference Two Years Makes

    Faced with public opposition to the practice, legislators granted oversight powers to the procuratorate, but it has taken nearly two years for the SPP to define its role. In the meantime, as predicted, DLRS has become a routine part of handling politically sensitive cases. Though its high costs of facilities and manpower are somewhat prohibitive, DLRS is unparalleled in its long duration, ability to isolate detainees, option to delay intervention by legal counsel, and general capacity to exert psychological (and, in some cases, physical) pressure on suspects.

    Unfortunately, the new rules will do little to diminish these serious violations of due process. Procurators are concerned with whether DLRS is carried out lawfully, yet the most concerning aspects of the practice are themselves spelled out in the law.

    Focus on Decisions, Implementation

    The SPP has yet to publish their oversight regulations, but highly controlled media reporting sheds some light on their content. One thing is clear: the intention of the rules is bureaucratic oversight, not judicial oversight. Procurators will likely focus on examining paperwork, making the occasional inspection, and issuing instructions in case anything is out of the ordinary. People held under DLRS may initiate the oversight process by filing complaints independently or through their advocates. What appear to be missing are mechanisms for hearings to allow for the presentation of evidence or for appeals to challenge procuratorial decisions.

    Monitoring by the procuratorate will focus on two areas: (1) whether the decision to impose DLRS was lawful and (2) whether DLRS has been lawfully implemented. The former chiefly concerns whether the case involves a person who either (a) lacks a fixed residence in the county or city where the criminal investigation is taking place, or (b) is suspected of ESS, terrorism-related offenses, or serious corruption. In case of (b), the law requires investigators to substantiate a claim that ordinary residential surveillance would impede their investigation and obtain approval for DLRS from their immediately superior law-enforcement unit.

    The second area of focus involves ensuring that all paperwork is in order; necessary notices have been delivered; and the appropriate location, duration, and personnel are employed. Procurators would also ensure that detainees’ lawful rights are being protected, interrogations are held in separate locations, and no “physical punishment or abuse” is inflicted.

    Adding Inspections

    Oversight activities require procurators to make an on-scene inspection within 24 hours of receiving a copy of a decision to carry out DLRS. This inspection presumably enables inspectors to interview detainees and establish whether they have any allegations to make. It should also allow them to ascertain whether the designated location meets the lawful conditions for “ordinary living and rest” and to ensure that surveillance cameras and safety equipment are installed.

    The rules also appear to require procurators to visit the location at least once a week for the duration of DLRS. Periodic inspections should offer minimal guarantees against physical torture or ill treatment. They are inadequate, however, in preventing mental suffering and the use of other cruel and degrading treatment.

    Also troubling is the requirement that inspections be carried out in ways that do not interfere with investigations. This prioritizes the needs of investigators over the rights of detainees and may give investigators broad discretion to delay access to facilities.

    Missing the Mark

    This type of oversight, with its emphasis on ensuring adherence to applicable laws and regulations, will no doubt help to limit certain kinds of arbitrary and abusive behaviors. Other arbitrary practices and violations of due process will remain unaffected because they are legally sanctioned. For example, procurators are very unlikely to challenge investigators’ decisions to deny access to legal counsel to individuals charged with ESS or terrorism. The CPL empowers investigators to deny such access if they believe it might interfere with their investigation.

    In their attention to the legality of decision and implementation, procurators may also fail to scrutinize the legitimacy of charges made against detainees. Investigators can use flimsy evidence to initiate ESS investigations—thereby justifying the use of DLRS and exclusion of legal counsel—only to modify the charges when requesting approval of formal arrest after expiry of the six-month time limit.

    Ultimately, however well intentioned it might be, this kind of bureaucratic review cannot address the risks of DLRS. The measure grants law-enforcement investigators too much power over individuals, and the procuratorate lacks both power and incentive to challenge DLRS decisions, especially in the kinds of politically sensitive cases where abuse is most likely.

    The best solution would be for China to abolish DLRS, or at the very least, to restore detainees’ rights to full access to legal counsel and to communicate with the outside world. Anything less, and China is sanctioning enforced disappearances.

  • China: Juveniles Biggest Winners in 2015 Special Pardon

    Source: outlookchina.com

    Just before last September’s 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) passed a decision—subsequently issued by President Xi Jinping—to grant a special pardon (teshe) to selected prisoners. Xinhua reported last week that the government pardoned 31,527 people during 2015. The total number of pardons exceeded estimates by members of the NPC Legal Committee more than threefold.

    Ninety-five percent of recipients were under age 18 at the time of their offense and either sentenced to fewer than three years in prison or had less than one year left to serve for a non-serious crime. Three other groups of prisoners also benefited following rigorous review. Fifty veterans of the War of Resistance Against Japan (World War II) and the War of Liberation (the Chinese Civil War) were pardoned, as were 1,428 veterans of foreign wars who were not convicted of serious crimes and 122 non-self-sufficient disabled elderly prisoners (over age 75).

    2015 Special Pardon Recipients by Category

    The 2015 special pardon was the first since 1975 and the first ever to include a more general prison population. Chairman Mao Zedong granted all previous special pardons to war criminals (zhanfan). China’s Constitution grants the authority to decide on special pardons to the NPC Standing Committee (Article 67), while reserving the authority to issue orders for special pardons to the president (Article 80).

    Chinese Special Pardons, 1959-2015
    DateTotal RecipientsBeneficiaries
    Dec 4, 195912,115Counterrevolutionaries & ordinary criminal offenders (12,082); war criminals (33), incl. Emperor Puyi
    Nov 28, 196050War criminals: Kuomintang (45), Manchukuo (4), Mengkukuo (1)
    Dec 25, 196168War criminals: Kuomintang (61), Manchukuo (7)
    Apr 9, 196335War criminals: Kuomintang (30), Manchukuo (4), Mengkukuo (1)
    Dec 28, 196453War criminals: Kuomintang (45), Manchukuo (7), Mengkukuo (1)
    Apr 16, 196657War criminals: Kuomintang (52), Manchukuo (4), Mengkukuo (1)
    Mar 19, 1975293War criminals: all remaining
    Aug 29, 201531,527Juvenile offenders, veterans, disabled elders

    Local government officials moved quickly to begin implementation shortly after the central government announced the special pardon. In Hebei, the provincial politico-legal committee held a teleconference days after the announcement to study the NPC decision and the implementation measures drafted by the Central Politico-Legal Committee. Representatives from provincial courts, procuratorates, and public security and justice agencies attended the meeting that led to the establishment of special teams and working groups. Provincial prisons, detention centers, and community corrections organizations specified the scope, conditions, and procedure of the special pardon in accordance with the NPC decision.

    Although pardons are typically decided on a case-by-case basis, special pardons pave the way for many individuals to benefit at once. Different from an amnesty, a pardon amends a punishment without affecting a guilty verdict. Amnesties remove the offense from a person’s criminal record.

    Public response to the 2015 pardon was lukewarm at best. Chinese legal scholars opined that too few would benefit, while the public took to Chinese social media to criticize the pardons for being too lenient. Dui Hua previously called on China to grant special pardons ahead of the 2008 Summer Olympics and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 2009.

    Having worked closely on juvenile justice reforms with the Supreme People’s Court Office of Juvenile Courts, Dui Hua welcomes the special pardon as a pathway to justice for youth in conflict with the law.

    “Having successfully carried out the largest special pardon in the history of the People’s Republic of China, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress should consider issuing special pardons to other groups of prisoners,” said John Kamm, executive director of The Dui Hua Foundation. “Prisoners serving sentences for crimes that no longer appear in the Criminal Law—like counterrevolution and hooliganism, which haven’t been on the books for nearly 20 years—should be prime candidates for clemency. Doing so would support China’s constitution, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (Article 15, Paragraph One), and the rule of law.”

  • Guangdong High Court Asks Why So Few Are Found Innocent

    A recently freed, wrongfully accused man becomes emotional during a 2014 interview. Credit: Nandu.com

    Since 2012, Chinese legal authorities have overturned a series of high-profile convictions and taken steps to prevent miscarriages of justice, but one question is still being asked: why do Chinese courts acquit so few defendants? (In 2013, the acquittal rate rose for the first time since 2000, growing annually from six acquittals per 10,000 adjudications to seven.) Some argue that institutional support for conviction stands in the way of systemic change.

    Researchers at Guangdong High People’s Court wanted to find out for themselves, conducting interviews, holding seminars, and analyzing court documents related to acquittals throughout the province. The results, which were published as a report last year, offer a fascinating view into how those within the judiciary interpret the institutional, legal, political, and social factors that shape the way Chinese courts operate.

    The researchers report that, for the five years between 2008 and 2012, Guangdong courts acquitted only 198 individuals in 180 cases. This represents a mere 0.04 percent of all individuals subject to criminal decisions that took effect during the period. The great majority (86 percent) of acquittals were on grounds of insufficient evidence, with a handful of others issued for things like self-defense, mental incompetence, or defendants who were under the age of 16. Acquittals occurred in a wide variety of cases—though not in any involving state-security offenses—but were most frequent in cases of assault. The trial process typically took longer than average when it resulted in acquittal, extended in accordance with the law by both courts and prosecutors. The average length of a trial that ended in acquittal was 169 days, or about five months, with the longest stretching to 504 days and the shortest at 55.

    These quantitative results are not the most interesting part of the report, in part because there are so few cases to study. Much more interesting are the authors’ observations on the factors contributing to the dearth of acquittals, the impact this has on the legal system and society at large, and what might be done to remedy the situation.

    Acquittal Averse Strategies

    The extremely low number of acquittals doesn’t mean that criminal prosecutions in Guangdong are rock-solid. The report points out that, when the facts of the case are unclear and evidence is insufficient, judges use a number of strategies other than acquittal. In relatively minor cases, for example, courts might work out an informal “plea bargain,” promising to hand down a non-custodial penalty (like a suspended sentence) in exchange for a defendant’s promise not to appeal. In death-penalty cases, on the other hand, a court might issue judgments “with room to maneuver” (liu you yudi caipan)—imposing a more lenient suspended death sentence that gets commuted to life imprisonment (and then, later, a fixed-term sentence) almost automatically. Appeals courts are in an even better position to shift responsibility, as they can always send cases back to a lower court for retrial rather than rule to acquit.

    Another common way courts avoid acquittals is to allow the prosecution to withdraw its indictment, which it may do at any point before a verdict is announced. In some cases, this has the effect of ending the case against the defendant, but in others, the prosecution can decide to submit a new indictment or send the case back to police for additional investigation. This amounts to a waste of resources, the report says, and results in individuals being locked up for far longer than they ought to be.

    The report argues that prosecutors, with the help of the courts, are abusing this provision of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) and that the practice needs to be more strictly regulated. For example, it recommends that prosecutors generally not be allowed to withdraw indictments for unclear facts or insufficient evidence. This is because the CPL already gives prosecutors two opportunities to request trial adjournment for additional investigation. If this is not enough, the report concludes, then the court should exercise its power to issue an acquittal. The report also suggests prohibiting prosecutors from withdrawing an indictment once investigation of the facts and evidence has begun at trial and, when withdrawal is approved, limiting prosecutors to one re-indictment.

    Inside the Pressure Cooker

    Why is it necessary to go through so much effort to avoid issuing acquittals? A recurring theme throughout the report is pressure. Stability-first governance campaigns and a whole system of associated performance measurements create pressures for conviction throughout the criminal justice system. Written and unwritten rules place a premium on rates of case-solving, arrest approval, and conviction as factors used to measure police or procuratorate effectiveness and can be tied to individual promotion or ranking. Since acquittals have the effect of lowering these statistics, police and prosecutors are incentivized to seek conviction and mobilize all manner of available resources to influence courts not to acquit.

    As the final stop in the criminal process, courts bear the brunt of the pressure to convict that’s built into the system. As the report puts it: “The public security bureau is responsible for cooking the meal and the procuratorate for serving it. Last to come, the court has only two choices as it faces this meal—either eat up or reject all the work that the first two institutions have already put into the case.” Acquittal, in other words, puts courts in potential conflict with other local law-enforcement bodies that are expecting conviction.

    In major cases, especially homicides, police often face considerable political and social pressure to bring a culprit to justice. When they do make arrests, it can lead to merit citations being publicly issued to the investigation team even before indictment, let alone conviction. If the court later acquits, not only must these citations be withdrawn, there will likely be compensation claims made against the police for wrongful detention. In some cases, the same individuals who had been rewarded for solving the case might end up facing investigation for misconduct or even criminal liability.

    Prioritizing Public and Process

    There are many negative consequences arising from courts’ failure to issue acquittals, according to the report. The most obvious effect is on the credibility of the courts. On this point, the report is particularly frank, warning: “the public is already deeply suspicious and dissatisfied with the [level of] fairness in our criminal justice system, and wrongful convictions are adding fuel to the fire.” They continue, stating: “Convictions based on protecting face and reducing pressure only bring momentary peace and tranquility. When and if the bomb will explode all becomes a matter of luck. But what’s certain is that, the moment the bomb goes off, the courts will suffer the heaviest casualties.”

    In order to prevent calamity, the report recognizes that courts must exercise their judicial powers more independently, but it provides little advice on how to do so, apart from improving awareness and understanding of the law and legal principles like the presumption of innocence. There is no mention of the “coordination” between police, procuratorates, and courts by the party’s politico-legal committees and little on the role of adjudication committees, where senior court officials get an opportunity to weigh in on how to rule in complex or important cases they have not personally heard.

    In fact, the authors appear to believe that increased communication between investigators, prosecutors, and judges can help judicial authorities make their case about resolving problematic prosecutions through acquittal. They recommend, for example, having police and prosecutors sit in on adjudication committee meetings in cases where problems arise. The assumption is that this will enable the courts to exert influence over the other law-enforcement bodies as opposed to the other way around.

    One thing that seems to be on the minds of the report’s authors is a responsibility system for wrongful convictions. They make the case that mistakes are inevitable within any legal system and that neither wrongful convictions nor acquittals should automatically be thought of as “mistakes” for which someone must be punished. That is what happens, they suggest, when too much emphasis is placed on outcomes without giving due weight to process.

    This is especially important for judges, they argue, and requires transforming the way that judges are evaluated and how data is used. They believe that judicial statistics like conviction rates have no place in deciding promotion or professional ranking. They do, however, see value in continuing to collect statistics and conduct ongoing research in order to evaluate the performance of the criminal justice system as a whole and to boost its credibility with the public.

  • More People Say China Doesn’t Respect Human Rights: Global Poll

    Hundreds of protesters march in Istanbul on July 5 against Beijing’s policies towards the Muslim Uyghur minority. Source: AP
    Chinese diplomats often assert that progress on human rights in China has been remarkable and is plain to see. The results of a recent survey by the Pew Research Center call this rosy assessment into question. In country after country, including China’s top trading partners, big majorities see human rights in China as bad and getting worse.
    Since 2013, the year Xi Jinping assumed China’s presidency, the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes project has conducted a one-of-its-kind survey that asks whether the Chinese government respects the individual liberties of its people. Over the last three years, Pew has polled more than 120,000 individuals in 49 countries. People in 34 of these countries were surveyed in all three years of Xi’s presidency. Pew conducted the latest survey in 40 countries from May 25–27, 2015; the results were released on June 23.
    “Does the government of China respect the personal freedoms of its people?” (Global median)

    Sources: Pew Research Center, Dui Hua.
    The survey finds a sharp deterioration in international opinion towards the Chinese government’s human rights record since the last survey of 43 countries in 2014. The poll poses the question: “Does the government of China respect the personal freedoms of its people?” In 2015, the global median responses for “Yes” and “No” showed an 11-point spread (34 percent “Yes” and 45 percent “No”), compared to a four-point spread in 2014 (36 percent “Yes” and 40 percent “No”). Of the 35 countries surveyed in both years, 23 registered an increase in the percentage of “No” responses, while 15 tallied an increase in the percentage of “Yes” responses. (Some countries showed increases in both the “Yes” and “No” results.)
    Between 2014 and 2015, the median percentage of people who said that the Chinese government does not respect the personal freedoms of its people increased in every geographic area surveyed.
    “Does the government of China respect the personal freedoms of its people?”
    (Median percentage saying “No” by region, 2014-2015)

    Sources: Pew Research Center, Dui Hua
    Attitudes towards China’s human rights record are particularly bad in Western Europe, North America, Northeast Asia, and Australia. In France, 93 percent replied that the Chinese government does not respect the personal freedoms of its citizens. In Germany 92 percent held that view, as did 88 percent in Spain. In the United States, the percentage of those who say that China does not respect the personal freedoms of its people rose steadily to 84 percent in 2015, from 71 percent in 2013, and 78 percent in 2014. Responses in the United Kingdom show a similar trend.
    In Italy, South Korea, Japan, and Australia, eight in ten or more of respondents in 2015 indicated that China lacks respect for personal freedoms.
    One of the biggest shifts in opinion took place in Turkey, where the percentage of those who said that China does not respect the personal freedoms of its people rose to 58 percent in 2015 from 38 percent in 2014.
    While opinions towards China’s human rights record in Latin America turned largely negative, the Pew survey found a staggering 31 percentage point increase in the percentage of Chileans—from 20 percent in 2014 to 51 percent in 2015—who said that China does respect its people’s personal freedoms. Other countries that registered double-digit improvements in perceptions of China’s human rights record were Pakistan (up 13 points), the Philippines (up 11 points), and Nigeria (up 13 points).
    One is left to speculate on why there has been such a sharp deterioration in China’s human rights image overall. In some countries, especially those engaged in territorial disputes with China, geopolitical factors might be at play. Countries with large Christian populations may have been affected by reports of church demolitions. In Turkey, China’s suppression of the economic, social, and cultural rights of Uyghurs, a Turkic-speaking Muslim ethnic group of Xinjiang, has almost certainly played a role in the dramatic fall of China’s image. (Uyghur economist Ilham Tohti was sentenced to life in prison for splittism in September 2014, and protests over China’s treatment of Uyghurs erupted in Istanbul in early July 2015.) Countries that value the rule of law may have been repelled by the increase in the jailing and beating of lawyers and human rights defenders. Beijing’s refusal to show flexibility in its dealings with Hong Kong protesters over political reforms and the, at least initially, heavy-handed police response to the protests were widely reported. Foreign journalists in China, many of whom complain of their treatment at the hands of Chinese authorities, not surprisingly, focus on reporting negative stories.
    On the other hand, the Chinese government’s effort to counter the country’s negative image has been feckless and episodic. Perhaps its biggest achievement in human rights in recent years is its sharp reduction in the number of executions. The government rarely highlights this feat, and when it does, omits specific figures, which it chooses to classify as state secrets.