Tag: endangering state security

  • Chinese State Security Arrests Stay High, Trials Soar

    In 2011, the number of arrests and indictments for “endangering state security” (ESS) in China remained high, while ESS trial numbers broke new ground, according to China Law Yearbook. The official compendium states that 930 individuals were arrested and 974 were indicted on ESS charges (see Figure 1). Both figures remained well above pre-2008 averages despite double-digit declines. Arrests fell 11 percent year-on-year and indictments fell 20 percent—in lock step with Dui Hua estimates published in March. The subset of concluded first-instance trials that includes ESS leapt 96 percent to 1,314 trials, the highest volume since ESS entered China’s criminal code in 1998.

    Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database includes information on 25 people convicted on ESS charges in 2011. Many ESS trials are closed on the grounds that they involve state secrets and the publication of verdicts is strictly controlled, making it difficult to obtain information on individual cases. Crimes in the ESS category include “subversion,” “splittism,” and their incitement.

    Figure 1. Arrests and Indictments for Endangering State Security in China, 1998-2011

    Among those convicted were Memetjan Abduqadir and Tursunjan Ablimit, who in 2002 set up a foundation to serve Uyghur students in impoverished areas of Xinjiang; dissidents like Xue Mingkai (薛明凯)—who had been diagnosed with mental illness—Liu Xianbin (刘贤斌), Chen Wei (陈伟), and Chen Xi (陈西), who were all jailed following online calls for Jasmine Revolution in China; Li Nanhang (李南航) and Sun Tianxi (孙天西), who were convicted in separate cases for allegedly organizing political parties, one of which only existed online; Falun Gong practitioners Wang Guangying (王光英) and Zhang Xiuling (張秀玲); Tibetan writer Tashi Rabten and Tibetan rights activist Kalsang Tsultrim—a number of other Tibetans were reported detained and convicted during the year but sentencing information is not available; and Lü Jiaping (吕嘉平)—the oldest person on the list, at age 71—and Jin Andi (金安迪), who published online articles critical of Communist Party elder Jiang Zemin.

    Although there are only two names of Uyghurs convicted of ESS in 2011 in the database, this group is known to account for a high percentage of those convicted of ESS. According to official statistics, 414 ESS trials (including first-instance and appellate trials) were held in Xinjiang last year.

    Figuring for Trials 

    The reason for the disparate trends in the number of ESS trials versus arrests and indictments is unclear but is likely due to a combination of a decline in the number of defendants per trial and case backlogs.[*] Since 2007, the average number of individuals involved in each case involving arrest or indictment has declined markedly (see Figure 2). Backlogs, i.e., instances where an individual’s arrest or indictment does not occur in the same year his/her trial, are likely since the gears of Chinese criminal justice often turn slowly when processing ESS cases. This is because these cases are commonly classified as either “complex” or “sensitive” and sometimes require additional investigation to overcome issues of insufficient evidence. For example, Li Nanhang and Liu Xianbin were arrested in May and July of 2010, respectively, but were not convicted until March 2011.

    Figure 2. Change in Number of Persons per Case, 1999-2011

    On average, there were no more than 600 ESS arrests or indictments per year between 1998 and 2007. These figures more than doubled in 2008 due in large part to a crackdown on Tibetans and Uyghurs—often the targets of “splittism” charges—particularly after the uprising in Lhasa in March 2008, and more generalized efforts to ensure that dissenting voices did not tarnish the Beijing Olympics.

    * Note: There is also a chance that there was an increase in the number of trials for dereliction of military duty, which Dui Hua believes China Law Yearbook lumps together with ESS crimes under the category “other,” but such an increase would be unlikely to have much impact on the whole. Although trial statistics are not disaggregated, indictment statistics have consistently indicated that dereliction of military duty accounts for less than 1 percent of indictments when placed in a separate category with only ESS. ^

  • Establishing a Reporting System for Important Prisoners

    Ministry of Justice Prison Administration Bureau
    Notice on Establishing a Reporting System for Important Prisoners

    April 24, 1995

    [95] Si Yu Zi No. 60

    In recent years, prisons in all areas have imprisoned a number of important prisoners with a relatively large influence. In order to accurately and in a timely manner deal with the reform of these important prisoners by the prison administration, to strengthen supervision over this type of prisoner, and to coordinate with the international struggle over human rights, it has been decided to establish a reporting system for imprisoned important prisoners. The relevant points regarding this notice are as follows:
    I. The following prisoners are considered important prisoners:
    1. Party and government leading cadres at the level of deputy director of a provincial bureau (currently serving office) or higher;
    2. Former members of the National People’s Congress (NPC) or Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC) at the national, provincial, or autonomous region level or members of the NPC or CPPCC of municipalities under the jurisdiction of the central government; responsible persons formerly belonging to provincial level or higher democratic party organizations; direct relations of provincial or department level or higher party and government leading cadres; and well-known persons with important influence in the fields of science and technology, the arts, sports, health, or religion.
    3. On the basis of written approval by the leadership, prisoners whose cases are being directly handled by either the central authorities or provincial, autonomous region, or municipal political and legal departments;
    4. Prisoners belonging to the “two disturbances”[*] and “two illegal”[**] types of cases who have received international attention;
    5. Prisoners who encourage ethnic splittism and take part in riots;
    6. Former clergy, underground bishops, and other similar prisoners;
    7. Prisoners with foreign passports who have been sentenced for counterrevolution;
    8. Prisoners whose cases have been reported in central-authority-level newspapers and magazines, or prisoners who have had a large influence either inside or outside of the country.
    II. Within three days of admitting an important prisoner, prisons should fill out an “Important Prisoner Registration Form” on the prisoner’s basic situation (with a copy of the people’s court verdict attached) and send the report to the provincial prison administration bureau. After the provincial prison administration bureau receives the report, it should, in a timely manner, forward it to the Ministry of Justice Prison Administration Bureau (PAB). The circumstances of important prisoners whose sentences have been extended or reduced, who have been released on probation or medical parole, or who have been released upon completion of their sentences, should also be reported.
    III. If the prison administration bureaus of provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities under the jurisdiction of the central government want to set up a special file on important prisoners, they should assign a cadre with a certain understanding of policy and public affairs to manage the file. As for the circumstances of the important prisoners’ prison management, ideological development, physical health and so forth, reports should be submitted once per quarter. Any important situations that occur should be reported as necessary. Any letters or materials mailed from outside of the country to important prisoners need to be registered by the prison and reported to the prison administration bureau of the province, autonomous region, or municipality under the jurisdiction of the central government; according to the relevant regulations on the appropriate handling of such situations, they must be reported in a timely manner to the PAB. As for requests for information on the situation of important prisoners by the PAB, such information should be quickly and accurately reported. At the end of each year, all individual prison administration bureaus should write a summary of their work on the reform of important prisoners, and should forward their report to the PAB.
    IV. All individual prison organs must strengthen supervisory work directed at important prisoners in accordance with relevant regulations, tightly grasp [important prisoners’] ideological development, and be sure to manage in accordance with the law and emphasize policy.
    After receiving this notice, all localities are asked to faithfully implement and pay close attention to this work.
    Attachment: Important Prisoner Registration Form

    [*] Cases related to unrest (dongluan) and counterrevolutionary rioting (fangeming baoluan) that occurred throughout China in 1989.

    [**] Cases related to illegal groups and illegal publications.

    NameSexAgeRace
    BirthplaceAddress
    Former work unitPosition
    CrimeSentencing organ
    Date of verdictTerm of Sentence
    Where ImprisonedPeriod of detention
    State of health:
    Facts of crime committed:
    Remarks:
    Chinese Source(原文):
    监狱工作手册1993年4月-1997年12月,218-219页
    Jianyu Gongzuo Shouce (Prison Work Manual), 1993.4 – 1997.12, pp. 218-219.
    Click on icon to expand


    司法部监狱管理局关于建立重要罪犯报告制度的通知

    (1995年4月24日)

    [95]司狱字第60号

    近年来,各地监狱相继收押了一些影响较大的重要罪犯。为及时、准确地掌握这部分重要罪犯的监管改造情况,加强对此类罪犯的管理,配合国际人权斗争,决定建立监狱收押重要罪祀报告制度。现就有关问题通知如下:

    一、下列押犯属于重要罪犯:

    1. 原副厅局级(现职)以上的党政领导干部;
    2. 原全国人大代表、政协委员,省、自治区、直辖市人大代表、政协委员;原省级以上民主党派组织的负责人;省、部级以上党政领导干部的直系亲属;科技、艺术、体育、卫生、宗教界等有重要影响的知名人士。
    3. 根据领导批示,中央及各省、自治区、直辖市政法部门直接承办案件中的罪犯。
    4. ” 两乱” 、”两非”案犯中国际上关注的罪犯;
    5. 鼓吹民族分裂主义、参与骚乱的罪犯;
    6. 原神职人员、地下主教等罪犯;
    7. 以反革命罪判刑的外国籍罪犯;
    8. 中央级报刊曾予报道、在国内外有重大影响的案件中的罪犯。

    二、各监狱收押重要罪犯后,应在3天内将罪犯的基本情况按《重要罪犯登记表》填写后(附人民法院判决书复印件)报省(自治区、直辖市)监狱管理局;各地监狱管理局接到报告后应及时上报司法部监狱管理局。现已在押尚未上报的重要罪犯情况,请各地监狱管理局在1995 年 5 月31 日前补报司法部监狱管理局。重要罪犯被加刑或减刑、假释、保外就医及刑满释放的情况应随时报告。

    三、各省、自治区、直辖市监狱管理局要设立重要罪犯专卷,指定有一定政策、业务水平的同志专门管理。对重要罪犯的监管、思想动态、身体状等方面情况,要每季度末上报一次;遇到重要情况要随时报告;对境外寄给重要罪犯的信件、物品,监狱要进行登记,并报告省、自治区、直辖市监狱管理局,按有关规定妥善处理,必要时上报司法部监狱管理局。对司法部监狱管理局要求查询的重要罪犯情况,要迅速、准确地核查上事;每年底,各地监狱管理局要对监管改造重要罪犯的工作进行总结,并上报部监狱管理局。

    四、各地监狱机关要按有关规定加强对重要罪犯的监管工作,密切掌握其思想动态,在管理上注意依法管理,讲究政策。

    请各地接此通知后,认真贯彻落实,将此项工作抓紧抓好。

    附: (重要罪犯登记表〉

    姓名性别年龄民族
    籍贵住址
    原工作单位职务
    罪名审判机关
    判决时间刑期起止
    关押单位收押时间
    身体状况:
    犯罪事实:
    备注:


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  • State Security Stats Highlight Ethnic Unrest, Lack of Names

    Growth in the number of “endangering state security” (ESS) trials concluded in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region (Xinjiang) provides evidence of a widespread crackdown on ethnic Uyghurs. The number of trials for the category of crimes often used to suppress speech, association, and assembly increased 10.11 percent year-on-year in 2011, up from 376 trials in 2010, according to the annual work report of courts in the region. (Note: There is not a one-to-one ratio of trials to defendants. Court data from 1998 through 2003 show that, for ESS crimes, there was an average of more than three defendants per trial in Xinjiang.)
     
    In 2009, ethnic riots in Urumqi—during which the Chinese government says 197 people were killed—coincided with a more than 60 percent jump in the number of ESS trials concluded in Xinjiang. In 2011, tensions between Uyghurs, a Turkic-speaking Muslim ethnic group, and Han Chinese, China’s ethnic majority, continued to precipitate smaller scale protests and culminated in a regional “Religious Strike Hard Campaign” beginning on November 20. The campaign will continue until February 22, 2012, and local authorities intend to recruit 8,000 police officers to join “the auxiliary police and militia” in, among other things, “cracking down on illegal religious activities.”
     
    The increase in ESS trials in Xinjiang also suggests that nationwide figures grew during the period. In 2009 and 2010, the change in the number of ESS trials in Xinjiang was indicative of nationwide trends (see chart below) because so many ESS trials occur in the region. Official statistics show that more than half of ESS trials (of first instance) took place in Xinjiang from 1998 through 2003.
    Note: *For nationwide data, the number of trials includes both ESS and dereliction of duty, which is believed to account for less than 1 percent of the total figure. 

    Source: National statistics are trials of first instance compiled from China Law Yearbooks (中国法律年鉴). Xinjiang statistics are not disaggregated by trials of first and second instance and are from annual court work reports and Xinjiang High People’s Court President
    Rozi Ismail.
    Court work reports come out during regional and provincial people’s congresses in January, but not all of them are made public. Those that are tend not to include ESS data but instead state generally that fighting ESS is a key aspect in achieving the goal of stability. Xinjiang and Sichuan were the only regions found to have stand-alone ESS data in their most recent reports. National figures for 2011 are expected to be reported to the National People’s Congress in March, including the number of indictments and arrests, and in China Law Yearbook in September, including the number of trials.
     
    Uyghur Activism
     
    It bears repeating that Xinjiang has been known to account for over 50 percent of China’s ESS trials yet makes up less than 2 percent of China’s population. The obvious question is: Why? The answer, suggested by regional government policies and anecdotal evidence, is Uyghur activism in response to government restrictions on religious and cultural activities and state-sponsored inward migration of Han Chinese. While Han Chinese account for more than 91 percent of China’s population, Uyghurs make up about 40 percent of Xinjiang’s.
     
    In 2010, RFA reported on five Uyghurs convicted of ESS in Xinjiang, with sentences ranging from three years’ to life imprisonment. All were Uyghurs involved in non-violent online activism or speaking to foreign media.
     
    The Chinese government confirmed two of the cases. Gheyret Niyaz was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for “inciting splittism.” RFA reported that Niyaz was persecuted for giving interviews to the foreign media about the Urumqi riots. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Niyaz was still awaiting the verdict of his appeal 16 months after the announcement of his original sentence.
     
    Dilshat Parhat was also convicted of inciting splittism. He was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. RFA reported that he maintained a Uyghur website and was detained on suspicion of online activism.
     
    “Splittism” and “inciting splittism” are believed to account for many, if not most, of the ESS cases in Xinjiang. In 2011, Dui Hua uncovered no information on individuals confirmed to be convicted on ESS charges in the region. One possible individual, however, is 25-year-old Musa Muhamad, who according to an RFA report, was sentenced to 17 years’ imprisonment in a closed trial in October. The charges against him are unclear, but Muhamad is one of 20 Uyghur asylum-seekers who fled to Cambodia following the Urumqi riots in July 2009 and was deported back to China in December 2009 before a Cambodian visit by Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping. Although the circumstances of Muhamad’s case are unknown, if he was involved in the riots, even just by talking about them to the wrong people, he may well have faced charges of splittism.
     
    Sichuan: Self-Immolation as Murder
     
    Sichuan Province is home to two Tibetan autonomous prefectures, Aba (Ngaba) and Ganzi (Kardze), in which ethnic Tibetans account for about 55 and 78 percent of the populations, respectively. Tibetan areas of Sichuan have seen widespread unrest since August 2007, and government repression of ethnic Tibetans has heightened since the Lhasa riots left at least 19 people dead (according to a Chinese government tally) in the Tibetan Autonomous Region in March 2008. In 2011, ethnic unrest continued and 12 Tibetan self-immolations were reported, 11 of which occurred in Sichuan.
     
    Unlike Xinjiang, however, ethnic unrest has not necessarily resulted in a high number of ESS trials in Sichuan. According to the annual work report of the Sichuan High People’s Court, there were 11 ESS trials concluded in the province in 2011. Moreover, cases relating to the immolations may not be among them. According to the report, three people detained in connection with the March 16 immolation of Phuntsog, a monk in his early 20s, were not charged with ESS, but with murder.
     
    As is the case in Xinjiang, information on individual cases is limited. For 2011, the only two people known to be convicted of ESS in Sichuan are Han Chinese dissidents Liu Xianbin (刘贤斌) and Chen Wei (陈卫). They were convicted of inciting subversion and are serving 10 and 9 year sentences, respectively, for writing articles critical of the Chinese government. Unofficial media reports have named a dozen Tibetans whose actions put them at risk of ESS conviction last year, but as indicated by the self-immolation cases mentioned above, they may not be included in ESS tallies and may instead face other criminal charges or administrative punishments like reeducation through labor. One of these question-mark cases is Jolep Dawa, a teacher and editor of a monthly Tibetan-language magazine reportedly sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for unknown charges.
     
    The identities of the people convicted in the nine remaining cases of endangering state security in Sichuan and all 414 cases in Xinjiang, to most of us, remain a mystery. What is clear, however, is the need for greater transparency in the criminal justice system in general and trials that involve fundamental freedoms of speech, association, and assembly in particular.
  • State Security Indictments Remain at Historic Highs

    Criminal justice statistics published in the 2011 China Law Yearbook (中国法律年鉴) offer more evidence of the heavy security crackdown that has been underway in China since 2008.
     
    According to included Supreme People’s Court data, Chinese courts tried approximately 670 cases involving “endangering state security” (ESS) charges in trials of the first instance in 2010, down only slightly from the previous year’s high of nearly 698. (As in previous years, court statistics published in the yearbook combine the number of ESS trials with trials for “dereliction of duty by military personnel” in a category simply labeled “other.” Based on consideration of additional data, however, Dui Hua can say with a high degree of confidence that 99 percent of trials covered in this “other” category are ESS cases.)
     
    During the decade from 1998—the first full year after ESS crimes were included in the criminal code—through 2007, courts averaged only 289, or 132 percent fewer, ESS trials per year.
     
    Concluded Endangering State Security Trials, 1998‒2010
    Note: Limited to trials of first instance. Source: China Law Yearbooks, Dui Hua
    Chinese authorities use ESS crimes in their effort to suppress political dissent in the name of protecting national security. Provincial statistics and Dui Hua’s database of political prisoners indicate that subversion, “splittism,” and incitement are the chief offenses for which individuals are charged with ESS.
     
    Meanwhile, statistics from the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) continue to show that authorities arrested and prosecuted individuals on ESS charges at historically high levels, with 1,045 arrests approved for ESS in 2010, and 1,223 individuals indicted. Both figures slightly exceed estimates Dui Hua produced earlier this year using incomplete data that the SPP included in its report to the National People’s Congress.
    Individuals Indicted for Endangering State Security, 1998‒2010
    Note: Limited to trials of first instance. Source: China Law Yearbooks, Dui Hua

     

    Trends in yearbook data clearly show that endangering state security has become a major focus of China’s law enforcement system since 2008, a period that has seen a marked emphasis on stability due to the Beijing Olympics; high-profile commemorations such as the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China; and increased levels of ethnic unrest, exemplified in part by the violence that broke out in Lhasa in 2008 and Urumchi in 2009.
     
    In January 2011, the president of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang) High People’s Court announced that courts there concluded 376 trials for ESS offenses in 2010. If this figure is limited to first-instance trials, Xinjiang would account for more than half of all ESS trials reported in China for that year. While the scope of this data remains unclear, other evidence indicates that the majority of ESS trials are brought against ethnic minorities, many of whom with roots in Xinjiang and Tibet.
     
    For example, of the 36 ESS cases recorded in Dui Hua’s prisoner database for 2010, only three involve Han Chinese. Though stark, this data point also clearly demonstrates the scarcity of reliable information available on ESS cases.
     
    While providing information on the number of trials, the 2011 yearbook does not include the number of individuals convicted of endangering state security. SPP data show that, on average, ESS cases involve more individuals than criminal cases taken as a whole—the overall ratio of individuals per criminal indictment has remained consistent at around 1.5 since 1998 versus roughly 2.5 individuals per ESS indictment during the same period and nearly 3.0 individuals per ESS indictment between 2008 and 2010, but there is too much variation in the data to produce meaningful estimates of the number of people convicted.
     
    Although the exact number of ESS convictions remains a mystery, it seems evident that heightened state security concerns are here to stay. China’s recent white paper on peaceful development included the political system as one of its “core interests,” a measure that reinforces the close identity between Communist Party rule and Chinese national security. Given that popular uprisings have toppled authoritarian rulers in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and the heightened anxiety surrounding the leadership transition expected during China’s 18th Party Congress in 2012, there is little to suggest any imminent political reform of the decades-old policy of ensuring “stability above all else.”
  • Of Spies and Dissidents

    Could it be that individuals convicted of espionage have higher rates of clemency than people convicted of non-violent speech and association?
    A recent communication from a Chinese government source indicates that the alleged leader of a group of British spies operating in Hong Kong in the 1990s, Wei Pingyuan (魏平原), has had his life sentence commuted and prison sentence reduced. After two sentence reductions totaling two-and-a-half years, he is now due for release on February 20, 2025.Wei worked on Taiwan affairs for Xinhua in the 1990s before resigning and becoming a naturalized Briton. He was detained while on a business trip to Guangdong Province in late 2003. At a closed trial in Guangzhou in November 2004, Wei was convicted of receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars from British intelligence for confidential communications between Chinese officials in Beijing and Hong Kong.

    One of the most senior Chinese officials based in Hong Kong before the territory’s reversion to China in 1997, Cai Xiaohong (蔡小洪), was convicted along with Wei and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Cai Xiaohong is the former secretary general of China’s Central Liaison Office and the son of former Justice Minister Cai Cheng (蔡诚). Cai Xiaohong received a 20-month sentence reduction in 2007 and was under consideration for medical parole when he was transferred to a Beijing prison in early 2009 to be closer to his ailing father. (On September 2, 2009, at the age of 82, Cai Cheng died proclaiming his son’s innocence.)

    Wei allegedly recruited Cai Xiaohong, leading to his harsher sentence. Sources also claim that he refused to cooperate with interrogators, but recent acts of clemency may indicate that he has since acknowledged the court’s verdict.

    Clemency for Guangdong, Fujian Agents
    Wei Pingyuan’s treatment is among the latest examples of clemency granted by Guangdong courts to individuals convicted of espionage and trafficking in state secrets. Chen Yulin (陈瑜琳), another British citizen and former Xinhua Foreign Affairs Department employee, was convicted of espionage and sentenced to life imprisonment in March 2004. His sentence was commuted to a fixed term in August 2007 and reduced by 18 months in June 2009. Sun Yuren (孙郁人), detained on suspicion of spying for Taiwan, was released from Guangdong’s Meizhou Prison on January 4, 2011. After three reductions, Sun served about two thirds of his initial 10-year sentence. High-profile sentence reductions for alleged American spy David Dong Wei and recently released Hong Kong scholar Xu Zerong also occurred in 2010 and 2011.In a 2005 response to a list of cases of concern submitted by Dui Hua, 17 of 28 endangering state security (ESS) prisoners who received clemency were convicted of espionage or providing intelligence outside of the country. A majority of these prisoners were from Fujian Province. Follow-up communication in late 2010 revealed that several of these prisoners have received additional sentence reductions, including six given sentences of seven years or more for spying for Taiwan.

    Among the most important acts of clemency for a state secrets trafficker in recent years is the early release of Jin Zhangqin (金章嵚). After retiring as an archivist for the Fujian provincial government, Jin served as a book agent for the University Services Center of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Jin was detained on suspicion of trafficking state secrets in May 2003 and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment and three years’ deprivation of political rights in January 2004. He was released early in September 2010 after a 22-month sentence reduction for good behavior in 2007 and a one-year sentence reduction in 2010.

    Soft on “Spies,” Tough on Dissidents

    The number of sentence reductions for prisoners convicted of espionage and supplying foreign entities with state secrets contrasts sharply with that of prisoners convicted of speech and association offenses (subversion, splittism, and their incitement). A review of records in Dui Hua’s prisoner database—which catalogues about 24,000 cases—and available official statistics suggests that, in recent years, the majority of ESS arrests and trials have been for speech and association offenses. Despite making up the bulk of known ESS cases, speech and association prisoners are rarely granted clemency. There has not been a single known act of clemency for this group of prisoners since September 2009, when Jiangsu-based Internet essayist and political organizer Huang Jinqiu (黄金秋) and Sichuan labor activist Wang Sen (王森) were given 23-month and 10-month reductions, respectively.

    Dui Hua research indicates that prisoners convicted of ESS have lower rates of sentence reduction and parole than the general prison population, for which the rate is about 30 percent. Within the ESS category, it seems that clemency is more common for individuals convicted of espionage—a crime most countries consider the greatest threat to national security—than for those convicted of non-violent speech and association. A number of factors may be involved here: discrepancies in information disclosure, differences in average lengths of sentences, official clout, admission of guilt, or individual circumstances.

    What may also be at play is systemic prejudice. One official with whom Dui Hua has worked for many years acknowledged Dui Hua’s concern that “spies” had better access to clemency than dissidents by noting that only prisoners considered not to be a “threat to society” are eligible for parole. He stated that once out of jail spies can’t go on spying, while dissidents can continue stirring dissent. One wonders if that means that, for the sake of stability, citizens are better off selling out their country than trying to change it.

  • Broad Changes to China’s Criminal Law Enacted

    Last Friday, China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) approved an amendment including 50 revisions to the Criminal Law of the PRC by a 139-7 vote (with 11 abstentions). This was the eighth time that China has made changes to its criminal code since a complete overhaul in 1997.The most newsworthy part of the amendment was the removal of the death penalty as punishment for 13 offenses, bringing the total number of crimes eligible for capital punishment to 55. As Dui Hua has noted before, this is unlikely to bring about a significant reduction in the number of individuals executed each year in China, as capital punishment has rarely, if ever, been imposed for most of the affected offenses. Nevertheless, the move is a concrete step signaling China’s intention to move towards further reduction in the use of the death penalty.

    Over the past six months, the Chinese press and the Internet community have paid a great deal of attention to the proposed changes to the number of capital crimes, as well as a related proposal to exempt most offenders over the age of 75 from the death penalty. Some of the other changes made to specific provisions received little to no coverage prior to their announcement last week.

    New Threats to State Security?

    For the first time, changes were made to crimes falling under the category of “endangering state security” (ESS). The change of the greatest potential significance was made to Article 107, which prohibits funding organizations or individuals that carry out criminal activities that endanger state security. The previous statute singled out those who gave funding to “domestic organizations or individuals,” but the amendment removes this restriction.

    Speaking to reporters after the amendment’s passage was announced, Wang Shangxin, a member of the NPCSC Legal Affairs Committee, explained:

    China’s economic situation has changed, and the criminal situation has changed as well such that domestic organizations or individuals are supporting foreign individuals to commit acts that endanger the national security of the PRC. . . . After this revision of the criminal law provision, it doesn’t matter whether the organization or individual is foreign or domestic: as long as one funds others to commit the crimes of endangering state security specified in the criminal statute, that act will be subject to prosecution.

    It is not entirely clear what this change will mean in practice. Dui Hua is aware of only two previous cases in which individuals have been convicted under Article 107. In 1999, a naturalized Spanish national named Wang Ce was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment in Zhejiang for giving US$1,000 to Wang Youcai, one of the founders of the China Democracy Party. The following year, another CDP member named Chen Zhonghe, the head of the party’s Hubei branch, was sentenced to seven years in prison for subversion and funding criminal activities that endanger state security, according to an official Chinese response provided to Dui Hua in September 2003.

    Both of these cases involved an organization whose principal members were charged with subversion and convicted in court. How, under the new provision, will “organizations or individuals that commit acts endangering state security” be identified? Will an administrative designation by, for example, the Ministry of Public Security be sufficient and, if so, will such organizations be identified publicly in order to help people avoid violating the law? The recent change potentially expands the range of circumstances in which Article 107 can be applied, but it is too soon to tell whether that means it will necessarily be easier to apply.

    “Pocket Crimes” and Court-Ordered Injunctions

    Several other changes were made to provisions covering specific offenses, altering either the definition of an offense or the range of punishment applicable. One example of the latter case is Article 293, the crime of “creating a serious disturbance.” Heir to the old crime of “hooliganism,” Article 293 has been criticized as a “pocket crime”—meaning that because of its vague definition “anything can be stuffed into it.” A number of persistent petitioners have been convicted of “creating a serious disturbance,” among them the food-safety activist Zhao Lianhai. Now, in a change that appears specifically targeted at those who petition en masse, the maximum sentence for Article 293 has been increased from five to 10 years for “gathering others on numerous occasions to commit the crime.”

    There has been an elaboration of provisions governing the punishments of “public surveillance (guanzhi, also known as “control”) and suspended prison terms. Offenders sentenced to these punishments may now, based on the circumstances of the crime, also be prohibited from participating in designated events, entering designated areas or locations, or making contact with designated individuals during the period of the sentence (Articles 38(2) and 72). Presumably, such injunctions would be imposed by the court at the time of sentencing and enforced by “community corrections” agencies (see below).

    “Severity Combined with Lenience”

    Besides making changes to specific offenses, many of the revisions also affect general provisions covering application of the criminal law. The net impact of these provisions is mixed, following the principle of “severity combined with lenience.” On the one hand, courts have been given authority to place restrictions on sentence reduction for the most serious offenders; individuals originally sentenced to life imprisonment or suspended death sentences will be obliged to serve longer prison terms before they can be released through parole (Article 81); and the maximum term for concurrently applied sentences has been raised from 20 to 25 years (Article 69).

    On the other hand, the law now requires lenient treatment of offenders aged 75 and older, and judges have been given more specific instructions about how “lenient punishment” should be applied in sentencing (Articles 17 and 49). Individuals convicted of minor offenses (subject to punishment of five years’ imprisonment or less) as juveniles are exempted from the requirement to notify employers of their criminal record (Article 100). Parole, as well as the punishments of public surveillance and suspended prison sentences, is to be supervised by “community corrections” agencies, rather than local police stations (Articles 38, 76, and 85).

    On the subject of this last provision, Lang Sheng, deputy chairman of the NPCSC Legal Affairs Committee, acknowledged that there had been debate over whether less-developed parts of China had sufficient time to develop community corrections institutions, which have been operating on a trial basis in selected locations for many years. He insisted, however, that concerted direction from the central government would ensure that these new provisions would be able to be instituted nationwide by the time the changes to the Criminal Law take effect on May 1.

  • Broad Changes to China’s Criminal Law Enacted

    Last Friday, China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) approved an amendment including 50 revisions to the Criminal Law of the PRC by a 139-7 vote (with 11 abstentions). This was the eighth time that China has made changes to its criminal code since a complete overhaul in 1997.

    The most newsworthy part of the amendment was the removal of the death penalty as punishment for 13 offenses, bringing the total number of crimes eligible for capital punishment to 55. As Dui Hua has noted before, this is unlikely to bring about a significant reduction in the number of individuals executed each year in China, as capital punishment has rarely, if ever, been imposed for most of the affected offenses. Nevertheless, the move is a concrete step signaling China’s intention to move towards further reduction in the use of the death penalty.

    Over the past six months, the Chinese press and the Internet community have paid a great deal of attention to the proposed changes to the number of capital crimes, as well as a related proposal to exempt most offenders over the age of 75 from the death penalty. Some of the other changes made to specific provisions received little to no coverage prior to their announcement last week.

    New Threats to State Security?

    For the first time, changes were made to crimes falling under the category of “endangering state security” (ESS). The change of the greatest potential significance was made to Article 107, which prohibits funding organizations or individuals that carry out criminal activities that endanger state security. The previous statute singled out those who gave funding to “domestic organizations or individuals,” but the amendment removes this restriction.

    Speaking to reporters after the amendment’s passage was announced, Wang Shangxin, a member of the NPCSC Legal Affairs Committee, explained:

    China’s economic situation has changed, and the criminal situation has changed as well such that domestic organizations or individuals are supporting foreign individuals to commit acts that endanger the national security of the PRC. . . . After this revision of the criminal law provision, it doesn’t matter whether the organization or individual is foreign or domestic: as long as one funds others to commit the crimes of endangering state security specified in the criminal statute, that act will be subject to prosecution.

    It is not entirely clear what this change will mean in practice. Dui Hua is aware of only two previous cases in which individuals have been convicted under Article 107. In 1999, a naturalized Spanish national named Wang Ce was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment in Zhejiang for giving US$1,000 to Wang Youcai, one of the founders of the China Democracy Party. The following year, another CDP member named Chen Zhonghe, the head of the party’s Hubei branch, was sentenced to seven years in prison for subversion and funding criminal activities that endanger state security, according to an official Chinese response provided to Dui Hua in September 2003.

    Both of these cases involved an organization whose principal members were charged with subversion and convicted in court. How, under the new provision, will “organizations or individuals that commit acts endangering state security” be identified? Will an administrative designation by, for example, the Ministry of Public Security be sufficient and, if so, will such organizations be identified publicly in order to help people avoid violating the law? The recent change potentially expands the range of circumstances in which Article 107 can be applied, but it is too soon to tell whether that means it will necessarily be easier to apply.

    “Pocket Crimes” and Court-Ordered Injunctions

    Several other changes were made to provisions covering specific offenses, altering either the definition of an offense or the range of punishment applicable. One example of the latter case is Article 293, the crime of “creating a serious disturbance.” Heir to the old crime of “hooliganism,” Article 293 has been criticized as a “pocket crime”—meaning that because of its vague definition “anything can be stuffed into it.” A number of persistent petitioners have been convicted of “creating a serious disturbance,” among them the food-safety activist Zhao Lianhai. Now, in a change that appears specifically targeted at those who petition en masse, the maximum sentence for Article 293 has been increased from five to 10 years for “gathering others on numerous occasions to commit the crime.”

    There has been an elaboration of provisions governing the punishments of “public surveillance (guanzhi, also known as “control”) and suspended prison terms. Offenders sentenced to these punishments may now, based on the circumstances of the crime, also be prohibited from participating in designated events, entering designated areas or locations, or making contact with designated individuals during the period of the sentence (Articles 38(2) and 72). Presumably, such injunctions would be imposed by the court at the time of sentencing and enforced by “community corrections” agencies (see below).

    “Severity Combined with Lenience”

    Besides making changes to specific offenses, many of the revisions also affect general provisions covering application of the criminal law. The net impact of these provisions is mixed, following the principle of “severity combined with lenience.” On the one hand, courts have been given authority to place restrictions on sentence reduction for the most serious offenders; individuals originally sentenced to life imprisonment or suspended death sentences will be obliged to serve longer prison terms before they can be released through parole (Article 81); and the maximum term for concurrently applied sentences has been raised from 20 to 25 years (Article 69).

    On the other hand, the law now requires lenient treatment of offenders aged 75 and older, and judges have been given more specific instructions about how “lenient punishment” should be applied in sentencing (Articles 17 and 49). Individuals convicted of minor offenses (subject to punishment of five years’ imprisonment or less) as juveniles are exempted from the requirement to notify employers of their criminal record (Article 100). Parole, as well as the punishments of public surveillance and suspended prison sentences, is to be supervised by “community corrections” agencies, rather than local police stations (Articles 38, 76, and 85).

    On the subject of this last provision, Lang Sheng, deputy chairman of the NPCSC Legal Affairs Committee, acknowledged that there had been debate over whether less-developed parts of China had sufficient time to develop community corrections institutions, which have been operating on a trial basis in selected locations for many years. He insisted, however, that concerted direction from the central government would ensure that these new provisions would be able to be instituted nationwide by the time the changes to the Criminal Law take effect on May 1.

  • Xinjiang Court Offers First Indicator of State Security Stats for 2010

    One of the ways we gauge the human rights situation in China is to look at the numbers of arrests and prosecutions for “endangering state security” (ESS) during the previous year. To this end, we pay close attention to statistics typically included by the heads of the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate during the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress in March. Close analysis of these figures over many years give us a perspective from which we can identify trends and make judgments about whether things are getting more or less restrictive in China.An early indication of which direction those trends might be heading comes from statements made by the president of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Higher People’s Court, Rozi Ismail. According to the Xinhua News Agency, on January 16 Mr. Ismail announced that courts in the XUAR concluded 376 trials for ESS in 2010. This reflects a 16 percent drop compared to the 437 cases concluded in 2009 but remains more than 30 percent above the number reported in 2008. It is assumed that a crackdown against “splittism” following the deadly riots in Urumqi on July 5, 2009, is primarily responsible for the increase in ESS cases over the past two years.

    In its coverage of the speech, the Reuters news agency erroneously announced that 376 defendants had been tried on ESS charges in 2010. In fact, the number of defendants is likely to be much higher. Court figures from the XUAR in the period from 1998 to 2003 show that there were more than three defendants, on average, in ESS cases. So, it is very likely that XUAR courts tried more than 1,000 defendants for ESS in 2010—and it is safe to conclude that the overwhelming majority were convicted.

    Since the XUAR has historically accounted for around half of all ESS trials nationwide, the drop reported last weekend suggests that we can expect that 2010 continued to show a modest decline in the total number of ESS trials in China after reaching historic highs in 2008. To get a sense of just how much of a decline, though, we shall have to await the release of fuller statistics in March.

  • Supreme People’s Court “Work Report” Indicates More Trials, Heavier Sentences for Endangering State Security in 2009

    On July 13, China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued its annual “work report” for 2009, the first time such a report has been presented to the public. Chinese media have hailed the report’s contribution towards promoting greater transparency and public oversight for China’s courts. But it is hard to see—at least as far as criminal justice is concerned—just how much more substantive information was provided in this report than is normally provided, for example, in the report of the SPC president presented at the annual session of the National People’s Congress each March.The latest report, however, is not without its revelations. It provides detailed statistics about criminal adjudications that were not released in March, offering insights into Chinese courts’ handling of various categories of criminal offenses. The report shows that the number of first-instance trials concluded in cases involving charges of “endangering state security” (ESS) rose to around 760 in 2009, compared to approximately 460 the previous year.

    (The figures above are estimates. The report only lists crime category breakdowns as percentages of the total number of cases adjudicated and—following the court’s practice—the category “other” includes ESS cases and also a very small number of trials for “dereliction of duty by military personnel.”)

    The figures in the report represent only the number of ESS cases, not the number of individuals tried in those cases. Data from China’s law-enforcement bodies over the past several years show an average of 1.6 defendants for each criminal trial in China. But the same data also suggests a much higher average number of defendants for ESS cases—at least two defendants per case. This would mean more than 1,500 defendants tried—and almost certainly convicted—on ESS charges in 2009. (By contrast, in 2004 the reported number convicted on ESS charges was around 360.)

    Such figures for ESS trials are consistent with previously reported data for arrests and indictments. According to statistics made public by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, China indicted more than 1,400 individuals for ESS in 2008, and another estimated 1,000 were indicted in 2009.

    As noted in previous discussions of China’s soaring arrests and indictments for ESS over recent years, it is believed that trials for alleged “splittist” activities by Uyghurs and Tibetans contributed significantly to the large increases in 2009. In January 2010, the president of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Higher People’s Court reported a 63 percent increase in ESS trials in the region for 2009 compared to 2008. From 1998 through 2003, more than half of all ESS trials in China took place in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, according to statistics published in the Xinjiang Yearbook. During the same period, each ESS trial in Xinjiang included more than three defendants, on average.

    One other remarkable item in the recent SPC report is the statement that the proportion of individuals charged with ESS who received heavy sentences—meaning imprisonment of five years or more, life imprisonment, or a death sentence (including suspended death sentence)—rose by 20 percent in 2009.

    Judged purely on the major social events that have taken place in the last two years—a confluence of important dates, sensitive anniversaries, and serious ethnic unrest among Tibetans and Uyghurs—the increased use of heavier sentences is not unexpected. However, when viewed in the larger context of Chinese criminal justice over the last two decades, in which the historical trend has been toward the use of lighter sentences, an increase of this magnitude is startling. Court statistics show that from 1988 through 1992, the proportion of heavy sentences handed down in all criminal cases was 34.9 percent; the percentage rose to 40.8 percent in the period from 1992 through 1996 before declining, first to 25 percent from 1997 through 2002 and then to 18.2 percent from 2003 through 2007. In 2008 and 2009, heavy sentences were handed down in only around 16 percent of cases.

    The available data suggest, however, that heavy sentences are already handed down in ESS cases at a much higher-than-average rate. In 2002 and 2004—years in which detailed data about criminal adjudications were published—heavy sentences were handed down to more than 50 percent of individuals convicted for ESS. By contrast, the overall proportion of convicted criminals given heavy sentences was around 23 percent in those years.

    Though the data reported do not allow for precise analyses, this and previous reports all point towards an unquestionable trend over recent years: Chinese citizens are being imprisoned on state security charges in larger numbers and for longer periods of time than at any point in recent history.

    Related Links:

    •    Official Data Show State Security Arrests, Prosecutions Exceeded 1,000 in 2009, March 12, 2010

    •    “Endangering State Security” Arrests, Prosecutions Jumped in 2008, More High Numbers Expected for 2009, Dialogue (Winter 2010)

  • Chinese Courts’ Spring Cleaning: Flurry of ESS Case Verdicts, Increase in Executions Just Before New Year

    Throughout China, people are busily preparing for the Lunar New Year (or Spring Festival). A week-long national holiday commences on Saturday, February 13, and millions of Chinese are returning home to spend the vacation with their families. Traditionally, public holidays in China are also busy periods for the administration of justice, with court actions ranging from the benevolent—widespread clemency shown to prisoners prior to Spring Festival or National Day in October—to the most punitive: there tends to be an increase in executions just before these very same events.

    This year, Chinese courts appear to be using the weeks leading up to Spring Festival to do some “spring cleaning,” making an extra effort to clear their dockets before the holiday, particularly for some major cases involving “endangering state security” (ESS) crimes.

    On Monday in Chengdu, Sichuan, the provincial court rejected the appeal of veteran rights activist Huang Qi (黃琦), who was sentenced to three years last November for “illegal possession of state secrets.” Also in Chengdu, environmental activist Tan Zuoren (谭作人), who has been waiting for the court’s decision since his trial for “inciting subversion” opened last August, was sentenced on Tuesday to five years in prison in connection with items he wrote to commemorate the June Fourth protest in Beijing (though Tan’s activism after the Sichuan earthquake may well have led to his arrest). On Wednesday, the Shenzhen Intermediate Court sentenced 20-year-old Xue Mingkai (薛明凯) to 18 months for subversion after he joined the outlawed “China Democracy Party.” And on Thursday, the Beijing Higher People’s Court rejected the appeal of Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波), sentenced to 11 years on Christmas Day on charges of inciting subversion stemming from a series of essays critical of Chinese leadership and his role in drafting “Charter 08.”

    The “spring cleaning” has not been limited to high-profile ESS trials. In recent weeks, there has been a significant increase in the number of executions reported in the Chinese press. During the two-week period from January 23 to February 5, Dui Hua researchers reviewed official Chinese media reports documenting the execution of at least 61 individuals. This is more than double the average, two-week rate of execution reported in the Chinese media over the last three months.
    Of course, many executions in China are not reported, and it is problematic to rely solely on media accounts to estimate the number of executions. Dui Hua bases its estimates in part on sources within the Chinese government who take into account executions which are not publicized. (For example, Dui Hua estimated that about 6,000 executions took place in China in 2007; by contrast, Amnesty International’s estimate, based on confirmed reports, released a figure of at least 470 for that year.) Under these circumstances, any change in the frequency or volume of execution reports is significant.
    To those who regularly follow criminal justice in China, it is tempting to ascribe a deep political explanation to sharp changes in the rate and severity of punishment. One might look at this string of convictions and flurry of executions as evidence of a sudden hardening against perceived threats to stability in China. But considering the season, another explanation comes to mind: perhaps judges and prosecutors—like everyone else in China preparing for the New Year—want to settle accounts and clear away unpleasant business before going on vacation.
  • Chinese State Security Arrests, Indictments Doubled in 2008

    Arrests and indictments for “endangering state security” (ESS) in China soared in 2008, more than doubling for the second time in three years, according to data made available by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) in its annual work report to the National People’s Congress (NPC) on March 10.While no figures for ESS were explicitly provided, data appended to the work report distributed at the annual plenary session of China’s legislature point unambiguously to such a rise. Based on those statistics, The Dui Hua Foundation estimates that last year more than 1,600 individuals were arrested and more than 1,300 individuals indicted on state security charges in China.

    Arrests and prosecutions for alleged “splittist” activities by Uyghurs and Tibetans are believed to have contributed significantly to the large increases in 2008. Security forces cracked down in Tibetan areas and Xinjiang following an uprising in Lhasa last March and numerous protests throughout the Tibetan plateau amid concerns that ethnic unrest and social instability would mar the Olympic Games held in Beijing last August.

    Close Tracking Makes Estimate Possible

    In 2007, Dui Hua called attention to the doubling of ESS arrests in 2006 over the previous year. Last year, the foundation used data announced in the SPP work report for 2007 to reveal another 23 percent increase in ESS arrests for that year. As early as January 2009, there were indications that arrests and prosecutions for ESS increased significantly in 2008. That month, an official spokesperson for the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People’s Procuratorate revealed that nearly 1,300 individuals were arrested for endangering state security in that region alone—compared to 742 for the entire country in 2007.

    The version of the SPP work report for 2008 that was distributed to NPC delegates, members of the media, and other observers included charts breaking down arrest and indictment totals by the crime categories as found in China’s criminal code. In these charts, the three smallest categories—ESS, “endangering national defense interests,” and “dereliction of duty by military personnel”—are combined in a category marked “Other.” When these totals are routinely reported in the China Law Yearbook, each category is listed separately. Looking at the data over time, one finds relative stability in the number of arrests and prosecutions made for endangering national defense interests and dereliction of duty by military personnel—meaning that most of the variance can be attributed to ESS cases.

    Analysis Yields Astonishing Results

    From 2004 to 2007, arrests for endangering national defense interests and dereliction of duty by military personnel remained at a fairly consistent rate of about 7 per 20,000 total arrests. (By contrast, arrests for ESS over this same period displayed considerable variation.) Assuming that this rate did not vary considerably in 2008, it would mean that Chinese law enforcement authorities arrested more than 1,620 individuals for ESS that year. This marks a 119 percent increase over 2007 and a 448 percent increase over the historic low reported in 2005. Similar calculations for indictments yield an estimate of 1,327 for ESS in 2008, a 114 percent increase over 2007 and a 280 percent increase over 2005.

    Corroboration of a doubling in arrests and indictments for ESS in 2008 can be seen in figures made public in the work report of China’s Supreme People’s Court, which shows that first-instance trials for ESS (and a small number of trials for dereliction of duty by military personnel) increased by more than 50 percent compared to 2007. Given that it routinely takes 12 months or longer to conclude ESS trials, one would expect to see a substantial proportion of the arrests and indictments in 2008 reflected in trials concluded in 2009. (Click on the chart below to view data on ESS arrests and indictments in China since 1998.)

    Dui Hua’s estimates for arrests and indictments for ESS in 2008 raise questions about the report from Xinjiang earlier this year. If, as reported, 1,295 individuals were arrested for ESS crimes in Xinjiang during the first 11 months of 2008, this would comprise 80 percent of Dui Hua’s estimated total, leaving roughly 330 arrested throughout the rest of the country—including Tibetan areas, where dozens, if not hundreds, are suspected of having been charged with ESS during the year. This number appears rather low.

    It is possible that the data reported nationally and the data for Xinjiang do not categorize ESS crimes the same way, with the Xinjiang total including cases of terrorism and other crimes that do not strictly fall under the category of ESS as defined by the criminal code. However, if uniform criteria are being used, it means either that Uyghurs and Tibetans represent an even larger proportion of ESS cases than previously believed or that Dui Hua’s estimate for the total number of arrests and indictments nationally is too conservative. Clarity on these questions will have to wait until the 2009 China Law Yearbook is published—assuming that Chinese authorities maintain a basic level of transparency of the criminal justice system by continuing to report specific figures for ESS crimes.

    Related Links:

  • Official Statistics on ESS Arrests, Indictments in Xinjiang Point to Big Crackdown on Political Crime in China in Olympics Year

    At a recent news conference by procuratorial officials in Urumqi, statistics on arrests and prosecutions for endangering state security (ESS) in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) were released. Through November 2008, 1,295 suspects were arrested and 1,154 individuals were indicted in 204 separate cases of ESS crimes. The statistics were published in a Procuratorial Daily article (in Chinese) on January 3, 2009 (see Dui Hua’s translation below), and were later posted on the website of the Political and Legal Committee of the XUAR. In addition to revealing the number of ESS arrests and prosecutions, other statistics on how the procuratorate in Xinjiang handled political crime were also released, including rare numbers for cases dismissed, erroneous verdicts and illegal use of coercive measures, including, presumably, torture. Such transparency on a politically sensitive subject is rare in China, and could portend greater openness on such topics in the future.

    The numbers of ESS arrests and indictments in Xinjiang in the first 11 months of 2008—with some indictments covering suspects arrested the year prior—are roughly double the totals for all of China in 2007, when 742 ESS arrests and 619 indictments were recorded, the most in each category since 1999. On a 12-month basis, it is estimated that more than 1,400 individuals were arrested for ESS crimes in Xinjiang in 2008, with nearly 1,300 indictments for the year as a whole.

    According to statistics published in the Xinjiang Yearbook for the years 1996 through 2003, approximately one half of all ESS trials in China take place in Xinjiang. The number of defendants in ESS cases tried in Xinjiang is typically more than in other parts of China, making it difficult to estimate national totals from the 2008 statistics released for Xinjiang. But, with the large number of arrests and indictments following unrest in Tibet, and the crackdown against dissent in other parts of China, it is likely that for the country as a whole the number of ESS arrests and indictments in 2008 more than doubled compared to the totals recorded in 2007 and could well exceed 2,000.

    The jump in 2008 arrests and indictments follows a 50 percent increase in ESS arrests and indictments in 2007 over 2006 and a 100 percent increase in arrests and indictments in 2006 over 2005. It is virtually certain that last year’s number of arrests and indictments for ESS—a category that covers subversion, separatism, espionage and trafficking in state secrets, among other political crimes—is the largest since statistics on ESS were first released in 1998.

    The big increase in arrests and prosecutions for ESS last year is reflected in an unprecedented rise of known and suspected cases of individuals imprisoned for endangering state security in Dui Hua’s prisoner database. During 2008, the number of such prisoners in the database more than doubled—going from 355 on December 31, 2007, to 763 on December 31, 2008, largely from widely applied ESS charges in Tibet for arrests related to the protests in March.

    Xinjiang: Striking hard against endangering state security crimesby
    Lu Lifeng

    Since the beginning of 2008, procuratorial organs at all levels in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region have taken on maintaining social stability as the central political task for strengthening legal supervision. [The organs] have struck hard according to law against endangering state security crimes conducted by the “three forces,”1 dispatching work groups in a timely manner and carrying out instructions that authorized arrests and prosecution for cases of violent terrorism. The following is information obtained by this journalist from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Procuratorial Work Conference convened on December 27, 2008.

    In the first 11 months of 2008, procuratorial organs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region authorized arrests according to law for 1,295 individuals and prosecuted 1,154 individuals in criminal cases of “endangering state security” (ESS). Investigative organs were supervised to file 204 cases that should have been filed but were not, and ordered to dismiss 16 cases that were filed but should not have been. [Investigative organs] were ordered to arrest an additional 61 suspects for whom no request for arrest had been issued, and also to indict 125 more in cases where orders for indictment had not been submitted. Opinions for correction against investigative organs were issued in 110 cases due to improper use of coercive measures and other illegal circumstances during the course of investigation. Appeals were filed in 51 cases in which criminal verdicts or [appeal] decisions were in error and in eight cases with errors in civil or administrative decisions. 55 cases were recommended for retrial. Corrected opinions were issued in 86 cases in which, among other illegal circumstances, sentence reductions, parole, and non-prison confinement were improperly issued [for criminals], and where penalties were not carried out according to regulation in terms of criminal handling.

    The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Procuratorate requests that all of its procuratorial agencies in the New Year make strengthening legal supervision their focus and make an effort to carry out supervisory work in a strict manner. At the same time, [agencies] have to further the standards for supervision of all institutions involved in law enforcement activities and the judicial process, and exert full effort to defend social stability and uphold the administration of justice.

    1. Dui Hua note: The “three forces” are terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism.

    Related Links: