Tag: endangering state security

  • The Resurgence of Big-Character Posters and Switching Tactics of Criminalization

    Big character posters were found on Peking University’s campus calling for action on sexual assault cases. The posters were removed by authorities. Image credit: Radio Free Asia.

    The iconic big-character posters (dazibao) of the 1970s and 1980s are often thought to have lost their purpose in a China now dominated by smartphones and WeChat. Popularized during the Cultural Revolution, big-character posters were used by competing political factions to instigate “mass mobilization.” In the revision to the 1982 Constitution, the right to use big-character posters was removed. During the June Fourth protests of 1989, the posters became ubiquitous when protesters used them to criticize the path of economic reform. In official narratives, authorities used the word fandong (reactionary), implying a hindrance to progress and reform, to describe cases involving big-character posters.

    Today, these wall-mounted posters, often handwritten and on a few sheets of paper are used by activists and petitioners seeking to air grievances and direct attention on a range of issues from forced evictions, to government corruption, to wage theft. In some cases, big-character posters allow the disgruntled to circumvent the extensive surveillance and censorship of the internet.

    In December 2017, Tianjin dissident Zhang Changhong (张长虹) was sentenced for using big-character posters to call for the rehabilitation of the June Fourth protests. In June 2013, Zhang put up posters at various bus stops and subway stations and in December 2016, he filmed videos of himself in front of his posters, one of which read “Do you know about the Tiananmen Massacre?” He published videos and articles calling on the public not to forget about the bloody suppression. The court accused Zhang of provoking a serious public disturbance for disseminating “fabricated” information and sentenced him to three years and three months’ imprisonment. Zhang is scheduled for release in 2019.

    In April 2018, big-character posters appeared on the campus of Peking University. The posters were put up in support for Yue Xin, a female student who sought information from the university about an alleged rape case in the 1990s involving a former professor. Yue wrote online that she had been warned by the school to stop requesting information about the rape case, or risk facing “treason” charges. The posters were promptly removed by the school security personnel.

    The following month, during the 120th anniversary of the university, 24 big-character posters briefly appeared on Peking University’s campus. Written by alumnus Fan Liqin, the posters stated that Mao Zedong’s promotion of a personality cult was disastrous for China. Fan warned the Chinese people to be vigilant of history repeating itself under Xi Jinping’s reign, following the removal of presidential term limits and the insertion of “Xi Jinping Thought” into the party constitution. Fan was reportedly escorted away by police officers and campus security personnel; he is not known to have received any coercive measures.

    Switching Tactics of Criminalization

    As big-character posters continue to be used for political purposes, Dui Hua has noticed an increasingly prevalent tactic of criminalization – a shift from charging “reactionaries” caught with big-character posters with inciting subversion to charging them with “picking quarrels and provoking troubles.” When “endangering state security” was introduced into the 1997 Criminal Law, inciting subversion was frequently used against “reactionaries” who used big-character posters to “vilify” party and senior leaders. In recent years, the term “reactionary” has disappeared from official narratives about petitioners. Instead, petitioners are more likely to be charged with the crime of “picking quarrels and provoking troubles.” At first glance, this shift seems like a welcome reform as inciting subversion is a more serious crime carrying a harsher sentence than picking quarrels and provoking troubles. However, Dui Hua’s research shows that in cases involving big-character posters, those charged with picking quarrels and provoking troubles can still find themselves serving as harsh of a sentence as those charged with incitement for committing similar acts. The reason behind this shift is unclear, but given the similarity in the harshness of sentencing, perhaps there is an attempt to obscure cases of a political nature that attract scrutiny by putting them into a pocket crime like picking quarrels and provoking troubles. In 2016 alone, China’s public security bureau filed more than 77,000 cases involving picking quarrels and provoking troubles; the scope of acts that count under this crime is indeed obscure, ranging from criticizing local officials on Weibo to drunken assaults.

    Incitement Cases involving Big-character Posters

    Dui Hua’s library research into government gazettes has uncovered several previously unknown incitement cases involving big-character posters. One of the earliest cases concerns Ding Qingyun (丁青云), a man from Zhenjiang, Jiangsu, who was caught putting up “reactionary” big-character posters on three separate occasions. In October 1997, he put up a poster titled “New Tongmenghui Propaganda” at a farmer’s market, signed by the “New Tongmenghui Dantu Township Branch.” Tongmenghui bore the same name as the secret society and underground revolutionary movement founded by Sun Yatsen in 1905 against the Qing Dynasty. Available sources did not provide further information about Ding’s Tongmenghui.

    Ding went on to write more “reactionary” slogans in April and May of 1998. In a restroom of the Dantu Township government building, Ding hung up big-characters posters reading: “Down with the Communist Party,” “Down with Socialism,” and “Down with the proletarian dictatorship.” In May 1998, Ding was taken into custody on suspicion of inciting subversion. Although the gazette record did not reveal Ding’s fate, a government response subsequently provided to Dui Hua confirmed that Ding completed his two-year sentence for inciting subversion in May 2000.

    Dui Hua previously reported on an incitement case involving Chen Shifu (陈世富), a coffin seller from Hunan who used big-character posters to call on residents to oppose local government policies on property demolition and forced evictions. The prosecution statement claimed that Chen’s big-character posters that called on people to overthrow the CCP and reestablish Kuomintang rule posed a threat to state security. The statement also described the books Chen possessed about Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek as “reactionary.”

    The Switch to Picking Quarrels and Provoking Troubles

    Today, those who use big-character posters to criticize the government and party are likely to face the charge of “picking quarrels and provoking troubles.” Dui Hua uncovered a judgment involving a farmer from Shaanxi surnamed Zhang, who was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment in December 2017. On July 1, 2017, the 96th anniversary of the founding of the CCP, Zhang stood in front of a series of big-character posters, which the court judgment later described as “distorting history,” and proceeded to deliver a three-hour long speech that “insulted the party and Chinese leaders.” Zhang had hired someone to film his speech while he delivered it on a busy street in a village in Shaanxi. The court deemed Zhang’s actions as leading to “social disorder” as crowds of onlookers gathered and vehicles stopped in the middle of the street to listen to his speech.

    In his speech, Zhang criticized a court decision to side with the township government over a longstanding property dispute. After futile attempts at petitioning, Zhang began pointing fingers at the central government. In 2000, he put up big-character posters calling past and present Chinese leaders, including Jiang Zemin, “traitors” and their rule “a disaster for the country and ruinous for the Chinese people.” Zhang accused local officials of colluding with mafia groups. His big-character posters made references to the “Tiananmen Massacre” and ridiculed Deng Xiaoping’s “black cat, white cat theory.” In 2005, Zhang was sentenced to one years’ re-education through labor for “insulting” the party and various leaders. After repeated detention and time under re-education through labor, Zhang allegedly refused to repent and continued to put up big-character posters. In December 2017, the court decided that Zhang had persistently refused to show remorse and that his slanderous remarks against the party, senior leaders, and other cadres qualified as a public disturbance. Zhang is scheduled for release in June 2019.

    In this case, the court described Zhang’s remarks about the party and leaders as “improper.” The same act would have been tantamount to a “vicious attack on the people’s government,” a phrase commonly used in official narratives about counterrevolution propaganda and former incitement cases such as that of Ding Qingyun’s and Chen Shifu’s. Although Zhang’s big-character posters were as politically charged as that of Ding and Chen’s, the political nature of Zhang’s case was obscured by its categorization under the crime of picking quarrels and provoking troubles, most telling is that the sentence he received was as harsh as Ding’s.

    Obscuring Political Cases

    The latest available statistics from China Law Yearbook shows that 576 individuals were arrested for endangering state security in 2016, a significant drop from 1,105 in 2012. However, this decline is no cause for celebration. As the big-character poster cases show, individuals previously charged with inciting subversion are now more likely to be prosecuted for picking quarrels and provoking troubles. The number of endangering state security cases alone does not give a comprehensive picture of the scale of suppression of dissent in China.

    The crime of picking quarrels and provoking troubles has long been decried as a pocket crime, meaning that because of its vague definition “anything can be stuffed into it,” after all 77,451 such cases were filed in 2016. Given the enormous variety of acts that can be prosecuted under this charge, it is no easy task to identify which ones are of a political nature. Dui Hua researchers continue to delve into government sources to uncover the names of political prisoners incarcerated for this charge.

  • Uncovering the Obscurity of “Educational Placement”

    The public sentencing of 55 people in a stadium in Yining, northern Xinjiang province. Image Credit: AP.

    Dui Hua’s research into online judgments has uncovered the first known case of “educational placement” (安置教育, anzhi jiaoyu), a measure imposed on prisoners who are considered “a danger to society” even after they have completed their sentences for terrorism or extremism offenses. Educational placement is a new measure included in the Counterterrorism Law which took effect on January 1, 2016. The measure is classified as a subcategory of a criminal case – carrying its own legal codes and procedures, standardized and stipulated by the Supreme People’s Court.

    The uncovered judgment states that the Urumqi Intermediate People’s Court approved a recommendation from Xinjiang No. 5 Prison to order a Uyghur prisoner from Shache County to be placed in educational placement on August 30, 2017, 18 days before his 10-year prison sentence for inciting splittism was due to expire. The court believed that the prisoner, Ismaili Rozi (伊斯马伊力·如则), continued to pose a threat to society because he “refused to admit guilt during imprisonment, refused to accept education and reform, and was deeply influenced by extreme religious thoughts.” The judgment did not state the length of his educational placement. However, it did indicate that Ismaili had the right to lodge a review of the court order to the Xinjiang High People’s Court within 10 days of receiving it.

    At present, information about educational placement exists mostly on paper and how it has been implemented remains largely unclear. Article 30 of the Counterterrorism Law states that it is organized and carried out by provincial-level people’s governments. The measure remains effective until the individual is no longer considered a risk to society by the educational placement institute. The implementation measures issued in Xinjiang on August 1, 2016, provide some details about what the “at-risk” prisoners are obliged to learn once they are committed to the institutes. These include “laws and regulations, ideology and morality, psychological health, modern culture, scientific education, religious orthodoxy and vocational trainings.” The implementation measures also state that prisons and detention centers shall submit recommendations for educational placement to the intermediate people’s courts six months prior to the scheduled release of the prisoners sentenced for terrorism or extremism offenses.

    A few Chinese scholars have spoken out on the custodial nature of educational placement. In an article published in the Jilin Province Law Society Journal in May 2017, legal scholar Xu Chi described the measure as both a coercive and custodial measure aimed to prevent released prisoners from re-offending, and as the most severe existing form of post-imprisonment security punishment. Another legal scholar, Zhou Zhenjie, described educational placement as an extension of a criminal sentence and as a security measure independent of the Criminal Law.

    Despite scarcely available information, the first-known judgment about educational placement raises several alarming issues. First, the measure was applied beyond the legal scope stipulated by the Counterterrorism Law. The Counterterrorism Law stipulates that educational placement is applicable only to prisoners sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment for terrorism or extremism offenses. However, Ismaili was sentenced for neither of these offenses, but for inciting splittism, which is a crime of endangering state security. When he was sentenced in 2010, the offenses of extremism did not even exist until five years later when they were codified during the ninth amendment to the Criminal Law. The judgment suggests that the scope of offenses for those serving educational placement is likely much greater than the Counterterrorism Law mandates. Educational placement also creates more risks for the arbitrary denial of rights for political prisoners who have already completed their sentences. Ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, who comprise the majority of the country’s endangering state security prison population, are particularly vulnerable to falling prey to this measure.

    Another troubling aspect is that it is unclear when Ismaili’s educational placement will end, if ever. The Counterterrorism Law provides no time limit for how long someone can be held in educational placement, meaning that the length of punishment can be indefinite. Xu described it as having “the same punitive effect as fixed-term or life imprisonment.” Zhou does not share Xu’s optimism that an indeterminate punishment could be effective in combating terrorism and extremism. Rather, he expressed concerns that it leaves open the possibility of de facto life imprisonment – an individual can be deprived of their lifelong freedom so long as the educational placement facility considers him or her a risk to society.

    Another cause for concern is how prisons and detention centers evaluate the risk levels of soon-to-be released prisoners when they make their initial recommendations to the courts for educational placement. Zhou criticized the procedure for being opaque and opening up risk to the notion that all prisoners convicted of terrorism or extremism offenses are predisposed to being perpetually “at risk.” Although the Counterterrorism Law mandates prisons to “hear opinions from grassroots organizations and organs that initially handled the case,” they have never made public how these opinions are accepted, or even considered, when forming their recommendations. Zhou also questioned how they assessed the impact of prisoner releases on the wider community. Do they conduct interviews and surveys? The evaluation process prisons use to decide whether prisoners should be held in educational placement after serving their sentences is highly subjective, wrote Zhou, and how decisions are reached likely depends more on the current political atmosphere and fears surrounding terrorism in a particular region at a given time than on any real indication of potential threat posed by an individual prisoner.

    While Ismaili can appeal the educational placement order to the Xinjiang High People’s Court in theory, it remains to be seen how he can go about exercising this right. Zhou wrote that it is unclear whether the appellant is allowed under the current law to entrust a third party to challenge the evaluation conducted by the prisons or detention centers.

    Zhou questions what the likelihood is of overturning recommendations made by the educational placement bodies to keep an individual incarcerated. Once admitted, an individual will be released only when the institute no longer considers him or her a threat to society, or when their application to lift the educational placement order has been approved by the court. Zhou remarked that the current law does not provide a clear review procedure. Should the application be submitted directly to the court, or indirectly through the educational placement institute? If it is the latter, the institute may censor applications submitted by those it considers a threat to society.

    Two years since its formal introduction, educational placement remains a measure shrouded in secrecy. Whether the measure is applied beyond its legal limits, and whether the evaluation mechanisms and review procedures are fair and transparent are not the only issues emanating from the discovered judgment. As Uyghurs in Xinjiang are disproportionately incarcerated for splittism, terrorism and extremism offenses, they are more likely than Han Chinese and other ethnic groups to bear the brunt of this post-imprisonment measure that could put their personal liberty at risk for life. China should promote judicial transparency by making judgments about its use more readily available on its online platforms.

  • Phan-Gillis Case Highlights Deportation of Foreigners in China

    Nanning Intermediate People ‘s Court. Image Credit: GXBaiBang.Com.

    The adjudication of the Sandy Phan-Gillis case by the Nanning Intermediate People’s Court has drawn attention to the supplemental punishment of deportation under Chinese law. Ms. Phan-Gillis, a prominent American businesswoman, was convicted of espionage by the court on April 25, 2017. She was sentenced to three and one-half years in prison and deportation. She was deported on April 28 without serving her prison sentence.

    Expulsion is one of four supplemental punishments in China’s Criminal Law, the others being deprivation of political rights, fines, and confiscation. Article 35 of the Criminal Law as amended states that expulsion can be a stand-alone punishment or a supplemental punishment. (In common usage, expulsion and deportation are synonymous. They both refer to the compulsory removal of a foreigner from the territory of a sovereign state.)

    Deportations of foreigners are carried out in accordance with the Joint Regulations of the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Finance Regarding the Implementation of Compulsory Deportation of Foreigners. The regulations were jointly issued on July 31, 1992. Despite being nearly 25 years old, the regulations remained in force as of 2013, according to a Supreme People’s Procuratorate source (see also a 2016 discussion on deportation on a Chinese law firm website). There is no record of the regulations having been amended or replaced.

    Although the joint regulations do not mention the role of the State Security Ministry in carrying out deportation of foreigners, the 1993 National Security Law and the Counterespionage Law, passed in 2014, authorize state security bureaus to carry out deportations of foreigners for state security violations and espionage. (The 2015 National Security Law does not mention deportation of foreigners.) Provincial and municipal state security bureaus have issued regulations that deal with deporting foreigners in state security cases (see, for example, the document issued by the Shanghai State Security Bureau that defines the scope of its administrative authority.)

    A source in Beijing familiar with the case relates that the deportation of American citizen Xue Feng in 2015 was the first time that the Beijing State Security Bureau had carried out a deportation. More than a dozen officers were involved. Xue was flown back to New York instead of to his home town of Houston. No one from the American Embassy in Beijing could speak to him before he was put on a plane for the United States.

    Dui Hua’s translation of the 1992 joint regulations (“deportation regulations”) can be found below. The foundation welcomes comments and suggestions for improvement.

    Review of Court Judgement Websites

    A search of judgements on the Supreme People’s Court Judgement Website yields 34 sentences of deportation of foreigners in criminal cases covering the years 2014-2016. This is not an exhaustive listing of all deportation sentences for foreigners during these years. Several deportation sentences, including that of the Canadian citizen Kevin Garratt, convicted of espionage and deported in September 2016, are not to be found on the website.

    Of the 34 deportation sentences found on the court website, five were stand-alone sentences and the rest were supplemental sentences. Three of the five stand-alone deportation sentences handed down by the court of first instance were appealed by the procuratorate, thereby delaying the effective date of judgment and deportation (see Chapter II Article 1 of the deportation regulations.) Two of the sentences were upheld by the court of second instance. The stand-alone deportation sentence for drug trafficking handed down for Nigerian citizen Ukaegbu Kingsley Chinonso by the Hunan Hengyang Intermediate People’s Court on August 20, 2015 was overturned by the Hunan High People’s Court on November 21, 2016. The latter court sentenced Chinonso to 15 years in prison, confiscation of property valued at RMB 50,000, and deportation.

    Deportation as a Criminal Penalty in Endangering State Security Cases

    Seven citizens of the United States and Canada have been convicted of espionage or state secret crimes, both crimes of endangering state security, since 1995. All were sentenced to be deported.

    Of the seven citizens of the United States and Canada convicted of endangering state security and ordered by the court to be deported, one was given a stand-alone deportation sentence, three were sentenced to prison and were deported upon completion of the sentences (including reductions), and three were sentenced to prison and deported without serving the prison sentence. The seven cases, six of which involve naturalized American citizens of ethnic Chinese descent:

    1. Harry Hongda Wu, an American citizen and human rights activist, was detained on June 3, 1995 by officers of the Wuhan Public Security Bureau on suspicion of trafficking in state secrets and fraud. He was convicted by the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court and given a combined sentence of 15 years in prison and deportation on August 24, 1995. He was deported the same day. His deportation came weeks before First Lady Hillary Clinton visited Beijing to attend an international conference.
    2. Li Shaomin, an American citizen and scholar, was taken into custody in late February 2001 in Shenzhen and subsequently charged with spying for Taiwan. He was tried by the Beijing Intermediate People’s Court on July 14, 2001 and sentenced to deportation as a stand-alone penalty. He was deported on June 25, 2001.
    3. Fong Fuming, an American citizen and business consultant, was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and deportation in March 2002 by the Beijing Intermediate People’s Court for the crimes of trafficking in state secret and bribery. He was released 22 months early on October 27, 2003 and deported the same day to the United States.
    4. David Dong Wei, an American citizen and businessman, was taken into custody in September 2003 on suspicion of spying for Taiwan. He was convicted and sentenced to 13 years in prison and deportation by the Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court in April 2005 for the crime of espionage. After sentence reductions totaling four years, David Dong Wei was released in September 2012. He is believed to have been deported to the United States shortly after his release.
    5. Xue Feng, an American citizen and geologist, was placed under residential surveillance in a designated location in 2007. He was convicted in 2010 of trafficking in state secrets and sentenced to eight years in prison, confiscation of RMB 200,000 worth of property, and deportation. He served his full sentence, minus a sentence reduction of 10 months, and was deported on April 3, 2015, returning to the United States the same day.
    6. Sandy Phan Phan-Gillis, an American citizen and businesswoman, was taken into custody in March 2015. She was convicted of spying for the United States and sentenced to three and one-half years in prison, deportation, and confiscation of personal property on April 25, 2017. Her deportation and return to the United States on April 28, 2017 came six weeks after American Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visited Beijing to prepare for the summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and American President Donald Trump held on April 6-7, 2017 in Florida.
    7. Kevin Garratt, a Canadian citizen detained in 2014, was convicted of spying for Canada and sentenced to eight years in prison, a fine of Canadian Dollar 20,000 (in RMB equivalent), and deportation in September 2016. His deportation on September 15 came several days after Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau finished a state visit to China.

    There is no clear basis under Chinese law for executing a deportation sentence prior to a defendant serving his or her imprisonment sentence. In all three cases where deportation was carried out prior to the defendant serving his or her sentence, the case had become a political issue affecting relations between the home countries and China, and the foreigners who were deported were the subjects of intense media attention, civil society advocacy, and high-level interventions by leaders of the home countries.

    Deportation as an Administrative Penalty in Politically Sensitive Cases

    Chapter Six of the Entry and Exit Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China (2014) and both the 1993 National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China and the Counterespionage Law, which took effect on January 1, 2015, provide for public security organs and state security organs, respectively, to carry out deportation of foreigners following detention and investigation, but prior to indictment and trial.

    In April 2001, American citizen Wu Jianmin was detained by agents of the Guangdong State Security Bureau on suspicion of spying for Taiwan. According to the Xinhua News Agency, he was expelled from China on September 29, 2001, and returned to the United States the same day.

    More recently, Swedish citizen and human rights worker Peter Dahlin was taken into custody on January 3, 2016 and placed under residential surveillance in a designated location. He was investigated for violating Article 23 of the Criminal Law, using foreign funding for subversive activities, and, following the airing of a taped confession, deported on January 24, 2016. His property was confiscated and he was banned from entering China for 10 years.

    China’s public security organs have detained, investigated, and deported foreign missionaries who have engaged in proselytizing in China on several occasions in recent years. Most have received little or no media attention.

    It is likely that espionage cases involving both Chinese citizens and foreigners will increase following the release of local state security bureaus’ measures that provide rewards to citizens who report espionage activities. The Beijing measures, announced on April 10, 2017, provide rewards on a sliding scale up to a maximum of RMB 500,000 for deterring and preventing espionage activities. If enacted, the National Intelligence Law, released on May 17, 2017 for public comment, will increase scrutiny of the activities of foreigners and foreign institutions in China.


    Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Justice, and Ministry of Finance:
    Regulations Regarding the Implementation of Compulsory Deportation of Foreigners
    (Jointly issued by SPC et. al. on July 31, 1992. Public Notice [1992] No. 18)

    To the High People’s Courts, High People’s Procuratorates, Public Security Departments (Bureaus), Foreign Affairs Offices of the People’s Governments, Justice Departments (Bureaus), Finance Departments (Bureaus) of all provinces, autonomous regions and directly-administered municipalities:

    The following regulations are issued concerning the implementation of compulsory deportation of foreigners who have violated the law:

    I. Applicable Scope

    These regulations need to be complied with when deporting foreigners under one of the following circumstances:

    1. In accordance with the Criminal Law, where a foreigner has been sentenced by a people’s court to expulsion, either as a stand-alone or supplemental penalty;

    2. In accordance with the Exit and Entry Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China [1985], where the Ministry of Public Security has expelled or ordered a foreign offender to depart before the expiry of his/her limit of stay;
    3. In accordance with the Exit and Entry Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China [1985] and other relevant laws, a foreigner will be compulsorily deported where the public security organ has given an order of repatriation, a shortened duration of stay, revoked the residence permit, or where the foreigner has failed to depart voluntarily before the expiry of his/her limit of stay;
    4. In accordance with international treaties or the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China Concerning Consular Privileges and Immunities, where a foreigner with diplomatic or consular privileges and immunities has been declared by China as persona non grata, or whose diplomatic or consular status is not recognized by the China, or has been ordered to depart before the expiry of his/her limit of stay, or has overstayed or refused to voluntarily depart without justification.

    II. Executive Organs

    The tasks of executing and monitoring the deportation of foreigners shall be carried out by public security organs in accordance with the law or official documents:

    1. Where a foreigner is sentenced to expulsion as a stand-alone penalty, the people’s court shall deliver the criminal judgment and a copy of the execution order to the provincial public security organ within fifteen days of the effective date of the judgment. The provincial public security organ shall designate a subordinate organ to execute the deportation.
    2. Where a foreigner is sentenced to a fixed-term sentence, expulsion as a supplemental penalty will be carried out after the expiration of the prison term. One month before the sentence expires, the prison administration bureau shall deliver the original judgment and a copy or duplicate of the execution order to the provincial public security organ. The provincial public security organ shall designate a subordinate organ to execute the deportation.

    3. Where a foreigner is expelled or ordered to exit before the expiry of his/her limit of stay, the local public security organ shall execute the order in accordance with the Entry and Exit Administration Decision of the Ministry of Public Security.

    4. Where a foreigner is given a deportation order, a shortened duration of stay, or whose residence permit is revoked, the local public security organ shall execute the deportation order in accordance with the decision.

      Where a foreigner is given a shortened duration of stay or whose residence permit is revoked, the host organization can also arrange his/her departure. The public security organ shall perform the supervision in accordance with the decision.

    5. The public security organ shall carry out and monitor the deportation order in conformity with the official documents issued by the Ministry of Public Security where a foreigner with diplomatic or consular immunity has been declared by China as persona non grata in accordance with international treaties or the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China Concerning Consular Privileges and Immunities, or whose diplomatic or consular status is not recognized by China, or has overstayed or failed to voluntarily depart without justification after being ordered to exit before the expiry of his/her limit of stay.

    III. Preparation Work Before Execution

    1. When a foreigner is to be compulsorily deported, all documents in their possession permitting them to stay in China shall be confiscated. The visa on the passport shall be shortened, stamped with a seal prohibiting an extension of stay, or revoked.

    2. Foreigners who have been expelled are listed as persons to be denied entry. The matter shall be handled in accordance with The Specific Measures Regarding the Reporting of Foreigners to be Denied Entry ([1989] Public Security Border Control No. 87). For other types of deportations of foreigners, when it is necessary to place someone on the list of persons to be denied entry it should be done in accordance with regulations.

      Where a foreigner is listed as a person to be denied entry, the public security organ shall announce to the person the period during which s/he will be denied entry.

    3. The organ executing a deportation must examine the validity of the foreign deportee’s passport, other identification documents that can be used in place of a passport, and any valid visas for transiting through a third country or region.

      If the foreigner does not possess the aforementioned visas or documents, the organ executing the deportation shall contact the embassy or consulate that is responsible for issuing the required visa or documents. If the person has a host organization in China, the host organization shall contact the embassy or consulate. If the foreigner is not associated with a host organization, the Exit and Entry Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security or local public security organ shall contact the embassy or local consulate. If the foreigner’s home country has no embassy or consulate in China, or if the embassy or consulate does not cooperate, the organ executing the deportation shall report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Public Security so that the matter may be resolved by diplomatic means.

      Where the foreigner is from a neighboring country sharing borders with China, s/he may exit from a border port or crossing without processing documents or visa.

    4. A foreigner who has been given a deportation order shall pay for his/her own expenses for air travel, ground transportation, or travel by ship. If the foreigner cannot afford the expenses, or if the host organization is not responsible for providing the travel expenses, the embassy or consulate shall pay (following the same means of coordination described in the previous clause). If the embassy or consulate refuses to take responsibility, or if the foreigner’s home country has no embassy or consulate in China, the Chinese government shall be responsible for the expenses.

    5. Where a foreigner has been given a deportation order, in deciding whether it is necessary to notify the embassy or consulate of the reasons for and date of the deportation, the local foreign affairs office may request instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

    6. If a case can cause possible diplomatic interventions or disputes, the authorized organ shall notify the local foreign affairs office of the case specifics and coordinate external lines of response with the local foreign affairs office. If a case requires a press release, the organ must seek approval from the Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

    IV. Execution Schedule

    The public security organ in charge shall immediately carry out the deportation order in accordance with the schedule set forth by the assigning organ. If there are special circumstances that require a delay, the organ shall seek approval from the public security department (bureau) of the province, autonomous region or directly-administered municipality.

    V. Departure Port

    1. Where a foreigner is to be deported, a departure port shall be arranged in advance and the nearest port shall be selected.

    2. Where a foreigner is to be deported to a neighboring country sharing borders with China, a border crossing shall be selected as the departure port.

    3. The organ executing the deportation shall coordinate with the public security organ at the departure port or immigration checkpoint, report details about the person being deported, arrival time at the port, transportation, flight number, ground transportation number, schedule and other matters related to the deportation. The public security organ at the departure port or immigration checkpoint shall assist with matters related to the departure.

    4. Whenever possible, the departure time shall be scheduled on the same day as arrival at the departure port. If the foreigner being deported cannot arrive and depart on the same day, the local public security organ at the departure port shall provide necessary assistance with custodial measures.

    VI. Execution Method and Related Matters

    1. Where a foreigner is sentenced to expulsion by the people’s court as a stand-alone penalty or is given a deportation order by the Ministry of Public Security, the foreigner shall be escorted by both armed police of the public security detention center and foreign affairs police; where a foreigner is sentenced to expulsion as a supplemental penalty after the expiration of the prison term, the foreigner shall be escorted by prison officers, guarding armed police and foreign affairs police of the public security organs. The above mentioned two types of foreigners may be handcuffed if necessary. Other deported foreigners who need to be escorted may be accompanied by foreign affairs police. If no police escort is required, the organ executing the deportation may assign foreign affairs police at the point of departure to monitor the deportation.

    2. The number of escorting personnel shall be determined by the specific circumstances. However, in principle, there should be a minimum of two officers.

    3. Escorting personnel shall be vigilant, ensure safety and prevent escape, violent acts, suicide, or acts of self-inflicted harm.

    4. Immigration checkpoints shall arrange passage for foreigners in accordance with the deportation order, decision or judgment, and said person’s passport and documents.

    5. Personnel executing a deportation shall monitor the means of transportation for the foreigner being deported and shall not leave the premises until s/he has boarded and departed. If a foreigner is deported through a border crossing, the personnel shall monitor the said person’s departure from China before leaving the premises.

    6. Depending on the specific circumstances and the means of transportation for the deporting foreigner the personnel shall take photographs, or record videos if conditions permit.

    VII. Expenses

    The expenses incurred in deporting a foreigner (including meals, lodging, and transportation for escorting personnel and meals, lodging, transportation, fees for renting temporary lodging, and international travel expenses that cannot be borne by the foreigner, or which the embassy or consulate in China refuses to pay, or the foreigner’s home country has no embassy or consulate in China) shall be handled in accordance with the existing fiscal system and borne by the finance department where the case is handled.

    VIII. People’s police and officers tasked with executing compulsory deportation shall have solemn demeanor, adhere strictly to professional duties, be civilized, and abide by foreign affairs discipline.

    Compulsory deportation of foreigners, from now on, shall comply with these regulations.

    Chinese Source(原文):法律图书馆 http://www.law-lib.com/Law/law_view.asp?id=8859


    最高人民法院 最高人民检察院 公安部 外交部 司法部 财政部
    关于强制外国人出境的执行办法的规定
    1992年7月31日最高法院等,公发18发布)

    各省、自治区、直辖市高级人民法院、人民检察院、公安厅(局)、人民政府外事办公室、司法厅(局)、财政厅(局):

    兹对违法犯罪的外国人强制出境的执行问题,作如下规定:

    一、适用范围

    有下列情形之一需要强制出境的外国人,均按本规定执行:

    1. 依据我国刑法的规定,由人民法院对犯罪的外国人判处独立适用或者附加适用驱逐出境刑罚的;

    2. 依据《中华人民共和国外国人入境出境管理法》的规定,由公安部对违法的外国人处以限期出境或者驱逐出境的;

    3. 依据《中华人民共和国外国人入境出境管理法》以及其他有关法律的规定,由公安机关决定遣送出境或者缩短停留期限、取消居留资格的外国人,未在指定的期限内自动离境,需强制出境的;

    4. 我国政府已按照国际条约或《中华人民共和国外交特权与豁免条例》的规定,对享有外交或领事特权和豁免的外国人宣布为不受欢迎的人或者不可接受并拒绝承认其外交或领事人员身份,责令限期出境的人,无正当理由逾期不自动出境的。

    二、执行机关

    执行和监视强制外国人出境的工作,由公安机关依据有关法律文书或者公文进行:

      1. 对判处独立适用驱逐出境刑罚的外国人,人民法院应当自该判决生效之日起十五日内,将对该犯的刑事判决书、执行通知书的副本交付所在地省级公安机关,由省级公安机关指定的公安机关执行。

      2. 被判处徒刑的外国人,其主刑执行期满后应执行驱逐出境附加刑的,应在主刑刑期届满的一个月前,由原羁押监狱的主管部门将该犯的原判决书、执行通知书副本或者复印本送交所在地省级公安机关,由省级公安机关指定的公安机关执行。

      3. 被公安部处以驱逐出境、限期出境的外国人,凭公安部出入境管理处罚裁决书,由当地的公安机关执行。

      4. 被公安机关决定遣送出境、缩短停留期限或者取消居留资格的外国人,由当地公安机关凭决定书执行。

    被缩短停留期限或者取消居留资格的外国人,也可以由接待单位安排出境,公安机关凭决定书负责监督。

    1. 我国政府已按照国际条约或《中华人民共和国外交特权与豁免条例》的规定,对享有外交或领事特权和豁免的外国人宣布为不受欢迎的人或者不可接受并拒绝承认其外交或领事人员身份,责令限期出境的人,无正当理由逾期不自动出境的,赁外交部公文由公安部指定的公安机关负责执行或者监督执行。

    三、执行前的准备工作

    1. 对被强制出境的外国人持有的准予在我国居留的证件,一律收缴。对护照上的签证应当缩短有效期,加盖不准延期章,或者予以注销。
    2. 凡被驱逐出境的外国人,均须列入不准入境者名单,具体办法按照公安部制订的《关于通报不准外籍人入境者名单的具体办法》(公境字87号)执行。对其他强制出境的外国人,需要列入不准入境者名单的,按规定报批。

      凡被列入不准入境者名单的外国人,执行的公安机关应当在执行前向其宣布不准入境年限。

    3. 对被强制出境的外国人,执行机关必须查验其本人的有效护照或者其他替代护照的身份证件,以及过境国家或者地区的有效签证。

      不具备上述签证或者证件的,应事先同其本国驻华使、领馆联系,由使、领馆负责办理。在华有接待单位的,由接待单位同使、领馆联系。没有接待单位的,由公安部出入境管理局或者领馆所在地公安机关同使、领馆联系。在华无使、领馆或者使、领馆不予配合的,应层报外交部或公安部,通过外交途径解决。

      对与我毗邻国家的公民从边境口岸或者通道出境的,可以不办理对方的证件或者签证。

    4. 被强制出境的外国人应当办妥离境的机票、车票、船票,费用由本人负担。本人负担不了的,也不属于按协议由我有关单位提供旅费的,须由其本国使、领馆负责解决(同使、领馆联系解决的办法,与前项相同)。对使、领馆拒绝承担费用或者在华无使、领馆的,由我国政府承担。

    5. 对已被决定强制出境的外国人,事由和日期是否需要通知其驻华使、领馆,可由当地外事部门请示外交部决定。

    6. 对有可能引起外交交涉或者纷争的案件,主管机关应及时将有关案情和商定的对外表态的口径等通知当地外事部门。需对外报道的,须经公安部、外交部批准。

    四、执行期限

    负责具体执行的公安机关、应当按照交付机关确定的期限立即执行。如有特殊情况,需要延期执行的,报省、自治区、直辖市公安厅、局核准。

    五、出境口岸

    1. 对被强制出境的外国人,其出境的口岸,应事先确定,就近安排。

    2. 如果被强制出境的外国人前往与我国接壤的国家,也可以安排从边境口岸出境。

    3. 执行机关应当事先与出境口岸公安机关和边防检查站联系,通报被强制出境人员的情况,抵达口岸时间、交通工具班次,出境乘用的航班号、车次、时间,以及其他与协助执行有关的事项。出境口岸公安机关和边防检查站应当协助安排有关出境事项。

    4. 出境时间应当尽可能安排在抵达口岸的当天。无法在当天出境的,口岸所在地公安机关应当协助采取必要的监护措施。

    六、执行方式及有关事项

    1. 被人民法院判决独立适用驱逐出境和被公安部处以驱逐出境的外国人,由公安机关看守所武警和外事民警共同押送;对主刑执行期满后再驱逐出境的外国人由原羁押监狱的管教干警、看守武警和公安机关外事民警共同押送。对上述两类人员押送途中确有必要时,可以使用手铐。对其他被责令出境的外国人,需要押送的,由执行机关派外事民警押送;不需要押送的,可以在离境时派出外事民警,临场监督。

    2. 执行人员的数量视具体情况而定,原则上应不少于2人。

    3. 押送人员应提高警惕,保障安全,防止发生逃逸、行凶、自杀、自伤等事故。

    4. 边防检查站凭对外国人强制出境的执行通知书、决定书或者裁决书以及被强制出境人的护照、证件安排放行。

    5. 执行人员要监督被强制出境的外国人登上交通工具并离境后方可离开。从边境通道出境的,要监督其离开我国国境后方可离开。

    6. 对被驱逐出境的外国人入出境交通工具等具体情况,应拍照,有条件的也可录像存查。

    七、经费

    执行强制外国人出境所需的费用(包括押送人员食宿、交通费,以及其本人无力承担费用而驻华使、领馆拒不承担或者在华没有使、领馆的外国人在中国境内的住宿、交通费、临时看押场所的租赁费、国际旅费等),应当按照现行财政体制,由办案地财政部门负责解决。

    八、执行强制出境任务的人民警察和工作人员,要仪表庄重、严于职守、讲究文明、遵守外事纪律。

    今后有关强制外国人出境的执行工作,统一遵照本规定执行。


  • China Tightens Clemency Rules for Political Prisoners

    China Tightens Clemency Rules for Political Prisoners

    Supreme People’s Court of China, Beijing. Image credit: WIPO Magazine

    On November 14th the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) published China’s most recent interpretation of the Criminal Law’s articles on sentence reduction and parole. The regulations, which take effect on January 1, 2017, will tighten rules for granting reduced sentences and parole to prisoners serving time for endangering state security (ESS) and other serious crimes including corruption. [1] They reflect a 2014 guiding opinion (指导意见) from the Communist Party’s Political and Legal Commission that mandated tougher rules for “three types” of crimes including bribery, financial fraud and organized crime—and they are considerably more detailed than the Court’s previous interpretation on sentence reduction and parole, issued in 2012.

    For decades, the SPC has issued regulations calling for “strict handling” of clemency for prisoners serving sentences for counterrevolution and (after 1997) ESS, a category of crimes that includes subversion, inciting subversion, splittism, and inciting splittism. However, until these latest regulations were issued, the court hadn’t defined “strict handling”, leaving it up to the provinces to decide what measures to apply to ESS prisoners in each jurisdiction. [2]

    Under the new regulations, “ordinary prisoners” sentenced to life in prison must wait two years before the sentence is commuted to a fixed term sentence of no less than 19 years. Thereafter, each ensuing sentence reduction can occur at a minimum interval of two years, and the length of the reduction is based on the prisoner’s behavior and whether the prisoner performs “meritorious service.” [3]

    The new regulations mandate that ESS prisoners like Ilham Tohti and Wang Bingzhang (王炳章) and other prisoners serving life sentences for serious crimes must wait a minimum of three years, rather than two, before the sentence is commuted to a term of no less than 20 years (as opposed to 19 for ordinary inmates). While each ensuing sentence reduction can occur at a minimum of a two-year interval, reductions for ESS prisoners cannot exceed one year. In the best-case scenario, if Ilham Tohti’s life sentence were commuted to a 20-year fixed term sentence in January 2017, it would be 2030 before his sentence would expire, and that would be only if all regulatory requirements for subsequent sentence reductions had been satisfied.

    Similarly, prisoners serving fixed term sentences of more than ten years under the new regulations are treated differently according to whether the crime is an ordinary crime or falls under one of the categories of serious crime (which includes ESS) as specified in the SPC regulations. Thus, an ordinary prisoner serving a 12-year sentence for robbery must wait a minimum of two years before being eligible for his or her first sentence reduction, and thereafter must wait at least eighteen months before being considered for subsequent reductions. The length of the reductions is largely at the discretion of the prison authorities, but cannot exceed two years.

    By contrast, while a prisoner serving a 12-year sentence for subversion, an ESS crime, must wait at least two years before the first sentence reduction (which is the same for ordinary prisoners) thereafter, he or she must wait more than eighteen months before being considered for a sentence reduction, and the sentence reduction cannot exceed one year.

    Three points are worth bearing in mind:

    1. The new regulations apply to everyone currently serving prison terms; in other words, existing sentences are not “grandfathered.” Dui Hua has documented many cases of prisoners serving long sentences for counterrevolution and endangering state security who have received generous sentence reductions that released them from prison many years before the expiration of their original sentences. (Hong Kong journalist Xi Yang , for example, served less than four years of a 12-year sentence for trafficking in state secrets.) The new regulations apply to prisoners whether their sentences were handed down before January 1, 2017 or after. Prior rules and practices will no longer apply.

    2. Provincial prison authorities will be able to impose stricter restrictions than those in the SPC regulations, but they may not impose laxer restrictions.

    3. Medical parole is not covered by the new regulations. Prisoners with serious illnesses can be released at any time with the approval of prison authorities and, for prominent political prisoners, approval by the Ministry of Justice in Beijing. (ESS prisoners who perform meritorious service can be granted clemency, but Dui Hua is not aware of a single example of an ESS prisoner getting a sentence reduction or parole in this manner.) Accordingly, as it has been for many years, medical parole remains the best hope for political prisoners seeking early release from prison.


    1. For sentences up to ten-years, serious crimes include graft; undermining financial order and committing security fraud; organizing, leading, participating in, harboring, or colluding with organized crime; endangering state security; terrorism; serious drug-related crimes; recidivism; refusing to fulfill financial judgment. For sentences of ten-years or more, serious crimes include the above, and murder, rape, robbery, kidnapping, arson, causing an explosion, releasing harmful materials, and organizing violent crimes.   Return to Article

    2. In the absence of a national standard as to what “strict handling” means, local authorities have been given broad discretion of interpretation and implementation. In December 2003, the Shanghai High People’s Court issued provisional rules stipulating that a sentence reduction for an ESS prisoner is normally up to one year shorter than that for other prisoners who satisfied the same conditions. The rules also stated that there must be an additional delay of one year before sentence reduction when a prisoner was eligible for “a normal commutation to a 20-year fixed-term sentence.” In 2009, the Yunnan Prison Management Bureau announced that sentence reductions for ESS prisoners would be three to six months shorter than those for other inmates under satisfying the same conditions. Restrictions on parole for ESS prisoners are also in force in other provinces and municipalities. In January 2005, Beijing issued a decision that required instructions from higher organs before parole can be granted to ESS prisoners. In the same year, Shandong issued a similar provisional notice that stated “criminals who endanger state security… are normally not to be granted parole.”    Return to Article

    3. The regulations define meritorious service as 1. Preventing others from committing crimes; 2. Reporting and exposing criminal activities inside or outside prison, or providing important clues for solving a case, which are later verified as being true; 3. Assisting the judicial organs in arresting other criminal suspects; 4. Making outstanding achievements in technological innovation in production and scientific research; 5. Actively resisting natural disasters or preventing major accidents; 6. Making major contributions to the state or society.   Return to Article

  • China: SPC Issues New Regulations on the Release of Court Judgments Online

    Written judgments from criminal and civil cases in a Yunnan court. New regulations now state that digital copies of such judgments must be released online within a week of a court’s decision. Photo credit: ynfy.gov.cn

    [Updated: as of September 30, 2016, Dui Hua has obtained 117 judgments YTD.]

    In a bid to increase judicial transparency, including the adjudication of sensitive political cases, China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) recently released new regulations that unambiguously assign to courts throughout the country the responsibility for publicly releasing judgments (see translation of the regulations below). The SPC released similar regulations in 2013 and 2010, but the new regulations require courts to release more information, and with greater detail.

    Article 1 of the regulations states that “People’s courts should promptly release court judgments online.” The new regulations provide a stronger mechanism for making courts comply with this provision—if the court decides not to release a judgment to the public, it must make public the reasons for not releasing it (Article 6). Courts also have a new deadline for releasing judgments under the new regulations— “Legally effective court judgments should be posted online within seven working days of taking effect” (Article 7).

    The Discretion to Keep Secrets

    The new regulations provide more detailed guidance to courts when they determine that judgments should not be posted online. Article 4 states that judgments are not to be released if they (1) involve state secrets, (2) involve underage suspects, (3) are resolved by arbitration, (4) concern divorce, or (5) involve custody of underage children. The regulations give unfettered discretion to keep judgments secret if the court determines that a judgment is “unsuitable for online posting.” The meaning of “unsuitable” is not clarified in the regulations.

    The language of these regulations provides leeway to courts to restrict the release of court judgments in cases other than prosecutions of state secrets crimes under Article 111 of the PRC Criminal Law. Court cases that are not ostensibly political might be subject to restrictions on posting online, including but not limited to civil cases involving trade secrets (which might also be classified as state secrets), administrative cases of citizens against the government, financial fraud, and disturbing market order. The police or procuratorates, rather than courts, might possess practical authority to decide when certain cases sufficiently “involve” state secrets such that they are withheld from the public.

    Regulations Having the Intended Effect?

    Although the courts possess authority to block public release of judgments if they “involve” state secrets or are otherwise “unsuitable” for online posting, courts have been much more forthcoming with judgments since the previous set of regulations were issued in 2013. During the three-year period those regulations were in effect, the number of judgments involving endangering state security (ESS) cases that Dui Hua obtained from official websites increased each year: in 2014, 27 judgments were obtained, in 2015, 80 judgments, and, so far in 2016, 117 judgments [updated]. ESS crimes, which include subversion, inciting subversion, splittism, inciting splittism, espionage, and state secrets violations, are the most political in China’s Criminal Law. The decision to publicly release ESS judgments serves as a useful touchstone for assessing judicial transparency.

    Considering that the number of ESS trials has declined during the same three-year period, the increase in judgments posted online is all the more surprising. Dui Hua has estimated that Chinese courts concluded more than 500 ESS trials of the first instance in 2015, compared with more than 1,000 ESS trials in 2014 and 893 in 2013. The drop is attributed to judicial authorities trying cases that used to be considered ESS cases as cases of terrorism and disturbing social order.

    Restrictions on Redaction

    In addition to stipulating which judgments can be released, the new regulations provide some guidance on the content that must be provided in court judgments. Article 8 of the regulations states that courts should redact the names of crime victims, juveniles, and parties to certain types of family cases. Article 10 states that courts should redact certain types of information, primarily personal, private information. The rules also give courts broad authority to redact other information that they deem “inappropriate” for public release.

    The regulations’ drafters likely attempted to avoid issues surrounding the redacting of criminal defendants’ and prisoners’ names. In a change from the 2013 version, the new regulations no longer require the redacting of names of people who are not repeat offenders or who have been sentenced to three years in prison or less. Juvenile defendants should have their names redacted in online judgments owing to Article 8’s restriction on publishing juveniles’ names in general. Other than these changes, however, courts receive little guidance on how and when to publish the names of criminal defendants. Although redacting a defendant’s name can mitigate social stigma associated with a conviction, publicly releasing a defendant’s name can also help family and supporters advocate for greater judicial transparency and clemency.

    New Opportunities for Tracking Court Transparency

    On paper, the new regulations appear to be an improvement over the 2013 version, as they identify courts as the specific institution responsible for releasing judgments and require courts to publicly give reasons for refusing to release judgments. Judging by the increased number of ESS cases released to the public since the previous regulations took effect in 2013, regulations governing the release of judgments also appear to increase court transparency, which hopefully encourages public identification of suspects in most cases—including those involving ESS. Over the next months and years, Dui Hua plans to step up its monitoring of court websites to determine the extent to which courts are exercising their responsibility to release judgments online.

    *

    Regulations of the Supreme People’s Court of China Regarding the Release of Court Judgments Online

    *

    The Supreme People’s Court of China
    Legal Interpretation No. 19 [2016]

    August 29, 2016

    The “Regulations of the Supreme People’s Court of China Regarding the Release of Court Judgments Online” was passed on July 25, 2016 at the Meeting No. 1689 of the SPC Adjudication Committee, and will become effective on October 1, 2016.

    These regulations are formulated to implement and carry out the principle of public adjudication, standardize the people’s courts’ online judgment-releasing work, promote judicial fairness, raise the level of judicial credibility, bring together the practical experience of people’s courts, and they are in accordance with relevant regulations including the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, the PRC Civil Procedure Law, and the PRC Administrative Litigation Law.

    Article 1: People’s courts should promptly release court judgments online according to law, in a comprehensive manner, and in a standardized fashion.

    Article 2: The China Judgments Online website is the nationwide, centralized platform for releasing court judgments. People’s courts at all levels install links to China Judgments Online on their court political affairs websites and judicial transparency platforms.

    Article 3: The following types of court judgments should be released online:

    1. Criminal, civil, and administrative judgments;
    2. Criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement judgments;
    3. Payment orders;
    4. Criminal, civil, administrative, and enforcement notices rejecting petitions for review;
    5. State compensation decisions;
    6. Decisions for compulsory medical treatment or decisions rejecting applications for compulsory medical treatment;
    7. Decisions to enforce or amend criminal penalties;
    8. Decisions to detain or to issue fines for obstructionist litigation activities and enforcement behavior; decisions for early release from detention; and decisions on applications for reconsideration that have been filed against orders for detentions and fines;
    9. Administrative mediation decisions and civil public interest litigation mediation decisions;
    10. Other court judgments in which there is a discontinuation or completion of the litigation process, there is an influence on a party’s material rights and benefits, or there is a major influence on a party’s procedural rights.

    Article 4: People’s court judgments displaying one of the following types of characteristics should not be released online:

    1. Cases involved with state secrets;
    2. Juvenile crime cases;
    3. Cases resolved through mediation procedures or verifying the people’s mediatory agreements’ effectiveness, but not including those to protect state interests, the public interest, and other legal interests that need to be made public;
    4. Cases involved with divorce litigation or those involving the fostering or guardianship of minors;
    5. Other circumstances which cause people’s courts to believe internet release is not suitable.

    Article 5: People’s Courts should, in their notices accepting cases and responses, inform the parties of the scope of release of judgments online and publicly inform people’s courts, via government affairs websites, electronic touchscreens, litigation guides, and other methods, of the relevant regulations for issuing court judgments online.

    Article 6: Court judgments that are not released online should release the case number, the adjudicating court, the date of judgment, and the reasons for not releasing the judgment, except when releasing the above-described information could reveal state secrets.

    Article 7: Legally effective court judgments should be posted online within seven working days of taking effect. First-instance judgments and judgments which have been appealed, or regarding which a procuratorial protest has been brought according to law, should be released online within seven working days of the second-instance court’s adjudication taking effect.

    Article 8: People’s courts, when they release court judgments online, should redact the names of the following types of persons:

    1. Parties to marriage, family, and inheritance dispute cases, and their legal representatives;
    2. Crime victims and their legal representatives, collateral civil litigation plaintiffs and their legal representatives, witnesses, and expert witnesses;
    3. Juveniles and their legal representatives.

    Article 9: According to Article 8 of these regulations, the redacting of names in the following circumstances should be handled accordingly:

    1. When the surname is kept, replace the given name with “X”;
    2. Regarding the names of ethnic minorities, keep the first character and replace the rest of the name with “X”;
    3. Regarding foreigners and stateless people, keep the Chinese transliteration for the first character, with the rest of the name replaced by “X”; regarding the English names of foreigners and stateless people, keep the first English letter and eliminate the rest of the name.

    For repeat names resulting from redacting, use Arabic numerals after the names to distinguish them.

    Article 10: When people’s courts release court judgments online, they should redact the following kinds of information:

    1. Family addresses, contact information, identification numbers, bank account numbers, health situations, vehicle license plate numbers, movable or immovable property certificate serial numbers, etc., of natural persons;
    2. Information regarding bank accounts, vehicle license plates, moveable or immovable property certificate serial numbers, etc., of legal persons and other organizations;
    3. Information involving corporate secrets;
    4. Private personal information regarding ongoing disputes involving family affairs, individual rights, etc.;
    5. Information that involves technological investigation measures;
    6. Other information that a people’s court believes is not appropriate to make public.

    According to part (a.) of this Article, if redacted information influences the proper understanding of a court judgment, use the letter “X” as a partial replacement.

    Article 11: People’s courts judgments that are released online should contain the following types of information regarding parties, legal representatives, entrusted agents, and defenders:

    1. Other than the handling of redaction under Article 8 of these regulations, if parties and other legal representatives are natural persons, keep the name, date of birth, sex, district and/or the county of residence; regarding parties and their legal representatives, if they are legal persons or other organizations, keep the name, residential address, organization code, and legal representative or primary responsible persons’ name and occupation;
    2. If entrusted agents and defenders are lawyers or grassroots legal service workers, then maintain the name, the professional registration number, and law firm or grassroots legal service institution name; for entrusted agents and defenders that are other types of personnel, keep the name, date of birth, sex, county or district of residence, and relationship to the party.

    Article 12: If the judge handling the case believes that a court judgment involves circumstances pursuant to Article 4(e) of these regulations rendering inappropriate the release of the judgment online, then the judge should issue such opinion and the grounds for it in writing, and responsible staff from the relevant department, after conducting investigation, report to the managing court’s vice president for approval.

    Article 13: The PRC Supreme People’s Court supervises and guides the whole country’s courts in work on releasing court judgments online. High-level and intermediate-level people’s courts supervise and guide district-level people’s courts in their work on releasing court judgments online.

    Adjudication management offices of people’s courts at every level, or other institutions undertaking the function of adjudication management, have responsibility for the work of releasing their court’s judgments online and carry out the following duties:

    1. Organizing and guiding the release of court judgments online;
    2. Supervising and inspecting the work of releasing court judgments online;
    3. Coordinating and handling complaints and opinions from the public and society regarding court judgments;
    4. Coordinating technology departments to provide technological support and safeguarding;
    5. Other relevant management work.

    Article 14: Courts at every level should rely upon information technology to take court judgments and publicly enter them into the procedures for adjudication management, reducing the amount of work in publicizing court judgments, while realizing promptness, comprehensiveness, and streamlining in releasing court judgments.

    Article 15: In court judgments released online, other than the handling of technology implementation according to the requirements of these regulations, there should be consistency with the original court judgments.

    People’s courts that correct the written errors of court judgments should promptly release the corrected judgment online.

    The judge handling the case is responsible for the consistency between the court judgment that is released online and the original judgment, as well as the standardization of the technological processing.

    Article 16: Court judgments released online that are inconsistent with the original judgment or that exhibit inappropriate technological processing should be promptly removed and released again after they have been corrected.

    For court judgments that have been released online, if inspection reveals circumstances listed in Article 4 of these regulations, they should promptly be removed and then handled according to Article 6.

    Article 17: People’s courts information technology service centers are responsible for China Judgments Online’s functional maintenance and upgrading, providing convenience to all of society for the use according to law of this website’s public court judgments.

    In the application of different case numbers for different adjudication procedures, China Judgments Online cross-references court judgments with each other.

    Article 18: These regulations are effective starting October 1, 2016. The Supreme People’s Court previously issued interpretations and standardizing documents, and in case of inconsistency, these regulations will serve as the authoritative version.

  • Could China’s New Oversight Rules Have Avoided Arbitrary Detention of American Citizen?

    The United Nations Palais des Nations. On June 29, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recommended the release of American Sandy Phan-Gillis, who has been detained for over a year without having charges brought against her in court. Photo: www.unog.ch

    Dui Hua recently found a copy of Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) regulations that govern oversight of “designated-location residential surveillance” (DLRS), a form of incommunicado detention that the Chinese government frequently uses in sensitive cases involving endangering state security, terrorism, and corruption (known as “three type offenses”). Dui Hua has translated the regulations into English below (Chinese source text available here).

    The SPP adopted the regulations on October 13, 2015 with the apparent intention of curtailing abuse of DLRS. During public comment periods leading up to the 2013 revisions to the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) that established DLRS powers, many commentators heavily criticized DLRS for effectively legalizing the secret, incommunicado detentions that had existed for years in China due to ambiguities and blank spots in the law. In November 2011, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances had also objected to the proposed CPL revisions, arguing that they would amount to the legalization of enforced disappearances.

    Oversight Regulations Aim to Limit Arbitrary Detention Through On-Site Inspections

    Given the importance of DLRS oversight, it is tempting to speculate whether these rules, had they been in place just a few months earlier, might have helped mitigate if not avert the arbitrary detention of American citizen Phan (Sandy) Phan-Gillis—the only American currently in a Chinese detention facility on state secrets charges. On June 29, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) published an Opinion holding that Phan-Gillis’ detention is “arbitrary”, with US State Department officials urging China to consider the WGAD’s recommendation to release Phan-Gillis. Indicating the heightened US-China tensions resulting from the case, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei issued a swift reply, referring to the WGAD findings as “irresponsible” and calling for greater respect of China’s “judicial sovereignty”.

    Phan-Gillis (pictured left) was initially taken into custody by agents of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region’s state security bureau on suspicion of espionage on March 19, 2015. She was placed under DLRS until September 2015, when the six-month time limit on this coercive measure expired, and was then transferred to a detention center in Nanning and placed in solitary confinement. In March 2016, Newsweek reported on the one-year anniversary of her detention.

    Phan-Gillis has not received access to effective assistance of legal counsel and continues to be held in detention in Nanning, having never had charges brought against her in court. Had the SPP’s new oversight regulations been in place when Phan-Gillis was initially detained, procurators would have possessed clear authority under Article 19 to carry out on-site inspection of Phan-Gillis’ DLRS conditions and to conduct return inspection visits once per week.

    Other provisions of the oversight regulations raise the question whether procurators might also have been able to request her release or to otherwise curtail police powers. Article 20 of the regulations, for example, provides local procurators with authority to issue “rectification opinions” on procedural irregularities, several of which apply to the Phan-Gillis case: state security officials failed to notify Phan-Gillis’ family of her placement in a DLRS facility; probably failed to place her in a facility that meets the statutory requirements for DLRS (no one, including the American consular officials who conducted monthly visits, were allowed to visit Phan-Gillis in the detention facility where she is actually housed); and failed to allow her reasonable visits and correspondence with legal counsel and family as provided for under the relevant sections of the CPL, which grant discretion for the detaining authority to allow family and lawyer visits even in so-called “three type offenses.”

    Unfortunately, even these minimal oversight mechanisms were not in place at the time of Phan-Gillis’ DLRS confinement. The new rules came into force weeks after the end of her transfer to a detention facility. As it stands, the abuses of discretion that marked the first case of legalized disappearance after passage of CPL revisions in 2013 are eerily similar to those apparent in ongoing cases like Phan-Gillis’. It remains to be seen whether the oversight rules translated below will yield discernible changes in future police application of DLRS procedures.

    *

    Regulations on Oversight of Residential Surveillance in a Designated Location by People’s Procuratorates

    *

    Adopted at the 41st meeting of the 12th Procuratorial Committee of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on October 13, 2015

    Chapter 1: General Principles

    Article 1: In order to strengthen and standardize how people’s procuratorates carry out oversight regarding imposition and implementation of designated-location residential surveillance (DLRS), these regulations are hereby enacted in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (CPL) and in consideration of the realities of procuratorial work.

    Article 2: When DLRS is used against criminal suspects or defendants by public security organs, people’s procuratorates, or people’s courts, people’s procuratorates shall carry out oversight in accordance with law as to the legality of imposition and implementation of DLRS.

    Article 3: Oversight of decisions to impose DLRS shall be the responsibility of the investigation-oversight and prosecutorial units of people’s procuratorates; responsibility for oversight of implementation of DLRS shall reside with the criminal enforcement inspectorate units of people’s procuratorates.

    Article 4: Designated locations shall possess the conditions for ordinary daily life and rest and shall be separate from places of interrogation; they shall be equipped with surveillance equipment to facilitate monitoring and management; and they shall possess security measures to ensure the security of case handling.

    Chapter 2: Oversight of Decisions to Impose Designated-Location Residential Surveillance

    Article 5: When a public security organ decides to impose DLRS on a criminal suspect who has no fixed residence, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate at the same administrative level [as the public security organ] shall conduct oversight to determine whether that decision has been made lawfully.

    When a public security organ at a higher administrative level has approved a decision to place an individual suspected of endangering state security or terrorist activity under DLRS, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate at the same administrative level as the public security organ that issued approval shall conduct oversight as to whether that decision has been made lawfully.

    Article 6: When a people’s procuratorate decides to place a criminal suspect who has no fixed residence under DLRS, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate immediately above shall conduct oversight as to whether that decision has been made lawfully.

    When a people’s procuratorate at a higher administrative level has approved a decision to place an individual suspected of serious corruption under DLRS, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate that gave that approval shall conduct oversight as to whether that decision has been made lawfully.

    Article 7: When any of the following conditions apply, the people’s procuratorate shall initiate oversight into whether a decision to impose DLRS is lawful:

    (i) A criminal suspect or his/her legal representatives, close relatives, or defense counsel believe that the decision to impose DLRS is in violation of the law and file a complaint, report, or petition with the people’s procuratorate;

    (ii) When, in the course of its involvement in investigation, review of arrest or indictment requests, review of criminal enforcement, or filing review, the people’s procuratorate discovers that the investigating organ (unit) may have issued a decision to impose DLRS in violation of the law;

    (iii) A people’s supervisor believes that a decision to impose DLRS is in violation of the law and files an oversight opinion with the people’s procuratorate;

    (iv) Other circumstances requiring initiation of oversight.

    Article 8: When initiating oversight of a decision by a people’s procuratorate to place a criminal suspect who has no fixed residence under DLRS, the investigating unit shall furnish the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate at the administrative level immediately superior with copies of the case-filing decision, the decision to impose DLRS, and main pieces of evidence within three days.

    When initiating oversight of a decision to place an individual suspected of serious corruption under DLRS, the investigation unit of the people’s procuratorate that approved the decision shall furnish the aforementioned documents to its own investigation-oversight unit within three days.

    When the people’s procuratorate initiates oversight into a decision to impose DLRS by a public security organ, it may request that the public security organ provide the aforementioned documents.

    Article 9: Oversight into decisions to impose DLRS may be carried out in one of the following ways:

    (i) Review of the relevant case documents;

    (ii) Listening to the investigating organ (unit) present its reasons and factual basis for issuing the decision to impose DLRS;

    (iii) Listening to the opinions of the criminal suspect or his/her legal representatives, close relatives, or defense counsel;

    (iv) Other ways.

    Article 10: In reviewing the legality of a decision to impose DLRS, the people’s procuratorate shall check to see whether the decision satisfies the conditions set out in Articles 72 and 69(3) of the CPL, and further review whether the decision meets the following conditions:

    (i) The criminal suspect has no fixed residence in the city or county where the case-handling organ is located;

    (ii) The public security organ or people’s procuratorate at the administrative level immediately superior has approved the decision to impose DLRS on an individual suspected of endangering state security, terrorist activity, or serious corruption for whom implementation of residential surveillance in his/her own residence would impede the investigation.

    Article 11: The investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate should issue a decision within seven days of initiating oversight into whether a decision to impose DLRS was lawful.

    Article 12: When, having carried out its review, the people’s procuratorate finds that the public security organ’s decision to impose DLRS does not meet the conditions set out by the law, it shall report those findings to the head of the procuratorate and, upon his or her approval, issue a rectification notice to the public security organ and recommend that the public security organ revoke its decision to impose DLRS.

    When the procuratorate finds that a decision to impose DLRS issued by itself or the procuratorate at the next lower administrative level does not meet the conditions set out by the law, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate shall report to the head of the people’s procuratorate and, upon his or her decision, notify its own investigating unit or the people’s procuratorate at the next lower administrative level to revoke the decision to impose DLRS. When notifying the people’s procuratorate at the next lower administrative level to revoke the decision to impose DLRS, the procuratorate shall also circulate a notice to its own investigating unit.

    Article 13: Upon receiving a rectification opinion from the people’s procuratorate at the immediately superior administrative level, the people’s procuratorate shall immediately carry out the recommendation and report on the steps taken to the investigation-oversight unit of the immediately superior people’s procuratorate.

    If the people’s procuratorate believes that the rectification opinion from the immediately superior people’s procuratorate regarding its decision to impose DLRS is in error, it may request a new review by [that same superior] people’s procuratorate within three days of receiving the rectification opinion. The superior people’s procuratorate shall appoint a new procurator to review the case and issue a decision whether to amend its original opinion within five days.

    Article 14: Oversight of decisions by the people’s procuratorate to impose DLRS during the indictment phase shall be carried out in accordance with these provisions by the investigation-oversight unit of the same people’s procuratorate.

    Oversight of decisions by the people’s court to impose DLRS shall be carried out in accordance with these provisions by the prosecutorial unit of the people’s procuratorate at the same administrative level as the court.

    Chapter 3: Oversight of Implementation of Designated-Location Residential Surveillance

    Article 15: Oversight of implementation of DLRS is the responsibility of the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate at the same administrative level as the public security organ that implements the DLRS.

    Article 16: Oversight by people’s procuratorates as to implementation of DLRS shall include the following:

    (i) Whether legal paperwork, such as the DLRS decision or enforcement notice, is complete;

    (ii) Whether the place, term, and personnel are in accordance with regulation;

    (iii) Whether the lawful rights of the person under residential surveillance are being protected;

    (iv) Whether there is any unlawful behavior, such as interrogation in the designated location, corporal punishment, or abuse of the person under residential surveillance;

    (v) Other things that should be monitored in accordance with the law.

    Article 17: When carrying out oversight into the implementation of DLRS, the people’s procuratorate may employ the following measures:

    (i) Review of relevant legal documents; records of any meetings, correspondence, or outgoings by the person under residential surveillance; and physical examination records;

    (ii) On-site inspection of whether the designated location meets the legal conditions;

    (iii) Review of relevant surveillance video footage and, if necessary, physical examination of the person under residential surveillance;

    (iv) Interviews with the person under residential surveillance, enforcement personnel, investigators, or other relevant personnel in order to ascertain and understand relevant circumstances.

    Article 18: Within 24 hours of receiving a copy of a decision to impose DLRS from a public security organ or people’s court, the people’s procuratorate case management unit shall forward the decision to its criminal enforcement inspectorate unit.

    When the investigation unit or prosecution unit of a people’s procuratorate issues a DLRS decision in the name of the procuratorate, it shall send a copy of the DLRS decision to its criminal enforcement inspectorate unit within 24 hours and notify it of the address of the designated location.

    Article 19: Within 24 hours after receiving a copy of the DLRS decision, the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate shall appoint procurators to carry out on-site inspection and complete a record of oversight inspection. Monitoring of DLRS implementation should include return inspection visits by roving teams of no fewer than two procurators at least once per week. Inspection of the implementation of DLRS must not interfere with the ordinary work of criminal investigation.

    Article 20: When oversight of DLRS implementation by the people’s procuratorate uncovers one of the following, the people’s procuratorate shall issue a rectification opinion to the enforcement or investigating organ in accordance with the law:

    (i) Failure of the enforcement organ to appoint enforcement personnel or failure to appoint enforcement personnel in a timely manner upon receipt of the DLRS decision and implementation notice;

    (ii) Except when it is impossible to provide notice, failure to notify the family of the person under residential surveillance within 24 hours of implementing DLRS;

    (iii) Implementation of residential surveillance in a detention center, administrative jail, prison, holding cell, case-handling area, or other location not meeting the statutory conditions for a designated location;

    (iv) Arranging meetings or correspondence between defense lawyers and the person under residential surveillance in ways that violate regulations or illegally restricting the person under residential surveillance from meeting or corresponding with a defense lawyer;

    (v) Failure by a new case-handing organ to issue a new DLRS decision in a timely manner when there is a change in the phase of the criminal process;

    (vi) Failure of the enforcement organ to lift residential surveillance in a timely manner and notify the person under residential surveillance in a timely manner when the case-handling unit issues a decision to lift or change the DLRS conditions and notifies the enforcing organ of such;

    (vii) Demands for payment by the person under residential surveillance or his or her family;

    (viii) Other illegality.

    When the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate discovers that the investigation or prosecutorial unit of its own procuratorate has violated one of the above conditions, it shall seek approval from the head of the procuratorate to issue a rectification opinion.

    Article 21: When the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate finds irregularities in enforcement or security risks in the implementation of DLRS, it shall seek approval from the head of the procuratorate to issue a procuratorial recommendation to the enforcement organ or case-handling organ.

    Article 22: When a rectification notice or procuratorial opinion has been issued, a copy shall be sent to the procuratorate at the administrative level immediately superior as well as to the unit immediately superior to the enforcement unit or case-handling unit.

    Article 23: When a person under residential surveillance dies while under DLRS, the case shall be handled with reference to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate procuratorial procedures for death of a person in custody in a detention facility.

    Article 24: When a people’s court or people’s procuratorate assigns judicial police officers to assist the public security organ with implementation of DLRS, the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate shall carry out oversight of those officers’ assistance with implementation.

    Chapter 4: Additional Provisions

    Article 25: The people’s procuratorate shall process and provide responses in a timely manner to complaints, reports, or petitions regarding imposition or implementation of DLRS from criminal suspects or their legal representatives, close relatives, or defense counsel.

    Article 26: When the investigation-oversight or prosecutorial unit of the people’s procuratorate discovers the possibility of illegality in the implementation of DLRS, they shall report their findings in a timely manner to the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit. When the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit discovers the possibility of illegality in imposing a DLRS decision, it shall report its findings in a timely manner to the investigation-oversight or prosecutorial unit.

    Article 27: If, in the course of its oversight of imposition or implementation of DLRS, the people’s procuratorate discovers violations of disciplinary rules or the law by case-handling personnel or enforcement personnel, it shall seek a decision from the head of the procuratorate to send the case in a timely manner to be handled by the appropriate unit; if the wrongdoing constitutes a criminal offense, it shall pursue criminal responsibility in accordance with the law.

    Article 28: If there are violations of disciplinary rules or violations of the law by procuratorial personnel overseeing imposition or implementation of DLRS, responsibility shall be pursued in accordance with the relevant provisions; if the wrongdoing constitutes a criminal offense, responsibility shall be pursued in accordance with the law.

    Article 29: Oversight of imposition or implementation of DLRS by the people’s procuratorate shall be handled as part of the unified system of duties of the people’s procuratorate. The case-management unit of the people’s procuratorate shall conduct periodic statistical analysis and quality assessment and report results in a timely manner to the relevant units.

    Article 30: These measures take effect from the date of promulgation.

  • China State Security Trials Fell 50 Percent in 2015, Official Data Suggest

    Pu Zhiqiang (pictured above) was arrested for “inciting splittism”, but convicted of “inciting ethnic hatred” and “picking quarrels and provoking trouble”. Source: CCTV, DW-TV

    Chinese courts concluded 50 percent fewer endangering state security (ESS) trials in 2015, according to Dui Hua’s analysis of data released in the annual work report of China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC). Dui Hua believes the decline represents an increase in the use of non-ESS charges to prosecute political and religious activism.

    Dui Hua estimates that Chinese courts concluded more than 500 ESS trials of the first instance in 2015, compared with more than 1,000 ESS trials in 2014. Delivered to the National People’s Congress by SPC President Zhou Qiang on March 13, 2016, the annual work report includes ESS and endangering national defense (END) crimes in a category of “Other” trials. The category comprised 0.06 percent of first-instance criminal trials in 2015, compared with 0.13 percent in 2014. Based on an accounting of all of the crime categories in China’s Criminal Law and historical data on END trials, Dui Hua believes that the “Other” category is primarily populated by ESS cases—according to China Law Yearbook, only 243 END trials were concluded in 2014.

    ESS crimes, which include subversion, inciting subversion, splittism, espionage, and state secrets violations, carry a mandatory supplemental sentence of deprivation of political rights (DPR). This sentence precludes individuals from writing articles, giving interviews, voting, standing for office, and working in a state-owned company.

    The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region typically accounts for the largest percentage of ESS trials of any Chinese region. According to the annual work report of the Xinjiang High People’s Court, courts in the autonomous region heard approximately 100 ESS trials in 2015, down from about 300 trials per year in 2014 and 2013. The same work report reveals that trials for the category of crimes that cover “terrorism” surged about 25 percent respectively in 2015. Dui Hua believes that many of the trials for cult and terrorism crimes had previously been handled as ESS trials.

    As previously reported by Dui Hua, ESS indictments by procuratorates in 2014 rose to a record level since the criminal category was introduced in 1997: 1,411 people were indicted in 663 cases. In light of the sharp drop in ESS trials in 2015, Dui Hua expects that ESS indictments also fell by a significant margin last year. The numbers are expected to be released later this year when the 2016 China Law Yearbook is published.

    ESS “and Other” Trials

    Pu Zhiqiang’s recent conviction is a prominent example of the uncertainty with which the justice system categorizes political activities as endangering state security. Police initially charged Pu with the ESS crime of “inciting splittism” for criticizing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on his microblog. However, his conviction at trial was ultimately for the non-ESS crimes of “inciting ethnic hatred” and “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.” Although Pu was given a suspended sentence, he is not a free man—he continues to serve a sentence through compulsory measures and will be subject to various regulations, the violation of which could result in his future detention.

    Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database (PPDB) records the names of 19 people tried for ESS crimes in 2015. Mettursun Eziz was sentenced in May to four years in prison and three years deprivation of political rights (DPR) for inciting splittism. The Henan Nanyang Intermediate People’s Court found that he used voice-messaging apps like WeChat to download a large number of “extreme religious materials” produced by the East Turkestan Islamic Party (ETIP). Mettursun Eziz is scheduled for release on April 2, 2018.

    In perhaps the most widely reported ESS trial of 2015, prominent journalist Gao Yu (高瑜) was sentenced to seven years in prison for leaking state secrets in April. Observers have attributed the charges to the leaking of “Document Number 9,” an internal CCP manifesto that rails against democracy, civil society, and universal values like human rights. In November, the Beijing High People’s Court reduced Gao’s sentence to a five-year term and allowed the 71-year-old to serve the remainder of her term outside prison.

    In December, the Nanyang Intermediate People’s Court sentenced prominent religious figure Li Baocheng (李保成) to four years in prison for inciting subversion and fraud. Henan’s Dahe Daily accused the 77-year-old of extortion for charging “baptism fees.” Li was also found guilty of discussing plans to establish a new political party to challenge the CCP.

    2015 First Instance Trials for ESS Cases in the Dui Hua PPDB
    NameSex Crime1st instance Trial Date1st Instance Verdict
    Du X
    杜某
    MInciting subversion12/15/201510 Months, 1 Yr DPR
    Gao Yu
    高瑜
    FIllegally procuring/trafficking in state secrets/intelligence for foreign entities04/17/20157 Yrs, 1 Yr DPR
    Han X
    韩某
    MIllegally procuring/trafficking in state secrets/intelligence for foreign entities01/29/20158 Yrs, 4 Yrs DPR
    Li Baocheng
    李保成
    MInciting subversion12/15/20154 Yrs, 2 Yrs DPR
    Li X
    李某
    MInciting subversion12/15/20151 Yr, 1 Yr DPR
    Liang Qinhui
    梁勤辉
    MInciting subversion11/13/2015Unknown
    Liu Chao
    刘超
    MInciting subversion01/27/20151 Yr (DPR Unknown)
    Liu Jiacai
    刘家财
    MInciting subversion05/08/20155 Yrs, 3 Yrs DPR
    Mettursun Eziz
    麦提图尔荪·艾则孜
    MInciting splittism03/17/20154 Yrs, 3 Yrs DPR
    Paziniye
    排孜妮耶
    FInciting splittism12/21/20155 Yrs, 2 Yrs DPR
    Qamber Amber
    卡姆巴尔·阿穆巴尔
    MInciting splittism03/21/20159 Yrs (DPR unknown)
    Wang Mo
    王默
    MInciting subversion11/19/2015Unkown
    Xie Fengxia
    谢丰夏
    MInciting subversion11/19/2015Unknown
    Yang Mingyu
    杨明玉
    MInciting subversion09/23/20153 Yrs, 4 Yrs DPR
    Yang X
    杨某
    MInciting subversion12/15/20151.5 Yrs, 1 Yr DPR
    Yang X
    杨某
    MInciting subversion12/15/201510 Months, 1 Yr DPR
    Zhang Rongping 张荣平MInciting subversion11/13/2015Unknown
    Zhang X
    张某
    MIllegally procuring/trafficking in state secrets/intelligence for foreign entities02/12/20156 Yrs, 1 Yr DPR
    Zhao X
    赵某
    MIllegally procuring/trafficking in state secrets/intelligence for foreign entities01/20157 Yrs, 2 Yrs DPR
  • China Issues Oversight Rules for “Non-residential” Residential Surveillance

    The Supreme People’s Procuratorate building in Beijing.

    Not long after the draft of the amended Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) was released by China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) for public comment in August 2011, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances expressed concern that the provisions relating to the coercive measure known as “designated-location residential surveillance” (zhiding jusuo jianshi juzhu) would legalize enforced disappearances. In late 2015, the United Nations Committee against Torture (CAT) went further and called on China to abolish the measure.

    The Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) subsequently issued trial rules for determining the necessity of detention and rules to govern oversight of “designated-location residential surveillance” (DLRS), which had leapt back into the headlines in 2015 as part of a police crackdown against Chinese rights lawyers that intensified in July.

    A Coercive Measure

    Custodial detention or arrest takes place in detention centers, ordinary residential surveillance in one’s residence. DLRS happens someplace else, perhaps in a hotel or guesthouse, where law enforcement agents hold criminal suspects or defendants for up to six months while they investigate alleged crimes or prepare a case for trial.

    Authorities justify the lengthy six-month period by stating that residential surveillance is relatively lenient—not depriving people of their liberty, but merely restricting it. Nonetheless, individuals held under DLRS face an environment ripe with potential abuse and rights violations.

    When law enforcement uses the practice against people charged with endangering state security (ESS), terrorist activity, or serious corruption, the outcome is hard to distinguish from enforced disappearance or incommunicado detention. In these types of cases, investigators may use the law to deny families the knowledge of where their loved ones are being held and to deny detainees’ access to a lawyer. Within 24 hours of carrying out DLRS, investigators are only required to provide families with notice of detention and of the alleged offense.

    What a Difference Two Years Makes

    Faced with public opposition to the practice, legislators granted oversight powers to the procuratorate, but it has taken nearly two years for the SPP to define its role. In the meantime, as predicted, DLRS has become a routine part of handling politically sensitive cases. Though its high costs of facilities and manpower are somewhat prohibitive, DLRS is unparalleled in its long duration, ability to isolate detainees, option to delay intervention by legal counsel, and general capacity to exert psychological (and, in some cases, physical) pressure on suspects.

    Unfortunately, the new rules will do little to diminish these serious violations of due process. Procurators are concerned with whether DLRS is carried out lawfully, yet the most concerning aspects of the practice are themselves spelled out in the law.

    Focus on Decisions, Implementation

    The SPP has yet to publish their oversight regulations, but highly controlled media reporting sheds some light on their content. One thing is clear: the intention of the rules is bureaucratic oversight, not judicial oversight. Procurators will likely focus on examining paperwork, making the occasional inspection, and issuing instructions in case anything is out of the ordinary. People held under DLRS may initiate the oversight process by filing complaints independently or through their advocates. What appear to be missing are mechanisms for hearings to allow for the presentation of evidence or for appeals to challenge procuratorial decisions.

    Monitoring by the procuratorate will focus on two areas: (1) whether the decision to impose DLRS was lawful and (2) whether DLRS has been lawfully implemented. The former chiefly concerns whether the case involves a person who either (a) lacks a fixed residence in the county or city where the criminal investigation is taking place, or (b) is suspected of ESS, terrorism-related offenses, or serious corruption. In case of (b), the law requires investigators to substantiate a claim that ordinary residential surveillance would impede their investigation and obtain approval for DLRS from their immediately superior law-enforcement unit.

    The second area of focus involves ensuring that all paperwork is in order; necessary notices have been delivered; and the appropriate location, duration, and personnel are employed. Procurators would also ensure that detainees’ lawful rights are being protected, interrogations are held in separate locations, and no “physical punishment or abuse” is inflicted.

    Adding Inspections

    Oversight activities require procurators to make an on-scene inspection within 24 hours of receiving a copy of a decision to carry out DLRS. This inspection presumably enables inspectors to interview detainees and establish whether they have any allegations to make. It should also allow them to ascertain whether the designated location meets the lawful conditions for “ordinary living and rest” and to ensure that surveillance cameras and safety equipment are installed.

    The rules also appear to require procurators to visit the location at least once a week for the duration of DLRS. Periodic inspections should offer minimal guarantees against physical torture or ill treatment. They are inadequate, however, in preventing mental suffering and the use of other cruel and degrading treatment.

    Also troubling is the requirement that inspections be carried out in ways that do not interfere with investigations. This prioritizes the needs of investigators over the rights of detainees and may give investigators broad discretion to delay access to facilities.

    Missing the Mark

    This type of oversight, with its emphasis on ensuring adherence to applicable laws and regulations, will no doubt help to limit certain kinds of arbitrary and abusive behaviors. Other arbitrary practices and violations of due process will remain unaffected because they are legally sanctioned. For example, procurators are very unlikely to challenge investigators’ decisions to deny access to legal counsel to individuals charged with ESS or terrorism. The CPL empowers investigators to deny such access if they believe it might interfere with their investigation.

    In their attention to the legality of decision and implementation, procurators may also fail to scrutinize the legitimacy of charges made against detainees. Investigators can use flimsy evidence to initiate ESS investigations—thereby justifying the use of DLRS and exclusion of legal counsel—only to modify the charges when requesting approval of formal arrest after expiry of the six-month time limit.

    Ultimately, however well intentioned it might be, this kind of bureaucratic review cannot address the risks of DLRS. The measure grants law-enforcement investigators too much power over individuals, and the procuratorate lacks both power and incentive to challenge DLRS decisions, especially in the kinds of politically sensitive cases where abuse is most likely.

    The best solution would be for China to abolish DLRS, or at the very least, to restore detainees’ rights to full access to legal counsel and to communicate with the outside world. Anything less, and China is sanctioning enforced disappearances.

  • China: State Security Indictments Hit Record High in 2014

    Sources: Dui Hua; China Law Yearbook (various years)

    China indicted more people for endangering state security (ESS) crimes in 2014 than in any year since China Law Yearbook began reporting the figure in 1999. The number of people indicted rose to 1,411, up 2 percent from 1,384 in 2013. These indictments spanned 663 cases, compared with 608 cases in the previous year.

    With the uptick in indictments, the number of trials in the category that includes ESS jumped 20 percent. China Law Yearbook reports ESS trials in aggregate along with trials for dereliction of military duty and possibly other crimes. The number of trials in this category hit 1,074 in 2014, compared with 893 in 2013. Based on indictment statistics from previous years, Dui Hua has assumed that the number of trials attributed to dereliction of military duty and other crimes was negligible. Trial numbers are limited to trials of first instance that courts concluded during the year.

    The ESS trial that received the most international attention in 2014 was that of Uyghur activist and scholar Ilham Tohti. He was convicted of splittism in September 2014 and sentenced to life in prison for operating a Uyghur news website. Including Ilham Tohti, Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database has information on 18 people tried for ESS in 2014, down from 32 in 2013 and 26 in 2012. Thus far in 2015, Dui Hua has information on nine people tried for endangering state security.

    Chinese courts invariably convict and sentence those tried for ESS. Although acquittals are extremely rare, relatively light sentences are sometimes imposed. In 2014, at least three of those tried—Gu Yimin, Liang Haiyi, and Liu Benqi—were released by year end. All three were convicted of inciting subversion. Gu and Liu were tried for online posts that were critical of the Chinese government. Gu was sentenced to 1.5 years in prison and Liu to three years, but both were released due to time served in detention. Liang was likely tried for online posts and her involvement in public protests. Detained in 2011, Liang was released after a court sentenced her to a suspended sentence of two years.

    ESS covers a range of political crimes including subversion, inciting subversion, splittism, inciting splittism, espionage, and state secrets violations. While it is considered the most serious category of political crimes—and is the only category that carries a mandatory supplemental sentence of deprivation of political rights—ESS crimes are not the only legal avenue used to punish activists. In recent years, authorities have also used “disturbing social order” crimes like “picking quarrels and provoking troubles” and economic crimes like fraud and operating an illegal business to put away critics.

    “The number of individuals indicted for ESS crimes reached an all time high in 2014, a striking and troubling development,” said Dui Hua Executive Director John Kamm. “Given ongoing campaigns against protest and dissent, especially in the western region of Xinjiang, the number of ESS indictments and trials are unlikely to fall in 2015.”

  • Xinjiang State Security Trials Flat, Criminal Trials Soar in 2014

    Sentences are announced for 55 defendants, including some convicted of splittism, a state security crime, at a public sentencing rally in Xinjiang’s Ili Prefecture on May 27, 2014. Image Credit: voachinese.com

    Xinjiang’s high court recently reported that, as compared with 2013, the number of endangering state security (ESS) trials in Xinjiang was flat in 2014. A graph included in the court’s annual work report and Dui Hua estimates released last year indicate that about 300 ESS trials of first instance were concluded in Xinjiang in each year. ESS trials can be used as a proxy for the suppression of human rights activism since several of the crimes in the ESS category are constituted by certain kinds of speech and association.

    A significant jump in the number of overall criminal trials indicates, however, that even without growth in ESS trials, authorities heightened the suppression of human rights activism and dissent in Xinjiang. The number of criminal trials concluded in the region soared more than 40 percent to 29,511 trials, including those of first and second instance. Kicked off in May 2014, Xi Jinping’s “anti-terrorism” campaign likely played a significant role in increased law enforcement.

    Concluded First-instance Criminal Trials in Xinjiang by Crime Category, 2013 & 2014

    Sources: Dui Hua; Xinjiang High People’s Court Annual Work Report, 2015

    Concluded First-Instance ESS Trials in Xinjiang, 2010-2014

    Note: Figures for 2012-2014 are estimates made by Dui Hua; all other data were reported by Xinjiang authorities.
    Sources: Dui Hua; Xinjiang High People’s Court Annual Work Report, 2011-2015; Xinjiang Yearbook, 2011-2013

    Three categories of crimes accounted for the bulk of the annual increase in criminal trials. Trials for obstructing social administrative order doubled to exceed 4,500. This category of crimes can be used to target unauthorized Islamic and Christian groups or “cults” and covers activities including the distribution of religious materials as well as assemblies and demonstrations.

    Trials for infringing upon citizens’ personal and democratic rights almost doubled nearly reaching 7,500. This category of crimes includes the offense of “inciting racial hatred and discrimination,” which may be applied to people who disseminate information that “tarnishes” China’s ethnic harmony by, for example, challenging government bans on beards, veils, and religious observance.

    Naming Names

    Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database includes the names of about a dozen people convicted of ESS crimes in Xinjiang in 2014. Ilham Tohti, a Uyghur scholar sentenced to life in prison for splittism, is the most well known. Seven of his students also went to trial for their involvement in the operation of Uyghur news site uighurbiz.net. All were convicted of splittism, and four were sentenced to 3-8 years’ imprisonment. Luo Yuwei (罗玉伟), a member of the Yi ethnic group, received the shortest sentence of three years, according to prominent Chinese lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan. Luo joined Perhat Halmurat and Shohret Tursun in a televised confession, presumably under duress, last November. The other students convicted in the case are Abdukeyum Ablimit, Mutellip Imin, Akbar Imin, and Atikem Rozi, the only woman in the group.

    In a lesser-known splittism case, Reyim Abuliz was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment in Ili Prefecture. She was involved in one of the 11 cases of Communist Party members and civil servants punished for violating political discipline. The teacher was accused of using China’s mobile instant messaging app WeChat to send “sensitive” pictures and audio materials to a number of individuals.

    Last May, state news media reported that five Uyghurs, whose names were not fully revealed, were convicted of splittism and sentenced to 7-15 years’ imprisonment in a public sentencing rally in Kashgar Prefecture. They were condemned in front of 300 cadres and students for disseminating information about hijrah and jihad through mobile and online networks and for “indoctrinating” young children in “extremism” in unauthorized religious classes.

    Zhao Haitong (赵海通) was the only Han Chinese known to have been convicted of ESS in Xinjiang in 2014. He was convicted of inciting subversion, and possibly other crimes, and sentenced by the Urumqi Intermediate People’s Court to 14 years in prison. Zhao actively participated in a series of small-scale protests against Internet censorship and miscarriages of justice and called for officials to disclose their assets. A Guangzhou-based lawyer has claimed that Zhao’s case was related to Xinjiang’s “ethnic issues.”

    Xinjiang typically accounts for the majority of China’s ESS trials, however, official data has yet to be released showing whether the nation’s ESS trial numbers grew in 2014. That said, in 2013 ESS indictments showed strong annual growth with 32 percent more individuals indicted in 57 percent more cases.

  • Xinjiang State Security Trials Flat, Criminal Trials Soar in 2014

    Sentences are announced for 55 defendants, including some convicted of splittism, a state security crime, at a public sentencing rally in Xinjiang’s Ili Prefecture on May 27, 2014. Image Credit: voachinese.com

    Xinjiang’s high court recently reported that, as compared with 2013, the number of endangering state security (ESS) trials in Xinjiang was flat in 2014. A graph included in the court’s annual work report and Dui Hua estimates released last year indicate that about 300 ESS trials of first instance were concluded in Xinjiang in each year. ESS trials can be used as a proxy for the suppression of human rights activism since several of the crimes in the ESS category are constituted by certain kinds of speech and association.

    A significant jump in the number of overall criminal trials indicates, however, that even without growth in ESS trials, authorities heightened the suppression of human rights activism and dissent in Xinjiang. The number of criminal trials concluded in the region soared more than 40 percent to 29,511 trials, including those of first and second instance. Kicked off in May 2014, Xi Jinping’s “anti-terrorism” campaign likely played a significant role in increased law enforcement.

    Concluded First-instance Criminal Trials in Xinjiang by Crime Category, 2013 & 2014

    Sources: Dui Hua; Xinjiang High People’s Court Annual Work Report, 2015

    Concluded First-Instance ESS Trials in Xinjiang, 2010-2014

    Note: Figures for 2012-2014 are estimates made by Dui Hua; all other data were reported by Xinjiang authorities.
    Sources: Dui Hua; Xinjiang High People’s Court Annual Work Report, 2011-2015; Xinjiang Yearbook, 2011-2013

    Three categories of crimes accounted for the bulk of the annual increase in criminal trials. Trials for obstructing social administrative order doubled to exceed 4,500. This category of crimes can be used to target unauthorized Islamic and Christian groups or “cults” and covers activities including the distribution of religious materials as well as assemblies and demonstrations.

    Trials for infringing upon citizens’ personal and democratic rights almost doubled nearly reaching 7,500. This category of crimes includes the offense of “inciting racial hatred and discrimination,” which may be applied to people who disseminate information that “tarnishes” China’s ethnic harmony by, for example, challenging government bans on beards, veils, and religious observance.

    Naming Names

    Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database includes the names of about a dozen people convicted of ESS crimes in Xinjiang in 2014. Ilham Tohti, a Uyghur scholar sentenced to life in prison for splittism, is the most well known. Seven of his students also went to trial for their involvement in the operation of Uyghur news site uighurbiz.net. All were convicted of splittism, and four were sentenced to 3-8 years’ imprisonment. Luo Yuwei (罗玉伟), a member of the Yi ethnic group, received the shortest sentence of three years, according to prominent Chinese lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan. Luo joined Perhat Halmurat and Shohret Tursun in a televised confession, presumably under duress, last November. The other students convicted in the case are Abdukeyum Ablimit, Mutellip Imin, Akbar Imin, and Atikem Rozi, the only woman in the group.

    In a lesser-known splittism case, Reyim Abuliz was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment in Ili Prefecture. She was involved in one of the 11 cases of Communist Party members and civil servants punished for violating political discipline. The teacher was accused of using China’s mobile instant messaging app WeChat to send “sensitive” pictures and audio materials to a number of individuals.

    Last May, state news media reported that five Uyghurs, whose names were not fully revealed, were convicted of splittism and sentenced to 7-15 years’ imprisonment in a public sentencing rally in Kashgar Prefecture. They were condemned in front of 300 cadres and students for disseminating information about hijrah and jihad through mobile and online networks and for “indoctrinating” young children in “extremism” in unauthorized religious classes.

    Zhao Haitong (赵海通) was the only Han Chinese known to have been convicted of ESS in Xinjiang in 2014. He was convicted of inciting subversion, and possibly other crimes, and sentenced by the Urumqi Intermediate People’s Court to 14 years in prison. Zhao actively participated in a series of small-scale protests against Internet censorship and miscarriages of justice and called for officials to disclose their assets. A Guangzhou-based lawyer has claimed that Zhao’s case was related to Xinjiang’s “ethnic issues.”

    Xinjiang typically accounts for the majority of China’s ESS trials, however, official data has yet to be released showing whether the nation’s ESS trial numbers grew in 2014. That said, in 2013 ESS indictments showed strong annual growth with 32 percent more individuals indicted in 57 percent more cases.

  • State Security Indictments, Cult Trials Up in Xi Jinping’s 2013

    Zhao Haitong, seen in a detention center, was reportedly arrested in August 2013 and sentenced to 14 years in October 2014 for crimes including inciting subversion. Zhao was one of many arrested for ESS crimes during 2013, Xi’s first year as party secretary. Photo credit: RFA

    Statistics recently released in China Law Yearbook (CLY) call into question earlier data reported by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) and indicate that in 2013 indictments for crimes of endangering state security (ESS) reached the second highest level on record. The authoritative compendium typically includes arrest and indictment data for ESS—the category of crimes that comprises the most serious political offenses including subversion, splittism, and their incitement—and for the first time, provides data on the number of trials for cult offenses used to prosecute Falun Gong and other banned religious groups.

    In contrast with past editions, the CLY published in 2014 does not refer explicitly to ESS in its accounting of arrests and indictments approved or made by the SPP. These numbers are not difficult to calculate, however, since the SPP work report for 2013 states that ESS statistics are aggregated with those of endangering national defense interests (ENDI) and dereliction of military duty (DMD), and the CLY provides disaggregated data for the latter categories.

    This arithmetic shows that in 2013 the SPP indicted 1,384 individuals in 607 ESS cases, up 32 and 57 percent year-on-year, respectively. The number of individuals indicted for ESS in 2013 is the second highest figure reported in the CLY since reporting began in 1998. The highest figure was reached in 2008 when Tibetan protests contributed to a total of 1,407 indictments. Dui Hua’s previous estimate of ESS indictments for 2013 was based on a SPP work report released in March 2014, which may significantly underreport this figure. The higher numbers provided in the CLY are not only more authoritative but more in line with the conditions on the ground. Despite the discrepancy in figures, Dui Hua maintains that in 2013 the procuratorate frequently used other crimes (e.g., “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” and “illegal assembly”) as proxies for ESS crimes making the increase in ESS indictments all the more staggering.

    The change in the number of arrests was less dramatic. We calculate that the SPP authorized public security and state security organs to arrest 937 individuals involved in 532 ESS cases in 2013. Compared with 2012, this represents an 18 percent decrease in individuals arrested but a 12 percent increase in cases. An average of 1.76 and 2.33 individuals were arrested in each ESS case in 2013 and 2012, respectively.

    The 2014 CLY does not provide disaggregated data for ESS trials, and unlike the SPP, the Supreme People’s Court does not provide notation that indicates how to arrive at this data. Given substantial growth in the number of ESS indictments nationwide and ESS trials in Xinjiang, where most of these trials occur, Dui Hua believes that there was an increase in the number of ESS trials concluded in China in 2013. We previously estimated that the number of ESS trials in Xinjiang grew 10 percent to 300 trials of first instance in 2013. Nationwide, 369 ESS first-instance trials were concluded in 2012.

    A lack of transparency in ESS cases continues to be a serious hurdle to protecting the rights of prisoners of conscience. Of the hundreds of people who faced ESS charges in 2013, only 31 made it into Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database (PPDB) as arrested, indicted, or tried. More than half of them are Tibetans implicated in self-immolation protests. Others are Han Chinese activists who called on government officials to disclose their assets through small-scale street protests. Although Xinjiang typically accounts for the majority of the ESS cases nationwide, we have discovered the names of just three Uyghurs sentenced for inciting splittism in that year.

    Known Individuals Facing Endangering State Security Charges, 2013
    NameType (Arrested: A,
    Indicted: I, Tried: T)
    ProvinceCharge(s)SentenceRelease
    Date
    Abdusalam Abulat
    阿不都萨拉木•阿卜来提
    TXinjiangInciting splittism10 yearsApr 2023
    Abulkerim Mehmet
    阿卜力克木•买买提
    TXinjiangInciting splittism4 yearsApr 2017
    Cerzha
    才扎
    AQinghaiInciting splittism––
    Chakdor
    恰多
    TSichuaninciting splittism4 years2016
    Choejor
    曲乔
    TTibetInciting splittism13 years2026
    Dorje
    多吉
    TQinghaiInciting splittism2.5 yearsMay 2015
    Gu Yimin
    顾义民
    IJiangsuInciting subversion1.5 yearsNov 2014
    Gyadehor
    加德合
    TQinghaiInciting splittism4 yearsFeb 2017
    Hortsang Tamdrin
    霍仓丹真
    TSichuanInciting splittism4.5 yearsOct 2017
    Jigme Tanke
    久买谈克
    TQinghaiInciting splittism5 years2018
    Kelsang Dangzhi
    尕藏当智
    TQinghaiInciting splittism6 years2019
    Kerem Mehmet
    克热木•买买提
    TXinjiangInciting splittism10 years2023
    Kunchok Choephel
    贡却曲培
    TTibetInciting splittism6 yearsNov 2019
    Liu Benqi
    刘本琦
    IQinghaiInciting subversion3 yearsJul 2015
    Liu Jiacai
    刘家财
    AHubeiInciting subversion––
    Lolo
    洛洛
    TQinghaiInciting splittism6 years2018
    Lobsang
    落桑
    TQinghaiInciting splittism4 years2017
    Huang Wenxun
    黄文勋
    AHubeiInciting subversion*4 yearsJun 2017
    Pema Trinley
    白玛赤列
    TSichuanInciting splittism4 years2016
    Phagpa
    普化
    TQinghaiInciting splittism, murder13 years2025
    Tenzin Rangdol
    丹增让卓
    TTibetInciting splittism5 yearsOct 2018
    Topden
    多丹
    TTibetInciting splittism5 yearsOct 2018
    Trinley Tsekar
    赤列次嘎
    TTibetInciting splittism9 years2021
    Tselha
    次拉
    TTibetInciting splittism3 years2016
    Wang XX
    王xx
    THunanInciting subversion3 yearsJul 2015
    Yang Lin
    杨林
    AGuangdongInciting subversion––
    Yuan Bing
    袁兵
    AHubeiInciting subversion*––
    Yang Wei
    杨微
    AGuangdongInciting subversion––
    Yuan Xiaohua
    袁小华
    AHubeiInciting subversion*––
    Zhao Haitong
    赵海通
    AXinjiangInciting subversion**14 yearsAug 2027
    *This charge was later changed to gathering a crowd to disrupt traffic.
    ** May include other charges. Source: Dui Hua
    Known Cult Crime Sentences by Group, 2013

    Source: Dui Hua Foundation

    Expanding the official picture of prisoners of conscience, the 2014 CLY provides a first-ever accounting of trials of first instance for Article 300: “leading or using a cult to undermine implementation of the law.” The yearbook said that the number of so-called cult trials rose nearly 60 percent year-on-year to 1,554 trials in 2013.

    As compared with information on ESS cases, information on Article 300 cases is typically more accessible. Dui Hua’s PPDB documents about a third (517) of the individuals tried in 2013. Falun Gong accounted for 65 percent of known cases, with Almighty God accounting for 32 percent and unorthodox Protestant sects such as Spirit Sect and Society of Disciples making up about 3 percent.

    2013 was Xi Jinping’s first year as party secretary, and in that year, he oversaw roughly three times as many ESS arrests and indictments as Hu Jintao did in 2003, Hu’s first year as party secretary. In Xi’s second year even more people are likely to have faced ESS charges, as policing increased in Xinjiang and the nationwide crackdown on dissent continued.