Tag: endangering state security

  • Xinjiang Obscures State Security Stats, Trials Likely Up 10%

    Police patrol around the clock to prevent crimes in Kashgar, XUAR, June 30, 2013. Photo credit: news.sina.com

    Dui Hua estimates that the number of endangering state security (ESS) trials in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) rose 10 percent to nearly 300 trials in 2013. The estimate is based on information reported in the annual work report of the XUAR High People’s Court. In marked contrast with the transparency with which it treated ESS trial numbers in reports issued since 2008, this year’s report does not provide the exact number of ESS trials concluded.

    The high court states that 21,061 criminal trials of first and second instance were concluded in 2013, and that ESS cases accounted for 1.67 percent of concluded criminal trials of first instance.

    First-instance trials accounted for about 84 percent of all criminal trials concluded in XUAR in each year between 2010 and 2012. Assuming a constant ratio in 2013, XUAR concluded 17,712 first-instance criminal cases, of which 296 (1.67 percent) were ESS trials.

    The Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) joined XUAR as the only provinces or autonomous regions to quantify ESS trials in their annual court reports. The TAR High People’s Court reported that 20 ESS cases were tried in the region in 2013. Dui Hua believes that, as in previous years, XUAR continued to account for the majority of ESS trials nationwide.

    Criminal and ESS Trials in XUAR, 2010-2013
    YearConcluded Criminal CasesConcluded ESS Cases
     First instanceFirst & second instance% First instanceFirst
    instance
    First & second instance% First instance
    2010167521978584.6731437683.51
    2011170972077282.3136641488.41
    2012187082195285.22270 *31485.96 §
    201317712 †2106184.10 §296 ‡––
    Source: Dui Hua, Xinjiang High Court Annual Work Reports, Xinjiang Yearbook
    * Dui Hua calculation: first and second instance ESS trials times estimated percentage of first instance ESS trials.
    § Dui Hua calculation: average of percentages in previous years.
    † Dui Hua calculation: first and second instance criminal trials times estimated percentage of first instance criminal trials.
    ‡ Dui Hua calculation: 1.67% (officially reported ratio) of estimated first instance criminal trials.

    Public information about individual defendants remained extremely limited. Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database has the names of three Uyghurs tried for ESS crimes in XUAR in 2013. Nurmamat Ibrahim (努尔麦麦提.伊布拉音) was one of the 95 defendants tried in 21 ESS cases by the Ili Intermediate People’s Court. Enwer Obul (艾尼瓦尔.乌布力) was among 10 defendants tried for inciting splittism by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps 3rd Agricultural Division Intermediate People’s Court in March 2013. Information is not available on the evidence against them or the outcomes of their trials.

    Kerem Mehmet (克热木.买买提) was sentenced for inciting splittism to 10 years’ imprisonment by the Bayinguoleng Monggol [Bayingolin] Autonomous Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court on March 26, 2013. Allegations against him included disseminating information about ethnic separatism, terrorism, and religious extremism through an online discussion group. He was also found guilty of possessing illegal books and mobile storage devices containing reactionary propaganda.

    The geographic spread of ESS trials is not even throughout the region. Kashgar alone tries more than 60 percent of Xinjiang’s ESS cases. The intermediate court in Kezilesu Kirghiz [Kizilsu] Autonomous Prefecture tried 18 ESS cases involving 29 individuals in 2013, while in the first 10 months of 2013, Hami Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court concluded just one case of inciting splittism.

    Although often conflated, ESS crimes do not include terrorism; instead, they often involve speech and association. None of the five defendants who participated in the Bachu incident on April 23, 2013, nor none of the four defendants who took part in the Shanshan Riots on June 26, 2013, were convicted of ESS crimes.

    The vast majority of ESS defendants appear to be Uyghurs passing through Kashgar, but their identities, acts, and fates remain unknown.

  • Xinjiang Obscures State Security Stats, Trials Likely Up 10%

    Police patrol around the clock to prevent crimes in Kashgar, XUAR, June 30, 2013. Photo credit: news.sina.com

    Dui Hua estimates that the number of endangering state security (ESS) trials in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) rose 10 percent to nearly 300 trials in 2013. The estimate is based on information reported in the annual work report of the XUAR High People’s Court. In marked contrast with the transparency with which it treated ESS trial numbers in reports issued since 2008, this year’s report does not provide the exact number of ESS trials concluded.

    The high court states that 21,061 criminal trials of first and second instance were concluded in 2013, and that ESS cases accounted for 1.67 percent of concluded criminal trials of first instance.

    First-instance trials accounted for about 84 percent of all criminal trials concluded in XUAR in each year between 2010 and 2012. Assuming a constant ratio in 2013, XUAR concluded 17,712 first-instance criminal cases, of which 296 (1.67 percent) were ESS trials.

    The Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) joined XUAR as the only provinces or autonomous regions to quantify ESS trials in their annual court reports. The TAR High People’s Court reported that 20 ESS cases were tried in the region in 2013. Dui Hua believes that, as in previous years, XUAR continued to account for the majority of ESS trials nationwide.

    Criminal and ESS Trials in XUAR, 2010-2013
    YearConcluded Criminal CasesConcluded ESS Cases
    First instanceFirst & second instance% First instanceFirst
    instance
    First & second instance% First instance
    2010167521978584.6731437683.51
    2011170972077282.3136641488.41
    2012187082195285.22270 *31485.96 §
    201317712 †2106184.10 §296 ‡––
    Source: Dui Hua, Xinjiang High Court Annual Work Reports, Xinjiang Yearbook
    * Dui Hua calculation: first and second instance ESS trials times estimated percentage of first instance ESS trials.
    § Dui Hua calculation: average of percentages in previous years.
    † Dui Hua calculation: first and second instance criminal trials times estimated percentage of first instance criminal trials.
    ‡ Dui Hua calculation: 1.67% (officially reported ratio) of estimated first instance criminal trials.

    Public information about individual defendants remained extremely limited. Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database has the names of three Uyghurs tried for ESS crimes in XUAR in 2013. Nurmamat Ibrahim (努尔麦麦提.伊布拉音) was one of the 95 defendants tried in 21 ESS cases by the Ili Intermediate People’s Court. Enwer Obul (艾尼瓦尔.乌布力) was among 10 defendants tried for inciting splittism by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps 3rd Agricultural Division Intermediate People’s Court in March 2013. Information is not available on the evidence against them or the outcomes of their trials.

    Kerem Mehmet (克热木.买买提) was sentenced for inciting splittism to 10 years’ imprisonment by the Bayinguoleng Monggol [Bayingolin] Autonomous Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court on March 26, 2013. Allegations against him included disseminating information about ethnic separatism, terrorism, and religious extremism through an online discussion group. He was also found guilty of possessing illegal books and mobile storage devices containing reactionary propaganda.

    The geographic spread of ESS trials is not even throughout the region. Kashgar alone tries more than 60 percent of Xinjiang’s ESS cases. The intermediate court in Kezilesu Kirghiz [Kizilsu] Autonomous Prefecture tried 18 ESS cases involving 29 individuals in 2013, while in the first 10 months of 2013, Hami Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court concluded just one case of inciting splittism.

    Although often conflated, ESS crimes do not include terrorism; instead, they often involve speech and association. None of the five defendants who participated in the Bachu incident on April 23, 2013, nor none of the four defendants who took part in the Shanshan Riots on June 26, 2013, were convicted of ESS crimes.

    The vast majority of ESS defendants appear to be Uyghurs passing through Kashgar, but their identities, acts, and fates remain unknown.

  • China’s State Security Arrests Up 19% in 2012

    Twelve men accused of ESS are publicly sentenced in Yili (Ili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, Xinjiang, September 18, 2008. Photo credit: iyaxin.com

    China arrested 1,105 people for “endangering state security” (ESS) crimes in 2012, up 19 percent from 2011, according to official statistics released in China Law Yearbook 2013. The number of people indicted rose 8 percent to 1,049.

    ESS trials involved more people per case allowing for a decline in ESS trials amid increases in arrests and indictments. The number of first-instance ESS cases received by Chinese courts across the country fell 13.58 percent year-on-year to 369 in 2012, the yearbook said. An average of 2.7 people were indicted per ESS case—compared with a person-per-case ratio of 1.5 for all types of indictments (including ESS) in 2012 and of 2.6 for ESS indictments in 2011 (Table 1).

    Dui Hua estimates that Xinjiang accounted for 75 percent of ESS trials in 2012 and 86 percent of ESS trials in 2011. (This revises lower Dui Hua estimates based on disaggregated national data.) Xinjiang’s high court reported in January that 314 ESS trials of first and second instance were concluded in the autonomous region in 2012. Xinjiang Yearbook, an official compendium, reported that courts in the region concluded 366 first-instance ESS trials in 2011. In consideration of recent national data and historical regional statistics, Dui Hua does not believe that the annual decrease in the number of ESS trials in Xinjiang corresponds with declines in the number of people arrested or indicted for ESS during the year. Splittism trials in Xinjiang have been known to include scores of defendants.

    Table 1. ESS Statistics, 2010-2012
    YearArrests
    Nationwide
    Indictments
    Nationwide
    First-Instance ESS Trials*
    PeopleCasesPeopleCasesNationwideXinjiang
    No. of TrialsNo. of Trials% of National
    201010454241223419–––
    201193040597437742736686%
    201211054741049385369278†75%
    Source: Dui Hua, China Law Yearbook, Xinjiang Courts Annual Work Report, Xinjiang Yearbook
    * Nationwide data is given as cases received. Xinjiang data is given as cases concluded.
    † Based on the number of aggregated first and second instance trials, this Dui Hua estimate assumes that 88.4 percent of trials were in the first instance, as was the case in 2011 according to a comparison of aggregated data in the Xinjiang Courts Annual Work Report and disaggregated first instance trial data in Xinjiang Yearbook.

    In contextualizing the crackdown on ESS, China Law Yearbook said there had been an increase in violent terrorism and extremist events in recent years. It underscored the need to keep “high pressure” on ESS crimes and “resolutely fight the crimes of splittism, subversion, terrorism and all kinds of cult organizations in accordance with the law to maintain state security and social and political stability, consolidate the party’s ruling position, and defend the socialist regime.” (……坚决依法打击分裂国家、颠覆国家政权、恐怖犯罪和形形色色的邪教组织犯罪,维护国家安全和社会政治稳定,巩固党的执政地位,捍卫社会主义政权……)

    According to local public security statistics cited by Xinhua’s weekly magazine Outlook (瞭望), violent terrorist incidents increased significantly in Xinjiang in 2012 to exceed 190 incidents. In Tibetan regions, the frequency of self-immolations increased dramatically ahead of the 18th Party Congress in November 2012. During China’s Universal Periodic Review, the Chinese delegation blamed the “Dalai Lama clique” for organizing the immolations.

    In the resolution on deepening reform efforts passed at its 3rd Plenum on November 12, 2013, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China said it would establish a state security committee. The committee is expected to primarily focus on internal threats, particularly in Xinjiang and Tibetan regions. Due to real and perceived independence movements, Uyghurs and ethnic Tibetans bear the brunt of crackdowns on splittism and terrorism—the latter is not an ESS crime.

    Naming Names

    Information on ESS cases is classified as state secrets, and Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database has information on just 17 individuals tried or convicted of ESS in 2012: five Han Chinese, five Uyghurs, five Tibetans, and two ethnic Mongolians (Table 2). All five Han Chinese were charged with subversion or inciting subversion. Zhu Yufu (朱虞夫) and Zhang Shaofeng (张绍峰) allegedly circulated online calls for “Jasmine Revolution.” Li Tie (李铁) and Cao Haibo (曹海波) were convicted of organizing banned political groups that criticized one-party rule. Chen Pingfu (陈平福) was accused of writing articles critical of the Chinese government; his case was withdrawn due to insufficient evidence.

    Bo Xilai’s Chongqing public security bureau chief Wang Lijun was one of two ethnic Mongolians known to be convicted of ESS for his defection to the US Consulate in Chengdu in February 2012. Govruud Huuchinhuu, a member of the Southern Mongolian Democratic Alliance which advocates for Mongolian self-determination, received a suspended sentence for allegedly leaking state secrets.

    Tibetans accused of being involved in pro-independence or self-immolation protests were convicted of splittism or state secrets charges. The outcome of Jigme Guri’s case remains unclear. He has been detained multiple times since releasing an online video in 2008 deploring religious suppression in Tibet.

    Uyghurs faced charges of splittism or inciting splittism. In August, official news media widely publicized the conviction of Abdirahman Yimer. He allegedly used USBs and CD-ROMs to disseminate “jihad,” “religious extremism,” and separatist ideas. Kurban Haji was one of 11 Uyghurs deported from Malaysia and sentenced to 11 months to 15 years in prison for splittism or terrorism, according to Radio Free Asia. A court in Kashgar Prefecture reported in 2012 that Mehmet Zunun Awut was tried in a splittism case alongside 22 other defendants. Sidik Kurban, a Muslim leader who ran religious homeschools throughout Xinjiang, received a 15-year sentence for inciting splittism.

    Table 2. ESS Cases in Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database, 2012
    English
    Name
    Chinese
    Name
    ProvinceCrimeSentenceDate
    Sentenced
    Li Tie李铁HubeiSubversion10 yrs1/18/12
    Zhu Yufu朱虞夫ZhejiangInciting subversion7 yrs2/10/12
    Zhang Shaofeng张绍峰GansuInciting subversion1.5 yrs11/7/12
    Cao Haibo曹海波YunnanSubversion or inciting subversion8 yrs10/30/12
    Chen Pingfu陈平福GansuInciting subversionWithdrawn
    Govruud
    Huuchinhuu
    高布如特•胡琴呼Inner MongoliaLeaking state secretsSuspended11/28/12
    Wang Lijun王立军SichuanDefection (and other crimes)15 yrs9/24/12
    Tseyang才央SichuanInciting splittism7 yrs4/12
    Yonten Gyatso云丹嘉措SichuanIllegally procuring state
    secrets for foreign entities
    7 yrs6/18/12
    Lobsang Tashi洛桑扎西SichuanIllegally procuring state
    secrets for foreign entities
    7 yrs9/18/12
    Bu Thupdor图多尔SichuanIllegally procuring state
    secrets for foreign entities
    7.5 yrs9/18/12
    Jigme Drolma晋美卓玛SichuanInciting splittism3 yrs2012
    Sidik Kurban斯迪克•库尔班XinjiangInciting splittism15 yrs5/13/12
    Kurban Haji库尔班•哈吉XinjiangSplittism6 yrs, reduced to 3 yrs7/12
    Abdirahman Yimer阿布都热合曼•依米尔XinjiangInciting splittism13 yrs2012
    Jigme Guri久美嘉措GansuInciting splittism––
    Mehmet Zunun Awut麦麦提祖农•阿吾提XinjiangSplittism––
  • Leftist Subversion in China: 1980 to Present

    Mao’s statue towers over a public square in his birthplace, Shaoshan City, Hunan. Photo credit: Changsha Evening Newspaper

    Officials in Shaoshan City, Hunan Province, the birthplace of Mao Zedong, have already spent in excess of 1.9 billion yuan in preparation for the 120th anniversary of Mao’s birth this December. Last month, more than 20 thousand people visited a mausoleum in the middle of Beijing to mark the 37th anniversary of his death. Throughout the country thousands more—many of them petitioners, former soldiers, workers, and officials—attended “red song” concerts in memory of China’s “great man,” depicted in official narratives to have “liberated” China from feudalism, capitalism, and imperialism.

    Mao and patriotism seem to go hand in hand, but Chinese authorities have convicted scores of individuals of “reactionary” or “subversive” acts for singing Mao’s praises too loud. Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database (PPDB) has information on more than 40 individuals detained or sentenced for their involvement in illegal opposition parties advocating pre-reform socialism. These self-proclaimed vanguards of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought include farmers, workers, academics, cadres, and even entrepreneurs discontented by the capitalist influence that poured into China following Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening in 1978.

    While many Chinese have joined leftist symposiums and, in the past decade, Internet forums to vent grievances about the corruption and social inequality that persist despite, or because of, the Communist Party of China (CPC), few chose to organize opposition parties to rebuild a proletarian dictatorship. Those who do face the same, and at times worse, fates as those who organize in the name of western-style democracy, a multiparty system and separation of powers.

    Striking Hard Against “Mao Anmin”

    On December 22, 1983, the Linyi District Intermediate People’s Court in Shandong Province sentenced Zhang Chengjian (张成检) to death. According to an official summary of the case (translated in Dui Hua Occasional Publications, Volume 2), the farmer claimed that he was Mao Anmin (毛岸民), Chairman Mao’s successor and Jiang Qing’s stepson. He said that his entire family was murdered by Deng Xiaoping and his allies and that Deng “usurped” the power of Mao’s designated successor, Hua Guofeng, and “distorted Mao’s revolutionary path.” Zhang was particularly critical of the household responsibility system. First adopted in the agricultural sector in 1981, the system allowed farmers to sell their produce at unregulated prices after meeting state production quotas. While increasing production incentives dramatically, the system also made farmers more vulnerable to economic losses from poor harvests, fluctuating market prices, and natural disasters.

    Assembling several like-mind individuals who hoped to restore the people’s commune and abolish the one-child policy, Zhang formed a new “Central Party Committee” in preparation for “revolution.” Between April and September 1983, the group allegedly mailed 97 letters attacking CPC principles, inciting military units to take up armed rebellion, and urging students to skip classes and workers to go on strike. Some letters were sent to foreign embassies, requesting their personnel to leave China and disseminate information about Zhang’s organization in their own countries.

    The case summary, the only known description of Zhang’s party, implies that the group was small and of little influence. Six farmers, ages 25‒43, were convicted for their involvement. Two others were mentioned as being approached by party members but refusing to join.

    In the trial of first instance, Zhang was convicted of organizing and leading a counterrevolutionary group, collaborating with foreign countries to conspire to damage state security, inciting state personnel and military units to rise up in armed rebellion, and counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement. As the trial coincided with China’s first “strike-hard” campaign, which used swift and severe punishment to maintain political stability, Zhang’s death sentence came as little surprise.

    A year later, however, an appellate court found the crimes against Zhang to be incorrect and his sentence to be unduly heavy. The Shandong High People’s Court reduced his sentence to 20 years’ imprisonment, convicting him only of non-violent crimes. The other members of his group were sentenced to 1.5 to 15 years’ imprisonment on appeal. According to government responses to 10 prisoner inquiries made by Dui Hua, Zhang received one sentence extension and three sentence reductions and was released in April 2005. He was 52 and had spent 22 years in prison.

    Henan’s Mamao Party

    Established in 1991, the Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought Communist Party of China (中国马列主义毛泽东思想共产党), or Mamao Party (马毛党), is one of the largest illegal political parties in China known to Dui Hua. Most opposition parties discussed in Chinese open sources are only reported to have a few dozen or few hundred followers. Three times the size of the Chinese People’s Democracy Party, the Mamao Party once had nearly 3,000 members in and around Dengfeng City, Henan Province. Of the 1,031 members identified in the late 1990s by local police, 899 were farmers; more than 100 were workers, teachers, cadres, and retirees; 90 percent had received middle-school education or above; and over two-thirds were ages 25‒45.

    Local public security records from 2003 name Wang Wuzhou (王五州) as party leader. A farmer and self-proclaimed special representative of the party’s Henan Provincial Committee, Wang assigned key members to take charge of propaganda, labor, military, and women’s affairs and appointed secretaries to various county- and district-level committees. The party criticized CPC policies dating back to the third plenary session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1978, when Deng’s market reforms were introduced. Calling the CPC “degenerate” and “corrupt,” the group cited Mao’s strategies of guerilla warfare to encourage the establishment of a new proletarian regime.

    Local police branded the Mamao Party a subversive group that “stole” the title of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. Wang was detained in Xuchang, Henan, on January 9, 1999. Chinese government sources informed Dui Hua that Wang was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for subversion, while leading members Zang Yongqin (臧永钦) and Dong De’an (董得安) were both sentenced to 10 years. Police classified all party members as part of the “targeted population,” a group of free persons singled out for additional public surveillance, and forced them to write statements of repentance. Zang and Dong were released in 2006 and 2007, respectively, after receiving sentence reductions. Wang is not known to have received clemency and may remain in prison until 2014.

    Internal Uprising

    In the 1990s, several senior CPC leaders advocated for workers and farmers to stage an armed rebellion, among them was Xu Jianyi (徐建一), according to investigative journalist Zhao Yan (赵岩). (Zhao was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment in 2006 for exposing forced land seizures, evictions, and other farmers’ rights issues.) Born in 1954, Xu was an editor of Hongqi (Red Flag), the state-run magazine that was renamed Qiushi Journal in 1988. He studied human rights theories in Geneva and co-wrote China’s first human rights white book, rebuking western criticisms of China’s human rights situation from 1990‒2000. Along with former Central Propaganda Minister Deng Liqun and leftist writer Wei Wei, Xu “supported” two banned publications that criticized Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” as overly capitalistic. Leftist officials were particularly outraged by Jiang’s plan to allow private entrepreneurs to become party members.

    Allegedly using Hongqi to establish a new publishing company and purchase an office building in Beijing, Xu was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for “embezzlement” and “favoritism” on December 31, 2003. He is the only person known to have been sentenced in the case. According to Zhao Yan, Xu’s sentence was “relatively light” because state prosecutors deliberately prolonged his investigation until after Jiang Zemin retired as chairman of the Central Military Commission in 2002. In 2005, Hong Kong journalist Ching Cheong (程翔) shared a cell with Xu in Beijing’s Dahongmen Detention Center, which houses high-profile political prisoners and high-ranking officials.

    One Man Committee

    Wang Shiji (王士吉) formed the CPC Revolutionary Committee at his chemical plant in Yongjin County, Hebei Province, on May 16, 1999. As the sole member of his committee, he called for the proletariat to stage the “second socialist revolution.” He appointed himself party secretary and designed party flags and emblems. In letters he wrote petitioning the CPC in 2001, Wang said he was born to a poor family in 1944 and was indebted to Mao for assigning farm work to his family, giving them a house, and subsidizing his education from the time he entered primary school to his university graduation in 1968.

    Wang opined that corruption plagued the CPC because it failed to strictly follow The Communist Manifesto and the principles of the Paris Commune. The root of this corruption, he argued, was Deng Xiaoping’s “revisionism,” a term used by Mao in the early 1960s to indicate that post-Stalinist Soviet interpretations of Marxism adulterated Marxist theory with capitalistic elements. Accusing Deng’s economic theory of betraying Marxism, Wang also openly criticized Jiang Zemin for strengthening the revisionist path and urged members of the Central Standing Committee to collectively resign. Between 1997 and 1999, Wang used the penname Mao Jidong (毛继东), literally “Mao’s successor,” to send more than two dozen critical letters and articles to the central government, party schools, and state-run and Hong Kong-based publishers. The self-proclaimed patriot and loyal party member warned that revisionism dismembered the Soviet Union in 1991, and China would follow suit.

    On November 22, 2000, the Shijiazhuang Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Wang to three years’ imprisonment for inciting subversion. His letters and articles, although never published, were presented as evidence of “rumors” defaming party policies and leaders and the socialist system.

    After his release in August 2002, Wang began petitioning to overturn his conviction and resumed his “anti-revisionist” writings. By that time, with the popularization of the Internet, he gained a broader audience, and in 2010, he reportedly formed the Marxism-Leninism-Maoism Workers’ Party of China (中国马列毛主义工人党). Wang explicitly stated that the party had a “fraternal” policy toward the CPC and would not attempt to overthrow incumbent party leaders.

    In December 2010, the Chang’an District Civil Affairs Bureau rejected Wang’s application to register the party as a social organization. Wang then defiantly stated that he would formally announce the party’s establishment in March 2011, but whether the party was formally established or continues to operate is unknown. In an article that appeared on Boxun in June 2013, Wang focuses on corruption in the CPC but makes no mention of his party. He questions President Xi Jinping’s sincerity and ability to curb graft after fire engulfed grain stocks slated for central government inspection in Daqing, Heilongjiang Province.

    Against Hu Jintao and Charter 08

    Circulating information on social networking services and sympathetic websites, the Mao Zedong Thought Communist Party of China (中国毛泽东主义共产党) was founded on November 28, 2008. In its “Ten Declarations,” the party promises that a successful revolutionary movement against the CPC will purge corrupt officials; restore the people’s communes; and lead to employment, education, healthcare, and housing for all. About a month after its founding, the party allegedly distributed pamphlets in Beijing, Shanghai, and other big cities asserting the rights of workers to overthrow Hu Jintao’s “fascist” regime. The party was equally hostile to signatories of Charter 08, a political manifesto calling for multi-party governance, calling them “traitors” and “reactionary elites” who plotted to “westernize” and “subjugate” China to US imperialism. In 2009, the party briefly received foreign media attention, but little is known about the fate of party members.

    Possibly emboldened by Bo Xilai’s Mao-style approach, 34 representatives from more than 20 provinces convened a secret meeting on October 15, 2009, in rural Wansheng County, Chongqing, where Bo was municipal party secretary, to discuss “Mao’s revolutionary practices.” One of the organizers was Ma Houzhi (马厚芝), a teacher and Shandong native who had spent more than 40 years advocating Maoism. According to Hong Kong’s Open Magazine, the meeting was joined by several members of a Chongqing Mao Zedong Thought society and a Nanjing university professor who had organized Mao Zedong Thought classes in Henan’s Nanjie Village—a place that reportedly retains pre-reform collectivized agricultural production.

    Online forums include accounts of armed police and security officers raiding the gathering and confiscating computers, party flags, and propaganda. Twenty-five of the meeting participants were sent back to their original residences after serving 4‒5 days of administrative detention for holding an “illegal assembly.” Ten other members, whose average age was over 50, were criminally detained for “organizing terrorist activity.”

    Government sources confirmed for Dui Hua earlier this year that at least four members, including Ma, are serving sentences for subversion in Chongqing and Guizhou. Ma and Wei Jinxiang (蔚晋湘) are both scheduled to complete 10-year sentences on October 14, 2019. Incarcerated in Guizhou’s Zunyi Prison, Niu Yong (牛勇) and He Yuanfa (何远发) are serving five- and six-year sentences, respectively. Government sources were unable to verify information about Deng Guobin (邓国宾), who was reportedly sentenced to five years’ imprisonment.

    Patriotism and Mao Zedong

    Partially to appease hardline leftists bitter over Bo Xilai’s downfall, in his first speech at the Politburo collective study session in November 2012, Xi Jinping emphasized that Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought “must not be lost.” This summer, Xi remarked that Mao’s lakeside villa in Wuhan, Hubei Province, should become a youth learning center dedicated to patriotism.

    While toeing the line of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and “stability above all else” under one-party rule, how appropriate is it for Xi to stress Mao Zedong Thought? As the aforementioned cases show, a deep love for Mao and country is not the same as a deep love for the CPC, and those who favor communist ideals over the “perils” of democracy and constitutional government may also face persecution.

  • Veteran Rights Activists and the Quantification of Dissent

    The 2011 verdict against Chen Wei (left) quantifies the influence of his “incitement” with page views.

    A new judicial interpretation defines the number of hits and reposts necessary for online information to be classified as “serious” slander, but counting page views existed in the judicial equation at least as far back as 2009. In December of that year the Beijing Municipality No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Liu Xiaobo to 11 years in prison for inciting subversion.

    In the verdict against him, translated by Human Rights in China, the Beijing court listed the number of links, repostings, and/or hits for seven articles he had written or co-authored. The majority had fewer than 800 hits—most far fewer—but one of them was said to have a total of more than 5,000 hits: Charter 08, a political manifesto calling for multi-party government.

    The judicial interpretation, issued by the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate earlier this month, lists the accrual of at least 5,000 hits or 500 reposts for a single item as “serious circumstances” for cases involving online defamation. The judicial interpretation applies to crimes of defamation, causing a serious disturbance, extortion, and illegal business activity, but not to inciting subversion.

    In 2011, at least five men were given lengthy prison sentences for “serious” cases of inciting subversion in which their verdicts quantified the reach of the essays they had authored. Both Chen Wei and Liu Xianbin (March 2011 verdict) were sentenced by the Suining Intermediate People’s Court in Sichuan Province, while Chen Xi (December 2011 verdict) was sentenced by the Guiyang Intermediate People’s Court in Guizhou Province. Writers Lü Jiaping and Jin Andi were sentenced 10 years and 8 years, respectively, for writing articles accusing a former leader of ceding northeast territories to Russia.

    In the criminal verdict against Chen Wei (translated below from a posting by Chinese Human Rights Defenders), the Suining court classifies his crime as serious, reasoning that he “published many articles on the Internet [that] had a strong instigatory nature, and their scope of influence was great.” In demonstrating the influence of the articles, the verdict notes that 11 items published on overseas websites by Chen Wei had been linked to by a total of 37 web pages and received 8,524 hits. The verdict states repeatedly that the articles he wrote spread “rumors and slander.”

    If linking to articles is proxy for re-posting, Chen’s essays—shared by just 37 web pages—didn’t come close to the threshold introduced this year. If averaged over 11 items, his page views also fell far below the mark, averaging 775 views per article.

    But back then, there was no benchmark. And, of course, the number of times information is viewed does not alone determine the severity of exposure. Influence and social context are important. Like Liu Xiaobo, by the time of their latest court hearings, Chen Wei, Liu Xianbin, and Chen Xi were all veteran rights activists with an aptitude for organizing and speaking their minds. Chen Wei and Chen Xi (no relation) were detained in the wake of the Jasmine Revolution—an uprising that was supposed to have been modeled on the popular uprisings of the “Arab Spring,” but never happened.

    In 2013, as the crackdown on activists like Xu Zhiyong unfolds around the New Citizen’s Movement, will the numerical guidelines for “rumors and slander” become the yardstick for quantifying dissent?

    *

    Suining Intermediate People’s Court of Sichuan
    Criminal Verdict

    (2011) Sui. Int. Crim First No. 00054

    The prosecuting organ is the Suining People’s Procuratorate of Sichuan.

    Defendant Chen Wei, male, born February 21, 1969, in Suining, Sichuan, Han ethnicity, attended university, unemployed, place of household residence at [redacted by translator], Suining, Sichuan, resides at [redacted by translator], Suining, Sichuan. In December 1994, he was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, with subsequent deprivation of political rights for two years, for the crime of counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement. He was released from prison at the end of his sentence on May 28, 1997. On February 21, 2011, he was placed under criminal detention on suspicion of inciting subversion and formally arrested on March 28 of that year. He is currently being detained in the Suining Detention Center.

    Defense counsel is Zheng Jianwei, attorney with the Chongqing Kangshi Law Firm.

    Defense counsel is Liang Xiaojun, attorney with the Beijing Daoheng Law Firm.

    On November 25, 2011, the Suining People’s Procuratorate filed indictment Sui. Proc. Indict. (2011) No. 42 with this court, charging defendant Chen Wei with inciting subversion. This court formed a collegiate bench in accordance with the law and held a hearing in open court to try this case. The Suining People’s Procuratorate appointed prosecutor Li Hongzhi and associate prosecutor Li Qin to appear in court on behalf of the prosecution. Defendant Chen Wei and his defense counsel Zheng Jianwei and Liang Xiaojun appeared in court to participate in the proceedings. The trial has now concluded.

    The Suining People’s Procuratorate alleged that: Between March 2009 and January 2011, defendant Chen Wei used the Internet to publish “Systemic Illness and the Medication of Constitutionalism and Democracy” and other articles that he had written on overseas websites such as minzhuzhongguo.org, Human Rights in China, and yibaochina.com, spreading rumors and slander [such as] “the people have been deprived of their [freedoms of] thought and belief” and “the Chinese Communist Party uses the machinery of violence to control the people” and inciting “the death knell has tolled for one-party dictatorship” and “[we] must change this system.” His articles were widely linked to, reposted, and viewed, [causing] an extremely bad influence. In court, the prosecution produced evidence including a crime scene inspection record, an inspection work record of electronic evidence, expert verifications, witness testimony, and the defendant’s confession. The prosecution maintains that defendant Chen Wei’s actions constitute the crime of inciting subversion, falling under the category of a serious offense, and it requests that the people’s court issue a verdict in accordance with the law.

    Defendant Chen Wei and his defense counsel argue in defense that Chen Wei did not have the intention to incite subversion of state power and what he published were all theoretical articles that did not contain rumors or slander. [They further argue that] his views fall within the scope of a citizen’s freedom of speech and do not constitute the crime of inciting subversion and that he is not a repeat offender.

    In the course of the trial it was ascertained that: Between March 2009 and January 2011, defendant Chen Wei used the Internet to publish “Systemic Illness and the Medication of Constitutionalism and Democracy,” “The Growth of Civil Opposition is a Crucial Factor in China’s Democratization,” “The Harmony Trap and the Absence of Fairness,” “Reflections on a Hunger Strike on Human Rights Day” and other articles that he had written on overseas websites such as minzhuzhongguo.org, Human Rights in China, and yibaochina.com, spreading rumors and slander [such as] “the people have been deprived of their [freedoms of] thought and belief,” “the Chinese Communist Party uses the machinery of violence to control the people,” “[they] are the enemies of democracy,” and “everyone realizes the Chinese Communists’ anti-human nature” and inciting “the death knell has tolled for one-party dictatorship,” “use street-level opposition to promote civic politics,” and “[we] must change this system.” His articles were widely linked to, reposted, and viewed, [causing] an extremely bad influence.

    The aforementioned facts are confirmed by the following evidence, which was cross-examined and confirmed in court:

    1. A record of receiving a criminal case, case-filing decision, case-solution report, and report of custody, confirming the source of the case and details about the investigation and manner in which Chen Wei was taken into custody.

    2. A search warrant, search record, inventory of seized items, a record of crime-scene inspection, and crime-scene photographs, confirming that the investigating organ seized two laptop computers, a portable hard drive, and some train tickets from Chen Wei’s residence in accordance with the law.

    3. Inspection work records of electronic evidence from the Suining Public Security Bureau—Sui. PSB (Int. Sec.) Inspect [2011] No. 011 Inspection Work Record of Electronic Evidence, Sui. PSB (Int. Sec.) Inspect [2011] No. 012 Inspection Work Record of Electronic Evidence, Sui. PSB (Int. Sec.) Inspect [2011] No. 013 Remote Inspection Record, and Sui. PSB (Int. Sec.) Inspect [2011] No. 010 Letter and Reply Regarding Assistance with Inspection of Relevant Data—confirming that “Systemic Illness and the Medication of Constitutionalism and Democracy,” “Reflections on a Hunger Strike on Human Rights Day,” “The Harmony Trap and the Absence of Fairness,” and other articles were discovered on the hard drive of the laptop computer seized from Chen Wei’s residence. Through remote inspection it was determined that as of February 25, 2011, 11 articles published by Chen Wei on overseas websites like minzhuzhongguo.org, Human Rights in China, and yibaochina.com had been linked to by a total of 37 web pages and received 8,524 hits.

    4. A forensic verification report (BNIA For. Ctr [2011] Verif. No. 12) and sample use explanation from the Beijing Network Industry Association Electronic Data Forensic Report Center, confirming that on the hard drive implicated in the Chen Wei case were discovered “Systemic Illness and the Medication of Constitutionalism and Democracy,” “Reflections on a Hunger Strike on Human Rights Day,” “The Harmony Trap and the Absence of Fairness,” and other articles written by Chen Wei and a record of the use of his registered Skype account to upload articles that he wrote point-to-point overseas.

    5. Hard copies of “Systemic Illness and the Medication of Constitutionalism and Democracy,” “The Growth of Civil Opposition is a Crucial Factor in China’s Democratization,” “The Harmony Trap and the Absence of Fairness,” “Reflections on a Hunger Strike on Human Rights Day,” and other articles published on the Internet, identified with a signature by Chen Wei as articles published by him, confirming that Chen Wei published instigatory articles on the Internet, spreading rumors and slander [such as] “the people have been deprived of their [freedoms of] thought and belief,” “the Chinese Communist Party uses the machinery of violence to control the people,” “[they] are the enemies of democracy,” and “everyone realizes the Chinese Communists’ anti-human nature” and inciting “the death knell has tolled for one-party dictatorship,” “use street-level opposition to promote civic politics,” and “[we] must change this system.”

    6. A criminal verdict from the Beijing Intermediate People’s Court, criminal decision from the Beijing High People’s Court, and certificate of release from the Sichuan Province Chuanzhong Prison, confirming that on December 16, 1994, the Beijing Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Chen Wei to five years’ imprisonment, with subsequent deprivation of political rights for two years, for the crime of counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement. He was released at the completion of his sentence on May 28, 1997.

    7. Household registration documents, confirming Chen Wei’s personal identity information.

    8. Witness testimony from Wang Xiaoyan (Chen Wei’s wife), Wang Lanfang (Chen Wei’s sister-in-law), Tang Jianlin (Chen Wei’s brother-in-law), Wang Lanying (Chen Wei’s sister-in-law), confirming that Chen Wei and his wife and Wang Lanfang and her husband [Tang Jianlin] reside together at [address redacted by translator], Suining. None of them have relatives living overseas. The documents “List of Sichuan Democracy Movement Activists” and “Activist Liu Xianbin” were not saved by them on the hard drive of the Founder laptop computer or Samsung portable hard drive seized in this case, and they did not publish articles on the Internet under Chen Wei’s name. Chen Wei had Wang Xiaoyan, Wang Lanfang, Tang Jianlin, and Wang Lanying settle overseas wire payments at the bank.

    9. Testimony of witnesses Chen Wei [陈伟], Yin Xia, and Yu Yuebo, confirming that they had each read articles written by Chen Wei on websites like minzhuzhongguo.org.

    10. Confession of defendant Chen Wei, confirming that he had written “Systemic Illness and the Medication of Constitutionalism and Democracy,” “The Growth of Civil Opposition is a Crucial Factor in China’s Democratization,” “The Harmony Trap and the Absence of Fairness,” “Reflections on a Hunger Strike on Human Rights Day,” and other articles published on overseas websites such as minzhuzhongguo.org, Human Rights in China, and yibaochina.com.

    This court finds that defendant Chen Wei wrote and published on the Internet articles that used rumors and slander to incite subversion of state power and overthrow of the socialist system and that his actions constitute the crime of inciting subversion. Chen Wei published many articles on the Internet, [these articles] had a strong instigatory nature, and their scope of influence was great; therefore, his crimes are categorized as serious. Chen Wei was previously convicted of a crime of endangering state security and, after the completion of that sentence, he again committed a crime of endangering state security; therefore, he is a repeat offender and ought to receive heavier punishment in accordance with the law. Chen Wei and his defense counsel claim that the articles he published fall within the scope of a citizen’s right to free speech, that he neither had the subjective intention nor committed the objective acts of inciting subversion of state power, and that his acts [therefore] do not constitute a criminal offense. Upon review, [this court finds that] Chen Wei published numerous articles on the Internet that used rumors and slander in a goal of inciting subversion of state power and overthrow of the socialist system; therefore, his actions do not fall within the scope of a citizen’s right to free speech. He seriously damaged the interests and security of the state; therefore, his defense arguments and justifications are not tenable and this court does not accept them. Chen Wei and his defense counsel claim that he is not a repeat offender. Upon review, [this court finds that] Chen Wei was previously convicted of counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement and, after the completion of that sentence, he again committed the crime of inciting subversion. These crimes both fall under the category of crimes of endangering state security; therefore, he is a repeat offender and his defense arguments and justifications are not tenable and this court does not accept them. In conclusion, the facts of the prosecution’s charges are clear, the evidence is reliable and sufficient, and the charged offense is valid; this court therefore supports [the prosecution’s charges]. In accordance with Articles 105(2), 55(1), 56(1), 66, and 64 of the Criminal Law of the PRC, [this court] rules as follows:

    I. For the crime of inciting subversion, defendant Chen Wei is sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment, with subsequent deprivation of political rights for two years.

    (The prison term is to be calculated from the day the verdict is implemented, with each day spent in detention prior to the verdict’s implementation to count as one day of the prison term; therefore, it will run from February 21, 2011, to February 20, 2020.)

    II. Items that were used in the crimes in this case shall be confiscated.

    If this verdict is not accepted, an appeal may be filed within 10 days of the second day following the receipt of this verdict, either to this court or directly to the Sichuan High People’s Court. In the case of a written appeal, the original appellate petition must be submitted together with two copies.

       

    Presiding Judge: Liu Zebin
    Judicial Officer: Wei Xiao
    Judicial Officer: Deng Gang

     

    December 23, 2011

     

    Court Clerk: Quan Liguo

  • Prosecutors: Man “Should Have Known” Employer Was Taiwan Spy

    Ma Ying-jeou meets Chen Yunlin, president of China’s Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits, in November 2008. Photo credit: Xing Guangli, Xinhua

    The cross-strait rapprochement that began when Ma Ying-jeou became Taiwanese president in 2008 marked a clear decline in the number of publicized Taiwanese espionage cases in mainland China. Based on open-source materials, Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database holds information on more than 90 Taiwanese “spies” detained or convicted between 2000 and 2008—during the presidency of Chen Shui-bian—compared with just five people convicted for espionage after Ma took office. Four of these convictions were for selling military secrets and led to sentences ranging from death with reprieve to 15 years’ imprisonment.

    Court records from Hunan describe the fifth case involving Long Jianbin, who was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. The official account charges Long with collecting information about leadership changes and political, military, and economic developments for someone he “should have known” was a Taiwanese agent.

    Through an online job search, Long was hired to work part time for a man surnamed Lee, who called himself the assistant vice president of a media company. After taking on initial assignments, Long reported Lee to relevant government bodies, perhaps concerned that he had gotten involved in illegal matters. Receiving no response from the government, however, Long continued to collect materials, many of which appear to have been publically available.

    One of the collected publications, Selected Internal Reference, is a limited distribution compendium of news and opinion pieces sold principally to government bodies and work units, but often made available to their employees. As social commentator Zhang Shihe (张世和) noted in 2007, cadres often sell the publication to scrap recyclers, while other internal publications were often made widely available by profit-driven publishers. Other so-called internal publications that Long collected, like Dispatches of from the General Office of the Communist Party of China, contain articles that can be freely viewed online. Perhaps acknowledging that the information Long supplied did little harm to state security, the court meted out a relatively short sentence.

    (Article 110 of the Criminal Law prescribes 3-10 years’ imprisonment for acts of espionage with minor circumstances.)



    Zhuzhou Court Records Verdict: click to expand

    Long Jianbin Espionage Case

    Prosecutor: Zhuzhou People’s Procuratorate of Hunan Province
    Defendant: Long Jianbin.

    As the result of an online posting in which he sought part-time work, in September 2008, defendant Long Jianbin received a recruitment email for an editorial post with a generous remuneration package from someone calling himself “Assistant Vice President Lee” of Huayu Media Information Center. Long provided samples of his writing and editing ability over the Internet and expressed his interest in the job. Assistant Vice President Lee instructed Long to collect information on position changes and transfers among high-ranking officials and on political, military, and economic conditions. Long collected materials using methods such as Internet downloads, purchasing books and newspapers from local stores, and scanning Selected Internal References at the Chalin County Party Committee Office. He then used foreign computer networks to compress and encrypt the collected materials and sent them to “Assistant Vice President Lee.” Long received from “Assistant Vice President Lee” three payment transfers totaling 14,000 yuan around January 7, 2009. At this time, Long started to have suspicions about the identity of Assistant Vice President Lee and filed an online report with relevant state bodies. After receiving no reply, Long continued cooperation with Lee. During the period of September 2008 to June 2009, under the instructions of “Assistant Vice President Lee,” an agent of a Taiwanese espionage organization, Long took from the Chalin County Confidential Affairs Bureau and borrowed from his own work unit classified materials and information from 27 issues of Selected Internal References and three issues of Dispatches from the General Office of the Communist Party of China and other works. Adhering to transmission methods imparted by the agent of the espionage organization, he sent the information to Taiwanese espionage organization agent “Assistant Vice President Lee” over the Internet and received from “Assistant Vice President Lee” five payment transfers totaling 10,000 yuan. Using aliases such as “Li Xiang,” “Da Hai,” and “Song Weiping,” Long Jianbin received espionage payments totaling RMB 24,000 yuan.

    After conducting a trial, the intermediate court found that defendant Long Jianbin, under circumstances in which he should have known that “Assistant Vice President Lee” was an agent of a foreign espionage organization, accepted assignments and requests from “Assistant Vice President Lee” and used secretive online methods to provide [him] with several confidential national documents and information. His actions constitute the crime of espionage. In accordance with the law, his sentence is as follows: 1) For the crime of espionage, defendant Long Jianbin is sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of five years and deprivation of political rights for one year with confiscation of personal assets of 10,000 yuan; 2) recovery of the 24,000 yuan [Long Jianbin] illegally obtained, transferred to the state treasury; and 3) confiscation of the tools used in committing the crime—one notebook computer, three desktop computers, and a USB flash drive.

    Chinese Source(原文):
    株洲市法院志 2011年,115-116页
    Zhuzhou Court Records, (2011), pp.115-116
    Click on icon to expand


    龙建斌间谍案。

    公诉机关湖南省株洲市人民检察院。
    被告人龙建斌。

    被告人龙建斌通过在网上求兼职,在2008年9月份收到了一个华昱传播信息中心自称是“李协理”的人,发来招聘采编人员并有优厚待遇的邮件,龙建斌通过网络将自己的文字和编辑能力进行介绍并表示愿意兼职。李协理要龙建斌收集大陆高层人员变动、政治、军事、经济等方面的情况。龙建斌即通过从网上下裁、当地购买书报和到茶陵县委领取《内参选编》扫描等方式收集资料,使用境外域网压缩加密将收集的资料发给”李协理”。并于2009年1月7日前后分三次收到了“李协理”汇来的人民币14000元。此时龙建斌开始怀疑李协理的身份,并通过网上向国家有关部门进行举报,在没有得到回应后,龙建斌又继续与李协理合作。在2008年9月至2009年6月间,龙建斌接受台湾间谍组织代理人“李协理”的指示,通过到茶陵县委机要局领取和在本单位借阅等方式,先后搜集《内参选编》27期、《中共中央办公厅通讯》3期等涉密资料和情报,按照间谍组织代理人传授的传输方式,通过互联网发送给了台湾间谍组织代理人“李协理”,又分五次收到了”李协理”汇来的人民币1万元。龙建斌分别用“李湘”、“大海”、“宋伟平”等化名领取间谍经费共计人民币24000元。

    中院审理后认为,被告人龙建斌在应当知道“李协理”为境外间谍组织代理人的情况下,接受“李协理”的任务和要求,在网上以隐秘方式向“李协理”提供多份国家秘密文件和情报,其行为巳构成间谍罪。依法判决:一、被告人龙建斌犯间谍罪,判处有期徒刑五年,剥夺政治权利一年,并处没收个人财产10000元;二、追缴非法所得24000元,上缴国库;三、对作案工具笔记本电脑一台、电脑主机三台、U 盘一个予以没收。


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  • Verdict of a Chongqing Citizen in the Time of Bo Xilai

    Tiananmen

    On July 21, 2010, in the southwestern city of Chongqing, 47-year-old Gao Yingpu was getting ready to have dinner at his in-law’s when two local police officers barged into his home, Caijing reports. The police officers came to ask Gao about the origins of two satirical images of Mao Zedong that had been posted online. The former journalist turned businessman acknowledged that he had reposted the images on his blog. He was then told to change his clothes and accompany the officers to the local police station to “assist with the investigation,” the findings of which are detailed in the criminal verdict translated below.

    Weeks earlier, a once high-ranking police official was executed in Chongqing, marking the high tide of a conspicuous anti-mafia campaign carried out by former Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai and Police Chief Wang Lijun. Although welcomed by many Chongqing residents, the campaign was criticized for allowing political interests to bulldoze due process and rule of law. Many who denounced the campaign, or other controversial policies carried out under Bo, were sent to prison or reeducation-through-labor camps.

    Gao Yingpu, who frequently engaged in online debates with supporters of Bo’s “leftist” policies, was one of dozens, perhaps hundreds, who fell victim to what some have called Chongqing’s period of “red terror.” Following a secret trial, Gao was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for “inciting subversion” and sent to Chongqing’s Daping Prison.

    Chongqing’s political environment changed dramatically just over a year later, as first Wang Lijun and then Bo Xilai were removed from office and investigated. (Wang was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment in September 2012; Bo is still awaiting trial.) Not long afterwards, many of those punished for expressing criticism of Chongqing’s former power-holders began to be released from custody, and some had their sentences overturned. Having had his sentence reduced, Gao was released seven months early in January 2013. The same month, he asked his wife to petition the Chongqing High People’s Court to overturn the sentence against him on the grounds that his conviction came during an “unusual historical period.” There is no word yet on whether the court will review the case.



    Chongqing Municipality No.1 Intermeidate Court Criniminal Verdict: click to expand

    Chongqing Municipality No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court
    Criminal Verdict

    (2010) CQ No. 1 Int. Crim. First No. 189

    The prosecuting organ is the Chongqing People’s Procuratorate No. 1 Branch.

    Defendant Gao Yingpu, male, born August 17, 1963, in Yuzhong District, Chongqing Municipality, Han ethnicity, university education, unemployed, resides at [redacted] Yubei District, Chongqing Municipality (place of household registration: 201-13 Guanghe 1st Street, Tianhenanjie [Subdistrict], Guangzhou, Guangdong). On July 21, 2010, he was taken into custody on suspicion of inciting subversion and placed under criminal detention the following day. On August 26 of that year, he was formally arrested. He is currently detained in Chongqing Municipality Yubei District Detention Center.

    Defense counsel is Zhao Yang, lawyer with the Chongqing Baijun Law Firm.

    On November 25, 2010, the Chongqing People’s Procuratorate No. 1 Branch filed indictment CQ Proc. No. 1 Branch Crim. Indict. (2010) No. 238 with this court, charging defendant Gao Yingpu with inciting subversion. This court formed a collegiate bench in accordance with the law and, as this case involves state secrets, held a closed hearing to try this case. The Chongqing People’s Procuratorate No. 1 Branch appointed associate prosecutor Ma Hongwei to appear in court on behalf of the prosecution. Defendant Gao Yingpu and his defense counsel Zhao Yang appeared in court to participate in the proceedings. The trial has now concluded.

    The Chongqing People’s Procuratorate No. 1 Branch alleged that: Beginning in 2009, defendant Gao Yingpu installed anti-firewall software [e.g., a virtual private network] and browsed overseas web sites such as secretchina.com, renminbao.com, dajiyuan.com, and aboluowang.com. He also set up QQ [an online chat tool] account number 190996622 and, using the screen name “Xinan Paike” joined the “Nabaichuan,” “Law Forum,” and “Grassroots Wisdom” QQ groups. Gao Yingpu did not set a password or download limit on his Qzone [a QQ social networking and blog platform similar to MySpace] page and saved photos vilifying Mao Zedong, Hu Jintao, and other national leaders on his QQ photo storage space. On his QQ blog, he posted more than 10 articles, including “Mao Zedong: If It Weren’t for the Japanese Imperial Army, We Couldn’t Have Taken Power” and “Eleven Days of Trickery.” He shared Tombstone, Mao Zedong: An Assessment of his Crimes and Accomplishments, and 28 other documents with his QQ groups. Beginning in July 2010, Gao Yingpu posted comments on QQ group chats such as “Socialism has proven that it causes bloodshed and failure; it’s a dying system. Capitalism can improve things for the better and move towards more humane and humanitarian [conditions]. China’s Maoist socialism must die and be reborn soon”; “Patriotism is an attempt to bring back the spirit of despotism”; and “We must follow the path of European-American democracy” and uploaded two photos vilifying Mao Zedong. On July 21, 2010, defendant Gao Yingpu was captured by the public security authorities.

    In support of these charges, the prosecution produced the following evidence in court: a detention record; a record of remote inspection of electronic evidence; a certification report for the inspection of electronic evidence; the statements of witnesses Xu Tao, Chen Lin, and Tang Yi; and the confession and defense argument of defendant Gao Yingpu. Based on this evidence, the prosecution maintains that defendant Gao Yingpu used rumor, slander, and other methods to express speech that incited subversion of state power and overthrow of the socialist system. His actions violate Article 105(2) of the Criminal Law of the PRC, the facts of the crime are clear, the evidence is reliable and sufficient, and he ought to be held criminally responsible for the crime of inciting subversion. [The prosecution] requests that this court deliver punishment in accordance with the law.

    Defendant Gao Yingpu did not raise any objections to the charge or the basic facts as presented in the indictment, but he argued in his defense that the defamatory image of state leader Hu Jintao in his Qzone page photo album was not something he downloaded; rather the image was automatically saved on his Qzone page because it had been part of a group page. His defense counsel argued that Gao Yingpu was a first-time offender and that he had acknowledged guilt and regret. Moreover, his criminal act had not resulted in major damage to national interests, and the subjective evil and degree of social harm were both relatively minor. Therefore, he recommended that [Gao] be punished with lenience in accordance with the law and in consideration of the circumstances.

    In the course of the trial, it was ascertained that: Beginning in 2009, defendant Gao Yingpu used QQ account number 190996622; joined the “Grassroots Wisdom,” “Law Forum,” and “Nabaichuan” QQ groups using the screen name “Xinan Paike”; and used “Freegate” anti-firewall software to browse overseas websites such as secretchina.com, renminbao.com, dajiyuan.com, and aboluowang.com. Gao Yingpu did not set a password or download limit on his Qzone page and saved photos vilifying Mao Zedong, Hu Jintao, and other national leaders in his QQ photo storage space. On his QQ blog, he posted more than 10 articles, including “Mao Zedong: If It Weren’t for the Japanese Imperial Army, We Couldn’t Have Taken Power” and “Eleven Days of Trickery.” He shared Tombstone, Mao Zedong: An Assessment of his Crimes and Accomplishments, and 28 other documents with his QQ groups. Beginning in July 2010, Gao Yingpu posted comments on QQ group chats such as “Socialism has proven that it causes bloodshed and failure; it’s a dying system. Capitalism can improve things for the better and move towards more humane and humanitarian [conditions]. China’s Maoist socialism must die and be reborn soon”; “Patriotism is an attempt to bring back the spirit of despotism”; and “We must follow the path of European-American democracy.” On the “Nabaichuan” QQ group, he uploaded two photos vilifying Mao Zedong that he had downloaded from other websites.

    On July 21, 2010, defendant Gao Yingpu was taken into custody by public security authorities.

    The aforementioned facts are confirmed by the following evidence, which was put forth by the prosecution and cross-examined and confirmed in court:

    1. The crime registration report and case-filing decision, confirming: After the public security authority received a crime report on July 21, 2010, it filed a case for investigating Gao Yingpu that same day.
    2. Record of capture, confirming: Public security personnel took Gao Yingpu into custody on July 21, 2010, at [address redacted], Yubei District, Chongqing Municipality.
    3. Recovery record and inventory of confiscated items, confirming: On July 21, 2010, a Lenovo notebook computer related to the case was recovered from Gao Yingpu’s home and confiscated in accordance with the law.
    4. Identification of photographs of a computer and sent images: On July 21, 2010, Gao Yingpu identified the notebook computer used to commit the crimes. He also identified two images vilifying Mao Zedong that he sent; the more than 10 articles, including “Mao Zedong: If It Weren’t for the Japanese Imperial Army, We Couldn’t Have Taken Power” and “Eleven Days of Trickery” that were posted on his blog; and Tombstone, Mao Zedong: An Assessment of his Crimes and Accomplishments, and 28 other documents that were shared with his QQ groups.
    5. Record of on-scene inspection and investigation, confirming: On July 21, 2010, the Yubei Internet Inspection Police conducted an on-scene inspection of Gao Yingpu’s computer, recovering electronic information including relevant images transmitted using QQ account number 190996622 on the “Nabaichuan” QQ group and QQ chat records.
    6. Record of remote investigation, confirming: On August 17, 2010, investigators from the Chongqing Public Security Bureau conducted a remote investigation of the overseas websites Gao Yingpu visited such as secretchina.com, renminbao.com, dajiyuan.com, and aboluowang.com. It is impossible to visit the aforementioned websites through normal browsing, but they may be opened using the “Freegate” anti-firewall software. From August 8‒9, 2010, investigators from the Chongqing Public Security Bureau examined records of the QQ groups, Qzone blog, and uploaded images associated with QQ account number 190996622. From the time it was opened until the time of the remote investigation, QQ account number 190996622 had 2,042 hits and a total of 10 QQ groups. There were a total of 339 items posted to the blog associated with QQ account number 190996622, of which approximately 15 had content attacking Mao Zedong and others. There were 1,629 images on the Qzone page associated with QQ account number 190996622, of which 11 insulted leaders such as Mao Zedong and Hu Jintao. Thirty documents, including Tombstone and Mao Zedong: An Assessment of his Crimes and Accomplishments, were shared via the QQ groups.
    7. A report on the inspection of electronic evidence, confirming: A search of Gao Yingpu’s computer that was involved in the case recovered a record of 5,824 web pages browsed; 2.95MB of QQ chat records, 25,485 images, .DOC files, and other documents; 10 QQ groups including “Nabaichuan,” “Law Forum,” and “Grassroots Wisdom”; and statements in the chat records of some of these 10 QQ groups, including: “Socialism has proven that it causes bloodshed and failure; it’s a dying system. Capitalism can improve things for the better and move towards more humane and humanitarian [conditions]. China’s Maoist socialism must die and be reborn soon”; “Patriotism is an attempt to bring back the spirit of despotism”; and “We must follow the path of European-American democracy.”
    8. A report of additional investigation, confirming: The QQ groups that Gao Yingpu’s QQ account joined are listed inconsistently in the two inspection records because the remote inspection record and the electronic evidence inspection report were compiled at different times and, in the interim, the QQ group names had changed. But the QQ account number does not change. Moreover, the Qzone software does not include any automatic saving of [group] images to individual QQ users’ spaces.
    9. The statement of witness Xu Tao: I came to know “Xinan Paike” in the “Grassroots Wisdom” group. “Xinan Paike” kicked anyone out of “Grassroots Wisdom” who supported and liked Chairman Mao and didn’t allow them to express their opinions. Later, I created the “Nabaichuan” group with more than 100 members, including “Xinan Paike.” “Xinan Paike” was prejudiced against Chairman Mao and liked to post comments attacking Chairman Mao. “Xinan Paike” shared some information, documents, and books that couldn’t be found on the Internet and had a certain degree of popularity.
    10. The statement of witness Wang Kan: I saw “Xinan Paike” publish comments many times on the “Rule of Law Forum” [sic] QQ group. His main view was support for reform and opening and desire for deeper political reform, open leadership elections, and exercise of effective oversight over officials.
    11. The statement of witness Chen Lin: Many topics of discussion on the “Grassroots Wisdom” group were introduced by “Xinan Paike” He posted a lot of information to the QQ group, much of which expressed dissatisfaction or even opposition to the actions of the party and government. The discussion topics initiated by “Xinan Paike” all criticized Mao Zedong and opposed the government. The discussions he proposed did not seek truth from facts; they were very extreme or you could even say reactionary.
    12. The statement of witness Tang Yi: I joined the “Grassroots Wisdom” and “Nabaichuan” QQ groups. The comments “Xinan Paike” posted to the “Nabaichuan” QQ group mainly opposed radical “leftism.” He said that China’s present economic development model wasn’t scientific and that it should be re-adjusted as quickly as possible. He was rather opposed to Mao Zedong and, in addition to posting comments, also posted some images that vilified and insulted Mao Zedong’s image. I visited the Qzone page and blog of “Xinan Paike” and saw articles slandering Mao Zedong and [discussing] Mao Zedong’s political struggles with other leaders during the Cultural Revolution. “Xinan Paike” also shared these articles with his QQ groups.
    13. The statement of witness Liu Yuntao: I’ve been going online for three or four years. I joined the “Nabaichuan” QQ group but I don’t know “Xinan Paike.”
    14. The statement of witness Li [redacted]: I’m Gao Yingpu’s wife. Our family has two computers, one desktop computer and one Lenovo notebook computer. Gao Yingpu usually uses the notebook computer. I only use the desktop.
    15. The confession of defendant Gao Yingpu: I have a QQ account with the screen name “Xinan Paike,” account number 190996622. I joined 10 QQ groups, including “Grassroots Wisdom,” “Law Forum,” and “Nabaichuan.” I used the “Freegate” software to browse overseas websites like aboluowang.com, secretchina.com, renminbao.com, and dajiyuan.com because these web sites have things I can’t read on websites within China. I also read some books online, such as Tombstone and Mao Zedong: An Assessment of his Crimes and Accomplishments. In 2009, I began participating in discussions about Mao Zedong and uploading books, articles, and comments that cast a negative light on Mao Zedong’s life. My QQ space has no password or limit on downloading. “Mao Zedong: If It Weren’t for the Japanese Imperial Army, We Couldn’t Have Taken Power,” “China’s Super Emperor,” “Eleven Days of Trickery,” and other articles were reposted by me, and I shared Tombstone, Mao Zedong: An Assessment of his Crimes and Accomplishments, and other documents on “Grassroots Wisdom,” “Nabaichuan,” and other QQ groups. In my QQ groups, I posted comments like “We must follow the path of European-American democracy”; “Socialism has proven that it causes bloodshed and failure; it’s a dying system. Capitalism can improve things for the better and move toward more humane and humanitarian [conditions]. China’s Maoist socialism must die and be reborn soon”; and “Patriotism is an attempt to bring back the spirit of despotism.” On the afternoon of July 20, 2010, when I was online at my home, I observed an argument between leftists and rightists on the “Nabaichuan” QQ group. The leftists said that the Maoist era was good and said that the people must stand up and rid themselves of the capitalists and the capitalist reform faction. Since I am part of the reform faction, I was very angry with the leftists’ views so I posted two insulting images of Mao Zedong that I had downloaded from the “Yuan Tengfei Ba” on Baidu. The first was an image of Mao Zedong kneeling on the ground in repentance; the second was an image of a turtle’s body with Mao Zedong’s head and a person standing on the turtle’s back. As I posted these images, I added the comment, “Old Hoodlum Mao’s statue has been erected in Tiananmen Square, are you ready to kneel alongside him?” At the time, I posted these two images to attack the ideas and comments of the leftists in the group who were supporting Mao Zedong. I was mainly trying to argue against them, ridicule them, and insult their spiritual leader.

    This court finds that defendant Gao Yingpu used rumor, slander, and other methods and incited subversion of state power and overthrow of the socialist system through the online posting, reposting, and sharing of remarks and texts and the storage and uploading of images that vilified state leaders; [therefore,] his actions constitute the crime of inciting subversion and he should be punished in accordance with the law. The criminal facts alleged by the prosecution and the charged crime are both valid, but given that defendant Gao Yingpu is a first-time offender, he truthfully confessed his crimes upon arrest, he displayed a relatively good attitude towards acknowledging guilt, and the harm he caused to state security was relatively minor, he may be punished with appropriate lenience. As for Gao Yingpu’s claim that the defamatory image of state leader Hu Jintao in his Qzone photo album was not something he downloaded but, rather, was automatically saved in his Qzone space because it was part of a group’s page, [the court finds that] the supplementary investigation report produced by the public security authority confirms that the Qzone software does not include any automatic saving of [group] images to individual QQ users’ spaces; therefore this defense argument is not tenable and is not accepted. Defense counsel’s defense arguments are tenable and may be accepted. In accordance with Articles 105(2), 55(1), 56(1), and 64 of the Criminal Law of the PRC, [this court] rules as follows:

    I. For the crime of inciting subversion, defendant Gao Yingpu is sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, with subsequent deprivation of political rights for one year.

    (The prison term is to be calculated from the day the verdict is implemented, with each day spent in detention prior to the verdict’s implementation to count as one day of the prison term; therefore, it will run from July 21, 2010, to July 20, 2013.)

    II. The Lenovo notebook computer used to commit defendant Gao Yingpu’s crimes is hereby confiscated.

    If this verdict is not accepted, an appeal may be filed within 10 days of the second day following the receipt of this verdict, either to this court or directly to the Chongqing High People’s Court. In the case of a written appeal, the original appellate petition must be submitted together with two copies.

    Presiding Judge: Xiao Ming
    Judicial Officer: Li Yi
    Deputy Judicial Officer: Li Ying

    December 13, 2010

    Court Clerk: Xia Yujie

    Chinese Source(原文):
    重庆市第一中级人民法院刑事判决书
    (2010)渝一中法刑初字第189号
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    重庆市第一中级人民法院
    刑事判决书

    (2010)渝一中法刑初字第189号

    公诉机关重庆市人民检察院第一分院。

    被告人高应朴,男,1963年8月17日出生于重庆市渝中区,汉族,大学文化程度,无业。住重庆市渝北区【略】号(户籍所在地:广东省广州市天河南街广和一街13号201房)。因涉嫌煽动颠覆国家政权罪,于2010年7月21日被捉获,次日被刑事拘留,同年8月26日被逮捕。现羁押于重庆市渝北区看守所。

    辩护人赵阳,重庆百君律师事务所律师。

    重庆市人民检察院第一分院以渝检一分院刑诉【2010】238号起诉书指控被告人高应朴犯煽动颠覆国家政权罪,于2010年11月25日向本院提起公诉。本院依法组成合议庭,因本案涉及国家秘密,不公开开庭进行了审理,重庆市人民检察院第一分院指派代理检察员马洪伟出庭支持公诉,被告人高应朴及其辩护人赵阳到庭参加诉讼。现已审理终结。

    重庆市人民检察院第一分院指控:2009年以来,被告人高应朴安装使用翻墙软件浏览境外《看中国》、《人民报》、《大纪元》、《阿波罗》等境外网站。并使用QQ号190996622,以“西南派克”的网名先后加入了“纳百川”、“法制论坛”、“草根智慧”等QQ群,高应朴在其QQ空间不设密码和下载限制,在QQ相册下载储存丑化毛泽东、胡锦涛等国家领导人的照片;在QQ日志存有《毛泽东:没有你们日本皇军,我们不可能夺取胜利》、《权谋十一天》等10余篇文章;在QQ群共享《墓碑》、《千秋功罪毛泽东》等30篇文章。2010年7月以来,高应朴在QQ群聊天时发表了“社会主义已证明更血腥更失败,是死的制度,资本主义能改恶从善,走向更人道更人性,中国的毛式社会主义要早死早投胎”、“爱国主义,是一面专制主义的招魂帆”、“要走欧美民主道路”等言论,上传丑化毛泽东的照片2张。2010年7月21日,被告人高应朴被公安机关捉获归案。

    为证明指控的事实,公诉机关当庭举示了扣押笔录,电子证据远程勘验笔录,电子证据检验鉴定报告书,证人许涛、陈琳、唐翼等的证言,被告人高应朴的供述和辩解等证据,并据此认为,被告人高应朴以造谣、诽谤等方式,在网络发表煽动颠覆国家政权、推翻社会主义制度的言论,其行为已触犯《中华人民共和国刑法》第一百零五条第二款之规定,犯罪事实清楚,证据确实、充分,应当煽动颠覆国家政权罪追究其刑事责任。提请本院依法判处。

    被告人高应朴对起诉书指控的内容及基本事实无异议,但辩称其QQ空间相册里丑化国家领导人胡锦涛的图片并非其下载储存。该图片系群空间的图片自动保存到其QQ空间中的。其辩护人提出被告人高应朴系初犯,认罪、悔罪,其犯罪行为没有为国家利益造成重大损害,主观恶性和社会危害程度相对较小。建议依法对其酌情从轻处罚的辩护意见。

    经审理查明,2009年以来,被告人高应朴使用QQ号190996622,以“西南派克”的网名加入了“草根智慧”、“法制论坛”、“纳百川”等QQ群,并安装使用“自由之门”翻墙软件浏览“看中国”、“人民报”、“大纪元”、“阿波罗”等境外网站,高应朴在其QQ空间不设密码和下载限制,在QQ相册下载储存丑化毛泽东、胡锦涛等国家领导人的照片;在QQ日志存有《毛泽东:没有你们日本皇军,我们不可能夺取胜利》、《权谋十一天》等10余篇文章;在QQ群共享《墓碑》、《千秋功罪毛泽东》等30篇文章。2010年7月以来,高应朴在QQ群聊天时发表了“社会主义已证明更血腥更失败,是死的制度,资本主义能改恶从善,走向更人道更人性,中国的毛式社会主义要早死早投胎”、“爱国主义,是一面专制主义的招魂帆”、“要走欧美民主道路”等言论,上传丑化毛泽东的照片2张。

    2010年7月21日,被告人高应朴被公安机关捉获归案。

    上述事实,有公诉机关举示并经庭审质证、认证的下列证据予以证明:

    1. 接受刑事案件登记表,立案决定书证明:2010年7月21日,公安机关接报案后,于同日依法对高应朴立案侦查。
    2. 捉获经过证明:2010年7月21日公安机关在重庆市渝北区【略】将高应朴捉获。
    3. 提取笔录及扣押物品清单证明:2010年7月21日从高应朴家中提取涉案“联想”牌笔记本电脑一台,并依法予以扣押。
    4. 指认电脑及所发图片的照片证明:2010年7月21日,高应朴对作案笔记本电脑进行指认;对所发的丑化毛泽东的图片2张进行指认;对在QQ日志中所发表的《毛泽东:没有你们日本皇军,我们不可能夺取胜利》、《权谋十一天》等10余篇文章进行指认;对在QQ群中共享的《墓碑》、《千秋功罪毛泽东》等30篇文章进行指认。
    5. 现场勘验检查工作记录证明:2010年7月21日渝北网监民警对高应朴电脑进行勘察,在电脑中获取QQ号为190996622在“纳百川”QQ群发布的相关图片及QQ聊天记录等电子信息。
    6. 远程勘验工作记录证明:2010年8月17日,重庆市公安局侦查员对高应朴访问过的“看中国”、“人民报”、“大纪元”、“阿波罗”等境外网站进行远程勘察,上述网站无法直接正常访问,但使用“自由之门”翻墙软件可以打开。2010年8月8日至9日,重庆市公安局侦查员对QQ190996622的QQ群、QQ空间日志、图片上传等情况进行固定。QQ90996622的空间从开通至远程勘验时,共有2042人/次访问过。QQ190996622共有10个QQ群。QQ90996622在空间发表日志339篇,其中有大约15篇文章有攻击毛泽东等人的内容。QQ190996622空间有图片1629张,其中有11张系毛泽东和胡锦涛等领导人的。QQ群共享《墓碑》、《千秋功罪毛泽东》等30篇文章。
    7. 电子证据检验报告书证明:对高应朴涉案电脑中恢复提取网页浏览记录5824条。QQ聊天记录2.95MB,图片、DOC后缀等文件25485个、QQ9099622共有“纳百川”、“法制论坛”、“草根智慧”等10个QQ群,其在10个QQ群中的部分聊天记录有“社会主义已证明更血腥更失败,是死的制度,资本主义能改恶从善,走向更人道更人性,中国的毛式社会主义要早死早投胎”、“爱国主义,是一面专制主义的招魂帆”、“要走欧美民主道路”等。
    8. 补充侦查报告书证明:高应朴的QQ号所加入的QQ群在两份勘察记录中记载的不一致,是因为远程勘验笔录与电子物证鉴定报告书形成时间有差异,期间,QQ群名称变更所致,但QQ群ID号不能更改,另外,QQ空间软件中没有群空间中的图片自动保存到QQ群友个人QQ空间中的功能。
    9. 证人许涛证言证明:我和“西南派克”是在“草根智慧”群中认识的,“西南派克”在“草根智慧”里把拥护和喜欢毛主席的网友踢出群,不准他们发表观点。后来,我创建了“纳百川”群,“纳百川”有100多人,也包括“西南派克”。“西南派克”对毛主席有成见,喜欢发表攻击毛主席的言论。“西南派克”在群里共享一些不能在互联网上找到的资料,文章和书籍,在群里有一定人气。
    10. 证人王侃证言证明:我在“法治论坛”这个QQ群中,多次看到“西南派克”发言,主要观点是支持改革开放,并要求进一步深化改革,公开选举领导人,对领导人实施有效监督。
    11. 证人陈琳证言证明:在“草根智慧”群里面很多讨论的话题是“西南派克”发起的,他发了很多资料到QQ群里面,这些资料很多都是对党和政府行为的一种不满甚至是持反对意见的。“西南派克”发起的讨论话题也都是批评毛泽东,反对政府的,他发起的话题不是实事求是的,很偏激或者说是反动。
    12. 证人唐翼证言证明:我加入过“草根智慧”和“纳百川”QQ群,“西南派克”在“纳百川”QQ群中发的言论主要是反对激进的“左”,他称现在国内的经济发展模式不科学,应该尽快调整,他比较反对毛泽东,除了发表的言论外还发了丑化毛泽东形象的图片,我进入过“西南派克”的QQ空间,空间日志中有污蔑毛泽东及文化大革命中毛泽东与其他领导人政治斗争等的文章,这些文章“西南派克”也传到QQ群共享空间中。
    13. 证人刘云涛证言证明:我上网三、四年了,我加入过“纳百川”QQ群,我不认识“西南派克”。
    14. 证人李XX证言证明:我与高应朴是夫妻关系,我家有两台电脑,一台台式电脑,一台“联想”笔记本电脑,高应朴一般都是用笔记本电脑,我只用台式机。
    15. 被告人高应朴供述:我有一个网名叫“西南派克”的QQ号,号码是190996622.我在网上加入了“草根智慧”、“法制论坛”、“纳百川”等10个QQ群。我通过“自由之门”软件,浏览过“阿波罗”、“看中国”、“人民报”、“大纪元”等境外网站,因为这些网站上有在国内网站上我看不到的东西,我还在上面看一些书,比如《墓碑》、《千秋功罪毛泽东》等。我从2009年开始参加有关对毛泽东的讨论和上传对毛泽东的生平有负面影响的书籍、文章及言论。我的QQ空间不设密码和下载限制,我QQ空间中的《毛泽东:没有你们日本皇军,我们不可能夺得政权》、《中国,有这样一个超级皇帝》、《权谋十一天》等文章是我转载的,在“草根智慧”、“纳百川”等多个QQ群里,共享有《墓碑》、《千秋功罪毛泽东》等文章。我在QQ群中发表了“要走欧美民主道路”、“社会主义已证明更血腥更失败,是死的制度,资本主义能改恶从善,走向更人道更人性,中国的毛式社会主义要早死早投胎”、“爱国主义,是一面专制主义的招魂帆”等言论。2010年7月20日下午,我在家中上网的时候,在名为“纳百川“的QQ群里看到左右派别的成员在进行争吵,左派的人说毛泽东时代好,并称人民要站起来对资产阶级及资改派进行清算,因为我是属于改革派,对左派的观点很生气,就在QQ群里发了两张从百度上的“袁腾飞吧”下载的侮辱毛主席的图片,一张是毛泽东跪在地上忏悔的图片,一张是毛泽东的龟身人头像,一个人站在龟背上的图片。我当时发图片的时候还发了一句话是“把毛老痞立在天安门广场的像都做好了,你做好陪跪的准备没有?”。我当时发表这两张图片是为了打击群里左派拥护毛泽东的思想和言论,我主要是要反驳他们的观点,取笑他们,侮辱他们的精神领袖。

    本院认为,被告人高应朴以造谣、诽谤等方式,在网络上发表、转载及共享煽动颠覆国家政权、推翻社会主义制度的言论、文章,储存及上传丑化国家领导人的图片,其行为已构成煽动颠覆国家政权罪,依法应予惩处。公诉机关指控的事实和罪名成立。鉴于被告人高应朴系初犯,归案后能如实供述自己的罪行,认罪态度较好,对国家安全造成的危害相对较小等情节,可对其酌情从轻处罚。关于被告人高应朴提出其QQ空间相册里丑化国家领导人胡锦涛的图片并非其下载储存,该图片系群空间的图片自动保存到其QQ空间的辩解意见,经查,公安机关出具的补充侦查报告书证明QQ空间软件中没有群空间中的图片自动保存到QQ群友个人QQ空间中的功能,故其辩解不能成立,不予采纳。其辩护人提出的辩护意见成立,予以采纳。依照《中华人民共和国刑法》第一百零五条第二款,第五十条第一款、第五十六条第一款、第六十四条之规定,判决如下:

    一、 被告人高应朴犯煽动颠覆国家政权罪,判处有期徒刑三年,剥夺政治权利一年。

    (刑期从判决执行之日起计算,判决执行以前先行羁押的,羁押一日抵刑期一日,即自2010年7月21日起至2013年7月20日止)。

    二、 对被告人高应朴犯罪所用的“联想”牌笔记本电脑一台予以没收。

    如不服本判决,可在接到判决书的第二日起十日内,通过本院或者直接向重庆市高级人民法院提出上诉。书面上诉的,应当提交上诉正本一份,副本二份。

    审判长 肖明
    审判员 李毅
    代理审判员 李颖

    二〇一〇年十二月十三日

    书记员 夏玉杰


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  • Big Character Posters Incite Subversion in the Internet Age

    Chen Shifu advocated for Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People in his big character posters.

    In April 2002, a “big character poster” (dazibao) appeared on a bulletin board reserved for official public notices outside the government building in Zhaoshi Town, Longshan County, in western Hunan Province. Entitled “Letter of Protest,” the poster was written with a calligraphy brush on red paper and called on residents to oppose local government policies related to property demolition and eviction. Over the course of the next several months, other posters appeared and their rhetoric grew more radical.

    After an August poster called on people to overthrow the Communist Party and re-establish rule by the Nationalist Party (Guomindang), local police launched a special investigation to find the author of the posters. Two weeks later they found their man, a 45-year-old coffin seller named Chen Shifu, and charged him with inciting subversion.

    In the age of blogs and Weibo, it’s perhaps easy to underestimate the significance of a few sheets of paper posted in a public place. Big character posters, large-print manifestos posted strategically to attract the attention of passers-by, have a long history in China, but they became an established means of expressing challenges to authority during the Cultural Revolution (1966‒1976). In fact, for a while the right to express criticisms in this manner became deeply connected to the idea of free speech. A right to post big character posters was enshrined in the 1975 constitution as one of the “four big rights,” which were extolled as “new forms of carrying on socialist revolution created by the masses of the people.” This right was retained in the first post-Cultural Revolution constitution in 1978, but in the wake of the 1979 Democracy Wall movement, the newly consolidated party leadership under Deng Xiaoping decided that big character posters were a threat to the “normal” exercise of the people’s democratic rights, and the right was removed from the 1980 constitution.

    Putting up “counterrevolutionary posters”—together with counterrevolutionary leaflets and letters—was classified as a crime of “counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement” in the criminal law that took effect in 1980. Hundreds if not thousands of people were sentenced to prison for “the three types of cases” during the 1980s and 1990s before the crime of counterrevolution was removed from the criminal law in 1997.[*] After 1997 those detained for putting up posters, distributing leaflets, or sending letters calling for the overthrow of the Communist Party were charged with “inciting subversion.”

    The political motivations behind the charge of inciting subversion are expressed clearly in the statement to the court (translated below) presented by Yang Qinghua, who served as public prosecutor in the trial of Chen Shifu. In his attempt to justify the charges against Chen, Yang takes us step by step through the alchemy by which nation, government, and ruling party are fused in China’s political culture, making any challenge to the Communist Party’s “core leadership” role a threat to state security. The prosecutor’s statement is suffused with political language, with which he makes clear that the law he enforces in this case is not so much state law as it is party law. His ultimate analysis of the roots of Chen’s crimes places blame on the defendant’s failure to adhere to the core political faiths that the party has gone to great lengths to instill in its citizens: that the 1949 revolution marked a distinct break between “old” and “new” Chinas, a sharp boundary between the poverty and weakness of the past and the promise of prosperity and strength for a people who had finally “stood up.”

    Yang ridicules Chen for his linguistic inelegance and ignorance, yet Yang’s statement (which earned a provincial award for excellent prosecution statements) also suffers from errors, faulty logic, and sloppy legal citations. Yang misquotes China’s constitution, and in what the prosecution must have thought was one of its most damaging arguments, Yang exposes Chen’s inability to elucidate the “Three Principles of the People” that he advocated in his posters. Yang then reveals his own ignorance by identifying “democracy” rather than “nationalism” as the first component of Sun Yat-sen’s famous theory. The fact that, despite these flaws, Yang’s statement was deemed worthy of an award reinforces the suspicion that it was assessed not for its excellence in legal analysis or logic, but rather for its ideological correctness.

    The outcome of Chen’s trial is currently unknown, but considering that prosecutors sought a maximum five-year sentence, he is believed to have been released no later than 2007.


    * Counterrevolutionary correspondence is related to the three types of cases. Among law enforcement authorities, it principally referred to cases in which letters were sent with counterrevolutionary purposes to overseas correspondence addresses broadcast by radio stations of “Chiang clique agents,” according to a notice issued by the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and Ministry of Public Security on December 26, 1979.⇑



    Procuratorate Prosecution Statement: click to expand

    Xiangxi Tujia & Miao Autonomous Prefecture People’s Procuratorate
    Prosecution Statement

    Presiding Judge, Adjudication Officers, and Citizen Observers:

    This morning, the First Criminal Division of the Xiangxi Autonomous Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court held a hearing here to publicly try the inciting subversion case against defendant Chen Shifu. In accordance with Articles 153, [160], 165, and [169] of the Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC and Article 15 of the Organic Law of the Procuratorate of the PRC, I have been assigned by the Xiangxi Autonomous Prefecture People’s Procuratorate to represent it as prosecutor on behalf of the state and appear in court to support the prosecution, as well as to undertake legal supervision of the criminal process.

    In the court investigation phase of the trial just now, the court’s investigation of the defendant’s testimony in court and questioning by the prosecutor, the reading of relevant witness statements, expert opinions, the record of the crime-scene investigation, and the presentation of relevant documentary evidence sufficiently demonstrates the correctness of our procuratorate’s decision to charge defendant Chen Shifu with the crime of inciting subversion and that the evidence is sufficient and reliable. In order to further expose criminality, castigate evil, uphold justice, and promote legal institutions, the prosecution will set out the following several arguments for the court’s consideration as it decides upon conviction and sentencing for the defendant:

    I. Defendant Chen Shifu’s actions constitute the crime of inciting subversion.

    According to Article 105(2) of the Criminal Law of the PRC: the offense of “inciting subversion of state power” means to engage in incitement by spreading rumors or slanders or any other means to subvert state power or overthrow the socialist system. Before convicting under this offense, we must clarify two concepts:

    1. What is the nature of our country’s state power?
    2. Article 1 of the Constitution of the PRC states: “The People’s Republic of China is a socialist state under the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.” The Constitution also states [The following language is not found in the Constitution–Trans.] that the Communist Party of China (CPC) is the core of leadership of China’s socialist revolution and socialist construction effort and the core of leadership of China’s state power of people’s democratic dictatorship. From the above constitutional provisions, we can see that leadership over the state by China’s working class is realized through CPC rule. Overthrow of the CPC is equivalent to overthrowing the leadership of the working class and tantamount to subverting state power, and is thereby a rejection of the socialist system.
    3. Inciting subversion is a behavioral offense, which means that a crime is constituted so long as the perpetrator engages in behavior that incites subversion of state power—regardless of whether or not that behavior results in actual harm or whether others believe [the incitement] or commit acts of incitement.

    In conclusion, knowing the nature of China’s state power and understanding that the crime of inciting subversion is a behavioral offense, let us again review the case and analyze the actions and subjective intent of defendant Chen Shifu: The prosecution charges that defendant Chen Shifu incited subversion of state power (i.e., the leadership of the CPC) by posting “big character posters.” To show why we say this, the prosecutor will read an excerpt from defendant Chen Shifu’s third “big character poster” (i.e., “Call to Arms”): “I call on all ordinary people and celebrities in China to rise up and overthrow the Communist Party; to retake our national government and govern China properly. Everyone can begin by posting ‘big character posters’ all over or directly participating in anti-Communist organizations. . . .” From this excerpt, we can see clearly that the defendant subjectively had a clear intention to overthrow the CPC and subvert state power and that he objectively engaged in corresponding behavior (posting ‘big character posters’). So, whether one looks at subjective or objective criteria, [his actions] satisfy the main constituent criteria for the crime of inciting subversion. The prosecution’s decision to prosecute defendant Chen Shifu on this charge is correct. However, ever since he was taken into custody—including in court today—defendant Chen Shifu has claimed in his defense that he only wanted to make comments and did not really want to overthrow the Communist Party. The prosecution believes that this is only sophistry on the defendant’s part in an effort to mitigate his criminal liability. Think about it: Does it make sense to overthrow a state’s ruling party first and then make comments? The prosecution believes that no ruling party in any country in the world would accept this way of making “commentary.” The collegiate panel should not give any credence to this sort of ridiculous defense argument.

    II. The evidence supporting the criminal charges against defendant Chen Shifu was collected legally and is objective and mutually correlative.

    During the just-concluded court investigation phase, the prosecution put forth a large amount of evidence supporting the criminal charges against the defendant. Below, the prosecution will summarize [that evidence] as follows:

    1. Defendant Chen Shifu fully confessed to using a brush to write the three big character posters “Letter of Protest,” “On the Current Political Situation,” and “Call to Arms,” and what he has said about the paper, ink, and adhesive used; the locations of posting; and the contents is all corroborated by the testimony of witnesses Chen Xiaohua, Yao Jinxiang, Wu Caixu, Xiang Famao, Peng Bin, Zhang Furong, and Li Wancai.
    2. The testimony of Zhou Minglong, Wang Boyu, Li Wenzhi, Chen Shiyun, Fan Guihua, and Wu Dan, confirming that they personally saw the big character posters and some of the contents, is completely consistent with the confession of defendant Chen Shifu.
    3. The corroborating documentary evidence of the three big character posters, “Letter of Protest,” “On the Current Political Situation,” and “Call to Arms,” in the case file.
    4. The public security authority’s record of on-scene investigation and relevant photographs, which are on file, and the conclusions of the Longshan County Public Security Bureau’s handwriting analysis determining that the three big character posters were all written by Chen Shifu himself, about all of which defendant Chen Shifu has not raised any objections.
    5. Documents on file such as the crime report, record of case solution, and record of defendant Chen Shifu’s apprehension.

    The evidence above is not mutually contradictory and forms a complete chain of evidence. The only exclusive conclusion that can be drawn from this evidence is that defendant Chen Shifu used the posting of big character posters to incite subversion of state power.

    III. Refutation of some of defendant Chen Shifu’s mistaken views

    In questioning the defendant and examining the investigation file, the prosecution has discovered that defendant Chen Shifu’s thinking is very confused and that his views are full of holes. There are numerous poorly constructed sentences and mistaken characters in the big character posters he wrote. (Based on the prosecution’s rough tally, there are more than 25 mistaken characters and seven poorly constructed sentences in his “Call to Arms,” an “essay” of fewer than 300 characters.) Some of his views display certain confusions, of which the prosecution will examine two in particular in order to set the record straight:

    1. First is the idea that the “freedom of expression” enjoyed by citizens can conceal his criminal activity. During the prosecution’s questioning and even here in today’s courtroom, the defendant continued to say that citizens enjoy the right to “freedom of expression.” There’s no mistake, “freedom of expression” is a fundamental right granted to citizens by the Constitution. But the prosecution is obligated to point out that “freedom of expression” must be established within the framework of law, instead of overriding the law. Moreover, the prosecution wants to explain very carefully that our country and our ruling party has never been afraid of comments from the masses. On the contrary, we welcome very much the oversight of the broad popular masses. Had the defendant expressed his comments and suggestions through lawful channels such as the system of letters and visits or petitioning or made complaints to a people’s congress deputy, he wouldn’t be standing here today in the defendant’s docket. On the contrary, he would receive the law’s protection. Unfortunately, however, Chen Shifu chose the unlawful manner of “posting big character posters” and made vicious attacks and slanders against the government and our party. This is something the law cannot allow. I wonder whether defendant Chen Shifu now realizes this as he sits in the defendant’s docket.
    2. Only the “Three Principles of the People” and the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) can properly govern China. This is something that the defendant has said many times; but, ironically, when asked by the prosecution what the “Three Principles of the People” were, the defendant could not answer. Just think, how can a person who doesn’t even know what the “Three Principles of the People” are know whether they can properly govern China? This in and of itself is a joke. One cannot deny that during the old era of democratic revolution, Sun Yat-sen’s idea of the “Three Principles of the People” being “Democracy, People’s Rights, and People’s Livelihood” [The first principle is “nationalism” (minzu) not “democracy” (minzhu)—Trans.] was certainly a progressive idea during its time. Today, however, when China has already entered the socialist era, it is clearly out of step with the times to talk about the “Three Principles of the People.” These days, only Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important idea of “Three Represents” can guide China on the path towards being a strong nation with wealthy citizens. The more than 20 years since reform and opening have proved this point, and I believe that future history will also prove this point. As for whether or not the Nationalist Party can properly govern China, anyone who understands even a little bit of modern history knows that from the 1911 Revolution until the founding of New China [in 1949], China was under control of the Nationalists for several decades. But what they brought the Chinese people was endless war and chaos, hardship and destitution, bullying by foreign powers, and selling out the nation in search of personal glory. As someone born after [1949] who grew up as a citizen of New China, defendant Chen Shifu never had any experience of the old China under Nationalist rule, so how can he know if the Nationalists governed well? Actually, you don’t have to go very far; if you had looked at the great differences between old and new China with regard to your own Zhaoshi Town or asked the old people around you, you wouldn’t have made such a basic error. The prosecution also wants to take this opportunity to mention to the defendant: the “ruling party” in Taiwan is the Democratic Progressive Party, not the Nationalist Party. Just think, the Guomindang cannot even govern the several dozen million people of Taiwan Province; how could they lead the more than one billion people of the mainland towards relative prosperity? Isn’t the defendant taking too much for granted?

    IV. The ideological origins and social consequences of defendant Chen Shifu’s crimes and their lessons to us

    Before analyzing why the defendant committed his crime, the prosecution first wishes to discuss three things: 1. After the defendant committed his crimes, the public security authority searched his residence in accordance with the law. They found not a single book promoting our party’s policies but discovered several reactionary books such as Biography of Chiang Kai-shek; 2. The defendant confessed to public security and procuratorate authorities on multiple occasions that when he was working as a migrant laborer in Fujian he often listened to Taiwan radio broadcasts to the mainland when he was bored; 3. During the process of relocating the marketplace, the defendant went to create a scene at the township government and other bodies because of the gap between the compensation payment and the expected [expenses].

    From the above three matters, it is actually very easy to explain the origins of the defendant’s crimes. He neglected his studies for a long time and stopped reforming his own worldview. Because he frequently listened to hostile radio broadcasts, he gradually developed dissatisfaction with current reality and a hatred for the party and government. The moment his own interests were affected, he immediately went to stand on the side of opposing the party, opposing socialism, and opposing the people. After the Chen Shifu case occurred, it created a big impact in Zhaoshi as well as the surrounding townships. In several middle and primary schools in Zhaoshi Town it was necessary to disrupt the normal curriculum to hold several days of political-thought classes for the students in order to set the record straight. During those several days, Zhaoshi was filled with discussion of the “big character poster” incident. No sooner had the special case team arrived in Zhaoshi than a dozen or so old party members set out on their own initiative to find the team leader. These old comrades with 20 or 30 years of party membership all expressed the same desire: the case must be solved quickly and the perpetrator taken into custody because criminals who spread such heresies and disrupt people’s thinking must be severely punished. I think the words of these dozen or so old party members represent the thinking of Zhaoshi’s masses, who number more than 100,000 people. Now the case has been solved and the defendant will receive law’s sanction, but the prosecution still feels a sense of unease. How could a case like this occur in a place with such a glorious revolutionary tradition as Zhaoshi? How can we eliminate these kinds of cases once and for all? The prosecution wants to use this case to share the following lessons:

    1. We cannot do as some local governments and pursue only economic development but must also develop spiritual civilization—both must be “grasped firmly with both hands.” Lately, there have been deviations in the ideology guiding the work of the heads of some local governments (of course, only a small minority). It’s as if it’s only important to pursue economics and nothing else is important. Actually, this kind of thinking is dangerous. If we sacrifice the construction of spiritual civilization in pursuit of economic development, I think this kind of prosperity will certainly not last long. Problems such as this case might even emerge.
    2. The character of some of our law enforcement personnel needs to improve. The defendant in this case, as well as many other members of the public, all complained to us about simple work methods and rough attitudes of some local law enforcement personnel. Perhaps to the [law enforcement officers] themselves this is only a matter of work details, but in the eyes of the popular masses these law enforcement personnel represent the image of the party and the government. If the behavior of an extreme few damages the image of the party and the government or even gives those with ulterior motives an opportunity, this does more harm than good.
    3. We still have a long way to go in our legal education work for the masses, especially for the masses in “old, minority, remote, and poor” [Here, “old” refers to old revolutionary base areas where CPC activity had been strong prior to 1949—Trans.] regions such as ours. On this point, the prosecution only wants to say one thing: The prerequisite and foundation for our ability to “rule the nation in accordance with the law” is to have the masses know and obey the law.

    V. The defendant ought to be held criminally responsible.

    According to Article 105(1) of the Criminal Law [The following is not actually a direct quote, the correct citations are Article 105(2) and Article 113—Trans.]: “Whoever incites subversion of state power shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, criminal detention, public surveillance or deprivation of political rights and may have their property confiscated.” Reviewing this case, defendant Chen Shifu has no grounds for lenience or mitigation, and we hope that the collegiate panel will render a lawful and fair verdict based on the magnitude of the defendant’s crimes, the social impact, and the defendant’s attitude towards confessing guilt. This concludes the prosecution’s statement.

    Prosecutor: Yang Qinghua
    April 18, 2003

    (Note: This prosecution statement was awarded first prize in a provincial competition of prosecution statements.)

    Chinese Source(原文):
    湘西州检察志(1989‒2007),pp. 300-305
    Click on icon to expand

    湘西士家族苗族自治州人民检察院
    公诉意见书

    审判长、审判员、旁听公民们:

    湘西自治州中级人民法院刑事审判第一庭今天在这里开庭,公开审理被告人陈世富煽动颠覆国家政权一案。根据《中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法》第一百五十三条、第一百六十条、第一百六十五条和第一六十九条以及《中华人民共和国检察院组织法》第一十五条之规定,我受湘西自治州人民检察院的指派,代表本院,以国家公诉人的身份,出席法庭支持公诉,并依法对刑事诉讼实行法律监督。

    在刚才的法庭调查阶段,通过被告人的当庭供述、公诉人的讯问、宣读有关证人证言、鉴定结论、勘验笔录以及出示有关书证等一系列法庭调查活动,充分说明本院指控被告人陈世富所犯煽动颠覆国家政权罪定性是准确的、证据也是确实充分的。公诉人为了进一步揭露犯罪、鞭挞邪恶、匡护正义、弘扬法制,下面就本案谈如下几点公诉意见,供法庭在对被告人定罪量刑时予以考虑:

    (一)被告人陈世富的行为己构成煽动颠覆国家政权罪

    《中华人民共和国刑法》第一百零五条第二款规定”煽动颠覆国家政权罪”是指以造谣、诽谤或其它方式煽动颠覆国家政权、推翻社会主义制度的行为。我们在认定此罪名前必须要明确两个概念:

    1. 我国国家政权的性质是什么?
    2. 《中华人民共和国宪法》第1条规定”中华人民共和国是工人阶级领导的、以工农联盟为基础的人民民主专政的社会主义国家“。同时《宪法》还规定“中国共产党是我国社会主义革命和社会主义建设事业的领导核心,是我国人民民主专政的国家政权的领导核心。由上述宪法规定我们可得知:中国工人阶级对国家的领导是通过中国共产党的执政来实现的,推翻中国共产党,即是推翻工人阶级的领导,既是颠覆国家的政权,从而否定社会主义制度。
    3. 煽动颠覆国家政权属于行为犯,即只要行为人具有煽动颠覆国家政权的行为,不管是否产生实际危害结果,不管他人是否相信或实施了煽动内容的行为,都构成犯罪。综上,知道了我国国家政权的性质,明白了煽动颠覆国家政权罪是行为犯,我们再来结合案情分析被告人陈世富的行为和主现故意:公诉机关指控被告人陈世富利用张贴”大字报”的形式煽动颠覆国家政权(即中国共产党的领导)。为什么这样讲,公诉人下面摘录宣读被告人陈世富在第三张”大字报”(即《号召书》)中的一段话:“号召天下百姓和知名人士站起来,推翻共产党,把国民政府接回来,再好好的治理中国。大家首先可以《大字报》的形式到处张贴,或者直接参加反共组织……”从此段话我们可以清楚地得知,被告人在主观上明显具有推翻中国共产党领导,颠覆国家政权的故意,同时在客观上也实施了相应的行为(张贴”大字报”),其无论从主观要件上,还是从客观行为要件上均符合煽动颠覆国家政权罪的构成要件。公诉机关以此罪起诉被告文陈世富在定性上是准确的。虽然,在被告人陈世富被抓后,乃至在今天的法庭上,陈一直辩称其只想提意见,并不是真的想推翻共产党。公诉人认为这只是被告人为了减轻罪责的一种狡辩,试想:有没有先将一个国家的执政党推翻后,才提意见的道理。公诉人想世界上任何一个国家的任何一个执政党都不会接受这种”提意见”的方式的。对于此种荒谬的辩解,合议庭在应不予采信。

    (二)认定被告人陈世富犯罪的证据来源合法、客观、证据之间具有关联性

    公诉人在刚才的法庭调查阶段,列举并出示了大量认定被告人犯罪的证据。公诉人下面在这里作一下归纳:1、被告人陈世富对其用毛笔书写《抗诉书》、《时局论》、《号召书》三份大字报供认不讳,所述用的纸张、墨水、胶水、张贴的位置、书写的内容均与证人陈小花、姚金香、吴才绪、向发茂、彭斌、张芙蓉、李万财证实一致;

    2 、证人周明龙、王伯宇、李文志、陈仕云、范桂花、吴丹等人证实亲眼看见的大字报的纸张及部分内容与被告人陈世富供述完全吻合;3、有书证《抗议书》、《时局论》、《号召书》三张大字报在卷佐证;4、有公安机关的现场勘场笔录、相关照片在卷,龙山县公安局文检鉴定三张大字报均系陈世富一人书写,并经被告人陈世富辩认后没有异议;5、有报案记录、破案记录、抓获被告人陈世富经过等材料在卷。以上证据间互无矛盾,且已形成完整的证据索链。通过这些证据只能得出唯一的排他性的结论即:被告人陈世富采取张贴大字报的方式煽动颠覆国家政权。

    (三)对被告人陈世富几个错误观点的反驳

    公诉人讯问被告人及审查卷宗时发现,被告人陈世富的思维相当混乱,观点也漏洞百出,书写的大字报病句、错字更是随处可见(公诉人粗略统计了一下,在其《号召书》不足三百字的”文章”中,便有多达二十五个错别字和七个病句)。然而其某些观点,又颇具一定的迷惑性,公诉人下面剖析两点,以正视听: (1)以公民享有”言论自由”权掩盖其犯罪行为,公诉人在提审被告人,甚至在今天的法庭上,被告人还提到公民享有”言论自由”权。不错,”言论自由”是《宪法》赋予公民的一项基本权利,但是公诉人必须指的是”言论自由”权必须是建立在法律的框架之下,而决非凌驾于法律之上。另外,公诉人要慎重说明的是,我们的国家,我们的执政党从来都不怕群众提意见,相反还十分欢迎广大人民群众的监督。假如被告人能够利用信访、上访或找人大代表代为反映等等这些合法的途径提出自己的意见和建议,那么今天他不但不会坐在被告席上,相反还会受到法律的保护。然而遗憾的是,陈世富却选择了“张贴大字报”这种不法手段,同时还对政府及我党进行恶毒的攻击和诽谤,这就是法律所不允许的了。不知今天坐在被告席上的陈世富是否意识到了这点;(2)只有”三民主义”,只有国民党才能治理好中国。这是被告人多次提及的观点,然而可笑的是,当公诉人问其什么是”三民主义”时,被告人却答不上来了。试想,一个连什么是”三民主义”也没弄明白的人,又怎么知道“三民主义”能治理好中国,这本身就是一个笑话。不可否认,在旧民主主义革命时期,孙中山先生提出的以”民主、民权、民生”为核心的“三民主义”思想,在当时确实是一种先进的思想。然而在中国已进入社会主义的今天,再提“三民主义”显然已不合时宜了。在当今,唯有邓小平理论和”三个代表”重要思想才能使中国走上强国、富民之路,改革开放二十多年来的历史已证明了这点,相信以后的历史还将证明这一点。再谈一下国民党是否能治理好中国,稍微懂一点近代史的人都知道,从辛亥革命到新中国成立,国民政府在中国也统治了几十年,然而它带给中国人民的是什么,是无穷的战乱,是民不聊生、是外强欺辱、是卖国求荣。被告人陈世富作为生在解放后,长在新中国的公民,根本都没有经历过国民政府统治过的旧中国,又怎么会知道国民党统治的好呢?其实你根本不用去远方,只要你看一看你们召市新、旧社会的巨大变化,问一问你身边的老人们,你也不至于犯这样一个低级的错误了。公诉人在这里还想顺带告诉一下被告人:目前在台湾”执政”的已不是国民党了,而是民进党。试想连一个几千万人口的台湾省也治理不好的国民党,又怎么能领导大陆十多亿人奔小康。被告人是否有点太想当然了。

    (四)被告人陈世富犯罪的思想根源,社会影响及给我们的启示

    在剖析被告人为会犯罪前,公诉人想先讲三件事:1、在被告人犯罪后,公安机关依法对其住所搜查时,竟未发现一本宣传我党方针政策的书籍,倒是翻出了几本像《蒋介石传》之类的反动书籍;2、被告人多次向公安和检察机关供述:自己在福建打工期间,由于无聊,经常收听台湾对大陆的广播;3、在这次市场搬迁过程中,由于补偿金与预期有一定的差距,被告人多次到乡政府等部门闹事。从上三件事,其实已很好地诠译了被告人犯罪的根源,那便是长期不学习,放松了对自己世界观的改造,由于经常收听敌台,逐渐产生了对现实不满,仇视党和政府的情绪。当自己的利益一旦受到触动,便马上站到了反党、反社会主义,与人民为敌的一面。陈世富一案发生后,在召市乃至相关乡镇,造成了极大的影响。召市镇几个中、小学、不得不打乱原来的教学计划,对学生上了几天的政治思想课,以正视听。而在那几天,召市的街头巷尾,莫不是纷纷议论”大字报事件”以至于专案组刚一进驻召市,便有十几位老党员自发地找到了专案组负责人,这些有着二、三十年党龄的老同志都表达了一个心愿:请务必尽快破案,请务必抓到罪犯,对于这种公然妖言惑众、扰乱民心的罪犯,必须严惩不贷。我想这十几位老党员的话也代表了召市十几万群众的心声。现在案虽破了,被告人也将要受到法律的制裁,然而公诉人的心情却难以平静,为什么在召市这片有着光荣革命传统的土地上会发生此案,如何才能杜绝此类案件再度发生,公诉人想通过此案谈几点启示:

    1. 我们某些地方政府不能光抓经济建设,同时还要抓精神文明建设,必须”两手抓,两手硬”。目前,我州某些地方政府领导(当然是极少数)的工作指导思想出现了一定的偏差,仿佛只要经济抓上去了,其它的都不重要了,其实这种思想是很危险的,假如我们以牺牲精神文明建设为代价去抓经济建设,我想这种繁荣一定不会持久,甚至还会出问题,辟如此案。
    2. 我们某些执法部门人员的素质还有待于提高,本案被告人同时也包括很多群众都向我们反映当地某些执法部门工作人员的工作方法简单,态度粗暴,也许对其个人而言,这仅仅是个工作细节问题,然而在人民群众眼中,这些执法部门的人员部代表的是党和政府的形象。假如因为极个别人的行为损害了党和政府的影象,甚至给一些别有用心的人有机可趁,这将是得不偿失;
    3. 群众的普法工作,尤其是像我们这样一些”老、少、边、穷”地区群众的普法工作还任重而道远,对于这点,公诉人不想多谈,只想讲一句:群众知法、守法将是我们”依法治国”的前提和基础。

    (五)被告人应负的刑事责任

    我国《刑法》第105 条第1款规定”犯煽动颠覆国家政权罪的,处5 年以下有期徒刑、拘役、管制或者剥夺政治权利,并可并处没收财产”。结合本案来看,被告人陈世富没有任何从轻、减轻情节,希望合议庭根据被告人的罪责大小、社会影响、认罪态度等对其作出合法而公正的判决,公诉意见发表完毕。

    公诉人:杨庆华
    2003年4月18日

    (注:此公诉词在全省公诉词评选中获得优胜奖。)


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  • Tibetans Imprisoned for Text, Images as Immolations Continue

    Gyurmey Thabkey, Kalsang Dondrub, and Lobsang stand trial in Qinghai’s Haidong Prefecture. Photo credit: people.com.cn

    Courts in Tibetan areas of China have been handing down long prison sentences to Tibetans accused of “inciting splittism” for activities connected to the series of self-immolation protests that have escalated over the past year. Just this week, three men were sentenced in Qinghai to between four and six years in prison for unspecified pro-independence text and images connected to the immolations. No detail is provided of the alleged offenses, but the official media report regarding the trial (translated below) goes to great lengths to state that the trial—which was concluded within one day, including sentencing—was carried out in strict accordance with the law and with the defendants’ rights fully protected.

    This trial is the latest sign of Chinese authorities’ determination to use criminal prosecution to respond to the serious problem of self-immolation protests by Tibetans. In December 2012, local authorities in Gansu announced that criminal liability would be pursued against both those who commit self-immolations and those who aid and abet such protests.

    By the end of 2012, Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database included about 5,000 people known or believed to be in custody (including in prison, RTL, detention, etc.). Of these, nearly a quarter were Tibetan, with the number of Tibetan activists recorded in the database growing 28 percent year-on-year largely due to the self-immolation protests. Imprisoned for charges similar to those brought against the men tried this week, prominent monk Yonten Gyatso was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment in June 2012 for sharing photographs and information about Tibet, while 20-year-old Ngawang Topden, an art student, was reportedly sentenced to two years’ imprisonment in February 2013 for storing images of self-immolations and the banned Tibetan national flag in his mobile phone.

    *
    Haidong Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court Issues Sentences in First-Instance Trial for Inciting Splittism

    Kan Wacao and Zhang Rui, People’s Daily Online
    March 18, 2013

    On the afternoon of March 18, 2013, the Haidong Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court of Qinghai Province publicly tried the inciting splittism case of defendants Gyurmey Thabkey†, Kalsang Dondrub‡, and Lobsang and issued its verdict at the conclusion of the trial. For the crime of inciting splittism, Gyurmey Thabkey was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment with subsequent deprivation of political rights for three years; Kalsang Dondrub was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment with subsequent deprivation of political rights for four years; and Lobsang was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment with subsequent deprivation of political rights for two years.

    In the course of the trial, the Haidong Intermediate People’s Court ascertained that defendants Gyurmey Thabkey, Kalsang Dondrub, and Lobsang carried out the actions of inciting splittism by using others’ self-immolation incidents to disseminate text and images relating to Tibetan independence, actions that had a negative effect both locally and internationally and violated the provisions of Article 103 of the Criminal Law, constituting the crime of inciting splittism. The facts charged by the prosecution were clear and the evidence was reliable and sufficient; [therefore] the crime stands as charged. Based on the facts, nature, circumstances, and degree of social harm of the three defendants’ [respective] crimes, and having given full consideration to the opinions of both the prosecution and defense, the court issued the aforementioned verdict.

    Furthermore, the Haidong Prefecture Branch of the Qinghai People’s Procuratorate assigned personnel to appear in court for the prosecution, and defendants Gyurmey Thabkey, Kalsang Dondrub, and Lobsang each appeared in court with their defense counsel to participate in the proceedings. The Haidong Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court tried this case in strict adherence with the law and regulations and fully safeguarded the procedural rights of the defendants. In the course of the trial, the court provided the defendants with Tibetan interpreters and the defendants and their defense counsel fully expressed their defense opinions during the investigation and debate over the facts and evidence relevant to conviction and sentencing. More than 100 people including friends and relatives of each defendant and people from all segments of society observed the trial and sentencing hearings.


    † Translated as “Jigme Thabkey” by Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD)
    ‡ Translated as “Kalsang Dhondup” by TCHRD
  • Chinese Man Gets "Lenient" Sentence for Online Political Groups

    Gansu Qingyang Intermediate People’s Court. Photo credit: gscn.com.cn

    In February 2011, after protests swept through North Africa and the Middle East in what became known as the “Arab Spring,” Chinese security officials initiated a vigorous and widespread crackdown on potential sources of perceived political instability. This crackdown involved secret detention of human rights lawyers, arrest of Internet users who posted information about China’s elusive “Jasmine Revolution,” and heightened monitoring of social media.

    Though not taken into police custody until June 2012, Zhang Shaofeng’s conviction on charges of “inciting subversion” perhaps ought to be seen in the context of the anti-Jasmine crackdown. Little is known about Zhang, in part because the court document that Dui Hua recently discovered excludes all of his personal details. Possibly a student, Zhang lived in Qingyang in the northwestern province of Gansu and, like many young people, appears to have been an active user of social networking sites.

    Prosecutors charged that Zhang used these sites to form illegal political organizations that spread anti-government propaganda. They also charged him with using email to join the China Democracy Party and disseminating articles that advocate violent revolution. For his part, Zhang contended that he had no intention of overthrowing the political order and participated in these activities out of a belief that it would help him seek political asylum in the United States.

    Ultimately, the Qingyang Intermediate People’s Court gave Zhang a relatively lenient 18-month prison sentence on account of his cooperative and remorseful attitude during investigation and trial. As is routine in verdicts involving the crime of “inciting subversion,” the court dismissed the argument of Zhang’s lawyers that his activities fell under the scope of constitutionally protected free speech by noting that this freedom is limited by constitutional obligations that prohibit the violation of national security.

    The court also clearly explains that for the purposes of assessing culpability it is only necessary that an act of expression have the potential to incite others to commit subversion, regardless of whether subversion actually results. Accordingly, whether Zhang’s political postings were well-received or widely disseminated is not discussed. Instead, the court makes an effort to justify the potential for social harm caused by Internet speech in a very general sense. This contrasts with more widely known cases of “inciting subversion,” such as those involving Hu Jia or Liu Xiaobo, in which the courts tally recipients or viewers. This is likely because prosecutors were not attempting to prove that Zhang’s crimes were especially serious, perhaps because they were already prepared to give relatively lenient punishment.



    Qingyang Intermediate People’s Court of Gansu Province Criminal Verdict: click to expand

    Qingyang Intermediate People’s Court of Gansu Province
    Criminal Verdict

    (2012) Qingyang Int. Crim. 1st Inst. No. 35

    The prosecuting organ is the Qingyang People’s Procuratorate of Gansu Province [hereafter, “Qingyang People’s Procuratorate”].

    Defendant Zhang Shaofeng. [Personal details have been omitted in the electronic version of this verdict—Ed.] Placed under criminal detention by the Qingyang Public Security Bureau on June 13, 2012, on suspicion of inciting subversion and formally arrested on July 19 of the same year.

    Defense counsel is Ma Hongbing, lawyer with the Gansu Beidou Law Firm.

    Defense counsel is Yan Lin, lawyer with the Gansu Beidou Law Firm.

    On October 9, 2012, the Qingyang People’s Procuratorate filed indictment Qingyang Proc. Crim. Indict. (2012) No. 25 with this court, charging defendant Zhang Shaofeng in a case of inciting subversion. This court formed a collegiate bench in accordance with the law and held an open hearing to try this case on November 1, 2012. The Qingyang People’s Procuratorate appointed procurator Li Haiying to appear in court on behalf of the prosecution. Defendant Zhang Shaofeng and his defense counsel Ma Hongbing and Yan Lin all appeared in court to participate in the proceedings. The trial has now concluded.

    The Qingyang People’s Procuratorate charged that, beginning in March 2011, defendant Zhang Shaofeng used screen names such as “MZ Xixiang,” “Xixiang Xianzhi,” “MZ Xixiang Sixty-Four,” “MZ China Sixty-Four,” “MZ Xixiang Yasheng,” “Zhang Xiaofeng,” and “MZ Labi Xixiang” (all with the QQ [user] number 630004145) and employed desktop, laptop, and tablet computers and mobile phones to go online in Xifeng District at the “Sunshine Road Bar,” “Pterodactyl Internet Bar,” and “Starry Sky Network” Internet bars and his dormitory to establish the illegal organizations “Chinese People’s Democratic League” [hereafter, CPDL] and “National Freemasons”; to join the hostile organization “China Democracy Party”; and to wantonly carry out reactionary propaganda activities, viciously attack the Communist Party of China [hereafter, CPC] and the government of the People’s Republic of China [hereafter, PRC], and [express] extreme dissatisfaction with the socialist system. In support of these charges, the prosecution produced the following main evidence in court: defendant Zhang Shaofeng’s confession; statements of witnesses Zhang Qingxu, Ma Jizhong, and Zhang Yaozong; documentary evidence and a record of remote inspection and investigation; electronic data; and a certification report. [The prosecution] maintains that defendant Zhang Shaofeng went online to join hostile organizations, participated in the formation of illegal organizations, expressed reactionary speech, and incited subversion of state power and overthrow of the socialist system; [therefore,] in accordance with Article 105.2 of the Criminal Law of the PRC, he should be held criminally responsible for the crime of inciting subversion.

    In his defense, defendant Zhang Shaofeng stated that he had only been asked to draft a constitution for the CPDL and did not have any major role in its establishment or participate in the integration or formation of a new CPDL; that the “National Freemasons” was only a QQ group that could not be called an “illegal organization” and that [he had] disbanded the group in December 2011; that his only motivation for joining the China Democracy Party was to be able to apply for political asylum and emigrate to the United States and that he never participated in any of that organization’s activities; that he disseminated articles online mainly to propagate Western democratic ideas in order to pressure the government to carry out political reform and that he had no intention of subverting the government. Zhang Shaofeng reflected in court that he lacked real-life understanding, had been influenced by the overseas anti-China media’s negative news reports, and had a mistaken understanding of Western democratic system, which led him to commit offenses. He expressed regret in court and requested lenient punishment.

    [According to] the defense statement of defense lawyers Ma Hongbing and Yan Lin: Zhang Shaofeng joined illegal organizations and published articles purely out of a wish to emigrate to the United States and had no subjective intent to incite subversion of state power or overthrow the socialist system. Objectively, Zhang Shaofeng never committed any acts of inciting subversion of state power or overthrow of the socialist system, and the articles he published were not created or edited by him and did not represent his own subjective thinking or will. Moreover, the content of these articles mostly propagated Western democratic thinking and expressions of displeasure with the current social situation, which falls under the scope of freedom of expression provided in China’s constitution. Merely relying on his expression and his own volition, it would be impossible to violate the state’s political power and the socialist system. Therefore, Zhang Shaofeng’s actions do not meet the constitutive criteria for the offense of inciting subversion of state power. The evidence for the indictment’s charges against Zhang Shaofeng is lacking and flawed. Based on Zhang Shaofeng’s ordinary behavior and his behavior in custody, his overall [degree of] malice is minor and his actions did not have clear harmful consequences for society; [therefore], it is requested that his punishment be mitigated.

    It was determined in the course of the trial that: Beginning in March 2011, defendant Zhang Shaofeng used screen names such as “MZ Xixiang,” “Xixiang Xianzhi,” “MZ Xixiang Sixty-Four,” “MZ China Sixty-Four,” “MZ Xixiang Yasheng,” “Zhang Xiaofeng,” and “MZ Labi Xixiang” (all with the QQ [user] number 630004145) and employed desktop, laptop, and tablet computers and mobile phones to go online in Xifeng District at the “Sunshine Road Bar,” “Pterodactyl Internet Bar,” and “Starry Sky Network” Internet bars and his dormitory to participate in the formation of the illegal organizations CPDL and “National Freemasons;” to join the hostile organization “China Democracy Party”; and to wantonly publish articles of reactionary propaganda, viciously attack the CPC and the government of the PRC, and [express] extreme unhappiness with the socialist system.

    1. Actively participated in the organization and establishment of the illegal organizations “China’s CPDL” and “National Freemasons” and participated in the formation of another illegal organization, the new “China’s CPDL.” In March 2011, on the invitation of “Zhao Gang” (basic circumstances unclear), chairman of the illegal organization “China’s CPDL,” defendant Zhang Shaofeng joined [that organization], actively participated in [that organization’s] formation, and personally drafted [its] Constitution. In early May 2011, Zhang Shaofeng established the illegal organization “National Freemasons” and established a “National Freemasons” [QQ] group, periodically advocating Western democratic ideas to members of the group and sending emails containing reactionary propaganda such as “Freemasons Weekly,” “Freemasons Monthly,” “Guide to Non-Violence and Non-Cooperation,” and “Democracy Movement Handbook.” On May 15, 2011, Zhang Shaofeng used anti-firewall software [e.g. a virtual private network] to enter Dynaweb’s “Free China Forum Website” and gather together a “compendium of Chinese underground organizations,” which he compiled into the Latest List of Registered Political Parties and Social Groups.” Then he posted under his personal QQ name: “The ‘National Freemasons’ have compiled a Compendium of Chinese Underground Organizations – write to request a copy.” In July 2011, after Zhang Shaofeng made contact with “Zhi Bi Wen Dao” (basic circumstances unclear), the person responsible for the “Chinese Association for Promotion of Democracy” [hereafter, CAPD], he participated in the integration of the CPDL, the “National Freemasons,” and the CAPD into the new China’s CPDL, with Zhao Gang as chairman, “Zhi Bi Wen Dao” as general secretary, and defendant Zhang Shaofeng as inspector general and head of the Organization Department. Later, defendant Zhang Shaofeng, in his capacity as head of the Organization Department of “China’s CPDL,” appointed Wang Xin (basic circumstances unclear) as the person responsible for [that organization] in Zhejiang. Later, on the invitation of Zhao Gang’s successor Zhang Qingxu (screen name “Zhi Bi Jian Ke”), defendant Zhang Shaofeng consulted documents of the hostile overseas organization “China Democracy Party” to draft CPDL Temporary Measures for the Extraordinary Period and sent them multiple times to his online contacts and actively recruited others to join the illegal organization “China’s CPDL.”

    2. Actively applied to join the hostile overseas organization “China Democracy Party.” On September 30, 2011, defendant Zhang Shaofeng used anti-firewall software to enter the “China Democracy Party” website and used his Vietnamese email account “jasonbysshe@zing.vn” to send an email to “China Democracy Party” chairman Xie Wanjun as an “application to join the party.” On October 23, 2011, Xie Wanjun used email to send a China Democracy Party Cadre Appointment Notice and China Democracy Party Registration Form to Zhang Shaofeng’s Vietnamese email account, appointing Zhang Shaofeng as a “Member of the China Democracy Party Gansu Provincial Committee” and “Chair of China Democracy Party Independent Branch No. 4803.” Subsequently, Xie Wanjun again sent reactionary propaganda such as “China Jasmine Newsletter,” “China Jasmine Action Special,” and “Oppose Communism to Save the Nation, All People Rise Up” to defendant Zhang Shaofeng’s Vietnamese email account.

    3. Using Weibo, Qzone [a social networking and blog platform similar to MySpace], mobile text messages, and other methods to wantonly disseminate reactionary propaganda and actively advocate Western democratic thought and ideas about violent revolution. On April 3, 2011, defendant Zhang Shaofeng sent an email containing the “Nine Commentaries” to an online friend named “MZ Lanqing.” On May 7, 2011, Zhang Shaofeng sent an email containing “Chinese Transitional Government Voluntary Training Sessions” to an online friend named “Maple Leaf with no Maple Leaf.” On October 8, 2011, Zhang Shaofeng sent an email with “Democracy Movement Leader’s Training Manual” to an online friend named “309945463.” On April 14, 2011, Zhang Shaofeng posted “Letter to MZ Colleagues” on his blog. On September 2, 2011, Zhang Shaofeng posted “How to Apply for Political Asylum in the United States—Think it Over, Let’s Go Together” on his blog. On September 17, 2011, Zhang Shaofeng posted “How to Join the China Democracy Party” on his blog. On October 8, 2011, Zhang Shaofeng posted “How to Raise Funds for the Democracy Movement” on his blog. On December 3, 2011, Zhao Shaofeng posted “Preliminary Draft Proposal for Establishing a People’s Organization” on his blog. On January 26, 2012, Zhang Shaofeng posted many reactionary articles on his blog, including “CPC Puts Million National Flags and Leaders’ Portraits in Tibetan Village Temples, Angers Public.” The aforementioned articles were hostile to the CPC, expressed hatred for the socialist system, viciously attacked the government of the PRC, and expressed high praise for the “Falun Gong” cult’s slander of our party and government through the “Nine Commentaries on the CPC” and “Three Resigns” and “Liu Xiaobo’s 2010 Nobel win.” At the same time, he incited interest groups in China to take to the streets and express their unhappiness and demands through “rights protection” and other means, to pressure the government, to incite the public to carry out violent revolution rather than color revolution and plot the subversion of the political power of the PRC and overthrow of the socialist system.

    The aforementioned facts are confirmed by the following evidence, which was put forth by the prosecution and cross-examined and confirmed in court:

    1. A record of remote inspection and investigation work from the Qingyang Public Security Bureau Network Security Monitoring Unit, recording the remote inspection and investigation carried out on the email accounts, personal blogs, and locations where Zhang Shaofeng went online.
    2. The statements of witnesses Zhang Qingxu, Zhang Yaozong, and others.
    3. Electronic data: An email from Zhang Shaofeng’s Vietnamese mailbox with contents related to the China Democracy Party; an application to join the party, a notice of official posting in the China Democracy Party, and a China Democracy Party membership registration certificate; articles published and email correspondence with others, and the articles of constitution for the Chinese Democratic League [retrieved] from Zhang Shaofeng’s blog.
    4. Documentary evidence: A Ministry of Public Security document confirming the “China Democracy Party” to be a hostile organization and other documents.
    5. A confirmation report;
    6. Defendant Zhang Shaofeng’s confession.

    This court finds that defendant Zhang Shaofeng used the Internet to participate in the formation of illegal organizations; joined a hostile organization; used Weibo, Qzone, and mobile text messages to publish reactionary propaganda multiple times; wantonly disseminated speech damaging to state political power and the socialist system; distorted facts; maliciously attacked the CPC and PRC government; and damaged the image of the state political power. Subjectively, he possessed a criminal intent to incite subversion of state political power and, objectively, he committed acts of inciting subversion of state power; [therefore,] his actions constitute the crime of inciting subversion. The criminal facts alleged by the prosecution are clear, and the evidence is reliable and sufficient; [therefore,] he is guilty of the offense. As for defendant Zhang Shaofeng’s defense that he only joined the illegal organization in order to apply for political asylum and immigrate to the United States, that the articles he published only propagated Western democratic ideas and that he had no intention of inciting subversion of the government, these [claims] do not accord with the facts that have been ascertained. Because the Internet has a large user base, criminal information may be disseminated quickly, and the degree of harm to society is extremely great, his actions ought to be punished in accordance with the law. With respect to Zhang Shaofeng’s defense lawyers’ defense argument that Zhang’s acts do not meet the constituent criteria for the offense of inciting subversion, since Zhang Shaofeng bears full criminal responsibility [i.e., he has not been found to be mentally ill or deficient—Trans.], his speech attacking the party, the government, and the socialist system shows his clear criminal motivation, and, objectively, he also committed criminal acts that endanger state security. Moreover, the offense in question is a crime of action in which the actor only needs to commit acts that incite subversion of state power and overthrow of the socialist system and, whether the target of his incitement believes or accepts the inciting content or whether [the defendant] committed the subversive acts being incited has no bearing on whether the crime is constituted. Therefore, this defense argument of defense counsel cannot be accepted. The court [also] cannot accept defense counsel’s argument that the defendant Zhang Shaofeng’s act of publishing articles falls under the scope of the freedom of expression provided for in China’s Constitution. Although freedom of expression is a basic right granted to citizens by the constitution, citizens must exercise this right in accordance with the law and may not damage the interests or security of the state; therefore, this view of defense counsel that only emphasizes the defendant’s rights but ignores the defendant’s obligations cannot be accepted. In light of defendant Zhang Shaofeng’s voluntary disbandment of the “National Freemasons” QQ group, his truthful confession of his crimes during the investigative and trial stages, his voluntary exposure of the criminal activities of other illegal organizations, and that he displayed a relatively good attitude in acknowledging guilt and showing remorse, lenient punishment may be given in accordance with the law. Pursuant to discussion and decision by this court’s adjudication committee and in accordance with Articles 105.2, 56, and 67.3 of the Criminal Law of the PRC and Article 2(1) of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee’s Decision on Preserving Internet Security, [this court] rules as follows:

    For the crime of inciting subversion, defendant Zhang Shaofeng is sentenced to one year and six months’ imprisonment, with subsequent deprivation of political rights for one year.

    (The prison term is to be calculated from the day the verdict is implemented, with each day spent in detention prior to the verdict’s implementation to count as one day of the prison term; therefore, it will run from June 13, 2012 to December 12, 2013.)

    If this verdict is not accepted, an appeal may be filed within 10 days of the second day following the receipt of this verdict, either to this court or directly to the Gansu High People’s Court. In the case of a written appeal, the original appellate petition must be submitted together with two copies.

    Presiding Judge: Li Ying
    Deputy Judicial Officer: Yang Weirong
    Deputy Judicial Officer: Chen Yuan

    November 7, 2012

    Court Clerk: Wang Wei

    Chinese Source(原文):
    《甘肃省庆阳市中级人民法院 – 刑事判决书》
    Click on icon to expand

    甘肃省庆阳市中级人民法院
    刑事判决书

    (2012)庆中刑初字35号

    公诉机关甘肃省庆阳市人民检察院。

    被告人张绍峰。2012年6月13日因涉嫌煽动颠覆国家政权罪被庆阳市公安局刑事拘留,同年7月19日被依法逮捕。

    辩护人马红兵,甘肃北斗律师事务所律师。

    辩护人闫琳,甘肃北斗律师事务所律师。

    甘肃省庆阳市人民检察院以庆检刑诉(2012)25号起诉书指控被告人张邵峰犯煽动颠覆国家政权罪一案,于2012年10月9日向本院提起公诉。本院依法组成合议庭,于2012年11月1日公开开庭审理了本案。庆阳市人民检察院指派检察员李海英出庭支持公诉。被告人张邵峰及其辩护人马红兵、闫琳均到庭参加诉讼。现已审理终结。

    庆阳市人民检察院指控,2011年3月份以来,被告人张绍峰以“MZ西乡”、“西乡贤治”、“MZ西乡六十四”、“MZ中国六十四”、“MZ西乡崖生”、“张笑风”、“MZ拉比西乡”等网名(QQ号均为630004145),先后在西峰区“一路阳光吧”、“翼龙网吧”、“网络星空”网吧、宿舍等地,利用台式机、笔记本电脑、平板电脑、手机登录互联网,通过网络建立非法组织“华夏人民民主联盟”、“国民共济会”,加入敌对组织“中国民主党”,并大肆从事反宣活动,恶意攻击中国共产党和中华人民共和国政府,对社会主义制度极度不满。公诉机关针对上述事实,当庭出示了被告人张邵峰的供述,证人张庆旭、马继忠、张耀宗等人的证言,书证远程勘验检查笔录、电子数据、鉴定结论等主要证据。指控认为,被告人张邵峰在网上加入敌对组织,参与组建非法组织,发表反动言论,煽动颠覆国家政权,推翻社会主义制度,根据《中华人民共和国刑法》第一百零五条第二款之规定,应当以煽动颠覆国家政权罪追究其刑事责任。

    被告人张邵峰辩称,其只是受托起草了华盟章程草案,未对华盟的成立起主要作用,亦未参与整合组建新的华盟;“国民共济会”只是一个QQ群,不能称之为“非法组织”,且该群已于2011年12月解散;其加入中国民主党的目的,只是为了申请政治庇护,移民美国,未参加过该组织的任何活动;通过网络转载文章,主要是宣传西方民主思想,向政府施压,迫使政府进行政治改革,无颠覆政府之意图。张邵峰当庭反省自己是因对现实生活缺乏了解,受境外反华媒体负面新闻报道的影响,错误的认识西方民主制度,以致走向犯罪,并当庭表示悔过,请求从轻判处。

    辩护人马红兵、闫琳的辩护意见:张邵峰加入非法组织、发表文章,只是单纯的希望移民美国,主观上没有煽动颠覆国家政权、推翻社会主义制度的故意;客观上没有实施任何煽动颠覆国家政权、推翻社会主义制度的行为,发表的文章并非其创作、编辑,不能代表张邵峰本人的主观思想和意志,且文章的内容大都是宣传西方民主思想及对社会现状不满的言论,属于我国《宪法》规定的言论自由范畴;仅凭其言论和一己之力,无法侵犯国家政权和社会主义制度。因此,张邵峰的行为不符合煽动颠覆国家政权罪的犯罪构成。起诉书指控张邵峰的犯罪事实证据缺失且证据存在瑕疵。根据张邵峰平时及羁押后的表现,结合其主观恶性小,且其行为没有造成明显的社会危害后果,请求予以减轻处罚。

    经审理查明:2011年3月份以来,被告人张绍峰以“MZ西乡”、“西乡贤治”、“MZ西乡六十四”、“MZ中国六十四”、“MZ西乡崖生”、“张笑风”、“MZ拉比西乡”等网名(QQ号均为630004145),先后在西峰区“一路阳光吧”、“翼龙网吧”、“网络星空”网吧、宿舍等地,利用台式机、笔记本电脑、平板电脑、手机登录互联网,通过网络参与组建非法组织“华夏人民民主联盟”、“国民共济会”,加入敌对组织“中国民主党”,并大肆发表反宣文章,恶意攻击中国共产党和中华人民共和国政府,对社会主义制度极度不满。

    1. 积极参与组建非法组织“中国华夏人民民主联盟”、“国民共济会”,参与整合其它非法组织为新“中国华夏人民民主联盟”。2011年3月,应非法组织“中国华夏人民民主联盟”主席“赵刚”(基本情况不详)的邀请,被告人张绍峰加入“中国华夏人民民主联盟”,积极参与组建“中国华夏人民民主联盟”,并亲自起草《中国华夏人民民主联盟章程》。2011年5月初,张绍峰创建非法组织“国民共济会”,并建立“国民共济会”群,不时向该群成员宣扬西方民主理念,发送《共济周刊》、《共济月刊》、《非暴力不合作指导》、《民运手册》等反宣文章的电子邮件。2011年5月15日,张绍峰通过翻墙软件进入动态网“自由中国论坛网站”搜集“中国地下组织大全”,整理形成《最新政党社团登记排列》,以个人QQ签名方式,发布信息“《中国地下组织大全》已由“国民共济会”整理汇总,欢迎来文索取”。2011年7月,张绍峰与”中华民主弘扬会”负责人”之笔问道”(基本情况不详)取得联系后,参与将非法组织“华夏人民民主联盟”、“国民共济会”、“中华民主弘扬会”整合,组建新的“中国华夏人民民主联盟”,由赵刚任主席,“之笔问道”任总秘书长,被告人张邵峰任总监察长兼组织部长。后被告人张绍峰以“中国华夏人民民主联盟”组织部长的名义委任王欣(基本情况不详)为“中国华夏人民民主联盟”浙江负责人。后应赵刚继任者张庆旭(网名“之笔剑客”)的邀请,参照境外敌对组织“中国民主党”的文件,被告人张邵峰又制定了《非常时期华盟暂行条例》,多次向其网络联系人发送,积极拉拢他人加入非法组织“中国华夏人民民主联盟”。

    2. 积极申请加入境外敌对组织“中国民主党”。2011年9月30日,被告人张绍峰利用翻墙软件进入“中国民主党”网站,通过其越南邮箱“jasonbysshe@zing.vn”向“中国民主党”主席谢万军发送了“入党申请书”电子邮件。2011年10月23日,谢万军亦通过发送电子邮件的方式,向张绍峰越南邮箱发送了《中国民主党干部任职通知》和《中国民主党党员登记表》,并任命张绍峰为“中国民主党甘肃省委员会委员”兼任“中国民主党第4803独立支部主任”。此后,谢万军又向被告人张邵峰越南邮箱发送了《中国茉莉花通讯》、《中国茉莉花行动专辑》、《反共救国、全民起义》等反宣文章。

    3. 利用微博、QQ空间、手机短信等传播方式,大肆散布传播反宣文章,积极宣扬西方民主思想和暴力革命理念。2011年4月3日,被告人张绍峰向其网友“MZ滥情”发送《九评共产党》电子邮件。2011年5月7日,张绍峰向其网友“无枫叶的枫叶”发送《中国过渡政府义工短期培训班》电子邮件。2011年10月8日,张绍峰向其网友“309945463”发送《民运领袖培训手册》电子邮件。2011年4月14日,张绍峰在其空间发表《至MZ同仁的一封信》。2011年9月2日,张绍峰在其空间发表《如何申请美国的政治庇护,参考一下,大家一块去》。2011年9月17日,张绍峰在其空间发表《如何加入中国民主党》。2011的10月8日,张绍峰在其空间上发表《民运经费如何筹措》。2011年12月3日,张绍峰在其空间发表《关于建立人民组织的方案初稿》。2012年1月26日,张绍峰在其空间发表《中共百万国旗领像入藏村寺引民众怒潮》等多篇反宣文章。上述文章敌视中国共产党、仇视社会主义制度,恶意攻击中华人民共和国政府,对“法轮功”邪教组织诋毁我党和政府的“九评共产党”、“三退”、“刘晓波获2010年诺贝尔”表示推崇。同时煽动国内利益群体走向街头,通过“维权”等方式表达不满诉求,向政府施压,煽动民众做暴力革命不做颜色革命,阴谋颠覆中华人民共和国国家政权、推翻社会主义制度。

    上述事实,有公诉机关提交,并经庭审质证、认证的下列证据证实:

    1. 庆阳市公安局网络安全保卫支队远程勘验检查工作记录对张邵峰使用的电子邮箱、个人空间、上网地点进行的远程勘验检查笔录
    2. 证人张庆旭、张耀宗等人的证言。
    3. 电子数据:张邵峰越南邮箱内关于中国民主党内容的邮件;入党申请,中国民主党干部任职通知,中国民主党党员登记证。张邵峰空间发表的文章及与他人的邮件往来,发送华夏民主联盟章程等。
    4. 书证:公安部确认“中国民主党”为敌对组织的文件等。
    5. 鉴定结论;
    6. 被告人张邵峰的供述。

    本院认为,被告人张绍峰通过网络参与组建非法组织,加入敌对组织,利用微博、QQ空间、手机短信等传播方式,多次发表反动宣传文章,大肆散布有损于国家政权和社会主义制度的言论,歪曲事实,恶意攻击中国共产党和中华人民共和国政府,损害国家政权形象,其主观上具有煽动颠覆国家政权的犯罪故意,客观上实施了煽动颠覆国家政权的行为,其行为已构成煽动颠覆国家政权罪。公诉机关指控的犯罪事实清楚、证据确实、充分,罪名成立。关于被告人张邵峰提出其参加非法组织只是为了申请政治庇护,移民美国,发表文章只是宣传西方民主思想,并无煽动颠覆政府之意图的辩解理由,与查明的事实不符,且由于网络用户多、分布广,犯罪信息传播速度快,社会危害性极大,故对其行为应当依法惩处。关于张邵峰的辩护人提出张邵峰的行为不符合煽动颠覆国家政权罪的犯罪构成的辩护意见,因张邵峰具有完全刑事责任能力,其发表了攻击党、攻击政府、攻击社会主义制度的言论,表明其有明显的犯罪动机,客观上又实施了危害国家安全的犯罪行为,且本罪为行为犯,行为人只要具有煽动颠覆国家政权、推翻社会主义制度的行为,不管其所煽动的对象是否相信或者接受其所煽动的内容,也不管其是否去实施所煽动的有关颠覆活动,均不影响犯罪的构成。因此,辩护人的此项辩护意见不予采纳。关于辩护人提出被告人张邵峰发表文章的行为,属于我国《宪法》规定的言论自由范畴的辩护意见亦不能成立,言论自由虽是宪法赋予公民的一项基本权利,但公民必须依法行使该权利,不得损害国家利益和安全,因此,辩护人只强调被告人权利而忽视被告人义务的观点,不予采纳。鉴于被告人张邵峰能够主动解散其建立的“国民共济会”QQ群,在侦查及法庭审理过程中,能如实供述自己的犯罪事实,并主动揭发其他非法组织的犯罪行为,认罪、悔罪态度较好,依法可从轻处罚。经本院审判委员会讨论决定,依照《中华人民共和国刑法》第一百零五条第二款、第五十六条、第六十七条第三款和全国人大常委会《关于维护互联网安全的决定》第二条第(一)项之规定,判决如下:

    被告人张邵峰犯煽动颠覆国家政权罪,判处有期徒刑一年六个月,剥夺政治权利一年。

    (刑期从判决执行之日起计算,判决执行前先行羁押的,羁押一日折抵刑期一日,即自2012年6月13日起至2013年12月12日止)。

    如不服本判决,可在接到判决书的第二日起十日内,通过本院或者直接向甘肃省高级人民法院提出上诉,书面上诉的,应提交上诉状正本一份,副本二份。

    审 判 长 李 瑛
    代理审判员 杨维荣
    代理审判员 陈 媛

    二〇一二年十一月七日

    书 记 员 王 微


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  • Transparency in Xinjiang: Reporting on State Security Trials

    Xinjiang Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian speaks with the press during the 11th National People’s Congress in March 2012. Photo credit: Chinanews.com
    On January 21, 2013, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region High People’s Court published its annual work report online, and, with a level of transparency not afforded by other jurisdictions, disclosed the number of endangering state security (ESS) trials in 2012. As is generally the norm, the first section of the report that covers the entire region discusses criminal cases and maintaining state security and social stability. The section states that 314 ESS trials of first and second instance were concluded in Xinjiang during the year. Compared with data in previous reports, the 2012 figure is a decline of 24 percent year-on-year and the second-lowest level in five years—the number of ESS trials peaked in 2009, corresponding with the July 2009 riots in Urumqi (Table 1).
    The decline is no cause for celebration, however, since, according to Xinjiang Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian, “the struggle between splittist and anti-splittist forces in Xinjiang [is] long-term, complicated, and intense” and “the insistence on stability maintenance as our first responsibility must not be relaxed.”[*] Splittism and inciting splittism are ESS crimes covered by Article 103 of the Criminal Law. Splittism is defined in the law as “organizing, plotting, or carrying out the splitting of the nation or damaging national unity.”
    To put Xinjiang data in the context of national estimates of ESS trials, which are limited to trials of first instance, first and second instance trials need to be disaggregated. Xinjiang Yearbook provides data on first-instance trials for 1997‒2003 and 2008‒2010 (Table 1) and shows that, in recent years, first-instance ESS trials accounted for an average of 85.9 percent of combined first- and second-instance trials. This percentage is consistent with that of criminal trials in Xinjiang but higher than that of criminal trials nationwide. For example, in 2010 and 2011, second-instance trials accounted for about 16 percent of criminal trials in Xinjiang but only about 11 percent of those in the nation as a whole.
    Accordingly, Dui Hua estimates that between 2008 and 2010, Xinjiang, which accounts for less than 2 percent of China’s population, accounted for 50 percent of first-instance ESS trials nationwide (Table 1). Given that splittism is the focus of stability maintenance, the great majority of defendants in these trials are almost certain to be Uyghurs, a Turkic-speaking Muslim ethnic group that accounts for 46 percent of Xinjiang’s population. More than 90 percent of Xinjiang ESS cases recorded in Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database (PPDB) is of Ugyhurs convicted of splittism or inciting splittism for asserting their cultural identity through speech, association, and assembly. In fact, of the more than 800 people charged with splittism or inciting splittism in the PPDB, over 80 percent are Tibetans and more than 15 percent are Uyghurs. Dui Hua is aware of three Han Chinese who have been charged with inciting splittism, but all three were ultimately convicted of other crimes.
    Table 1: ESS/CR* Trials Concluded in Xinjiang, Nationwide, 1997‒2012 
    First- and
    Second-Instance
    First-Instance
    YearXinjiangNationwide†Xinjiang
    No. of TrialsNo. of TrialsNo. of Trials% of National
    1997–2718330.63
    1998–20810952.40
    1999–22013862.73
    2000–32419259.26
    2001–30520567.21
    2002–2527730.56
    2003–32818355.79
    2004–336–
    2005–299–
    2006–310–
    2007–306–
    200826846623550.43
    200943769837854.15
    201037667031446.87
    20114141314§356‡27.09
    2012314**270‡
    Source: Dui Hua, Xinjiang Courts Annual Work Report, Xinjiang Yearbook, China Law Yearbook
    Notes:
    * Counterrevolution (CR) was a category of crimes in China’s Criminal Law until 1997. In that year, the ESS category entered the Criminal Law and encompassed most of the crimes previously list under CR.
    “-” indicates data unavailable
    † China Law Yearbook disaggregates first-instance trial data by crime category, listing eight of the 10 categories enumerated in the Criminal Law (Part 2, chapters 1‒10) along with a category referred to as “other.” Dui Hua believes that the unlisted categories of ESS and dereliction of military duty are combined under “other.” Since indictment statistics have indicated that dereliction of military duty generally accounts for less than 1 percent of indictments when placed in a separate category with only ESS, we believe that military dereliction trials account for a similarly low percentage of trials when combined with ESS and thus use “other” trials as a proxy for ESS trials.
    ‡ Dui Hua estimate based on the assumption that 85.9 percent of combined first- and second-instance trials are trials of first instance. First-instance trials accounted for 87.7 percent of combined first- and second-instance trials in 2008, 86.5 percent in 2009, and 83.5 percent in 2010.
    § Given the discrepancy between this number and historical data, we do not include 2011 figures in our analysis.
    ** Data expected to be released later this year.
    Many Defendants per Trial
    In 2012, there was a decline in ESS trials in Xinjiang, but in light of Zhang’s comments, it is unlikely that there was a change in the political climate and, depending on the number of defendants per trial, there may not have been an equivalent decline in the number of people tried. Xinjiang has not reported the number of defendants in ESS trials since 2003, but between 1996 and 2003, there was an average of 2‒4 defendants per trial (Table 2) and more recent data suggests that current figures may be higher. In 2009, Kashgar, which accounted for more than 60 percent of Xinjiang’s most serious ESS cases between 2001 and 2009, heard 49 ESS trials involving 225 defendants, with 33 of the trials involving 171 defendants allegedly linked to Islamic separatist organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. In restive Hotan, where Uyghurs make up more than 90 percent of the population, 8 first-instance trials involved a total of 39 defendants in 2011. If each of Xinjiang’s ESS trials involves 2‒5 defendants, the 270 trials estimated for 2012 included between 540 and 1,350 defendants in total.
    Table 2: Xinjiang ESS/CR* Trials and Defendants, 1996‒2003 
    YearFirst-Instance,
    Concluded Trials
    DefendantsDefendants per Trial
    199640852.13
    1997832272.73
    19981094734.34
    19991383672.66
    20001925142.68
    20012057513.66
    2002772483.22
    20031836553.58
    Source: Dui Hua, Xinjiang Yearbook
    Note: * Counterrevolution (CR) was a category of crimes in China’s Criminal Law until 1997. In that year, the ESS category entered the Criminal Law and encompassed most of the crimes previously list under CR.
    Of the hundreds of people tried for ESS in Xinjiang in 2012, information has been made public about only two—both are Uyghurs sentenced to more than 10 years’ imprisonment by the Kashgar Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court. Sidik Kurban (斯迪克库尔班) is a Muslim leader who oversaw religious homeschools throughout Xinjiang. He was convicted of inciting splittism and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment with 5 years’ deprivation of political rights, according to Radio Free Asia. Abdirahman Yimer (阿布都热合曼依米尔) allegedly disseminated separatist ideas via removable storage devices and CD-ROM. He was sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment with 5 years’ deprivation of political rights, according to Xinjiang Daily.
    In Xinjiang, harsh sentences are routine. In 2009, the conclusion of 437 ESS cases resulted in 255 people sentenced to more than 10 years’ imprisonment, life imprisonment, or death. The respective maximum sentences for inciting splittism and splittism are fixed-term imprisonment of more than five years and death.
    Looking Beyond Xinjiang
    Xinjiang is unique in its willingness to routinely publish ESS trial statistics online, but a handful of other provincial-level jurisdictions publish these figures in annual yearbooks. Dui Hua’s survey of available material shows that most reporting jurisdictions only have a few ESS trials per year (Table 3). Figures may be higher in Guangdong, which heard 14 ESS trials (including first and second instance) in 2008, according to a Xinhua report.
    Table 3: First-Instance ESS Cases Filed by Location, 1999‒2011 
    Year1999200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011
    Chongqing
    Municipality
    –––––––––2331
    Guizhou
    Province
    ––31223311022
    Hebei
    Province
    45322434123––
    Henan
    Province
    455010211–141
    Source: Dui Hua, Hebei Legal Yearbook, Chongqing Statistical Yearbook, Guizhou Statistical Yearbook, Henan Statistical Yearbook
    Note: “-” indicates data unavailable
    Given splittism data in the PPDB, the number of ESS trials is also likely to be higher in areas with large Tibetan populations, including Tibet, Sichuan, Gansu, Qinghai, and Yunnan. However, Tibetan regions rarely disclose data on ESS arrests and trials, and last year, Sichuan news media reported that only 11 ESS cases were concluded in the province in 2011, despite the high frequency of self-immolation incidents, which have been characterized as “splittist” acts. That said, recent guidelines for handling self-immolation cases show that authorities are not necessarily using ESS charges to counter the protests.
    What about 2011?
    Based on our existing model, the percentage of nationwide ESS trials held in Xinjiang dropped to 27 percent in 2011. While the number of ESS trials in Xinjiang grew modestly, national figures soared to over 1,300 trials, compared with 408-trial average for the previous decade. The spike underscores the huge deficit of public information in the vast majority of jurisdictions and raises more questions than answers. It may indicate that Tibetan self-immolations and calls for “Jasmine Revolution” in China precipitated unprecedented numbers of ESS trials, but it may also indicate that there has been a change in official accounting to include more types of trials in the category that Dui Hua has attributed to ESS since 1998. Until more jurisdictions follow Xinjiang’s model of transparency, we cannot know for sure.

    * “必须认识到新疆分裂和反分裂的斗争是长期的、复杂的、尖锐的……坚持维护稳定第一责任不放松” ⇑
  • China Outlines Criminal Punishments for Tibetan Self-Immolations

    Monestary in Aba [Ngawa] County of Sichuan Province, where many self-immolations occurred. Photo credit: sc157.com

    Since February 2009, more than 90 Tibetans have reportedly set themselves on fire in protest against Chinese government policies. These self-immolations, which because of restrictions on reporting have been difficult to confirm, have largely been carried out by young Tibetan men and women in the eastern Tibetan regions that are divided between the provinces of Sichuan, Qinghai, and Gansu. Most of the protesters are known or believed to have died as a result of injuries sustained during these incidents.

    The frequency of self-immolation, a form of protest that was previously unknown in Tibet, has accelerated in recent weeks. Some analysts suggest that this represents a new phase of protest, one aimed at forcing China’s new party leaders to confront grievances about tightened political control over religious institutions and policies that further weaken the cultural autonomy to which Tibetans and other ethnic groups are entitled under Chinese law.

    In the face of growing protest in Tibetan and Uyghur regions in recent years, the Chinese government has held on firmly to its two-pronged effort to assimilate its western ethnic populations economically and culturally, even though many of these policies—such as relocation of nomadic herders into settled villages and “bilingual education” that places primary emphasis on Mandarin Chinese—have tended to further intensify grievances.

    In an effort to curb self-immolations, local governments in Tibetan areas have also instituted a heavy security crackdown and intensified propaganda efforts aimed at demonizing protesters and the “black hands” who allegedly incite them. Both of these tactics are on display in an editorial recently published in the Gannan Daily, the newspaper published by the local party committee in Gannan [Kanlho] Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu Province. The editorial introduces guidelines issued by China’s top judicial and law-enforcement authorities aimed directly at criminalizing a wide variety of activities related to the protests. (Three of the activities mentioned in the report are to be considered intentional homicide, as was the case for at least three people detained in Sichuan last year.) It also features classic examples of the language associated with political campaigns—language that emphasizes the treachery of “splittist” forces inside and outside China who “cloak their illegal criminal acts in religion” while “bewitching” protesters to go against the interests of the “broad masses” and undermine ethnic unity.

    It is unlikely that either the criminalization of self-immolation or heavy-handed propaganda will lead to the resolution of the longstanding grievances that underlie the protests. Recent government policies appear aimed at integrating these peripheral ethnic regions more firmly into the dominant economic, social, and cultural order of China, without giving due consideration to the desires of inhabitants there. Though self-immolation may appear to some as a senseless act, for those who choose this form of protest such sacrifice may reflect the relative lack of other means to express the suffering and indignity experienced by Tibetans.

    *
    Those Who Incite Self-Immolations Must be Severely Punished Under the Law

    Gannan Daily
    December 3, 2012

    Gannan Daily commentator

    Just as cadres and the masses of all ethnic groups in our prefecture are studying how to carry out the spirit of the 18th Party Congress by wholeheartedly seeking development and making concerted efforts in pursuit of moderate prosperity, splittist forces inside and outside our borders have bewitched and incited [people to carry out] a series of self-immolation incidents that have seriously affected the overall social situation of unity and stability in our prefecture.

    So that the recent self-immolation cases that have occurred in Tibetan areas may be handled in accordance with the law and in order to ensure social stability, the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have, based on relevant laws and regulations, jointly issued an “Opinion on Handling Self-Immolation Cases in Tibetan Areas in Accordance with the Law.”

    The Opinion points out that the recent self-immolations that have occurred in Tibetan areas are cases of significant evil that result from collusion between hostile forces inside and outside our borders whose attempts to use premeditated, organized plots to incite splittism, undermine ethnic unity, and seriously disrupt social order. [The cases] have seriously affected the present overall situation of ethnic unity and social stability in Tibetan areas. Those who carry out self-immolations in these cases are unlike the ordinary world-weary person who commits suicide. Their common motivation is to split the nation and they endanger public safety and social order, classifying their self-immolations as illegal criminal acts. Organizing, plotting, inciting, coercing, enticing, abetting, or assisting others to carry out self-immolations is, at its essence, a serious criminal act that intentionally deprives another of his or her life.

    Tibetan Buddhism emphasizes compassion and not killing as fundamental precepts. However, those who plot self-immolations cloak their illegal criminal acts with religion and have desecrated the faith of the broad masses of believers in Tibetan Buddhism. The Opinion makes clear that those criminals who act as principal culprits behind the scenes to organize, direct, and plot [self-immolations], as well as those who actively participate in inciting, coercing, enticing, abetting, or assisting others to carry out self-immolations, will be held criminally liable for intentional homicide in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Criminal Law of the PRC and targeted for severe punishment in accordance with the law. As for self-immolators themselves, once the nature of their illegal acts has been clarified, they should be treated differently depending on specific circumstances such as the extent of their malign intentions and the degree of the harm caused by their acts. If the circumstances are serious and major harm has been caused, they should also be held legally liable in accordance with the law.

    The Opinion indicates that anyone who organizes, plots, incites, coerces, entices, abets, or assists others to commit self-immolations shall be held criminally liable for intentional homicide in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who actively commits self-immolation in which the circumstances are serious and that causes major harm or serious danger to society shall be held criminally liable in accordance with the law. Anyone who commits self-immolation in a public space and endangers public safety shall be held criminally liable for using dangerous methods to endanger public safety in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who prepares implements or creates conditions for committing self-immolations shall be treated as if he or she were preparing to commit a crime. Anyone who commits self-immolation and, while burning, grabs hold of another person, shall be held criminally liable for intentional homicide in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who commits self-immolation in a public place who does not endanger public safety but gathers many people to seriously disrupt public order or traffic order shall be held criminally liable for gathering a crowd to disrupt public order or traffic order in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who, in order to commit self-immolation, illegally carries gasoline or other flammable items into a public space or onto a public transportation vehicle shall be held criminally liable for illegally carrying dangerous items that endanger public safety in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who has been enticed, tricked, or coerced into committing self-immolations may be given lenient or mitigated [punishment] or exempted from criminal punishment in accordance with the law.

    The Opinion further indicates that anyone who creates disturbances at the scene of a self-immolation and creates serious chaos in a public place shall be held criminally liable for creating a serious disturbance in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who gathers crowds to disrupt social order, public order, or traffic order by means such as parading around with a corpse or summoning a group to gather and watch shall be held criminally liable for gathering a crowd to disrupt social order or gathering a crowd to disrupt public order or traffic order in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who obstructs public security officers, medical personnel, or others from rescue efforts shall be held criminally liable for intentional homicide in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who commits beating and smashing at the scene [of an immolation] or damages or steals public or private property shall be held criminally liable for robbery or intentional destruction of property in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who prevents public security officers or other employees of state organs from carrying out their duties in accordance with the law, if the circumstances are rather serious, shall be held criminally liable for obstructing public service in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who summons a group to mourn or collect funds for a self-immolator shall be prevented from doing so in accordance with the law; anyone who refuses to obey and gathers a crowd to disrupt social order, public order, or traffic order or who obstructs public service shall be held criminally liable in accordance with the law.

    Civilized society requires rule of law, and the construction of a harmonious and beautiful society necessitates even more the safeguards of rule of law. The issuance of this Opinion is extremely necessary and extremely timely, not only because it provides a strong legal basis for handling various self-immolation cases in accordance with the law, but also because it serves as a strong deterrent for self-immolation incidents. It leads us to understand that laws are norms that every person must obey in a modern society, that absolutely no organization or individual may be allowed to operate above the law, that no one can enjoy extralegal privileges, and that all must be in awe before the law. In particular, those black hands behind the scenes who plan, direct, and incite others to commit self-immolation, [have committed] serious, illegal crimes that are extremely inhuman and they have violated human society’s most basic standards of conscience and morality. They must be subject to the law’s severe punishment and moral condemnation.

    Throughout these recent years, the prefectural party committee and government have always shared joys and hardships together with the people of all ethnic groups in the prefecture, made improving livelihood and promoting the people’s well-being their fundamental goals, and continually improved the education system and extended public health and social security systems throughout urban and rural areas. Steady progress has been made toward the construction of new agricultural and pastoral villages as breakthroughs of the resettlement project, the incomes of farmers and herders have continued to increase, and the conditions of agricultural and pastoral villages have been completely improved. This has earned praise from cadres and the masses at all levels in the prefecture and received broad support from all segments of society.

    Splittist sabotage does not enjoy popular support and self-immolations will not win people over. The facts prove that the fundamental interests of cadres and masses of all ethnic groups in Gannan rest on a unified nation, ethnic unity, and a harmonious and stable society and that these same conditions serve as fundamental assurance of breakthroughs to harmony and stability in pursuit of moderate prosperity and construction of a prosperous and beautiful new Gannan. Criminals who incite and bewitch with self-immolation must be brought to justice. Cadres and masses from all ethnic groups must have a deep understanding of the truth of “unity and stability lead to prosperity; splittism and rioting lead to disaster” and stand firm in drawing a clear line between [themselves and] all hostile forces and not be tricked or deceived. They must develop self-awareness of [the necessity of] upholding the good situation of ethnic unity and social stability and cherishing and protecting the good life that has not come easily.