Tag: law

  • Judicial Independence Debuts in Contentious SPC Work Report

    Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference delegate Wang Junfeng (right) discusses the “Two Meetings.” Photo credit: legaldaily.com.cn

    One of the major events during the annual lianghui—plenary sessions of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)—is the day when the heads of the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate (commonly referred to as the “two supremes”) present their work reports to delegates assembled in Beijing. Though short on detail, these overviews of the work done by the national judiciary and procuracy can still help to identify aspects of the legal system that are given special emphasis in China as well as those areas that might be given special priority for future reform.

    The reports presented this year by outgoing Supreme People’s Court (SPC) President Wang Shengjun and Supreme People’s Procuratorate Procurator-General Cao Jianming, who will serve a second term, focus on the accomplishments of the previous five years and set out an agenda for their successors for the coming year. To many casual observers, these work reports often seem replete with empty rhetoric and slogans. But those who look carefully can sometimes discern new phrases and subtle shifts in emphasis that may signal important future policy directions.

    Such speculation was the subject of a recent interview conducted by the newspaper Legal Weekly with CPPCC delegate and chairman of the All-China Lawyers Association (ACLA), Wang Junfeng. At issue was how much to read into references to “judicial independence” in this year’s SPC work report—especially in light of pronouncements made earlier by new Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping about the importance of governing in accordance with the law and upholding the independence and fairness of the judicial system.

    Supreme People’s Court President Wang Shengjun delivers the court’s work report during the National People’s Congress. Photo credit: China.com.cn

    This expression of commitment to judicial independence by SPC President Wang Shengjun is notable, especially considering that many observers feel that under his tenure political control of China’s courts increased and earlier progress towards a more professional, independent judiciary stalled or even eroded. As evidence of dissatisfaction among lianghui delegates, the SPC report was one of several government work reports receiving the most opposition votes it has seen in five years and received more opposing votes than any other government work report, with 2,218 yeas, 605 nays, and 120 abstentions.

    Wang Junfeng is clearly hopeful that new leadership in the party and the courts will change the atmosphere of “neglect of rule of law” that he sees as having brought many negative consequences to China over the past decade. But one can sense continued uncertainty in his optimism, as he insists that commitments to judicial independence and rule of law be more than just slogans.

    *
    Judicial Independence Shouldn’t Be Mere Slogan

    Interview with CPPCC delegate, ACLA president Wang Junfeng

    Chen Xiao and Gao Yuan, Legal Weekly
    March 13, 2013

    Legal Weekly [hereafter, “LW”]: We’ve noticed that the issue of courts exercising independent, impartial judicial power was mentioned twice in the sections of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) report discussing the problems and difficulties faced by courts and the section on this year’s work agenda. Legal academics have been talking about this problem for a long time, but past reports seem never to have clearly raised the issue. What do you think about its being raised now?

    Wang Junfeng [hereafter, “WJF”]: I think it’s great to bring up (independent judicial authority)! We legal professionals feel extremely gratified to see the SPC report clearly raise this issue. Actually, we knew that it would be mentioned sooner or later. From the beginning of opening and reform, independent judicial authority was one of our important standards. Independent judicial authority is one of the most important cornerstones of a rule-of-law society.

    Over the past decade, China’s economy has been very successful and there have been many changes in all industries. We feel extremely proud, as if we had experienced it ourselves. But there’s no doubt that a major regret is the neglect of rule of law. In an era when the economy developed so quickly, [this neglect] is really astonishing.

    But lately we’ve seen General Secretary Xi Jinping mention upholding the authority and protecting the dignity of the constitution and say that we ought to hold firm to the independence and fairness of the judicial system. Legal academics and professionals know that this is the way it should be. Of course it shouldn’t merely be mentioned. Our judicial work, including our legal professions must always attach importance to the professional and independent nature of the law. Only by remaining firm on this point will we have true rule of law.

    LW: What do you think led [SPC] President Wang Shengjun to mention this problem in this year’s report? What expectations do you have as a result?

    WJF: First, the new generation of central leadership is vigorously promoting governance in accordance with the law, which is a fundamental basic plan for China. Because General Secretary [Xi] mentioned this earlier, it’s logical for President Wang to mention it in [the SPC] report. If it continued to go unmentioned, how could [the report] reflect the importance of the credibility of our judicial system? To a great extent, the decline in credibility of the judicial system is a consequence of the inability to uphold judicial independence.

    Bringing up the issue after 10 years makes me feel gratified, but that the same time I feel…I don’t know how to put it.

    From another angle, it reminds us that this is not a slogan. No matter what changes take place in society, they must not shake the cornerstone of judicial independence.

    I anticipate that this is not merely a slogan and hope that independent judicial authority can truly be put into effect in practice.

    LW: President Wang mentioned in his report that the problems of difficult litigation and implementation have not yet been fundamentally resolved. As a lawyer, what is the situation? Does the All-China Lawyers Association have any data that reflect these problems? Can you give us one or two examples drawn from your practice [as a lawyer]?

    WJF: The difficulties of litigation and implementation are major problems.

    On the one hand, the difficulty of litigation has to do with the inability to strictly operate according to legal procedures during the court’s trial process. Sometimes the difficulty can be seen in cases where one side is in the right but cannot win their suit. Other times, it’s difficult even to file the case. In general, judicial work is affected by all sorts of factors that shouldn’t exist, problems with judicial independence, problems with judges themselves, etcetera.

    Every year there’s talk of the “difficulties of litigation and implementation.” I sweat with anxiety for China’s judicial system. This shows that even though China has made many advances in rule of law, there is still a long way to go to reach ordinary people’s ideal of rule of law.

    So, I look forward to this being improved under the new central party leadership and their promotion of governance in accordance with the law. Many people in legal sectors said they felt there was more hope for the nation after hearing General Secretary Xi Jinping’s speech, first of all, that the spring of rule of law had arrived. Once the spring of rule of law arrives, the glory of a nation can further progress.

    I hope that when judicial independence is realized and China’s rule of law progresses further that President Wang or [future] court presidents will [be able to] speak less of these kinds of problems at the NPC and allow ordinary people to live in a bit more dignity. This is what we look forward to.

    As far as the difficulties of litigation and implementation are concerned, I don’t have any relevant data. But the data isn’t that important. Now that President Wang has spoken of how difficult things are in front of the NPC, is data really that important?

    LW: In the agenda for this year’s work, the SPC report spoke of the need to build up the credibility of the judicial system. This phrasing also seems rather new. Based on your practical understanding, what aspects of the realities [of the judicial system] is this aimed at? From a lawyer’s perspective, how should the credibility of the judicial system be strengthened?

    WJF: Ordinary people know what it means to talk about the credibility of the judicial system.

    I think that to restore the credibility of the judicial system, it’s important to eliminate bureaucratism. Actually, being a judge is an extremely sacred and honorable position, one with the authority to adjudicate according to national laws and regulations. We must eliminate bureaucratism from this profession, reduce the air of “officialism,” and increase the spirit of professionalism.

    First of all, how can there be credibility when there is still no judicial independence, when bureaucratism is so severe, and when there are so many ranks among judges? In foreign countries, judges are called judicial officers and represent fairness. In China’s feudal, traditional consciousness, [the word “judge” was created by] taking the word for “law” and adding “official” at the end. I encourage the media and the courts internally to stop calling [judges] “officials” in the future. “Judicial officers” or “presiding judge” is more appropriate. When you add the word “official,” it not only brings with it seriously feudal ways of thinking, it also desecrates the position of judge itself by wiping out its specialized and professional characteristics. In the feudal society of the past, bureaucrats judged cases; now, [this is done by] judicial officers and presiding judges. If we stop calling them “officials,” perhaps it will enhance the credibility of the judicial system.

    There are many factors affecting credibility: the inability to adjudicate independently, interference of all types, various disciplinary problems and derelictions among judges themselves, insufficient respect for professionalism, and so on. But as long as we stand firm on judicial independence and accept society’s public oversight, I think this problem shouldn’t be difficult to resolve.

    LW: Ordinary people attach considerable importance to the fight against corruption. Recently, the anti-corruption winds have been blowing rather fiercely. Before they came out, we had hoped that the [SPC and Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP)] reports would make a point of describing the results and future plans on this subject, but it seems that not much ink was spilled on this account. Why is this?

    WJF: The fight against corruption has already been mentioned many times. I think it’s normal that it wasn’t mentioned and that the court didn’t mention it. When corruption cases occur, the courts should punish them in accordance with the law. Moreover, I don’t think that the court report needs to mention such things as preserving growth or maintaining stability. The law is the law; when [a case] comes, you try it. When courts’ actions follow society or politics too closely, there will be doubts about judicial independence.

    The legal system and the courts are like high mountains, standing in the distance. Its ordinary operations are to uphold fairness, punish crime, and support society. It shouldn’t be affected by the blowing wind or the falling rain. Courts ought to stand firm and adjudicate fairly and independently in accordance with the law and regulations and adhere to its professional spirit. That’s enough.

    I personally believe that judges are chosen through a certain process and are endowed by the law with a special mission. It’s enough for them to handle the cases they’re given to adjudicate and stick to their responsibilities to the law.

    LW: Please share your thoughts on the [SPC and SPP] reports, including positive aspects, what the highlights were, where they were lacking, and your expectations as a lawyer.

    WJF: The [reports] explain clearly to the public what work was done in the judicial system over the past five years and what things were achieved. As in the past, I feel that for the most part the reports were factual and honest.

    The rare thing here is that we saw that the [SPC and SPP] did not avoid the problems they face. We also saw the efforts being made to restore the credibility of the judicial system.

    However, we know that legislation is not an end [in itself]. Laws are meant to be enforced. On this point, lawyers, police, prosecutors, and judges all share the same goal of ensuring that state legislation is truly and correctly enforced. That is the ultimate purpose of legislation and the ultimate objective of the state’s development of rule of law.

    What we want to see from the court and procuratorate reports is not only that they say a lot, but even more so we want to see how much they have done. We hope that in the new era of national development we will be able to see the effect of rule of law in all areas of the state. Over the past decade, neglect of rule of law has brought negative consequences: corruption, loss of credibility, a growing gap between rich and poor, poisoned milk powder, collapsing buildings, and so on. I hope that society will not make this mistake again.

    Over the past decade, China’s economy developed so fast yet the unfortunate neglect of rule of law brought about consequences. The entire nation should reflect on this and not allow ourselves to make this mistake again. We cannot afford to.

    It’s good for us to bring up the issue of independent judicial and prosecutorial power, but we still don’t know how much we can achieve or how quickly. Based on the hopes expressed in [Xi Jinping’s] words and the expectations we legal professionals have, all lead to the hope that the springtime of rule of law could be approaching.

  • Judicial Independence Debuts in Contentious SPC Work Report

    Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference delegate Wang Junfeng (right) discusses the “Two Meetings.” Photo credit: legaldaily.com.cn

    One of the major events during the annual lianghui—plenary sessions of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)—is the day when the heads of the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate (commonly referred to as the “two supremes”) present their work reports to delegates assembled in Beijing. Though short on detail, these overviews of the work done by the national judiciary and procuracy can still help to identify aspects of the legal system that are given special emphasis in China as well as those areas that might be given special priority for future reform.

    The reports presented this year by outgoing Supreme People’s Court (SPC) President Wang Shengjun and Supreme People’s Procuratorate Procurator-General Cao Jianming, who will serve a second term, focus on the accomplishments of the previous five years and set out an agenda for their successors for the coming year. To many casual observers, these work reports often seem replete with empty rhetoric and slogans. But those who look carefully can sometimes discern new phrases and subtle shifts in emphasis that may signal important future policy directions.

    Such speculation was the subject of a recent interview conducted by the newspaper Legal Weekly with CPPCC delegate and chairman of the All-China Lawyers Association (ACLA), Wang Junfeng. At issue was how much to read into references to “judicial independence” in this year’s SPC work report—especially in light of pronouncements made earlier by new Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping about the importance of governing in accordance with the law and upholding the independence and fairness of the judicial system.

    Supreme People’s Court President Wang Shengjun delivers the court’s work report during the National People’s Congress. Photo credit: China.com.cn

    This expression of commitment to judicial independence by SPC President Wang Shengjun is notable, especially considering that many observers feel that under his tenure political control of China’s courts increased and earlier progress towards a more professional, independent judiciary stalled or even eroded. As evidence of dissatisfaction among lianghui delegates, the SPC report was one of several government work reports receiving the most opposition votes it has seen in five years and received more opposing votes than any other government work report, with 2,218 yeas, 605 nays, and 120 abstentions.

    Wang Junfeng is clearly hopeful that new leadership in the party and the courts will change the atmosphere of “neglect of rule of law” that he sees as having brought many negative consequences to China over the past decade. But one can sense continued uncertainty in his optimism, as he insists that commitments to judicial independence and rule of law be more than just slogans.

    *
    Judicial Independence Shouldn’t Be Mere Slogan

    Interview with CPPCC delegate, ACLA president Wang Junfeng

    Chen Xiao and Gao Yuan, Legal Weekly
    March 13, 2013

    Legal Weekly [hereafter, “LW”]: We’ve noticed that the issue of courts exercising independent, impartial judicial power was mentioned twice in the sections of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) report discussing the problems and difficulties faced by courts and the section on this year’s work agenda. Legal academics have been talking about this problem for a long time, but past reports seem never to have clearly raised the issue. What do you think about its being raised now?

    Wang Junfeng [hereafter, “WJF”]: I think it’s great to bring up (independent judicial authority)! We legal professionals feel extremely gratified to see the SPC report clearly raise this issue. Actually, we knew that it would be mentioned sooner or later. From the beginning of opening and reform, independent judicial authority was one of our important standards. Independent judicial authority is one of the most important cornerstones of a rule-of-law society.

    Over the past decade, China’s economy has been very successful and there have been many changes in all industries. We feel extremely proud, as if we had experienced it ourselves. But there’s no doubt that a major regret is the neglect of rule of law. In an era when the economy developed so quickly, [this neglect] is really astonishing.

    But lately we’ve seen General Secretary Xi Jinping mention upholding the authority and protecting the dignity of the constitution and say that we ought to hold firm to the independence and fairness of the judicial system. Legal academics and professionals know that this is the way it should be. Of course it shouldn’t merely be mentioned. Our judicial work, including our legal professions must always attach importance to the professional and independent nature of the law. Only by remaining firm on this point will we have true rule of law.

    LW: What do you think led [SPC] President Wang Shengjun to mention this problem in this year’s report? What expectations do you have as a result?

    WJF: First, the new generation of central leadership is vigorously promoting governance in accordance with the law, which is a fundamental basic plan for China. Because General Secretary [Xi] mentioned this earlier, it’s logical for President Wang to mention it in [the SPC] report. If it continued to go unmentioned, how could [the report] reflect the importance of the credibility of our judicial system? To a great extent, the decline in credibility of the judicial system is a consequence of the inability to uphold judicial independence.

    Bringing up the issue after 10 years makes me feel gratified, but that the same time I feel…I don’t know how to put it.

    From another angle, it reminds us that this is not a slogan. No matter what changes take place in society, they must not shake the cornerstone of judicial independence.

    I anticipate that this is not merely a slogan and hope that independent judicial authority can truly be put into effect in practice.

    LW: President Wang mentioned in his report that the problems of difficult litigation and implementation have not yet been fundamentally resolved. As a lawyer, what is the situation? Does the All-China Lawyers Association have any data that reflect these problems? Can you give us one or two examples drawn from your practice [as a lawyer]?

    WJF: The difficulties of litigation and implementation are major problems.

    On the one hand, the difficulty of litigation has to do with the inability to strictly operate according to legal procedures during the court’s trial process. Sometimes the difficulty can be seen in cases where one side is in the right but cannot win their suit. Other times, it’s difficult even to file the case. In general, judicial work is affected by all sorts of factors that shouldn’t exist, problems with judicial independence, problems with judges themselves, etcetera.

    Every year there’s talk of the “difficulties of litigation and implementation.” I sweat with anxiety for China’s judicial system. This shows that even though China has made many advances in rule of law, there is still a long way to go to reach ordinary people’s ideal of rule of law.

    So, I look forward to this being improved under the new central party leadership and their promotion of governance in accordance with the law. Many people in legal sectors said they felt there was more hope for the nation after hearing General Secretary Xi Jinping’s speech, first of all, that the spring of rule of law had arrived. Once the spring of rule of law arrives, the glory of a nation can further progress.

    I hope that when judicial independence is realized and China’s rule of law progresses further that President Wang or [future] court presidents will [be able to] speak less of these kinds of problems at the NPC and allow ordinary people to live in a bit more dignity. This is what we look forward to.

    As far as the difficulties of litigation and implementation are concerned, I don’t have any relevant data. But the data isn’t that important. Now that President Wang has spoken of how difficult things are in front of the NPC, is data really that important?

    LW: In the agenda for this year’s work, the SPC report spoke of the need to build up the credibility of the judicial system. This phrasing also seems rather new. Based on your practical understanding, what aspects of the realities [of the judicial system] is this aimed at? From a lawyer’s perspective, how should the credibility of the judicial system be strengthened?

    WJF: Ordinary people know what it means to talk about the credibility of the judicial system.

    I think that to restore the credibility of the judicial system, it’s important to eliminate bureaucratism. Actually, being a judge is an extremely sacred and honorable position, one with the authority to adjudicate according to national laws and regulations. We must eliminate bureaucratism from this profession, reduce the air of “officialism,” and increase the spirit of professionalism.

    First of all, how can there be credibility when there is still no judicial independence, when bureaucratism is so severe, and when there are so many ranks among judges? In foreign countries, judges are called judicial officers and represent fairness. In China’s feudal, traditional consciousness, [the word “judge” was created by] taking the word for “law” and adding “official” at the end. I encourage the media and the courts internally to stop calling [judges] “officials” in the future. “Judicial officers” or “presiding judge” is more appropriate. When you add the word “official,” it not only brings with it seriously feudal ways of thinking, it also desecrates the position of judge itself by wiping out its specialized and professional characteristics. In the feudal society of the past, bureaucrats judged cases; now, [this is done by] judicial officers and presiding judges. If we stop calling them “officials,” perhaps it will enhance the credibility of the judicial system.

    There are many factors affecting credibility: the inability to adjudicate independently, interference of all types, various disciplinary problems and derelictions among judges themselves, insufficient respect for professionalism, and so on. But as long as we stand firm on judicial independence and accept society’s public oversight, I think this problem shouldn’t be difficult to resolve.

    LW: Ordinary people attach considerable importance to the fight against corruption. Recently, the anti-corruption winds have been blowing rather fiercely. Before they came out, we had hoped that the [SPC and Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP)] reports would make a point of describing the results and future plans on this subject, but it seems that not much ink was spilled on this account. Why is this?

    WJF: The fight against corruption has already been mentioned many times. I think it’s normal that it wasn’t mentioned and that the court didn’t mention it. When corruption cases occur, the courts should punish them in accordance with the law. Moreover, I don’t think that the court report needs to mention such things as preserving growth or maintaining stability. The law is the law; when [a case] comes, you try it. When courts’ actions follow society or politics too closely, there will be doubts about judicial independence.

    The legal system and the courts are like high mountains, standing in the distance. Its ordinary operations are to uphold fairness, punish crime, and support society. It shouldn’t be affected by the blowing wind or the falling rain. Courts ought to stand firm and adjudicate fairly and independently in accordance with the law and regulations and adhere to its professional spirit. That’s enough.

    I personally believe that judges are chosen through a certain process and are endowed by the law with a special mission. It’s enough for them to handle the cases they’re given to adjudicate and stick to their responsibilities to the law.

    LW: Please share your thoughts on the [SPC and SPP] reports, including positive aspects, what the highlights were, where they were lacking, and your expectations as a lawyer.

    WJF: The [reports] explain clearly to the public what work was done in the judicial system over the past five years and what things were achieved. As in the past, I feel that for the most part the reports were factual and honest.

    The rare thing here is that we saw that the [SPC and SPP] did not avoid the problems they face. We also saw the efforts being made to restore the credibility of the judicial system.

    However, we know that legislation is not an end [in itself]. Laws are meant to be enforced. On this point, lawyers, police, prosecutors, and judges all share the same goal of ensuring that state legislation is truly and correctly enforced. That is the ultimate purpose of legislation and the ultimate objective of the state’s development of rule of law.

    What we want to see from the court and procuratorate reports is not only that they say a lot, but even more so we want to see how much they have done. We hope that in the new era of national development we will be able to see the effect of rule of law in all areas of the state. Over the past decade, neglect of rule of law has brought negative consequences: corruption, loss of credibility, a growing gap between rich and poor, poisoned milk powder, collapsing buildings, and so on. I hope that society will not make this mistake again.

    Over the past decade, China’s economy developed so fast yet the unfortunate neglect of rule of law brought about consequences. The entire nation should reflect on this and not allow ourselves to make this mistake again. We cannot afford to.

    It’s good for us to bring up the issue of independent judicial and prosecutorial power, but we still don’t know how much we can achieve or how quickly. Based on the hopes expressed in [Xi Jinping’s] words and the expectations we legal professionals have, all lead to the hope that the springtime of rule of law could be approaching.

  • China Ushers in Non-Residential Residential Surveillance

    Zhu Chengzhi (right) visits his friend, deceased democracy activist Li Wangyang. Photo credit: Deutsche Welle

    Considerable public controversy erupted in China in late 2011 and early 2012 over proposed amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) that would have allowed police to detain certain suspects without notifying the suspects’ family. One of the most troubling examples was the proposal concerning the measure known as “residential surveillance,” which—in spite of the name—was revised to include certain circumstances under which police could choose to carry out the coercive measure in a “designated residence” that was not the suspects’ home for up to six months. Critics argued that the ability to employ this measure without family notification would be tantamount to enforced disappearance and, therefore, a violation of international human rights law.

    Public criticism over the “disappearance clauses” may have ultimately contributed to some salutary changes to the legislation, including the removal of exemptions for providing notification of residential surveillance (but not carrying out residential surveillance in a designated residence). Under the revised CPL, which took effect on January 1, 2013, police are thus required to give notice to relatives within 24 hours of all individuals being subjected to “non-residential residential surveillance.” This limits the ability of police to make an individual disappear without a trace, but the practice of non-residential residential surveillance remains deeply problematic, even though its inclusion in the CPL has given it a veneer of legitimacy.

    This situation is illustrated by the case of Zhu Chengzhi, who, according to Zhu’s defense lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan, is likely to be the first person in China to be placed in this form of residential surveillance (the number of the notice issued by local police is “A01”) since the new CPL took effect earlier this month. Zhu, age 62, was detained in June 2012 by police in Shaoyang, Hunan, after he allegedly disseminated information that raised doubts about local authorities’ official finding of suicide in the death of his friend and long-time political prisoner Li Wangyang (李旺阳). After reportedly refusing to sign a guarantee that he would cease his efforts to draw attention to suspicions surrounding Li’s death, Zhu was placed under criminal detention on suspicion of “inciting subversion,” charges for which he was formally arrested on July 25, 2012.

    After five months of incommunicado detention, Zhu’s case was transferred to prosecutors on December 25. On January 4 (the first day of business for Chinese government offices following the New Year’s Day holiday), Zhu’s wife, Zeng Qiulian, retained Liu Xiaoyuan to represent her husband. That same day, the Shaoyang People’s Procuratorate handed the case back to police for additional investigation, and police decided to place Zhu under residential surveillance and delivered an official notification (translated below) to his wife.

    Even though Zhu Chengzhi has a legal residence in Shaoyang, police have chosen to carry out residential surveillance in a designated location under the provisions of Article 73 of the CPL, which allows for use of this measure “in cases involving crimes of endangering state security, terrorist activity, or especially serious bribery, if carrying out [residential surveillance] in the residence [of the criminal suspect or defendant] has the potential to interfere with the investigation.” The official notice of residential surveillance provided to Zhu’s wife does not identify the location where he is being held, meaning that his current whereabouts are unknown. The new CPL does not specify what information is to be included on notices of residential surveillance. Stipulations included in the August 2011 draft of CPL revisions said that the grounds and whereabouts of detention should be disclosed, but these clarifications were removed for residential surveillance and other coercive measures in the final law. Zeng told Reuters that police were moving her husband to a hotel but that they did not provide an exact location.

    On January 5, Liu Xiaoyuan met with Shaoyang police and filed a request to meet with his client. Article 37 of the CPL gives lawyers the right to meet with clients who are under residential surveillance but also gives police discretion to deny lawyers’ requests when the client’s alleged offense falls under the category of “endangering state security,” which includes inciting subversion. Liu told Voice of America that he suspects Zhu was placed under non-residential residential surveillance precisely in order to prevent him from having access to a lawyer.

    Under the new CPL, will this kind of long-term, incommunicado detention for people charged with state security crimes become more routine? It is still too early to say, but Zhu Chengzhi’s example is a very worrying sign.


    Shaoyang Public Security Bureau
    Notice of Residential Surveillance in a Designated Residence

    SY PSB (     ) Res. Surv. Not. (2013) No. A01

    Zeng Qiulian:

            In accordance with the provisions of Article 73 of the Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC, our bureau on January 4, 2013 at 11 a.m. carried out residential surveillance in a designated residence against Zhu Chengzhi (sex male, birthdate 1950.10.18, residence 1469 Baoqing East Road, Shuangqing District, Shaoyang, Hunan Province) on suspicion of the crime of inciting subversion of state power.

    Shaoyang Public Security Bureau (chop)
    January 4, 2013

    This notice is given to the family member of the person under residential surveillance.

  • Can China’s Legal Reform Survive Without Judicial Independence?

    Experts at a conference on legal reform earlier this month. Clockwise from top left: Hu Yunteng, Supreme People’s Court Research Office; Xie Pengcheng, Supreme People’s Procuratorate Institute of Procuratorial Theory; Tian Wenchang, All-China Lawyers’ Association; former lawyer Li Zhuang; lawyer Mao Lixin; Xu Xin, Beijing Institute of Technology Law School.
    Photo credits: Sina

    Since last month’s installation of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang at the head of the Chinese Communist Party, there has been much speculation about whether China is about to embark on a new round of reforms and, if so, whether it might alter the political system. In the near term, the odds of political reform are not high, but gradual changes to the legal system are more likely. The most immediate changes will probably result from revisions to the criminal and civil procedure codes that are set to take effect on January 1, 2013.

    If recent history is any guide, it is very likely that any substantial reforms to China’s legal system (for example, changes in the system of reeducation through labor) will have to wait until 2014—after Communist Party leaders approve the new legal reform agenda expected to be drawn up by the Central Politico-Legal Commission and submitted for approval toward the end of next year.

    Legal-system (or judicial) reform was the subject of a recent conference in Beijing, according to a report published in The Mirror (a Beijing evening paper with a focus on legal affairs). Although the article’s headline focuses on the “revolutionary” system of guiding cases, many conference participants quoted in the article express a degree of impatience with the limited nature of legal reform thus far, and a conviction that establishing a system of judicial independence is essential to the fair and authoritative administration of justice. Pointing to corruption in Russia’s Western-styled judicial system, however, others note that China’s socio-economic realities call into question whether judicial independence is currently feasible.

    One is left with the sense that China faces a dilemma that is difficult to resolve: an urgent need to improve the capacity and quality of its legal system in an environment with political, economic, and social factors that restrict the speed and scope of change. Some have even gone so far as to identify this problem as a trap that can only be escaped by instituting political reform—the very thing legal reform is intended to forestall.

    Such pessimism is of course inappropriate for the pages of a Chinese newspaper, which may explain why the initial focus is on concrete systemic reforms that have the potential for genuine improvement and why the piece ends with a comment—very likely stripped of its larger context—by former lawyer Li Zhuang, saying that the “spring [of Chinese judicial reform] has truly arrived.” Expectations are high, which means there could be repercussions if this new dawn doesn’t materialize soon.

    *
    Building a Guiding Precedents System with Chinese Characteristics

    Wang Hong, The Mirror
    December 7, 2012

    Supreme People’s Court (SPC) judge discusses judicial reform, speaks of plans to set up independent procedure to ensure sentencing precision; citizens can recommend outstanding precedents to courts

    The [political] report of the 18th Party Congress mentioned ruling the country in accordance with the law and delivered a new message about “using legal-system thinking to resolve social problems,” all of which has given great encouragement to all segments of society. Some say that the third wave of Chinese reform has already begun, with judicial reform as an important component.

    Recently, the Public Policy Research Center at China University of Political Science and Law held a conference on the subject of “The Characteristics of Chinese Judicial Reform,” attended by many authoritative experts, scholars, and lawyers in related fields. Everyone is hoping for the springtime of judicial reform to arrive.

    Keyword: Institutional Reform

    For a long time China has not given enough attention to sentencing, and in a past era when consciousness about human-rights protection was not strong, it did not matter much if some were punished more heavily and others more lightly.

    Reform of sentencing standards began two years ago to address the problems of over-broad sentencing ranges and judges with too much discretion.

    Setting up an Independent Sentencing Process

    According to Hu Yunteng, director of the SPC Research Office, for a long time in China the sentencing and conviction processes were not separate, not enough attention was paid to sentencing, and there were instances of unequal sentencing.

    In a past era in which consciousness about human-rights protection was not strong, it did not matter much if some were punished more heavily and others more lightly. These days, following the increase in human-rights consciousness, freedom is considered increasingly precious and a sentence that is excessive or insufficient by even one day has an impact on the fair administration of justice.

    Starting two years ago, China began studying reform of sentencing standards with an eye towards building a relatively independent sentencing process that would, to a degree, separate sentencing from criminal adjudication and allow the prosecution and defense to debate not only the issue of guilt but also the issue of sentencing.

    One important result of this reform has been to give finer gradation to sentencing ranges and refine the circumstances under the criminal law in which heavier punishment, more lenient punishment, mitigated punishment, and exemption from punishment [may be imposed], all in an effort to overcome the problems of relatively over-broad sentencing ranges and judges with too much discretion.

    Let Outstanding Precedents “Speak”

    Director Hu Yunteng says that, in the past, we were always very careful about the way we used [earlier] cases lest it turn into a Western precedent system. In fact, courts nationwide adjudicate millions of cases annually, an extraordinarily valuable judicial resource that encapsulates the collective wisdom of judges, lawyers, prosecutors, and litigants.

    After a long period of study, the SPC decided to set up a system of guiding cases with Chinese characteristics, which was formally established in 2010. The SPC has already issued three sets of guiding cases and will soon issue the fourth set.

    This Chinese-style system of guiding cases is different from those found in the West. In the West, any case [in which the verdict] has been announced automatically becomes a precedent, but guiding cases in China are all carefully selected by the SPC. The selection of cases involves an extremely strict recommendation process.

    A court at any level that believes a case it has adjudicated can serve as a guiding case may recommend it to the adjudication committee of the court at the next-higher level. Cases must move up the recommendation ladder by passing through the adjudication committees of courts at each level.

    Citizens who find that a particular case may serve as a guiding case may recommend it to the adjudication committee of the court that adjudicated the case in final instance.

    Furthermore, guiding cases must be re-written and the key points of the decision must be approved by the SPC adjudication committee. An individual case may have many highlights, but the ultimate number of confirmed guidance points is usually between one and three, [ensuring that] the scope of guidance is not unlimited or random. Allowing each court, scholar, or lawyer to give [their opinions about a case] in an unstructured way might prevent the case from fulfilling its guiding function.

    Courts should consult guiding cases when the case they are trying is similar, but “similar” refers to the essential similarity of the legal issues being contested in the case and not similarity in terms of subject, amount, or the plaintiff or defendant. If a defense lawyer recommends a certain case be consulted, the judge should respond. If a judge ought to consult a guiding case but fails do so without explaining the reason, that case could be remanded for retrial or the verdict changed.

    Keyword: Judicial Openness

    Experts and scholars all believe that after the 18th Party Congress the next steps in judicial reform will revolve around raising the level of trust in the administration of justice. One of the key links in this is to increase the openness of the judicial system. The current system of judicial openness merely rests on “open hearings,” and there is not enough openness in some of the other aspects [of the judicial process].

    Let the Public Participate in Judicial Reform

    Director Hu Yunteng observed that many countries worldwide are carrying out judicial reforms, including Japan, Vietnam, and many developed countries. Judicial reform in China is [part of] the development and perfection of a socialist system with Chinese characteristics and must resolve the many problems that currently affect social justice.

    The process of China’s judicial reform is not a closed-door process but rather one in which the public should participate and one that should absorb opinions from all sectors of society. The effectiveness of reform should be judged by the public. The goal of China’s judicial reforms is the establishment of a judicial system that is fair, highly efficient, and authoritative.

    Mao Lixin, a law Ph.D. and lawyer with the Beijing Shangquan Law Firm, believes that the essence and basic function of the administration of justice is to resolve conflicts, something that requires fairness while at the same time emphasizing efficiency. “Fairness and efficiency” are two major themes in the administration of justice.

    However, China currently has a low degree of judicial efficiency. There are 210,000 judges in China, ranking number one worldwide. Its ratio of 19.7 judges for every 100,000 people is higher than in the United States, but its judicial output is actually very low. According to statistics, last year the average number of cases handled per judge was only 57.

    In the United States, a judge handles at least 1,000 to 2,000 cases per year; in South Korea the average judge handles more than 700 cases. But in China, many simple cases remain undecided even after several years.

    Keyword: Judicial Independence

    Many experts and scholars believe that the biggest problem facing China’s current administration of justice is insufficient trust in the judicial system. Abusing power to control the law and interference in the administration of justice are very apparent in some locations, and the key to solving this problem rests on the need to ensure that judicial bodies exercise their judicial power independently.

    Stop Power from Kidnapping Justice

    Professor Xu Xin of the Beijing Institute of Technology School of Law says that in the past several years the great majority of judicial reforms involved minor revisions and fixes without touching the core of the legal system, and that some of these revisions were even expedient. For example, the system of guiding cases is a revolutionary reform, but it is very difficult to implement. He hopes that the SPC will set up a precedent database and make all precedents public so that everyone may supervise, consult, and compare.

    As a next step, China must reaffirm judicial independence, because that is a bottom-line issue. If no one dares speak of judicial independence more than 30 years since opening and reform, then there is no point in discussing judicial reform. Judicial independence is the most fundamental condition for realizing fairness in the administration of justice, without any distinction between East and West. Socialist judicial independence can surpass capitalist judicial independence.

    Lawyer Tian Wenchang observes that in many cases judges and courts face control, interference, and even kidnapping [in a figurative sense] at the hands of all sorts of power, a situation that must be eliminated. If [the problem of] judicial independence is not resolved, judicial reform is just empty rhetoric.

    Independence of Judicial Officers is Prerequisite

    Xie Pengcheng, deputy director of the Institute of Procuratorial Theory at the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, noted that the [political] reports of the 13th through 18th party congresses all contained similar language about “ensuring that judicial bodies exercise judicial power independently and fairly in accordance with the law.” This shows above all that the problem of guaranteeing that judicial bodies exercise judicial power independently and fairly in accordance with the law requires further attention.

    The basic goal for future judicial reform is: guaranteeing judicial independence. To this day, there is no country that has fair and authoritative administration of justice without judicial independence.

    Where is the fulcrum for future judicial reform in China? It is the establishment and protection of independence for judicial officers.

    When relevant international covenants mention judicial independence, they are firstly referring to the independence of judicial officers. However, judicial independence in China means the independence of courts and procuratorates, without recognition of independent judges and procurators. This is the basic reason China cannot truly realize judicial independence.

    Establish a High-Quality Corps of Judges

    In response to the question of judicial independence, Hu Yunteng says frankly that judicial independence and judicial democratization must conform to our current social realities.

    Russia is a classic example of a judicial system transplanted from Western countries: constitutional court, separation of powers, and judicial independence. But fewer than one third of Russians are satisfied with their judicial system, particularly [because of] judicial corruption.

    If overall social conditions have not been met and judicial personnel have not achieved [a certain level of] quality, giving judges power will result in serious consequences.

    There are currently a number of problems in which the SPC can intervene, and we have some institutions that promote judicial fairness. The fact that many people do not obey the judicial system at present is not because they do not take judges seriously; it is because the law itself has no authority.

    Keyword: Lawyer Participation

    In the “Li Zhuang incident,” the defendant made accusations against his lawyer in order to save his own life. This fundamentally subverts the foundations of the institution of lawyers.

    No Judicial Reform Without Lawyers’ Participation

    Tian Wenchang, chair of the All-China Lawyers’ Association Criminal Law Profession Committee, believes that judicial reform cannot occur without the participation of lawyers. In the “Li Zhuang incident,” the defendant made accusations against his lawyer in order to save his own life. This fundamentally subverts the foundations of the institution of lawyers.

    There are two very basic foundations to the institution of lawyers: the first is attorney-client privilege and the second is the litigant’s “principle of lawyer protection.”

    Several years ago, when the Lawyers Law was being enacted, there were many years of debate about attorney-client privilege. At the beginning, the majority view was that lawyers should be responsible to the law rather than to their clients and that lawyers should reveal and report illegal criminal behavior by their clients when they discover it.

    After several years of hard work, attorney-client privilege was finally written into the Lawyers Law. In other countries, lawyers, doctors, and priests are all statutorily exempted from the obligation to give evidence.

    But unfortunately the “principle of lawyer protection” has never been established. If a defendant can report on a lawyer in exchange for lighter treatment, what lawyer would dare tell the truth?

    Sidelight

    “Current Well-Known Non-Lawyer” Li Zhuang: “Spring is Here for the Judicial System”

    The afternoon discussion on December 1 was the first open-door academic conference that Li Zhuang attended since his release from prison. The discussion chair’s introduction of him was clever: former non-well-known lawyer, current well-known non-lawyer.

    As guest discussant, he stood and spoke last for about 15 minutes. Li Zhuang said that he read the Criminal Procedure Law many times while in prison and [observed] many loopholes therein.

    He believes that the bottleneck in judicial reform lies in the lack of independence for judicial officers. If people are not independent, independence will be difficult to achieve even with more funding. And then there are the huge differences in sentencing, in which two cases with nearly the same circumstances result in very different judgments. This reveals the arbitrariness in the administration of justice.

    Li Zhuang says that China has discussed judicial reform for more than 20 years, but he has only heard the footsteps on the staircase without seeing anyone come down the stairs. This time, however, spring has truly arrived for the administration of justice in China!

  • Chinese State Security Arrests Stay High, Trials Soar

    In 2011, the number of arrests and indictments for “endangering state security” (ESS) in China remained high, while ESS trial numbers broke new ground, according to China Law Yearbook. The official compendium states that 930 individuals were arrested and 974 were indicted on ESS charges (see Figure 1). Both figures remained well above pre-2008 averages despite double-digit declines. Arrests fell 11 percent year-on-year and indictments fell 20 percent—in lock step with Dui Hua estimates published in March. The subset of concluded first-instance trials that includes ESS leapt 96 percent to 1,314 trials, the highest volume since ESS entered China’s criminal code in 1998.

    Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database includes information on 25 people convicted on ESS charges in 2011. Many ESS trials are closed on the grounds that they involve state secrets and the publication of verdicts is strictly controlled, making it difficult to obtain information on individual cases. Crimes in the ESS category include “subversion,” “splittism,” and their incitement.

    Figure 1. Arrests and Indictments for Endangering State Security in China, 1998-2011

    Among those convicted were Memetjan Abduqadir and Tursunjan Ablimit, who in 2002 set up a foundation to serve Uyghur students in impoverished areas of Xinjiang; dissidents like Xue Mingkai (薛明凯)—who had been diagnosed with mental illness—Liu Xianbin (刘贤斌), Chen Wei (陈伟), and Chen Xi (陈西), who were all jailed following online calls for Jasmine Revolution in China; Li Nanhang (李南航) and Sun Tianxi (孙天西), who were convicted in separate cases for allegedly organizing political parties, one of which only existed online; Falun Gong practitioners Wang Guangying (王光英) and Zhang Xiuling (張秀玲); Tibetan writer Tashi Rabten and Tibetan rights activist Kalsang Tsultrim—a number of other Tibetans were reported detained and convicted during the year but sentencing information is not available; and Lü Jiaping (吕嘉平)—the oldest person on the list, at age 71—and Jin Andi (金安迪), who published online articles critical of Communist Party elder Jiang Zemin.

    Although there are only two names of Uyghurs convicted of ESS in 2011 in the database, this group is known to account for a high percentage of those convicted of ESS. According to official statistics, 414 ESS trials (including first-instance and appellate trials) were held in Xinjiang last year.

    Figuring for Trials 

    The reason for the disparate trends in the number of ESS trials versus arrests and indictments is unclear but is likely due to a combination of a decline in the number of defendants per trial and case backlogs.[*] Since 2007, the average number of individuals involved in each case involving arrest or indictment has declined markedly (see Figure 2). Backlogs, i.e., instances where an individual’s arrest or indictment does not occur in the same year his/her trial, are likely since the gears of Chinese criminal justice often turn slowly when processing ESS cases. This is because these cases are commonly classified as either “complex” or “sensitive” and sometimes require additional investigation to overcome issues of insufficient evidence. For example, Li Nanhang and Liu Xianbin were arrested in May and July of 2010, respectively, but were not convicted until March 2011.

    Figure 2. Change in Number of Persons per Case, 1999-2011

    On average, there were no more than 600 ESS arrests or indictments per year between 1998 and 2007. These figures more than doubled in 2008 due in large part to a crackdown on Tibetans and Uyghurs—often the targets of “splittism” charges—particularly after the uprising in Lhasa in March 2008, and more generalized efforts to ensure that dissenting voices did not tarnish the Beijing Olympics.

    * Note: There is also a chance that there was an increase in the number of trials for dereliction of military duty, which Dui Hua believes China Law Yearbook lumps together with ESS crimes under the category “other,” but such an increase would be unlikely to have much impact on the whole. Although trial statistics are not disaggregated, indictment statistics have consistently indicated that dereliction of military duty accounts for less than 1 percent of indictments when placed in a separate category with only ESS. ^

  • Call for Constitutionalism at the 18th Party Congress

    18th National Party Congress Press Conference Center. Photo: Xinhua

    At a press conference on the eve of the 18th Party Congress, a spokesman told reporters that the delegates assembled in Beijing to select China’s newest leadership group “brought with them the wishes of the Chinese people.” Indeed, as they did at the time of China’s last leadership transition 10 years ago, many in and outside China have high expectations for China’s incoming leadership, looking to them to push forward all sorts of much-needed economic, legal, and political reform.

    In a recent interview with the Economic Observer newspaper, Shanghai-based constitutional scholar Tong Zhiwei expresses his own hopes that China’s coming decade will bring a renewed commitment to the principles of constitutional governance. As Tong explains, such a commitment to limiting state power and protecting individual rights would have profound ramifications for China’s economy, its legal institutions, and especially its political system.

    *
    Constitutional Rule: Current Realities and Future Visions
    Meng Lei
    Economic Observer, November 3, 2012

    Conscientiously Protect Citizens’ Fundamental Rights

    Economic Observer [hereafter, EO]: A few days from now, the Chinese Communist Party will hold its 18th Party Congress and there will be a transition of the party’s central leadership. This year is also the 30th anniversary of the promulgation of the 1982 constitution. As a constitutional scholar, what prospects do you see for “ruling the country according to the constitution” in the coming decade?

    Professor Tong Zhiwei. Photo: 21CCOM.net

    Tong Zhiwei: It’s great that you’ve chosen to discuss things from the angle of ruling the country according to the constitution! To rule according to the constitution is a concrete requirement of constitutionalism; ruling according to the constitution means implementing constitutionalism, and implementing constitutionalism requires ruling according to the constitution. Governance is not an issue for ordinary citizens; it’s only a problem for state leaders and the ruling party. So, during the 18th Party Congress, it is necessary to discuss this fundamental issue.

    Essentially speaking, the most important aspects of constitutionalism are, first, the need to implement the restrictions and checks on [the exercise of] supreme power provided for in the constitution and, second, the need to conscientiously protect all of the fundamental rights of citizens that are affirmed by the constitution.

    In the 30 years since the current constitution took effect, constitutional implementation has made major achievements overall, but has also encountered some fairly major problems. We don’t lack for self-praise, so with respect to ruling according to the constitution I think I’ll focus on what hasn’t been done well and where it is necessary to exert significant effort to improve.

    Whether one is talking about rule according to the constitution or constitutionalism, the first requirement is the need to place all public power under the regulation or restriction of the constitution and not allowing [the existence of] any power that is unchecked or not subject to restriction by the constitution. But in our country, there are some basic issues of constitutionalism that have yet to be resolved. For starters, have a look at the power [enjoyed by] the party secretaries in some cities and counties—how are they restrained by the constitution? The most extreme [example] is Bo Xilai when he was in Chongqing. There he was called a leader of the ruling party, but the constitution and laws that were established in accordance with party proposals were simply unable to restrain him. He was called the leader of the municipal party committee, but in fact [he ran] a personal dictatorship where local institutions of state power and other state institutions set forth in the constitution were only for show. Under these circumstances, how can it be acceptable not to reform?

    Another requirement of rule according to the constitution or constitutionalism is the conscientious protection of citizens’ fundamental rights. Citizens’ fundamental rights refer to those individual rights affirmed in the constitution; rights that the state is obliged to protect. Over the past 30-plus years, our citizens’ fundamental rights have received fuller protection than they ever did in the past, but unfortunately, obvious defects exist. China is a country that strictly adheres to a statutory-law system in which the fundamental rights provided in the constitution generally must first be expressed through legislation before they can actually be protected. In reality, it remains an open question how to implement and how to use the law to protect these constitutional rights of citizens.

    EO: Without special legislation, these specific constitutional rights cannot be protected. In other words, when these rights are subjected to restriction, the constitution is not enough to be used as a “shield.”

    Tong: You’re a reporter, you’ve certainly heard sayings such as “there is freedom to research, but expression must be disciplined.” But can citizens’ fundamental rights be restricted through discipline? If so, it is the same as the deprivation of relevant fundamental rights.

    Citizen’s fundamental rights can only be restricted by laws. Moreover, laws restricting fundamental rights cannot protect these fundamental rights in form but negate them in practice. Also, laws restricting citizens’ fundamental rights cannot violate the constitution, because laws that violate the constitution are invalid. Of course, this necessitates an effective system of constitutional review, or, as our constitution puts it, a system to “oversee constitutional enforcement.”

    Here, it’s crucial to understand why all norms that are not laws, like administrative regulations, have no power to restrict citizens’ fundamental rights. The logic is simple. Taking China’s constitution as an example, if a fundamental right affirmed in a constitution that was passed by more than two thirds of all of the delegates to the National People’s Congress (NPC) could be restricted arbitrarily by central state organs like the State Council or by local state organs, it would effectively mean a veto over this right’s essence as a fundamental right and be no different in consequence from the constitution not affirming this right.

    Of course, this is not to say that without legal protections citizens are entirely unable to enjoy these rights. Without corresponding legal provisions, citizens more or less still enjoy some fundamental rights affirmed in the constitution, but this kind of enjoyment lacks stable, reliable protection.

    EO: Just now you were discussing constitutional rights that are not yet protected through specific laws. But in reality, there are some fundamental rights for which there is already specific legislation but the protection [of these rights] is still not ideal. What causes this?

    Tong: There are many reasons that can lead to this kind of situation.

    The first situation is that the legislation itself is problematic. Even though there are legal protections, things like violations of the principles of rule of law mean that the legislation doesn’t meet the standards of effective protection that are commonly necessary. For example, there are procedures in the Criminal Procedure Law that protect the right to personal liberty. According to rule-of-law principles, criminal coercive measures and investigative methods taken by investigative departments should be reviewed and approved by a court. But in the majority of situations our laws do not require review or approval by a court; rather, the public security departments decide and implement [these decisions] on their own. This is the case for residential surveillance, release on guarantee pending further investigation, seizure of property, monitoring, etc.

    The second scenario is when laws exist but are not followed. This has been particularly noticeable in recent years. I won’t discuss this in detail; readers can recall some of the more notorious cases from recent years.

    The third situation is when laws or administrative regulations violate the constitution. From a certain perspective, the system of reeducation through labor, which we have all had enough of, can be put in this category.

    The fourth situation is when a law’s derivative laws or normative documents violate the constitution or the law but cannot be reviewed in order to remedy the situation.

    Aside from this, there are also outrages committed by state agencies or officials who don’t follow any rules at all. These are even more terrifying.

    Exercise Power, Rule in Accordance with the Constitution

    EO: Besides protection through dedicated legislation, I’d like to ask you to discuss why courts can’t directly apply the constitutional provisions protecting fundamental rights. In this regard, didn’t we once discuss “judicialization of the constitution”?

    Tong: Constitutional adjudication is different from ordinary judicial discretion. Valid constitutional rulings must effectively restrain all state agencies and officials, otherwise they cannot be considered constitutional rulings and would have no significance. Our courts have a lower status than the people’s congresses and their standing committees. It would be unimaginable for a Chinese court ruling to restrain the NPC and its standing committee or even the people’s congress and standing committee at its own administrative level. So, there is no way to accomplish this so-called “judicialization of the constitution.” However, even if we cannot judicialize the constitution, it is possible to implement constitutional review, or, as provided for in our constitution, the oversight of constitutional enforcement. Oversight of constitutional enforcement is a power of the NPC and its standing committee. A dedicated body ought to be established to deal with this matter. We’ve discussed this issue for decades, ever since 1982 when the constitution was promulgated. Unfortunately, it has yet to be resolved. What we can strive for at the moment is to establish a dedicated constitutional oversight body.

    There has been much discussion of this subject. One of the more radical ideas is to have the NPC establish a constitutional committee, equal in status to the NPC Standing Committee, that would be able to review the constitutionality of all legislation except that passed by the NPC. A more moderate proposal is to establish a dedicated state agency under the NPC and its standing committee equal in rank to the State Council and the Supreme People’s Court. The most modest reform would involve setting up a special committee under the NPC, not an independent organ of the state, that would carry out specific review work related to oversight of constitutional enforcement and provide consultative opinions to the NPC and its standing committee. Whether it’s a constitutional court or constitutional committee, the most important thing is that it must not be all talk and no action.

    EO: On September 15, 2004, Comrade Hu Jintao said in a speech at the “50th anniversary commemoration of the establishment of the National People’s Congress”: “In order to rule the country in accordance with the law, we must first rule in accordance with the constitution. In order to exercise power in accordance with the law, we must first exercise power in accordance with the constitution.” Nevertheless, when Lu Yongxiang, vice chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, said last week that China’s fundamental [task] going forward would be to “exercise power and rule the country in accordance with the constitution,” the media and the public still treated it as a major, noteworthy event. Why do you think that some comrades, like theoreticians and leading cadres, treat this subject as taboo?

    Tong: If the constitution and laws are properly utilized, they can be used to resolve all problems. However, because many leading cadres are not familiar with the constitution, they don’t have a clear understanding about how to resolve problems within the framework of the constitution or law. When there is no effective implementation of the constitution or laws, much of the time it is mainly because of poor use by institutions of public power and their officials.

    Moreover, it’s much easier to talk about doing things or governing in accordance with the constitution than it is to have correct understandings. A fundamental requirement of ruling in accordance with the constitution is, first, that those bodies that exercise constitutional state authority are themselves based in the constitution. In other words, the name of that body or official position can be found in the constitution. Bodies or official positions that are not named in the text of the constitution cannot exercise constitutional state power—that is most important. A big problem we currently face is that some party and governmental bodies commonly exceed their authority and exercise state power. All state power derives from the people, and the people express themselves legally through voting. Only organizations or persons that are directly or indirectly elected by voters are those that have been granted state power by the voters. At present, there are still many matters with which there is a gap from this standard.

    EO: Returning to the constitution itself, how do you assess the results of constitutional amendments over the years?

    Tong: I normally divide constitutional amendments into comprehensive and partial amendments. The 1982 constitution was a comprehensive amendment of the 1978 Constitution, while since 1982 the constitution has undergone four partial amendments. Without question, the 1982 Constitution is more advanced than the 1978 Constitution, and the current constitution is a relatively good one.

    No matter whether one is talking about comprehensive or partial amendments, the biggest problem that has emerged in our country over the course of all previous amendments remains an insufficient mentality regarding constitutional enforcement. The constitution is emblematic of [the state of] democracy and rule of law, and without a constitution you cannot even speak of these things. So, in the past, consideration mostly went to creating a constitution in order to represent [these things], whereas relatively little consideration was given to how to seriously enforce it. This can be seen in the way that amended constitutions have immediately taken effect after their promulgation. Never once at the time of promulgating and implementing a new constitution was a thorough constitutional review of existing law, regulations, and other normative documents conducted and the results of it released.

    The 1954 constitution was like this, and the 1982 constitution and the four subsequent amendments were each handled this way as well. In order to seriously enforce the constitution, there definitely needs to be a transitional period before it takes effect, during which time two things must be done in earnest: first, the enactment of necessary laws as concrete protections of the new fundamental rights affirmed in the new constitution; and, second, the weeding out of legal and regulatory provisions that contradict [the new constitution] and the announcement of [these provisions] as in violation of the constitution and abolished. You cannot say that this kind of new basic law can take effect immediately after it is announced. That’s impossible.

    EO: Can you give a few examples of old laws or regulations that were in conflict with the new constitution or constitutional amendments at the time they were announced that should have been reviewed and abolished but never were?

    Tong: There are too many. For example, the Methods for Custody and Repatriation of Urban Migrants and Beggars that led to the Sun Zhigang affair count as an administrative regulation that should have been sorted out and abolished at the time the 1982 constitution was promulgated and implemented, but it never was. Similarly, the State Council Decision on the Issue of Reeducation through Labor and its Supplementary Regulations, as well as the NPC Standing Committee’s Decision Regarding the Handling of Offenders Undergoing Reform through Labor and Persons Undergoing Reeducation through Labor who Escape or Commit New Crimes are normative documents that should at least have already been sorted out and abolished when constitutional amendments were promulgated to respect and protect human rights [in 2004] and to establish a socialist country under rule of law [in 1999].

    EO: Just now you mentioned institutional regulations, which definitely include administrative regulations. This makes me think of some rules of government and administrative bodies, such [as those involving] so-called property tax, about which there has been furious speculation of late. I’d like your opinion: if the State Council or local governments pass new rules or revise old rules to levy a tax, would it satisfy constitutional principles?

    Tong: The State Council is a state administrative body. Even though it is the highest state administrative body, for it to decide to levy a tax would not satisfy constitutional principles. The right to private property is a citizen’s fundamental right protected in the constitution. Moreover, the levying of taxes on citizens is a major state issue. Looking from these two perspectives, levying of taxes can only be decided through legislation passed by the NPC. I believe that the next amendment to the constitution should add some new provisions regarding taxation and financial budgeting in order to more fully protect citizens’ private property rights and the effective control over budgeting by people’s congresses at all levels.

    Constitutionalism and the Economy

    EO: Turning to look at economic development, how do you see the relationship between constitutionalism and economic development?

    Tong: There is an extremely close relationship between constitutionalism and economic development. We need long-term, sustainable development. The American legal scholar [Richard] Posner once suggested that a state structured on separation of powers and the principle of checks and balances is the lowest-cost, most efficient constitutional system there is. In saying this he pretties-up their political system, but he makes a significant point about the relationship between constitutionalism and healthy, sustainable economic development. Historically, some totalitarian, dictatorial governments have sometimes appeared more efficient and able to make rapid and timely decisions about various matters. But they often make big mistakes and, once having made them, it is extremely difficult to rectify them, which leads to especially major economic waste. With a system of constitutionalism and rule of law, the situation is precisely the opposite. These days, we all talk about “low-carbon economics” and “green economics.” I think that constitutionalism is the rule-of-law low-carbon and green environment that most suits economic development.

    There are many counterexamples in China. For example, during our history the Great Leap Forward and “Cultural Revolution” were economic disasters seldom seen in world history. Everyone knows that more than 10 million people starved to death during the Great Leap Forward and that the “Cultural Revolution” brought China’s national economy to the brink of disaster. These problems were all caused by China’s lack of constitutionalism and rule of law. They were economic disasters caused by flaws in the political and legal [systems].

    EO: Since reform and opening, some constitutional changes such as provisions to establish a market economy and emphasize the status and role of the non-state-sector economy have fundamentally pushed forward our country’s economic development or, at least, played an irreplaceable role.

    Tong: The state-sector economy certainly played an important role in the rapid economic development over the past 30 years, but first and foremost we must recognize that it was [the introduction of] new elements that brought about this sort of high-speed development, starting with the private economy and then the market economic system and the introduction of foreign capital through reform and opening. Under 30 years of the state-owned, planned economy, things didn’t go well. Then, after the constitution provided for the co-existence of a variety of economic actors and the implementation of the market economy, growth immediately picked up. But after things picked up, many people forgot [the reasons for this]. The [policy of] advancing the state sector and shrinking the private sector is, on some level, that is, to a real degree, following the old path and, it ought to be said, has no future. We will see that none of the modern economic powers with reasonably balanced development rely on a state-run economic sector, and some countries, such as the United States, can almost be said to have no state-sector economy. These are things we should consider but not necessarily replicate. I’m not advocating privatization but advancing the state sector and shrinking the private sector is definitely no good. China’s economic future mainly rests on the strong growth of the non-state economy. Our current economy is still a kind of “identity economy” in which things are unequal and [success] depends on the identity of the actor. We need to devise a way to fix this.

    EO: What concrete reform measures could be [implemented] next to realize rule and governance according to the constitution? Put another way, in the next 10 years, in what areas should constitutional rule and governance be promoted?

    Tong: I’ll make a few simple points:

    1. Institutions of the state and ruling-party organization, along with their powers, should return to the constitution. The ruling party ought to use its political leaders to have its positions written into the constitution and the laws, and recommend its trusted party-member cadres to positions in state organs through legal procedures. State institutions must truly take up the duties of state institutions and handle matters strictly according to the constitution and laws, rather than doing things according to speeches or temporary [policy] documents issued by one body or another. There should be a true separation.

    2. Enact necessary constitutional legislation. First of all, this includes a News Law and Publication Law to protect citizens’ freedom of speech and publication, an Association Law to protect the people’s right to form associations, and a Protection of Religious Freedom Law to protect citizen’s freedom of religious beliefs. The highest organ of state power should establish legislation to protect the fundamental citizens’ rights provided for in the constitution.

    3. Step-by-step, planned implementation of direct, competitive elections of people’s congress delegates at all levels. Even if for the time being we still cannot have direct elections of NPC delegates, we should at least gradually introduce direct election of local people’s congresses at all levels. There should be no problems with having direct competitive elections for local people’s congress delegates. If there are no competitive elections, the people’s congresses serve no representative function.

      Presently, people’s congresses clearly serve no representative function. For instance, consider the example of the recent incident in Ningbo, as well as those in Qidong and Shifang. We can see that in these incidents, people’s congresses did not participate substantively in making major local decisions, not to mention make those decisions themselves. Even if they had participated, they wouldn’t reflect public opinion. When there are matters that ought to be discussed before decisions are made and people’s congresses don’t even engage in substantive discussion, the results will be conflict appearing in the streets.

    4. Effective protection of judicial independence. An independent judicial system is an important sign of a modern nation. All types of disputes in society ultimately rely on resolution through the judicial system, but today, because courts and judges are not independent, judicial rulings lack the authority they ought to have. For this reason, the party and government always have to face social conflicts directly. This is extremely harmful to China’s stability and sustained development.

    5. Set up a body dedicated to constitutional review (or constitutional oversight and protection) and properly deal with review of the constitutionality and legality of derivative legislation and normative documents. It is because the 1954 constitution had no system for constitutional review that [the idea] silently died. In response to this lesson, the 1982 constitution specially enacted some provisions with the hopes that they would remedy the unfortunate deficiencies of the 1954 constitution. However, because for more than 30 years it has been all talk and no action, constitutional review today remains something relegated to paper only. In more than 30 years the highest organ of state power has not enacted the necessary procedural law and has not carried out a thorough review of the constitutionality or legality of laws or relevant administrative regulations. This is a major problem that concerns the unity of the state legal institutions, and one that ought to be resolved in a timely manner.

      I hope that the 18th Party Congress can set out an encouraging blueprint for the construction of constitutionalism for the coming decade. This would have profound significance for China.

    Tong Zhiwei: Vice president of the China Constitutional Studies Association and professor at East China University of Political Science and Law

  • Court Discipline Rules Hype Up Judge-Lawyer Conflict?

    Before recently passed revisions to China’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) take effect on January 1, 2013, four of the main bodies affected by the law—the Ministry of Public Security, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Supreme People’s Court, and Ministry of Justice*—are expected to issue implementation regulations or interpretations governing how each will internally carry out the revised provisions. Unlike the formal legislative process, these interpretations and regulations—which could have significant consequences for the way the CPL is enforced—are not expected to go through any kind of formal public consultation.
    But if the Supreme People’s Court expected that discussions surrounding its 560-article draft judicial interpretation would remain out of the public eye, it was surely disappointed when details of some of the proposed provisions leaked last month. Two items concerned with maintaining courtroom order during criminal trials have elicited howls of protest from Chinese lawyers in particular. The first provision would bar them from using email, blogs, or social media to report on trial proceedings from the courtroom, whereas the second would give judges the ability to sanction lawyers who breach court rules by prohibiting them from appearing in court for up to one year.
    Critics see these provisions—particularly the latter—as further evidence of efforts by Chinese authorities to rein in defense lawyers and prevent those who engage in activism from interfering with the “efficiency” of the judicial process. Tensions between lawyers and judges have been on the rise in recent years, with the two sides going head to head in trials both big and small. Lawyers who refuse to cooperate can find themselves expelled from trial, deprived of their licenses to practice, or even subject to retaliatory prosecution.
    A recent article (translated below) appearing in the Guangzhou newspaper Southern Weekly reviews the confrontational atmosphere inside the courtroom and concludes that the situation may not be as dire as some have suggested. Frustration on the part of both lawyers and judges is largely to blame for emotions running high, and, if cooler heads prevail, extreme (and impractical) measures to sanction “troublemaking” lawyers should not be necessary.
    * Note: The Ministry of State Security is another key body that will be affected by the law, but it is not expected to release relevant regulations to the public.
    *
    Judges vs. Lawyers: An Imaginary Showdown
    Liu Chang
    Southern Weekly, September 4, 2012
    A knowledgeable source has confirmed to Southern Weekly that Zhang Jun did in fact mention a few lawyers disrupting court order but never used the phrase “stirring up trouble in the courtroom.”
    “There are definitely two sides to the problem: lawyers have shortcomings, and judges also have shortcomings; that’s how I’d put it.”
    “During these difficult times, every legal professional needs to do more soul-searching.”
    Every time lawyer Si Weijiang appears in court, he always brings with him a white digital clock from Ikea. One afternoon in June 2012, at the Xiaohe District People’s Court in Guiyang, a court police officer suddenly took it and dismantled it for inspection. Fortunately, this was only an ordinary digital clock; it didn’t have a recording function.
    If new provisions being considered by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) take effect, this digital clock may not even make it through the main entrance of the court.
    The (Consultation Draft) of the SPC Interpretation on Certain Issues Regarding Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC (hereafter “Draft Interpretation”) is being circulated for opinions within the national court system.
    Two provisions are brand new: First, trial participants are prohibited from using email, blogs, microblogs, or other means to report on trial activity while inside the courtroom. Second, where defense lawyers and legal counsel have been expelled from the court or otherwise punished for serious violations of courtroom order, the court may bar them for between six months and one year from appearing in court as defense lawyers or legal counsel and can even recommend to the justice bureau that they be punished with measures such as suspension or even license-revocation.
    There is more controversy over the second provision, since the power to punish lawyers professionally belongs to judicial administration departments. Even judges interviewed believe there is no legal basis for courts to bar lawyers from carrying out their profession and that the provision is unfeasible and merely “words spoken in anger.”
    These two new provisions have led many to reflect on some recent conflicts that have occurred between lawyers and judges. However, most judges, lawyers, and scholars interviewed believe that the antagonism between the two sides is not nearly as serious as the Internet makes it seem. Mainly, it reflects short-term, emotional confrontations between the two sides since lawyers began banding together to take a stand. [Those interviewed] call on the members of both groups of legal professionals to be more self-reflective and be more sympathetic and understanding to the other side as they drive forward together along the road towards rule of law.
    Speaking to Southern Weekly, two authoritative scholars of criminal procedure expressed criticisms of the Draft Interpretation, each saying that they felt that the wording regarding courtroom discipline was inappropriate.
    According to the SPC’s plans, opinions are presently being sought from within the court system through the middle of September. Then, “after further revision and request for comment from relevant departments,” [the SPC] will formally issue [the interpretation] at the end of the year.
    An Overreaction?
    Some lawyers have linked these two provisions on courtroom discipline to a speech given by Zhang Jun, the vice-president at the SPC responsible for criminal adjudication work.
    According to a report in the Economic Observer, at the end of April 2012 Zhang Jun went to Beijing to give a lecture at one of the rotating training sessions for vice-presidents of high- and intermediate-level courts nationwide, during which he criticized a handful of “no-good” lawyers who disrupted courtroom order and some lawyers whose words served to diminish public trust in the court’s judicial process.
    Not long afterwards, in early May, Zhang Jun convened a meeting of chiefs from the SPC criminal divisions, adjudication supervision division, research office, and other departments along with a group of experts and academics to discuss the first draft of the judicial interpretation of the CPL. After this meeting, the SPC Research Office put together a second draft.
    On July 5, the second draft of the judicial interpretation of the CPL was sent to Xining, Qinghai, where the National Court Criminal Adjudication Work Conference was being held. There, the draft was submitted for discussion by vice-presidents responsible for criminal adjudication and criminal division heads from high-level courts nationwide.
    Based on discussions at the Qinghai meeting, in mid-July Zhang Jun again held a meeting and revisions were made to the second draft. On July 30, this third draft was submitted for comment to courts throughout the country.
    It is unknown how the new provisions on courtroom discipline that are now under scrutiny came to be included in the judicial interpretation currently under revision. The amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law that were passed on March 14, 2012, are the first major revision since the one in 1996 and brought changes to more than 50 percent of the law’s provisions. But not a word was changed in the section on courtroom discipline. Why weren’t these issues raised during the legislative process? It’s worth pondering the attitude of the SPC.
    “The SPC’s decision may have been an intense reaction to the Xiaohe case,” was the analysis a vice-president of a basic-level court in Shandong offered Southern Weekly. The Draft Interpretation shows that on some level the SPC is backing up lower-level courts, but it may have “overreacted.”
    A vice-president of a basic-level court in Hubei thinks that the most recent Draft Interpretation “is connected to the peculiar environment of the last year or so.” The “rebellious” nature of some lawyers is also due to this environment. “During this time,” [he says,] “even if what you say is correct you might be opposed, because the time is not right.”
    According to the report in the Economic Observer, in Zhang Jun’s controversial speech he mentioned three cases since 2011 in Beihai, Changshu, and Guiyang. [In each case,] lawyers worked collectively to provide defense in major criminal trials.
    At the Li Qinghong organized crime trial in the Xiaohe District People’s Court in Guiyang, during the first set of hearings from January 9 to 14, 2012, a new record was set for conflict between judges and lawyers: more than 10 lawyers were reprimanded, four lawyers were thrown out of the courtroom, and a National People’s Congress delegate fainted in the courtroom … [Note: Ellipsis appears in original—Ed.] The trial, which had been set to conclude before the lunar new year holiday, had to be suspended.
    In Beijing, the SPC, Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP), and Ministry of Justice (MOJ) met to view an edited video from the Xiaohe District People’s Court. Lawyer Tian Wenchang, chair of the All-China Lawyer’s Association (ACLA) Criminal Defense Committee, says, “After the conflict, the court cut five days of hearings into a 16-minute video that showed lawyers with rather intense attitudes. Watching this led officials concerned to believe that there was a problem with lawyers stirring up trouble in the courtroom.”
    After ACLA’s Criminal Defense Committee reviewed the [unedited] video footage, it produced a 30-minute version in which Tian Wenchang personally added narration and commentary and sent it to the SPC. The video revealed many problems in the courtroom, such as “not letting lawyers speak, saying either that it was irrelevant to the case or that it was repetitive; failing to acknowledge you when you raised your hand; refusing requests to speak; and kicking you out when you insisted on speaking anyway.” As China’s most prestigious criminal defense lawyer, Tian has experienced all of these situations.
    Perhaps because video doesn’t do justice to reality, from June 8 to July 19, 2012, the Xiaohe court held another hearing lasting more than 40 days, and a “Central Supervisory Group” made up of individuals from the SPC, SPP, MOJ, and ACLA not only showed up but also insisted on observing the entire proceeding.
    The SPC sent the head of one of its criminal divisions. According to a report in Caijing magazine, an SPC representative confirmed that their main goal was to “investigate the new Criminal Procedure Law.”
    “There are definitely two sides to the problem with the Xiaohe court,” says Tian Wenchang. “There are indeed lawyers who are rather intense, but there are inevitably reasons for this. Surely, lawyers don’t go around stirring up trouble in courtrooms without reason?” He says that sometimes lawyers lose their cool, but it’s also true that some judges do not allow lawyers to speak or treat them roughly and that this makes lawyers furious: “Lawyers have shortcomings and judges also have shortcomings; that’s how I’d put it.”
    Lawyer Zhang Qingsong is a representative sent by the ACLA to observe in Xiaohe. To his understanding, this draft judicial interpretation makes the SPC’s position clear: a show of support for the Xiaohe judge.
    People inside the court system do not find anything unusual about many of the provisions in the Draft Interpretation regarding courtroom discipline, including having to get permission from the court to record, videotape, or film. “Courts in many countries do this,” [they say.] But most judges believe that it goes beyond the authority of judicial interpretation to have courts be able to punish lawyers by barring them from appearing in court.
    “Could a prohibition imposed by a Shandong court be applicable to courts in Yunnan?” asked a vice-president of a basic-level court in Shandong. Even if the provision is passed, there are still technical issues that haven’t been resolved.
    Weaklings Bullying Each Other?
    From the beginning of the Beihai case, lawyers used new media to broadcast details of the case. As for so-called “live microblogging,” in fact many lawyers post to microblogs after trial hearings conclude, but this has caused great headaches for the courts.
    According to the report in the Economic Observer, in that internal speech Zhang Jun complained bitterly about some “lawyers talking nonsense.”
    A knowledgeable source has confirmed to Southern Weekly that in that internal speech Zhang Jun did mention a few lawyers disrupting court order but never used the phrase “stirring up trouble in the courtroom.”
    Other views raised by the top judge in his speech actually closely resonate with the expectations of lawyers, but this has gotten lost in the heat of the rhetoric.
    According to the Economic Observer report, Zhang Jun was emphasizing how judges should have a trial-centered consciousness when he mentioned the problem of lawyers’ so-called “stirring up trouble in the courtroom.” He said that the facts show that one reason that judges do not have a high degree of control over trials is that judges still think and operate like inquisitors and are unable to adapt to the adversarial trial system. A second reason is that presiding judges lack relative independence.
    According to the aforementioned report, what leads a few lawyers to stir up trouble is, in Zhang Jun’s view, “the lack of fair procedure and failure to do what was expected” in a few cases, “including some unfairness towards lawyers.”
    However, the proposals in the Draft Interpretation regarding trial powers have been seen as showing a lack of self-reflection on the part of the courts.
    “Judges first need to reflect upon whether they are being good judges, only then [should they focus on] the work of enforcing the law,” says lawyer Zhang Peihong. For example, although a lot of courtroom disciplinary measures appear to be “international norms” and their limitations applicable to “all trial participants,” if lawyers are always the ones being punished, in reality, they’re still essentially unjust.”
    “The biggest problem in China’s courtrooms right now is that judges really want to be like judges in countries with mature rule of law—enjoying absolute authority and respect in the courtroom,” says lawyer Zhang Peihong. “What they don’t understand is that such authority and respect doesn’t come from the rules that [judges] themselves enact; they are earned through generation after generation of judges being more knowledgeable, more reasonable, and more humble than the other participants in the litigation process.”
    Zhang Peihong has noticed an interesting phenomenon in recent years: In Chinese criminal trials, the conflicting sides in the courtroom seem to have increasingly shifted from prosecution versus defense to judges versus lawyers. Judges want to control order in the courtroom, whereas lawyers feel this leaves no way to ensure equal treatment. Lawyers feel that “live microblogging” promotes oversight of the judicial process in individual cases, but judges worry about too much interference from public opinion. Judges criticize an extremely small number of lawyers for “stirring up trouble in the courtroom” and creating hype, while lawyers take to the media and Internet to complain about judges’ unfairness in trying cases.
    Judges and lawyers are oriented similarly in their struggles: it has always been difficult to achieve breakthrough in lawyers’ right to carry out defense—it must be accomplished through convincing the court—and there’s a common consensus that the status of the courts needs to be elevated.
    In the view of Sichuan Judge Gao Hui [pseudonym], looking at current problems by considering the relationship between judges and lawyers only scratches the surface. At root is the problem of public trust in the judicial process. If courts and judges could have a high level of universal support from the public, then “relations between judges and lawyers would not be an issue.”
    “In a country with rule of law, it’s not considered excessive to emphasize discipline in the courtroom and the authority of judges in the courtroom,” said Judge Gao Hui. “In a country that has already established modern rule of law, authority must be given to judges. But we currently lack this kind of authority.”
    Lawyer Tian Wenchang has also seen signs of worsening relations between lawyers and judges. In a society under rule of law, judges and lawyers are inextricably linked. The current situation makes him worry.
    “Every legal professional needs to do more soul-searching,” sighed Liu Guofeng, vice-president of the Lichuan City People’s Court in Hubei, after seeing the war of words between lawyers and judges on Weibo [a micro-blog service similar to Twitter].
  • Bridging the Legal Gap for China’s Incarcerated Women

    NPC study group visits Beijing No. 2 Prison, March 30, 2012.
    Photo credit: bjrd.gov.cn

    While putting the rights of political prisoners in jeopardy, amendments to China’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) add safeguards for women, juveniles, and people facing the death penalty. In line with certain aspects of the UN rules for the treatment of women prisoners (the Bangkok Rules), protections are specifically strengthened for pregnant women and girls. But as China’s population of women prisoners continues to grow, national standards to protect women’s rights must reach beyond these groups. One place to start might be China’s Prison Law, which has been in force for nearly 18 years.

    Criminal Procedure Law
     
    Effective January 1, 2013, the amended CPL gives pregnant women greater access to non-custodial measures and provides young women with additional support during questioning. In Articles 65 and 72 (Article 51 of the 1996 CPL), women who are pregnant or breastfeeding are added to the list of those who may be released on bail (取保候审) or placed under residential surveillance (监视居住). Article 72 also makes eligible for residential surveillance “the only caretakers of a person who cannot take care of her/himself.” Although this provision does not specify sex, women are more likely than men to assume caretaking responsibilities.
     
    In the 1996 CPL, women who are pregnant or breastfeeding are eligible to temporarily serve outside prison if they have a fixed-term sentence. In the revised CPL, Article 254 expands this eligibility to women sentenced to life imprisonment—as was the case in the CPL enacted in 1980.
     
    As part of the newly drafted section on juveniles, Article 270 states that female personnel shall be present during the interrogation of young women who are suspected of criminal acts and during the questioning of young women who are victims or witnesses.
     
      Amended CPL: Highlights for Women and Girls
      New Protections
      Article 65
    Women who are pregnant or breastfeeding may be released on bail (取保候审)
      Article 72
    In the instance that they meet the requirements for arrest, women who are pregnant or breastfeeding or individuals who are the only caretakers of a person who cannot take care of her/himself may be released under residential surveillance (监视居住)
      Article 254
    Women sentenced to life imprisonment who are pregnant or breastfeeding may temporarily serve outside prison
      Article 270
    When young women are interrogated as suspects or questioned as victims or witnesses, female personnel shall be present
      Current Protections
      Article 130
    Physical examinations of women shall be conducted by female personnel or doctors
      Article 137
    Searches of the persons of women shall be conducted by female personnel
      Article 251
    Executions of pregnant women shall be suspended and immediately reported to the Supreme People’s Court
      Article 254
    Women sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment who are pregnant or breastfeeding may temporarily serve outside prison
     
    Criminal Law & Domestic Violence
     
    Last year’s amendments to the Criminal Law also showed consideration for pregnant women by allowing them, along with juveniles and the elderly, to receive suspended sentences in lieu of criminal detention or prison sentences (of three years or less). But women’s rights groups like the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) contend that Criminal Law amendments did little to protect other groups of women, namely survivors of domestic violence. Back in 1996, Hunan became the first province to introduce anti-domestic violence rules. It was not until 2011—after an ACWF survey indicated that domestic violence played a role in more than 50 percent of crimes committed by Chinese women, however, that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) announced plans to draft an anti-domestic violence law.
     
    Prison Law
     
    China’s Prison Law has protections for women akin to those found in the CPL, but, as noted by Yang Mugao (杨木高), the deputy director of the reform and education department of the Jiangsu Prison Administration Bureau, it does not have enough to say about women. Article 39 of the Prison Law requires that the reform of women prisoners take into account their physiological and psychological characteristics, but it does not elaborate on what form such considerations should take.
     
    In an article published in an academic journal (犯罪与改造研究) in 2011, Yang proposed that the Prison Law be amended to include a chapter on the rehabilitation of incarcerated women. Earlier this year, an NPC study group stated that Prison Law reform would occur at the appropriate time and would focus on rights related to labor, medical treatment, and communications as well as how to balance punishing crime and protecting human rights—there was no explicit mention of women prisoners.
     
    When the Prison Law went into effect on December 29, 1994, there were not that many women in China’s 15 women’s prisons. Between 1997 and 2002, the number of incarcerated women rose at an average annual rate of 13 percent. In 2010, it marked its highest annual growth rate (6.05 percent) since 2004 (6.44 percent). If growth remains at 2010 levels, the number of incarcerated women will exceed 100,000 in 2012, spread across 36 women’s prisons.
     
    Legislative Gap
     
    The absence of national legislation on women in prison became somewhat conspicuous in 1999 with the promulgation of national regulations on the administration of juvenile reformatories (未成年犯管教所管理规定). The 1999 rules restrict the use of torture implements and provide specific measures for the frequency of visitation, educational programs, psychological consultation, and hygiene. Given that women are more likely to be the primary caretakers of juvenile children and more likely to be survivors of domestic violence, added clarity on visitation rights and rehabilitative programs for incarcerated women would bolster existing protections. Considerations regarding medical treatment and hygiene are also necessary due to the sexual variance in the incidence of disease and the occurrence of menstruation among women.
     
    At a 2003 symposium on the reform of women prisoners, the Prison Administration Bureau enumerated several ways in which women should be treated differently than men, not as a sign of lax management, but of more targeted and effective management. This call (要求) has yet to result in national regulations.
     
    While domestic research on women in prison frequently discusses the unique characteristics of incarcerated women, measures that take these characteristics into account are unlikely to be implemented without increased public awareness or a clear national agenda. Along with ensuring that the CPL amendments are implemented next year, reforming or introducing additional national legislation with an eye towards the Bangkok Rules would be an important next step in protecting women’s rights.
     
  • China’s New Criminal Procedure Law: Death Penalty Procedures

    The “disappearance clauses” headlined much of the commentary on recently passed amendments to China’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), but a number of provisions for death penalty cases also introduced notable protections while raising new questions. In this post, we take a detailed look at the most consequential of these changes: expanded access to legal aid, recorded interrogations, longer trials, mandatory appellate hearings, and more rigorous death penalty review.
     
    Notes: The term “current law” refers to the 1996 CPL, while “amended law” refers to the amended CPL passed in March 2012 and effective January 1, 2013. In tables featuring specific CPL provisions, bold text denotes additions, while strikethrough text denotes deletions.
    Expanded Access to Legal Aid
     
    Under the current law, Article 34(3) requires only the court to ensure that defendants are represented by a defense lawyer in capital cases. Under the amended law, public security and procuratorate investigators will also be required to provide this guarantee if suspects do not retain attorneys on their own.
     
    This change reflects one of the most lauded aspects of the amended law: to give lawyers a more significant role in defending suspects during the investigative stage. In Article 34(3), greater access to defense lawyers is also expanded to those facing life in prison.
     
      Article 34(3)
      Current Law  Amended Law
    If a defendant may be sentenced to death, and such person has not appointed a defender, the people’s court shall appoint an attorney who provides legal aid to serve as his defender.
    If a criminal suspect or defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment or death, and such person has not appointed a defender, the people’s court, people’s procuratorate, or public security authority shall appoint an attorney who provides legal aid to serve as his defender notify the legal aid agency to assign an attorney as his defender.
    Recorded Interrogations
     
    Article 121 is one of several provisions in the amended law aimed at preventing the coercion of confessions through torture. It makes complete, unedited audio or video recording mandatory for the interrogations of suspects who face serious penalties like death or life imprisonment. Given that it is a stronger obligation than previously put forth—interrogations “may be recorded according to necessity,” says paragraph 11 of a 2007 opinion from the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of Justice—this new provision should deter interrogators from committing abuses and assist courts in excluding illegal evidence.
      Article 121 (Amended Law)
    When a criminal suspect is being interrogated, the investigator may record the interrogation process in audio or video forms; for crimes punishable by life imprisonment or death and other serious crimes, audio or video recording of the interrogation process shall be recorded in audio or video format.
    The audio or video recording shall cover the entire interrogation process and shall be preserved intact.
    Longer Trials
     
    Courts have been given more time to decide death penalty cases under changes to provisions covering trials of first and second instance. Article 202(1) generally lengthens the applicable deadlines for courts of first instance to issue verdicts in all cases, doubling both the standard deadline, from one month to two, and the maximum deadline, from one and a half months to three. Death penalty cases are one of several types of potentially more complex cases for which an additional extension can be approved. The length of additional extensions has been increased from one to three months.
     
    The provision, Article 232(1), covering deadlines for trials of second instance (or “appellate trials”) contains similar language. Deadlines for appellate trials have been doubled, with the option of an extension for complex cases, including those involving the death penalty. The length of the extension is slightly shorter for appellate trials than for trials of first instance.
     
    These amended articles introduce some ambiguities in approving extensions and limiting the length of trials. Article 232(1) calls for the approval of trial extensions by a provincial-level high people’s court. Since all death penalty trials of second instance are heard by provincial-level courts, however, this appears to mean that in these circumstances, courts can approve their own extensions.
     
    Moreover, both articles have a new provision allowing the Supreme People’s Court to approve additional extensions in “exceptional circumstances.” This creates the possibility for defendants to be stuck in trial indefinitely since no criteria are provided to limit the length or scope of such extensions.
      Current Law  Amended Law
      Article 168(1)  Article 202(1)
    When a people’s court hears a public prosecution case, it shall announce a verdict within one month, and no later than one and a half months, after receiving the case. In cases falling under one of the circumstances provided in Article 126 of this law, subject to approval by the high people’s court of the province, autonomous region, or municipality, the trial period may be extended by one month.
    When a people’s court hears a public prosecution case, it shall announce a verdict within one two months, and no later than one and a half three months, after receiving the case. In cases punishable by death and cases with adjoining civil action, as well as in cases falling under one of the circumstances provided in Article 126 156 of this law, subject to approval by the high people’s court of the province, autonomous region, or municipality people’s court of the next higher level, the trial period may be extended by one three months. Where the trial period needs to be extended further due to exceptional circumstances, application shall be made to the Supreme People’s Court for approval.
      Article 196  Article 232(1)
    Where a people’s court of second instance admits an appeal by the defendant or prosecutor, it shall conclude the case within one month, and no later than one and a half months. In cases falling under one of the circumstances provided in Article 126 of this law, subject to approval or decision by the high people’s court of a province, autonomous region, or municipality, the period may be extended by one month. However, for an appeal or protest by a defendant or prosecutor that is admitted by the Supreme People’s Court, such a decision shall be made by the Supreme People’s Court.
    Where a people’s court of second instance admits an appeal by the defendant or prosecutor, it shall conclude the case within one two months, and no later than one and a half months. In cases punishable by death and cases with adjoining civil action, as well as in cases falling under one of the circumstances provided in Article 126 156 of this law, subject to approval or decision by the high people’s court of a province, autonomous region, or municipality, the period may be extended by one two months. However, for an appeal or protest by a defendant or prosecutor that is admitted by the Supreme People’s Court, such a decision shall be made by the Supreme People’s Court. Where the trial period needs to be extended further due to exceptional circumstances, application shall be made to the Supreme People’s Court for approval.
    Mandatory Appellate Hearings
     
    Article 223(1) of the amended law requires courts of second instance to hold trial hearings for all appeals involving the death penalty. In contrast to the corresponding provision in the current law, it enumerates the specific circumstances in which appellate hearings are mandatory.
     
    Although the language of the current law implies that court hearings should be the general rule for trials of second instance, courts have routinely chosen not to hold hearings on the grounds that the “criminal facts are clear.” The amended law limits some of that discretion, especially when it comes to death penalty cases.
     
    This amendment is one of many that are based on existing regulations or policies that have been in effect for many years. Requiring hearings for death penalty appeals was one of several important capital punishment reforms instituted under the leadership of former Supreme People’s Court president Xiao Yang (肖揚). Elevating this policy, which has been in force since the second half of 2006, to a provision of a basic law like the CPL strengthens its legal standing and solidifies its position.
      Current Law  Amended Law
      Article 187(1)  Article 223(1)
    The people’s court of second instance shall form a collegial panel to hold a court hearing to hear an appellate case. However if, after consulting the case file, interrogating the defendant, and listening to the opinions of the other parties, defenders, and counsels ad litem, the collegial panel thinks the criminal facts are clear, it may open no court session. A people’s court of second instance shall hold a court hearing to hear a case appealed by a people’s procuratorate.
    The people’s court of second instance shall form a collegial panel to hold a court hearing to hear an appellate case. However if, after consulting the case file, interrogating the defendant, and listening to the opinions of the other parties, defenders, and counsels ad litem, the collegial panel thinks the criminal facts are clear, it may open no court session. A people’s court of second instance shall hold a court hearing to hear a case appealed by a people’s procuratorate. for any of the following cases:
         (1) Appeal cases where the defendant or private prosecutor and his legal counsel object to the facts found or evidence admitted in the first instance and where the conviction or sentence might be changed by such facts and evidence;
         (2) Appeal cases where the defendant has been sentenced to death;
         (3) Cases appealed by a people’s procuratorate; and
         (4) Other cases for which a court hearing shall be held.
    More Rigorous Death Penalty Review
     
    Xiao Yang also oversaw reform of the death penalty’s final review process, which since January 2007 has been the sole prerogative of the Supreme People’s Court. The amended law includes two important changes with respect to this process. First, a new provision, Article 239, sets out the options available to the court in its review: to approve the sentence, remand the case for new trial, or change the sentence.
     
    A crucial question about this provision is whether it provides the court with a generally applicable option to “change the sentence” directly when it rejects the lower court’s decision. Court regulations in force since February 2007 place strict limits on the circumstances under which the Supreme People’s Court may directly rule to change the sentence, and in most instances, the Supreme People’s Court is required to remand rejected cases for reconsideration by a lower court. The amended law seems to leave more room for the court to impose its own sentence. It is also possible, however, that current regulations limiting this function will remain in force or be adapted into new implementation regulations or interpretations that should be promulgated before the amended law takes effect.
      Article 239 (Amended Law)
    When the Supreme People’s Court reviews a death penalty case, it shall decide whether or not it approves the death sentence. Where it disapproves, it may remand the case for a new trial or change the sentence.
    One of the most dramatic changes to the CPL occurred in Article 240. In the first draft of CPL amendments published in August 2011, the text of this provision required that defendants be questioned and defense attorneys be heard during the death penalty review process.
     
    By December 2011, the text of the provision had been changed so that the court’s requirement to interview defendants went from mandatory (应当, meaning “shall”) to discretionary (可以, meaning “may”) and that the requirement to hear defense lawyers was contingent upon their request. Legal scholar Chen Guangzhong called the rewording a “rather serious setback” and urged legislators to restore the original language or adopt wording that would give defendants and their counsel the right to demand a hearing.
     
    When the draft amended CPL was distributed to delegates on March 7, 2012, however, the loose language remained intact. Many delegates reportedly expressed concerns about the wording—so much so that it was one of a handful of provisions changed in the days before the amendment was passed on March 14. Ultimately, “shall” was restored, but the requirement to give defense lawyers a hearing remains contingent upon request.
     
    While the new provisions add some clarity to the process, questions remain: Will SPC judges be required to meet defendants in person, or will interviews be set up remotely or with provincial-court officials acting as proxies? Similarly, will defense lawyers be limited to written submissions or will they be guaranteed a face-to-face meeting, and if so, will there be a more formal process than the “petitioner” channel that many lawyers have been forced to endure?
     
    As with many other details of the amended CPL, answers to these questions and clues to their application are forthcoming in implementation measures expected out later this year.
      Article 240
      Draft (August 2011)  Draft (December 2011)  Amended Law
    When the Supreme People’s Court reviews a death penalty case, it shall question the defendant and listen to the opinion of the defense attorney.
    During the review of death penalty cases, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate may advise the Supreme People’s Court of its opinion.
    When the Supreme People’s Court reviews a death penalty case, it shall may question the defendant and; if the defense attorney requests, it shall listen to the opinion of the defense attorney.
    During the review of death penalty cases, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate may advise the Supreme People’s Court of its opinion. The Supreme People’s Court shall report the result of the review to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.
    When the Supreme People’s Court reviews a death penalty case, it may shall question the defendant; if the defense attorney requests, it shall listen to the opinion of the defense attorney.
    During the review of death penalty cases, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate may advise the Supreme People’s Court of its opinion. The Supreme People’s Court shall report the result of the review to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.
  • China’s New Criminal Procedure Law: “Disappearance Clauses” Revised

    Results of the vote on amendments to the Criminal Procedure
    Law on March 14, 2012. Photo credit: Weibo.com
    The Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) passed on March 14 contains many improvements to China’s criminal justice system, including enhanced rights for juvenile offenders, women in prison, and death row inmates. Suspects in the vast majority of criminal cases will enjoy greater due-process rights when the law takes effect on January 1, 2013. The modifications to the provisions on residential surveillance and arrest as they apply to suspects in endangering state security cases—from 2008 to 2010, more than 1,000 people were detained every year on suspicion of endangering states security, most of them for non-violent speech and association offenses—are welcome but do not go far enough in meeting the requirements of international human rights law.
    In the short term, efforts should be made to stretch the provisions so that family members are given details on where and why their relatives have been taken into custody and individuals under residential surveillance should be allowed family visits, as was the case with Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo and internationally recognized artist Ai Weiwei. Longer term the National People’s Congress (NPC) should revise the provisions on residential surveillance and detention to bring them in line with international standards.
    Play by Play
    On March 14, China’s NPC passed a set of amendments to the CPL by a vote of 2,639 to 160. Of the many provisions that have been changed or introduced in the amended CPL, few were as controversial as the “disappearance clauses”—provisions that, in the draft of the bill published on the NPC’s website for public comment in August 2011, would have authorized investigators to detain suspects in certain types of cases without requiring family notification. These provisions promised to reinforce a dual-track system of detention in which due-process rights guaranteed to ordinary criminal suspects could be denied to suspects accused of being serious threats to national security or public safety.
    Soon after the draft amendments were published, fears were raised of “widespread secret arrest,” and the revision was branded a “major reversal” of progress towards rule of law. Of particular concern were new provisions concerning “residential surveillance in a designated abode.” As it was proposed, this measure could have been carried out for up to six months without requiring family notification. The United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID) issued a statement in November expressing concern that the proposed revisions would legalize enforced disappearance and proclaiming, “Any enforced disappearance is unacceptable and such practices are in violation of international law.” The same month, Dui Hua Executive Director John Kamm, in testimony to the United States House of Representatives, asserted that the provisions on residential surveillance and detention as applied to suspects in endangering state security cases constituted enforced disappearance under international law.
    In response to these criticisms, defenders of the CPL revision argued that, compared to the 1996 CPL, it actually placed tighter restrictions upon the circumstances under which detention could be carried out without notification. Neither the 1996 CPL nor associated regulations make any requirement for notification in cases of residential surveillance. They also allow for notification of criminal detention to be waived in cases “involving state secrets” or where “notification would interfere with the investigation.” On the other hand, the wording of some of the disappearance clauses found in the August draft was ambiguous, leaving the possibility for interpretation beyond the offenses explicitly named, and the 1996 CPL gave no circumstances under which notification could be withheld in cases of residential surveillance.
    In the face of domestic and international criticism, many of the disappearance clauses were removed from the final legislation. Below, we compare the provisions for residential surveillance, criminal detention, and arrest as they first appeared in August with how they looked upon passage in March. (A full Chinese comparison of the 1996 CPL and newly amended CPL is available here.)
    The outcome of these changes is mixed. As passed into law, the only situation in which authorities are allowed to waive family notification is when a suspect in a state security or terrorism case is placed under criminal detention (i.e., held in a detention center) and “notification has the potential to interfere with the investigation.” Criminal detention can last for up to 37 days.[*] In a concession to critics, a new provision requires notification once doing so would no longer “interfere with the investigation.”
    Authorities must notify relatives of all persons placed under formal arrest or “residential surveillance in a designated abode,” although requirements to specify the grounds and whereabouts of the detention were cut from the final legislation. This means that, with respect to “residential surveillance in a designated abode,” investigators will be allowed to hold suspects in state security, terrorism, and major bribery cases in an undisclosed location for up to six months. They also have discretion to prevent defense lawyers from meeting with suspects in these types of cases. A United Nations joint study on secret detentions by the WGEID and other working groups, published February 19, 2010, states that any incommunicado detention for over 15 days is a violation of Article 10 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, to which China is a signatory.
    [*] Time limits for criminal detention carried over to the amended CPL, in Article 89, from the 1997 CPL require police to request approval for formal arrest in three days. Under “extraordinary circumstances,” that time limit may be extended to seven days, and when the detainee is a “major suspect” suspected of committing crimes in more than one location, committing offenses multiple times, or committing offenses in league with others, the time limit may be extended to 30 days. Despite these guidelines, it has become routine to delay requests for approving arrests for 30 days, after which the procuratorate has up to seven days to render a decision.
    Revisions
    Below, we compare the provisions for residential surveillance, criminal detention, and arrest by using English translations of the text as it first appeared in August 2011 with English translations of the final text passed in March 2012. Strikethrough text denotes deletions from the August draft, while bold text denotes additions to the August draft.
    RESIDENTIAL SURVEILLANCE
    Article 73 (August 2011 draft)

    Residential surveillance shall be carried out in the residence of the criminal suspect or defendant. When there is no fixed residence, it may be carried out in a designated abode. In cases involving crimes of endangering state security, terrorist activity, or major bribery, if carrying out [residential surveillance] in the residence [of the criminal suspect or defendant] has the potential to interfere with the investigation, it may also be carried out in a designated abode following approval by the procuratorate or public security organ one level superior. But [residential surveillance] may not be carried out in a place of detention or place specially designated for handling cases.

    When residential surveillance is carried out in a designated abode, a relative of the person under residential surveillance shall be notified of the reason for and location of the residential surveillance within 24 hours after initiating the residential surveillance, except when it is impossible to give notice or in cases involving crimes of endangering state security, terrorist activity, or major bribery, when notification has the potential to interfere with the investigation.

    [With respect to] appointing defense counsel, criminal suspects or defendants placed under residential surveillance being carried out in a designated abode, apply the provisions of Article 33 of this law.

    The people’s procuratorate shall oversee the legality of any decision and execution of residential surveillance in a designated abode.

    Article 73 (March 2012 final)

    Residential surveillance shall be carried out in the residence of the criminal suspect or defendant. When there is no fixed residence, it may be carried out in a designated abode. In cases involving crimes of endangering state security, terrorist activity, or especially serious bribery, if carrying out [residential surveillance] in the residence [of the criminal suspect or defendant] has the potential to interfere with the investigation, it may also be carried out in a designated abode following approval by the procuratorate or public security organ one level superior. But [residential surveillance] may not be carried out in a place of detention or place specially designated for handling cases.

    When residential surveillance is carried out in a designated abode, a relative of the person under residential surveillance shall be notified of the reason for and location of the residential surveillance within 24 hours after initiating the residential surveillance, except when it is impossible to give notice or in cases involving crimes of endangering state security, terrorist activity, or major bribery, when notification has the potential to interfere with the investigation.

    [With respect to] appointing defense counsel, criminal suspects or defendants placed under residential surveillance being carried out in a designated abode, apply the provisions of Article 33 of this law.

    The people’s procuratorate shall oversee the legality of any decision and execution of residential surveillance in a designated abode.

    CRIMINAL DETENTION
    Article 84 (August 2011 Draft)

    When the public security organ detains a person, it must show a warrant of detention.

    After detention, the detainee shall be immediately transferred to a detention center for custody no later than 24 hours. Within 24 hours of detention, a relative of the detainee shall be notified of the reason for and location of the detention, except when it is impossible to give notice or in cases involving serious offenses such as crimes of endangering state security or terrorist activity, when notification has the potential to interfere with the investigation.

    Article 83 (March 2012 Final)

    When the public security organ detains a person, it must show a warrant of detention.

    After detention, the detainee shall be immediately transferred to a detention center for custody no later than 24 hours. Within 24 hours of detention, a relative of the detainee shall be notified of the reason for and location of the detention, except when it is impossible to give notice or in cases involving serious offenses such as crimes of endangering state security or terrorist activity, when notification has the potential to interfere with the investigation. When the circumstances of interference with the investigation no longer exist, a relative of the detainee shall be notified immediately.

    FORMAL ARREST
    Article 92 (August 2011 Draft)

    When a public security organ arrests a person, it must show a warrant of arrest.

    After arrest, the arrestee shall be immediately transferred to a detention center for custody. Within 24 hours of arrest, a relative of the detainee shall be notified of the reason for and location of the arrest, except when it is impossible to give notice or in cases involving serious offenses such as crimes of endangering state security or terrorist activity, when notification has the potential to interfere with the investigation.

    Article 91 (March 2012 Final)

    When a public security organ arrests a person, it must show a warrant of arrest.

    After arrest, the arrestee shall be immediately transferred to a detention center for custody. Within 24 hours of arrest, a relative of the detainee shall be notified of the reason for and location of the arrest, except when it is impossible to give notice or in cases involving serious offenses such as crimes of endangering state security or terrorist activity, when notification has the potential to interfere with the investigation.

  • Detention House Rules Can’t Accommodate Oversight

    On March 1, China’s State Council published long-awaited rules governing the management of police-run detention houses (拘留所). Also known as administrative jails, these facilities are primarily used for people given administrative detentions of 10 to 15 days for violations of the Law on Public Security Administration Punishments. (Detention houses are different from criminal detention centers (看守所), which are police-run facilities that hold individuals being investigated or prosecuted for violations of the Criminal Law.)
    The regulations include many new protections for detainees, including prohibitions of forced labor and detainee abuse, provisions guaranteeing health and safety standards, and a requirement that relatives be notified “promptly” after detainees are taken into custody. Beijing-based criminal lawyer Tang Hongxin told China Daily that the new provisions are “up to international standards” and will offer better protection to detainees “if they can be enforced well.”
    The need for improved detention-house regulation has been evident for some time. The jails are currently regulated by provisional rules formulated in 1990, well before more progressive thinking about rule of law and the need to protect individual rights began to take firm hold in China. Moreover, the nation’s detention facilities have come under scrutiny in recent years for a spate of suspicious detainee deaths that were widely reported by domestic media. Concern over the deaths, and their implications for poor jail management, has been compounded by police who have attributed them to seemingly incredible causes, like falling out of bed during a nightmare or drowning while washing one’s face.
    The majority of reported incidents took place in criminal detention centers, but administrative jails have not been immune. It is notable, then, that the new regulations eliminate a draft provision that would have required police to report unnatural deaths and procuratorates to investigate their cause. This is one of several provisions involving external procuratorial oversight that were struck from the rules that become effective next month. Other provisions, including a ban on using detainees to control other detainees, were also removed.
    Professor Li Kejie.
    Photo credit:
    Shandong University of
    Political Science and Law
    Li Kejie (李克杰), a law professor at the Shandong University of Political Science and Law, argues in a Legal Daily article (translated below) that the omissions demonstrate the limitations of administrative regulations, which are rife with institutional interests. In this case, police may have chosen to omit certain provisions to reduce demands on enforcement, which is their responsibility. It is also simply the case, Li notes, that State Council agencies like the Ministry of Public Security have no authority to legislate action by judicial bodies like procuratorates or the courts. Thus, in order to establish adequate procuratorial oversight of administrative jails, administrative regulations are ineffectual and a law enacted by the National People’s Congress is essential.
    *
    Detention House Rules Bound by Administrative Regulation [Status]
    Li Kejie, Legal Daily
    March 5, 2012
    The State Council recently issued Detention House Regulations (拘留所条例) that will take effect on April 1, 2012. The regulations require detention houses to protect the personal safety and legal rights of detainees in accordance with the law; prohibit the act of or the permission or instruction of others to humiliate, corporally punish, or abuse detainees; and prohibit forced labor. However, compared to the previous discussion draft, [the regulations] also eliminate provisions for things such as “submitting to oversight by the procuratorate” and “notifying relatives within 12 hours of custody” (The Beijing News, March 2).
    With everything from content to form, the Detention House Regulations clearly show progress towards rule of law. In terms of content, the regulations strengthen the protection of detainees’ rights, providing: when carrying out a detention, [one] shall inform detainees of their rights and promptly notify their relatives. During detention, [one] shall provide detainees with food and drink and respect their ethnic dietary customs; guarantee at least two hours per day of activity outside the holding room; prohibit forced labor; not monitor or intercept correspondence; and not monitor or intercept documents such as those [necessary for] detainees to lodge a complaint or request administrative review. Detainees enjoy visitation rights and may request leave for school-entrance examinations, the birth of a child, or the life-threatening illness or death of a close relative.
    In form and in terms of legal hierarchy, the rules are administrative regulations. When they come into effect, they will replace the internal rules that have been used for the past 22 years, strengthening the authority of rule-making and displaying abundant respect for and effective protection of citizens’ personal rights.
    However, we also note with disappointment that the formally announced Detention House Regulations concurrently eliminate several major provisions that were included in the discussion draft. These include provisions like “detention houses carrying out detention activities shall submit to legal oversight by procuratorates,” “the death of a detainee from unnatural causes shall be reported to the procuratorate and investigated immediately,” “relatives shall be notified within 12 hours of custody,” and “detainees must not be used to manage other detainees.” Speaking as a matter of rule of law, I think that these provisions ought to be included in the national legal document that governs detention houses. But why were they ultimately removed? Based on my analysis, there are probably two major reasons: First, the regulations strongly tend towards institutional rulemaking, and [provisions] were [thus] eliminated to make enforcement more convenient for the institution or to accommodate reality. The last two of the aforementioned provisions may fall under this category. Second, limited by their nature as administrative regulations, the rules cannot issue orders to procuratorates. So in order to avoid overstepping legislative authority, it was necessary to remove [certain provisions]. The first two of the aforementioned provisions would fall into this group.
    In my view, both of these reasons clearly show the limitations of administrative regulations. The only way to better resolve the problems associated with detention houses and have their work follow a truly norm-abiding, rule-of-law path is to speed up the legislative process of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and promptly enact a law on detention houses. Even though administrative regulations enjoy considerable authority in China, they are ultimately administrative legislation that, according to Chinese conventional practice, is mostly drafted by enforcement agencies. Commonly called “institutional rulemaking,” the provisions and even principles of such laws are strongly infused with institutional interests, and many considerations are made to convenience management and enforcement, while insufficient consideration is given to the legal rights of those being managed. As such, there are always doubts about the fairness of “institutional rulemaking.” On the other hand, NPC legislation is able to enact laws that are much fairer and take into account the interests of all parties. This is by virtue of its high level of democratization in which various voices may openly compete as well as the impartiality of the NPC as an institution.
    When it comes to issues concerning procuratorial oversight, it is certainly inappropriate for administrative regulations to provide specific provisions. First, there is currently insufficient direct legal basis for [a provision saying that] “detention houses carrying out detention activities shall submit to legal oversight by procuratorates.” Looking at China’s Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorates and Law on Prosecutors, there are only provisions covering legal oversight of prisons and detention centers (看守所), while no provisions concern procuratorates’ legal oversight of detention houses (拘留所). If the Detention House Regulations added such provisions, it would raise concerns that the State Council had exceeded its legislative powers.
    “Procutorial oversight in the event that a detainee dies of unnatural causes” should be treated differently. A regulation requiring that “the procuratorate at the same [administrative] level shall immediately investigate and determine the cause of death” also seems like something that an administrative regulation is unable to stipulate because it also involves the separation and arrangement of power. But there is nothing wrong with “the detention house shall immediately notify the procuratorate,” because it has a legal basis. This is because, first of all, the public security organ must avoid suspicion, and second of all, the procuratorate has the legal responsibility to investigate crimes of dereliction of duty. When an unnatural death occurs in a detention house, the procuratorate should arrive at the scene as soon as possible—this is the fundamental requirement set out in Article 18(2) of the Criminal Procedure Law.
    (Author is a law professor at Law School of the Shandong University of Political Science and Law)
  • Universal Human Rights Should Trump the Politics of “the People”

    How much difference can two Chinese characters make to the impact of legislation? Considerable difference, according to recent commentary by Han Dayuan (韩大元), dean of Renmin University of China Law School, that looks at proposed changes to the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL).
    Ever since the full text of a draft CPL revision was made public in August 2011, its content has been examined closely and debated vociferously within China. Supporters herald the legislation as a major improvement in the protection of rights, pointing to things like facilitating the work of criminal defense lawyers, formalizing procedures aimed at excluding evidence obtained illegally, and establishing new procedures for juvenile offenders. Critics, on the other hand, have raised concerns that the revision would greatly expand the power of investigators to abuse secret surveillance and to detain people without notifying their family.
    More than 80,000 recommendations regarding the draft amended CPL were submitted to the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee during a one-month period of public consultation that ended September 30. At least some of these suggestions made their way into a second draft that was reviewed by the NPC Standing Committee in late December. Now, a final draft of the legislation is slated for review by the nearly 3,000-member NPC when it meets for its annual session, scheduled to open in less than two weeks.
    Thus far, most of the discussion surrounding CPL revision has concerned specific changes to procedures or measures added to the legislation. But there are also many concerns about changes that haven’t been made.
    For example, the drafts reviewed by the NPC Standing Committee do not change Article 1, the statement of the legislation’s purpose: “保护人民” [to protect the people]. In commentary published in Legal Daily last week, Han Dayuan recommends changing that purpose to “保障人权” [to protect human rights]. This change was included in each of the major revision proposals prepared by Chinese legal scholars after CPL revision was first placed on the legislative agenda back in 2003.
    Professor & Dean Han Dayuan. Photo credit:
    Renmin University of China Law Shool
    Han believes the change would better reflect the spirit of China’s constitution—which was amended in 2004 to affirm the state’s role in respecting and safeguarding human rights—and highlight both domestically and internationally China’s existing achievements and future goals with regard to rights protection and rule-of-law development.
    The change is also significant because in the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist political culture of China, all references to “the people” are implicitly exclusive of particular groups, e.g., the exploiting classes, counterrevolutionaries, and “enemies of the people.” Removing this political category from the CPL would imply that the rights and protections granted therein are universal, rather than selective.
    Making the protection of human rights the explicit aim of the CPL would thus strike a symbolic blow against the kind of “dual track” criminal justice system that is being fostered in China, one in which procedural protections are extended in the majority of criminal cases but withheld in cases deemed threatening to sociopolitical order.
    At this stage in the legislative process, a symbolic victory like an amendment to Article 1 may be more achievable than substantial changes to procedural provisions over which China’s law-enforcement stakeholders have already reached consensus. And for those who have been working to more firmly establish constitutionalism, rule of law, and human rights protection, a symbolic victory could set new standards for future legal reform.
    Ultimately, however, the immediate impact of such a change would likely be only symbolic. What matters more as far as the protection of human rights is concerned is not the CPL’s programmatic principles but, rather, the concrete procedures and measures set out therein and the extent to which these measures are implemented. In evaluating China’s human rights situation, actions still speak louder than words.
    *
    Clarify Subject in CPL Draft Amendment, Article 1
    Recommend Changing “Protect the People” to “Protect Human Rights”
    Han Dayuan, Legal Daily
    February 15, 2012
    The 5th plenary session of the 11th National People’s Congress (NPC) will open on March 5, 2012, at which time the Draft Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) Amendments will be deliberated. This revision of the CPL adds many important items, including a prohibition on compulsory self-incrimination, and emphasizes the basic principle of protecting human rights. The number of articles that the draft adds or revises makes up around half of the total number of articles in the current CPL.
    As a basic law of the state, revision of the CPL has always received widespread attention from all sectors of society, including legal scholars. Among the issues discussed most often is how to properly understand and handle the relationships between the CPL and the constitution and between punishing crime and protecting human rights. The basic idea behind the CPL should be adequate protection of human rights and effective crime-fighting. The content of the CPL should sufficiently embody the constitutional principles of protecting human rights, [developing] rule of law, and “dividing [the] functions [of the courts, procuratorates, and public security organs], each taking responsibility for its own work, and coordinating their efforts and checking each other.”
    Generally speaking, the first article of a law expresses the purpose of that law, reflects its central values, and serves as a kind of summary of its essential points. Article 1 of the CPL draft revision states: “This law is enacted in accordance with the constitution for the purpose of ensuring correct enforcement of the Criminal Law, punishing crimes, protecting the people, safeguarding state- and public security and maintaining socialist public order.” In light of the relationship between the constitution and the CPL and based on the legislative purpose, I recommend that “protecting the people” in Article 1 be changed to “protecting human rights.”
    Protecting Human Rights Embodies Constitutional Principles
    The constitution is the founding law of the state. It carries supreme legal force and occupies the “leading” position in the socialist legal system wherein all laws and regulations should remain in accord with the constitution. This is why the majority of laws all say in their first articles: “This law is enacted in accordance with the constitution.” In his 2004 speech in Beijing commemorating the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the NPC, General Secretary Hu Jintao emphasized that to rule the country in accordance with the law means first ruling the country in accordance with the constitution and that to govern in accordance with the law means first governing in accordance with the constitution.
    In 2004, China’s constitution was revised and “the state respects and safeguards human rights” was solemnly added to establish a national value system and set a basic standard for all acts of public authority. As a basic law meting out the specifics of the constitution, the CPL must obey the values of the constitution and give expression in its conception of values to the principles and spirit of the constitution, as well as establish institutions that respect and implement the provisions of the constitution. The relationship between the CPL and human rights is especially close, with the CPL having been called the “defendant’s charter of rights.” It should embody the requirements of the constitution and clearly provide for “protecting human rights.”
    After the constitution was revised in 2004, the enactment and revision of laws must fully reflect the principle of protecting human rights. If the CPL were to announce “to protect human rights” as its legislative purpose, then it would be not only a major step forward for criminal legislation and the administration of criminal justice but also a concrete implementation of constitutional principles.
    Though the phrase “to protect the people” that is stipulated in the current draft is premised on expressing the law’s affinity with the people, it is neither scientific legal terminology nor is it appropriate. “The people” is a political concept, not a legal concept. During different periods, the specific meaning of “the people” has varied depending on the historical period of the nation’s development. What human rights protects are “human beings.” Even defendants, criminal suspects, or criminal offenders—even offenders who have been sentenced to death—all enjoy certain human rights and there are some human rights that cannot be stripped away. When the constitution says that the state protects human rights, it means that the constitution protects not only the people but protects the legitimate rights and interests of criminal offenders, suspects, and defendants as well.
    An important function of the CPL is to use procedural [norms] to safeguard the basic rights of specific groups. If we only write “to protect the people,” then it’s possible that other groups outside of the people will be left out, resulting in an incomplete level of protection by the state. Generally speaking, in the procedures of the CPL, those who are being prosecuted are clearly in the weaker category. Their human rights are easily infringed upon by the mighty power of state organs, and so they rightly ought to receive fuller protection under the CPL in order to realize the principle of all being equal before the law.
    Protecting Human Rights Embodies the Spirit of International Covenants
    A clear CPL provision “to protect human rights” would also help to express the spirit of international human rights covenants. China has already acceded to several international treaties related to criminal justice and has signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). A clear statement “to protect human rights” in Article 1 of the CPL would help link the legislation with human rights treaties, help the NPC Standing Committee to ratify the ICCPR, to reduce the legal and technical problems that might be faced at the time of ratification, to display China’s progress in rule of law, to avoid attacks by hostile forces against our human rights situation, and to effectively uphold China’s international image.
    At the same time that we firmly establish “to protect human rights” as the legislative purpose of the CPL, I recommend that we also change the expression “to punish crime [and] to protect the people” to “to protect human rights [and] to punishing crime.” Punishing crime and protecting human rights are both of important significance, and both are goals for the CPL to realize. But protection of human rights is fundamental, and the goal of punishing crime is to protect human rights.
    The phrase “to punish crime [and] to protect the people” carries the logic that the people are protected by punishing crime. Once “to protect the people” is changed to “to protect human rights,” the CPL will protect the rights of all people as human beings, not just protect the rights of the people from being infringed upon by criminal elements. The innocent must also be protected from prosecution and, even more, the lawful rights and interests of criminal suspects, defendants, and criminal offenders must be protected.
    In sum, changing “to protect the people” to “to protect human rights” will help to embody the spirit of the constitution, to correctly reflect the positive achievements of CPL reform, and to highlight the progress of China’s human rights development and future goal of the development of rule of law.