Tag: law enforcement

  • Can Beijing’s “Black Security” Crackdown Protect Petitioners?

    Police in Beijing have launched a six-month campaign to crack down on illegal behavior of the city’s security companies. The campaign claims “zero tolerance” for security contractors involved in “petitioner interception” and “black jails;” however, this involvement is generally sanctioned by local governments keen to keep petitioners out of the capital.
     
    Though long denied officially, the illegal detention of petitioners has been of increasing concern among the Chinese public since the end of 2009. At that time, an in-depth report revealed the role played by local government contractor Anyuanding in the detention, incarceration, and transport of petitioners, resulting in widespread condemnation and a criminal investigation. Partly to curb the abuse of petitioners, Beijing has taken steps to reduce the presence of local “liaison offices” in the capital, but pressure on local governments to “preserve stability” has made it difficult to protect petitioners’ rights.
     
    On December 2 the lead editorial in The Beijing News (translated below) welcomed the announcement of the crackdown but warned that security firms must be held thoroughly accountable, with personnel at all levels punished for their involvement. The editorial also places special emphasis on the need for transparency, urging not only that details of the extent of illegal activity be made public but that police report fully on how they deal with offenders.
     
    Transparency is important partly because, until recently, China’s security companies were monopolized as the revenue-generating ventures of local police. On January 1, 2010, however, new State Council regulations took effect to prohibit police from running security companies, while giving them administrative oversight of the industry.
     
    Yet this Caijing article from April 2011 makes clear that police have had a hard time giving up their monopoly. Police in many areas have apparently been using oversight and registration controls to form patron-client relationships with security companies—some of which may be indistinguishable from companies once run by police. Under these circumstances, it seems natural for The Beijing News to highlight transparency as Beijing probes “black security.”
     
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    Rooting Out “Petitioner Interception” by Security Firms Requires Lawful Punishment
    Editorial, The Beijing News
    December 2, 2011
     
    How to protect the bottom line that security firms must not participate in “petitioner interception”? Besides a concentrated clean-up and crackdown, it is also necessary to punish involved security companies and personnel in accordance with the law.
     
    According to reports in The Beijing News, Beijing police announced on November 30 that they would be carrying out a six-month campaign to clean up and restore order to Beijing’s security industry, focusing on six types of illegal behavior by security guards. Among them, particular emphasis was placed on strictly prohibiting security service companies from involvement in “petitioner interception” and strictly prohibiting the illegal restriction of the personal liberty of others. Until February of next year, Beijing security guards must carry their security-personnel ID while on duty in an effort to achieve zero tolerance of “petitioner interception” and illegal acts by security service companies.
     
    Now, the security industry certainly needs to be cleaned up and order restored. Targeting “petitioner interception” and other illegal acts by security guards and setting a zero tolerance goal for “petitioner interception” is in line with public opinion and deserves recognition.
     
    Last year, it was revealed that the Anyuanding Security Company took deposits from some local governments to set up several “black jails” and intercept and lock up petitioners. Then in September of this year, Zhao Zhifei, a tourist who came to Beijing from Henan, was mistaken for a petitioner [resulting in] a dozen or so “black security guards” barging into his guesthouse in the middle of the night and escorting him the same night to a town government in Henan. The participation of these “black security guards” in “petitioner interception,” with its illegal detention and pummeling of citizens, not only infringes on the freedom of citizens but also sullies the image of the capital and ought to be punished severely in accordance with the law.
     
    Before, Beijing police have also made many efforts to combat “black security.” For example in July of this year, they discovered and closed one “black jail” and rescued the people being held there illegally, the oldest of whom was 81 and the youngest of whom was still nursing!
     
    This time, a person responsible said that the reason this campaign has set a zero tolerance goal for “petitioner interception” is to remind companies in the industry not to cross the line. How can this “bottom line” be adequately protected? Besides a concentrated clean-up and crackdown, it’s also necessary to punish involved security companies and personnel in accordance with the law.
     
    First, security companies that violate the law should receive appropriate punishment and those that need to be shut down should be shut down. The Security Services Management Regulations issued by the State Council in 2009 stipulate that the security industry must strictly examine and approve entrants. Public security organs are only responsible for the examination and approval of security guards and companies, and management mechanisms have been rationalized. At the same time, the Measures for Implementation of Security Services Management Regulations for Public Security Organs contain explicit provisions for the daily management and punitive measures of security companies. For example, if security companies “instigate or condone security guards’ obstruction of law enforcement, participation in debt collection, or resolution of conflicts through violence or threats of violence,” they can be shut down. This is an important way to achieve “zero tolerance.”
     
    Second, all personnel involved in a case should be punished in accordance with the law to intimidate other violators. When “black security guards” commit acts like intercept petitioners and take people into custody, they are suspected of a crime. Based on relevant judicial interpretations, when an illegal detention lasts for more than 24 hours there should be criminal liability. Clearly, the personnel in charge of the security company as well as guard, support, and other staff all fall under [the category of] accomplices to the crime of illegal detention and should all be investigated. When “black security guards” beat petitioners or steal property, it should be treated as intentional assault, robbery, and so on.
     
    Moreover, fixing [the problem of] “black security” should be open and transparent, giving the public sufficient information. Some cases of “black security guards” intercepting petitioners have such a negative impact that providing the public with the circumstances and developments of the case will restore government credibility. For example, the police have already begun investigations into a group of “black security companies” including Anyuanding and relevant persons in charge have been detained. How the cases are currently progressing; what stage has been reached in the judicial process—the public is actually extremely interested to know this information. Revealing the details of the cases can also better show the resolve of police to combat “black security.” Through these cases, those black security companies that continue to illegally do wrong can be warned and supervision of the entire society can be reminded.
     
    [We] hope, in the course of this six-month campaign, that some “black security” companies are shut down because of it and the relevant people responsible are held accountable in accordance with the law. Otherwise, it will not be enough to intimidate violators and it will not be enough to promote the righteousness of the capital.
  • Taming Police Influence in Politico-Legal Committees

    The overlap of administrative and Communist Party bureaucracies and party control over bureaucratic appointments mean that Chinese officials often wear many hats. Giving a single official simultaneous leadership posts cements party interest in the administration of government and allows various bureaucratic interests to be represented in policymaking. One way to judge an official’s political clout is to look at how many leadership posts he or she occupies at once.
     
    Since 2002, concurrent appointments in powerful party and government leadership groups (领导班子) have indicated an increase in the amount of power granted to China’s police chiefs. One common arrangement at the provincial, prefectural, and especially county levels has been to name the same person as head of the public security organ and the “politico-legal committee” (政法委) within the local party organization. Due to a 2010 party directive discussed in a recent article by Guangzhou’s Southern Weekly, this arrangement may be coming to an end, but the change won’t necessarily mean any diminution of police power.
     
    Entering the Inner Circle
     
    The politico-legal committee is one of the least-understood components of the Chinese criminal justice system. This is largely because the Communist Party has not provided many details on its structure, internal rules, and day-to-day operations. Established at each level of the party’s leadership bureaucracy, from the central government down through China’s counties and urban districts, these committees are responsible for overseeing, coordinating, and managing the work of police, procuratorates, courts, and judicial administration organs.
     
    Particularly at and below the provincial level, politico-legal committees frequently play an active role in the process of administering justice. Represented by high-ranking officials from public security, procuratorates, courts, and judicial administration institutions, the committee serves as a channel through which the interests of these institutions can be coordinated in pursuit of broader policy goals, such as fighting crime or preserving social and political stability.
     
    In 2002, when Zhou Yongkang (then Minister of Public Security) was named to the Politburo and the State Council, it marked a clear elevation in the status of the public security system within the party-state organization. Throughout the country, heads of local public security bureaus joined their respective party and government “leadership groups,” often as members of the standing committee of the local party committee and as secretary of that committee’s politico-legal committee.
    Politburo member and Politico-Legal Committee Chairman Zhou Yangkang presides over a plenary
    meeting of the Central Politico-Legal Committee in Beijing, October 19, 2011.
    Photo credit: Zhang Duo, Xinhua
    In practice, this has tended to give police the greatest say in decision-making among China’s various legal institutions. Welcoming public security chiefs into the leadership group has generally increased the political clout of the police, giving them better access to personnel and budget allocations and facilitating the mobilization of political support for security interests.
     
    Honorary Chief of Police
     
    The arrangement, however, carries a significant downside. Instead of giving a sitting police chief a spot within the local leadership group, the more common practice has been to appoint an official who is already part of the leadership group as head of the public security bureau. As a result, many police chiefs have little to no experience in law enforcement and spend much of their time in administrative and party meetings with no direct relation to police work.
     
    Having the same person head both the public security organ and the politico-legal committee also tends to create imbalance between the various institutions charged with enforcing and administering the law. With the head of police managing a committee responsible for “coordinating” the interests of public security, procuratorates, and courts, conflicts are bound to be resolved in favor of police interests—as, for example, when the committee intervenes in a criminal case in which the procuratorate refused to grant police approval for arrest.
     
    Yang Haiyun, who until earlier this year headed the public security bureau and politico-legal committee in Huangzhong County, Qinghai Province, acknowledged that this arrangement tends to have a detrimental effect on the ability of procuratorates and courts to exert proper oversight. In 2010, National People’s Congress Deputy Wu Xiaoling urged an end to the practice of “putting the monitored in charge of the monitors.” Soon thereafter, according to Southern Weekly, the Central Organization Department of the Communist Party issued a directive that would prevent the heads of provincial-level public security departments from simultaneously heading provincial politico-legal committees. As of late October 2011, 22 of China’s 31 provincial-level politico-legal committees had complied.
     
    This is not likely, however, to mean that the overall authority of China’s public security apparatus will diminish. The same 2010 directive still calls for public security chiefs to be members of the leadership group or party organization within the same level of government. So while the directive seeks to address the imbalance of power between public security, procuratorates, and courts that became institutionalized in the politico-legal committee, it also preserves a policymaking role for public security so as to maintain its preeminence in preserving public order and socio-political stability.
  • Leadership Transition Points to Possible Reduction in Police Power

    [Edited 10/29/07]The ascension of Zhou Yongkang (周永康) to the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo Standing Committee, announced at the close of the 17th Party Congress, leaves an opening at the head of the Ministry of Public Security. This position will reportedly be filled by Meng Jianzhu (孟建柱), who previously served as the party secretary of Jiangxi Province.

    This transition in leadership could significantly affect the power of the Ministry of Public Security and China’s police. Holding a concurrent position on the Politburo, Zhou Yongkang was the most powerful public security minister in recent history. From this position, he ushered in new reforms designed to professionalize China’s police force—while also boosting the political leverage of the Ministry of Public Security vis-à-vis other bodies in China’s criminal justice system, particularly the courts and the procuratorate. The result has been a failure to move forward on key legal reforms that would limit police power over detention and the criminal investigation process.

    When Meng Jianzhu takes over as public security minister, it will be from a far weaker political position than Zhou. Meng will presumably even have to wait until at least next spring’s plenary session of the National People’s Congress to become a member of the Standing Committee of the State Council (China’s cabinet). Analysts predict that Meng and future public security ministers will not be allowed to hold a concurrent position on the Politburo precisely in order to limit the power of the police among China’s legal institutions.

    Zhou Yongkang is now expected to take over from Luo Gan (罗干) as head of the Central Party Political-Legal Committee, arguably an even more powerful position, since this body sets policies and oversees all the institutions in China’s legal system. However, it is yet unclear whether Zhou—who has long focused on the importance of maintaining social stability—will continue to favor the extra power of the police from his new post. It is possible that, in fact, Zhou will be forced to pay more consideration to greater balance among the institutions in the criminal justice system, which would mean more authority and oversight by the courts and procuratorate. If so, it would be a welcome step toward establishing a more just and credible legal system for China.

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