Tag: judicial reform

  • Jailhouse Informants and Wrongful Convictions

    Zhang Hui (right) and his uncle Zhang Gaoping (left) were acquitted in March 2013 after spending a decade in jail due to false testimony given by a jailhouse informant. Photo credit: news.ifeng.com.

    A controversial issue facing criminal justice reformers around the world is the use of jailhouse informant testimony, which has been discredited as being unreliable and a leading cause of wrongful convictions. Jailhouse informants are detained or incarcerated individuals tasked with obtaining inculpatory information about criminal suspects. Informants are often pressured into becoming informants in exchange for financial rewards and sentence reductions.

    Authorities in China acknowledge the practice of using jailhouse informants to gather information for investigations. Detention centers receive funding from the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) to help deploy a network of informants. The MPS Working Rules of 1986 classify informants into two groups: one group collects intelligence about criminal suspects to maintain jailhouse security and the other group assists police in the investigation of difficult cases.

    Prisoners with at least three months remaining on their terms typically serve their sentences in prisons, however an exemption is made for long-serving prisoners to be placed in detention centers where they can act as the prison guards’ watchful eyes and ears. While the exact figures are unknown, a study revealed that of the 480 detainees in Xinjiang’s Yining Detention Center in 1990, 14 were informants. In the early 2000s, Xinjiang’s Yopurga County Detention Center used a total of 18 informants – 14 security informants and 4 “special case” informants. A recent estimate indicated that three to five percent of the entire prison population in China are informants in detention centers.

    There has been widespread public criticism over the use of jailhouse informant testimonies in cases resulting in wrongful convictions. Below are three examples of cases where informant testimony was used to push forward on investigations when evidence against the accused was weak or non-existent.

    Yuan Lianfang – “The Jailhouse Snitch”

    Ma Tingxin

    Yuan Lianfang (袁连芳) is a former jailhouse informant known to have produced false testimonies leading to two wrongful conviction cases involving three victims. In February 2003, Yuan was transferred to the Hebei Detention Center to collect information for a homicide case, which the county public security bureau had pledged to solve within three months. Ma Tingxin (马廷新) was mistakenly identified as a criminal suspect after failing a polygraph test. Investigators were unable to find sufficient evidence to use against Ma and ended up coercing six witnesses into providing false testimony. It was later discovered that Yuan was assigned to be the informant responsible for extracting Ma’s confession.

    In an interview, Yuan admitted that he would take any opportunity to complete his six-year sentence early. At the time of Ma’s detention, his wife and father had been taken into custody for investigation. Using his position as a “cellblock boss,” Yuan did not allow Ma to sleep if he failed to memorize the confession script Yuan had composed for him. Yuan later threatened the safety of Ma’s family, prompting Ma to write a five-page long statement in which he admitted to committing the murder. After Ma’s “confession,” Yuan was transferred back to Hangzhou’s Gongshu District Detention Center on April 8, and one month later, he earned a sentence reduction of 18 months.

    In July 2004, Ma was acquitted in the trial of first instance, but the prosecution appealed the judgment insisting that evidence for conviction was sufficient. The appeal was not withdrawn until April 2008. Ma spent five years in a detention center for a crime he did not commit.

    Two Zhangs

    Yuan Lianfang’s name did not garner media attention until a case involving a rape and murder conviction overturned by the Zhejiang High People’s Court in March 2013 came to light. Zhang Hui (张辉) and his uncle Zhang Gaoping (张高平) were sentenced to death with reprieve and 15 years’ imprisonment, respectively, in the appellate trial in October 2004.

    Initial investigations against the duo produced no substantive evidence of their guilt. The victim was last known to have hitchhiked by truck from Anhui to Hangzhou before her corpse was found in a ditch. The DNA found on the victim belonged to neither of the Zhangs, but to another individual who could not be identified by police at the time. As the investigation dragged on, Yuan was transferred to Gongshu District Detention Center where he collected testimony from Zhang Hui. Yuan alleged that Zhang Hui had voluntarily confessed to strangling the victim to death after raping her. Zhang did not appear in court to testify. As in Ma’s case, Yuan used his position as the “cellblock boss” to coerce Zhang into writing a confession letter. The court ignored accusations against Yuan and convicted the two Zhangs for rape and murder.

    In the appellate trial, the Zhejiang High People’s Court held that the facts in the two Zhang’s case were “clearly established.” In the judgment, the court only mentioned in passing that Zhang Hui “is not a criminal who requires immediate execution due to the special circumstances of the case” without explaining what constituted the “special circumstances.” In the absence of admissible circumstantial evidence, their conviction was yet another violation of the presumption of innocence – a principle established in the Criminal Procedure Law.

    Both Zhangs were released in 2013 after they had been in prison for almost a decade. While serving his sentence in a Xinjiang prison in March 2008, Zhang Hui read about Ma Tingxin’s acquittal in a newspaper and learned that Yuan had given false testimony leading to Ma’s wrongful conviction. The prosecution accepted Zhangs’ request to re-examine the admissibility of Yuan’s testimony. Yuan admitted to perjury in both Ma and Zhangs’ cases. It was later found that the DNA on the victim belonged to another criminal who had been executed. An interview with Yuan in 2013 revealed that he had suffered a stroke while in prison, leaving him with permanent health issues. At the time of the interview Yuan was living in a small rented apartment in Hangzhou with limited means and fearful for his safety due to the reputation he had garnered as a jailhouse informant.

    Jailhouse Bullies

    In May 2018, Caixin Media’s coverage of the case of Wang Baiyu (王柏玉) brought much discredit to both law enforcement and jailhouse informants in China. Wang, a native in Jilin province, was sentenced to death with reprieve in 2004 after “confessing” to the murder of his fiancée. The investigation failed to uncover sufficient evidence that Wang was to blame for the murder and basic facts of the case were not disclosed to the defence, such as the victim’s time of death. Wang might have been able to provide a credible alibi had these details been disclosed. There was no witness testimony or forensic evidence linking Wang to the murder scene. The only evidence used to substantiate the conviction was Wang’s confession, which had been extracted by jailhouse informants.

    Wang’s confession was full of inconsistencies. He gave three different accounts detailing how he committed the murder. It was later discovered that Wang’s confession was coerced in the detention center by investigating officers who also instructed several informants to inflict torture on Wang, including “banging Wang’s head against the wall, kicking him in his chest, suffocating him with plastic bags, depriving him of water, food, and sleep for consecutive days.” On May 31, 2002, Wang delivered his first written confession to his informants. In mid-August, the informants tortured Wang again, leaving him with a nasal fracture and bruises all over his body. Wang signed another fabricated confession statement. One of the informants received a sentence reduction of two years in January 2005 as a reward for his “meritorious service” in eliciting Wang’s confession.

    In the appeal statement published in February 2017, Wang stated that at least four detainees witnessed the abuse and torture he suffered and that he knew of at least one other detainee, surnamed Song, who also fell victim to the same informants in June 2002. For the past 15 years, Wang has been lodging a post-conviction appeal. On August 26, 2016, the Jilin People’s Procuratorate refused to re-examine the admissibility of Wang’s testimony and determined that there were insufficient grounds to lodge an appeal. At the time of writing, Wang has 12 years left on his sentence.

    Reform in United States

    In the U.S., there is ongoing legislative debate concerning the use of jailhouse informant testimony. In response to Texas legislation that would end the use of incentivized jailhouse informants in death penalty cases, a Washington Post op-ed in May 2015 criticized that “[M]ost jailhouse snitches are lying. Informant testimony has become such a critical tool for prosecutors precisely because it allows them to put on testimony that is a) damning, b) easy to manufacture and c) allows b) to happen while giving them plausible deniability.” The Texas bill that was later passed in 2017 has been widely applauded. In California, Florida, Washington, New York, and Pennsylvania, legislatures have also sought to restrict the use of informant testimony. In November 2018, Illinois passed a bill making it mandatory for prosecutors to disclose their use of jailhouse informant testimony at least 30 days before trial. The bill gives defence attorneys time to examine informant testimony and forces prosecutors to prove that informant testimony is admissible and to disclose what rewards will be given to informants in exchange for testimony.

    In China, reformers widely agree that the use of jailhouse informant testimony is problematic. Informants are deployed by police in detention centers administered by the Ministry of Public Security. Police play both a custodial role and an investigatory role and they routinely use informants to boost crime clearance rates for their own career advancement. In 2015, Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission Meng Jianzhu announced the removal of crime clearance rates as a performance indicator for police officers. The arbitrary power of police could be more easily restrained if the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) administered detention centers, since it has little direct interest in the outcome of criminal investigations.

    Wrongful convictions reduce public confidence in the criminal justice system. The consequences are severe when miscarriages of justice result from the use of forced testimony obtained by torture. Legislative restrictions are needed to curb the arbitrary use of testimony. China can draw on the U.S. experience by improving transparency in how informant testimony is collected, and by restricting and banning its use in certain cases such as cases involving the death penalty.

  • United States and Chinese National Security Policies Raise Memories of World War II

    Photo by Crystal K. Huie, Courtesy of the Fred T. Korematsu Institute.

    In 2018 the international community rebuked both China and the United States (U.S.) for controversial policies affecting Muslim populations. This summer it was reported that China has detained more than a million of its own citizens — Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region suspected of dissident sentiments — in re-education camps. Meanwhile, the U.S. instituted a travel restriction on citizens from eight Muslim majority countries in what was widely viewed as an attempt to prevent Muslims from entering the country. Despite the many differences in these two policies, China and the U.S. offer strikingly similar justifications for their actions. Both countries point to overriding national security concerns and insist that these extreme practices are permissible by law. Although extremist violence is portrayed as a new threat that requires new responses, the legal battle over the U.S. travel ban and the outcry over detention of Muslims in China resurface discussion of a similar policy from a bygone era: the internment of Japanese citizens in the U.S. during World War II.

    This summer the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Trump administration’s travel ban is constitutional. In the same decision, the court finally overturned its ruling in United States v. Korematsu, a 1944 case holding it permissible for the military to detain Japanese Americans in internment camps as a preventative safety measure. Although the internment camps were widely condemned in the decades since that decision, the practice officially remained “good law” until this year. The fact that such a flagrant human rights abuse could be found legally permissible—and remain so for so long—offers an important lesson: Although a policy that directly or indirectly targets an ethnic group may be judged lawful in a contemporary court, it may still be overruled in the court of history.

    The Internment of Japanese Americans and the Korematsu Decision

    More than a half-century ago the U.S. and China united in war against a common enemy: Japan. After years of imperial expansion in Asia, Japan’s incursion into Manchuria led to the formal declaration of war with China in 1937. In 1941 Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, prompting the U.S. to enter the conflict as well. The next year President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which authorized the military to exclude people from geographic areas in the U.S. at their discretion.

    Following the executive order, more than 112,000 people in the U.S., primarily people of Japanese ancestry living on the west coast, were relocated from their homes and interned in concentration camps. At least 70,000 of these people were American citizens. Despite a lack of empirical evidence that Japanese-Americans posed a threat to national security, citizens were held against their will for years because of their ethnic background.

    Fred Korematsu, an American of Japanese descent who was born in Oakland, California, refused to obey the exclusion order. He was arrested, convicted of violating the order, and sent to a camp in Utah. Korematsu appealed the conviction, arguing that the exclusion order was discriminatory and violated his constitutional rights.

    In 1944 the U.S. Supreme Court considered Korematsu’s case. A divided court ultimately upheld the exclusion order and Korematsu’s conviction. Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, argued that while restrictions on the civil rights of a racial group are legally suspect, Roosevelt was justified in his order for reasons of national security. Black opined that “exclusion of those of Japanese origin was deemed necessary because of the presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members of the group.”

    Even at the time of the ruling, some members of the Court condemned the exclusion. In a published dissent, Justice Frank Murphy called the order a “legalization of racism.” In the decades following the end of World War II, the U.S. reached a similar national consensus that the internment was a mistake and an injustice. In 1976 President Gerald Ford issued a formal apology, stating that “[w]e now know what we should have known then—not only was that evacuation wrong but Japanese-Americans were and are loyal Americans.” President Jimmy Carter established a commission that debunked the argument that the internment was necessary for national security. Following the recommendations of the commission, the U.S. government subsequently made reparation payments to people who had been interned.

    But, despite the widespread recognition by both the public and the U.S. government that the internment was unjust, the Supreme Court’s 1944 Korematsu decision remained the unchallenged law of the land for more than 70 years.

    Supreme Court Decision Invokes America’s Past Missteps in Travel Ban Decision

    The Supreme Court reconsidered Korematsu this year in light of a contemporary presidential directive. Immediately after assuming office in 2017 President Donald Trump issued an executive order temporarily restricting entry to the U.S. for citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries. Although the Trump administration insisted that the restrictions were intended to prevent terrorist attacks, critics of the proposal pointed to numerous campaign statements by the president that seemed to indicate the order was intended to bar Muslims from entering the country.

    The travel restriction order immediately came under judicial scrutiny. Following a series of legal actions and modifications to the order, in April 2018 the U.S. Supreme Court heard opinions in the question of whether the ban violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment, which forms the basis of the constitutional right to freedom of religion. In June the court issued its decision. Justice John Roberts, writing for a narrow majority, <a href=”The Korematsu decision reminds us that while a discriminatory policy may enjoy a veneer of legality, that legality is ultimately no match for the judgment of history. The internment of Japanese Americans was wrong during WWII, despite Supreme Court reasoning to the contrary. China’s efforts to criminalize Muslim expressions of faith today are no less abhorrent, whether or not they find basis in statute. As Justice Murphy wrote in his dissent in Korematsu in 1944, “[s]uch exclusion goes over ‘the very brink of constitutional power,’ and falls into the ugly abyss of racism” Justice John Roberts, writing for a narrow majority, upheld the constitutionality of the Trump order, finding that the president has broad authority over issues of national security.

    In two dissents, four of the Supreme Court’s nine justices disagreed with the majority opinion upholding the travel ban. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, wrote that the majority “leaves undisturbed a policy first advertised openly and unequivocally as a ‘total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States’ because the policy now masquerades behind a façade of national-security concerns.”

    The ghost of the court’s previous decision in Korematsu haunts both the majority decision and the dissent response to the travel restrictions. In the majority opinion Justice Roberts seemed to finally overturn the 1944 decision, stating that the contemporary debate “affords this Court the opportunity to express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong on the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear— ‘has no place in law under the constitution’.” Meanwhile, Justice Sotomayor wrote that while “[i]n the intervening since Korematsu, our Nation has done much to leave its sordid legacy behind,” in upholding the executive order and sanctioning a discriminatory policy in the name of national security, “the court replaces one ‘gravely wrong decision’ with another.”

    The debate over Korematsu shows that even in a country such as the U.S. with a hearty tradition of strong and independent courts, when it comes to questions of national security and minority groups, what is lawful is not always what is right.

    Korematsu and Lessons for China

    China ought to take note of the legacy of the Korematsu decision. International news outlets reported this year that China has detained as many as a million Chinese Muslims—particularly ethnic minority Uyghurs and Kazakhs in the western autonomous region of Xinjiang—out of national security concerns. In August the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination issued a report expressing concern that these Muslims were being “held incommunicado and often for long periods, without being charged or tried, under the pretext of countering terrorism and religious extremism” and are “forced to spend varying periods in political ‘re-education camps’ for even nonthreatening expressions of Muslim ethno-religious culture like daily greetings.” In November numerous nations raised concerns about China’s treatment of Muslims at the Universal Periodic Review of China’s human rights record at the United Nations. Dui Hua’s submission to the Review highlights the Foundation’s research uncovering discrimination against Muslims in Xinjiang.

    China disputes reports on its policies towards Muslims in Xinjiang. At the same time, the government passed a series of laws and regulations purportedly providing a legal basis for targeting Muslims in response to national security concerns. These new legal measures include a 2015 Counterterrorism Law that criminalized a broad range of conduct and expression, including clothes and symbols. And Xinjiang introduced regulations authorizing re-education facilities to combat “religious extremism.” Dui Hua found the first judgment involving the use of “educational placement,” a new coercive measure imposed on prisoners who are considered a danger to society even after completing their sentences for terrorism or extremism offenses. The Foundation also discovered judgments involving violators of the Islamic clothing ban in force throughout Xinjiang. Individuals can be sentenced for “illegal business activity” for selling clothing with the Islamic star and crescent symbol. In one case, a Muslim man, Gong Xiaojun, was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for “disrupting official business” after arguing with cadres over his “abnormal” beard and a black robe his wife was wearing at home. The case indicates that Xinjiang authorities have extended the reach of the ban to peoples’ homes. Across the board, China appears to be using the veil of national security law to justify openly discriminatory practice.

    The Korematsu decision reminds us that while a discriminatory policy may enjoy a veneer of legality, that legality is ultimately no match for the judgment of history. The internment of Japanese Americans was wrong during WWII, despite Supreme Court reasoning to the contrary. China’s efforts to criminalize Muslim expressions of faith today are no less abhorrent, whether or not they find basis in statute. As Justice Murphy wrote in his dissent in Korematsu in 1944, “[s]uch exclusion goes over ‘the very brink of constitutional power,’ and falls into the ugly abyss of racism.”

  • “All Criminal Defendants to Have Lawyers”: Is Access to Defense Lawyers Enough in a System Designed Against Defendants? Part I

    Guangdong Department of Justice Notice given to defense lawyer Sui Muqing, claiming Sui was in violation of court rules; Sui’s license to practice was revoked by Guangdong authorities. Image credit: HKFP.
    In January 2018, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) announced that “all criminal defendants are to have defense lawyers.” Pilot projects in various provinces across China have since launched with this goal in mind. Official media reports boast 100% defense counsels assigned to criminal cases in certain pilot project localities. At first glance, these results are impressive considering public defenders have historically been provided in only 30% of criminal cases in China. Increased access to defense lawyers should ensure the rights of defendants are upheld, however the relationship is not always automatic. Access to defense is effective so long as lawyers have the right tools at their disposal to represent their clients. Dui Hua analyzes shortcomings in the pilot projects including their failure to address the role of defense counsel in pre-trial contexts and the overemphasis on measuring success by coverage rather than quality of defense. Additionally, basic principles such as conflict of interest and identifying clear sources of funding and accountability mechanisms are obstacles that reformers have yet to address in their attempts to institutionalize a more robust defense counsel.
    “All Criminal Defendants to Have Lawyers”


    The eight provinces and municipalities selected to participate in the pilot projects are Beijing, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Anhui, Henan, Guangdong, Sichuan, and Shaanxi. Senior officials have praised the projects as “serving as a well of experience for further national expansion and as a vehicle to uphold human rights and to avoid miscarriages of justice.” The regulations on the pilot projects outline procedural guidelines for expanding access to defense counsel to all criminal cases, including setting three days as the maximum amount of time that courts can take to inform defendants that they have the right to retain a lawyer and the right to receive legal assistance. The regulations also call on courts to directly provide legal aid centers with information regarding the defendant’s case.
    Defense lawyers are not new to China’s criminal justice system. China’s Criminal Procedure Law mandates compulsory defense counsel for mentally ill persons and juveniles and provides guidance on scenarios in which courts should request legal aid centers to appoint a defense lawyer. Legal aid centers were nationalized in 2003 under State Council regulations and in 2017 the “Regulations on Legal Aid” fine-tuned the provisions for criminal cases stipulating defense lawyers for those incompetent to stand trial and those facing the death penalty.
    Pretrial Defense


    In Shenzhen, the Bao’an District Court and the Bao’an Justice Bureau announced that they had achieved their goal of assigning defense lawyers to every criminal defendant in April 2018. Bao’an officials applauded the establishment of a “green channel” (lüse tongdao) to streamline “delivery to defendant of the indictment, the court’s issuing notice to the defense, and the legal aid center assigning counsel to defendant.” In Jiangsu Province, the Wujin District of Changzhou applauded the pilot projects installation of a legal help window and a legal aid center inside its Litigation Service Hall. While focusing heavily on increased courtroom defense representation, these pilot projects fail to address questions of pretrial legal assistance. It is common for defendants to encounter difficulty meeting their lawyers once coercive measures are placed on them. In cases involving endangering state security, lawyers face obstacles in accessing evidence and escaping pressure from authorities to drop cases.
    One of the lawyers implicated in the “709” crackdown in 2015, Wang Quanzhang (王全璋), was barred from seeing his family and the lawyers hired by his family during his three years in custody. On the afternoon of July 12, 2018, Wang’s lawyer was finally able to meet with him at the Tianjin No.1 Detention Center. Wang’s trial date has yet to be announced. Activist Zhang Liumao (张六毛), was detained for picking quarrels and provoking troubles on August 15, 2015 and later arrested for subversion. He died in Guangzhou No.3 Detention Centre on November 4, 2015. Police restricted Zhang’s lawyer from meeting with him because the case was considered “anti-Party” and “anti-China.” Two weeks after Zhang’s death, his family and lawyer discovered bruises on his corpse, prompting suspicion that Zhang had been tortured to death. Wang and Zhang’s cases exemplify the injustice that can result when criminal suspects are restricted from meeting their lawyers before trial.
    Following the “709” crackdown, administrative penalties such as suspension or revocation of legal licenses have become commonplace tactics to retaliate against lawyers and law firms that take on sensitive cases. For example, Wang Quanzhang has so far had seven different lawyers assigned to his case. One of Wang’s lawyers was disbarred in 2017 during an annual review overseen by the party-controlled local lawyers’ associations and justice bureaus. In the spring of 2018, another lawyer, who had served as Wang’s counsel for two years, was barred from renewing his practicing license. In the case of Huang Qi (黄琦), the webmaster of the legal rights website 64 Tianwang, authorities in Guangdong revoked his defense lawyer Sui Muqing’s license to practice. During an interview with Hong Kong Free Press, Sui claimed that “I’m afraid the reason is that I’ve represented clients in too many human rights cases – the things I’ve said about my cases cannot be tolerated by the party.”
    In cases deemed to threaten “social stability,” defense lawyers are often handpicked by authorities seeking to control the outcome of the case. This practice raises questions about whether the rights of the accused can be fairly represented by lawyers who are not of their client’s choosing. In November 2016, after being detained for 16 months, Xie Yang (谢阳), another disappeared lawyer, was finally granted access to two lawyers he had appointed. However, after exposing the torture Xie endured while in detention, both lawyers were dismissed from the case in April 2017. Xie allegedly voluntarily appointed He Xiaodian to take over the case before it was heard in May 2017, however Xie’s family argues that he was coerced into appointing He. In the same month, Xie appeared on state television where he denied torture claims and confessed to being “brainwashed” by overseas groups. On December 26, 2017, Xie was convicted of inciting subversion but was exempted from criminal punishment.
    Liu Zhengqing and Huang Qi’s mother outside the Mianyang Detention Center. Image credit: Radio Free Asia.
    In a healthy criminal justice system, lawyers are given adequate time to examine evidence before a case is tried. Although Article 38 of the Criminal Procedure Law grants defense counsels the right to access evidence, in practice defense lawyers face a myriad of obstacles, particularly in cases involving “state secrets.” In February 2018, lawyer Liu Zhengqing, who took over Huang Qi’s case from disbarred defense lawyer Sui Muiqing, said that his request to photocopy evidence was turned down by the Mianyang Intermediate People’s Court because it contained “top secret” state secrets. The so-called state secrets reportedly concerned a document issued by a local neighborhood committee about the handling of a petitioner’s complaint. Li Jinglin, another one of Huang’s defense lawyers, also claimed that his appointment to examine evidence on October 12, 2017, was cancelled because the prosecutors were allegedly busy reporting the endangering state security case to authorities in Chengdu. In February 2018, Li’s request to examine evidence was again rejected, this time because the judge claimed he “had no time” to deal with the matter.
    Procedural Violations During Trial


    Increased courtroom representation does not necessarily guarantee the right to a fair trial. In cases concerning social stability, the role of defense lawyers is often for show – as presiding judges routinely side with prosecutors and frequently interrupt the arguments of defense counsels. In his defense of prominent activist Yang Maodong (杨茂东), also known as Guo Feixiong (郭飞雄), Zhang Lei reported that he had been repeatedly interrupted after questioning the court’s jurisdiction over the case. Yang was charged with “gathering a crowd to disrupt order in a public place” in Guangzhou’s Yuexiu District after leading a demonstration in support of the newspaper The Southern Weekend. To no avail, Zhang argued that the case should not have been investigated and tried in Tianhe District. Defending Sun Desheng (孙德胜), who was tried in the same case as Yang, Chen Jinxue also claimed that the presiding judge lacked impartiality and repeatedly interrupted the defense’s statements.
    Zhang Lei also spoke about the difficulty of summoning witnesses to Yang’s trial. The court refused to issue subpoenas to witnesses and the day before trial, three key witnesses were either coerced into “traveling” or kidnapped by authorities. In a case involving a Three-Self Church pastor sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment for fraud and a public order offense, the Nan Le County People’s Court refused the defense lawyer’s request to summon witnesses to testify in defense of Pastor Zhang Shaojie (张少杰). One of the witnesses was taken to a “black jail,” an extra-judicial detention facility.
    Rights lawyer Wang Yu outside the San He City Court. Image credit: Radio Free Asia.
    Rights lawyers who criticize violations of procedural justice in court also face the risk of being expelled or disbarred. In July 2015, rights lawyer Wang Yu (王宇) was representing a Falun Gong practitioner in Hebei when he was expelled and forcibly removed from court after pointing out procedural violations. The court neglected to send Wang a notice of appearance as a defense attorney before the case was heard and the court turned down Wang’s request to adjourn the trial after her client suffered a heart attack in the courtroom. The presiding judge continued to hear the multi-defendant case involving other Falun Gong practitioners and decided to only reschedule the trial for Wang’s client. Wang objected to the judge’s decision, insisting that all the defendants should be heard together in an adjourned trial. The court subsequently issued an order to expel Wang from the courtroom; court guards violently removed Wang.
    Not only has the offense of “disrupting courtroom order” been used as an excuse to expel lawyers from trial and to disbar them from practicing, but the offense also has the potential to imprison lawyers who challenge procedural violations during trial. Deriving from the ninth amendment to the Criminal Law in 2015, the offence has a maximum sentence of three years in prison. The offence conspicuously targets lawyers who complain about procedural violations in cases involving social stability. Xie Yang was one of the first ones indicted for this offence in December 2016. The indictment states that Xie “slapped the table, insulted the judge and instigated claimants” in the courtroom to protest the judge’s decision to expel two other lawyers entrusted in the same eviction compensation lawsuit against a local government. Although Xie was eventually not found guilty of “disrupting courtroom order,” the offence continues to discourage lawyers from speaking out against procedural violations in court.Read Part II to learn about the barriers to reform.

  • “All Criminal Defendants to Have Lawyers”: Is Access to Defense Lawyers Enough in a System Designed Against Defendants? Part II

    Dr. Tan Qindong, detained for three months in Guangdong, found himself at the center of a major conflict of interest story in Chinese media. Image source: Caixin.
    In “‘All Criminal Defendants to Have Lawyers:’ Is Access to Defense Lawyers Enough in a System Designed Against Defendants? Part I,” Dui Hua analyzed shortcomings in the pilot projects including their failure to address the role of defense counsel in pre-trial contexts and the overemphasis on measuring success by coverage rather than quality of defense. In Part II, Dui Hua looks at a how a failure to embrace principles such as conflict of interest and clear commitment to public resources and accountability mechanisms are barriers that reformers must also consider.

    Conflict of Interest

    The presence of lawyers who are free from conflict of interest is key to a well-functioning criminal justice system. Recent cases illustrate that this principle has yet to be fully embraced in China’s criminal justice system. In January 2018, Guangzhou doctor Tan Qindong was arrested for writing online that in “his scientific opinion” the popular Chinese tonic liquor made by the Hongmao Liquor Company “appeared to be quack medicine, and a potential ‘poison’ for many retirees who drink it every day.” Hongmao is considered the backbone of the economy in Liangcheng County in Inner Mongolia, where the liquor is produced. Inner Mongolia police officers traveled more than 1,700 miles to arrest Tan in Guangzhou for his statements made online. The police later recommended that Tan’s wife, hire an attorney. Unbeknownst to her, the lawyer had previously served as Hongmao’s in-house legal counsel (falü guwen). The attorney advised Tan to admit guilt and to refrain from speaking to the media. Following heavy media attention and public outcry, Tan was released in April 2018. Professor Wang Yong of China University of Political Science and Law described the case as an overreach of power reflecting the influence of the Hongmao Liquor Company on the Inner Mongolia legal authorities.
    Yin Chuji was investigated in 2016 for handling cases as a defense attorney while also serving as a Hunan Taojiang Party official. Source: ifeng.
    In Hunan, Yin Chuji, was investigated in 2016 for simultaneously serving as a defense attorney at a Changsha law firm as well as a deputy party secretary of the Hunan Taojiang Political-Legal Commission. Yin reportedly handled more than eighty cases over a six-year period while holding both positions. In Beijing, Wang Hongguang, a former presiding Supreme People’s Court judge of the second civil division, was imprisoned in a case suggesting serious conflict of interest. The case was reported on WeChat. Wang allegedly accepted payments to influence the outcome of cases. In 2017, Beijing Dongcheng People’s Court found Wang guilty of accepting bribes. Wang’s appeal was rejected in 2018. As reformers seek to create a more robust system of defense counsels in China, efforts must also be made to address corruption and bias in the court room.
    Funding for Defense Counsels

    Another shortcoming of the pilot projects is adequate funding – critical for defense counsels who are expected to perform an array of functions. As a Congressional Executive Commission on China report points out, legal aid centers have “insufficient funding and eligibility restrictions continue to seriously limit accessibility to legal aid.” Local officials in Bao’an and Henan have acknowledged the varying duties defense counsels must perform, from obtaining case files and drafting briefs to applying for bail and other changes to coercive measures. However, the national regulations on the criminal defense pilot projects do not specify which government actors or units are responsible for ensuring the project’s funding.
    Media outlets have stated that in some cases subsidies are provided for defendants who cannot afford to hire their own attorneys. The pilot project regulations on funding are complex, leaving a series of bureaucratic loopholes for local officials looking to cut funding for criminal defense counsel. For example, Article 9 states that defendants should bear the costs of a publicly funded defense lawyer and that any cost sharing can be determined by provincial level judicial-administrative branches based on the regions local economic development, average residents’ income, and case-handling subsidy allowance standards. Article 7 and 8 states that the responsibility for providing funding for defense attorneys in criminal cases is shared among local jurisdictions, with unspecified “areas with means” (you tiaojian de difang) relied upon to voluntarily shoulder the cost burden in different ways, including establishing a criminal defense lawyer pool to develop the criminal defense counsel pilot projects and launching government procurement of legal aid services. A clear commitment to public resources would bolster the capacity of defense counsels to perform these specialized tasks.
    Sources of Accountability

    Another troubling pattern has emerged in the implementation of the pilot projects – it is unclear which bodies of government are responsible for the projects. Different municipalities and provinces seem to have their own opinion on which bodies are responsible for project implementation. In some projects, party units are entrusted with carrying out the projects, even though the national regulations on the pilot projects were launched by the Ministry of Justice. In some projects, the implementation is carried out by government offices or by provincial justice bureaus and courts. In Hebei province, which was not among the pilot project jurisdictions initially selected, neither the courts nor justice bureau has been involved in the project implementation. Instead it is the party or the government office that is overseeing the implementation. In Henan province, among the first to launch its pilot project in 2016, the provincial justice ministry is the project implementer “throughout the province and in selected areas,” with plans to expand the project to 91 county-level localities.
    The presence of a justice ministry bureau as the project implementer does not automatically mean the projects are better informed. For example, in the E’zhou prefecture of Hubei province, the pilot project was subsumed under a larger project of combating organized crime, with only a cursory mention of the criminal defense counsel pilot project.
    Meetings on “Full Coverage” of Defense Counsel for All Criminal Defendants in China
    JurisdictionBody Managing Pilot ProjectsReported DateOfficial Pilot Project location Under Article 26 Regulations?Status of Defense Counsel Pilot Projects
    Bao’an District, Shenzhen, GuangdongBao’an courts and Bao’an Justice BureauJune 2018YesAchievement of “complete criminal defense coverage” in Bao’an District
    Guangzhou, GuangdongGuangzhou courts and Guangzhou Justice BureauMay 2018YesImplementation of local regulations
    Henan provinceHenan Justice BureauJune 2018YesImplementation of local regulations
    Wujin District, Changzhou JiangsuWujin Court and Wujin Justice BureauMay 2018NoComplete criminal defense coverage underway
    Hebei provinceHenan Party General Office and Henan Government General OfficeJune 2018NoCriminal defense reform is part of a broader anti-crime agenda
    E’zhou, Hubei provinceE’zhou Justice BureauMay 2018NoCity Ministry of Justice unit advances criminal defense reform as part of a broader anti-crime agenda
    As these defense counsel pilot projects take shape across the country, precise guidelines on funding and identifying responsible actors are crucial. To understand the future implications of not doing so, the Chinese government’s needs to look no further than what has happened in the last fifty years in the U.S. In the 1963 U.S. Supreme Court decision Gideon v. Wainwright, the court unanimously announced that the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution “guarantees to every criminal defendant in a felony trial the right to a lawyer.” As Justice Hugo Black wrote, “any person hauled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided to him.”
    Fifty years later, much of Gideon’s promise remains a myth. The resources necessary to maintain high standards for the pro bono defense bar have been largely gutted; states are incentivized to cut funding and have many tools at their disposal to do so. Remuneration for public defenders has been capped in some states; in others, defendants must jump through various bureaucratic hoops to see a lawyer. In many jurisdictions, unqualified defense attorneys are the norm. To avoid the pitfalls of Gideon’s promise, Chinese authorities would benefit from making a long-term investment in their defense counsels.
    The defense counsel pilot projects are a step towards enhancing the protection of human rights in China. It is encouraging to see that provinces beyond the eight localities originally selected are also carrying out their own versions of the pilot projects, including in Jiangsu, Hubei, and Hebei provinces. However, there are obstacles that still need to be addressed, including providing better pre-trial defense, ensuring defense lawyers are free from conflicts of interest, and clarifying the funding sources and accountability mechanisms for defense counsels. As localities move ahead with expanding defense counsel appointments in criminal cases, courts and local units of the Justice Ministry should take the lead in implementing these reforms as the state institutions responsible for processing criminal cases. Limiting the role of party officials in the pilot project would safeguard defendants and minimize bias in court.
  • “All Criminal Defendants to Have Lawyers”: Is Access to Defense Lawyers Enough in a System Designed Against Defendants? Part II

    Dr. Tan Qindong, detained for three months in Guangdong, found himself at the center of a major conflict of interest story in Chinese media. Image source: Caixin.
    In “‘All Criminal Defendants to Have Lawyers:’ Is Access to Defense Lawyers Enough in a System Designed Against Defendants? Part I,” Dui Hua analyzed shortcomings in the pilot projects including their failure to address the role of defense counsel in pre-trial contexts and the overemphasis on measuring success by coverage rather than quality of defense. In Part II, Dui Hua looks at a how a failure to embrace principles such as conflict of interest and clear commitment to public resources and accountability mechanisms are barriers that reformers must also consider.
     
    Conflict of Interest
     
    The presence of lawyers who are free from conflict of interest is key to a well-functioning criminal justice system. Recent cases illustrate that this principle has yet to be fully embraced in China’s criminal justice system. In January 2018, Guangzhou doctor Tan Qindong was arrested for writing online that in “his scientific opinion” the popular Chinese tonic liquor made by the Hongmao Liquor Company “appeared to be quack medicine, and a potential ‘poison’ for many retirees who drink it every day.” Hongmao is considered the backbone of the economy in Liangcheng County in Inner Mongolia, where the liquor is produced. Inner Mongolia police officers traveled more than 1,700 miles to arrest Tan in Guangzhou for his statements made online. The police later recommended that Tan’s wife, hire an attorney. Unbeknownst to her, the lawyer had previously served as Hongmao’s in-house legal counsel (falü guwen). The attorney advised Tan to admit guilt and to refrain from speaking to the media. Following heavy media attention and public outcry, Tan was released in April 2018. Professor Wang Yong of China University of Political Science and Law described the case as an overreach of power reflecting the influence of the Hongmao Liquor Company on the Inner Mongolia legal authorities.
    Yin Chuji was investigated in 2016 for handling cases as a defense attorney while also serving as a Hunan Taojiang Party official. Source: ifeng.
    In Hunan, Yin Chuji, was investigated in 2016 for simultaneously serving as a defense attorney at a Changsha law firm as well as a deputy party secretary of the Hunan Taojiang Political-Legal Commission. Yin reportedly handled more than eighty cases over a six-year period while holding both positions. In Beijing, Wang Hongguang, a former presiding Supreme People’s Court judge of the second civil division, was imprisoned in a case suggesting serious conflict of interest. The case was reported on WeChat. Wang allegedly accepted payments to influence the outcome of cases. In 2017, Beijing Dongcheng People’s Court found Wang guilty of accepting bribes. Wang’s appeal was rejected in 2018. As reformers seek to create a more robust system of defense counsels in China, efforts must also be made to address corruption and bias in the court room.
    Funding for Defense Counsels
     
    Another shortcoming of the pilot projects is adequate funding – critical for defense counsels who are expected to perform an array of functions. As a Congressional Executive Commission on China report points out, legal aid centers have “insufficient funding and eligibility restrictions continue to seriously limit accessibility to legal aid.” Local officials in Bao’an and Henan have acknowledged the varying duties defense counsels must perform, from obtaining case files and drafting briefs to applying for bail and other changes to coercive measures. However, the national regulations on the criminal defense pilot projects do not specify which government actors or units are responsible for ensuring the project’s funding.
    Media outlets have stated that in some cases subsidies are provided for defendants who cannot afford to hire their own attorneys. The pilot project regulations on funding are complex, leaving a series of bureaucratic loopholes for local officials looking to cut funding for criminal defense counsel. For example, Article 9 states that defendants should bear the costs of a publicly funded defense lawyer and that any cost sharing can be determined by provincial level judicial-administrative branches based on the regions local economic development, average residents’ income, and case-handling subsidy allowance standards. Article 7 and 8 states that the responsibility for providing funding for defense attorneys in criminal cases is shared among local jurisdictions, with unspecified “areas with means” (you tiaojian de difang) relied upon to voluntarily shoulder the cost burden in different ways, including establishing a criminal defense lawyer pool to develop the criminal defense counsel pilot projects and launching government procurement of legal aid services. A clear commitment to public resources would bolster the capacity of defense counsels to perform these specialized tasks.
    Sources of Accountability
     
    Another troubling pattern has emerged in the implementation of the pilot projects – it is unclear which bodies of government are responsible for the projects. Different municipalities and provinces seem to have their own opinion on which bodies are responsible for project implementation. In some projects, party units are entrusted with carrying out the projects, even though the national regulations on the pilot projects were launched by the Ministry of Justice. In some projects, the implementation is carried out by government offices or by provincial justice bureaus and courts. In Hebei province, which was not among the pilot project jurisdictions initially selected, neither the courts nor justice bureau has been involved in the project implementation. Instead it is the party or the government office that is overseeing the implementation. In Henan province, among the first to launch its pilot project in 2016, the provincial justice ministry is the project implementer “throughout the province and in selected areas,” with plans to expand the project to 91 county-level localities.
    The presence of a justice ministry bureau as the project implementer does not automatically mean the projects are better informed. For example, in the E’zhou prefecture of Hubei province, the pilot project was subsumed under a larger project of combating organized crime, with only a cursory mention of the criminal defense counsel pilot project.
    Meetings on “Full Coverage” of Defense Counsel for All Criminal Defendants in China
    JurisdictionBody Managing Pilot ProjectsReported DateOfficial Pilot Project location Under Article 26 Regulations?Status of Defense Counsel Pilot Projects
    Bao’an District, Shenzhen, GuangdongBao’an courts and Bao’an Justice BureauJune 2018YesAchievement of “complete criminal defense coverage” in Bao’an District
    Guangzhou, GuangdongGuangzhou courts and Guangzhou Justice BureauMay 2018YesImplementation of local regulations
    Henan provinceHenan Justice BureauJune 2018YesImplementation of local regulations
    Wujin District, Changzhou JiangsuWujin Court and Wujin Justice BureauMay 2018NoComplete criminal defense coverage underway
    Hebei provinceHenan Party General Office and Henan Government General OfficeJune 2018NoCriminal defense reform is part of a broader anti-crime agenda
    E’zhou, Hubei provinceE’zhou Justice BureauMay 2018NoCity Ministry of Justice unit advances criminal defense reform as part of a broader anti-crime agenda
    As these defense counsel pilot projects take shape across the country, precise guidelines on funding and identifying responsible actors are crucial. To understand the future implications of not doing so, the Chinese government’s needs to look no further than what has happened in the last fifty years in the U.S. In the 1963 U.S. Supreme Court decision Gideon v. Wainwright, the court unanimously announced that the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution “guarantees to every criminal defendant in a felony trial the right to a lawyer.” As Justice Hugo Black wrote, “any person hauled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided to him.”
    Fifty years later, much of Gideon’s promise remains a myth. The resources necessary to maintain high standards for the pro bono defense bar have been largely gutted; states are incentivized to cut funding and have many tools at their disposal to do so. Remuneration for public defenders has been capped in some states; in others, defendants must jump through various bureaucratic hoops to see a lawyer. In many jurisdictions, unqualified defense attorneys are the norm. To avoid the pitfalls of Gideon’s promise, Chinese authorities would benefit from making a long-term investment in their defense counsels.
    The defense counsel pilot projects are a step towards enhancing the protection of human rights in China. It is encouraging to see that provinces beyond the eight localities originally selected are also carrying out their own versions of the pilot projects, including in Jiangsu, Hubei, and Hebei provinces. However, there are obstacles that still need to be addressed, including providing better pre-trial defense, ensuring defense lawyers are free from conflicts of interest, and clarifying the funding sources and accountability mechanisms for defense counsels. As localities move ahead with expanding defense counsel appointments in criminal cases, courts and local units of the Justice Ministry should take the lead in implementing these reforms as the state institutions responsible for processing criminal cases. Limiting the role of party officials in the pilot project would safeguard defendants and minimize bias in court.
  • Stalemate on Detention Center Law

    Reformers widely agree that changes are needed to the management of detention centers, which are currently governed by a set of administrative regulations issued in 1990. Image credit: Sixth Tone.

    It has been more than a year since the Ministry of Public Security circulated a draft of the new Detention Center Law for a one-month period of public comment. The consultation period served as an opportunity for Chinese legal scholars and lawyers to reiterate their strong criticism of the current system of detention and express their visions for reform—positions which have been relatively consistent for many years.

    It is difficult to say where the process stands now. As is common in the process of Chinese law-making, there is little transparency about how public comments are incorporated into the legislative process. No new drafts have been made public, and the only news from China’s legislative body, the National People’s Congress (NPC), is that work on the Detention Center Law will continue under a new legislative plan.

    Things appear to be in a stalemate. Reformers widely agree that changes are needed to a system that is currently governed by a set of administrative regulations issued in 1990. There is widespread consensus among critics that the key to reforming China’s detention centers is shifting administrative responsibility from the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). But the draft legislation put forward by the MPS proposes strengthening legal provisions without touching the current institutional arrangement.

    The argument for moving detention centers away from MPS control is based on a critique of the overlapping and conflicting functions that detention centers are currently used for. At present, Chinese detention centers play both a custodial role and an investigatory role. In addition to housing suspects and defendants, detention centers are expected to enhance criminal investigation and uncover additional evidence of crimes. According to critics like Professor Chen Ruihua of Peking University, some places have even based performance criteria for detention centers on their role in solving criminal cases. There is estimated to be at least 3,000 detention centers in China housing more than one million individuals.

    One consequence of using detention centers to further criminal investigations is the widespread use of “jailhouse bullies” and informants to obtain evidence or confessions from suspects. This clearly violates evidence rules and leads to false confessions and wrongful convictions. It has also been blamed for a number of deaths in detention under mysterious circumstances.

    This blurring of functions in Chinese detention centers is made possible because the public security system is responsible for both criminal investigation and detention—with the former being given higher priority in the interest of social stability and national security. Shifting responsibility for detention to the MOJ would put detention facilities in the hands of an institution with no direct interest in the outcome of a criminal investigation. This would, in principle, make detention centers more neutral sites that can focus on the protection of detainees’ rights.

    Advocates of such reform believe that putting detention centers under the MOJ would not only help to reduce jailhouse abuses but also facilitate the rights of suspects and defendants to meet with legal counsel. It will lead, they also believe, to a much stronger presumption of innocence throughout the pre-trial phase of the criminal process. The current regulations governing detention centers still refer to detainees as “criminals” (renfan), as opposed to “suspects” (xianyiren) or “defendants” (beigaoren)—terms that have already been well-established in China’s Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law. Notably, the draft MPS legislation did propose making these changes in terminology, but critics doubt that changing the wording will lead to changing the mindset and practices that presume all detainees to be guilty. Another benefit to placing detention centers under the MOJ is that it would allow detainees to use points earned for good behavior towards future applications for sentence reductions.

    The current stalemate may be hard to overcome given the institutional interests at stake in preserving the practice of using detention as a tool of criminal investigation. The fact that the MPS draft has not been enacted by the NPC suggests that there may be relatively strong support for deeper reform. But the battles and negotiations over Chinese legislation mostly take place behind closed doors, far from the public eye. The next opportunity for insight into the content of the law might well be after it’s passed by the NPC Standing Committee—at which point, the debate will have been settled one way or another.

  • Flouting Global Norms, China Continues to Incarcerate Prisoners for Abolished Crimes

    Flouting Global Norms, China Continues to Incarcerate Prisoners for Abolished Crimes

    The fifth session of the 8th National People’s Congress, which adopted the revision to the Criminal Law. Image credit: NPC.gov.cn.

    As Dui Hua has previously reported, the People’s Republic of China continues to incarcerate prisoners for the crimes of counterrevolution and hooliganism, despite the abolition of these crimes in 1997. A recent comparative survey of criminal laws, summarized below, notes that most countries (67 percent) allow some “retroactive ameliorative relief” (e.g., sentence reductions or early release) in the wake of legislative changes that abolish or lighten the sentences of certain crimes. The major governing human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), determine that prisoners should benefit from legal reforms that impose lighter penalties than those in existence at the time the offense was committed. Although prisoners serving sentences for abolished crimes have received sentence reductions, the Chinese government should unequivocally join other countries by releasing and doing more to reduce the sentences for these prisoners.

    The Long Reach of Counterrevolution and Hooliganism

    Chinese legal scholar Chen Jianfu points out the crime of counterrevolution has always assumed primary importance in the PRC’s criminal justice system. One of the first PRC legal provisions, the “Regulations for the Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries,” passed in 1951, reveals that counterrevolutionary crimes were primarily political in nature. When the PRC Criminal Law was amended in 1997, problems with enforcing these ambiguously worded, politically charged counterrevolutionary crimes led to the abolition of this criminal legal category; some of the activities that fell under counterrevolutionary crimes were included into the collection of “endangering state security” crimes which are tailored more directly at criminalizing specific actions that threaten the state.

    Dui Hua’s research has uncovered the names of prisoners in China who continue to be incarcerated for political crimes of counterrevolution. Dui Hua has received written responses from the Chinese government that the following individuals are still imprisoned for crimes of counterrevolution:

    • Chen Yulin (陈瑜琳): Chen is a former Xinhua news agency employee who was convicted of espionage by the Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court on March 4, 2004 and sentenced to life imprisonment. Because Chen’s alleged offense took place before the amended Criminal Law took effect in 1997, he was tried under the 1979 Criminal Law for the crime of counterrevolution. Chen Yulin’s life sentence was commuted in 2007 and replaced with a fixed-term sentence of 19.5 years. Although Chen has received multiple sentence reductions, he is not due for release until August 26, 2020.
    • Jiang Cunde (蒋存德): Jiang is a former labor activist serving in Shanghai’s Tilanqiao Prison for counterrevolutionary sabotage and illegal possession of weapons. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia in prison and in 1993 he was released on medical parole. In 1999, he was re-incarcerated for participating in demonstrations. Since then, Jiang has received only one sentence reduction, in 2004, when his life sentence was commuted to a fixed-term of 20 years’ imprisonment. A government response given to Dui Hua in 2015 stated that Jiang was held in a “mental retardation unit” and a response in 2018 indicated that there had been no change to Jiang’s sentence. Jiang’s sentence expires on August 22, 2024.
    • Abdukerim Abduweli: Abduweli was sentenced by the Urumqi Intermediate People’s Court to twelve years in prison on May 6, 1993, for counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement and leading a counterrevolutionary group. According to information provided by the Chinese government, his imprisonment has been extended several times. His sentence expires in December 2018.
    • Omer Akchi: Akchi was detained in December 1996 for organizing the Islamic Party of Allah. Akchi continues to serve his 21-year sentence for counterrevolution.

    Although prisoners serving sentences for abolished crimes in China have received clemency in the form sentence reductions, cases such as Chen Yulin’s and Jiang Cunde’s demonstrate the importance Chinese leadership should place in aligning its laws with international. Dui Hua has received government responses on both cases in 2018. The responses confirm that Jiang Cunde has not received a sentence reduction in over 14 years and that by the time Chen Yulin is expected to be released, he will have served more than 16 years in prison. Dui Hua’s research has found that sentence reductions for prisoners serving sentences for counterrevolution are infrequently handed down and those that are handed down are usually only in the months to yearlong range. In the case of life sentences that are commuted to fixed-term sentences, such as for Jiang and Chen, the time spent already served does not count towards their new fixed-term sentence, which is usually twenty years imprisonment. Another impediment to the formalization of retroactive ameliorative relief is that when sentence reductions are filed by the prisons to the courts the justification for the sentence reductions is based almost exclusively on evidence of meritorious behavior, never the fact that the prisoners are serving a sentence for a crime no longer in the books. Following the latest regulation on sentence reduction released by the Supreme People’s Court in November 2016, prisoners serving sentences for endangering state security crimes (which replaced many of the offenses previously categorized under counterrevolution) must wait three years, rather than the standard two years, before they can be considered for sentence reductions. The regulation fails to clarify the status of prisoners serving sentences for counterrevolution and hooliganism.

    The ill-defined crime of “hooliganism” was also abolished in 1997, yet nearly 200 individuals remain incarcerated for this crime. Inspired by the criminal laws of the former Soviet Union and other socialist states, hooliganism was loosely defined, granting state officials the broad discretion to punish undesirable behavior as defined in interpretations issued by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. Between 1979-1997, a large but unknown number of people were convicted of this offense.

    Dui Hua’s research into online judgments has uncovered the names of 182 prisoners serving sentences for hooliganism who were still in prison as of December 31, 2017. Although the offense was abolished in 1997, some of them received sentences in the 2000s or even more recently, because the Criminal Law imposes no limit on the period of prosecution for cases where the suspect has escaped after a case has been filed by police or procuratorate, or heard by the courts.

    International Norms on Abolished Crimes

    The Chinese government’s continued incarceration of these prisoners marks a clear break from international norms regarding changes to the criminal law and prisoners convicted of those crimes. This area of international and comparative criminal justice policy, referred to as “retroactive application of ameliorative law,” was examined in a recent report by the Human Rights in Criminal Sentencing Project at the University of San Francisco School of Law. According to the report, the international legal framework governing retroactive amelioration is explicit and clear: “The major governing human rights treaties allow an offender to benefit from a change in law that imposes a lighter penalty than the one in existence at the time the offense was committed.”

    In the report, of 193 countries surveyed, 129 (or 67%) have incorporated some type of provision requiring retroactive implementation of a lesser penalty into their constitution and/or their criminal statutes. Under retroactive ameliorative relief, a law change that eases or eliminates punishments for a specific crime would result in a corresponding amendment to any convictions and sentences for persons already convicted of the crime. Revisions to death penalty statutes provide perhaps the clearest illustrations of the importance of retroactive relief: according to Amanda Solter, Project Director of the USF Human Rights and Criminal Sentencing Reform Project, when the death penalty was repealed in the US states of Connecticut and New Mexico, the change was not made retroactive, leaving prisoners on death row despite a lack of valid legal authority for the state to carry out executions. “South Africa, on the other hand, abolished the death penalty and made it retroactive for 300 to 400 people on Death Row. Russia did the same in the ’90s and commuted the sentences of roughly 700 people.”

    China Should Unambiguously Follow Global Norms and Release Prisoners and Increase Transparency

    To take a global leadership role in the world, China should avoid such contradictions in its criminal law and unequivocally embrace retroactive ameliorative relief when crimes are removed from applicable criminal justice statutes. This policy stance would involve releasing and/or commuting the sentences of all prisoners confined for committing the long-defunct crimes of counterrevolution and hooliganism. In the event that release or commutation is not granted, the relevant legal authorities should issue a transparent explanation justifying the continued imprisonment under valid and effective criminal law provisions.

    General proscriptions against retroactive applications of law should not be an obstacle to recognizing ameliorative relief; in fact, such objections have already been addressed in the applicable international legal provisions. Article 15 of the ICCPR prohibits criminal ex post facto laws but notes the exception that “[i]f, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.”

    Given the global consensus on this issue, the Chinese government should clarify its policy regarding changes to the criminal law and their effects on prisoners incarcerated for those crimes. In this case, releasing prisoners whose acts of “counterrevolution” or “hooliganism” have been completely decriminalized would send a strong message and bring Chinese law into alignment with the international consensus on this issue.

  • Call for Constitutional Review of Custody and Education

    Zhu Zhengfu, Vice President of the All-China Lawyers Association and member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Image Credit: Weibo.

    In the lead up to this year’s session of the National People’s Congress (NPC), prominent Chinese lawyer, Zhu Zhengfu, called on the NPC to review the constitutionality of the system of custody and education (收容教育). Zhu is the Vice President of the All-China Lawyers Association and a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Custody and education is a form of administrative detention designed to punish both sex workers and their clients.

    Those who find themselves in one of these centers can be detained for up to two years without judicial process. Similar to previous debates over the system of “re-education through labor,” which was abolished in 2013, calls for the abolition of custody and education have been made ahead of the annual NPC meeting. The detention of well-known Chinese actor Huang Haibo in 2014 for soliciting a sex worker also helped put a spotlight on the coercive measure.

    During the 2016 NPC session, Taiwanese delegate Zhang Xiaodong proposed to the NPC, on similar grounds as Zhu, that custody and education be abolished. In this years’ proposal, Zhu emphasized the weak legal basis of the system, specifically citing its inconsistency with the Constitution and the Legislation Law.

    As a form of administrative detention, custody and education is exclusively overseen and carried out by public security organs and is beyond the supervision of procuratorates and courts. Public security organs have comprehensive control over the investigation and incarceration process as well as the operation of the custody and education centers, an environment in which abuse of power thrives. The centers were originally created with the goal of educating and rehabilitating sex workers and treating sexually transmitted diseases (STD). The education detainees receive is intended to direct them towards other occupations upon release and treatment of STDs is designed to help contain ongoing public health issues such as the prevalence of HIV/AIDS.

    Instead, the centers are often riddled with stories of arbitrary arrests, forced and unpaid labor, and charging detainees fees for their living and medical expenses as well as their rehabilitation treatments. Detainees undergo compulsory testing and treatment for STDs, which they must bear the costs of; many are not informed about the results of their tests or provided adequate counselling. The centers not only violate detainees’ right to health and privacy, but critics argue that they have also been counterproductive at achieving their goal. Detainees frequently return to sex work upon release, having failed to obtain an education, new professional skills, or the health services and counselling needed to protect themselves as they reenter the sex work industry.

    Experts estimate that somewhere between 18,000 to 28,000 individuals are sent to custody and education centers each year. From 1987 to 2000, more than 300,000 people had been housed in custody and education centers across China and as of 2014 there were more than 116 custody and education centers in the country.

    *

    Discussing the System of Custody and Education

    Restricting the Personal Freedoms of Individuals Through Administrative Regulations Goes Against the Spirit of the Constitution

    Beijing News (BJ News): Why does your proposal focus on custody and education? What are the current problems with this system?

    Zhu Zhengfu (Zhu): The system of custody and education has many facets, including legislation passed at the 1991 National People’s Congress (NPC) Decision on the Strict Prohibition Against Prostitution, the State Council’s Measures on the Custody and Education of Prostitutes and Clients of Prostitutes, and the Ministry of Public Security’s regulations governing the sites of custody and education centers. The thrust of the legislations targets sex workers and their clients. Around the time of 1991, societal conditions were decadent and sex work was on the cusp of spreading. In hindsight, we cannot say that those who hired sex workers were right or wrong. However, following constitutional amendments and the passage of the Legislation Law, problems underlying custody and education’s legislative process, its legislative jurisdiction, and its enforcement began to gradually surface. The main problem is that as an administrative penalty, custody and education can restrict the personal freedoms of an individual from six months up to two years prior to trial and without judicial process before the punishments take effect. In other words, there is no legal defense and no cross-examination of evidence. Long periods of restricting personal freedoms under administrative penalties, without corresponding procedural safeguards, clearly demonstrates that the measure violates [the principle] of procedural fairness.

    BJ News: In other words, when you punish by limiting the personal freedoms of an individual, it should not be governed by administrative regulations.

    Zhu: Yes, Article 8(5) of the Legislation Law clearly stipulates that coercive measures and penalties that restrict personal freedoms must be governed by law. Article 9 of the Legislation Law also stipulates that if laws have not been formulated regarding this matter [Article 8(5)], the NPC or its Standing Committee can authorize the State Council to formulate administrative regulations, except for when it involves regulations that restrict personal freedoms. However, the 1991 NPC Decision on the Strict Prohibition Against Prostitution authorized the State Council to formulate specific measures for custody and education, which is legally at odds with the Legislation Law.

    Besides its inconsistency with the Legislation Law, custody and education also touches on the issue of the inconsistency of legislative jurisdiction. Custody and education is now regarded as a measure carried out by public security organs. Administrative penalties can be appealed and litigated on. The Law on Administrative Penalties covers different types of administrative penalties, however it does not include custody and education. Even as the most serious form of an administrative penalty, the system of custody and education is inconsistent with the Law on Administrative Penalties.

    Furthermore, the Criminal Law provides exemption from criminal punishment in cases where there is a sentence of less than two years’ imprisonment; in cases involving six-months [or less] criminal detention or control; and in cases where the circumstances are minor, even though the action constitutes a criminal offence. The Criminal Law targets and punishes those who commit criminal offences, however sex work is merely an administrative offence, yet it carries a punishment that is more severe than a criminal offence. In doing so, [custody and education] has disrupted the order set forth by the various measures stipulated in the Criminal Law.

    BJ News: You have repeatedly proposed abolishing the system of custody and education at the time of the Two Meetings, why are you so closely committed to ridding this system?

    Zhu: In 2003, I joined several members of the Guangdong People’s Consultative Conference and proposed to abolish the system of Re-education Through Labor (RTL); through many calls for action, media spotlight, and several important RTL cases, RTL was finally abolished in 2013. Custody and education and RTL are similar, on a legislative basis they have clear flaws and they both work through administrative organs that enforce punishments to restrict personal freedoms. Thus in 2014, [I proposed to] abolish custody and education, and again in 2016 and 2017.

    Prior proposals have all tackled the issue from an abolitionist perspective, this year’s proposal takes a constitutional review angle. In the 19th Party Congress work report, it clearly states the importance of “strengthening the implementation and supervision of the constitution, advancing constitutional review, and maintaining the authority of the constitution.” Because the work report has such a focus on this area and because I believe that the era of conducting constitutional reviews and establishing constitutional authority has come, I made the proposal to conduct a constitutional review of custody and education.

    BJ News: There are many vocal supporters of abolishing custody and education. At present, what do you regard as the hardest part in abolishing this system?

    Zhu: The hardest part is that [custody and education] has already become an established system that is well-embedded into mutually beneficial relationships; law enforcement organs may believe that the existing system could aid in problem solving – once you get rid of it, you are also removing a tool of law enforcement.

  • How Transparency in Death Penalty Cases Can Reduce Wrongful Convictions

    He Jiahong (right) speaking on a forum at the “World Day Against Death Penalty”, October 2014.

    He Jiahong is a special kind of Chinese legal expert. He is a well-known legal scholar at Renmin University Law School in Beijing, where he specializes in criminal justice and the issue of wrongful convictions. He is also the author of detective novels and writes prolifically on legal subjects for popular audiences. He reportedly likes to describe himself as: “I am not only a jurist but a novelist, so I often have novel ideas about law.”

    One of the ways in which He Jiahong expresses those ideas is through his public WeChat channel—a blog distributed to anyone who subscribes via the social media platform. Recently, he posted a piece with the rather provocative title: “The Number of Executions Should be Made Public.”

    In China’s criminal justice discourse, public calls for greater transparency around the use of the death penalty are not unheard of but are nevertheless eye-catching when they do appear, especially from well-known legal experts such as He. Information related to the death penalty, including the number of executions carried out each year, continue to be treated as a closely guarded “state secret.” This is despite the fact that there are many indications that China has significantly reduced its use of capital punishment over the past decade—though it is still generally believed to be the world’s top executioner—and continues to face pressure from NGOs and United Nations human rights bodies to be more transparent about its use of the death penalty.

    Changsha Court public announcement of death sentences. Source: Hu Guiyun.

    He Jiahong raises some familiar arguments in support of greater transparency about capital punishment in China, including the importance of preventing wrongful executions, demonstrating the progress made in reducing the use of the death penalty, and the value of facilitating public discussion about the future of capital punishment. He clearly believes that openness and greater transparency will help build public trust in the judiciary and show respect for the public’s right to access such information.

    He notes that the trend towards online publicization of court documents is making secrecy about capital punishment irrelevant. On this point, he is perhaps overly optimistic. Dui Hua and other organizations that have tried to use online platforms like the Supreme People’s Court’s national database of court judgments have found it seriously lacking when it comes to information about cases involving the death penalty and other “sensitive” subjects.

    This suggests that the trend toward judicial transparency is already bound by pre-set limits on what information is considered “appropriate” for public disclosure. If the Chinese government were to do as He Jiahong recommends and make data about capital punishment public, it would first have to make the top-down decision to lift secrecy restrictions. The hope of a shortcut to judicial transparency through the release of court data is unlikely given such secrecy restrictions.

    *

    The Number of Executions Should be Made Public

    He Jiahong

    He Jiahong, professor at Renmin University School of Law. Source: Financial Times.

    On April 27, 1987, a dismembered female corpse was found in the Mianjiang River of Mayang County, Hunan. After searching missing-person’s reports, identification by family members, and blood-type analysis, the police confirmed that the deceased was a woman from Guizhou named Shi Xiaorong who had been missing for a month after working at a local hotel.

    After several months of investigation, police determined, based on the manner in which the culprit had dismembered the corpse that the killer was a butcher named Teng Xingshan… On December 6, police placed Teng Xingshan under custody and investigation. Following continuous interrogation, Teng finally “confessed.” On December 13, 1988, the Huaihua Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Teng Xingshan to death. On January 19, 1989, the Hunan Higher People’s Court rejected Teng’s appeal, upheld the original verdict, and approved his death sentence.

    In order to ensure that the death penalty is applied impartially and correctly, Chinese law mandates a special review and ratification procedure for death penalty cases, on the principle of a two-stage judicial process of trial and appeal. According to the provisions of the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law, death sentences with two-year reprieve were to be reviewed by high people’s courts and death sentences with immediate execution were to be reviewed by the Supreme People’s Court. Regardless of whether or not the defendant filed an appeal, cases involving the death penalty would all be subject to an automatic review process. In 1983, in an effort to “strike hard and fast” against criminal acts that seriously endangered public security and social order, the Supreme People’s Court delegated the power to review death sentences for homicide, rape, robbery, setting explosions, and other serious crimes to high people’s courts. To a certain degree, this led to a loosening of the review and control procedures over the death penalty. Since high people’s courts in provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions were generally the courts hearing appeals in death penalty cases, delegation of the power to review these cases meant that the same court became responsible for hearing the appeal and carrying out the final review. The review and ratification process that had been originally intended as a way to strictly control use of the death penalty became effectively meaningless.

    Teng Xingshan’s case was handled under the combined “two-in-one” process of appeal trial and death sentence approval that existed during that particular period of Chinese law. On January 28, 1989, Teng Xingshan was executed by gunshot. However, that wasn’t the end of the case, because the so-called “victim” was still alive and would later “come back to life.”

    In 1993, Shi Xiaorong finally made it home to Guizhou after having been abducted and trafficked to Shandong. When she heard about the Teng Xingshan case, she said that she didn’t even know Teng, and certainly did not have any “dubious relationship” with him. She even wrote to the Hunan court, asking it to revoke its mistaken judgment that she had “dubious relations” with Teng Xingshan, had been “murdered” by him, and demanded compensation for her reputation damage. But there was no response from the court. Shi now has a new life and no longer cares about an old case that has nothing to do with her.

    News that the “dead had come back to life” eventually reached Teng Xingshan’s family. Teng’s parents had both died not long after their son had been executed. His brother figured that because their family was poor and ordinary they should not oppose the government. Not wanting to make trouble for himself, he decided not to mention the matter to anyone outside the family. In 2004, Teng Xingshan’s daughter Teng Yan had already grown up and worked as a migrant laborer for many years. After she learned the truth about what had happened, she and her younger brother Teng Hui, with help from a lawyer, filed a motion for appeal with the Hunan Provincial Procuratorate and Hunan High People’s Court. On October 25, 2005, the Hunan Higher People’s Court ordered a retrial in Teng Xingshan’s homicide trial and formally acquitted him of the charges. Teng Yan and Teng Hui received state and other compensations in the amount of 666,660 yuan (approximately US$85,000 at the time).

    At the time, the National People’s Congress Legislative Affairs Commission was organizing experts and scholars to study ways of reforming the Criminal Procedure Law, and the death penalty review procedure was one of the areas that everyone was paying close attention to. There’s no question that the Teng Xingshan case played a role in pushing forward reform of the death penalty review system. The Supreme People’s Court decided from January 1, 2007, to take back the authority to review death sentences in all cases.

    It’s now been 10 years since the reform of the death penalty review system. I was recently asked how I’d evaluate this reform. I said that it’s certainly been very positive, but I would have a hard time saying for sure. I believe that, since the power to review death sentences was returned to the Supreme People’s Court, the death penalty has definitely been applied with much greater strictness, in greater accordance with the rules, and in a more uniform manner. And the number of executions has certainly also decreased by a great deal. But because I don’t know the specific details, it’s impossible to comment in an objective and precise way.

    In China, the number of executions seems to be treated as a kind of “state secret”. Those in the know remain tight-lipped on the subject, while those on the outside let their imaginations run wild. In my opinion, there’s no reason to treat the number of executions as a “state secret.” All death sentences in China are handed down and executed openly and in accordance with the law. It’s all perfectly open and aboveboard—executions are not carried out in secret or indiscriminately. Why does the government choose to be so secretive and why is it afraid of keeping the public informed? Disclosing the number of executions will not stain the reputation of the judicial organs or lead to social unrest. Tempered by their experience of numerous wars and disasters, Chinese people surely are psychologically resilient enough to face up to the number of executions!

    On this point, policymakers ought to abandon their antiquated ideas of closed-door justice and embrace the modern judicial norms of transparency. Practical experience shows that openness is the best publicity and offers the best route to foster public trust. Publishing execution numbers also demonstrates judicial organs’ respect for citizens’ right to access information (zhiqingquan).

    Actually, the Chinese judiciary has already made progress on this front, as court verdicts have begun to be published online! As a technical matter, when court verdicts are all online it won’t be that difficult to use “big data” technology to tally up the number of executions. Even if officials don’t make it public, the public can still find out. Therefore, I recommend that the Supreme People’s Court choose the right moment to begin publishing the number of executions. This can demonstrate the Chinese government’s resolve and sincerity in facing up to capital punishment and promoting civilized justice.

    At the present time, there are more than 140 countries and regions in the world that have abolished the death penalty either by law or in practice. This shows that abolishing the death penalty is the general trend of human society because it is in line with the general spirit of humanitarianism and civilized justice. Furthermore, abolishing the death penalty is an effective way to prevent wrongful executions of innocent people. For judicial personnel, “no unjust treatment, no indulging wrongdoings” is but a beautiful tale/lore. Police, prosecutors and judges aren’t supernatural beings, and making the incorrect decisions when evidence is lacking is something that cannot be entirely avoided. Therefore, to prevent further miscarriages of justice in which innocent people are mistakenly put to death, we should seriously consider abolishing capital punishment.

    I am deeply aware that China cannot abolish the death penalty at the current time, but we should have an earnest discussion about the issue and, through our efforts, make more of our fellow Chinese understand that the death penalty is not perfectly justified. Our government ought to make a solemn pledge to the world that China will make an effort to abolish the death penalty and that it will start by making the number of executions public so that the world can see the progress of China’s death penalty policies. After several years of continued hard work, China will go from “executing fewer” to “no executions” to full abolition of capital punishment, once again making China one of the most civilized, humane, and harmonious countries in the world!

  • Violent Crime and Juvenile Justice: Lessons for China and the United States (Part II of II)

    Following “Violent Crime and Juvenile Justice: Lessons for China and the United States Part I,” Part II explores the states of California and South Dakota, characterized by their “mid-high” to “high” juvenile confinement rates. Do lower juvenile confinement rates guarantee more lenient policies regarding juvenile waiver into adult court?


    Number of Inmates Serving Life-Without-Parole Sentences for Crimes Committed as Juveniles

    Data taken from July 2015 study “No Hope: Re-Examining Lifetime Sentences for Juvenile Offenders.” Source: Philips Black.
    The US is also dealing with the issue of violent crimes committed by juveniles 15 and under, with perhaps the most famous case being the “Slender Man” incident in Wisconsin, in which two 12-year-old female defendants stabbed a classmate repeatedly and were charged with attempted homicide. Because these cases are highly complex, this article conducts in-depth case studies comparing different state approaches to high profile felonies committed by juveniles 15 and younger, similar to the Slender Man case. Two case studies involve female juvenile defendants, and two involve males. Chinese officials considering policy reforms aimed at curbing violence among very young juveniles might draw important lessons from these state-level US cases.
    California: Mid-High Confinement Rate (173-366.5 per 100,000)

    Facts: Female defendant, Sarah Weeden, who was 14 at the time of the crime, was arrested, convicted, and sentenced for the murder of Navnil Chand, killed by gunshot by 23-year-old Sertice Melonson. The crime occurred in August 2005. According to testimony at Weeden’s 2008 trial, Weeden agreed to meet Chand at a park for a date and directed him there by cellphone. When he arrived, Melonson waited to rob him. During the robbery, Melonson shot and killed Chand. In April 2017, the 9th US Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Weeden’s conviction and remanded her for a new trial, finding that Weeden’s trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to have Weeden evaluated by a psychologist to determine her capacity to form criminal intent. Weeden might be re-tried in juvenile court.
    Law and Policies: California has three ways that juveniles can be prosecuted as adults:
    1. Statutory Exclusion: California has a list of offenses, which if committed by a youth aged 14 or older, require that the youth be criminally prosecuted as an adult. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 602(b);
    2. Discretionary Judicial Waiver: The juvenile court has original jurisdiction over most juvenile cases, but in certain delineated cases where the child is at least 16 years old at the time of the offense, the state may request that the juvenile court transfer jurisdiction to adult criminal court. The juvenile court must conduct a hearing and consider statutorily listed factors to determine whether to transfer jurisdiction. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 707;
    3. Once an Adult, Always an Adult: California has a set procedure by which if a juvenile has been adjudicated, and certain criteria are met, all future charges against them will be automatically prosecuted in adult criminal court. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 707.01.
    Defendants Waived Into Adult Court? Weeden appears to have been processed automatically in adult trial court pursuant to the “statutory exclusion” provisions above. Weeden’s appellate attorney notes that prosecutors filed directly in Superior Court (i.e., “adult court”) because it was a murder case, without consideration of factors such as Weeden’s age, maturity level, or mental health. Jurors found Weeden guilty of first-degree murder as an aider and abettor to Melonson, and Sacramento Superior Court Judge Maryanne G. Gilliard sentenced her to 27 years to life in prison.
    South Dakota: High Rate of Juvenile Confinement (366.5-560 per 100,000)
    Facts: In 2000, a jury convicted Daniel Charles of first-degree murder in the sniper killing of his stepfather, Duane Ingalls. Charles was 14 at the time of the crime. Charles was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP), despite the fact that such sentences were largely ruled unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court in 2012. In March 2017, Charles was resentenced to a 92-year sentence, a decision that was upheld by the South Dakota Supreme Court.
    Law and Policies: South Dakota has three ways that juveniles can be prosecuted as adults:
    1. Discretionary waiver: for any felony; there is no minimum age requirement. S.D. Codified Laws § 26-11-4;
    2. Statutory Exclusion: required for youth age 16 and older accused of class A, B, C, 1, or 2 felonies. S.D. Codified Laws § 26-11-3.1;
    3. Once an Adult, Always an Adult (if convicted of the offense): S.D. Codified Laws § 26-11-4.
    Defendant Waived Into Adult Court? It appears that Charles was waived into adult court based on the “discretionary waiver” provisions listed above.
    Figure 1. Selected Non-custodial Measures for Women in Prison in US States
    StateConfinement Rate, 2013 (per 100,000 juveniles)Defendant Age, Sex, CrimeState Laws on Waiver into Adult CourtCase Prosecuted in Adult Court?
    Wisconsin109.5-17312-year-old girl defendants; attempted homicide, stabbingWI law requires children as young as 10 to be charged as adults for homicide crimesYes
    Massachusetts46-109.515-year-old boy defendant; homicide, stabbingJuveniles 14 and older accused of homicide are automatically tried as adultsYes
    California173-366.514-year-old girl defendant; homicide, gunshot (participant)Mandatory adult court jurisdiction for violent crimes committed by person 14 or olderYes
    South Dakota366.5-56014-year-old defendant, homicide, gunshotDiscretionary waiverYes; defendant sentenced to LWOP in 2000, later commuted to 92 years

    Reforming Juvenile Sentencing Standards
    While the case studies and data presented above are subject to multiple interpretations, the case studies curiously display little correlation between confinement rate and waiver into adult court jurisdiction laws. Where a trend can be identified is in the relationship between high confinement rates and the severity of punishment (as exemplified in the South Dakota case).
    Juvenile justice policy reformers have tended to assume that limiting adult court jurisdiction for very young juvenile offenders will help limit unnecessary juvenile confinement. In extremely serious cases involving very young defendants, however, it appears that juvenile court jurisdiction is almost never an option. The two states with the lowest juvenile confinement rates in the case study have the most restrictive laws in favor of trying very young, violent juveniles in adult criminal court: Massachusetts and Wisconsin. Rather than focusing on waiver into adult court in these cases, perhaps juvenile justice reformers should place more emphasis on reforming juvenile sentencing standards and providing defendants with mental health evaluations.
    The case study comparison suggests that harsh penalties, rather than mandatory adult court jurisdiction, might co-occur more significantly with high juvenile confinement rates. After all, the state with the highest juvenile confinement rate in the case study, South Dakota, also dealt the harshest penalty: Daniel Charles, the 14-year-old defendant in the South Dakota case, was tried in adult court without a mental health evaluation and was sentenced to life without parole. Even following US Supreme Court criticism of life sentences for juveniles in 2012, the South Dakota court still provided Charles only a nominal commutation to his sentence, reducing the life sentence to a term of 92 years in prison, allowing Charles no chance at parole until he is 60 years old. Further, it appears that only in the bizarre Slender Man case in Wisconsin were the defendants given a mental health evaluation before adjudication. In California, this omission resulted in the reversal of the defendant’s conviction. Increased attention to a defendant’s mental health status might also lower pressure on judges to impose long prison sentences on very young juveniles, thereby reducing the overall rate of confinement in the US.
  • Violent Crime and Juvenile Justice: Lessons for China and the United States (Part II of II)

    Following “Violent Crime and Juvenile Justice: Lessons for China and the United States Part I,” Part II explores the states of California and South Dakota, characterized by their “mid-high” to “high” juvenile confinement rates. Do lower juvenile confinement rates guarantee more lenient policies regarding juvenile waiver into adult court?


    Number of Inmates Serving Life-Without-Parole Sentences for Crimes Committed as Juveniles

    Data taken from July 2015 study “No Hope: Re-Examining Lifetime Sentences for Juvenile Offenders.” Source: Philips Black.
    The US is also dealing with the issue of violent crimes committed by juveniles 15 and under, with perhaps the most famous case being the “Slender Man” incident in Wisconsin, in which two 12-year-old female defendants stabbed a classmate repeatedly and were charged with attempted homicide. Because these cases are highly complex, this article conducts in-depth case studies comparing different state approaches to high profile felonies committed by juveniles 15 and younger, similar to the Slender Man case. Two case studies involve female juvenile defendants, and two involve males. Chinese officials considering policy reforms aimed at curbing violence among very young juveniles might draw important lessons from these state-level US cases.
    California: Mid-High Confinement Rate (173-366.5 per 100,000)
     
    Facts: Female defendant, Sarah Weeden, who was 14 at the time of the crime, was arrested, convicted, and sentenced for the murder of Navnil Chand, killed by gunshot by 23-year-old Sertice Melonson. The crime occurred in August 2005. According to testimony at Weeden’s 2008 trial, Weeden agreed to meet Chand at a park for a date and directed him there by cellphone. When he arrived, Melonson waited to rob him. During the robbery, Melonson shot and killed Chand. In April 2017, the 9th US Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Weeden’s conviction and remanded her for a new trial, finding that Weeden’s trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to have Weeden evaluated by a psychologist to determine her capacity to form criminal intent. Weeden might be re-tried in juvenile court.
    Law and Policies: California has three ways that juveniles can be prosecuted as adults:
    1. Statutory Exclusion: California has a list of offenses, which if committed by a youth aged 14 or older, require that the youth be criminally prosecuted as an adult. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 602(b);
    2. Discretionary Judicial Waiver: The juvenile court has original jurisdiction over most juvenile cases, but in certain delineated cases where the child is at least 16 years old at the time of the offense, the state may request that the juvenile court transfer jurisdiction to adult criminal court. The juvenile court must conduct a hearing and consider statutorily listed factors to determine whether to transfer jurisdiction. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 707;
    3. Once an Adult, Always an Adult: California has a set procedure by which if a juvenile has been adjudicated, and certain criteria are met, all future charges against them will be automatically prosecuted in adult criminal court. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 707.01.
    Defendants Waived Into Adult Court? Weeden appears to have been processed automatically in adult trial court pursuant to the “statutory exclusion” provisions above. Weeden’s appellate attorney notes that prosecutors filed directly in Superior Court (i.e., “adult court”) because it was a murder case, without consideration of factors such as Weeden’s age, maturity level, or mental health. Jurors found Weeden guilty of first-degree murder as an aider and abettor to Melonson, and Sacramento Superior Court Judge Maryanne G. Gilliard sentenced her to 27 years to life in prison.
    South Dakota: High Rate of Juvenile Confinement (366.5-560 per 100,000)
    Facts: In 2000, a jury convicted Daniel Charles of first-degree murder in the sniper killing of his stepfather, Duane Ingalls. Charles was 14 at the time of the crime. Charles was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP), despite the fact that such sentences were largely ruled unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court in 2012. In March 2017, Charles was resentenced to a 92-year sentence, a decision that was upheld by the South Dakota Supreme Court.
    Law and Policies: South Dakota has three ways that juveniles can be prosecuted as adults:
    1. Discretionary waiver: for any felony; there is no minimum age requirement. S.D. Codified Laws § 26-11-4;
    2. Statutory Exclusion: required for youth age 16 and older accused of class A, B, C, 1, or 2 felonies. S.D. Codified Laws § 26-11-3.1;
    3. Once an Adult, Always an Adult (if convicted of the offense): S.D. Codified Laws § 26-11-4.
    Defendant Waived Into Adult Court? It appears that Charles was waived into adult court based on the “discretionary waiver” provisions listed above.
    Figure 1. Selected Non-custodial Measures for Women in Prison in US States
    StateConfinement Rate, 2013 (per 100,000 juveniles)Defendant Age, Sex, CrimeState Laws on Waiver into Adult CourtCase Prosecuted in Adult Court?
    Wisconsin109.5-17312-year-old girl defendants; attempted homicide, stabbingWI law requires children as young as 10 to be charged as adults for homicide crimesYes
    Massachusetts46-109.515-year-old boy defendant; homicide, stabbingJuveniles 14 and older accused of homicide are automatically tried as adultsYes
    California173-366.514-year-old girl defendant; homicide, gunshot (participant)Mandatory adult court jurisdiction for violent crimes committed by person 14 or olderYes
    South Dakota366.5-56014-year-old defendant, homicide, gunshotDiscretionary waiverYes; defendant sentenced to LWOP in 2000, later commuted to 92 years
     
    Reforming Juvenile Sentencing Standards
    While the case studies and data presented above are subject to multiple interpretations, the case studies curiously display little correlation between confinement rate and waiver into adult court jurisdiction laws. Where a trend can be identified is in the relationship between high confinement rates and the severity of punishment (as exemplified in the South Dakota case).
    Juvenile justice policy reformers have tended to assume that limiting adult court jurisdiction for very young juvenile offenders will help limit unnecessary juvenile confinement. In extremely serious cases involving very young defendants, however, it appears that juvenile court jurisdiction is almost never an option. The two states with the lowest juvenile confinement rates in the case study have the most restrictive laws in favor of trying very young, violent juveniles in adult criminal court: Massachusetts and Wisconsin. Rather than focusing on waiver into adult court in these cases, perhaps juvenile justice reformers should place more emphasis on reforming juvenile sentencing standards and providing defendants with mental health evaluations.
    The case study comparison suggests that harsh penalties, rather than mandatory adult court jurisdiction, might co-occur more significantly with high juvenile confinement rates. After all, the state with the highest juvenile confinement rate in the case study, South Dakota, also dealt the harshest penalty: Daniel Charles, the 14-year-old defendant in the South Dakota case, was tried in adult court without a mental health evaluation and was sentenced to life without parole. Even following US Supreme Court criticism of life sentences for juveniles in 2012, the South Dakota court still provided Charles only a nominal commutation to his sentence, reducing the life sentence to a term of 92 years in prison, allowing Charles no chance at parole until he is 60 years old. Further, it appears that only in the bizarre Slender Man case in Wisconsin were the defendants given a mental health evaluation before adjudication. In California, this omission resulted in the reversal of the defendant’s conviction. Increased attention to a defendant’s mental health status might also lower pressure on judges to impose long prison sentences on very young juveniles, thereby reducing the overall rate of confinement in the US.
  • Violent Crime and Juvenile Justice: Lessons for China and the United States (Part I of II)

    In May 2014, two twelve year-old girls were charged with attempted homicide in Wisconsin. Image Credit: Newsweek.
    Recently, stories of violent crimes committed by juveniles, particularly girls, have featured widely in Chinese media. Stories include the case of a 14 year old girl in Yunnan who was charged with homicide in cooperation with her much older boyfriend and a 12 year old in Hunan who is suspected of having fatally poisoned two other primary school girls. Dui Hua’s 2014 Women in Prison symposium also features research exploring violent crimes committed by juvenile girls in Beijing courts. It found that the percentage of violent crimes committed by juvenile girls has been increasing over the past several years.
    The US is also dealing with the issue of violent crimes committed by juveniles 15 and under, with perhaps the most famous case being the “Slender Man” incident in Wisconsin, in which two 12-year-old female defendants stabbed a classmate repeatedly and were charged with attempted homicide. Because these cases are highly complex, this article conducts in-depth case studies comparing different state approaches to high profile felonies committed by juveniles 15 and younger, similar to the Slender Man case. Two case studies involve female juvenile defendants, and two involve males. Chinese officials considering policy reforms aimed at curbing violence among very young juveniles might draw important lessons from these state-level US cases.
    Putting the Case Studies in Perspective
    To better understand these case studies on violent juvenile crime, this section provides a survey of each state’s rate of juvenile confinement. State juvenile policy works best when the lowest possible proportion of the juvenile population is confined in a detention facility.
    Understanding each state’s juvenile confinement rate will then allow for the selection of state-level case studies that reflect the variation in juvenile justice policy across the United States. Using the map below, we hope to identify what conditions are operating in states that do a good job of keeping juveniles out of adult prisons.
    The data and maps used in this article come from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), which collects comprehensive data for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The following map is based on the most recent available data from 2013. [1]

    In the map above, it appears that in general, lower confinement rates are found in the Northeast and in some states in the South. (The raw data for 2013 can be found here.)
    State-Level Case Studies of Violent Crimes Committed by Young Juveniles
    Based on this map of juvenile confinement rates, case studies were selected from different states to get a sense of the variations in juvenile justice performance across the country. The case studies focus on violent crimes committed by juveniles in four states: Massachusetts, Wisconsin, California, and South Dakota, each with varying juvenile confinement rates. Massachusetts has a “low” confinement rate, Wisconsin has a “mid-low” rate, California has a “mid-high” rate, and South Dakota has a “high” rate.
    This case selection is intended to gain a better understanding of the spectrum of regional variations in juvenile justice performance across the US, even though the cases themselves likely represent a small number of recent violent juvenile crimes committed in the US.
    Massachusetts: Low Confinement Rate (46-109.5 per 100,000 juveniles)
    Facts: Fifteen year-old Mathew Borges is accused of stabbing Viloria Paulino, his Lawrence High School classmate on November 18, 2016, decapitating him and mutilating his body.
    Laws and Policies: Massachusetts has one way that juveniles can be prosecuted as adults: “Statutory exclusion: [adult court original jurisdiction is] mandatory for youth 14 and older charged with first-degree or second-degree murder. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 119, § 72B.”
    Defendants Waived Into Adult Court? The defendant was automatically processed in adult court based on the severity of the charges: “Borges will be arraigned in Lawrence District Court…as an adult on a count of first degree murder.”
    Wisconsin: Mid-Low Confinement Rate (109.5-173 per 100,000)
    Facts: In May 2014, two 12-year-old girls stabbed another girl of the same age 19 times to impress the fictional “Slender Man” horror character; the case has received extensive media attention and the trial is now pending in adult court.
    Laws and Policies: In the “Slender Man” case, the adult court assumed mandatory “original jurisdiction” over the case, even though the defendants were 12 years-old, because under Wis. Stat. Sec. 938.183(1), “adult courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over first degree intentional homicide, attempted first degree intentional homicide, first degree reckless homicide, second degree intentional homicide.” According to the Wisconsin Council on Children and Families, “Wisconsin’s lowest age of automatic adult court jurisdiction (age 10) is the lowest in the nation,” and “Wisconsin is one of only 7 states remaining in which youth under 18 are automatically considered adults.” For less serious offenses, Wisconsin youth ages 15 and 16 can still be waived into adult court for any delinquent offense, and for a few serious offenses youth as young as 14 may be waived. Wis. Stat. Sec. 938.18(1).
    Defendants Waived Into Adult Court? The defendants were automatically placed into adult court, as mandated by law, and appealed their placement in adult court. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld the placement of defendants in adult court, and denied a related motion for “reverse waiver” that would have placed defendants back in juvenile court: “Wisconsin law requires children as young as 10 to be charged as adults for the most serious crimes, but allows them to seek transfer back to juvenile court, as was recently tried, unsuccessfully, by the two 12-year-old Waukesha girls charged with trying to kill a sixth grade classmate last year to please Slender Man.”

    1. OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book. “The information in this table is based on the state where the offense was committed. However, the state of offense is not always reported. Youth for whom state of offense was unknown are included in U.S. totals (3,401 in 1997). These instances are not evenly distributed across states. As such, users should exercise caution when examining state-level trends or comparing states. Visit the EZACJRP methods section for more information. U.S. total excludes youth in tribal facilities. The residential placement rate is the number of juvenile offenders in residential placement per 100,000 juveniles age 10 through the upper age of original juvenile court jurisdiction in each state. To preserve the privacy of the juvenile residents, state cell counts have been rounded to the nearest multiple of three. Detail may not add to total because of rounding. Rates and percentages presented are also based on rounded totals. More information on this rounding rule is available on the EZACJRP Web site.” Return to article