Tag: petitioning

  • Party Paper Lists Six Errors in Chinese Social Management

    A 2011 panel meeting on social management in Beijing. Photo: Xinhua

    During the past two years, “social management” (社会管理) has emerged as an important new concept under which China’s leadership hopes to deal with the growing tensions in Chinese society, reflected in recent years in an increasing number of “mass incidents.” As articulated by Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao and Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang, social management involves such things as “developing, managing, and supervising” social organizations; building a “service-oriented” government; and establishing “social-stability risk and evaluation mechanisms.” By becoming more proactive and extending its leadership over civil society, the party aims to limit the risks associated with the social transformations attendant to economic development.

    The emphasis on social management was reflected one year ago when the name of the party’s key body responsible for “maintaining stability” was changed to the Central Comprehensive Social Management Commission (from the Central Comprehensive Public Order Management Commission). This change has been accompanied by a gradual shift in the leaders and members of the commission and its subordinate bodies nationwide. Altogether, these moves appear to be asserting more direct party control over the mechanisms of social management, while broadening the range of associated interests from its traditional focus on law enforcement to include things like public services, crisis response, healthcare, education, social security, and mental health.

    Although the language of social management encourages a more holistic, less repressive approach to preserving social stability and appears to place more emphasis on developing the capacity for civil-society development, skeptics worry that the effect of social management policies will not be the liberation of autonomous social forces but, rather, more effort to assert control over the processes of civil-society formation that are already underway. Some of these concerns can be seen in a recent article (translated below) by Gong Weibin, a professor at the National Academy of Governance, who identifies six misconceptions about social management among Chinese officials.

    The article appeared in the October 15 edition of Study Times, a newspaper published under the auspices of the Central Party School. It is replete with the kind of jargon commonly seen in articles dealing with party policies and pronouncements, but behind all the buzzwords lies a genuine concern about striking a proper balance between government control and individual and group autonomy—as well as an implicit warning that if this balance is not struck properly, there could be serious consequences for the legitimacy of the political regime.

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    Six Errors in Contemporary Social Management
    Gong Weibin, Study Times
    October 15, 2012

    At present, innovations in social management are being launched throughout [China] with great vigor, achieving positive results and accumulating a great deal of good experience and methods. However, there are some errors in understanding and practice.

    Error One: A Rigid “Stability-Maintenance Perspective”

    Our country is in a crucial period of its reform and development, a period in which there are both important development opportunities and obvious contradictions. It has become more important to correctly manage the relationship between reform, development, and stability. Therefore, “development is the number one task” and “stability is the number one responsibility” have become two important matters for local party committees and governments.

    However, some people understand social stability in a one-sided way, thinking of it as everyone getting along, as songbirds in spring, without any “noise” and without social conflicts or contradictions. Guided by this type of thinking, [they] cannot tolerate the slightest expression of different opinions, unreasonably obstruct people’s [ability to make] ordinary appeals on behalf of their interests, and spare no expense to tightly guard against some “so-called abnormal behaviors.” In the name of “maintaining stability,” some will even go so far as to suppress different opinions and impose a patriarchal system in which their word is law.

    The essence of social stability is political stability or, in other words, the stability of the political system. Stability of the political system depends upon the level of trust that the public has in the political system. Petitioning by the public is actually an expression of trust in the party and the government, not an attempt to create instability. Historical experience shows that social stability is relative. A harmonious and stable society is not totally without contradictions or conflict; rather, social contradictions and conflicts are kept within the bounds of what society is able to endure. It should be clear that society has the ability to endure a certain amount of social contradictions and conflict, as well as the ability to clear up such contradictions and conflicts on its own.

    No society in the world can achieve stability that lasts forever. Social stability is realized dynamically by continually regulating [stakeholder] relations and [through the use of] “safety valve” mechanisms that continually release the discontent and grievances [pent up] in society. In the current stage of frequently erupting social contradictions, leading cadres at all levels must increase their awareness of hardship, risk, and responsibility. They must be neither aloof and indifferent nor too tense and must adopt a flexible, dynamic “stability-maintenance perspective” and increase the level of inclusiveness and tolerance in society.

    Error Two: One-Sidedly Emphasizing Government Control

    Traditional ideas, habits, and methods persist in current social management, and in many places social management means only an emphasis on efforts at government control. Rather than positively focusing on bringing [problems] under control at their source, there is a negative focus on remaining on guard and asserting control when trouble breaks out. The emphasis is not on improving people’s livelihoods, improving methods of service, and raising the quality and standards of service. [Leaders] aren’t looking to safeguard the public’s lawful rights and interests or making efforts to unblock channels for expressing demands and expanding citizens’ orderly participation in politics. Rather, [they] focus on protecting themselves to the death and surrounding, pursuing, and intercepting [citizens]. [They] aren’t looking at transforming government functions and ways of governing, at fully utilizing the power of people and markets, or at realizing a cooperative management in the common interest; rather, [they] are used to taking complete charge and putting on a one-man show.

    Modern social management should entail diverse participation and shared control. Government should properly carry out its responsibilities of social management and public service; it can neither be absent nor substandard, nor can it be in the wrong place or exceed its bounds. At the same time, all social forces should be fully mobilized to jointly participate in social management through the promotion of neighborhood self-management and corporate responsibility for social management and the realization of new models for [achieving] a good interaction between government administrative control and social self-adjustment and residents’ self-management, organic integration between neighborhood management and workplace management, comprehensive involvement of a variety of methods, integration between management and service, and the orderly and vital integration of diverse control with joint establishment and enjoyment.

    Error Three: Unwillingness to Develop Social Organizations

    It has been repeatedly shown that social organizations [contribute] positive functions and important impacts in the development of modern society. Since the 16th Party Congress, social organizations have undergone definite development, and, as of year-end 2011, there were more than 450,000 social organizations of various types nationwide playing positive roles in [activities] such as providing public services, dealing with unemployment, protecting people’s legitimate rights and interests, and coordinating social relationships.

    However, the present number of social organizations and their [combined] scale is extremely unsuited to the needs of a large nation with a population of more than 1.3 billion. Social organizations are developing at a slow pace, and some are not thriving and have imperfect internal control structures and poor management and service capacities. The status of some social organizations is not clear, with [these organizations] becoming “alternative governments” that, overly relying on government budgetary support, have a weak capacity to develop on their own. There are also some social organizations that deviate from their missions and seek profit.

    There are a variety of reasons for this: there are problems of understanding as well as problems with institutional policies and law, and problems with the quality and capacity of those engaging in the work. At the root [of the problem] are some leaders who have a mistaken understanding of social organizations. Although the great majority of leading cadres say that they attach importance to the development of and role played by social organizations, deep down many still carry profound concerns that social organizations will, if they grow big and strong, become the opponents of the party and government and, if they’re not [managed properly], will turn into rivals that will vie for public [support]. [These cadres] set up obstacles to the development of social organizations. [But] faced with the increasing diversity of social groups and interest structures, the party and government cannot run everything and need to provide public services and social management through social organizations. Thus, with the exception of a need to exert more control over a small number of social organizations of special types, [leading cadres] ought to loosen entry conditions for economic, public interest, charitable, and neighborhood social organizations; improve relevant laws; increase the degree of government support; and promote and standardize the rapid, healthy development of social organizations. Social management is about both “managing society” and “having society manage.” A variety of actors are needed, including social organizations, to realize the self-management of “society.”

    Error Four: Stressing Stability, Ignoring Rights

    For a relatively long time in the past, people commonly thought of social management as social control and of maintaining social stability as managing, controlling, suppressing, and fining; restricting people’s freedom; and placing prohibitions on this and that. Guided by this negative view of maintaining stability, some cadres frequently focus on asserting control after an incident in order to avoid getting in trouble, and pay less attention to pre-incident prevention and controlling [problems] at their source. This kind of thinking and way of doing things still persists in some locations. What [adherents to these beliefs] don’t realize is that, as a result of the opening and progress of society, protecting the lawful rights and interests of the public is at the root of realizing long-term peace and stability in society.

    The prerequisite and basis for maintaining stability is protecting rights. First, [we] must respect and protect the public’s rights to information, to participation, to expression, and to [government] oversight. [We must] actively open up mechanisms for public opinion, widen channels for the expression of public demands, and allow mass organizations like the [All-China Federation of Trade] Unions, the Communist Youth League, and the All-China Women’s Federation as well as all types of social organizations to fulfill their function of safeguarding the rights and interests of the broader public. The protection and realization of the lawful rights and interests of the masses is an important means of ensuring social harmony and stability, stimulating social vitality, and promoting social development and progress.

    Error Five: Stressing Livelihood, Ignoring Democracy

    Since the 17th Party Congress, the pace of social construction has sped up across the country with an emphasis on improving people’s livelihoods. Issues like employment, education, healthcare, housing, and social security have all received unprecedented attention. The mission to improve people’s livelihoods has seen rapid progress and development, and the standard and quality of people’s basic needs have seen relatively large improvements.

    However, in the course of improving people’s livelihoods, there have arisen a series of social problems and contradictions associated with livelihood issues. Looking at the reasons, the principal [cause] is that there has not been sufficient attention to the opinions of the public, and what the government has done on behalf of people’s livelihoods has not necessarily met public need. Livelihood policies themselves cannot resolve questions of how to engender more scientific and rational decision-making on livelihood issues, and how to allow livelihood policies to gain the understanding and support of vast majorities of the stakeholding public.

    Although some places have made great efforts and large investments [to improve] people’s livelihoods, the results have not been apparent, public discontent has not abated, and some contradictions and disputes have even arisen during the roll out of livelihood projects. The root cause [of all of this] is that they discuss livelihood without mentioning democracy. On the other hand, some local leaders have integrated democracy and livelihood and used democracy to promote people’s livelihoods. At the same time that they strengthen grassroots party organization, they conscientiously develop self-governance by village and urban residents; follow through on village (urban) residents’ rights to democratic elections, democratic decision-making, democratic management, and democratic oversight; allow the public to participate in discussions of livelihood issues; and mobilize the public to offer advice and make suggestions.

    Public participation in the enactment of policies concerning livelihood issues enables the gathering of public knowledge and the optimization of the decision-making process. It is also a way of ensuring that policies concerning livelihood issues are understood and supported by the public. Public participation in the decision-making process enables people to understand matters in a complete and correct way and to understand the various considerations behind decisions and the difficulties faced by decision-makers.

    Once they understand the difficulties that decision-makers face, the public will also understand when some things cannot be done all at once. The integration of democracy and livelihood avoids the embarrassing situation in which leading cadres make decisions on behalf of the people and, despite their best intentions to do the right thing, do not get the understanding and approval of the public. As the structure of societal needs changes, the democratic consciousness of the masses will increasingly grow stronger. Therefore, democracy is an important safeguard of improving people’s livelihoods and is an important measure for promoting social management.

    Error Six: Abusing Grid Management

    Grid management is a new management method adopted in recent years by cities across the country in which urban communities are divided into several management grid units according to a certain standard. After clarifying the scope of management and the responsibilities of [social management] personnel, information is proactively gathered about people, events, and things [in order] to build a database of urban components and events. [This database] forms [the basis of] an urban management work platform through which relevant departments and work units can proactively uncover problems in a timely manner, respond quickly, and resolve problems in a timely manner. [All of this represents] the informatization and refinement of urban management and is a kind of innovation in social-management service.

    The idea of grid management has spread rapidly, and methods of grid management have been promoted rapidly, so that now party and government departments in many cities are exploring grid management. However, if within one city various agencies like those responsible for politico-legal work, public security, civil affairs, social security, family planning, and city management and law enforcement each pursue grid management separately and for their own purposes such that information cannot be shared effectively, it can potentially result in duplicated investment and wasted resources. In the name of grid management, some cities divide communities or buildings into grid units of five or 10 households, appointing a “grid captain” and setting up [a system of] collective responsibility. This way of doing things either tends towards the formalistic, producing no real effects, or it results in excessive control that infringes on personal space. Attention needs to be paid to these problems in the course of establishing and managing grids. Good things need to be done well.

  • Court Promises Death to Quell Petitions

    On August 2, 2001, a 13-year-old girl surnamed Guo was raped and murdered on the banks of the Sha River in central Henan Province while gathering cicada nymphs for sale. Several days later, police in Ye County detained a local man, Li Huailiang, who that same day had been seen in the same area collecting the same insects. Two years passed before the case went to trial.
    At trial, Li proclaimed his innocence and recanted an earlier confession that he alleged had been coerced through torture. Nevertheless, the Ye County People’s Court found him guilty and sentenced him to 15 years in prison. Neither the defendant nor the victim’s family was satisfied with the verdict, so an appeal was made to the Pingdingshan Intermediate People’s Court, which rejected the verdict on the grounds of “unclear facts and insufficient evidence” and sent the case back to Ye County for retrial.
    Although a new trial was held, the Ye County court never issued a new decision. Instead, the case was retried in first instance by the Pingdingshan Intermediate People’s Court, which convicted Li Huailiang and sentenced him to death in August 2004. Still insisting on his innocence, Li again appealed to the provincial high court, which once again rejected the verdict on the grounds of “unclear facts and insufficient evidence.” The Pingdingshan court retried the case in April 2006 and handed down a death sentence with two-year reprieve, but this, too, was rejected by the provincial court on appeal.
    The death penalty guarantee on letterhead of
    the Pingdingshan Intermediate People’s Court
    signed by the victim’s parents and witnesses.
    Source: China Comment

    Since September 2006, there have been no further court hearings, and Li Huailiang has remained in the local detention center for nearly 11 years with his legal fate still uncertain. About the only thing that has been made clear in the course of the case is that the evidence against Li is flimsy. According to Li’s sister, blood and sperm samples recovered from the crime scene don’t correspond to Li and footprints don’t match up, either.

    Li Huailiang’s legal limbo may come to an end soon, however, after a document from his case file was leaked online earlier this year. The handwritten document, entitled “Letter of Guarantee,” appears on stationary of the Pingdingshan Intermediate People’s Court and is signed by the parents of the murdered girl. In it, they request that the court “sentence Li Huailiang to life imprisonment or, even better, death” and “guarantee” that were the court to do so, they would accept the verdict and stop petitioning about the case—even if the court’s verdict were later rejected by a higher court on appeal. Not long after the victim’s parents submitted their “guarantee,” the court issued its death sentence.
    Media Coverage
    Investigative journalists working for Guangdong newspapers began reporting on this story in February 2012, but the story did not gain much traction. The timing was certainly inconvenient, from the perspective of the authorities who decide what stories may and may not be reported in China’s media. The annual plenary session of the National People’s Congress was set to open in a matter of days after the story first broke, and one of the main topics for discussion was proposed revision of the Criminal Procedure Law. Perhaps this explains why the case disappeared from public view for several months.
    But the scandalous story of the “death sentence guarantee” is now back, and it has an even brighter spotlight shining upon it. On June 6, the case was reported again in China Comment, a semi-monthly publication of the Xinhua News Agency with close links to the Central Publicity Department of the Communist Party. Then on June 12, China Comment followed up with a new report citing internal court documents that appear to show that the “guarantee” had been written after discussions with the then-president of the Pingdingshan Intermediate People’s Court, Zhao Mingzhang, and agreed to by a deputy secretary of the local politico-legal committee. The whistleblower responsible for leaking the documents reportedly gave them to China Comment in hopes that the case would get the attention of central party leaders who might intervene and bring resolution to the case.
    The day before these latest revelations, on June 11, a Guangzhou lawyer named Geng Shuang (耿爽) published a sharp critique of the case (translated below) in Southern Metropolis Daily. Though Geng is critical of officials at the Pingdingshan court for placing considerations of stability above basic principles of legal procedure and fairness, she recognizes that cases like these are not isolated but, rather, are systemic in nature. When pressure is put on judges and court officials to make decisions that will not lead to petitioning or other potentially destabilizing activity, courts risk straying from the ideals of independent and objective adjudication. Focusing on rule of law and justice is a better path to long-term stability, she concludes, because it reinforces public trust in the judicial system, instead of destroying it.
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    Ridiculous “Death Sentence Guarantee” Devalues Public Trust in the Judicial Process
    Geng Shuang
    Southern Metropolis Daily
    June 11, 2012
    According to a report in the June 6 edition of China Comment magazine, the Pingdingshan Intermediate People’s Court in Henan Province, in order to prevent the relatives of a victim in a murder case from petitioning, actually “promised” to sentence the suspect in that case to death. Even though the verdict was rejected by the Henan High People’s Court because of insufficient evidence, the suspect continues to remain locked up in a detention center, held beyond legal time limits for more than 10 years.
    Thereafter, the Pingdingshan Intermediate People’s Court issued a statement via weibo [a Twitter-like service] to deny the report, saying that from the content of the “letter of guarantee” one could see that it was a letter of request by the victim’s relatives, not an agreement, and that no person from the court had signed it.
    Looking back at the case, on the evening of August 2, 2001, the body of Guo Xia [This is identified as a pseudonym in the original source—Trans.], a villager from Wanli Village, Ye County, Henan, was found dumped in a river. Li Huailiang, from the same village, was arrested on suspicion of intentional homicide. A total of seven trials were held and three verdicts annulled because of insufficient evidence. During the trial, the victim’s mother Du Yuhua demanded severe punishment for the “murderer,” lest she go to the [top of the] court building and jump. This is the origin of the so-called death sentence guarantee or application.
    As a legal professional, I am deeply shocked by seeing this kind of ridiculous incident that goes against the spirit of the law—even though this is not the first time. This letter of guarantee or application was a promise or appeal made to the court by the victim’s relatives, and the Pingdingshan intermediate court admits that it was a promise by a single party and not a two-party agreement. Be that as it may, this guarantee is neither evidence used to weigh the facts [in the case] nor legal statute to determine guilt or assign a penalty. So how did it end up in the case file? No matter what explanation is given by the court involved, the answer is all too clear: this is a guarantee against petitioning demanded by the court of the victim’s relatives. What sort of mindset did the court have in demanding that the victim’s relatives make this kind of guarantee? Actually, the court is truly helpless, because if it doesn’t prevent victims’ families from petitioning, court officials will have a hard time keeping their jobs.
    In this case, the court has been kidnapped—and, at a deeper level, that means the judicial system has been kidnapped—by the petitioning system. And once the judicial system has been kidnapped, the natural balance of the law inevitably becomes imbalanced. In this case, specifically, this sort of kidnapping resulted in two clear errors by the Pingdingshan intermediate court:
    The first error was to violate a basic principle of adjudication in China: “taking facts as the basis and the law as criterion.”
    If a suspect is sentenced to death without conclusive evidence, this means that every day each of us has the potential to become a murderer. But the Pingdingshan intermediate court was able to get a party to the case to write the following letter of guarantee and openly included it in the case file: If the suspect can be sentenced to life imprisonment or above, preferably the death sentence, then [we] guarantee not to petition any more. This ridiculous “death sentence guarantee” obviously resulted from the victim’s relatives’ continuous petitioning and judicial personnel going beyond the law to take “calming petitions” and “maintaining stability” into consideration. With the law no longer the sole criterion, the case was artificially made more complex.
    In fact, more than two months after the relative signed the letter of guarantee, the Pingdingshan Intermediate People’s Court did, in fact, sentence the suspect to death. Considering that a higher court subsequently annulled the death sentence based on insufficient evidence, it is clear that the death sentence in this case was imposed without enough evidence and that the primary factor of consideration at the time of sentencing was not only “taking facts as the basis and the law as criterion” but, rather, preventing the victim’s relatives from further petitioning.
    The second error was to violate the basic principle of the presumption of innocence in criminal cases.
    Since revision of the Criminal Procedure Law in 1996, the presumption of innocence has become clear in the law. Presumption of innocence means that an acquittal must be made if there is insufficient evidence to prove the existence of a crime. An example of the presumption of innocence is the ultimate acquittal in America’s famous trial of the century, the [O.J.] “Simpson case.”
    In this case against criminal suspect Li Huailiang, multiple findings of insufficient evidence should have meant his acquittal and release long ago, but to this day he has been in custody for more than 10 years. The court, which specializes in adjudication, surely understands the concept of presumption of innocence, but this case has become a hot potato precisely because everyone is clear that Li should have been acquitted and released long ago. The moment he is acquitted, huge amounts of state compensation will be involved, and this case could become the “sequel to the Zhao Zuohai case.” And whether the court acquits, the procuratorate retracts its indictment, or the public security organ drops the case, it will involve the assignment of responsibility to legal institutions and concerned officials—and no one wants to take on that responsibility. [This has] caused the case to become a ball, being kicked around by each institution for more than a decade.
    Although the court’s errors are obvious, if you look farther behind these errors you see that in requiring the victim’s relatives to sign a “death sentence guarantee,” the court appears to be trying to “calm petitions.” But, in fact, their actions are counterproductive and do more harm than good. When the court, sitting beneath the national emblem and armed with the scales [of justice], itself strays from the law and makes a party to a case sign an extralegal guarantee (or, if you like, application) in order to “calm petitions,” it might allow a small group or individual officials to avoid risk, but it sacrifices rule of law and devalues public trust in the judicial process. (The author is a lawyer in Guangzhou.)
  • Can Beijing’s “Black Security” Crackdown Protect Petitioners?

    Police in Beijing have launched a six-month campaign to crack down on illegal behavior of the city’s security companies. The campaign claims “zero tolerance” for security contractors involved in “petitioner interception” and “black jails;” however, this involvement is generally sanctioned by local governments keen to keep petitioners out of the capital.
     
    Though long denied officially, the illegal detention of petitioners has been of increasing concern among the Chinese public since the end of 2009. At that time, an in-depth report revealed the role played by local government contractor Anyuanding in the detention, incarceration, and transport of petitioners, resulting in widespread condemnation and a criminal investigation. Partly to curb the abuse of petitioners, Beijing has taken steps to reduce the presence of local “liaison offices” in the capital, but pressure on local governments to “preserve stability” has made it difficult to protect petitioners’ rights.
     
    On December 2 the lead editorial in The Beijing News (translated below) welcomed the announcement of the crackdown but warned that security firms must be held thoroughly accountable, with personnel at all levels punished for their involvement. The editorial also places special emphasis on the need for transparency, urging not only that details of the extent of illegal activity be made public but that police report fully on how they deal with offenders.
     
    Transparency is important partly because, until recently, China’s security companies were monopolized as the revenue-generating ventures of local police. On January 1, 2010, however, new State Council regulations took effect to prohibit police from running security companies, while giving them administrative oversight of the industry.
     
    Yet this Caijing article from April 2011 makes clear that police have had a hard time giving up their monopoly. Police in many areas have apparently been using oversight and registration controls to form patron-client relationships with security companies—some of which may be indistinguishable from companies once run by police. Under these circumstances, it seems natural for The Beijing News to highlight transparency as Beijing probes “black security.”
     
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    Rooting Out “Petitioner Interception” by Security Firms Requires Lawful Punishment
    Editorial, The Beijing News
    December 2, 2011
     
    How to protect the bottom line that security firms must not participate in “petitioner interception”? Besides a concentrated clean-up and crackdown, it is also necessary to punish involved security companies and personnel in accordance with the law.
     
    According to reports in The Beijing News, Beijing police announced on November 30 that they would be carrying out a six-month campaign to clean up and restore order to Beijing’s security industry, focusing on six types of illegal behavior by security guards. Among them, particular emphasis was placed on strictly prohibiting security service companies from involvement in “petitioner interception” and strictly prohibiting the illegal restriction of the personal liberty of others. Until February of next year, Beijing security guards must carry their security-personnel ID while on duty in an effort to achieve zero tolerance of “petitioner interception” and illegal acts by security service companies.
     
    Now, the security industry certainly needs to be cleaned up and order restored. Targeting “petitioner interception” and other illegal acts by security guards and setting a zero tolerance goal for “petitioner interception” is in line with public opinion and deserves recognition.
     
    Last year, it was revealed that the Anyuanding Security Company took deposits from some local governments to set up several “black jails” and intercept and lock up petitioners. Then in September of this year, Zhao Zhifei, a tourist who came to Beijing from Henan, was mistaken for a petitioner [resulting in] a dozen or so “black security guards” barging into his guesthouse in the middle of the night and escorting him the same night to a town government in Henan. The participation of these “black security guards” in “petitioner interception,” with its illegal detention and pummeling of citizens, not only infringes on the freedom of citizens but also sullies the image of the capital and ought to be punished severely in accordance with the law.
     
    Before, Beijing police have also made many efforts to combat “black security.” For example in July of this year, they discovered and closed one “black jail” and rescued the people being held there illegally, the oldest of whom was 81 and the youngest of whom was still nursing!
     
    This time, a person responsible said that the reason this campaign has set a zero tolerance goal for “petitioner interception” is to remind companies in the industry not to cross the line. How can this “bottom line” be adequately protected? Besides a concentrated clean-up and crackdown, it’s also necessary to punish involved security companies and personnel in accordance with the law.
     
    First, security companies that violate the law should receive appropriate punishment and those that need to be shut down should be shut down. The Security Services Management Regulations issued by the State Council in 2009 stipulate that the security industry must strictly examine and approve entrants. Public security organs are only responsible for the examination and approval of security guards and companies, and management mechanisms have been rationalized. At the same time, the Measures for Implementation of Security Services Management Regulations for Public Security Organs contain explicit provisions for the daily management and punitive measures of security companies. For example, if security companies “instigate or condone security guards’ obstruction of law enforcement, participation in debt collection, or resolution of conflicts through violence or threats of violence,” they can be shut down. This is an important way to achieve “zero tolerance.”
     
    Second, all personnel involved in a case should be punished in accordance with the law to intimidate other violators. When “black security guards” commit acts like intercept petitioners and take people into custody, they are suspected of a crime. Based on relevant judicial interpretations, when an illegal detention lasts for more than 24 hours there should be criminal liability. Clearly, the personnel in charge of the security company as well as guard, support, and other staff all fall under [the category of] accomplices to the crime of illegal detention and should all be investigated. When “black security guards” beat petitioners or steal property, it should be treated as intentional assault, robbery, and so on.
     
    Moreover, fixing [the problem of] “black security” should be open and transparent, giving the public sufficient information. Some cases of “black security guards” intercepting petitioners have such a negative impact that providing the public with the circumstances and developments of the case will restore government credibility. For example, the police have already begun investigations into a group of “black security companies” including Anyuanding and relevant persons in charge have been detained. How the cases are currently progressing; what stage has been reached in the judicial process—the public is actually extremely interested to know this information. Revealing the details of the cases can also better show the resolve of police to combat “black security.” Through these cases, those black security companies that continue to illegally do wrong can be warned and supervision of the entire society can be reminded.
     
    [We] hope, in the course of this six-month campaign, that some “black security” companies are shut down because of it and the relevant people responsible are held accountable in accordance with the law. Otherwise, it will not be enough to intimidate violators and it will not be enough to promote the righteousness of the capital.
  • Taking a Stand in the Name of Rule of Law

    The Chinese government’s response to petitioners has been much in the news this past week, thanks in large part to the efforts of the country’s more outspoken investigative journalists.Earlier this week, the Beijing News earned the ire of local officials in Fuping County, Shaanxi, after it reported on the case of two women who had been forced by police to stand before an audience of hundreds, arms shackled, as a warning to others about engaging in “illegal petitioning.” Legal experts denounced the action as a violation of legal provisions against public shaming of prisoners or suspects—especially given the fact that the women had merely been given light administrative punishments.

    For their part, officials in Fuping publicly insisted that their handling of the situation had been legal and proper. “It increases transparency of law enforcement,” they claimed. “The goal is to educate [the women] themselves and to educate the public.” In support of their actions, they point to a 2009 directive from the Central Politics and Law Committee authorizing use of “serious measures” against persistent petitioners or those who act unlawfully.

    Meanwhile, from Hunan, there emerged an account in the Southern Metropolis Daily of a farming couple subjected to “preemptive punishment” for “preparing to petition.” Tang Fengyin had sued the local government in Yongzhou over the illegal requisition of his land, but despite a local court finding in his favor, government agents continued to infringe on his property rights. So, Tang and his wife traveled to Guangzhou to meet with a lawyer and seek out a sympathetic reporter to whom they could recount their plight. But police from Yongzhou tracked them down, dragged them back to Hunan, and gave Tang a 10-day administrative detention for “preparing to petition.”

    Like the Fuping case, the treatment of the Tangs has generated a lot of outrage from Chinese commentators. Today, in the Beijing News, Wei Yingjie writes:

    Petitioning is no crime, much less “preparing to petition”! By giving the Tangs an administrative punishment before they had gone to petition, local police can be said to have “preemptively violated the law.” Even if the Tangs subjectively had the intent to petition, they had not yet in fact taken action, so for local police to slap them with this is a classic case of trumped-up charges.

    Even more alarming is the ruling mentality behind the “preemptive punishment” of citizens. Petitioning is both a lawful administrative channel for seeking redress and also an effective means of defusing tensions in society. Some local governments go to so much trouble to block and intercept petitioners because, first, they are afraid their dirty laundry will be displayed in public and, second, they have been warped by their ruling mentality. By this I mean that some local governments and officials, out of self-interest, often have a tendency to see citizens as potential “enemies.” This is the most frightening and worrying part about this “detention of citizens for preparing to petition” incident.

    When local government agencies and officials in possession of unquestionably strong public power see citizens as being opposed to their interests, the consequences are obvious. It’s not limited to petitioners normally exercising their “right to petition”—any ordinary person can be reduced to a “prisoner” of those holding public power at any time. Therefore, this is not merely an ordinary case involving administrative punishment but a serious violation of the law, one that tramples on legal institutions and infringes on citizens’ legal rights.

    Perhaps not coincidentally, these reports of local abuses of power against petitioners come in the same week that China’s State Council released a new “opinion” on the importance of rule of law, calling for fairer administration of justice and government accountability in order to reduce the level of social grievance.

    Perhaps more than anything, the cases described above illustrate the dilemma facing local officials in China. On the one hand, they are being constantly reminded of the paramount importance of social stability and pressured to take serious measures to preserve it. On the other hand, they are being exhorted to pay increased attention to rule of law.

    Until the balance of these messages begins to tip more unambiguously in the direction of rule of law—and institutions are developed to place real checks on abuse of power—it is doubtful that either the grievances or the outrageous responses to them will disappear anytime soon.

    Related links:

  • Op-Ed: “A Savage Lesson in Eroding Stability on the Mainland”

    The opinion piece below by Joshua Rosenzweig, Dui Hua’s senior manager of research and Hong Kong operations, was published in the July 24 edition of the South China Morning Post. Rosenzweig observes that recent incidents involving Chinese police forces—and official responses to them—have damaged the image of the country’s law-enforcement system. Even worse, the scandals reflect that official goals that strive for a hard line against perceived threats may do more to jeopardize social and political order than to achieve it.
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     A Savage Lesson in Eroding Stability on the MainlandJoshua Rosenzweig
    Senior Manager, Research & Hong Kong Operations
    The Dui Hua Foundation

    The image of the police force on the mainland has taken a beating over the past few months with the domestic media exposing scandal after embarrassing scandal. The public’s patience for the nation’s unaccountable law enforcement system is growing thin.First there was the series of unnatural deaths of criminal suspects in police-run detention centres, with officials offering increasingly outrageous explanations for the causes of death—”death by nightmare”, “death by picking at acne”, or “death by drinking water”. Then there was the incredible tale of Zhao Zuohai , a man who spent nearly 11 years in prison for a murder he didn’t commit—all because police investigators found torture to be the most expedient way to get a confession, and law enforcement authorities who were anxious to solve the case turned a blind eye to Zhao’s claims of innocence.

    The latest incident occurred in Wuhan , Hubei , where six plain-clothes police officers stationed outside a government building savagely beat a woman in her 50s named Chen Yulian , who had come to discuss a grievance with officials. Such violence against so-called “petitioners”—many of whom are, like Chen, middle-aged women—would normally not be newsworthy, so commonplace has it become on the mainland today.

    The difference in this instance is the fact that Chen’s husband is an official on the provincial “politics and law commission”—an institution of the Communist Party charged with overseeing all aspects of law enforcement. As if that weren’t ironic enough, Chen’s husband is responsible for “maintaining stability”—in the pursuit of which, acts of brutal violence and violations of individual rights are routinely carried out, including against petitioners seeking redress for personal grievances.

    Wuhan police officials immediately apologised to Chen and her family, saying that the officers in question hadn’t realised she was the wife of such a high-level official. Their explanation—with its implicit acceptance of violence towards the “common folk”—and the relatively light disciplinary action that has been taken against the officers in question, have fuelled public outrage over this latest example of officers of the law acting lawlessly.

    Beijing has repeatedly rejected international criticism of its human rights record, pointing, for example, to strict laws prohibiting the extraction of confessions by torture and claiming that independent mechanisms exist to root out police wrongdoing. Yet laws and institutions are only effective if they are fully and consistently implemented, and it is growing increasingly difficult to argue that oversight over law enforcement is effective.

    This lack of accountability is closely tied to the emphasis the leaders place on stability. Chen was beaten because local officials see petitioners as sources of social instability. Police use coercion to get confessions and limit access by defence lawyers because having a high conviction rate is a more visible index of stability than guaranteeing a suspect’s procedural rights.

    Meanwhile, arrests and convictions for vaguely defined state security offences have skyrocketed over recent years, and those convicted sentenced to longer prison terms, all in the name of stability.

    Maintaining social stability is a worthy goal for a government, and it’s a challenge on the mainland where economic growth has far outpaced development in society and political institutions, and where income, status and power are so unevenly distributed. The danger, as Professor Yu Jianrong of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has warned, is that relying on “rigid stability” will probably do more to destroy the “harmonious society” than build it.

    As long as “stability above all else” remains the fundamental principle of governance on the mainland, security forces there will feel empowered to flout laws and regulations intended to safeguard individual rights. When rights are not protected and people lack faith in the fairness and independence of the judicial system, grievances fester and eventually erupt into full-blown unrest.

    Part of the solution is to provide effective channels for resolving grievances before they develop into destabilising factors. But restoring faith in the institutions of law enforcement—especially mainland police—may require sacrificing some stability in exchange for something equally valuable: accountability.

  • Translation: “Following Mistaken Beating of Official’s Wife, Let’s Look at Reform of Petitioning System”

    Over the past several days, the Chinese Internet has been buzzing with news of a middle-aged woman who was beaten by police officers in Wuhan outside of a government building, where she had gone to discuss a grievance with officials. Police violence is unfortunately not a rare occurrence in China, but what has garnered so much attention was that the victim, Chen Yulian, is the wife of an official on the provincial “politics and law commission”—an institution of the Chinese Communist Party charged with overseeing all aspects of law enforcement. As if all this weren’t ironic enough, the woman’s husband is responsible for “maintaining stability”—a goal in the name of which acts of violence and violations of individual rights are routinely carried out, including against petitioners seeking redress for personal grievances.The Chinese press has reported that police officials were ultimately forced to apologize for this incident of “mistaken identity,” but the apology only brought further outrage over the double standard that has been exposed. As the author of a July 21 opinion piece in the Beijing Times put it: “Those doing the beating may have mistaken Chen Yulian’s identity as the wife of [an official], but they could not have mistaken her identity as a citizen.” (In response to the incident and ensuing fallout, the public security bureau has taken some punitive action. It has been reported that, of the six officers involved, three have received “demerits” on their records, and of these, one was transferred off the force.)

    Zhou Hucheng, who writes columns on current affairs for the Guangzhou newspaper Southern Daily, assesses this scandal from a different perspective (Dui Hua’s translation is below). In fact, he argues, ultimate responsibility for violence like this rests with China’s broken petitioning system. Under pressure to promote an image of the “harmonious society,” local officials frequently adopt a “zero tolerance” policy toward petitioners and use all means of coercion and, often, violence to prevent complaints from reaching higher levels. Huge amounts of money are being devoted to “maintaining stability,” funds that, Zhou implies, could be better spent—perhaps on measures to resolve grievances rather than simply covering them up.

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    Following Mistaken Beating of Official’s Wife, Let’s Look at Reform of Petitioning System
    Zhou Hucheng
    Southern Daily, July 21, 2010
         Six plainclothes police officers from the Wuchang Branch Public Security Bureau in Wuhan, assigned by the public security authority to serve a special “petitioning assignment” at the provincial Party headquarters, violently beat the wife of a deputy department-level official on the Hubei Party Committee’s Politics and Law Commission. Headlines everywhere say the beating was a “mistake,” but strictly speaking it was no mistake. If the beating victim, Ms Chen Yulian, were not the wife of an official, the beating would not be called a “mistake.” Why not?
         First, let’s look at what public security officials told family members: “It was a mistake—a simple mistake. They didn’t recognize you and didn’t know that you were the wife of such a high official.” A person at the scene asked them in retort: “You say the beating was a mistake and it’s not allowed to beat the wife of an official. Does that mean ordinary people can be beaten?” Looking at all of the rules governing [police] work that have been made public, the law does not authorize police to beat petitioners at will. Moreover, if it is legal for those possessing public authority to beat ordinary people as they wish, this would theoretically shake the foundation of our governance. However, in real life, instances of petitioners being beaten, locked up in psychiatric facilities, or even sent to re-education through labor are too numerous to count. Again, why is this?
         It is primarily because of the pressure felt by local governments over petitioning quotas. Petitioning is linked to official performance, so that if there are many petitioners it is seen as meaning local society is unstable and officials bear responsibility for ineffective governance. If, on the other hand, there are few petitioners, it will be seen as effective construction of a harmonious society. When maintaining stability becomes such an extremely important—even the most important—job, one in which the quality of the work of [dealing with] petitions is closely linked to official performance, some places have even established a one-strike policy for petitioning, where even a single case of petitioning to higher authorities will result in officials from the petitioner’s locality being penalized with a warning or removal from office. Under such circumstances, the petitioning system has become a sharp sword hanging over the heads of local government officials, for whom the slightest mishandling [of a dispute] could have an impact on their personal futures and fates. So, for them, no method is too extreme in dealing with petitioners. They intercept petitioners at key petitioning offices, organize study sessions, ally [with other localities] to intercept petitioners, or even send [petitioners] to re-education through labor. In short, there are numerous ways [of dealing with petitioners], including using the instruments of dictatorship to commit violence. It may seem that the beating of the wife of an official from the politics and law commission was mistaken, but if we consider that “a prince who petitions is as guilty as a commoner,” then actually those police officers should feel wronged: “Why is it okay to beat ordinary petitioners but not okay to beat a petitioner who is the wife of an official?”
         This in fact has exposed an unspeakable secret about the petitioning system. Ever since it was established, the system has, on the one hand, substantially expanded the authority of petitioning offices, which appears on the surface to give petitioners everywhere more opportunities to express their opinions. On the other hand, by making petitioning an indicator of official performance and closely linking petitioning with maintenance of stability—where areas with few petitioners are rewarded—this leads [officials] everywhere to pursue and intercept petitioners and use all possible means to control them. It’s been said that there are two armies stationed at the gate of the National Office for Letters and Visits: one made up of petitioners and another made up of personnel sent to the capital by each locale to intercept petitioners. Each contingent for intercepting petitioners helps each other out, and when they see people who look like petitioners they grab them first without asking any questions and send them off to the local representative office in Beijing to have them sent back home. Responding to local petitioners who come to Beijing is a major task for local representative offices in Beijing. Why do so many localities dare not eliminate their Beijing representative offices? Other than [fearing the loss of] “funding inflows resulting from lobbying,” a key reason is that they must remain in Beijing to respond to local petitioners who could appear in Beijing at any moment. By the way, according to a Tsinghua University report, China’s expenditures in 2009 for maintaining stability exceeded 500 billion [yuan].
         The mistaken beating of an official’s wife and the above analysis makes clear that the petitioning system is in need of wide-ranging reform. Failure to reform will bring both material and physical harm to the public. Failure to reform will also exhaust local officials’ ability to respond and lead to estranged relations between cadres and the public, antagonism between officials and the people, and great financial waste. Is it worth it? For this reason, a timetable for reform of the petitioning system must be announced as soon as possible, because the longer we postpone, the more damage will be done to long-term, fundamental stability.
  • Translation & Commentary: Petition Procedures in China Receive Official Treatment

    China’s petitioning system is once again in the spotlight, both in the country and abroad. The modern incarnation of China’s centuries-old tradition of providing individuals with channels to voice complaints and seek redress for injustice—formally known as the “letters and visits” (信访) system—is officially viewed as an important element in promoting a “harmonious society” and combating official corruption and other malfeasance. At the same time it is widely seen as overburdened and ineffective, and some charge that it is contributing to the very social instability it is intended to address.One area of focus lately has been the disturbing treatment of some petitioners at the hands of “interceptors,” agents hired by local officials to retrieve individuals who have traveled to Beijing in hopes of getting their grievances heard by the central government. Local officials, concerned that too many (or overly troublesome) petitioners from their home jurisdictions will reflect poorly on their job performance and chances for career advancement, have sanctioned the incarceration of such individuals in “black jails”—unauthorized, unregulated detention centers where petitioners are kept while being pressured to drop their cases and return home.

    Significantly, concern over “black jails” and the treatment of petitioners has recently been expressed (English story links to original Chinese text) in Outlook Weekly (瞭望), a major state-sponsored magazine devoted to news and opinion. This sort of public acknowledgement of such a serious rights infringement is rare in China, and marks a clear departure from previous public denials that “black jails” even existed.

    Indeed, there now appears to be spreading recognition that China’s petitioning system is in need of substantial reform if it is to play a role that is socially beneficial, rather than harmful. Some of these reform efforts were discussed recently in a front-page item (Chinese only, entitled “信访工作应在法律框架下运作,” published here and translated by Dui Hua below) from Legal Daily, a newspaper published in Beijing by the Ministry of Justice. In the piece, the author looks at a pair of developments in the southern city of Shenzhen, just across the border from Hong Kong.

    On one hand, Shenzhen is attempting to facilitate petitioners’ activities by grouping the letters-and-visits offices of various city agencies under a single roof. On the other hand, Shenzhen also recently warned of possible serious punishments for “abnormal” petitioning behaviors—an announcement that elicited strong criticism from some online commentators and rights advocates.

    The author’s call for a clearer legal framework to govern petitioning is not surprising, given the nature of the publication in which it appeared. However, his warning that better “hardware” (government infrastructure) should be accompanied by improvements in “software” (or petitioning procedures) should also serve as a reminder that a “legal framework” is only as good as its implementation and enforcement. If maintaining social stability and harmony is given priority over safeguarding individual rights—that is, if petitioners are viewed as “unruly people” and potential sources of instability—authorities may use the law to punish, rather than protect.

    Letters and Visits Work Should Operate Under a Legal Framework
    You Chunliang
    Legal Daily, December 1, 2009

    Recently, [letters and visits work] for Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, and each of its urban districts began operating out of a single letters and visits hall. This is the first time that the letters and visits personnel from 16 functional departments have been gathered to work from one location. [These departments] cover land resources and planning; science, technology, industry, and trade information; residential habitat; transportation; health and family planning; education; public security; supervision; civil affairs; justice; human resources and social security; culture, sports, and tourism; state-owned assets; housing construction; market regulation; and urban management.

    Although this letters and visits hall is still in a trial phase, a spokesperson from the city’s letters and visits office indicated that the launch of the newly formed hall combining the city and district levels will help to break the traditional work mode of scattered resources and lack of coordination. Integrating resources will help to raise the petition resolution rate and the quality of case handling.

    However, with the establishment of the Shenzhen Letters and Visits Hall, one cannot help but recall the recent attention paid to 14 types of “abnormal petitioning” activities. The Shenzhen Intermediate Peoples Court, Procuratorate, Public Security Bureau, and Justice Bureau recently issued a “Notice Regarding the Lawful Handling of Abnormal Petitioning Activity,” [which identified] 14 types of “abnormal petitioning,” such as wearing petition garments [i.e., clothing upon which the petitioner’s complaints have been written], engaging in sit-in protests, self-mutilation, suicide, causing unreasonable disturbances, blocking vehicles, or pestering employees of government organs, and [outlined] serious punishments such as administrative detention, pursuing criminal responsibility, or re-education through labor [for engaging in such behavior].

    Release of the announcement led immediately to popular debate. Some took it as an effort by public authorities to suppress petitioners and something that would have a detrimental effect on the timely resolution of social grievances. Others viewed it as an effective, legal measure to stem unlawful petitioning behavior, one that would promote social harmony and stability.

    In fact, the announcement released does not restrict the rights of Shenzhen residents to engage in normal petitioning, but rather encourages residents to exercise those rights properly. The announcement particularly addresses the issue of “how residents should properly exercise their petitioning rights,” pointing out that petitioners who choose to submit petitions in person should do so at the relevant government agency or locations specified for receiving petitions.

    Construction of the Shenzhen Letters and Visits Hall shows us that the Shenzhen government is making progress in carrying out petitioning work. But “software” needs to keep up with this infrastructural “hardware”—for example, regulating the time needed to resolve a petition, standardizing the rights and obligations of personnel receiving petitions, and improving the quality of personnel receiving petitions. In practice, some locations view petitioning as “making trouble” and petitioners as “elements of instability.” They buy off petitioners, try to win over or deceive them, or even attack or harm them, making the situation even worse. The key to resolving the issue is to face the problems that exist with the petitioning process, improve work procedures, eliminate the popular concern that “nothing gets resolved without making a fuss,” and effectively protect people’s [right to make] reasonable and legitimate demands.

    Work involving petitioning is not something that can be glossed over; it should operate under a legal framework and must not be placed above the law. This is the bottom line to which personnel and concerned functional departments [that handle] petitioning should adhere, and it is the most fundamental legal rule that petitioners should obey.