Tag: lawyers

  • Translation: The Most Important Politics for Lawyers is Pursuing Rule of Law

    One of the fundamental dilemmas facing Chinese leaders today involves the relationship between political control and social stability. On the one hand are those who try to pursue stability through policing, propaganda, and maintaining tight political control over social institutions. On the other hand are those who see this emphasis on “rigid stability” as counterproductive and instead counsel allowing freer range to a variety of social forces, including the media, public opinion, and civil society organizations.
     
    Debate over the role of lawyers and the nature of the Chinese legal system as a whole is one area in which this dynamic between control and stability has become especially relevant. Where there was once visible momentum towards developing professionalization and autonomy among legal professionals, recent years have seen a turn towards increased politicization of the legal sector under the doctrine of the “Three Supremes,” with greater emphasis placed on the Communist Party’s guiding role and the importance of popular opinion in determining legal
    outcomes.
     
    In this environment, lawyers whose solitary efforts to protect the rights of individuals come into conflict with the prevailing sensibilities can find themselves confronted with numerous obstacles and sometimes physical danger. There is even a fear that lawyers have been detained and disappeared over recent weeks as part of a larger effort to cultivate a more compliant cadre of lawyers in China, one made up of individuals less likely to openly confront the rich and powerful and more willing to accept decisions mediated by political considerations.
     
    Further evidence of this can be seen in recently announced plans in Shanxi Province to screen applicants for lawyers’ licenses based in part on political considerations. In an item in the latest issue of New Century Weekly (republished in a variety of other mainland media outlets in recent days), Hong Kong University law professor Zheng Ge (George Zheng) argues that measures like this threaten to erase more than two decades of progress from the days when all criminal defense lawyers were employees of the state.
     
    Without denying China the opportunity to pursue its own “socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics,” Zheng contends that that pursuit would be better served by allowing lawyers to help people pursue their contentious demands in a rational, systematic manner that treats the rights of all parties equally before the law. Otherwise, he suggests, China faces being trapped in a vicious cycle of injustice and violence that is far from the “harmonious society” the nation’s leaders envisage.


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    The Most Important Politics for Lawyers is Pursuing Rule of Law
    Zheng Ge
    New Century Weekly
    April 25, 2011

     

    Recently, the Shanxi Judicial Administration Department unveiled new policy guidelines aimed at promoting a province-wide system to evaluate the conduct of those applying for a license to practice as a lawyer. It would require all law firms in the province to collect information from public security, education, personnel, and other relevant departments and, on the basis of a comprehensive review, produce conduct evaluations to “ensure the quality of those entering the lawyer profession from the beginning.”
     
    What is meant here by “conduct” is not only personal character and professional ethics but also an emphasis on “political behavior.” This is an implementation of the “Opinion on Further Strengthening and Improving the Work of Lawyers” issued by the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) in November 2010, whose “Four Adherings”—namely, adhering to holding high the banner of socialism, adhering to using the theory of scientific development to guide the work of lawyers, adhering to the essential character of lawyers as workers in the socialist [system of] laws with Chinese characteristics, and adhering to the party’s leadership over the work of lawyers—form the index against which the aforementioned “political behavior” will be measured. This Opinion specifically mentions improving the mechanism for admittance into legal practice and barring those people with poor “political character, professional ability, and professional ethics” from joining the ranks of lawyers.
     
    The reversion of lawyers under the politico-legal system undermines the accomplishments of the past two decades of reform. Ever since 1993, when the State Council approved the MOJ’s “Plan to Further Intensify Reform of the Work of Lawyers”—and especially since 1996, when the Lawyer’s Law defined lawyers as “professionals serving the legal needs of society”—the legal profession has distanced itself from the former system of “state legal workers,” allying itself with society in conflicts between state and society and with rights in conflicts between power and rights. This development path is in line with the general direction pointed to in the ruling party’s “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of the Party Since the Founding of the PRC”: “[We must] improve our Constitution and laws and turn them into a powerful and inviolable [instrument]that all persons must strictly observe. . . . The kind of chaotic situation seen in the ‘Cultural Revolution’ must never be allowed to happen again
    in any sphere.” 
     
    Ensuring that the common people strictly observe the law is the role of government, whereas ensuring that the government itself strictly observes the law is the function of society, which includes lawyers. If the power structure absorbs all social elites, thereby monopolizing the legal discourse, the result is [a situation in which those in power can say] “I’ll be the judge of what’s legal and illegal” and spokespersons for power can plainly say to certain members of the public: “Don’t use law as a shield; the law cannot protect you.”
     
    Another matter whose connection to the recent trend towards “political” lawyers is greater than it first appears is the Beijing Lawyers’ Association’s “local registration” requirement. According to personnel policies in Beijing, individuals from outside of Beijing cannot register [as lawyers] in their own names and can only register collectively in the name of their work unit. In reality, this is a crafty way of using administrative measures to restrict out-of-town lawyers from practicing in Beijing. The backdrop for this policy is probably a fear that out-of-towners like Li Zhuang will continue to present themselves as “Beijing lawyers” and cause trouble in the provinces; so, under pressure from all sides, the Beijing Lawyers’ Association has to adopt measures to raise the threshold for admittance as a “Beijing lawyer.” Political considerations are one of the
    deciding factors.
     
    Allowing lawyers or even all legal professionals a certain amount of independence will not cause China to “change color.” On the contrary, it would be fundamentally beneficial to China’s political stability and economic development, as well as helpful to improving the ethics and living standards of Chinese people.
     
    In other words, lawyers should absolutely be concerned with politics, but the most important politics for lawyers is pursuing rule of law and using legal channels to help citizens express their legal demands and protect their legal rights. If lawyers’ “political character” is measured purely on whether they assist the government in maintaining stability or defending economic development and “rights-defending lawyers” are viewed as displaying poor political behavior, then the legal profession will lose its need for existence.
     
    As for what role lawyers should play in a country with socialist rule of law, here are some factors worth considering:
     
    First, citizens’ moral reasoning and moral judgment should not be stuck at the level of black versus white. When lawyers go head to head in the courtroom with prosecutors or other lawyers, [the way they] present evidence or engage in debate allows people to see the complexity of truth and legal principles. In the recent cases of Li Gang’s son, Yao Jiaxin, and other cases that inflamed popular anger, we see how popular opinion is mostly one-sided, involving groundless accusations and crude, simplistic judgment. This kind of real-life “ideographic expression” is connected to the institutional lack of mechanisms whereby different positions and viewpoints may confront and debate each other.
     
    Second, the independent, professional legal service that lawyers provide to clients could fundamentally enable the authority of the law to contribute to stability. You cannot stand on one leg alone. If all the participants in the legal process pursue the same objective, then that legal process will be unable to resolve disputes, balance interests, or establish the law’s authority. Different interest demands need to be expressed through systematic channels and in a calm, rational manner. Otherwise, we will fall into a vicious cycle of violence leading to repression, leading in turn to greater violence and again to even greater repression.
     
    Third, in the course of providing legal services to a client, a lawyer’s speech and activities ought to be protected by law to a certain degree. If a defendant can turn in a lawyer for “suborning perjury” and, acknowledged as having performed meritorious service by the prosecution, avoid the death penalty by bringing the lawyer to justice, this sort of “conspiracy” completely undermines the ethical and legal protections that lawyers—at least criminal defense lawyers—need in order to do their work. Turning this around, will those “political” lawyers now be able to report their clients in order to render meritorious service?
     
    Fourth, meaningful participation by lawyers can exercise oversight over the administration of judicial power. To be sure, lawyers are complicit in many judicial corruption cases, but the blame for this is not simply a matter of lawyers’ “inattention to politics” or “poor standards.” The institutional cause is precisely the low status of lawyers, which allows judges to give less consideration to lawyers’ opinions in the trial or adjudication processes. Therefore, [monetary] advantage replaces [legal] principle and lawyers can only employ cash and other benefit to “persuade judges.”
     
    Fifth, lawyers’ ethical and professional standards cannot be improved through politics; they are formed through routinized, institutional incentive mechanisms. Emphasizing political quality can only drive lawyers away from “rights defense” and gradually force them to serve capital and power. This will cause an already-unbalanced legal services market to distance itself further away from the weakest [members of society].
  • Translation: How “Three Difficulties” of Criminal Defense Became “10 Difficulties”

    In a previous post, Dui Hua translated an account by a Chinese criminal defense lawyer of the obstacles he encountered trying to get police to allow him to meet with a detained suspect. The challenges facing criminal defense lawyers in China have been documented again and again, and explain why many new Chinese lawyers are reluctant to pursue criminal defense work.This subject was taken up in an article (translated below) included in a recent issue of Legal Weekly, a newspaper published under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice—which regulates the legal profession in China. In the article, interviews with several lawyers create a sense of shared and growing frustration on the part of criminal defense attorneys. Where lawyers identified the difficulties of getting access to suspects, obtaining case files, and carrying out discovery as the “three difficulties,” observers see common challenges endemic in 10 different areas.

    Some of these difficulties involve procedural barriers, but others pose risks to the pursuit of substantive justice. Of particular concern among the lawyers interviewed is the rarity with which Chinese courts accept defense pleas and find defendants innocent. When there is no real presumption of innocence and a decision to acquit could lead to repercussions for police and prosecutors, judges have little incentive to give serious consideration to defense pleas. The article warns that this threatens to stunt the growth of the criminal defense profession, not only because it saps the morale and confidence of lawyers but also because defendants may start to question whether there is really any point at all in trying to defend oneself in a Chinese court.

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    How “Three Difficulties” of Criminal Defense Became “10 Difficulties”
    Difficulty Getting Defense Arguments Accepted
    Stunts Growth of Criminal Defense Work

    Sun Jibin
    Legal Weekly
    January 20, 2011

    Research indicates that over the past decade, the rate of active representation by lawyers in criminal cases has been declining. The primary reasons for this are the great hazards and difficulties associated with criminal defense work.How difficult is criminal defense work? The answer to this question is continually being revised, growing from the “three difficulties” of the past—the difficulty in meeting [with suspects], the difficulty in getting access to [the prosecution’s] case files, and the difficulty in carrying out investigation and collecting evidence—to five or even 10 “difficulties.”

    The newly-defined “seven difficulties” include: the difficulty of obtaining bail, the difficulty of getting witnesses to appear in court, the difficulty of getting a hearing for an appellate trial, the difficulty of pleading innocent, the difficulty of [participating in the process of] death penalty review, the difficulty of abolishing Article 306 of the Criminal Law, and the difficulty of proving that evidence was illegally obtained.

    Of these new “seven difficulties,” the difficulty of pleading innocent may pose the most insurmountable obstacle for criminal defense lawyers, and its root is the difficulty lawyers face in getting courts to accept their innocence-defense arguments.

    When the infamous, wrongly-judged cases of Du Peiwu, She Xianglin, and Zhao Zuohai were exposed, people discovered that the defense lawyers in these cases had all made innocence pleas on behalf of the defendants but that, clearly, none of their defense arguments had been accepted.

    Lawyers believe that, compared to difficulties involved in participating in the criminal justice process, the difficulty of getting courts to accept defense arguments is the most central hazard. It not only saps the confidence of lawyers who carry out criminal defense work, it also saps the confidence of defendants in engaging lawyers in criminal cases. This has a huge impact on a country’s [ability to] develop rule of law in the area of criminal justice.

    Criminal Defense Work Transformed into “Ten Big Difficulties”

    In 2008, the revised Lawyers’ Law took effect. Much hope was placed in this “advanced” law, which said lawyers could meet [suspects] if they provided the “three documents” [i.e., license to practice law, license of the law firm, and either power-of-attorney or legal-aid documents] and could get access to [the prosecution’s] case files once [the procuratorate’s] investigation had begun—perhaps it could bring resolution to criminal defense lawyers’ “three difficulties.”

    Two years later, people have realized that, while there has certainly been a breakthrough in some locations, in general there has not been a very big improvement.

    Looking at [how things work] in practice, not only has there been no solution to the old problem of the original “three difficulties,” other difficult problems related to defense work are emerging daily. Not long ago, at the “Fourth Annual Shangquan Criminal Defense Forum,” the well-known Beijing defense attorney Xu Lanting first spoke of the “ten difficulties” in criminal defense work.

    Besides the old “three difficulties” of meeting [with suspects], accessing [the prosecution’s] case files, and conducting investigations and obtaining evidence, the new “seven difficulties” can be seen in: the difficulty of obtaining bail, the difficulty of getting witnesses to appear in court, the difficulty of getting a hearing for an appellate trial, the difficulty of pleading innocent, the difficulty of [participating in the process of] death penalty review, the difficulty of abolishing Article 306 of the Criminal Law, and the difficulty of proving that evidence was illegally obtained.

    Lawyers can encounter difficulties at every part of the criminal litigation process. In an interview with Legal Weekly, Xu Lanting said that these new “seven difficulties” are increasingly becoming a new bottleneck restricting the development of criminal defense work in China. Witnesses—especially key witnesses—do not appear in court, hearings are not held in appellate proceedings, it is difficult for lawyers to participate effectively in the death penalty review process, and it is difficult to get illegal evidence excluded. These all directly contribute to lawyers having no way to carry out a full defense.

    Beijing lawyer Jin Xuekong, who has many years of experience in criminal defense work, sees things similarly.

    Jin told Legal Weekly that the primary reason lawyers request that a witness appear in court is because that witness can prove exculpatory facts or might change earlier statements alleging a crime. But because law enforcement organs proceed from [the principle that] the first impression is the strongest and prejudge the guilt of the defendant, anything that might change that preconception or challenge their judgment—especially the appearance of key witnesses in court—gets strictly limited.

    According to [Article 187 of] China’s Criminal Procedure Law, hearings should be held in criminal appellate trials as a matter of principle, with trials without hearings being the exception. But in practice, because it is much easier to try the case without hearings and because it creates less work, it has become common for appellate trials to be held without hearings and hearings have become the exception.

    “In practice,” said Jin Xuekong, “no matter how great the differences between the prosecution and defense over the facts or how many facts or pieces of evidence need further investigation in the appeal proceeding, as long as the judges believe that the original verdict should be upheld, it is hard for a lawyer’s request for a trial hearing to be accepted.” [He added that] the level of difficulty in getting an appellate trial hearing is revealed by the way that many defendants and lawyers treat getting an appellate trial hearing as a major procedural victory. “If hearings are not held to try most appeals, it is bound to cause appellate trials to become a mere formality. If appellate trials cannot fulfill their oversight function over first-instance trials, there will be no way for defendants to seek remedies when their rights have not been protected.”

    And in the death penalty review phase [by the Supreme People’s Court], lawyers are presently only able to submit written defense arguments and arrange for meetings with judges to discuss their defense arguments. (Meetings by lawyers with judges are not available in every case.) Lawyers cannot meet with defendants or review [prosecutors’] case files. Xu Lanting points out that if a lawyer has not represented a defendant in stages prior to the death penalty review, there is no channel for them to understand the facts of the case even if they directly participate in defense during the death penalty review. What kind of defense is this?

    Moreover, in the course of criminal defense work it is also very difficult to prove investigators’ use of coercion, fraud, or inducements to obtain confessions.

    Many lawyers report that in practice it is very hard to get courts to acknowledge coercion of confessions through torture, obviously [meaning] there is no way to get illegal evidence directly related to coerced confessions acknowledged [by the court] and excluded [from the trial]. More detailed provisions concerning the determination and exclusion of illegal evidence took effect on July 1, 2010, when the “Rules Concerning Questions about Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal Cases” took effect. But since that time, even though investigators have testified in court in many cases, there have been nearly no instances in which illegal evidence has been found.

    Difficulty Getting Defense Arguments Accepted Becomes Bottleneck

    In the view of Jin Xuekong, regardless of whether there are three or 10 “difficulties” in criminal defense work, the core difficulty currently faced in defense is that of getting one’s defense opinions accepted, of which the difficulty of pleading innocent is the most notable example.

    Jin points out that if one says that the difficulty in getting one’s defense opinions accepted is a hazard on the substantive side [of criminal defense work], other defense difficulties such as the difficulty of meeting [with a suspect], the difficulty of getting access to the [prosecution’s] case file, or the difficulty of getting a witness to appear in court can all be seen as hazards on the procedural side. A lawyer’s [ability to] meet [with a suspect], access case files, carry out investigations and collect evidence, request witnesses to appear in court, get an appellate trial hearing, participate in the death penalty review procedure, and exclude illegal evidence are all means of [carrying out a] defense, whereas having one’s defense opinions accepted is the ultimate goal.

    “If defense arguments that should be accepted are not accepted,” Jin Xuekong said in an interview with Legal Weekly, “lawyers and defendants will all lose faith in the criminal defense [process]. Lawyers won’t be willing or dare to engage in criminal defense [work] and defendants won’t be willing to hire a lawyer. The impact on criminal defense work will be total and long-lasting.” [He went on to say that] the difficulty in getting defense arguments accepted could become the main bottleneck restricting the growth of criminal defense [work] in China.

    Jin Xuekong points out several main reasons why it is so difficult to get defense arguments accepted: a longstanding approach to litigation that values fighting crime and places emphasis on the allegations, while de-valuing protection [of rights] and downplaying defense; the standard for determining mistaken cases and the responsibility system; and the professional knowledge and experience of those handling cases.

    Approaches to litigation differ, and the same issue may result in different judgments and assessments. When law enforcement agencies and personnel—or even the public at large—place excessive emphasis on fighting crime and maintaining social stability, defendants’ legal rights and lawyers’ defense [efforts] will of course be restricted and it will become more difficult for lawyers to get their defense opinions accepted, becoming an obstacle to lawyers’ criminal defense work that is difficult to surmount.

    Jin Xuekong points out that the standard of proof in China’s criminal procedure law is insufficiently complex and varied. For the stages of completing the investigation, indictment, and conviction, the standard of proof is always the existence of clear facts and evidence of a crime. Were an indicted defendant to be later found innocent, it would mean the indictment was in error. Even though the standard of proof for criminal detention and arrest is lower, when a defendant who has been placed under criminal detention and arrested is then later found innocent, there is no question that the [decisions] to place under criminal detention or arrest would be seen to have been made in error.

    A mistakenly-decided case can affect the performance appraisal and promotion of the individuals handling the case and even the image and prestige of the court itself. Because of this, it has been difficult to implement the presumption of innocence and for lawyers’ pleas of not guilty to succeed. If a court renders a verdict of not guilty, it will feel the pressure not only from victims and the public but from the public security organ and the procuratorate as well.

    Documents show that over a period of many years, the national rate of acquittal in criminal cases has rarely broken above 0.2 percent. In other words, it is possible that a given court does not have a single case of acquittal in a particular year. Looking at media reports or annual court work reports, one sees that some courts go many years without even one acquittal. A judge can hear hundreds of cases over a period of several years without a single acquittal. And in so doing, these courts and judges are seen as advanced and models.

    A criminal defense lawyer observed that the acquittal rate is a direct reflection of the current state of acceptance of defense opinions. If defense has no impact, how significant would greater procedural participation really be? If defense has no impact, what defendant would still be willing to engage a lawyer?

  • Translation & Commentary: “Can Having a Lawyer Present for Interrogations Eliminate Torture?”

    In its “National Human Rights Action Plan” for 2009–2010, China asserted its commitment to eliminate torture in its criminal justice system, something UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Manfred Nowak had described as “widespread” in an interview with Dui Hua following his visit to the country in 2005.
    Over the past year, China took a significant step forward in the direction of combating torture by issuing two sets of detailed rules governing the exclusion in criminal trials of evidence obtained through illegal methods. While these rules provide further proof of China’s commitment to protecting the rights of criminal suspects, observers have pointed out that thorough implementation and further steps are needed before this commitment can be turned into action.
    Ensuring a suspect’s right to legal counsel at all stages of the criminal investigation process is one such further step that experts cite. So, it was welcome news to see last week that prosecutors in Beijing have launched a pilot program to allow certain criminal suspects to request a lawyer’s presence during questioning carried out by investigators. The move marks another small sign of progress along China’s path towards procedural justice.
    However, as legal commentator Xu Mingxuan notes in a Beijing News opinion column (translated below), the narrow application of these new measures in Beijing makes it unlikely that they will have much of a direct impact on preventing torture. For one, the rules only apply to suspects not being held in custody, a small group in a country where bail is not widely used.
    Moreover, it is the initial stage of police investigation (rather than the secondary stage of investigation by prosecutors), where the danger of torture is perhaps greatest. And this danger is not limited to the interrogation room, since most criminal suspects are detained in police-run detention centers, where they appear to be most vulnerable to torture.
    As Xu rightly points out, it is the “confession-centric” mentality in China’s criminal justice system that needs to change. Only then are we likely to see measures designed to protect suspects’ procedural rights truly take hold.
    *
    Can Having a Lawyer Present for Interrogations Eliminate Torture?
    Xu Mingxuan
    Beijing News
    December 7, 2010
         Recently, the Beijing Municipality Procuratorate Second Division issued [a set of] “(Provisional) Rules for Lawyers to be Present During Interrogations.” According to reports, criminal suspects in cases in which the suspect is not being held in custody may request the presence of a lawyer at the time of interrogation. This is understood to be the first such initiative by a Beijing procuratorate, one that will gradually be expanded to include cases involving offenses by juveniles, foreigners, and individuals from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.
         Even if you’re still unfamiliar with the phrase “lawyers being present during interrogations,” surely everyone must be familiar with lines like “I have nothing to say without an attorney present” from European and American movies. This is the “right to have a lawyer present,” one of a criminal suspect’s procedural rights. The right to a lawyer’s defense and presence is, in essence, an extension of citizens’ private rights, a [way of] monitoring public authority and an effective way to prevent extraction of confessions through torture and miscarriages of justice.
         For various historical reasons, the Criminal Procedure Law that China established 14 years ago has no provision for the right to have a lawyer present. On the contrary, there is actually a provision for a “right to have law enforcement organs present.” ([According to Article 96,] “When a lawyer meets with a criminal suspect in custody, the investigation organ may, in light of the seriousness of the crime and when it is deemed necessary, send personnel to be present at the meeting.”) Many miscarriages of justice have been caused by the absence of various procedural rights in [China’s] criminal procedure system. If he had had a lawyer present, would She Xianglin [link] have been tortured and beaten until he confessed? Or take the case of Xiao Chuanguo’s hiring of thugs to attack Fang Zhouzi [link]. The facts in this case were quite clear, with a clear distinction between right and wrong. But foreign media reports deliberately emphasized that Xiao Chuanguo had made his confession of guilt without having a lawyer present. This shows that having a lawyer present during interrogations by law enforcement bodies is something that all countries recognize as a part of rule of law. Without such a system in place, no matter whether substantive justice is achieved one will be unable to avoid criticisms about procedural injustice.
         In fact, even though China’s criminal procedure legislation is relatively lagging, it doesn’t mean that nothing can be done in law enforcement practice. Several years ago, the Procedural Law Research Institution at China University of Political Science and Law received funding from the United Nations to launch a pilot program at the Haidian Branch of the Beijing Public Security Bureau in which police in selected cases were required to notify a lawyer to appear during initial questioning of a suspect. This pilot program had a positive social impact. The Beijing Municipality Procuratorate Second Division’s current launch of a system for lawyers to be present during interrogations is [an example] of China’s gradual, one-step-at-a-time progress in rule of law.
         The real reason that it has been so difficult to realize the right to have a lawyer present is the question of whether the investigating organs (public security bureaus or procuratorates) dare to accept monitoring by lawyers and shine a light on the way that cases are handled. Only by establishing the right to have a lawyer present can we abandon the longstanding “confession-centrism” of China’s law enforcement system. Shifting investigators’ focus to physical evidence and other technical evidence will destroy the institutional space in which coerced confessions and the use of violence to extract confessions can exist.
         Though this pilot effort by the Beijing Municipality Procuratorate Second Division is worthy of praise, one should recognize that the limited scope of this program means that the impact of lawyers being able to sit in on interrogations is not great. The pilot project only covers the phase in which procuratorates are carrying out their investigation [in preparation for] indictment, and lawyers cannot sit in on interrogations of suspects carried out by the police. There remains a considerable distance from standard international practice. As far as application is concerned, [the rules] are only to be used for suspects who are not being held in custody. In law-enforcement practice, most cases in which suspects are not being held in custody involve those with a good attitude toward acknowledging guilt, those facing relatively light charges, or cases involving little disagreement [over the charges]. Even if lawyers [are allowed to] sit in on interrogations [in such cases], it would be extremely difficult for lawyers to play their role in protecting human rights and eliminating confessions extracted by torture or inducement.
  • A Day in the Life of a Chinese Defense Lawyer

    Criminal defense lawyers face many challenges in China, especially when the clients they defend are charged with endangering state security or other politically sensitive acivity. Among the many difficulties defense lawyers must overcome is trying to meet with a suspect whose case is still in the “criminal investigation stage”—that is, being handled by police prior to making a recommendation to the procuratorate for prosecution.Just how difficult arranging such a meeting can be was recently described in great detail in a blog post (translated below) by Liu Xiaoyuan, a prominent criminal defense lawyer at the Qijian Law Firm in Beijing. Liu, who often writes about the cases he handles on one of his many blogs, has been involved with a number of difficult and sensitive cases in recent years. He was involved in Yang Jia’s murder trial and, most recently, defended You Jingyou, one of three people in Fujian convicted of defamation in connection with Internet postings aimed at helping an illiterate woman pressure local authorities to investigate the suspicious circumstances surrounding her daughter’s death.

    In May and June of this year, Liu spent three weeks in the United States as part of the State Department’s “International Visitors Program.” While overseas, he learned that he had been requested to defend Zuo Xiaohuan, an activist from Sichuan formally arrested on May 28 on charges of inciting subversion. Liu’s account of his attempts to meet with his client in the local county detention center illustrates the importance he and other rights attorneys in China place on procedural rights, as well as the repeated battles that must be fought with law enforcement officers who have their own sense of how things should be done.

    A Meeting with Zuo Xiaohuan
    July 8, 2010

    Who is Zuo Xiaohuan? Before I met him, I had no idea. But he probably knew of me, because when the Mianyang Public Security Bureau [formally] arrested him on charges of inciting subversion on May 28, Zuo Xiaohuan told them he wanted to engage me as his attorney. At the time, I was in the United States visiting Washington and was given the news by someone else over the Internet. I immediately replied that I would accept.
    I returned to China from the United States on the afternoon of June 13. Because I had to take care of some old cases, I didn’t have time to go to Mianyang right away. Later, Zuo Xiaohuan’s older sister telephoned and asked me to go to the Santai County Detention Center to meet [with Zuo] as soon as possible. She said that the officer in charge had been threatening her for having passed along the arrest notice to another person.
    Zuo’s sister is a rural woman with very little education, so the officer’s threats made her feel extremely scared. I told her over the phone that she hadn’t committed any criminal act, so there was no need to worry or be afraid. I said that the arrest notice was given to her and isn’t any state secret, so she’s within her rights to pass it on to anyone. The public security organ has no right to interfere, and if they dare step out of line, she can report them.
    On July 6, I took the earliest flight from Beijing International Airport to Mianyang. I didn’t arrive in Santai County until around noon.
    Zuo’s sister never told me clearly which public security bureau was investigating the case. Only after I got to Santai County and she showed me the two notices did I learn that Zuo Xiaohuan had been placed under criminal detention by the Santai County Public Security Bureau and that the Mianyang Public Security Bureau had executed the arrest. In other words, at the time of arrest the case had been transferred to the Mianyang Public Security Bureau for investigation. The Santai County Public Security Bureau had detained Zuo Xiaohuan on suspicion of the crime of subversion, while the Mianyang Public Security Bureau [formally] arrested him on suspicion of the crime of inciting subversion. These are two different crimes.
    When an attorney asks to meet with  a criminal suspect during the investigative stage of a criminal case, it must be arranged by the unit handling the case. Zuo’s sister gave me the telephone number of Team Leader Feng, who as head of the Mobile Investigation Team of the Mianyang Public Security Bureau’s Domestic Security Unit was responsible for the case. I called Team Leader Feng, and he told me to go to the Mianyang Public Security Bureau the next day, saying that the bureau would have someone accompany me to the meeting. I pointed out that Zuo Xiaohuan’s case didn’t involve state secrets and that there was no need to “trouble” the police to accompany me to the meeting. Team Leader Feng said that Zuo’s case was no ordinary case and that according to their rules a police officer had to accompany me. I said that if they wanted to come escort me, I’d wait for them there in Santai County but wouldn’t go to Mianyang.
    At about 6 p.m., I got a call from Team Leader Feng, who said that I had to go to the Mianyang Public Security Bureau to hand in the paperwork for the meeting and that his superiors needed to give approval before I could meet [with Zuo].
    According to the provisions of the law, as long as the case doesn’t involve state secrets a lawyer doesn’t need approval from the public security bureau to meet [with a suspect]. The public security bureau should [simply] arrange for a meeting within 48 hours. But in practice, the arrangement process often turns into an approval process—all so the public security organ can put its authority on display. In order to ensure the meeting would take place, I had to check out of my hotel room in Santai County and hire a car to take me to Mianyang.
    On July 7, I arrived at the office of Team Leader Feng at 9 a.m., as we had arranged. Team Leader Feng was very polite, asking me to take a seat in the conference room and warmly bringing me a cup of tea.
    Team Leader Feng took the official letter from my law firm and the authorization letter from Zuo Xiaohuan’s sister, and then he turned to seek his superior’s approval. About a half-hour later, Team Leader Feng returned to the conference room. He told me that there were problems with the power of attorney [POA] authorization letter from Zuo’s sister. I asked him what the problem was. He said that, first of all, there was a problem with the way the POA letter had been completed; second, the letter did not clearly set out the limits of the authorization; and third, the letter had merely been signed, without affixing a fingerprint.
    I explained to him that a POA authorization letter could be completed either by a lawyer or by the person making the authorization. Zuo’s sister didn’t have much education, so I had completed the letter and she indicated her approval with a signature. The format of a POA authorization is uniform and set by the lawyers’ association, so it’s the same throughout the whole country. Since this is a criminal case, not a civil case, it’s only necessary for the letter to specify the engagement of a certain lawyer from a certain law firm to act as attorney for a [particular] criminal suspect. There is no need to state specific limits of the authorization, because specific limits to a lawyer’s authorization are set out in the Criminal Procedure Law and Lawyers Law. Moreover, the Ministry of Public Security’s Procedural Regulations on the Handling of Criminal Cases by Public Security Organs also has similar provisions. The POA authorization was personally signed by Zuo Xiaohuan’s sister, and the law doesn’t have any provisions requiring her to affix her fingerprint as well before it can be binding.
    Having heard my explanations, Team Leader Feng still believed that the POA authorization needed to set out the limits of authorization. I countered that if he felt there was a problem with the letter’s format, we could go make an inquiry at the Mianyang Justice Bureau or the lawyers’ association. Or we could go ask the criminal investigation unit, which arranges attorney visits frequently, whether other lawyers have submitted POA authorization letters in the same format. I even asked, rhetorically, whether Zuo Xiaohuan’s case was the only one the domestic security unit had ever handled. If they’d handled cases in the past, they could compare those POA authorization letters with this one.
    Team Leader Feng no longer contested the format of the POA authorization letter, but he continued to insist that it needed to be affixed with a fingerprint. I asked him to show me the legal basis—which law, regulation, or rule required both a signature and a fingerprint before a POA authorization  could be binding?
    I said that even if he could show me provisions in a document [issued by] the Sichuan Public Security Department or even the Mianyang Public Security Bureau, I would accept them.
    Team Leader Feng still had doubts about the authenticity of Zuo’s sister’s signature, so I said: “You delivered the arrest notice to Zuo’s sister. Can’t you just compare it to the signature she made when accepting the arrest notice?”
    Zuo Xiaohuan’s note indicating he wanted to engage me as his attorney was delivered by the public security bureau to his sister from the detention center. At this point, I also took out that note and said: “If Zuo Xiaohuan didn’t want to hire me, would I have come all this way to Sichuan?” Team Leader Feng was silent.
    I have a habit of carrying a collection of laws whenever I’m working on a case. Team Leader Feng saw me pull out the book and said that he wasn’t used to looking at my book, so he turned around and went back to his office to get his own book.
    Flipping through the Procedural Regulations on the Handling of Criminal Cases by Public Security Organs, he was unable to find any provision that required a family member to affix a fingerprint in addition to a signature on a POA authorization letter before it could be binding. Neither the Criminal Procedure Law nor the Lawyers’ Law had provisions, either.
    Even though he couldn’t find an appropriate basis, Team Leader Feng still insisted on the need for affixing a fingerprint. He said he was not intentionally trying to make things difficult for me but only wanted to do things according the public security bureau’s procedures.
    Actually, this wasn’t making things difficult for me; it was Zuo’s sister who would have to be called to personally make a trip. Left with no alternative, I called Zuo’s sister and asked her to come to the Mianyang Public Security Bureau. Her house is some distance from Santai County and is thus even farther away from Mianyang.
    I thought to myself: “Even if Zuo’s sister had affixed her fingerprint on the POA authorization, [Feng] probably would have still found fault, saying that he couldn’t verify that the fingerprint was hers.”
    Team Leader Feng said I was too agitated and had a bias against the police. But I think that when it comes to an attorney’s involvement in the investigation stage of a criminal case, it’s usually the police, not the lawyer, who has the bias.
    When the public security bureau turns “arranging a visit” into “approving a visit” or when a family member’s signature isn’t enough and a fingerprint necessary—even when no concrete [legal] basis can be found—is it the lawyer who’s biased against the public security organ or the public security organ who’s biased against the attorney’s involvement?
    After three hours of discussion from 9 a.m. to 12 noon, there was still no result. Zuo’s sister couldn’t get there right away, so I left the Mianyang Public Security Bureau to have lunch. Team Leader Feng told me to come back at 1 p.m.
    Around 1 p.m., Zuo’s sister arrived. Without time to eat lunch, she went with me to the public security bureau and, in the presence of Team Leader Feng, affixed her fingerprint on the POA authorization letter.
    But Team Leader Feng again said that the POA authorization needed to set out limits of the authorization. Zuo’s sister told him she only had a second-grade education and couldn’t write. Team Leader Feng wanted me to help her with the writing. I said there was no basis for writing limits of the authorization.
    In order to avoid any further complications, I wrote on a blank piece of paper: “The limits of the power of attorney are in accordance with Article 35 of the Procedural Regulations on the Handling of Criminal Cases by Public Security Organs.” Team Leader Feng wanted Zuo’s sister to copy that on the POA authorization letter, but she said she honestly couldn’t write, so Team Leader Feng finally gave up.
    After completing the formalities for arranging the visit—which actually were “approval procedures”—Team Leader Feng said they were just following procedures and regulations and were really not trying to make things difficult for me.
    At 2:30 p.m., Zuo’s sister and I hired a car to take us to the Santai County Detention Center. Team Leader Feng notified a police officer who was in Santai County handling a case to accompany me to the meeting.
    When I arrived at the Santai County Detention Center just before 4 p.m., the police officer was there waiting to accompany me to the meeting.
    The public security organ hadn’t classified Zuo Xiaohuan’s case as one involving state secrets, so according to the Criminal Procedure Law, the Lawyers’ Law, and the Procedural Regulations on the Handling of Criminal Cases by Public Security Organs, police officers may not accompany lawyers during their meetings [with suspects]. But public security organs are very powerful, and even a lawyer who loves to argue as much as I do has no choice.
    What surprised me is that after Zuo Xiaohuan was brought into the meeting room, the police officer took out a recording device in the shape of a pen and placed it on the table. I immediately argued that to accompany me to the meeting was already a violation of the law but recording a lawyer is an even bigger violation.
    They had me call Team Leader Feng, but when I dialed his number no one answered. I could only take out my own pen-recorder, at which point the police officer informed me that the detention center didn’t allow lawyers to make recordings. I asked them to show me the legal basis.
    I told them that according the the rules for handling criminal cases established by the All-China Lawyers’ Association, a lawyer meeting with a criminal suspect (or defendant) may make a recording or a photograph as long as the suspect (or defendant) agrees. There is no need for the detention center to agree.
    I said that I’d heard that in the case of Li Zhuang [a defense lawyer accused of coaching his client in an organized crime trial to recant his testimony] the police had a recording but that they didn’t dare reveal it as evidence for the prosecution because it was a serious violation of the law for police to make recordings. Zuo Xiaohuan’s is no mafia-type case of organized crime; he’s been charged with inciting subversion of state power for helping people to defend their rights, writing articles that exposed the darker side, and discussing his political views during interviews with overseas media. His confession isn’t important for convicting him of a crime; the key is the articles he wrote. Is there any need to worry about a lawyer coaching him to recant his confession?
    In Zuo Xiaohuan’s case, to take these kinds of precautions against his lawyer is actually a sign of a guilty conscience.
    I told Team Leader Feng numerous times that during the criminal investigation stage I’m not too interested in discussing the facts of the case, because I haven’t yet seen the prosecution’s evidence or the case file and can only hear Zuo Xiaohuan’s side of the story. During the criminal investigation stage, I’m much more focused on the legal procedure followed in handling the case.
    It’s not up to the public security organ or the procuratorate to decide whether Zuo Xiaohuan is guilty of a crime. That should be decided by a court, based on the facts and the law. Of course, in light of problems with the legal system, it’s possible that it will be up to the politics and law committee [to determine guilt]—the Zhao Zuohai case in Henan is a classic example. But in some places the head of the public security bureau is also secretary of the politics and law committee, so there are also cases where it’s up to the public security bureau [to determine guilt].
    Seeing that I was going to keep arguing, the police officer accompanying me for the meeting suggested that neither side make recordings, but I suspected that he might have some hidden way to record secretly. If the police want to eavesdrop, what power does a lawyer have to prevent it?
    Zuo Xiaohuan says that the police decided to take him into custody because he was helping private-school teachers in Santai County protect their rights. The local private-school teachers are of the same opinion.
    In helping others to protect their rights, Zuo Xiaohuan had in the past also been interviewed by overseas media and given political opinions about social problems. He’d even been sent to re-education through labor when he was working at Leshan Teachers’ College. After being fired from his job, he began seeking to protect his own rights. Having encountered numerous injustices in the course of helping to protect the rights of others and himself, he said some things out of dissatisfaction with present circumstances, but he maintains they didn’t have anything to do with state political power.
    When he mentioned state political power, I suddenly asked him: “What is [meant by] state political power?” He couldn’t explain it. I think that Zuo Xiaohuan isn’t the only person who doesn’t know what state political power means; probably the officer handling the case doesn’t understand it either. Otherwise he wouldn’t suspect the act of criticizing the government as the crime of inciting subversion of state power.
    Zuo Xiaohuan’s mind is clear and he has mentally prepared himself to be sentenced. He thinks someone always has to sacrifice and says that since they’ve taken him in on suspicion of inciting subversion there’s almost no chance that he’ll be acquitted. Otherwise, the police would lose face.
    In recent years, basically all those who have been taken in for helping the vulnerable groups to protect their rights have been found guilty of crimes like defamation, false accusation, or extortion. For local [officials] to charge Zuo Xiaohuan with inciting subversion shows that they’re treating him as a “political figure.”
    In my view, Zuo Xiaohuan is only a rights defender, not a “political figure.” Maybe it’s because he participated in [the events of] 1989 or discussed political opinions with overseas media that led to [the case] being upgraded to a political level and linked to a threat to state political power.

    Zuo Xiaohuan was born in 1969 and is yet unmarried. After being fired from his job, he went looking for work but, thanks to interference by others, wound up an unemployed person. Zuo Xiaohuan has four brothers and sisters, his father has passed away, and his mother is in her seventies. Zuo’s sister told me their mother hopes that Zuo can be released soon and return to the countryside to become a farmer.
    When you come right down to it, the tragedy of Zuo Xiaohuan, this individual, is actually the tragedy of the [entire] society.

  • A Day in the Life of a Chinese Defense Lawyer

    Criminal defense lawyers face many challenges in China, especially when the clients they defend are charged with endangering state security or other politically sensitive acivity. Among the many difficulties defense lawyers must overcome is trying to meet with a suspect whose case is still in the “criminal investigation stage”—that is, being handled by police prior to making a recommendation to the procuratorate for prosecution.

    Just how difficult arranging such a meeting can be was recently described in great detail in a blog post (translated below) by Liu Xiaoyuan, a prominent criminal defense lawyer at the Qijian Law Firm in Beijing. Liu, who often writes about the cases he handles on one of his many blogs, has been involved with a number of difficult and sensitive cases in recent years. He was involved in Yang Jia’s murder trial and, most recently, defended You Jingyou, one of three people in Fujian convicted of defamation in connection with Internet postings aimed at helping an illiterate woman pressure local authorities to investigate the suspicious circumstances surrounding her daughter’s death.

    In May and June of this year, Liu spent three weeks in the United States as part of the State Department’s “International Visitors Program.” While overseas, he learned that he had been requested to defend Zuo Xiaohuan, an activist from Sichuan formally arrested on May 28 on charges of inciting subversion. Liu’s account of his attempts to meet with his client in the local county detention center illustrates the importance he and other rights attorneys in China place on procedural rights, as well as the repeated battles that must be fought with law enforcement officers who have their own sense of how things should be done.

    A Meeting with Zuo Xiaohuan
    July 8, 2010

        Who is Zuo Xiaohuan? Before I met him, I had no idea. But he probably knew of me, because when the Mianyang Public Security Bureau [formally] arrested him on charges of inciting subversion on May 28, Zuo Xiaohuan told them he wanted to engage me as his attorney. At the time, I was in the United States visiting Washington and was given the news by someone else over the Internet. I immediately replied that I would accept.
        I returned to China from the United States on the afternoon of June 13. Because I had to take care of some old cases, I didn’t have time to go to Mianyang right away. Later, Zuo Xiaohuan’s older sister telephoned and asked me to go to the Santai County Detention Center to meet [with Zuo] as soon as possible. She said that the officer in charge had been threatening her for having passed along the arrest notice to another person.
        Zuo’s sister is a rural woman with very little education, so the officer’s threats made her feel extremely scared. I told her over the phone that she hadn’t committed any criminal act, so there was no need to worry or be afraid. I said that the arrest notice was given to her and isn’t any state secret, so she’s within her rights to pass it on to anyone. The public security organ has no right to interfere, and if they dare step out of line, she can report them.
        On July 6, I took the earliest flight from Beijing International Airport to Mianyang. I didn’t arrive in Santai County until around noon.
        Zuo’s sister never told me clearly which public security bureau was investigating the case. Only after I got to Santai County and she showed me the two notices did I learn that Zuo Xiaohuan had been placed under criminal detention by the Santai County Public Security Bureau and that the Mianyang Public Security Bureau had executed the arrest. In other words, at the time of arrest the case had been transferred to the Mianyang Public Security Bureau for investigation. The Santai County Public Security Bureau had detained Zuo Xiaohuan on suspicion of the crime of subversion, while the Mianyang Public Security Bureau [formally] arrested him on suspicion of the crime of inciting subversion. These are two different crimes.
        When an attorney asks to meet with  a criminal suspect during the investigative stage of a criminal case, it must be arranged by the unit handling the case. Zuo’s sister gave me the telephone number of Team Leader Feng, who as head of the Mobile Investigation Team of the Mianyang Public Security Bureau’s Domestic Security Unit was responsible for the case. I called Team Leader Feng, and he told me to go to the Mianyang Public Security Bureau the next day, saying that the bureau would have someone accompany me to the meeting. I pointed out that Zuo Xiaohuan’s case didn’t involve state secrets and that there was no need to “trouble” the police to accompany me to the meeting. Team Leader Feng said that Zuo’s case was no ordinary case and that according to their rules a police officer had to accompany me. I said that if they wanted to come escort me, I’d wait for them there in Santai County but wouldn’t go to Mianyang.
        At about 6 p.m., I got a call from Team Leader Feng, who said that I had to go to the Mianyang Public Security Bureau to hand in the paperwork for the meeting and that his superiors needed to give approval before I could meet [with Zuo].
        According to the provisions of the law, as long as the case doesn’t involve state secrets a lawyer doesn’t need approval from the public security bureau to meet [with a suspect]. The public security bureau should [simply] arrange for a meeting within 48 hours. But in practice, the arrangement process often turns into an approval process—all so the public security organ can put its authority on display. In order to ensure the meeting would take place, I had to check out of my hotel room in Santai County and hire a car to take me to Mianyang.
        On July 7, I arrived at the office of Team Leader Feng at 9 a.m., as we had arranged. Team Leader Feng was very polite, asking me to take a seat in the conference room and warmly bringing me a cup of tea.
        Team Leader Feng took the official letter from my law firm and the authorization letter from Zuo Xiaohuan’s sister, and then he turned to seek his superior’s approval. About a half-hour later, Team Leader Feng returned to the conference room. He told me that there were problems with the power of attorney [POA] authorization letter from Zuo’s sister. I asked him what the problem was. He said that, first of all, there was a problem with the way the POA letter had been completed; second, the letter did not clearly set out the limits of the authorization; and third, the letter had merely been signed, without affixing a fingerprint.
        I explained to him that a POA authorization letter could be completed either by a lawyer or by the person making the authorization. Zuo’s sister didn’t have much education, so I had completed the letter and she indicated her approval with a signature. The format of a POA authorization is uniform and set by the lawyers’ association, so it’s the same throughout the whole country. Since this is a criminal case, not a civil case, it’s only necessary for the letter to specify the engagement of a certain lawyer from a certain law firm to act as attorney for a [particular] criminal suspect. There is no need to state specific limits of the authorization, because specific limits to a lawyer’s authorization are set out in the Criminal Procedure Law and Lawyers Law. Moreover, the Ministry of Public Security’s Procedural Regulations on the Handling of Criminal Cases by Public Security Organs also has similar provisions. The POA authorization was personally signed by Zuo Xiaohuan’s sister, and the law doesn’t have any provisions requiring her to affix her fingerprint as well before it can be binding.
        Having heard my explanations, Team Leader Feng still believed that the POA authorization needed to set out the limits of authorization. I countered that if he felt there was a problem with the letter’s format, we could go make an inquiry at the Mianyang Justice Bureau or the lawyers’ association. Or we could go ask the criminal investigation unit, which arranges attorney visits frequently, whether other lawyers have submitted POA authorization letters in the same format. I even asked, rhetorically, whether Zuo Xiaohuan’s case was the only one the domestic security unit had ever handled. If they’d handled cases in the past, they could compare those POA authorization letters with this one.
        Team Leader Feng no longer contested the format of the POA authorization letter, but he continued to insist that it needed to be affixed with a fingerprint. I asked him to show me the legal basis—which law, regulation, or rule required both a signature and a fingerprint before a POA authorization  could be binding?
        I said that even if he could show me provisions in a document [issued by] the Sichuan Public Security Department or even the Mianyang Public Security Bureau, I would accept them.
        Team Leader Feng still had doubts about the authenticity of Zuo’s sister’s signature, so I said: “You delivered the arrest notice to Zuo’s sister. Can’t you just compare it to the signature she made when accepting the arrest notice?”
        Zuo Xiaohuan’s note indicating he wanted to engage me as his attorney was delivered by the public security bureau to his sister from the detention center. At this point, I also took out that note and said: “If Zuo Xiaohuan didn’t want to hire me, would I have come all this way to Sichuan?” Team Leader Feng was silent.
        I have a habit of carrying a collection of laws whenever I’m working on a case. Team Leader Feng saw me pull out the book and said that he wasn’t used to looking at my book, so he turned around and went back to his office to get his own book.
        Flipping through the Procedural Regulations on the Handling of Criminal Cases by Public Security Organs, he was unable to find any provision that required a family member to affix a fingerprint in addition to a signature on a POA authorization letter before it could be binding. Neither the Criminal Procedure Law nor the Lawyers’ Law had provisions, either.
        Even though he couldn’t find an appropriate basis, Team Leader Feng still insisted on the need for affixing a fingerprint. He said he was not intentionally trying to make things difficult for me but only wanted to do things according the public security bureau’s procedures.
        Actually, this wasn’t making things difficult for me; it was Zuo’s sister who would have to be called to personally make a trip. Left with no alternative, I called Zuo’s sister and asked her to come to the Mianyang Public Security Bureau. Her house is some distance from Santai County and is thus even farther away from Mianyang.
        I thought to myself: “Even if Zuo’s sister had affixed her fingerprint on the POA authorization, [Feng] probably would have still found fault, saying that he couldn’t verify that the fingerprint was hers.”
        Team Leader Feng said I was too agitated and had a bias against the police. But I think that when it comes to an attorney’s involvement in the investigation stage of a criminal case, it’s usually the police, not the lawyer, who has the bias.
        When the public security bureau turns “arranging a visit” into “approving a visit” or when a family member’s signature isn’t enough and a fingerprint necessary—even when no concrete [legal] basis can be found—is it the lawyer who’s biased against the public security organ or the public security organ who’s biased against the attorney’s involvement?
        After three hours of discussion from 9 a.m. to 12 noon, there was still no result. Zuo’s sister couldn’t get there right away, so I left the Mianyang Public Security Bureau to have lunch. Team Leader Feng told me to come back at 1 p.m.
        Around 1 p.m., Zuo’s sister arrived. Without time to eat lunch, she went with me to the public security bureau and, in the presence of Team Leader Feng, affixed her fingerprint on the POA authorization letter.
        But Team Leader Feng again said that the POA authorization needed to set out limits of the authorization. Zuo’s sister told him she only had a second-grade education and couldn’t write. Team Leader Feng wanted me to help her with the writing. I said there was no basis for writing limits of the authorization.
        In order to avoid any further complications, I wrote on a blank piece of paper: “The limits of the power of attorney are in accordance with Article 35 of the Procedural Regulations on the Handling of Criminal Cases by Public Security Organs.” Team Leader Feng wanted Zuo’s sister to copy that on the POA authorization letter, but she said she honestly couldn’t write, so Team Leader Feng finally gave up.
        After completing the formalities for arranging the visit—which actually were “approval procedures”—Team Leader Feng said they were just following procedures and regulations and were really not trying to make things difficult for me.
        At 2:30 p.m., Zuo’s sister and I hired a car to take us to the Santai County Detention Center. Team Leader Feng notified a police officer who was in Santai County handling a case to accompany me to the meeting.
        When I arrived at the Santai County Detention Center just before 4 p.m., the police officer was there waiting to accompany me to the meeting.
        The public security organ hadn’t classified Zuo Xiaohuan’s case as one involving state secrets, so according to the Criminal Procedure Law, the Lawyers’ Law, and the Procedural Regulations on the Handling of Criminal Cases by Public Security Organs, police officers may not accompany lawyers during their meetings [with suspects]. But public security organs are very powerful, and even a lawyer who loves to argue as much as I do has no choice.
        What surprised me is that after Zuo Xiaohuan was brought into the meeting room, the police officer took out a recording device in the shape of a pen and placed it on the table. I immediately argued that to accompany me to the meeting was already a violation of the law but recording a lawyer is an even bigger violation.
        They had me call Team Leader Feng, but when I dialed his number no one answered. I could only take out my own pen-recorder, at which point the police officer informed me that the detention center didn’t allow lawyers to make recordings. I asked them to show me the legal basis.
        I told them that according the the rules for handling criminal cases established by the All-China Lawyers’ Association, a lawyer meeting with a criminal suspect (or defendant) may make a recording or a photograph as long as the suspect (or defendant) agrees. There is no need for the detention center to agree.
        I said that I’d heard that in the case of Li Zhuang [a defense lawyer accused of coaching his client in an organized crime trial to recant his testimony] the police had a recording but that they didn’t dare reveal it as evidence for the prosecution because it was a serious violation of the law for police to make recordings. Zuo Xiaohuan’s is no mafia-type case of organized crime; he’s been charged with inciting subversion of state power for helping people to defend their rights, writing articles that exposed the darker side, and discussing his political views during interviews with overseas media. His confession isn’t important for convicting him of a crime; the key is the articles he wrote. Is there any need to worry about a lawyer coaching him to recant his confession?
        In Zuo Xiaohuan’s case, to take these kinds of precautions against his lawyer is actually a sign of a guilty conscience.
        I told Team Leader Feng numerous times that during the criminal investigation stage I’m not too interested in discussing the facts of the case, because I haven’t yet seen the prosecution’s evidence or the case file and can only hear Zuo Xiaohuan’s side of the story. During the criminal investigation stage, I’m much more focused on the legal procedure followed in handling the case.
        It’s not up to the public security organ or the procuratorate to decide whether Zuo Xiaohuan is guilty of a crime. That should be decided by a court, based on the facts and the law. Of course, in light of problems with the legal system, it’s possible that it will be up to the politics and law committee [to determine guilt]—the Zhao Zuohai case in Henan is a classic example. But in some places the head of the public security bureau is also secretary of the politics and law committee, so there are also cases where it’s up to the public security bureau [to determine guilt].
        Seeing that I was going to keep arguing, the police officer accompanying me for the meeting suggested that neither side make recordings, but I suspected that he might have some hidden way to record secretly. If the police want to eavesdrop, what power does a lawyer have to prevent it?
        Zuo Xiaohuan says that the police decided to take him into custody because he was helping private-school teachers in Santai County protect their rights. The local private-school teachers are of the same opinion.
        In helping others to protect their rights, Zuo Xiaohuan had in the past also been interviewed by overseas media and given political opinions about social problems. He’d even been sent to re-education through labor when he was working at Leshan Teachers’ College. After being fired from his job, he began seeking to protect his own rights. Having encountered numerous injustices in the course of helping to protect the rights of others and himself, he said some things out of dissatisfaction with present circumstances, but he maintains they didn’t have anything to do with state political power.
        When he mentioned state political power, I suddenly asked him: “What is [meant by] state political power?” He couldn’t explain it. I think that Zuo Xiaohuan isn’t the only person who doesn’t know what state political power means; probably the officer handling the case doesn’t understand it either. Otherwise he wouldn’t suspect the act of criticizing the government as the crime of inciting subversion of state power.
        Zuo Xiaohuan’s mind is clear and he has mentally prepared himself to be sentenced. He thinks someone always has to sacrifice and says that since they’ve taken him in on suspicion of inciting subversion there’s almost no chance that he’ll be acquitted. Otherwise, the police would lose face.
        In recent years, basically all those who have been taken in for helping the vulnerable groups to protect their rights have been found guilty of crimes like defamation, false accusation, or extortion. For local [officials] to charge Zuo Xiaohuan with inciting subversion shows that they’re treating him as a “political figure.”
        In my view, Zuo Xiaohuan is only a rights defender, not a “political figure.” Maybe it’s because he participated in [the events of] 1989 or discussed political opinions with overseas media that led to [the case] being upgraded to a political level and linked to a threat to state political power.

        Zuo Xiaohuan was born in 1969 and is yet unmarried. After being fired from his job, he went looking for work but, thanks to interference by others, wound up an unemployed person. Zuo Xiaohuan has four brothers and sisters, his father has passed away, and his mother is in her seventies. Zuo’s sister told me their mother hopes that Zuo can be released soon and return to the countryside to become a farmer.
        When you come right down to it, the tragedy of Zuo Xiaohuan, this individual, is actually the tragedy of the [entire] society.

  • Chinese Lawyer Interviewed on New Measures to Prevent Torture: “Key to Stopping Torture Is Presence of Counsel, Right to Silence”

    Over the past ten days, the Chinese media have been reporting on the recent adoption of two new sets of rules by China’s five main law enforcement institutions—the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of Justice. The “Regulations on Several Questions Concerning the Investigation and Judgment of Evidence in Handling Capital Cases” and “Regulations on Several Questions Concerning the Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal Cases” (referred to below as “the regulations”) set out new procedural standards aimed at preventing criminal cases from being decided on the basis of illegally obtained evidence, especially evidence obtained through physical torture.
    As one might imagine, the coverage has been overwhelmingly positive, with several respected legal scholars endorsing the adoption of the regulations as major progress in China’s legal reform. The announcement of the rules could not be more timely considering the scandalous discovery last month that a man named Zhao Zuohai had served 11 years of a death sentence commuted to life imprisonment for a murder he did not commit, all because of a confession that had been extracted through police torture. But true assessment of the impact the new rules will likely have on preventing future cases of injustice must await their publication—at the time of this writing, the actual texts had not yet been released—and, more importantly, consideration of how thoroughly and enthusiastically they will be enforced.
    While acknowledging the importance of the new regulations as a first step, some Chinese lawyers in particular have pointed out that the problem of torture and use of illegal evidence is a systemic problem in China’s criminal justice system and that the new regulations might not be strong enough medicine to cure the disease. In a lengthy interview (translation below) with the Beijing News published on June 5, well-known criminal defense lawyer Xu Lanting argues that giving suspects the right to remain silent and, even more importantly, the right to have a lawyer present during questioning, would have a much greater impact on curbing the problem of coerced confessions.
    [Translator’s note: Chinese texts rarely refer to “torture” (kuxing) in discussions of the domestic context. China’s Criminal Law prohibits the use of corporal punishment or “disguised” corporal punishment to obtain a confession from a suspect or a witness statement, and this is the primary basis upon which China claims to prohibit torture. To reflect this practice, the text below routinely translates xingxun bigong literally as “coercion of confession,” rather than extrapolating with the word “torture.”]

    *
    1. Having interrogators appear in court is of great significance
    Beijing News (BN): Media reports on the regulations have universally focused on the sections concerning coerced confessions. How do you rate this content?
    Xu Lanting: Each country primarily uses “rules on the exclusion of evidence” to stop coerced confessions, for example by ruling that evidence obtained through coerced confessions is illegal and cannot be used. This forces the investigating organ to stop relying on coerced confessions to obtain evidence.
         The enactment and thorough enforcement of these new regulations are of major significance in [the effort to] stop the coercion of confessions and other illegal methods of obtaining evidence, as well as in the protection of human rights.
         First of all, they overcome past limitations that excluded only illegal statements and clarify that illegally obtained physical evidence and documentary evidence will also be excluded. “When physical evidence or documentary evidence is clearly obtained in violation of the law and could possibly have an impact on the fairness of the adjudication, [the court] should order redress or make a reasonable explanation; otherwise, the physical evidence or documentary evidence in question may not be used to determine a case.”
    BN: I understand that in some countries any evidence obtained through coerced statements is categorically excluded. Are there loopholes in our regulations?
    Xu: In the United States, this kind of evidence is called “fruit of the poisonous tree” and is categorically excluded. There’s debate about this among Chinese academics. Some advocate that consideration be made of specific circumstances on a case-by-case basis, [and so] if the violations of law involved in obtaining some physical evidence is not too serious or it can be used after making redress, it shouldn’t be excluded.
         My own view is that any physical evidence obtained in ways that violate the law—especially through leads provided in coerced confessions—should also be excluded. Otherwise, there will be no way to eliminate coerced confessions. [The investigator] will think, “I’ll beat you first to get a confession. I might not be able to use that confession, but I can then rely on that confession to find other evidence.”
    BN: What breakthroughs do the regulations have in the area of procedures for excluding illegal evidence?
    Xu: The regulations establish five procedural stages: initiation of the proceedings, preliminary court investigation, the prosecution’s presentation of proof, examination of the evidence by both sides, and the court’s decision. In the past, provisions in this area only took the form of principles or slogans. Now there is a big improvement because there is a clear procedure that is more practicable.
         It’s worth pointing out that, unlike in the past, investigators will give testimony in court. Also, if the prosecution’s evidence is not credible or sufficient enough to rule out that a defendant’s pre-trial statements were obtained illegally, the court may rule those statements to be illegal and exclude them. On a certain level, this can be seen as “inverting the burden of proof” and forcing the investigating organ to preserve the interrogation [process] through audio and video recording.
    BN: But this so-called [requirement that] investigators give testimony in court is still passive, being initiated only after defendants or their defense attorneys make allegations of coerced confessions. Why can’t China do like some other countries and make court appearances by investigators routine?
    Xu: It’s true that in some countries it’s routine for investigators to testify in court. In countries that follow the Anglo-American system of law, investigators are treated as witnesses and all witnesses must appear in court or else their testimony is treated as hearsay and cannot be used. I’ve also observed that some European countries’ trial systems make their investigators appear in court, even if only to state how they originally took the suspect into custody.
         Our regulations can only be considered a “limited principle on court appearance,” but this is realistic and reasonable. First, it’s probably impossible at present to make investigators in each case appear in court, and it’s not necessary. If there’s no argument over the records and statements, then there’s no need [for investigators] to appear in court.
         But even if there’s a limited [requirement] to appear in court, it will pressure and deter investigators. Just think: if an investigator is always being called to testify in court over allegations of coercing confessions, he will become passive and embarrassed.
    2. There’s often no way to prove coerced confessions
    BN: Can these breakthroughs in the regulations be written into the Criminal Procedure Law?
    Xu: It should be possible to integrate them. We can say that these regulations are the fundamental rules regarding evidence in criminal cases, but that the current Criminal Procedure Law’s provisions regarding things like how to examine and judge evidence, how to accept evidence, how to establish the facts of a case, and precisely how to set the standard of proof are all very crude and difficult to carry out in practice.
    BN: How does this crudeness primarily manifest itself? Why do you say it’s difficult to carry out in practice?
    Xu: For example, in cases I’ve represented some defendants have alleged their confessions were obtained by coercion or disguised coercion—in other words, illegally obtained evidence [of the type] described in the new regulations—but they couldn’t prove it. This is where the difficulty lies.
    BN: Why couldn’t they prove it?
    Xu: First, if the lawyer is not present when a suspect is interrogated, there is no way to monitor and provide evidence. Defendants themselves are even less able to produce evidence. Even if there is bodily injury, how does one prove it is the result of an investigator’s beating? It is very possible to blame it on a cellmate or struggle during arrest.
         Moreover, the investigation period often lasts a long time, with several months to half a year before trial. Any wounds can heal [during that length of time].
    BN: Then what do you recommend to defendants about whether to speak out or not?
    Xu: I tell them to tell the truth. If something like that happened, you can and should speak up. But often there’s no way to confirm the allegation.
    BN: If the “victim” in the Zhao Zuohai case hadn’t returned alive, to this day there would probably be no way to prove [that Zhao’s confession had been coerced through torture].
    Xu: Why didn’t Zhao Zuohai petition [the court to rehear his case because his confession had been coerced]? Because petitioning was useless and the case couldn’t be overturned. Even the judge couldn’t confirm [the allegation], because he wasn’t present at the interrogation, either.
    3. The crux of the interrogation [problem] is lack of a third-party monitor
    BN: Based on your experience with criminal cases, why do you think that time and again it has been impossible to prohibit coercion of confessions?
    Xu: The reasons are many. The first is because of mindset and ideas. Even though the law provides for a presumption of innocence, some investigators still operate with a presumption of guilt, thinking, “I’ve caught you, so you must be guilty.” So, some investigators start off by asking suspects, “Do you know why we’ve arrested you?” or “If you say you’re innocent, show us proof.”
         Also, many law enforcement agents still focus on fighting crime and ignore the protection of human rights. They worry that they won’t be able to solve a case without a confession and will be too soft on a true criminal.
    BN: Isn’t fighting crime most important?
    Xu: According to the provisions of the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law, law enforcement agencies ought to fight crime as well as protect human rights, putting equal focus on each. Moreover, given a choice between being too soft and wrongly convicting someone, I’d rather be too soft on the occasional criminal than wrongly convict an innocent person. When a criminal is let off the hook, the violation is only one-way. But if you wrongly convict a good person, not only have you let the real criminal off the hook, you’ve also unjustly punished an innocent person, causing double the harm to society.
    BN: What are the systemic and institutional causes of [the failure to eliminate coerced confessions]?
    Xu: There are some specific systemic problems such as [emphasis on] the rates at which cases are solved, arrests are approved, and convictions are handed down, or [on] requiring that all capital cases be solved or that cases be solved within a particular period of time. Because of criteria for [performance] assessment, it seems as if the procuratorate must approve all arrests reported to it or all cases prosecuted at court must result in conviction—otherwise, it affects work [performance] results. This has a negative impact on the thorough implementation of the presumption of innocence and the exclusion of illegal evidence.
         As for the justice system, the law requires the public security, procuratorate, and courts to cooperate through division of labor and also to mutually check each other. But currently there’s more cooperation and the monitoring and checking functions aren’t really brought into play. For example, the public security organs all do their own investigation and interrogation. They take someone into custody and interrogate them, too. No approval is needed to place someone under criminal detention, and this detention can last up to more than 30 days. During detention, acts of illegally seeking evidence are common, such as repeated interrogation sessions lasting several dozen hours.
    BN: It seems as if all television crime series show suspects being subjected to overnight interrogation as soon as they are taken into custody. Even when striking a blow to the suspect’s face, the investigator’s face is serious, both dignified and devoted.
    Xu: Many countries don’t allow nighttime interrogations and prevent interrogations from exceeding a certain number of hours. We don’t have any regulations on this point. What’s more, many interrogations don’t take place in the detention center, but rather in the police station or some other location. At least there are many other people who can observe in the detention center, making coercion difficult. In the end, it’s a matter of not having the attorney present, not having a neutral third-party monitor.
    4. Time is ripe for granting suspects right to remain silent
    BN: Can enactment of these regulations stop the coercion of confessions?
    Xu: Stopping the coercion of confessions is a systemic project that requires comprehensive management. My personal view is that the best way is to grant defendants the right to remain silent and the right to have an attorney present.
    BN: Don’t the Law on Lawyers and the Criminal Procedure Law already provide for lawyers to intervene [in a case] during the investigative stage?
    Xu: The law allows a suspect to hire and meet with a lawyer from the moment of first interrogation or being placed under coercive measures. But in practice, lawyers are not present during the interrogation. If lawyers were present to monitor and witness, obtaining evidence illegally through coercion, fraud, or inducements would be impossible.
    BN: In other words, if the lawyer is not present, the suspect could refuse to answer?
    Xu: Right. This is the suspect’s right. Such provisions are primarily to ensure that confessions are made voluntarily. I’m even in favor of invalidating the record of a confession if the lawyer isn’t present.
    BN: Then the right to have a lawyer present should be provided for simultaneously with a suspect’s right to remain silent.
    Xu: Correct. The right to remain silent and the right to have a lawyer present (also known as the right to a lawyer’s assistance) are inseparable. The suspect’s right to remain silent is an international standard to prohibit forcing self-incrimination. A suspect has a right to an attorney’s assistance, and, if he has no money to hire a lawyer, the state should appoint an attorney to provide legal aid.
         If we could enact both of these rights simultaneously, it would be even better, but if they cannot be enacted simultaneously we should at least provide the right to have a lawyer present. A lawyer must be present especially when a confession of guilt is being made (except when the suspect voluntarily waives [the right]), in order to guarantee the voluntary and true nature of that confession of guilt.
    BN: Isn’t it a bit premature to have a right to remain silent as far as China is concerned? It’s still written [on the walls of] some detention centers: “Come clean and be treated leniently, resist and be treated severely.”
    Xu: Actually, it’s not premature. Many countries in the world have such provisions. It’s okay to require suspects to answer [questions] in a forthcoming way, but the problem is when the suspect truthfully answers with a defense that he is innocent and the officer handling the case believes that he is not answering truthfully.
    BN: Some investigators have complained that many cases won’t get solved if you enact a right to remain silent.
    Xu: In short, they still put too much emphasis on confessions. In fact, even some judges feel unsure [about how to handle a case] if there’s no confession or no one pleading guilty. Actually, the right to remain silent doesn’t encourage suspects to refuse to confess; rather, it emphasizes voluntary confessions in order to ensure their truthfulness and prevent unjust or error-filled cases. In countries [following] the Anglo-American [legal system], a trial is not even necessary if there’s a voluntary admission of guilt—they can go straight to sentencing. This shows they, too, place an emphasis on confession, but only if the confession is made with the assistance of an attorney and is made voluntarily, rather than being obtained through coercion.
  • Chinese Lawyer Interviewed on New Measures to Prevent Torture: “Key to Stopping Torture Is Presence of Counsel, Right to Silence”

    Over the past ten days, the Chinese media have been reporting on the recent adoption of two new sets of rules by China’s five main law enforcement institutions—the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of Justice. The “Regulations on Several Questions Concerning the Investigation and Judgment of Evidence in Handling Capital Cases” and “Regulations on Several Questions Concerning the Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal Cases” (referred to below as “the regulations”) set out new procedural standards aimed at preventing criminal cases from being decided on the basis of illegally obtained evidence, especially evidence obtained through physical torture.
    As one might imagine, the coverage has been overwhelmingly positive, with several respected legal scholars endorsing the adoption of the regulations as major progress in China’s legal reform. The announcement of the rules could not be more timely considering the scandalous discovery last month that a man named Zhao Zuohai had served 11 years of a death sentence commuted to life imprisonment for a murder he did not commit, all because of a confession that had been extracted through police torture. But true assessment of the impact the new rules will likely have on preventing future cases of injustice must await their publication—at the time of this writing, the actual texts had not yet been released—and, more importantly, consideration of how thoroughly and enthusiastically they will be enforced.
    While acknowledging the importance of the new regulations as a first step, some Chinese lawyers in particular have pointed out that the problem of torture and use of illegal evidence is a systemic problem in China’s criminal justice system and that the new regulations might not be strong enough medicine to cure the disease. In a lengthy interview (translation below) with the Beijing News published on June 5, well-known criminal defense lawyer Xu Lanting argues that giving suspects the right to remain silent and, even more importantly, the right to have a lawyer present during questioning, would have a much greater impact on curbing the problem of coerced confessions.
    [Translator’s note: Chinese texts rarely refer to “torture” (kuxing) in discussions of the domestic context. China’s Criminal Law prohibits the use of corporal punishment or “disguised” corporal punishment to obtain a confession from a suspect or a witness statement, and this is the primary basis upon which China claims to prohibit torture. To reflect this practice, the text below routinely translates xingxun bigong literally as “coercion of confession,” rather than extrapolating with the word “torture.”]

    *
    1. Having interrogators appear in court is of great significance
    Beijing News (BN): Media reports on the regulations have universally focused on the sections concerning coerced confessions. How do you rate this content?
    Xu Lanting: Each country primarily uses “rules on the exclusion of evidence” to stop coerced confessions, for example by ruling that evidence obtained through coerced confessions is illegal and cannot be used. This forces the investigating organ to stop relying on coerced confessions to obtain evidence.
         The enactment and thorough enforcement of these new regulations are of major significance in [the effort to] stop the coercion of confessions and other illegal methods of obtaining evidence, as well as in the protection of human rights.
         First of all, they overcome past limitations that excluded only illegal statements and clarify that illegally obtained physical evidence and documentary evidence will also be excluded. “When physical evidence or documentary evidence is clearly obtained in violation of the law and could possibly have an impact on the fairness of the adjudication, [the court] should order redress or make a reasonable explanation; otherwise, the physical evidence or documentary evidence in question may not be used to determine a case.”
    BN: I understand that in some countries any evidence obtained through coerced statements is categorically excluded. Are there loopholes in our regulations?
    Xu: In the United States, this kind of evidence is called “fruit of the poisonous tree” and is categorically excluded. There’s debate about this among Chinese academics. Some advocate that consideration be made of specific circumstances on a case-by-case basis, [and so] if the violations of law involved in obtaining some physical evidence is not too serious or it can be used after making redress, it shouldn’t be excluded.
         My own view is that any physical evidence obtained in ways that violate the law—especially through leads provided in coerced confessions—should also be excluded. Otherwise, there will be no way to eliminate coerced confessions. [The investigator] will think, “I’ll beat you first to get a confession. I might not be able to use that confession, but I can then rely on that confession to find other evidence.”
    BN: What breakthroughs do the regulations have in the area of procedures for excluding illegal evidence?
    Xu: The regulations establish five procedural stages: initiation of the proceedings, preliminary court investigation, the prosecution’s presentation of proof, examination of the evidence by both sides, and the court’s decision. In the past, provisions in this area only took the form of principles or slogans. Now there is a big improvement because there is a clear procedure that is more practicable.
         It’s worth pointing out that, unlike in the past, investigators will give testimony in court. Also, if the prosecution’s evidence is not credible or sufficient enough to rule out that a defendant’s pre-trial statements were obtained illegally, the court may rule those statements to be illegal and exclude them. On a certain level, this can be seen as “inverting the burden of proof” and forcing the investigating organ to preserve the interrogation [process] through audio and video recording.
    BN: But this so-called [requirement that] investigators give testimony in court is still passive, being initiated only after defendants or their defense attorneys make allegations of coerced confessions. Why can’t China do like some other countries and make court appearances by investigators routine?
    Xu: It’s true that in some countries it’s routine for investigators to testify in court. In countries that follow the Anglo-American system of law, investigators are treated as witnesses and all witnesses must appear in court or else their testimony is treated as hearsay and cannot be used. I’ve also observed that some European countries’ trial systems make their investigators appear in court, even if only to state how they originally took the suspect into custody.
         Our regulations can only be considered a “limited principle on court appearance,” but this is realistic and reasonable. First, it’s probably impossible at present to make investigators in each case appear in court, and it’s not necessary. If there’s no argument over the records and statements, then there’s no need [for investigators] to appear in court.
         But even if there’s a limited [requirement] to appear in court, it will pressure and deter investigators. Just think: if an investigator is always being called to testify in court over allegations of coercing confessions, he will become passive and embarrassed.
    2. There’s often no way to prove coerced confessions
    BN: Can these breakthroughs in the regulations be written into the Criminal Procedure Law?
    Xu: It should be possible to integrate them. We can say that these regulations are the fundamental rules regarding evidence in criminal cases, but that the current Criminal Procedure Law’s provisions regarding things like how to examine and judge evidence, how to accept evidence, how to establish the facts of a case, and precisely how to set the standard of proof are all very crude and difficult to carry out in practice.
    BN: How does this crudeness primarily manifest itself? Why do you say it’s difficult to carry out in practice?
    Xu: For example, in cases I’ve represented some defendants have alleged their confessions were obtained by coercion or disguised coercion—in other words, illegally obtained evidence [of the type] described in the new regulations—but they couldn’t prove it. This is where the difficulty lies.
    BN: Why couldn’t they prove it?
    Xu: First, if the lawyer is not present when a suspect is interrogated, there is no way to monitor and provide evidence. Defendants themselves are even less able to produce evidence. Even if there is bodily injury, how does one prove it is the result of an investigator’s beating? It is very possible to blame it on a cellmate or struggle during arrest.
         Moreover, the investigation period often lasts a long time, with several months to half a year before trial. Any wounds can heal [during that length of time].
    BN: Then what do you recommend to defendants about whether to speak out or not?
    Xu: I tell them to tell the truth. If something like that happened, you can and should speak up. But often there’s no way to confirm the allegation.
    BN: If the “victim” in the Zhao Zuohai case hadn’t returned alive, to this day there would probably be no way to prove [that Zhao’s confession had been coerced through torture].
    Xu: Why didn’t Zhao Zuohai petition [the court to rehear his case because his confession had been coerced]? Because petitioning was useless and the case couldn’t be overturned. Even the judge couldn’t confirm [the allegation], because he wasn’t present at the interrogation, either.
    3. The crux of the interrogation [problem] is lack of a third-party monitor
    BN: Based on your experience with criminal cases, why do you think that time and again it has been impossible to prohibit coercion of confessions?
    Xu: The reasons are many. The first is because of mindset and ideas. Even though the law provides for a presumption of innocence, some investigators still operate with a presumption of guilt, thinking, “I’ve caught you, so you must be guilty.” So, some investigators start off by asking suspects, “Do you know why we’ve arrested you?” or “If you say you’re innocent, show us proof.”
         Also, many law enforcement agents still focus on fighting crime and ignore the protection of human rights. They worry that they won’t be able to solve a case without a confession and will be too soft on a true criminal.
    BN: Isn’t fighting crime most important?
    Xu: According to the provisions of the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law, law enforcement agencies ought to fight crime as well as protect human rights, putting equal focus on each. Moreover, given a choice between being too soft and wrongly convicting someone, I’d rather be too soft on the occasional criminal than wrongly convict an innocent person. When a criminal is let off the hook, the violation is only one-way. But if you wrongly convict a good person, not only have you let the real criminal off the hook, you’ve also unjustly punished an innocent person, causing double the harm to society.
    BN: What are the systemic and institutional causes of [the failure to eliminate coerced confessions]?
    Xu: There are some specific systemic problems such as [emphasis on] the rates at which cases are solved, arrests are approved, and convictions are handed down, or [on] requiring that all capital cases be solved or that cases be solved within a particular period of time. Because of criteria for [performance] assessment, it seems as if the procuratorate must approve all arrests reported to it or all cases prosecuted at court must result in conviction—otherwise, it affects work [performance] results. This has a negative impact on the thorough implementation of the presumption of innocence and the exclusion of illegal evidence.
         As for the justice system, the law requires the public security, procuratorate, and courts to cooperate through division of labor and also to mutually check each other. But currently there’s more cooperation and the monitoring and checking functions aren’t really brought into play. For example, the public security organs all do their own investigation and interrogation. They take someone into custody and interrogate them, too. No approval is needed to place someone under criminal detention, and this detention can last up to more than 30 days. During detention, acts of illegally seeking evidence are common, such as repeated interrogation sessions lasting several dozen hours.
    BN: It seems as if all television crime series show suspects being subjected to overnight interrogation as soon as they are taken into custody. Even when striking a blow to the suspect’s face, the investigator’s face is serious, both dignified and devoted.
    Xu: Many countries don’t allow nighttime interrogations and prevent interrogations from exceeding a certain number of hours. We don’t have any regulations on this point. What’s more, many interrogations don’t take place in the detention center, but rather in the police station or some other location. At least there are many other people who can observe in the detention center, making coercion difficult. In the end, it’s a matter of not having the attorney present, not having a neutral third-party monitor.
    4. Time is ripe for granting suspects right to remain silent
    BN: Can enactment of these regulations stop the coercion of confessions?
    Xu: Stopping the coercion of confessions is a systemic project that requires comprehensive management. My personal view is that the best way is to grant defendants the right to remain silent and the right to have an attorney present.
    BN: Don’t the Law on Lawyers and the Criminal Procedure Law already provide for lawyers to intervene [in a case] during the investigative stage?
    Xu: The law allows a suspect to hire and meet with a lawyer from the moment of first interrogation or being placed under coercive measures. But in practice, lawyers are not present during the interrogation. If lawyers were present to monitor and witness, obtaining evidence illegally through coercion, fraud, or inducements would be impossible.
    BN: In other words, if the lawyer is not present, the suspect could refuse to answer?
    Xu: Right. This is the suspect’s right. Such provisions are primarily to ensure that confessions are made voluntarily. I’m even in favor of invalidating the record of a confession if the lawyer isn’t present.
    BN: Then the right to have a lawyer present should be provided for simultaneously with a suspect’s right to remain silent.
    Xu: Correct. The right to remain silent and the right to have a lawyer present (also known as the right to a lawyer’s assistance) are inseparable. The suspect’s right to remain silent is an international standard to prohibit forcing self-incrimination. A suspect has a right to an attorney’s assistance, and, if he has no money to hire a lawyer, the state should appoint an attorney to provide legal aid.
         If we could enact both of these rights simultaneously, it would be even better, but if they cannot be enacted simultaneously we should at least provide the right to have a lawyer present. A lawyer must be present especially when a confession of guilt is being made (except when the suspect voluntarily waives [the right]), in order to guarantee the voluntary and true nature of that confession of guilt.
    BN: Isn’t it a bit premature to have a right to remain silent as far as China is concerned? It’s still written [on the walls of] some detention centers: “Come clean and be treated leniently, resist and be treated severely.”
    Xu: Actually, it’s not premature. Many countries in the world have such provisions. It’s okay to require suspects to answer [questions] in a forthcoming way, but the problem is when the suspect truthfully answers with a defense that he is innocent and the officer handling the case believes that he is not answering truthfully.
    BN: Some investigators have complained that many cases won’t get solved if you enact a right to remain silent.
    Xu: In short, they still put too much emphasis on confessions. In fact, even some judges feel unsure [about how to handle a case] if there’s no confession or no one pleading guilty. Actually, the right to remain silent doesn’t encourage suspects to refuse to confess; rather, it emphasizes voluntary confessions in order to ensure their truthfulness and prevent unjust or error-filled cases. In countries [following] the Anglo-American [legal system], a trial is not even necessary if there’s a voluntary admission of guilt—they can go straight to sentencing. This shows they, too, place an emphasis on confession, but only if the confession is made with the assistance of an attorney and is made voluntarily, rather than being obtained through coercion.