Tag: lawyers

  • Despite Legal Reform, SPC Still Blocks Lawyer-Client Access

    Defense lawyer Zhang Kai holds a sign outside Zhejiang’s Pingyang County Detention Center requesting that he be able to meet with his client in October 2014. Image credit: Weibo

    Improving criminal defense lawyers’ access to clients was hailed as one of the highlights of the revised Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) that came into force in 2013. Incorporating provisions of the 2007 Lawyers Law that had yet to be universally respected, the new CPL requires detention centers to arrange for access within 48 hours of request by a lawyer upon presentation of his or her license to practice, the certificate of his or her law firm, and power-of-attorney documentation. The only exceptions are cases involving state security, terrorism, or “particularly serious” bribery, for which police investigators can require that a lawyer seek their approval before a meeting can be arranged.

    Although these new provisions have not been implemented perfectly, defense lawyers generally acknowledge that access to suspects has improved in most routine criminal cases. But what recourse is there when these provisions are not strictly enforced?

    Background

    On July 15, 2014, long-time petitioners Zhang Xiaoyu and husband Xu Youchen were formally “reprimanded” (xunjie) by Beijing police for disturbing public order. Two days later, officials from their hometown of Jiaozuo, Henan, accompanied them back home. Upon arrival, Zhang and Xu reportedly resisted attempts to hand them over to local police officers. Xu allegedly attacked a police officer with a small knife, causing a fatal wound. Xu and Zhang were then placed under criminal detention on suspicion of intentional homicide.

    Lawyers for the couple attempted over a period of several days to meet with the detainees, but their multiple requests were refused by the Jiaozuo Detention Center. Finally, on July 25, lawyers got their first opportunity to meet with Zhang and Xu, who each spoke of being beaten by police. The lawyers took photographs of the couple’s bruised and swollen faces and uploaded these to the Internet.

    The next day, detention center officials refused to provide the lawyers with any additional access to Xu and Zhang, saying that the lawyers had violated the rules by releasing photos of the detainees. The officials informed the lawyers that a complaint had been filed with judicial administration authorities in Shandong and that the detention center would not agree to any more visits, pending a decision on sanctions.

    Over subsequent weeks, lawyers for the couple complained repeatedly to local and provincial authorities and attempted to get the official lawyers’ association to intervene on their behalf. When none of these efforts were successful, two of the lawyers—Liu Jinbin and Liu Shuqing—decided to sue the detention center in court.

    Administrative Action or Judicial Process

    Citizens or other parties who wish to challenge the legality of official government actions can do so under the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL). The challenge must involve a concrete administrative action directed against specific individuals or entities, rather than decisions with general applicability. The ALL also explicitly excludes certain areas from challenge, including national defense and foreign affairs, administrative rules and regulations, administrative decisions of an internal nature, and administrative acts that are deemed by the law to be within a particular state organ’s final authority.

    Under the law, administrative actions are generally distinguished from actions related to judicial process. In theory, disputes that private parties may have with public authorities in the course of the judicial process should be dealt with as part of the judicial process itself. For example, unlawful coercion of confessions by investigators can be addressed through a request to have a court rule on exclusion of that confession from evidence. In China, however, many aspects of judicial authority are invested in the procuratorate, rather than the court. For example, procuratorates make decisions about whether suspects may be held under formal arrest pending trial and are generally responsible for ensuring that various parts of the criminal process are lawful.

    China’s public security organs carry out a variety of functions, some of which fall under the category of administrative acts and some of which can be classified as being part of the judicial process. Punishments for public order offenses (such as short-term jailings, property confiscation, or fines) are unquestionably administrative actions and are, therefore, subject to challenge under the ALL. On the other hand, imposition of coercive measures and actions related to criminal investigation are considered to be actions related to the judicial process that are excluded from the purview of the ALL.

    Legal Argument

    In the nearly identical lawsuits that plaintiffs Liu Jinbin and Liu Shuqing brought before the Shanyang District People’s Court in November 2014, the main issue of dispute was whether arrangement of meetings between lawyer and detainee by a detention center should be considered an administrative action or part of the judicial process. The opportunity to argue this point at trial was itself a rarity, as courts throughout the country had basically refused to hear such cases for almost 15 years.

    That hadn’t always been the case. In 1999, a Hunan lawyer named Liao Jianhua successfully sued the Loudi Public Security Bureau for refusing to allow him to meet with a detained suspect. According to Professor Chen Ruihua, there were a few other cases around that time where courts similarly granted relief to lawyers. But that effectively ended in March 2000, when the Supreme People’s Court issued an interpretation of the ALL that explicitly excluded from the purview of administrative litigation all “actions that the Criminal Procedure Law specifically empowers (shouquan) public security, state security [and other] organs to carry out.” With this provision, the SPC eliminated the courts as an avenue for lawyers to challenge decisions over access to detainees, which helped contribute to making the securing of such access one of the “three difficulties” often complained about by Chinese lawyers.

    The lawyers argued that the Criminal Procedure Law only empowers the police to detain people and carry out investigations. Although the Detention Center Regulations issued by the State Council in 1990 gave responsibility over management of detention centers to public security organs and stated their purpose as “guarantee[ing] the smooth progress of the criminal process,” that role as custodian over detainees was merely a managerial function indirectly part of the criminal process. Under the law, the process of arranging meetings between lawyers and detainees was, at least in the case at hand, supposed to be a relatively simple matter of ensuring that the lawyer’s paperwork was in order and did not leave any room for discretion. Despite being set out in the CPL, this amounted to a routine approval process indistinguishable in form from other administrative actions and should, therefore, be subject to challenge under the ALL.

    The court of first instance rejected this argument, finding that decisions over lawyers’ access were acts “empowered” by the CPL and, therefore, outside the purview of the ALL. In an appeal to the Jiaozuo Intermediate People’s Court in February 2015, Liu Jinbin argued that the district court’s conclusion was based on a flawed understanding of the word “empowered” (shouquan). He argued that arranging lawyers’ access to detainees was a responsibility, rather than a right, and could not therefore be the object of the word “empower.” Public security organs were only empowered by the CPL to detain and investigate suspects; if anything, it was lawyers who were empowered by the law with the right to access detainees.

    The Jiaozuo Intermediate People’s Court essentially ignored this argument by noting that laws endow state organs with both powers and responsibilities. Arranging access between lawyers and detainees was a “clearly stipulated responsibility” under the CPL, it found, and if a lawyer believed that the exercise of his or her rights in this regard were being “hindered” (zu’ai), then the proper channel for seeking remedy was through complaint to the procuratorate. Since the matter was outside the scope of the ALL, the matter was dismissed.

    SPC Interpretation Remains Supreme

    Given that guaranteeing suspects’ access to legal assistance from the point of initial detention is an essential part of safeguarding their human rights and preventing torture and other miscarriages of justice, any violations of lawyers’ rights in the criminal process ought to be met with swift and strong consequences in order to ensure compliance. In the current legal environment, however, a lawyer’s only option is to seek intervention by the procuratorate. Notwithstanding that the Supreme People’s Procuratorate recently issued a set of regulations aimed at protecting the rights of lawyers, what happens if the procuratorate refuses or is slow to intervene? Or what if a procuratorate order goes unheeded?

    These scenarios suggest that some form of judicial remedy could be helpful in vindicating lawyers’ rights to meet with detainees. There are, however, few signs that the door to administrative litigation will open anytime soon. A revised version of the ALL took effect on May 1, and even though legislators still have not explicitly excluded acts connected to the criminal process from the scope of administrative litigation, officials at the SPC have made clear that the relevant provision of its previous interpretation remains binding.

    One possible solution would be pending legislation regarding detention center management. Were management of detention centers to be shifted toward the judicial administration authorities that also manage China’s prisons, it would potentially result in a much clearer separation between the administrative management of detainees and the investigative powers associated with the criminal justice process itself. However, even though there has been a great deal of support among legal experts for making such institutional reform part of a proposed Detention Center Law, current indications are that public security authorities will retain power over detention facilities for the time being. This means that, barring change to the SPC interpretation, the boundaries between criminal investigation and detainee management will remain blurred.

  • Gao Zhisheng Begins Sentence of Deprivation of Political Rights

    Gao Zhisheng was released from Xijiang’s Shaya Prison on August 7, 2014. Image credit: rfa.org

    Gao Zhisheng (高智晟), a defense lawyer known for taking on politically sensitive cases and for calling on the Chinese government to end its persecution of Falun Gong, completed his three-year prison sentence for inciting subversion today. He was released from Shaya Prison in western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Gao was accompanied by his brother and taken by police escort to his father-in-law’s house in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital and Gao’s place of household registration (hukou).

    Gao now begins his supplemental sentence of one year of deprivation of political rights (DPR). China’s Criminal Law, promulgated in March 1997, stipulates that DPR sentences of 1‒5 years be applied to individuals convicted of inciting subversion (which falls under the category of endangering state security) and other serious crimes. According to Chapter 3, Section 7 of the Criminal Law, people serving DPR sentences lose their rights to freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, procession, and demonstration.

    Two years prior to the promulgation of the Criminal Law, the Ministry of Public Security issued the “Regulations for Monitoring and Management of Offenders Subject to Public Surveillance, Deprivation of Political Rights, Suspended Sentence, Parole, or Medical Parole by Public Security Organs.” The Dui Hua Foundation has translated these regulations in their entirety. Together with the relevant articles of the Criminal Law, these regulations provide the framework for how Gao Zhisheng will be monitored and managed over the next 12 months.

    According to the regulations, public security authorities in Urumqi (Gao’s place of residence) will be responsible for monitoring and observing him during DPR. He must report periodically to police and receive their approval to travel outside Urumqi. The regulations prohibit Gao from giving interviews to journalists, and from “publishing or circulating, inside or outside China, any remarks, books, audio recordings, or other such items that damage the reputation or interests of the state or pose any other threat to society.”

    Gao was detained on suspicion of inciting subversion on August 16, 2006, and sentenced on December 22, 2006, to three years in prison and one year deprivation of political rights by the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court. The prison sentence was suspended for five years, but shortly before that period ended, the suspension was revoked by the court on December 16, 2011. Gao was then incarcerated in remote Shaya Prison. The four months and seven days he spent in detention prior to his first trial was credited to his three-year sentence.

    Local public security bureaus have a high degree of discretion to establish measures targeting specific individuals during the enforcement of DPR. Given what is known about how Gao was treated during the period of his suspended sentence, portions of which were spent in Urumqi, and the current tense situation in Xinjiang arising from ethnic strife between Uyghurs and Han, it is likely that the Urumqi public security authorities will strictly implement the regulations, thereby effectively restricting Gao’s personal freedom and contact with the outside world.

    * * *

    Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China

    Order 23

    These “Regulations for Monitoring and Management of Offenders Subject to Public Surveillance, Deprivation of Political Rights, Suspended Sentences, Parole, or Medical Parole by Public Security Organs” have been passed by the Ministerial Conference of the Ministry of Public Security and are hereby issued for implementation.

    Minister of Public Security Tao Siju
    February 21, 1995

    Regulations for Monitoring and Management of Offenders Subject to Public Surveillance, Deprivation of Political Rights, Suspended Sentences, Parole, or Medical Parole by Public Security Organs

    Section I. General Provisions

    Article 1: In order to safeguard the smooth operation of the criminal process and the strict enforcement of criminal verdicts and rulings, as well as to strengthen monitoring and management of offenders subject to public surveillance, deprivation of political rights, suspended sentences, parole, or medical parole, these regulations are hereby enacted in accordance with the Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law, and the Regulations on Public Order Management Penalties.

    Article 2: County (city) public security bureaus and urban public security bureau branches shall take responsibility for arranging and implementing the monitoring and management of offenders subject to public surveillance, deprivation of political rights, suspended sentences, parole, or medical parole.

    Article 3: When public security organs carry out monitoring and management of offenders subject to public surveillance, deprivation of political rights, suspended sentences, parole, or medical parole, they must put in effect a monitoring and management responsibility system and carry out management in accordance with the law and in a civilized manner.

    Article 4: After the public security organ receives a verdict, ruling, or decision from a people’s court ordering that an offender be subject to public surveillance, deprivation of political rights, suspended sentences, parole, or medical parole or receives a decision from the prison administration authority approving medical parole, the public security organ shall immediately form a monitoring and observation team, set up a monitoring and observation file, and formulate and implement specific measures for monitoring and observation.

    Article 5: When an offender subject to public surveillance, deprivation of political rights, suspended sentences, parole, or medical parole relocates his or her residence with the permission of the public security organ, the public security organ originally responsible for enforcement shall provide the public security organ responsible for enforcement in the new location with an introduction to the offender’s situation and transfer all monitoring and observation files.

    Article 6: Public security organs shall provide timely reports of their monitoring and management of offenders subject to public surveillance, deprivation of political rights, suspended sentences, parole, or medical parole to people’s procuratorates, people’s courts, and prison administration authorities.

    Article 7: Monitoring and management of offenders subject to public surveillance, deprivation of political rights, suspended sentences, parole, or medical parole by the public security organs is subject to oversight by people’s procuratorates.

    Section II. Monitoring and Management of Offenders Subject to Public Surveillance or Deprivation of Political Rights

    Article 8: With respect to offenders who have been sentenced to public surveillance or deprivation of political rights, the county (city) public security bureau or urban public security bureau branch shall assign the public security police station in the offender’s place of residence to take specific responsibility for monitoring and observation. The urban residents committee or village committee in the offender’s place of residence or his or her former work unit shall assist in carrying out monitoring activity.

    Article 9: Public security organs responsible for monitoring and observation of offenders subject to public surveillance or deprivation of political rights shall, according to the verdict of the people’s court, make an announcement to the offender and members of the public from his or her former work unit or place of residence, including the facts of the offender’s crime, the duration of his or her public surveillance or deprivation of political rights, and the rules that the offender must obey during the enforcement period.

    Article 10: The public security organ shall announce to an offender sentenced to public surveillance that he or she must obey the following rules during the enforcement period:

    (1) Obey state laws and regulations as well as any relevant provisions enacted by the Ministry of Public Security;
    (2) Actively engage in productive labor or other work;
    (3) Periodically report his or her activities and situation to the monitoring and observation team;
    (4)Obtain permission from the public security organ before moving to a new residence or leaving his or her area of residence;
    (5) Obey all specific measures for monitoring and management established by the public security organ.

    Article 11: When an offender subject to public surveillance needs to leave his or her area of residence, he or she must receive approval from the public security organ and obtain an exit certificate. Upon arrival at and departure from his or her destination, the offender must report to the local public security police station, which shall make note of the arrival and departure times and the offender’s behavior on the exit certificate. Upon return to the enforcement locale, the offender must immediately report to the public security organ and hand over the certificate.

    Article 12: The public security organ shall declare to an offender sentenced to deprivation of political rights that he or she must obey the following rules during the enforcement period:

    (1) Obey state laws and regulations as well as any relevant provisions enacted by the Ministry of Public Security;
    (2) He or she may not vote or stand for election;
    (3) He or she may not organize or participate in any assembly, march, demonstration, or association;
    (4) He or she may not give interviews or make speeches;
    (5) He or she may not publish or circulate, inside or outside China, any remarks, books, audiovisual recordings, or other such items that damage the reputation or interests of the state or pose any other threat to society;
    (6) He or she may not take up any position in the state civil service;
    (7) He or she may not take up a leadership position in any enterprise, state institution, or mass organization;
    (8) Obey all specific measures for monitoring and management established by the public security organ.

    Article 13: Any offender subject to public surveillance or deprivation of political rights who violates these provisions shall, when the violation does not constitute a criminal offense, be subject to public-order management penalty by the public security organ in accordance with the law. When the violation constitutes a criminal offense, criminal liability shall be pursued in accordance with the law.

    Article 14: At the conclusion of the period of public surveillance or deprivation of political rights, the public security organ shall notify the individual (serving the sentence) and make a public announcement of release from public surveillance or restoration of political rights.

    When an offender dies during the period of public surveillance or deprivation of political rights, the public security organ shall immediately make a report to the sentencing people’s court or the prison that held former custody.

    Upon release from public surveillance, a “Notice of Release from Public Surveillance” shall be issued. When deprivation of political rights has been imposed as a supplementary punishment, a simultaneous announcement of restoration of political rights shall be made.

    Section III. Monitoring and Management of Offenders Granted Suspended Sentences or Parole

    Article 15: With respect to offenders who have been granted suspended sentences or parole, during the probationary period of the suspension or parole the county (city) public security bureau or urban public security bureau branch shall assign the public security police station in the offender’s place of residence to carry out monitoring and observation. The urban residents committee or village committee in the offender’s place of residence or his or her former work unit shall assist in carrying out monitoring activity.

    Article 16: Public security organs responsible for monitoring and observation of offenders granted suspended sentences or parole shall, according to the verdict or decision of the people’s court, make an announcement to and members of the public from the offender’s former work unit or place of residence, including the facts of the offender’s crime, the duration of his or her probationary period, and the rules that the offender must obey during the probationary period.

    Article 17: The public security organ shall announce to an offender who has been granted a suspended sentence or parole that he or she must obey the following rules:

    (1) Obey state laws and regulations as well as any relevant provisions enacted by the Ministry of Public Security;
    (2) Periodically report his or her activities and situation to the enforcement organ;
    (3) Obtain permission from the public security organ before moving to a new residence or leaving his or her area of residence;
    (4) If the offender serving a suspended sentence or parole has been given the supplementary punishment of deprivation of political rights, he or she must obey the rules set out in Article 12 of these regulations;
    (5) Obey all specific measures for monitoring and management established by the public security organ.

    Article 18: For offenders granted suspended sentences or parole, the public security organ shall periodically request reports on the offender’s behavior and situation from his or her former work unit or from the urban residents committee or village committee in his or her place of residence, and the public security unit shall also establish an observation file.

    Article 19: When an offender granted parole violates these provisions during the probationary period, if the violation does not constitute a new criminal offense requiring remand to prison, the public security organ shall recommend to the people’s court that the parole be revoked. When the people’s court rules to revoke parole, the public security organ shall immediately return the offender to prison to serve his or her sentence.

    Article 20: Any offender granted a suspended sentence or parole who violates these provisions shall, when the violation does not constitute a criminal offense, be subject to public-order management penalty by the public security organ in accordance with the law. When the violation constitutes a criminal offense, the public security organ shall report to the people’s court requesting revocation of the suspended sentence or parole and pursue criminal liability in accordance with the law.

    Article 21: At the end of the probationary period of a suspended sentence, if the offender granted a suspended sentence has not committed any new crime during the probationary period, the original penalty shall not be enforced and the public security organ shall declare [the end of the sentence] to the individual and make a report to the sentencing people’s court.

    At the end of the probationary period for parole, if the offender granted parole has not committed any new crime during the probationary period, his or her sentence shall be considered complete and the public security organ shall declare [the end of the sentence] to the individual and make a report to the people’s court that granted parole and the offender’s former prison.

    When an offender dies while serving a suspended sentence or parole, the public security organ shall immediately make a report to the sentencing people’s court and the [offender’s] former prison.

    Section IV. Monitoring and Management of Offenders Released on Medical Parole

    Article 22: With respect to offenders who have been released on medical parole, the county (city) public security bureau or urban public security bureau branch shall assign the public security police station in the offender’s place of residence or place of medical treatment to take responsibility for monitoring. The urban residents committee or village committee or the offender’s former work unit shall assist in carrying out monitoring activity. When necessary, the public security organ may assign personnel to keep close watch.

    Article 23: The public security organ shall make a declaration to the offender released on medical parole and members of the public from his or her former work unit or place of residence, including the facts of the offender’s crime, the reason for release on medical parole, and the rules that the offender must obey while under medical parole.

    Article 24: The public security organ shall declare to an offender who has been released on medical parole that he or she must obey the following rules during the parole period:

    (1) Obey state laws and regulations as well as any relevant provisions enacted by the Ministry of Public Security;
    (2) Receive medical treatment at the assigned hospital;
    (3) When, due to the special needs of medical treatment or care, it is necessary to change hospitals or leave the area of residence, approval must first be obtained from the public security organ;
    (4) Any social activities other than medical treatment must receive approval from the public security organ;
    (5) Obey all specific measures for monitoring and management established by the public security organ.

    Article 25: When the public security organ discovers that any one of the following circumstances applies to an offender who has been released on medical parole, it shall report to the former prison of custody and immediately remand the offender to custody:

    (1) Release on medical parole was obtained through fraud;
    (2) Recovery from or basic improvement of the medical condition through treatment such that the offender may be returned to custody;
    (3) Use of self-injury, self-maiming, fraud, or other means to intentionally prolong the medical parole period;
    (4) Failure to receive medical treatment after release on medical parole;
    (5) Repeated violation of monitoring and management rules, despite warnings.

    Article 26: Any offender released on medical parole who violates these provisions shall, when the violation does not constitute a criminal offense, be subject to public-order management penalty by the public security organ in accordance with the law. When the violation constitutes a criminal offense, criminal liability shall be pursued in accordance with the law.

    Article 27: When an offender released on medical parole reaches the end of his or her sentence, the public security organ shall immediately make a report to the prison where his or her sentence was originally served in order to carry out release procedures.

    When an offender dies while released on medical parole, the public security organ shall immediately report to the prison that formerly held custody.

    Section V. Additional Provisions

    Article 28: These regulations shall take effect from the date of issue.

  • During Death Penalty Review, No Right to Legal Aid

    China University of Political Science and Law conference on lawyer participation in death penalty review, July 2014. Photo credit: CUPL

    The 2012 revisions to China’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) introduced a number of important provisions aimed at expanding the role of defense lawyers in the criminal process. One of the highlights included a provision requiring that suspects have access to legal aid defenders during the pre-trial investigation stage as well as at trial.

    The CPL revision also introduced a requirement that defense lawyers be able to submit opinions to the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) during the process of final review of death sentences. But what if a defendant still cannot afford to hire a lawyer at this stage of the process? Unfortunately, neither the CPL nor the related implementation regulations provide for the appointment of legal aid defenders during the death penalty review stage.

    This could change if Liu Renwen has his way. Professor Liu, a legal scholar at the China Academy of Social Sciences, recently issued a public call for the SPC to change its rules and require the appointment of legal aid defenders to death row prisoners. In a piece published last month in Legal Daily, Professor Liu notes that, without a lawyer to intercede on behalf of a defendant facing the death penalty, the more rigorous review process introduced in the recent CPL provisions becomes nothing but empty words.

    It remains to be seen whether the SPC (and Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for the legal aid system) will establish new rules based on Professor Liu’s recommendation. Given SPC President Zhou Qiang’s repeated expressions of concern about the importance of preventing wrongful convictions and other miscarriages of justice, extending further protections to those whose lives hang in the balance might be a good place to start.

    *
    Defendants Facing Death Penalty Review Should Have Right to Legal Aid

    Liu Renwen
    Legal Daily, 26 March 2014

    I recommend that the SPC draw upon the aforementioned Article 42 of the “Interpretation on Application of the Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC” and issue a “Notice on Providing Legal Aid to Defendants Facing Death Penalty Review,” stating: “When the SPC reviews a death penalty case and the defendant has not appointed a defender, [the court] shall notify the legal aid agency to assign an attorney as his defender.”

    Article 34, paragraph 3, of the 2012 revised Criminal Procedure Law states: “If a criminal suspect or defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment or death, and such person has not appointed a defender, the people’s court, people’s procuratorate, or public security authority shall notify the legal aid agency to assign an attorney as his defender.” On this basis, criminal suspects and defendants who face the death penalty and have not appointed an attorney all received a right to legal aid at the stages of public security [investigation], procuratorate [review], and first- and second-instance court trial. But currently at the stage of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) death sentence review, if a defendant who has been sentenced to death has not appointed a lawyer because of economic hardship or other reasons, the SPC will not assign him an attorney to provide legal aid. I believe that, in order to ensure the quality of each case under death penalty review, this practice ought to be changed and we ought to grant defendants under death penalty review with the right to legal aid as soon as possible.

    Even though a case under death penalty review has already resulted in a death sentence after first-instance trial and also following either second-instance trial or review by the [provincial-level] high court, the conclusion has still not yet been confirmed because the procedure has not yet run its full course. The final result comes only after the SPC makes a decision either to ratify or reject the death sentence. In other words, before the results of the SPC review are handed down, the defendant still faces the prospect of life or death; therefore, he still “may be sentenced to death.”

    Some might say that Article 34(3) only applies to those who “may be sentenced to death,” whereas death penalty review cases are “cases where the death sentence has already been imposed” and, therefore, not subject to the provision of Article 34(3), regarding compulsory appointment of a defender. This view takes an exceedingly narrow reading of Article 34(3). In fact, when it comes to death penalty cases, the SPC review is also a kind of “sentence,” because only death penalty verdicts or decisions that are ratified by the SPC can become legally effective.

    It should be pointed out that Article 42 of the SPC “Interpretation on Application of the Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC” clearly states: “When a high people’s court reviews a death penalty case and the defendant has not appointed a defender, [the court] shall notify the legal aid agency to assign a lawyer as his defender.” According to the provisions of the CPL, currently high people’s courts review two types of death penalty cases. First, when an intermediate people’s court has handed down a death sentence (with immediate execution) in a trial of first instance and the defendant does not appeal, the higher people’s court shall conduct a review and report the results to the SPC. The other type is cases of death sentences with two-year suspension. From this, one can pose the question: Why does the legal aid provision in Article 34 apply when the high people’s court conducts a death penalty review but not when the same review is carried out by the SPC? Legal aid is provided in cases involving suspended death sentences under review (by a high people’s court), so why is legal aid not provided in cases involving the death penalty with immediate execution under review (by the SPC)? This makes no sense logically, and in reality makes it difficult for the SPC to consider both sides of the case during death penalty review.

    Death penalty cases are a matter of a person’s life and death, and the utmost caution ought to be exercised at every stage. One of the principal reasons why the SPC took back the authority to review death sentences was in order to make death penalty cases ironclad and prevent wrongful convictions. It is precisely for this reason that Article 240 of the new CPL states: “When the SPC reviews a death penalty case … if the defense attorney requests, it shall listen to the opinion of the defense attorney.” If, because of economic hardship or other reasons, a defendant facing death penalty review has not hired a lawyer and the court does not appoint a defender for him, then “listen to the opinion of the defense attorney” are mere empty words. Without a doubt, this does not help to ensure the quality of death penalty cases.

    To summarize, I recommend that the SPC draw upon the aforementioned Article 42 of the “Interpretation on Application of the Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC” and issue a “Notice on Providing Legal Aid to Defendants Facing Death Penalty Review,” stating: “When the SPC reviews a death penalty case and the defendant has not appointed a defender, [the court] shall notify the legal aid agency to assign an attorney as his defender.” At the same time, the SPC also ought to consult with the Ministry of Justice and have the ministry’s Department of Legal Aid Work take responsibility for implementing legal aid for death penalty review cases. In other words, when the SPC discovers that a defendant in a death penalty review case has not hired a lawyer, it should immediately notify the MOJ Department of Legal Aid Work to have it assign a legal aid lawyer to take on the death penalty review case. Of course, detailed provisions should also be put in place concerning the professional duties of legal aid lawyers (for example, regarding meeting with death row prisoners and submitting legal opinions), the manner of involvement in death penalty review (it would be preferable to be able to communicate in person with judges and procurators involved in the review), and remunerations.

  • During Death Penalty Review, No Right to Legal Aid

    China University of Political Science and Law conference on lawyer participation in death penalty review, July 2014. Photo credit: CUPL

    The 2012 revisions to China’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) introduced a number of important provisions aimed at expanding the role of defense lawyers in the criminal process. One of the highlights included a provision requiring that suspects have access to legal aid defenders during the pre-trial investigation stage as well as at trial.

    The CPL revision also introduced a requirement that defense lawyers be able to submit opinions to the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) during the process of final review of death sentences. But what if a defendant still cannot afford to hire a lawyer at this stage of the process? Unfortunately, neither the CPL nor the related implementation regulations provide for the appointment of legal aid defenders during the death penalty review stage.

    This could change if Liu Renwen has his way. Professor Liu, a legal scholar at the China Academy of Social Sciences, recently issued a public call for the SPC to change its rules and require the appointment of legal aid defenders to death row prisoners. In a piece published last month in Legal Daily, Professor Liu notes that, without a lawyer to intercede on behalf of a defendant facing the death penalty, the more rigorous review process introduced in the recent CPL provisions becomes nothing but empty words.

    It remains to be seen whether the SPC (and Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for the legal aid system) will establish new rules based on Professor Liu’s recommendation. Given SPC President Zhou Qiang’s repeated expressions of concern about the importance of preventing wrongful convictions and other miscarriages of justice, extending further protections to those whose lives hang in the balance might be a good place to start.

    *
    Defendants Facing Death Penalty Review Should Have Right to Legal Aid

    Liu Renwen
    Legal Daily, 26 March 2014

    I recommend that the SPC draw upon the aforementioned Article 42 of the “Interpretation on Application of the Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC” and issue a “Notice on Providing Legal Aid to Defendants Facing Death Penalty Review,” stating: “When the SPC reviews a death penalty case and the defendant has not appointed a defender, [the court] shall notify the legal aid agency to assign an attorney as his defender.”

    Article 34, paragraph 3, of the 2012 revised Criminal Procedure Law states: “If a criminal suspect or defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment or death, and such person has not appointed a defender, the people’s court, people’s procuratorate, or public security authority shall notify the legal aid agency to assign an attorney as his defender.” On this basis, criminal suspects and defendants who face the death penalty and have not appointed an attorney all received a right to legal aid at the stages of public security [investigation], procuratorate [review], and first- and second-instance court trial. But currently at the stage of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) death sentence review, if a defendant who has been sentenced to death has not appointed a lawyer because of economic hardship or other reasons, the SPC will not assign him an attorney to provide legal aid. I believe that, in order to ensure the quality of each case under death penalty review, this practice ought to be changed and we ought to grant defendants under death penalty review with the right to legal aid as soon as possible.

    Even though a case under death penalty review has already resulted in a death sentence after first-instance trial and also following either second-instance trial or review by the [provincial-level] high court, the conclusion has still not yet been confirmed because the procedure has not yet run its full course. The final result comes only after the SPC makes a decision either to ratify or reject the death sentence. In other words, before the results of the SPC review are handed down, the defendant still faces the prospect of life or death; therefore, he still “may be sentenced to death.”

    Some might say that Article 34(3) only applies to those who “may be sentenced to death,” whereas death penalty review cases are “cases where the death sentence has already been imposed” and, therefore, not subject to the provision of Article 34(3), regarding compulsory appointment of a defender. This view takes an exceedingly narrow reading of Article 34(3). In fact, when it comes to death penalty cases, the SPC review is also a kind of “sentence,” because only death penalty verdicts or decisions that are ratified by the SPC can become legally effective.

    It should be pointed out that Article 42 of the SPC “Interpretation on Application of the Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC” clearly states: “When a high people’s court reviews a death penalty case and the defendant has not appointed a defender, [the court] shall notify the legal aid agency to assign a lawyer as his defender.” According to the provisions of the CPL, currently high people’s courts review two types of death penalty cases. First, when an intermediate people’s court has handed down a death sentence (with immediate execution) in a trial of first instance and the defendant does not appeal, the higher people’s court shall conduct a review and report the results to the SPC. The other type is cases of death sentences with two-year suspension. From this, one can pose the question: Why does the legal aid provision in Article 34 apply when the high people’s court conducts a death penalty review but not when the same review is carried out by the SPC? Legal aid is provided in cases involving suspended death sentences under review (by a high people’s court), so why is legal aid not provided in cases involving the death penalty with immediate execution under review (by the SPC)? This makes no sense logically, and in reality makes it difficult for the SPC to consider both sides of the case during death penalty review.

    Death penalty cases are a matter of a person’s life and death, and the utmost caution ought to be exercised at every stage. One of the principal reasons why the SPC took back the authority to review death sentences was in order to make death penalty cases ironclad and prevent wrongful convictions. It is precisely for this reason that Article 240 of the new CPL states: “When the SPC reviews a death penalty case … if the defense attorney requests, it shall listen to the opinion of the defense attorney.” If, because of economic hardship or other reasons, a defendant facing death penalty review has not hired a lawyer and the court does not appoint a defender for him, then “listen to the opinion of the defense attorney” are mere empty words. Without a doubt, this does not help to ensure the quality of death penalty cases.

    To summarize, I recommend that the SPC draw upon the aforementioned Article 42 of the “Interpretation on Application of the Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC” and issue a “Notice on Providing Legal Aid to Defendants Facing Death Penalty Review,” stating: “When the SPC reviews a death penalty case and the defendant has not appointed a defender, [the court] shall notify the legal aid agency to assign an attorney as his defender.” At the same time, the SPC also ought to consult with the Ministry of Justice and have the ministry’s Department of Legal Aid Work take responsibility for implementing legal aid for death penalty review cases. In other words, when the SPC discovers that a defendant in a death penalty review case has not hired a lawyer, it should immediately notify the MOJ Department of Legal Aid Work to have it assign a legal aid lawyer to take on the death penalty review case. Of course, detailed provisions should also be put in place concerning the professional duties of legal aid lawyers (for example, regarding meeting with death row prisoners and submitting legal opinions), the manner of involvement in death penalty review (it would be preferable to be able to communicate in person with judges and procurators involved in the review), and remunerations.

  • Justice Ministry to Silence Lawyers with New Confidentiality Rules

    China University of Political Science and Law Professor Wang Jianxun. Photo credit: sohu.com

    Months before China’s highest court and prosecutor prescribed imprisonment for online posts that got too popular, the Ministry of Justice introduced information controls in draft regulations targeting criminal defense lawyers. Circulated to province-level judicial administration departments earlier this summer, the rules were met with criticism from those in the legal profession.

    Defense lawyers voiced concern that certain provisions would impose upon them absolute obligations to keep various case details confidential. Compared with the Supreme People’s Court’s judicial interpretation of the Criminal Procedure Law that barred the use of social media in the courtroom, the Ministry of Justice rules go further. While the judicial interpretation only covers the conduct of lawyers inside the courtroom and, specifically, their ability to reveal trial proceedings, the rules impose limitations on things like sharing case information with the relatives of defendants or accessing or reproducing court records. As the body mandated with the supervision of lawyers, the ministry also has more direct weapons (e.g., the approval of lawyer licenses) to use as punishment against those who fail to abide by its rules.

    The main concern, explains China University of Political Science and Law Professor Wang Jianxun, is that the rules are aimed at preventing defense lawyers from using the media and the Internet to raise public awareness about individual cases that may become miscarriages of justice.

    In recent years, Chinese lawyers have increasingly made public details of ongoing criminal cases involving procedural irregularities or other types of injustice. There is a perception among some, however, that such mobilization of public opinion interferes with courts’ ability to adjudicate cases independently and ought to be curbed in an effort to promote rule of law.

    But as Professor Wang notes, in an article published by Caijing (translated below), the Chinese judicial system is plagued by insufficient transparency and imperfect attention to procedural rights. Moreover, “coordination” between judicial and law-enforcement bodies under the party’s guidance limits, rather than promotes, judicial independence. Under these circumstances, publicity and public opinion offers an important channel through which courts, prosecutors, and police may be held accountable for their actions in the criminal process. Imposing an absolute ban on revealing case details would further limit lawyers’ ability to defend their clients and could potentially result in sanctions for those lawyers who violate these provisions.

    *
    Lawyers’ Defense Rights and the “Cutthroat” Bill

    Wang Jianxun
    Caijing, July 29, 2013

    In the wake of the promulgation of rules related to the new Criminal Procedure Law by the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has also drafted a consultation version of Regulations on Several Issues Concerning Criminal Defense by Lawyers, regulations specifically aimed at regulating the criminal defense activities of lawyers. These regulations concern issues related to the appointment of criminal defense lawyers and their abilities to meet with clients, read case files, and carry out defense work. Many provisions tend toward restriction of lawyers’ defense rights, among which a widely criticized one is the requirement that lawyers keep case information confidential.

    According to Articles 18, 27, and 42 of these regulations, defense lawyers must not leak notes, audio recordings, video recordings, or photographs to relatives of criminal suspects or defendants or use case-file documents or notes or audio- or video recordings made during the trial for purposes other than defense in that case. Also, any audio- or video recording of the trial or requests to view or reproduce audio- or video recordings of the trial made by the people’s court must first get the court’s approval.

    What do these provisions mean, ultimately? Will they constrict the already narrow space available for criminal defense even further? How will lawyers’ criminal defense rights be protected?

    There’s no doubt that criminal cases are special, and it’s understandable that lawyers’ activities in criminal litigation be subject to certain regulation and restriction. But the problem is that restrictions on lawyers’ activities ought to be premised on protecting their rights to engage in defense and motivated by protecting the rights of criminal suspects and defendants. After all, the entire system of criminal defense was set up to protect the rights of these persons, and to protect the rights of lawyers to engage in defense is also to protect the rights of suspects and defendants.

    In this respect, there is nothing improper about requiring criminal defense lawyers to fulfill certain confidentiality obligations, but complete or unconditional requirements that lawyers keep case information secret are inappropriate.

    If in certain special instances secrecy does not benefit a lawyer’s exercise of defense rights or benefit protection of the rights of a criminal suspect or defendant, then there is no reason to require the lawyer to fulfill this kind of confidentiality obligation. For example, the MOJ regulations bar defense lawyers from leaking notes, audio recordings, video recordings, or photographs to relatives of criminal suspects or defendants. Does this mean that defense lawyers may not report information about the case or give a progress report to those relatives? If those things are prohibited, how are they supposed to coordinate on behalf of defending the suspect or defendant?

    As another example, the MOJ regulations also bar lawyers from using case documents or notes or audio- or video recordings of the trial for purposes other than defense in the case at hand. This provision is intended to prevent lawyers from revealing information about cases to outsiders.

    The question is: what is the legal basis for this sort of prohibition? If a defendant’s confession is coerced through torture, can’t a lawyer notify relatives of audio or videotapes or make them public? And how does one define “other purposes”? Does discussing details of the case with relatives of a suspect or defendant count as “other purposes”? Does being interviewed about a trial count as “other purposes”? Does publicizing details of the trial online count as “other purposes”?

    There is widespread concern among lawyers that these provisions barring defense lawyers from revealing case details will in fact block them from using the media and public opinion to prevent miscarriages of justice. In a society where rule of law is imperfect and the judicial process is not independent, there is already limited space for criminal defense. The rights of lawyers to engage in criminal defense work are unable to receive effective protection, and the rights of criminal suspects and defendants are often violated. For proof, just look at the frequent occurrence of miscarriages of justice and the jailing of some criminal defense lawyers.

    If one says that the confidentiality responsibility of lawyers in societies with rule of law does not worry people because of procedural justice, then in a society with imperfect rule of law this kind of confidentiality responsibility has the possibility to deny a wrongly accused criminal suspect or defendant their final hope of obtaining justice.

    In fact, when we look at the level of practice, in a society where the judicial process is not independent and procedural justice is not made manifest, the act of a lawyer revealing case details will often enable an unfair case to turn itself around and either prevent or remedy a case of injustice due to false evidence or errors in the law.

    Cases like the “Beihai Case” in Guangxi or the “Xiaohe Case” in Guiyang were able to benefit to a considerable degree from timely publicity of case information by defense lawyers in order to avoid an even greater degree of judicial unfairness. As everyone knows, one of the chronic problems of the criminal process is insufficient openness and transparency. Even though trials and verdicts are supposed to be public according to the law, in practice both are regularly done in a non-open manner—especially those so-called sensitive or major and important cases. The court often makes excuses for refusing to try a case in public, whether it’s through the excuse that all observer permits have been distributed already, deliberately holding the trial in a small courtroom, or even making it impossible for the defendant’s relatives to observe.

    In essence, these kinds of trials are secret trials, and not only do secret trials violate the law, they are also unfair. Even worse, in many criminal cases, defendants and their relatives don’t even get copies of the verdicts.

    In this kind of situation with no open trials or verdicts, what is the crime in a defense lawyer making details of the case public? Otherwise, would there be any openness to speak of in the entire criminal process? Without openness, how can the fairness of the judicial process be guaranteed?

    One of the signs of humanity’s becoming more civilized is the shift from secret trials to public trials and the shift from secret decisions to public decisions. Where there are secret trials and secret decisions, there is no reason to bar lawyers from revealing case details; otherwise, it’s unavoidable that defendants’ rights will get trampled upon.

    Then if you permit lawyers to reveal case details as they please—especially in those cases that have not yet been tried—what do you do when these actions have negative consequences for adjudication or even judicial independence? Frankly speaking, this sort of worry is not without merit because public opinion has the potential to be a double-edged sword.

    However, the way to go about resolving this problem is not to bar lawyers from revealing case details, which could possibly make it so that these cases of injustice have no remedy. Rather, the solution is to establish judicial independence in an institutional way and realize the procedural justice of the Criminal Procedure Law.

    Were the judicial process to truly achieve independence, then even if a lawyer reveals details of a case or public opinion exerts pressure on the judicial process the judicial process would be able to handle it calmly, stand firm, and carry on. It thus wouldn’t have to worry about the improper influence of public opinion or the media.

    Only a judicial system that is not independent will be vulnerable in the face of public opinion and [state] power.

    The author is an assistant professor at China University of Political Science and Law.

  • Government Notice Fuels Crackdown on Assembly as Subversion

    Xu Zhiyong (top) & Guo Feixiong are among the recent arrested for “disrupting social order”.
    Photo credit: VOAChinese.com

    Over the past several months, Chinese authorities have been cracking down on peaceful assembly and association. As of August 14, more than 50 individuals had been detained, arrested, or disappeared. Among the most prominent are Xu Zhiyong, chief proponent of the “New Citizens’ Movement” and co-founder of the Open Constitution Initiative—a legal aid and rights-protection organization shuttered under government pressure in 2009—and veteran rights activist Guo Feixiong. Both were detained on charges of “gathering a crowd to disrupt social order”; Xu on July 16 and Guo on August 8. Many of those detained were active in calling on Chinese government leaders to disclose their assets and make good on promises to combat official corruption.

    An internal notice issued by China’s Supreme People’s Procuratorate in June may be one impetus for this crackdown. The notice called on prosecutors (who also investigate corruption and approve arrests in criminal cases) to support the ongoing propaganda effort to “build a peaceful China” by paying special attention to certain types of criminal cases seen as particularly disruptive to political stability and social order. One thing this notice calls for is resoluteness in combatting criminal activity such as “illegal assembly and gathering a crowd to disrupt social order” where there is a “goal of subverting state power.” It is likely no coincidence, then, that the charges of illegal assembly and gathering a crowd to disrupt social order have been widely used against those detained in this latest crackdown.

    In the August 11 edition of Caijing magazine, constitutional law professor Zhang Qianfan published an essay expressing serious reservations about this notice and the latest campaign against assembly and association. In this essay (translated below), he argues that peaceful assembly should be seen as a form of speech and subject to the protections of China’s Constitution. Protecting citizens from punishment for peaceful assembly or legitimate criticism and exposure of government wrongdoing should be, he argues, a key component in pursuing the goal of social stability and security. Though he does not mention the recent detentions specifically, his linkage between clear channels for free public expression and the effectiveness of China’s fight against corruption makes it clear that he is not simply speaking in abstractions.

    *
    How to Build a Peaceful China

    Zhang Qianfan
    Caijing, August 11, 2013

    On June 20, 2013, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate issued a “Notice on Making Full Use of the Procuratorial Functions to Thoroughly Promote the Building of a Peaceful China” (hereafter the “Notice”). On the one hand, the Notice calls for severity in combatting especially major and serious criminal cases involving safety and accidents, such as those involving threats to food or pharmaceutical safety, public health, environmental pollution, damage to natural resources or fires, mining disasters, or serious traffic accidents. On the other hand, the Notice calls for severity in accordance with the law in combatting crimes that endanger state security, earnest support for political security, and resoluteness in combatting criminal activity such as illegal assembly and gathering a crowd to disrupt social order or a public place with the goal of subverting state power.

    The criminal activities in the first provision produce social harm and are related to public safety, so the procuratorates truly need to exercise their powers to approve arrest and prosecute in order to effectively combat them. As for the latter provision, activities that damage state security such as espionage, inciting defection, and disclosure of legitimately and lawfully classified state secrets truly need to be combatted in accordance with the law. But in order to be compatible with the constitutional goals of ruling the nation in accordance with the law and protection of human rights, there is a need for strict interpretation of broad concepts such as “subversion of state power,” “illegal assembly,” and “disturbing social order”; otherwise, if handled inappropriately, it will not only potentially infringe on citizens’ constitutional rights but may also run contrary to the idea of building a peaceful China.

    Part Two, Chapter One of the Criminal Law provides for “Crimes of Endangering State Security,” among which Article 105 punishes the acts of “organizing, plotting or carrying out” or “using rumor, slander or other means to incite the subversion of state power or overthrow of the socialist system.”

    According to the definition in Article 4 of the State Security Law, “endangering state security” is an offense based on actions. For example, in “plotting to subvert the government, split the nation, or overthrow the socialist system,” the words “subvert,” “split,” and “overthrow” are all action verbs. In other words, only actual illegal activity such as plotting an armed rebellion, engaging in espionage activity, or disclosing state secrets can possibly constitute actions that endanger state security. Of course, Article 105 of the Criminal Law broadens the crime to speech such as rumor or slander that “incites subversion of state power,” but this broadening must be treated with caution.

    In order to charge a particular mode of speech as constituting “inciting subversion of state power,” one must prove that the speech intended to subvert state power and also that it really had the potential to cause subversion of state power. This is because the object of Article 105 is not to restrict speech; rather, it is to prevent the act of subversion. If inciting speech is actually able to cause subversion, it ought to be forbidden in accordance with the law. But unlimited expansion makes it easy to exaggerate and prosecute and repress legitimate criticism of the government as criminal speech “inciting subversion of state power,” thereby trampling on citizens’ right to free speech and right to criticize and make recommendations as granted by Articles 35 and 41, respectively, of the Constitution.

    The reason why the Constitution protects citizens’ freedom of speech and especially provides citizens with the “right to criticize and make suggestions to any state organ or functionary,” the “right to make to relevant state organs complaints and charges against, or exposures of, violation of the law or dereliction of duty by any state organ or functionary,” and [states] “no one may suppress [such complaints, charges, and exposures] or retaliate [against the citizens making them]” is because freedom of speech is critical to maintaining the security and stability of the entire society.”

    It’s worth emphasizing that the “ordinary mechanism” for maintaining state security and social stability is not the frequent use of the Criminal Law to punish those citizens who dare to speak out; rather, it is actually in the protection of citizens’ freedom of speech. This point is especially important to a great nation. The main source of a variety of sources of instability in Chinese society at present is the uncontrolled abuse of state power. Up to this point, China’s main mechanism for checking official corruption is top-down organizational control. However, China is so large and has so many localities and complex administrative hierarchy that it is difficult for the central government to keep an eye on all the provincial and ministerial-level officials, difficult for provincial government to keep an eye on officials in each of its cities, counties, townships, and towns, and so on. Since top-down organizational oversight is of limited effectiveness and bottom-up democratic oversight is, for many reasons, unable to play a full role, corruption and abuse of power have become rampant.

    But with the rise of the Internet in recent years, the citizen voices have played an increasingly big role in oversight over the government, and much corrupt behavior has been exposed through channels like the Internet, providing an opening for the top-down legal- and disciplinary oversight.

    But without strict definition of the scope of the crime of “endangering state security,” the social consequences of inappropriate use of those laws may run counter to the intent of protecting state security. For example, if charges are cooked up to punish speech, then the channels for citizen expression and oversight by society will be blocked, corrupt officials will run wild until seething popular resentment shakes the central government, causing irreparable damage to society, more acute social unrest, and accumulated dangers.

    By the same logic, there should also be strict interpretation of the “Crimes of Disturbing Public Order” set out in Part Two, Chapter Six, Section One of the Criminal Law. Among these, Article 290 establishes the “crime of gathering a crowd to disturb social order.” So-called “gathering a crowd to disturb social order” means acts “to such a serious extent that work in general, production, business operation, teaching, or scientific research are unable to go on and heavy losses are caused.” From this, it is clear that if one only gathers a crowd but the extent is not serious and it does not lead to work, production, business operation, or teaching being “unable to go on” or “cause heavy losses,” then it is insufficient to constitute “disturbing social order” and the Criminal Law should not be applied as one pleases. If citizens gather together merely to articulate a particular demand and do not attack government offices, obstruct traffic, or negatively affect other people’s work or daily life in any other way, then they should be allowed to speak their minds.

    Related to this, Article 291 [sic, should be 296] of the Criminal Law provides for the “crime of illegal assembly,” to be used “where social order is seriously disrupted because an assembly, procession, or demonstration is held with no application made in accordance with the law or regulations, where no permission was granted for the application, or where it is held not in accordance with the time for start and stop, venue, and routes permitted by the competent authorities and the order of dismission is disobeyed.” On this point, “serious disruption of social order” should follow the understanding of “disrupting social order” given in the provision discussed above; namely, its key constitutive criteria should include “work in general, production, business operation, teaching, or scientific research are unable to go on and heavy losses are caused.” If it is merely an assembly without a permit but this does not cause any heavy losses, it cannot constitute “serious disruption of social order” and the crime of “illegal assembly” will also be untenable.

    It is especially necessary to point out that citizen assemblies are one form of expression protected under Article 35 of the current Constitution and do not fall under the scope of actions that the law may ordinarily restrict or punish; therefore, use of the Criminal Law to punish assembly ought to be done with the utmost caution. Under general circumstances, peaceful assembly is one manner of rational expression of citizen’s demands, especially small-scale assembly that cannot lead to any serious consequences on society. Therefore, these cannot constitute the key criterion of the crimes of “illegal assembly” or “gathering a crowd to disturb social order”—serious disruption of public order—and even less can they be considered acts of endangering state security such as “inciting subversion of state power.”

    At present, there is a common misperception that assembly is an “action” and thus substantially distinguishable from ordinary speech. [In this view,] once citizens assemble, it constitutes an “action” and the relevant authorities can use the Criminal Law to suppress it severely. This understanding does not comport with the provisions of Article 35 of the Constitution: “Citizens have the freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, procession, and demonstration.” Clearly, assembly, procession, and demonstration are listed alongside speech and publication, making them all “speech” or “expression” in the broader sense and enjoying the Constitution’s protection for freedom of speech in this broad sense. Of course, if during an assembly there are violent incidents like riots, arson, or attacks, this clearly enters the realm of action and the state has both the power and the obligation to prohibit these actions. But peaceful assembly is clearly speech, so even if the legal process is flawed the Criminal Law cannot be used to punish it.

    Article [296] of the Criminal Law requires assemblies to apply for permission in accordance with law and regulation and treats assembly without requesting or receiving permission to be “illegal assembly.” Applying for permission is indeed a statutory condition for lawful assembly, and just about all countries with rule of law make similar requirements.

    But it needs to be pointed out that the goal of this requirement is to ensure that citizen assembly is carried out peacefully and in an orderly manner so that it does not have a negative impact on others’ work, transportation, or rest, and is not a disguised way to deprive [citizens] of their freedom of assembly. Those who give permission may not refuse their approval because they do not agree with the views that those assembled want to express or out of some inexplicable fear of citizens gathering; otherwise, this is an abuse of the permit authority. This is why in countries with rule of law applications for permission to assemble are a formality, with those giving approval simply conducting a procedural review of the time, location, and manner of the assembly and not a substantive review of the content of the assembly. Any assembly without violent tendency will be approved, making assembly a common way in which citizens peacefully express their demands and gather popular support. One could even say that the more orderly a society, the more common citizen assembly is.

    It cannot be denied that the reason why the citizen “strolls” and other activities taking place in many parts of China today are treated as “illegal assembly” is to a great extent because local authorities view ordinary assembly as a plague and very rarely approve requests by citizens to assemble. They routinely refuse to approve assemblies on the grounds that they will “seriously disrupt social order,” without ever giving any specific explanation or reasoning—often without even any written decision. Even though under the provisions of the Law on Assembly, Procession, and Demonstration, failure to respond by the statutory deadline can be seen as approval, once citizens take to the streets, police are mobilized to counter the “illegal assembly.” Not only does this not serve to maintain true public order, it even artificially intensifies social contradictions.

    Clearly, Article [296] of the Criminal Law cannot be based simply on whether an assembly is “illegal” but must consider whether an assembly constitutes a “serious disruption to social order” and especially needs to review whether the relevant authorities exercised their power to approve the assembly in accordance with the law.

    In sum, enforcing the Criminal Law certainly is the mandate of the public security and procuratorial authorities, but this important mandate must be exercised appropriately. First, we must establish a professional habit of respect for the Constitution, because only the freedom of speech provided by Article 35 of the Constitution can serve as the main path toward true social peace.

    The Notice requires investigation and punishment in accordance with the law of the corruption behind especially major and serious criminal cases involving safety and accidents and the serious investigation of crimes of office such as corruption, bribery, and malfeasance. This is commendable, but the experience of past years has taught us that corruption and malfeasance cannot be fully investigated only by the procuratorate’s efforts. Especially in a broader context in which independent procuratorial authority does not enjoy full protection, exposure of the corruption and other crimes of many officials has relied on public whistleblowers. If the public’s channels of expression are blocked or the Criminal Law is used to punish the public-spirited, conscientious, and courageous expression of responsible citizens, then the only result will be a chilling effect on the people of noble character in this realm, people of base character will increasingly have nothing to fear, and it will be difficult to realize “peaceful China.”

    The author is a professor of constitutional law at Peking University.

  • Judicial Independence Debuts in Contentious SPC Work Report

    Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference delegate Wang Junfeng (right) discusses the “Two Meetings.” Photo credit: legaldaily.com.cn

    One of the major events during the annual lianghui—plenary sessions of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)—is the day when the heads of the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate (commonly referred to as the “two supremes”) present their work reports to delegates assembled in Beijing. Though short on detail, these overviews of the work done by the national judiciary and procuracy can still help to identify aspects of the legal system that are given special emphasis in China as well as those areas that might be given special priority for future reform.

    The reports presented this year by outgoing Supreme People’s Court (SPC) President Wang Shengjun and Supreme People’s Procuratorate Procurator-General Cao Jianming, who will serve a second term, focus on the accomplishments of the previous five years and set out an agenda for their successors for the coming year. To many casual observers, these work reports often seem replete with empty rhetoric and slogans. But those who look carefully can sometimes discern new phrases and subtle shifts in emphasis that may signal important future policy directions.

    Such speculation was the subject of a recent interview conducted by the newspaper Legal Weekly with CPPCC delegate and chairman of the All-China Lawyers Association (ACLA), Wang Junfeng. At issue was how much to read into references to “judicial independence” in this year’s SPC work report—especially in light of pronouncements made earlier by new Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping about the importance of governing in accordance with the law and upholding the independence and fairness of the judicial system.

    Supreme People’s Court President Wang Shengjun delivers the court’s work report during the National People’s Congress. Photo credit: China.com.cn

    This expression of commitment to judicial independence by SPC President Wang Shengjun is notable, especially considering that many observers feel that under his tenure political control of China’s courts increased and earlier progress towards a more professional, independent judiciary stalled or even eroded. As evidence of dissatisfaction among lianghui delegates, the SPC report was one of several government work reports receiving the most opposition votes it has seen in five years and received more opposing votes than any other government work report, with 2,218 yeas, 605 nays, and 120 abstentions.

    Wang Junfeng is clearly hopeful that new leadership in the party and the courts will change the atmosphere of “neglect of rule of law” that he sees as having brought many negative consequences to China over the past decade. But one can sense continued uncertainty in his optimism, as he insists that commitments to judicial independence and rule of law be more than just slogans.

    *
    Judicial Independence Shouldn’t Be Mere Slogan

    Interview with CPPCC delegate, ACLA president Wang Junfeng

    Chen Xiao and Gao Yuan, Legal Weekly
    March 13, 2013

    Legal Weekly [hereafter, “LW”]: We’ve noticed that the issue of courts exercising independent, impartial judicial power was mentioned twice in the sections of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) report discussing the problems and difficulties faced by courts and the section on this year’s work agenda. Legal academics have been talking about this problem for a long time, but past reports seem never to have clearly raised the issue. What do you think about its being raised now?

    Wang Junfeng [hereafter, “WJF”]: I think it’s great to bring up (independent judicial authority)! We legal professionals feel extremely gratified to see the SPC report clearly raise this issue. Actually, we knew that it would be mentioned sooner or later. From the beginning of opening and reform, independent judicial authority was one of our important standards. Independent judicial authority is one of the most important cornerstones of a rule-of-law society.

    Over the past decade, China’s economy has been very successful and there have been many changes in all industries. We feel extremely proud, as if we had experienced it ourselves. But there’s no doubt that a major regret is the neglect of rule of law. In an era when the economy developed so quickly, [this neglect] is really astonishing.

    But lately we’ve seen General Secretary Xi Jinping mention upholding the authority and protecting the dignity of the constitution and say that we ought to hold firm to the independence and fairness of the judicial system. Legal academics and professionals know that this is the way it should be. Of course it shouldn’t merely be mentioned. Our judicial work, including our legal professions must always attach importance to the professional and independent nature of the law. Only by remaining firm on this point will we have true rule of law.

    LW: What do you think led [SPC] President Wang Shengjun to mention this problem in this year’s report? What expectations do you have as a result?

    WJF: First, the new generation of central leadership is vigorously promoting governance in accordance with the law, which is a fundamental basic plan for China. Because General Secretary [Xi] mentioned this earlier, it’s logical for President Wang to mention it in [the SPC] report. If it continued to go unmentioned, how could [the report] reflect the importance of the credibility of our judicial system? To a great extent, the decline in credibility of the judicial system is a consequence of the inability to uphold judicial independence.

    Bringing up the issue after 10 years makes me feel gratified, but that the same time I feel…I don’t know how to put it.

    From another angle, it reminds us that this is not a slogan. No matter what changes take place in society, they must not shake the cornerstone of judicial independence.

    I anticipate that this is not merely a slogan and hope that independent judicial authority can truly be put into effect in practice.

    LW: President Wang mentioned in his report that the problems of difficult litigation and implementation have not yet been fundamentally resolved. As a lawyer, what is the situation? Does the All-China Lawyers Association have any data that reflect these problems? Can you give us one or two examples drawn from your practice [as a lawyer]?

    WJF: The difficulties of litigation and implementation are major problems.

    On the one hand, the difficulty of litigation has to do with the inability to strictly operate according to legal procedures during the court’s trial process. Sometimes the difficulty can be seen in cases where one side is in the right but cannot win their suit. Other times, it’s difficult even to file the case. In general, judicial work is affected by all sorts of factors that shouldn’t exist, problems with judicial independence, problems with judges themselves, etcetera.

    Every year there’s talk of the “difficulties of litigation and implementation.” I sweat with anxiety for China’s judicial system. This shows that even though China has made many advances in rule of law, there is still a long way to go to reach ordinary people’s ideal of rule of law.

    So, I look forward to this being improved under the new central party leadership and their promotion of governance in accordance with the law. Many people in legal sectors said they felt there was more hope for the nation after hearing General Secretary Xi Jinping’s speech, first of all, that the spring of rule of law had arrived. Once the spring of rule of law arrives, the glory of a nation can further progress.

    I hope that when judicial independence is realized and China’s rule of law progresses further that President Wang or [future] court presidents will [be able to] speak less of these kinds of problems at the NPC and allow ordinary people to live in a bit more dignity. This is what we look forward to.

    As far as the difficulties of litigation and implementation are concerned, I don’t have any relevant data. But the data isn’t that important. Now that President Wang has spoken of how difficult things are in front of the NPC, is data really that important?

    LW: In the agenda for this year’s work, the SPC report spoke of the need to build up the credibility of the judicial system. This phrasing also seems rather new. Based on your practical understanding, what aspects of the realities [of the judicial system] is this aimed at? From a lawyer’s perspective, how should the credibility of the judicial system be strengthened?

    WJF: Ordinary people know what it means to talk about the credibility of the judicial system.

    I think that to restore the credibility of the judicial system, it’s important to eliminate bureaucratism. Actually, being a judge is an extremely sacred and honorable position, one with the authority to adjudicate according to national laws and regulations. We must eliminate bureaucratism from this profession, reduce the air of “officialism,” and increase the spirit of professionalism.

    First of all, how can there be credibility when there is still no judicial independence, when bureaucratism is so severe, and when there are so many ranks among judges? In foreign countries, judges are called judicial officers and represent fairness. In China’s feudal, traditional consciousness, [the word “judge” was created by] taking the word for “law” and adding “official” at the end. I encourage the media and the courts internally to stop calling [judges] “officials” in the future. “Judicial officers” or “presiding judge” is more appropriate. When you add the word “official,” it not only brings with it seriously feudal ways of thinking, it also desecrates the position of judge itself by wiping out its specialized and professional characteristics. In the feudal society of the past, bureaucrats judged cases; now, [this is done by] judicial officers and presiding judges. If we stop calling them “officials,” perhaps it will enhance the credibility of the judicial system.

    There are many factors affecting credibility: the inability to adjudicate independently, interference of all types, various disciplinary problems and derelictions among judges themselves, insufficient respect for professionalism, and so on. But as long as we stand firm on judicial independence and accept society’s public oversight, I think this problem shouldn’t be difficult to resolve.

    LW: Ordinary people attach considerable importance to the fight against corruption. Recently, the anti-corruption winds have been blowing rather fiercely. Before they came out, we had hoped that the [SPC and Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP)] reports would make a point of describing the results and future plans on this subject, but it seems that not much ink was spilled on this account. Why is this?

    WJF: The fight against corruption has already been mentioned many times. I think it’s normal that it wasn’t mentioned and that the court didn’t mention it. When corruption cases occur, the courts should punish them in accordance with the law. Moreover, I don’t think that the court report needs to mention such things as preserving growth or maintaining stability. The law is the law; when [a case] comes, you try it. When courts’ actions follow society or politics too closely, there will be doubts about judicial independence.

    The legal system and the courts are like high mountains, standing in the distance. Its ordinary operations are to uphold fairness, punish crime, and support society. It shouldn’t be affected by the blowing wind or the falling rain. Courts ought to stand firm and adjudicate fairly and independently in accordance with the law and regulations and adhere to its professional spirit. That’s enough.

    I personally believe that judges are chosen through a certain process and are endowed by the law with a special mission. It’s enough for them to handle the cases they’re given to adjudicate and stick to their responsibilities to the law.

    LW: Please share your thoughts on the [SPC and SPP] reports, including positive aspects, what the highlights were, where they were lacking, and your expectations as a lawyer.

    WJF: The [reports] explain clearly to the public what work was done in the judicial system over the past five years and what things were achieved. As in the past, I feel that for the most part the reports were factual and honest.

    The rare thing here is that we saw that the [SPC and SPP] did not avoid the problems they face. We also saw the efforts being made to restore the credibility of the judicial system.

    However, we know that legislation is not an end [in itself]. Laws are meant to be enforced. On this point, lawyers, police, prosecutors, and judges all share the same goal of ensuring that state legislation is truly and correctly enforced. That is the ultimate purpose of legislation and the ultimate objective of the state’s development of rule of law.

    What we want to see from the court and procuratorate reports is not only that they say a lot, but even more so we want to see how much they have done. We hope that in the new era of national development we will be able to see the effect of rule of law in all areas of the state. Over the past decade, neglect of rule of law has brought negative consequences: corruption, loss of credibility, a growing gap between rich and poor, poisoned milk powder, collapsing buildings, and so on. I hope that society will not make this mistake again.

    Over the past decade, China’s economy developed so fast yet the unfortunate neglect of rule of law brought about consequences. The entire nation should reflect on this and not allow ourselves to make this mistake again. We cannot afford to.

    It’s good for us to bring up the issue of independent judicial and prosecutorial power, but we still don’t know how much we can achieve or how quickly. Based on the hopes expressed in [Xi Jinping’s] words and the expectations we legal professionals have, all lead to the hope that the springtime of rule of law could be approaching.

  • Judicial Independence Debuts in Contentious SPC Work Report

    Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference delegate Wang Junfeng (right) discusses the “Two Meetings.” Photo credit: legaldaily.com.cn

    One of the major events during the annual lianghui—plenary sessions of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)—is the day when the heads of the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate (commonly referred to as the “two supremes”) present their work reports to delegates assembled in Beijing. Though short on detail, these overviews of the work done by the national judiciary and procuracy can still help to identify aspects of the legal system that are given special emphasis in China as well as those areas that might be given special priority for future reform.

    The reports presented this year by outgoing Supreme People’s Court (SPC) President Wang Shengjun and Supreme People’s Procuratorate Procurator-General Cao Jianming, who will serve a second term, focus on the accomplishments of the previous five years and set out an agenda for their successors for the coming year. To many casual observers, these work reports often seem replete with empty rhetoric and slogans. But those who look carefully can sometimes discern new phrases and subtle shifts in emphasis that may signal important future policy directions.

    Such speculation was the subject of a recent interview conducted by the newspaper Legal Weekly with CPPCC delegate and chairman of the All-China Lawyers Association (ACLA), Wang Junfeng. At issue was how much to read into references to “judicial independence” in this year’s SPC work report—especially in light of pronouncements made earlier by new Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping about the importance of governing in accordance with the law and upholding the independence and fairness of the judicial system.

    Supreme People’s Court President Wang Shengjun delivers the court’s work report during the National People’s Congress. Photo credit: China.com.cn

    This expression of commitment to judicial independence by SPC President Wang Shengjun is notable, especially considering that many observers feel that under his tenure political control of China’s courts increased and earlier progress towards a more professional, independent judiciary stalled or even eroded. As evidence of dissatisfaction among lianghui delegates, the SPC report was one of several government work reports receiving the most opposition votes it has seen in five years and received more opposing votes than any other government work report, with 2,218 yeas, 605 nays, and 120 abstentions.

    Wang Junfeng is clearly hopeful that new leadership in the party and the courts will change the atmosphere of “neglect of rule of law” that he sees as having brought many negative consequences to China over the past decade. But one can sense continued uncertainty in his optimism, as he insists that commitments to judicial independence and rule of law be more than just slogans.

    *
    Judicial Independence Shouldn’t Be Mere Slogan

    Interview with CPPCC delegate, ACLA president Wang Junfeng

    Chen Xiao and Gao Yuan, Legal Weekly
    March 13, 2013

    Legal Weekly [hereafter, “LW”]: We’ve noticed that the issue of courts exercising independent, impartial judicial power was mentioned twice in the sections of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) report discussing the problems and difficulties faced by courts and the section on this year’s work agenda. Legal academics have been talking about this problem for a long time, but past reports seem never to have clearly raised the issue. What do you think about its being raised now?

    Wang Junfeng [hereafter, “WJF”]: I think it’s great to bring up (independent judicial authority)! We legal professionals feel extremely gratified to see the SPC report clearly raise this issue. Actually, we knew that it would be mentioned sooner or later. From the beginning of opening and reform, independent judicial authority was one of our important standards. Independent judicial authority is one of the most important cornerstones of a rule-of-law society.

    Over the past decade, China’s economy has been very successful and there have been many changes in all industries. We feel extremely proud, as if we had experienced it ourselves. But there’s no doubt that a major regret is the neglect of rule of law. In an era when the economy developed so quickly, [this neglect] is really astonishing.

    But lately we’ve seen General Secretary Xi Jinping mention upholding the authority and protecting the dignity of the constitution and say that we ought to hold firm to the independence and fairness of the judicial system. Legal academics and professionals know that this is the way it should be. Of course it shouldn’t merely be mentioned. Our judicial work, including our legal professions must always attach importance to the professional and independent nature of the law. Only by remaining firm on this point will we have true rule of law.

    LW: What do you think led [SPC] President Wang Shengjun to mention this problem in this year’s report? What expectations do you have as a result?

    WJF: First, the new generation of central leadership is vigorously promoting governance in accordance with the law, which is a fundamental basic plan for China. Because General Secretary [Xi] mentioned this earlier, it’s logical for President Wang to mention it in [the SPC] report. If it continued to go unmentioned, how could [the report] reflect the importance of the credibility of our judicial system? To a great extent, the decline in credibility of the judicial system is a consequence of the inability to uphold judicial independence.

    Bringing up the issue after 10 years makes me feel gratified, but that the same time I feel…I don’t know how to put it.

    From another angle, it reminds us that this is not a slogan. No matter what changes take place in society, they must not shake the cornerstone of judicial independence.

    I anticipate that this is not merely a slogan and hope that independent judicial authority can truly be put into effect in practice.

    LW: President Wang mentioned in his report that the problems of difficult litigation and implementation have not yet been fundamentally resolved. As a lawyer, what is the situation? Does the All-China Lawyers Association have any data that reflect these problems? Can you give us one or two examples drawn from your practice [as a lawyer]?

    WJF: The difficulties of litigation and implementation are major problems.

    On the one hand, the difficulty of litigation has to do with the inability to strictly operate according to legal procedures during the court’s trial process. Sometimes the difficulty can be seen in cases where one side is in the right but cannot win their suit. Other times, it’s difficult even to file the case. In general, judicial work is affected by all sorts of factors that shouldn’t exist, problems with judicial independence, problems with judges themselves, etcetera.

    Every year there’s talk of the “difficulties of litigation and implementation.” I sweat with anxiety for China’s judicial system. This shows that even though China has made many advances in rule of law, there is still a long way to go to reach ordinary people’s ideal of rule of law.

    So, I look forward to this being improved under the new central party leadership and their promotion of governance in accordance with the law. Many people in legal sectors said they felt there was more hope for the nation after hearing General Secretary Xi Jinping’s speech, first of all, that the spring of rule of law had arrived. Once the spring of rule of law arrives, the glory of a nation can further progress.

    I hope that when judicial independence is realized and China’s rule of law progresses further that President Wang or [future] court presidents will [be able to] speak less of these kinds of problems at the NPC and allow ordinary people to live in a bit more dignity. This is what we look forward to.

    As far as the difficulties of litigation and implementation are concerned, I don’t have any relevant data. But the data isn’t that important. Now that President Wang has spoken of how difficult things are in front of the NPC, is data really that important?

    LW: In the agenda for this year’s work, the SPC report spoke of the need to build up the credibility of the judicial system. This phrasing also seems rather new. Based on your practical understanding, what aspects of the realities [of the judicial system] is this aimed at? From a lawyer’s perspective, how should the credibility of the judicial system be strengthened?

    WJF: Ordinary people know what it means to talk about the credibility of the judicial system.

    I think that to restore the credibility of the judicial system, it’s important to eliminate bureaucratism. Actually, being a judge is an extremely sacred and honorable position, one with the authority to adjudicate according to national laws and regulations. We must eliminate bureaucratism from this profession, reduce the air of “officialism,” and increase the spirit of professionalism.

    First of all, how can there be credibility when there is still no judicial independence, when bureaucratism is so severe, and when there are so many ranks among judges? In foreign countries, judges are called judicial officers and represent fairness. In China’s feudal, traditional consciousness, [the word “judge” was created by] taking the word for “law” and adding “official” at the end. I encourage the media and the courts internally to stop calling [judges] “officials” in the future. “Judicial officers” or “presiding judge” is more appropriate. When you add the word “official,” it not only brings with it seriously feudal ways of thinking, it also desecrates the position of judge itself by wiping out its specialized and professional characteristics. In the feudal society of the past, bureaucrats judged cases; now, [this is done by] judicial officers and presiding judges. If we stop calling them “officials,” perhaps it will enhance the credibility of the judicial system.

    There are many factors affecting credibility: the inability to adjudicate independently, interference of all types, various disciplinary problems and derelictions among judges themselves, insufficient respect for professionalism, and so on. But as long as we stand firm on judicial independence and accept society’s public oversight, I think this problem shouldn’t be difficult to resolve.

    LW: Ordinary people attach considerable importance to the fight against corruption. Recently, the anti-corruption winds have been blowing rather fiercely. Before they came out, we had hoped that the [SPC and Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP)] reports would make a point of describing the results and future plans on this subject, but it seems that not much ink was spilled on this account. Why is this?

    WJF: The fight against corruption has already been mentioned many times. I think it’s normal that it wasn’t mentioned and that the court didn’t mention it. When corruption cases occur, the courts should punish them in accordance with the law. Moreover, I don’t think that the court report needs to mention such things as preserving growth or maintaining stability. The law is the law; when [a case] comes, you try it. When courts’ actions follow society or politics too closely, there will be doubts about judicial independence.

    The legal system and the courts are like high mountains, standing in the distance. Its ordinary operations are to uphold fairness, punish crime, and support society. It shouldn’t be affected by the blowing wind or the falling rain. Courts ought to stand firm and adjudicate fairly and independently in accordance with the law and regulations and adhere to its professional spirit. That’s enough.

    I personally believe that judges are chosen through a certain process and are endowed by the law with a special mission. It’s enough for them to handle the cases they’re given to adjudicate and stick to their responsibilities to the law.

    LW: Please share your thoughts on the [SPC and SPP] reports, including positive aspects, what the highlights were, where they were lacking, and your expectations as a lawyer.

    WJF: The [reports] explain clearly to the public what work was done in the judicial system over the past five years and what things were achieved. As in the past, I feel that for the most part the reports were factual and honest.

    The rare thing here is that we saw that the [SPC and SPP] did not avoid the problems they face. We also saw the efforts being made to restore the credibility of the judicial system.

    However, we know that legislation is not an end [in itself]. Laws are meant to be enforced. On this point, lawyers, police, prosecutors, and judges all share the same goal of ensuring that state legislation is truly and correctly enforced. That is the ultimate purpose of legislation and the ultimate objective of the state’s development of rule of law.

    What we want to see from the court and procuratorate reports is not only that they say a lot, but even more so we want to see how much they have done. We hope that in the new era of national development we will be able to see the effect of rule of law in all areas of the state. Over the past decade, neglect of rule of law has brought negative consequences: corruption, loss of credibility, a growing gap between rich and poor, poisoned milk powder, collapsing buildings, and so on. I hope that society will not make this mistake again.

    Over the past decade, China’s economy developed so fast yet the unfortunate neglect of rule of law brought about consequences. The entire nation should reflect on this and not allow ourselves to make this mistake again. We cannot afford to.

    It’s good for us to bring up the issue of independent judicial and prosecutorial power, but we still don’t know how much we can achieve or how quickly. Based on the hopes expressed in [Xi Jinping’s] words and the expectations we legal professionals have, all lead to the hope that the springtime of rule of law could be approaching.

  • Can China’s Legal Reform Survive Without Judicial Independence?

    Experts at a conference on legal reform earlier this month. Clockwise from top left: Hu Yunteng, Supreme People’s Court Research Office; Xie Pengcheng, Supreme People’s Procuratorate Institute of Procuratorial Theory; Tian Wenchang, All-China Lawyers’ Association; former lawyer Li Zhuang; lawyer Mao Lixin; Xu Xin, Beijing Institute of Technology Law School.
    Photo credits: Sina

    Since last month’s installation of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang at the head of the Chinese Communist Party, there has been much speculation about whether China is about to embark on a new round of reforms and, if so, whether it might alter the political system. In the near term, the odds of political reform are not high, but gradual changes to the legal system are more likely. The most immediate changes will probably result from revisions to the criminal and civil procedure codes that are set to take effect on January 1, 2013.

    If recent history is any guide, it is very likely that any substantial reforms to China’s legal system (for example, changes in the system of reeducation through labor) will have to wait until 2014—after Communist Party leaders approve the new legal reform agenda expected to be drawn up by the Central Politico-Legal Commission and submitted for approval toward the end of next year.

    Legal-system (or judicial) reform was the subject of a recent conference in Beijing, according to a report published in The Mirror (a Beijing evening paper with a focus on legal affairs). Although the article’s headline focuses on the “revolutionary” system of guiding cases, many conference participants quoted in the article express a degree of impatience with the limited nature of legal reform thus far, and a conviction that establishing a system of judicial independence is essential to the fair and authoritative administration of justice. Pointing to corruption in Russia’s Western-styled judicial system, however, others note that China’s socio-economic realities call into question whether judicial independence is currently feasible.

    One is left with the sense that China faces a dilemma that is difficult to resolve: an urgent need to improve the capacity and quality of its legal system in an environment with political, economic, and social factors that restrict the speed and scope of change. Some have even gone so far as to identify this problem as a trap that can only be escaped by instituting political reform—the very thing legal reform is intended to forestall.

    Such pessimism is of course inappropriate for the pages of a Chinese newspaper, which may explain why the initial focus is on concrete systemic reforms that have the potential for genuine improvement and why the piece ends with a comment—very likely stripped of its larger context—by former lawyer Li Zhuang, saying that the “spring [of Chinese judicial reform] has truly arrived.” Expectations are high, which means there could be repercussions if this new dawn doesn’t materialize soon.

    *
    Building a Guiding Precedents System with Chinese Characteristics

    Wang Hong, The Mirror
    December 7, 2012

    Supreme People’s Court (SPC) judge discusses judicial reform, speaks of plans to set up independent procedure to ensure sentencing precision; citizens can recommend outstanding precedents to courts

    The [political] report of the 18th Party Congress mentioned ruling the country in accordance with the law and delivered a new message about “using legal-system thinking to resolve social problems,” all of which has given great encouragement to all segments of society. Some say that the third wave of Chinese reform has already begun, with judicial reform as an important component.

    Recently, the Public Policy Research Center at China University of Political Science and Law held a conference on the subject of “The Characteristics of Chinese Judicial Reform,” attended by many authoritative experts, scholars, and lawyers in related fields. Everyone is hoping for the springtime of judicial reform to arrive.

    Keyword: Institutional Reform

    For a long time China has not given enough attention to sentencing, and in a past era when consciousness about human-rights protection was not strong, it did not matter much if some were punished more heavily and others more lightly.

    Reform of sentencing standards began two years ago to address the problems of over-broad sentencing ranges and judges with too much discretion.

    Setting up an Independent Sentencing Process

    According to Hu Yunteng, director of the SPC Research Office, for a long time in China the sentencing and conviction processes were not separate, not enough attention was paid to sentencing, and there were instances of unequal sentencing.

    In a past era in which consciousness about human-rights protection was not strong, it did not matter much if some were punished more heavily and others more lightly. These days, following the increase in human-rights consciousness, freedom is considered increasingly precious and a sentence that is excessive or insufficient by even one day has an impact on the fair administration of justice.

    Starting two years ago, China began studying reform of sentencing standards with an eye towards building a relatively independent sentencing process that would, to a degree, separate sentencing from criminal adjudication and allow the prosecution and defense to debate not only the issue of guilt but also the issue of sentencing.

    One important result of this reform has been to give finer gradation to sentencing ranges and refine the circumstances under the criminal law in which heavier punishment, more lenient punishment, mitigated punishment, and exemption from punishment [may be imposed], all in an effort to overcome the problems of relatively over-broad sentencing ranges and judges with too much discretion.

    Let Outstanding Precedents “Speak”

    Director Hu Yunteng says that, in the past, we were always very careful about the way we used [earlier] cases lest it turn into a Western precedent system. In fact, courts nationwide adjudicate millions of cases annually, an extraordinarily valuable judicial resource that encapsulates the collective wisdom of judges, lawyers, prosecutors, and litigants.

    After a long period of study, the SPC decided to set up a system of guiding cases with Chinese characteristics, which was formally established in 2010. The SPC has already issued three sets of guiding cases and will soon issue the fourth set.

    This Chinese-style system of guiding cases is different from those found in the West. In the West, any case [in which the verdict] has been announced automatically becomes a precedent, but guiding cases in China are all carefully selected by the SPC. The selection of cases involves an extremely strict recommendation process.

    A court at any level that believes a case it has adjudicated can serve as a guiding case may recommend it to the adjudication committee of the court at the next-higher level. Cases must move up the recommendation ladder by passing through the adjudication committees of courts at each level.

    Citizens who find that a particular case may serve as a guiding case may recommend it to the adjudication committee of the court that adjudicated the case in final instance.

    Furthermore, guiding cases must be re-written and the key points of the decision must be approved by the SPC adjudication committee. An individual case may have many highlights, but the ultimate number of confirmed guidance points is usually between one and three, [ensuring that] the scope of guidance is not unlimited or random. Allowing each court, scholar, or lawyer to give [their opinions about a case] in an unstructured way might prevent the case from fulfilling its guiding function.

    Courts should consult guiding cases when the case they are trying is similar, but “similar” refers to the essential similarity of the legal issues being contested in the case and not similarity in terms of subject, amount, or the plaintiff or defendant. If a defense lawyer recommends a certain case be consulted, the judge should respond. If a judge ought to consult a guiding case but fails do so without explaining the reason, that case could be remanded for retrial or the verdict changed.

    Keyword: Judicial Openness

    Experts and scholars all believe that after the 18th Party Congress the next steps in judicial reform will revolve around raising the level of trust in the administration of justice. One of the key links in this is to increase the openness of the judicial system. The current system of judicial openness merely rests on “open hearings,” and there is not enough openness in some of the other aspects [of the judicial process].

    Let the Public Participate in Judicial Reform

    Director Hu Yunteng observed that many countries worldwide are carrying out judicial reforms, including Japan, Vietnam, and many developed countries. Judicial reform in China is [part of] the development and perfection of a socialist system with Chinese characteristics and must resolve the many problems that currently affect social justice.

    The process of China’s judicial reform is not a closed-door process but rather one in which the public should participate and one that should absorb opinions from all sectors of society. The effectiveness of reform should be judged by the public. The goal of China’s judicial reforms is the establishment of a judicial system that is fair, highly efficient, and authoritative.

    Mao Lixin, a law Ph.D. and lawyer with the Beijing Shangquan Law Firm, believes that the essence and basic function of the administration of justice is to resolve conflicts, something that requires fairness while at the same time emphasizing efficiency. “Fairness and efficiency” are two major themes in the administration of justice.

    However, China currently has a low degree of judicial efficiency. There are 210,000 judges in China, ranking number one worldwide. Its ratio of 19.7 judges for every 100,000 people is higher than in the United States, but its judicial output is actually very low. According to statistics, last year the average number of cases handled per judge was only 57.

    In the United States, a judge handles at least 1,000 to 2,000 cases per year; in South Korea the average judge handles more than 700 cases. But in China, many simple cases remain undecided even after several years.

    Keyword: Judicial Independence

    Many experts and scholars believe that the biggest problem facing China’s current administration of justice is insufficient trust in the judicial system. Abusing power to control the law and interference in the administration of justice are very apparent in some locations, and the key to solving this problem rests on the need to ensure that judicial bodies exercise their judicial power independently.

    Stop Power from Kidnapping Justice

    Professor Xu Xin of the Beijing Institute of Technology School of Law says that in the past several years the great majority of judicial reforms involved minor revisions and fixes without touching the core of the legal system, and that some of these revisions were even expedient. For example, the system of guiding cases is a revolutionary reform, but it is very difficult to implement. He hopes that the SPC will set up a precedent database and make all precedents public so that everyone may supervise, consult, and compare.

    As a next step, China must reaffirm judicial independence, because that is a bottom-line issue. If no one dares speak of judicial independence more than 30 years since opening and reform, then there is no point in discussing judicial reform. Judicial independence is the most fundamental condition for realizing fairness in the administration of justice, without any distinction between East and West. Socialist judicial independence can surpass capitalist judicial independence.

    Lawyer Tian Wenchang observes that in many cases judges and courts face control, interference, and even kidnapping [in a figurative sense] at the hands of all sorts of power, a situation that must be eliminated. If [the problem of] judicial independence is not resolved, judicial reform is just empty rhetoric.

    Independence of Judicial Officers is Prerequisite

    Xie Pengcheng, deputy director of the Institute of Procuratorial Theory at the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, noted that the [political] reports of the 13th through 18th party congresses all contained similar language about “ensuring that judicial bodies exercise judicial power independently and fairly in accordance with the law.” This shows above all that the problem of guaranteeing that judicial bodies exercise judicial power independently and fairly in accordance with the law requires further attention.

    The basic goal for future judicial reform is: guaranteeing judicial independence. To this day, there is no country that has fair and authoritative administration of justice without judicial independence.

    Where is the fulcrum for future judicial reform in China? It is the establishment and protection of independence for judicial officers.

    When relevant international covenants mention judicial independence, they are firstly referring to the independence of judicial officers. However, judicial independence in China means the independence of courts and procuratorates, without recognition of independent judges and procurators. This is the basic reason China cannot truly realize judicial independence.

    Establish a High-Quality Corps of Judges

    In response to the question of judicial independence, Hu Yunteng says frankly that judicial independence and judicial democratization must conform to our current social realities.

    Russia is a classic example of a judicial system transplanted from Western countries: constitutional court, separation of powers, and judicial independence. But fewer than one third of Russians are satisfied with their judicial system, particularly [because of] judicial corruption.

    If overall social conditions have not been met and judicial personnel have not achieved [a certain level of] quality, giving judges power will result in serious consequences.

    There are currently a number of problems in which the SPC can intervene, and we have some institutions that promote judicial fairness. The fact that many people do not obey the judicial system at present is not because they do not take judges seriously; it is because the law itself has no authority.

    Keyword: Lawyer Participation

    In the “Li Zhuang incident,” the defendant made accusations against his lawyer in order to save his own life. This fundamentally subverts the foundations of the institution of lawyers.

    No Judicial Reform Without Lawyers’ Participation

    Tian Wenchang, chair of the All-China Lawyers’ Association Criminal Law Profession Committee, believes that judicial reform cannot occur without the participation of lawyers. In the “Li Zhuang incident,” the defendant made accusations against his lawyer in order to save his own life. This fundamentally subverts the foundations of the institution of lawyers.

    There are two very basic foundations to the institution of lawyers: the first is attorney-client privilege and the second is the litigant’s “principle of lawyer protection.”

    Several years ago, when the Lawyers Law was being enacted, there were many years of debate about attorney-client privilege. At the beginning, the majority view was that lawyers should be responsible to the law rather than to their clients and that lawyers should reveal and report illegal criminal behavior by their clients when they discover it.

    After several years of hard work, attorney-client privilege was finally written into the Lawyers Law. In other countries, lawyers, doctors, and priests are all statutorily exempted from the obligation to give evidence.

    But unfortunately the “principle of lawyer protection” has never been established. If a defendant can report on a lawyer in exchange for lighter treatment, what lawyer would dare tell the truth?

    Sidelight

    “Current Well-Known Non-Lawyer” Li Zhuang: “Spring is Here for the Judicial System”

    The afternoon discussion on December 1 was the first open-door academic conference that Li Zhuang attended since his release from prison. The discussion chair’s introduction of him was clever: former non-well-known lawyer, current well-known non-lawyer.

    As guest discussant, he stood and spoke last for about 15 minutes. Li Zhuang said that he read the Criminal Procedure Law many times while in prison and [observed] many loopholes therein.

    He believes that the bottleneck in judicial reform lies in the lack of independence for judicial officers. If people are not independent, independence will be difficult to achieve even with more funding. And then there are the huge differences in sentencing, in which two cases with nearly the same circumstances result in very different judgments. This reveals the arbitrariness in the administration of justice.

    Li Zhuang says that China has discussed judicial reform for more than 20 years, but he has only heard the footsteps on the staircase without seeing anyone come down the stairs. This time, however, spring has truly arrived for the administration of justice in China!

  • Court Discipline Rules Hype Up Judge-Lawyer Conflict?

    Before recently passed revisions to China’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) take effect on January 1, 2013, four of the main bodies affected by the law—the Ministry of Public Security, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Supreme People’s Court, and Ministry of Justice*—are expected to issue implementation regulations or interpretations governing how each will internally carry out the revised provisions. Unlike the formal legislative process, these interpretations and regulations—which could have significant consequences for the way the CPL is enforced—are not expected to go through any kind of formal public consultation.
    But if the Supreme People’s Court expected that discussions surrounding its 560-article draft judicial interpretation would remain out of the public eye, it was surely disappointed when details of some of the proposed provisions leaked last month. Two items concerned with maintaining courtroom order during criminal trials have elicited howls of protest from Chinese lawyers in particular. The first provision would bar them from using email, blogs, or social media to report on trial proceedings from the courtroom, whereas the second would give judges the ability to sanction lawyers who breach court rules by prohibiting them from appearing in court for up to one year.
    Critics see these provisions—particularly the latter—as further evidence of efforts by Chinese authorities to rein in defense lawyers and prevent those who engage in activism from interfering with the “efficiency” of the judicial process. Tensions between lawyers and judges have been on the rise in recent years, with the two sides going head to head in trials both big and small. Lawyers who refuse to cooperate can find themselves expelled from trial, deprived of their licenses to practice, or even subject to retaliatory prosecution.
    A recent article (translated below) appearing in the Guangzhou newspaper Southern Weekly reviews the confrontational atmosphere inside the courtroom and concludes that the situation may not be as dire as some have suggested. Frustration on the part of both lawyers and judges is largely to blame for emotions running high, and, if cooler heads prevail, extreme (and impractical) measures to sanction “troublemaking” lawyers should not be necessary.
    * Note: The Ministry of State Security is another key body that will be affected by the law, but it is not expected to release relevant regulations to the public.
    *
    Judges vs. Lawyers: An Imaginary Showdown
    Liu Chang
    Southern Weekly, September 4, 2012
    A knowledgeable source has confirmed to Southern Weekly that Zhang Jun did in fact mention a few lawyers disrupting court order but never used the phrase “stirring up trouble in the courtroom.”
    “There are definitely two sides to the problem: lawyers have shortcomings, and judges also have shortcomings; that’s how I’d put it.”
    “During these difficult times, every legal professional needs to do more soul-searching.”
    Every time lawyer Si Weijiang appears in court, he always brings with him a white digital clock from Ikea. One afternoon in June 2012, at the Xiaohe District People’s Court in Guiyang, a court police officer suddenly took it and dismantled it for inspection. Fortunately, this was only an ordinary digital clock; it didn’t have a recording function.
    If new provisions being considered by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) take effect, this digital clock may not even make it through the main entrance of the court.
    The (Consultation Draft) of the SPC Interpretation on Certain Issues Regarding Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC (hereafter “Draft Interpretation”) is being circulated for opinions within the national court system.
    Two provisions are brand new: First, trial participants are prohibited from using email, blogs, microblogs, or other means to report on trial activity while inside the courtroom. Second, where defense lawyers and legal counsel have been expelled from the court or otherwise punished for serious violations of courtroom order, the court may bar them for between six months and one year from appearing in court as defense lawyers or legal counsel and can even recommend to the justice bureau that they be punished with measures such as suspension or even license-revocation.
    There is more controversy over the second provision, since the power to punish lawyers professionally belongs to judicial administration departments. Even judges interviewed believe there is no legal basis for courts to bar lawyers from carrying out their profession and that the provision is unfeasible and merely “words spoken in anger.”
    These two new provisions have led many to reflect on some recent conflicts that have occurred between lawyers and judges. However, most judges, lawyers, and scholars interviewed believe that the antagonism between the two sides is not nearly as serious as the Internet makes it seem. Mainly, it reflects short-term, emotional confrontations between the two sides since lawyers began banding together to take a stand. [Those interviewed] call on the members of both groups of legal professionals to be more self-reflective and be more sympathetic and understanding to the other side as they drive forward together along the road towards rule of law.
    Speaking to Southern Weekly, two authoritative scholars of criminal procedure expressed criticisms of the Draft Interpretation, each saying that they felt that the wording regarding courtroom discipline was inappropriate.
    According to the SPC’s plans, opinions are presently being sought from within the court system through the middle of September. Then, “after further revision and request for comment from relevant departments,” [the SPC] will formally issue [the interpretation] at the end of the year.
    An Overreaction?
    Some lawyers have linked these two provisions on courtroom discipline to a speech given by Zhang Jun, the vice-president at the SPC responsible for criminal adjudication work.
    According to a report in the Economic Observer, at the end of April 2012 Zhang Jun went to Beijing to give a lecture at one of the rotating training sessions for vice-presidents of high- and intermediate-level courts nationwide, during which he criticized a handful of “no-good” lawyers who disrupted courtroom order and some lawyers whose words served to diminish public trust in the court’s judicial process.
    Not long afterwards, in early May, Zhang Jun convened a meeting of chiefs from the SPC criminal divisions, adjudication supervision division, research office, and other departments along with a group of experts and academics to discuss the first draft of the judicial interpretation of the CPL. After this meeting, the SPC Research Office put together a second draft.
    On July 5, the second draft of the judicial interpretation of the CPL was sent to Xining, Qinghai, where the National Court Criminal Adjudication Work Conference was being held. There, the draft was submitted for discussion by vice-presidents responsible for criminal adjudication and criminal division heads from high-level courts nationwide.
    Based on discussions at the Qinghai meeting, in mid-July Zhang Jun again held a meeting and revisions were made to the second draft. On July 30, this third draft was submitted for comment to courts throughout the country.
    It is unknown how the new provisions on courtroom discipline that are now under scrutiny came to be included in the judicial interpretation currently under revision. The amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law that were passed on March 14, 2012, are the first major revision since the one in 1996 and brought changes to more than 50 percent of the law’s provisions. But not a word was changed in the section on courtroom discipline. Why weren’t these issues raised during the legislative process? It’s worth pondering the attitude of the SPC.
    “The SPC’s decision may have been an intense reaction to the Xiaohe case,” was the analysis a vice-president of a basic-level court in Shandong offered Southern Weekly. The Draft Interpretation shows that on some level the SPC is backing up lower-level courts, but it may have “overreacted.”
    A vice-president of a basic-level court in Hubei thinks that the most recent Draft Interpretation “is connected to the peculiar environment of the last year or so.” The “rebellious” nature of some lawyers is also due to this environment. “During this time,” [he says,] “even if what you say is correct you might be opposed, because the time is not right.”
    According to the report in the Economic Observer, in Zhang Jun’s controversial speech he mentioned three cases since 2011 in Beihai, Changshu, and Guiyang. [In each case,] lawyers worked collectively to provide defense in major criminal trials.
    At the Li Qinghong organized crime trial in the Xiaohe District People’s Court in Guiyang, during the first set of hearings from January 9 to 14, 2012, a new record was set for conflict between judges and lawyers: more than 10 lawyers were reprimanded, four lawyers were thrown out of the courtroom, and a National People’s Congress delegate fainted in the courtroom … [Note: Ellipsis appears in original—Ed.] The trial, which had been set to conclude before the lunar new year holiday, had to be suspended.
    In Beijing, the SPC, Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP), and Ministry of Justice (MOJ) met to view an edited video from the Xiaohe District People’s Court. Lawyer Tian Wenchang, chair of the All-China Lawyer’s Association (ACLA) Criminal Defense Committee, says, “After the conflict, the court cut five days of hearings into a 16-minute video that showed lawyers with rather intense attitudes. Watching this led officials concerned to believe that there was a problem with lawyers stirring up trouble in the courtroom.”
    After ACLA’s Criminal Defense Committee reviewed the [unedited] video footage, it produced a 30-minute version in which Tian Wenchang personally added narration and commentary and sent it to the SPC. The video revealed many problems in the courtroom, such as “not letting lawyers speak, saying either that it was irrelevant to the case or that it was repetitive; failing to acknowledge you when you raised your hand; refusing requests to speak; and kicking you out when you insisted on speaking anyway.” As China’s most prestigious criminal defense lawyer, Tian has experienced all of these situations.
    Perhaps because video doesn’t do justice to reality, from June 8 to July 19, 2012, the Xiaohe court held another hearing lasting more than 40 days, and a “Central Supervisory Group” made up of individuals from the SPC, SPP, MOJ, and ACLA not only showed up but also insisted on observing the entire proceeding.
    The SPC sent the head of one of its criminal divisions. According to a report in Caijing magazine, an SPC representative confirmed that their main goal was to “investigate the new Criminal Procedure Law.”
    “There are definitely two sides to the problem with the Xiaohe court,” says Tian Wenchang. “There are indeed lawyers who are rather intense, but there are inevitably reasons for this. Surely, lawyers don’t go around stirring up trouble in courtrooms without reason?” He says that sometimes lawyers lose their cool, but it’s also true that some judges do not allow lawyers to speak or treat them roughly and that this makes lawyers furious: “Lawyers have shortcomings and judges also have shortcomings; that’s how I’d put it.”
    Lawyer Zhang Qingsong is a representative sent by the ACLA to observe in Xiaohe. To his understanding, this draft judicial interpretation makes the SPC’s position clear: a show of support for the Xiaohe judge.
    People inside the court system do not find anything unusual about many of the provisions in the Draft Interpretation regarding courtroom discipline, including having to get permission from the court to record, videotape, or film. “Courts in many countries do this,” [they say.] But most judges believe that it goes beyond the authority of judicial interpretation to have courts be able to punish lawyers by barring them from appearing in court.
    “Could a prohibition imposed by a Shandong court be applicable to courts in Yunnan?” asked a vice-president of a basic-level court in Shandong. Even if the provision is passed, there are still technical issues that haven’t been resolved.
    Weaklings Bullying Each Other?
    From the beginning of the Beihai case, lawyers used new media to broadcast details of the case. As for so-called “live microblogging,” in fact many lawyers post to microblogs after trial hearings conclude, but this has caused great headaches for the courts.
    According to the report in the Economic Observer, in that internal speech Zhang Jun complained bitterly about some “lawyers talking nonsense.”
    A knowledgeable source has confirmed to Southern Weekly that in that internal speech Zhang Jun did mention a few lawyers disrupting court order but never used the phrase “stirring up trouble in the courtroom.”
    Other views raised by the top judge in his speech actually closely resonate with the expectations of lawyers, but this has gotten lost in the heat of the rhetoric.
    According to the Economic Observer report, Zhang Jun was emphasizing how judges should have a trial-centered consciousness when he mentioned the problem of lawyers’ so-called “stirring up trouble in the courtroom.” He said that the facts show that one reason that judges do not have a high degree of control over trials is that judges still think and operate like inquisitors and are unable to adapt to the adversarial trial system. A second reason is that presiding judges lack relative independence.
    According to the aforementioned report, what leads a few lawyers to stir up trouble is, in Zhang Jun’s view, “the lack of fair procedure and failure to do what was expected” in a few cases, “including some unfairness towards lawyers.”
    However, the proposals in the Draft Interpretation regarding trial powers have been seen as showing a lack of self-reflection on the part of the courts.
    “Judges first need to reflect upon whether they are being good judges, only then [should they focus on] the work of enforcing the law,” says lawyer Zhang Peihong. For example, although a lot of courtroom disciplinary measures appear to be “international norms” and their limitations applicable to “all trial participants,” if lawyers are always the ones being punished, in reality, they’re still essentially unjust.”
    “The biggest problem in China’s courtrooms right now is that judges really want to be like judges in countries with mature rule of law—enjoying absolute authority and respect in the courtroom,” says lawyer Zhang Peihong. “What they don’t understand is that such authority and respect doesn’t come from the rules that [judges] themselves enact; they are earned through generation after generation of judges being more knowledgeable, more reasonable, and more humble than the other participants in the litigation process.”
    Zhang Peihong has noticed an interesting phenomenon in recent years: In Chinese criminal trials, the conflicting sides in the courtroom seem to have increasingly shifted from prosecution versus defense to judges versus lawyers. Judges want to control order in the courtroom, whereas lawyers feel this leaves no way to ensure equal treatment. Lawyers feel that “live microblogging” promotes oversight of the judicial process in individual cases, but judges worry about too much interference from public opinion. Judges criticize an extremely small number of lawyers for “stirring up trouble in the courtroom” and creating hype, while lawyers take to the media and Internet to complain about judges’ unfairness in trying cases.
    Judges and lawyers are oriented similarly in their struggles: it has always been difficult to achieve breakthrough in lawyers’ right to carry out defense—it must be accomplished through convincing the court—and there’s a common consensus that the status of the courts needs to be elevated.
    In the view of Sichuan Judge Gao Hui [pseudonym], looking at current problems by considering the relationship between judges and lawyers only scratches the surface. At root is the problem of public trust in the judicial process. If courts and judges could have a high level of universal support from the public, then “relations between judges and lawyers would not be an issue.”
    “In a country with rule of law, it’s not considered excessive to emphasize discipline in the courtroom and the authority of judges in the courtroom,” said Judge Gao Hui. “In a country that has already established modern rule of law, authority must be given to judges. But we currently lack this kind of authority.”
    Lawyer Tian Wenchang has also seen signs of worsening relations between lawyers and judges. In a society under rule of law, judges and lawyers are inextricably linked. The current situation makes him worry.
    “Every legal professional needs to do more soul-searching,” sighed Liu Guofeng, vice-president of the Lichuan City People’s Court in Hubei, after seeing the war of words between lawyers and judges on Weibo [a micro-blog service similar to Twitter].
  • He Weifang: Legal Reform, Resolve, and Lawyers (Part III of III)

    Professor He Weifang. Photo credit:
    China Business View
    There is perhaps no better example of a public intellectual in China than He Weifang (贺卫方), professor of law at Peking University Law School and avid promoter of legal reform and judicial independence. In part two of a three-part translation of an interview He gave Xi’an newspaper China Business View, he discusses the role of lawyers in legal reform and the benefits judicial professionalization brings to the public. Click here to read part one of the translation on reform and professionalization and part two on the reformer’s need for resolve.
    *
    Reform Itself Changes National Circumstances [Excerpt]
    China Business View, May 19, 2012
    Interview with He Weifang

    Lawyers Can Bring Public Discontent into the Realm of Rationality

    CBV: Discuss the importance of civil society to reform.
    He: Chinese society has never resolved the problem of the structure in the middle of society: besides the state, there are only individuals who are like a sheet of loose sand. For 2,000 years it’s been like this. So, we need to fight against these 2,000 years of history. We know that the bar in the UK is an extremely independent organization that experiences no interference from the state. On the contrary, they nibble away at state power. In the 17th and 18th centuries, British lawyers monopolized entry for judges and judges had to be reputable members of the legal profession. This meant that the strength of society had entered into state power and a portion of the power of the state had been transformed by the logic of society. In my view, this is what civil society is. When society is filled with a variety of forces, the state cannot do whatever it wants.
    CBV: Lawyers play a very important role in the democratic process, as they can minimize the intensity of conflicts and promote moderate progress. But in practice, lawyers are less effective than hoped for and they are heavily restricted.
    He: Lawyers as a profession have decided that they must struggle against public power. In today’s China, when we glance behind us we can see lawyers “banding together for support” and continually demonstrating their strength. Lawyers are determined to struggle against public power and think of ways to use norms to shape state power. But in another sense, they are also using norms to shape public sentiments and bring public discontent with the government into the realm of rationality so that it can be resolved reasonably. So, when ordinary people hire a lawyer to represent them in a lawsuit, the clearest symbolic significance is that they still respect the state. Can you still attack lawyers at that point? A history lesson from France teaches us that if you always attack lawyers, it forces lawyers to become the leaders of a great revolutionary era. Silver-tongued lawyers are good at argument at court and they can also be terrific at inciting people. Weren’t Danton and Robespierre both lawyers? So, I am always calling on officials both directly and indirectly to change their prejudices and stereotypes about lawyers.
    CBV: Often during some high-profile individual cases the arguments that develop in public opinion and the media cannot be bridged, such as in the case of Li Changkui. What is the significance of a society’s culture to the law?
    He: Some decisions are clearly unreasonable or, perhaps, flawed. Take the case of Li Changkui: sentenced to death by the court of first instance, the death sentence suspended on appeal. I felt the reasoning used by the appeal court to change the verdict was not convincing, but I said we should respect the court’s final judgment because we must support the determinacy and stability of judicial decisions. We cannot allow judicial decisions to be like baking a pie, because if decisions are not determinate, it means power is not determinate and we’ll forever live in a state of uncertainty. The security of a rule-of-law society relies to a great degree on the stability of judicial decisions. This is what we commonly refer to as the ultimate nature of judicial decisions.
    Cicero said that extreme justice is extreme injustice. Humans cannot achieve absolutely perfect justice. [So] we [shouldn’t] concentrate the limited financial and human resources of the legal system on those errors that should not be corrected—that’s the primary lesson of the Li Changkui case. This kind of sense is what Chinese legal culture lacks most. I’ve been trying everything I can to use weibo [a Twitter-like service] and the Internet to express this kind of idea. I will continue to say that if ordinary people don’t understand a judge’s decision, it doesn’t mean it does not benefit them. On the contrary, the more one pursues professionalism, the more benefits it brings to ordinary people. Admittedly, ordinary people don’t really understand what [judges] are doing, but despite not understanding, these things are still valuable and must be subject to checks and balances from within the profession. Of course, what sort of force can constrain the actions of jurists? This requires a slow growth process for the legal profession, as well as rationalization of the legal profession’s internal mechanisms. I’ve discovered an interesting paradox: The more emphasis is placed on maximizing the value of one’s own industry, sometimes it actually brings the most benefits to ordinary people.

    Related links:

  • Translation: Appointment with an SPC Death Penalty Judge

    What role do criminal defense lawyers play in the final review over death penalties in China? This is a question many, including lawyers themselves, have been asking ever since authority over death-penalty review was restored to the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) on January 1, 2007. There is much that remains hazy about how the process works, in fact, even though measures have been adopted in an attempt to give it some structure.

    Liu Xiaoyuan (above left) and Li Fangping (above right)
    are representing convicted murderer
    He Shengkai (bottom) during his
    death-penalty review proceeding.

    In an April 27 blog post, Beijing-based criminal defense lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan offers a glimpse at his experience representing death-row prisoners. As in previous accounts of his experiences with China’s criminal justice system, Liu describes that system’s bureaucracy in considerable detail, in this case recounting his visit to the SPC’s office for handling complaints by petitioners—known as the “Visitor Reception Center”—in order to make an appointment to meet with the judge handling the review in the case of He Shengkai, a 29-year-old Guizhou man convicted of killing a court police officer in a knife attack at the Zunyi Intermediate People’s Court.

    Liu and another defense lawyer, Li Fangping, sought the meeting with the court—as allowed under SPC regulations—in order to convey their opinion that evidence of He’s possible mental illness had never been properly investigated and that the results of such an investigation might limit criminal liability in the case. Liu describes the atmosphere as cordial, but cool and distant. Throughout the day’s events, Liu senses that he is being treated as a nuisance, rather than an integral part of a formal legal process, a sense that is constantly reinforced by being forced to submit to procedures intended to manage those other “visitors” to the court—ordinary petitioners, whose precarious rights are symbolized by the dozens of provincial police vehicles that wait for them outside the reception center every day.

    Liu Xiaoyuan and Li Fangping have been in the news lately, part of the continuing offensive being waged against activist defense lawyers in China over recent months. In mid-April, Liu was detained for five days under circumstances that remain unclear. Last Friday, Li similarly disappeared after phoning his wife to say he was in the custody of security agents. And, as it happens, Wen Tao, a journalist who wrote an early account of the travails of petitioners to the SPC, has been missing for a month, as of this writing, apparently in police custody in connection with the ongoing disappearance/criminal investigation of artist Ai Weiwei.

    *
    Appointment with a SPC Death Penalty Judge
    April 27, 2011

    At 7:30 a.m. on April 26, I went to the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) “Visitor Reception Center” in  Hongsicun, Chaoyang District (where one goes to petition the court to accept a case) in order to make an appointment with the SPC judge responsible for reviewing He Shengkai’s death sentence.

    According to SPC regulations, defendants in death penalty cases and their relatives have a right to engage a defense lawyer when the case reaches the death penalty review stage. Once the lawyer receives the authorization [letter], he or she may submit a defense opinion or legal opinion to the SPC and also may schedule a meeting with the judge [responsible for] the case in order to convey his or her views and opinions on the case in person. However, in order for the lawyer to schedule a meeting with the judge, he or she must follow the “petitioner” route and queue up and register at the “Visitor Reception Center” like [any other] petitioner. The “Visitor Reception Center” will then make the arrangements. It’s really strange to treat a meeting between a lawyer and a judge as you treat a petitioning relative!

    At 8 a.m., I entered the main entrance of the “Visitor Reception Center,” its steel entry gate guarded by a dozen or so court police officers who inspected the documents and identification of everyone who entered. If you don’t have a copy of the provincial high court decision, they won’t let you enter.

    I walked through the courtyard and entered the office building, which has separate doors for entry and exit. I went in through the exit and [thus] didn’t have to go through the security screening, though a police officer checked my license to practice as a lawyer. There were many petitioners filling out registration forms in the hall, as well as a number of people queued up to obtain registration forms. There were 12 service windows in the hall, but two of them were not open. I asked the police officer whether there was a window for lawyers handling case-related matters, and he explained that lawyers had to queue up like the petitioners because there was no special window for lawyers. I queued up at Window #12, and when it came time for me to get a registration form I explained that I was there not to petition but to handle a case. The person behind the counter didn’t appear to understand me and asked me how many times I had been there before. I said I had never been there before and had only mailed my authorization documents and defense opinions to the judge handling the case. I was given a “First-Time Visitor Registration Form” to fill out. I was there to meet a judge as He Shengkai’s defense lawyer, but still the SPC was treating me like a petitioner.

    I completed the registration form, and the police officer had me hand it in at Window #1. The person behind the counter looked over the first-instance trial verdict, the second-instance decision, and my license to practice as a lawyer. As he was entering the information from my registration form into his computer, he said that He Shengkai’s sister had previously come to petition, so my meeting to discuss the case with the judge was a “repeat visit,” not a “first-time visit.” “Repeat visitors” were only [allowed to] register once every two months.

    After the decision was announced in the second-instance proceeding against He Shengkai, his sister He Shengxian had come to the SPC to petition, but I wasn’t sure about the specific date. I explained to the person behind the counter that this was the first time I had personally come to meet with the judge and that, though He Shengkai’s sister had come earlier to raise issues [regarding the case], the family’s issues were not the same as the lawyer’s. The person behind the counter said it was all the same and had me go back to Window #12. While waiting in the queue, I said to the police officer, “If you can only register once every two months, it’s quite possible that when you come again after the two months are up that the execution will have taken place!”

    I returned the “First-Time Visitor Registration Form” to Window #12, which the person behind the counter took from me and shredded. But he wouldn’t give me a “Repeat Visitor Registration Form.” I left the counter and tried to call the SPC’s 4th Criminal Division [in charge of death penalty review], but the line was constantly busy. The police officer I’d spoken to earlier came over and pointed to a female officer who was on the telephone and told me to explain the situation to her.

    After the female officer finished with her call, I explained things to her. She said that rules were rules but indicated that she’d help me sort things out. She led me to Window #1, where the person behind the counter continued to insist that I was a “repeat visitor.” He said that He Shengkai’s sister, He Shengxian, had come to petition on February 21 and that since two months had already passed I could register as a “repeat visitor” this time. The female officer asked him to give me a “Repeat Visitor Registration Form,” but he said he didn’t have any. With the female officer’s help, I was able to get a registration form from one of the other windows. After again completing the form, I submitted it at Window #1, and the person behind the counter told me to wait outside. At 9:30 a.m., I inquired at Window #1 and the person behind the counter said that they had contacted the 4th Criminal Division and that I should go to that office for a meeting later that afternoon.

    I left the SPC “Visitor Reception Center” and was met by Lawyer Li Fangping. We rode a bus and took the roundabout way to the Number 9 Building at Beihuashi, in Dongcheng District, which is where the offices of the SPC Criminal Courts are located.

    That morning when I went to the SPC “Visitor Reception Center,” I noticed many police vehicles parked on the side of the road. When I left, those police vehicles were still parked there. I did a rough tally and counted more than 20 vehicles, all with provincial license plates. In recent years, when the SPC “Visitor Reception Center” was located near the Beijing South Railway Station, you could see this same scene every day.

    At 1 p.m., we arrived to wait outside the offices of the SPC Criminal Court. At 2 p.m., I asked the police officer posted outside the office building courtyard how we could enter, and he said we first needed to contact the person handling the case. I dialed the number, but no one answered at the 4th Criminal Division. At 2:15, I finally reached an employee, who told me that the “Reception Center” had told them the meeting was scheduled for 2:30 p.m. and told me to wait a while longer. When the time came, the judge and a court clerk came out to meet us. Because there was an armed police guard on duty at the gate, we had to register. The guard asked the judge what we were there for, and the judge replied that we were there to petition. I forced a smile and explained that we were lawyers who had come to discuss a case, not petitioners with a petition. The judge said that they had read all of the documents I had sent and that there was actually no need to meet in person. I said that even though our documents were complete, there was still a need to discuss the case in person. [I reminded him that] SPC regulations say that the defendant may hire a lawyer during the death-penalty review process and that the lawyer may schedule a meeting with the judge [responsible for] the case in order to convey his or her views and opinions on the case. The judge acknowledged that this was true.

    The judge brought us to the first floor of the office building, and we went through a basic security check upon entry. In a meeting room, the judge and court clerk listened as we discussed our opinions on the He Shengkai case. Even though the court clerk was there, she did not make any notes. Perhaps they thought we had [fully] expressed our opinions in detail in the written documents? The judge said that they had visited He Shengkai in the Zunyi Number Two Detention Center.

    The main issue we conveyed to the judge was that He Shengkai might suffer from mental illness and that a judicial evaluation of mental illness should be carried out in order to make an accurate determination of his criminal responsibility. We did not launch into a detailed discussion, because we had written about this in great detail in our defense opinion. The judge listened to us speak for half an hour, during which he never once rejected our opinions. In the end, I noted that [the murder in] this case had taken place inside the court system and urged the SPC to be objective and rational in its review of the death penalty and review the case according to the facts and the law without any external interference.

    I’ve handled four death penalty review cases, and this is the second time I’ve met with the judge in the criminal court [building]. The other times, we met in the “Visitor Reception Center.” The first meeting in the criminal court concerned the case of Yang Jia. That time, I was received by the presiding judge and two judicial officers handling the death penalty review in Yang’s case. However, they refused to allow me to act as [Yang’s] lawyer because Yang objected to his father’s choice of [me as] lawyer. What’s interesting is that even though they rejected me as lawyer, the three judges still listened to my opinions and allowed me to submit a legal opinion as an ordinary citizen.

    Ever since the SPC reclaimed the authority over death penalty review, lawyers have been allowed to participate in the death penalty review process and provide defendants with legal service. Given that lawyers are able to play a role in defense during the death-penalty review process, I believe that their meetings with judges shouldn’t be treated like “petitions” from relatives. Even though relatives who petition to express opinions about a case and lawyers meeting with judges to discuss a case are both concerned with the same case, the opinions being discussed differ because the two roles are different. I therefore hope that the SPC can issue clearer regulations regarding the participation of lawyers in the death-penalty review process and establish a dedicated service window for lawyers participating in judicial petitions or the death-penalty review process so that lawyers will no longer have to be treated as petitioners.