Tag: arbitrary detention

  • Wrongful Conviction for Counterrevolutionary Incitement Resurfaces

    After the Cultural Revolution, workers at Shanghai No. 1 Textile Factory gathered to denounce the crimes of the “Gang of Four.” Image credit: zgdsw.org.cn

    When China emerged from the Cultural Revolution and set off on its path of “reform and opening,” the country’s judicial system was enlisted to address many of the politically motivated judgments that had been handed down during the Mao era. Courts throughout the country overturned verdicts against former “counterrevolutionaries,” clearing away their status as “enemies of the people.”

    This effort took place as China worked to rebuild its shattered legal institutions and put a new legal framework in place that would help to reduce some of the arbitrariness and injustice that had characterized the preceding era. Notably, a new Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law took effect on January 1, 1980. Counterrevolutionary crime continued to be punished, but punishment would henceforth be handed down in accordance with laws and would follow prescribed legal procedures.

    Of course, not everyone could benefit from the political rehabilitation of past political crimes. Those associated with the “Gang of Four,” pinned with blame for the violence and destruction of the Cultural Revolution and deemed to oppose the Communist Party of China and its leaders, were among the first “counterrevolutionaries” sentenced in accordance with the new laws. It didn’t matter much that most of them had been sitting in jail for years without access to any legal counsel or even anticipation of any formal legal proceeding. And though the courts that handed down judgments were now technically bound to do so “in accordance with the law,” the law was still primarily an instrument of the state’s political power that offered defendants little as far as protection of their rights was concerned.

    Lingering Stigma: Counterrevolutionary Incitement

    Concern for wrongful convictions and miscarriages of justice might lead one to take another look at some of these cases from the early 1980s. One example of residual injustice from this period recently came to light via Liu Xiaoyuan, a Beijing-based criminal defense lawyer who has been actively involved in rights-protection cases. Liu recently blogged about being contacted by an 80-year-old man from Henan who has spent most of the past four decades trying to get his elder brother’s 1980 conviction for “counterrevolutionary incitement” overturned.

    Ren Ruixiang (任瑞祥) was 17 years old when the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949. Though he came from a “rich peasant” background, his middle-school education made him a valuable asset for building a “New China.” He served as a local government cadre in the city of Luoyang and joined the Communist Youth League.

    But Ren’s “bad class background” would eventually catch up with him. In 1959, in the fevered final months of the Anti-Rightist Movement, he was accused of having concealed his membership in a Nationalist Party youth organization and stripped of his position. Most likely he was also sent for re-education. He would eventually be transferred to Mianchi County, where he spent the tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution labelled as a “bad element.”

    At the end of the Cultural Revolution, local authorities accused Ren of having been a follower of the “Gang of Four” and sent him for compulsory “re-education” in what was euphemistically known as a “study session” (xuexi ban). During his time there, in December 1977, Ren allegedly jotted down a short piece of counterrevolutionary verse in a notebook and then shouted it aloud. The verse read:

    “China’s troubles aren’t through—
    Bandit Hua* has risen again!
    My fellow Chinese brothers—
    You must eliminate Bandit Hua!”

    Ren was arrested and sent to the county detention center in January 1978, where he was alleged to have continued shouting counterrevolutionary slogans calling for the ouster of central party leaders, including Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, and Deng Xiaoping. China’s procuratorate system had not yet been restored after the Cultural Revolution, so the county public security authorities sent the case to the local court for prosecution the following month. But no trial was held and Ren spent the next two years in a detention center.

    At the time, China had few trained legal professionals. Therefore, it’s surprising to learn that Ren Ruixiang was able to be represented by a defense lawyer named Bo Xiping. When Bo went to meet with his client at the detention center, he found his behavior odd and reported this to the court. As a result, the court arranged for Ren Ruixiang to be evaluated by the Kaifeng Psychiatric Hospital. The hospital’s assessment report stated that Ren Ruixiang’s mental state was fine and that he had been feigning illness to avoid criminal responsibility.

    Imprisonment & Release

    China’s new Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law took effect just days after the completion of Ren’s psychiatric evaluation. The Mianchi County People’s Court proceeded to find Ren Ruixiang guilty of “counterrevolutionary incitement” and sentenced him to seven years in prison. According to Ren’s brother, however, the court held no trial hearing and did not notify the defense lawyer of Ren’s conviction. By the time anyone knew what had happened, the deadline for appeal had already passed.

    Ren was sent to a “reform through labor” camp at a glue factory in the city of Jiaozuo. Doubts about his mental state persisted, and family members again called upon Bo Xiping to file a petition for post-conviction relief. Bo also met with Ren Ruixiang and was shocked to hear the detainee insist that he “spoke with Chairman Mao every night.”

    Bo reviewed Ren’s medical file at the Kaifeng Psychiatric Hospital and found in the entrusted letter that the court had sent the hospital several statements detailing Ren’s past and his alleged “counterrevolutionary speech”. Bo considered the court’s behavior to be prejudicial and noted that the hospital had not employed modern diagnostic tests, such as an EEG, in assessing whether Ren was mentally ill and instead conducted only blood and urine tests.

    By this time Bo had become a senior legal figure in the province, and doubts about the case had begun to reach other senior provincial and central officials. In 1983, the Jiaozuo People’s Procuratorate arranged for Ren Ruixiang to undergo another psychiatric evaluation at the provincial psychiatric hospital in Xinxiang. This time, doctors performed an EEG and found abnormalities in his frontal cortex. They also reported that Ren Ruixiang frequently suffered from auditory hallucinations in which voices told him to say or do certain things. They diagnosed Ren as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, and he was soon released on medical parole.

    Erasing Stigma

    Of course, Ren Ruixiang’s release is not the end of the story. His brother told Liu Xiaoyuan that the family’s limited resources meant that Ren was never able to receive the medical treatment needed for his illness. He has spent most of the past four decades unsuccessfully trying to clear his brother’s name. Now at the age of 85, Ren’s mental illness is unaddressed and the stigma of his conviction for “counterrevolution” remains.

    In the early days of “reform and opening”, courts across the nation overturned a number of counterrevolution cases handed down at a time when China’s criminal justice system did not operate under the boundaries of law. Ren’s case was decided after the Gang of Four was purged from leadership and his “reactionary” verse was cited as evidence of him being a remnant of the cadre population. The highly political nature of the case barred him from exoneration, or pingfan, that allowed many of the former “counterrevolutionaries” to escape stigma.

    There was no hope of a legal remedy until February 2012 when the Sanmenxia Intermediate People’s Court offered to pay Ren monthly subsidies so long as his family acknowledged his involvement with the Gang. Ren’s brother nevertheless rejected the offer and insists that Ren should never have been criminally responsible as he became mentally ill during his incarceration in the “study session” back in 1977. The family continued to file petitions until 2011, but the Mianchi County People’s Court formally rejected the family’s petition and upheld its original findings and the psychiatric assessment that Ren was “mentally sound” at the time of committing the crimes and had “feigned illness.”

    Setting aside the question of Ren Ruixiang’s mental illness, as Liu Xiaoyuan points out there are several substantive and procedural issues that arise because of the way that Ren’s case straddles a moment in history when Chinese criminal justice began to be implemented “in accordance with the law.” On the substantive side, it is unclear whether Ren’s statements against central government leaders amounted to “incitement to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system,” the standard under the Criminal Law at the time. And given the restrictive space (a “re-education” class) and the limited audience that heard Ren’s comments, the decision to classify his speech as a “serious offense” appears arbitrary. These objections about the arbitrary and harsh criminalization of political speech in China persist to the current day, however, as “counterrevolutionary incitement” is replaced with “inciting subversion” and “inciting splittism,” both crimes of “endangering state security.”

    Ren’s trial also seems to have violated several procedural protections that should have come into force with the new legal provisions. Under the Criminal Law, Ren’s case should have been handled by an intermediate court and not by the Mianchi County People’s Court. (In the county court’s 2011 appeal decision, it states that the Luoyang Prefecture Intermediate Court had granted it jurisdiction to try the case on its behalf, but no mention of this was made in the original court document.) The case should have been tried in open court, with Ren Ruixiang’s lawyer there to represent him. And by 1980 the prosecution should have been handled by the county procuratorate, but the record only shows that the case had been sent for prosecution by the county public security bureau.

    Double Standard

    There was nothing magical about the “legalization” of criminal justice in 1980 that would make Ren Ruixiang’s case any less deserving of re-evaluation than the cases that came before. But by the same token, a decision to re-evaluate a case like Ren’s could open the door for re-evaluation of other counterrevolution convictions that came afterwards, say in 1983 or 1989.

    Under Xi Jinping, China’s judicial system has made a point of its efforts to prevent and remedy wrongful convictions, and there have been some notable instances in which longstanding convictions have been overturned. But the victims of past political persecutions are clearly not meant to be included among the cases subject for review. Though willing, on occasion, to acknowledge the contribution of police abuse and procedural violations to miscarriages of justice in “ordinary” criminal cases involving rape and homicide, it is easier to pretend that these same things don’t happen in cases involving purported threats to the security of the regime. Perhaps it’s worth asking those who want to strengthen the credibility and legitimacy of China’s judiciary whether a system that maintains this sort of double standard and blindness to past injustice can ever be considered “fair.”


    * “Bandit Hua” likely was referring to the then Chairman Hua Guofeng.

  • Could China’s New Oversight Rules Have Avoided Arbitrary Detention of American Citizen?

    The United Nations Palais des Nations. On June 29, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recommended the release of American Sandy Phan-Gillis, who has been detained for over a year without having charges brought against her in court. Photo: www.unog.ch

    Dui Hua recently found a copy of Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) regulations that govern oversight of “designated-location residential surveillance” (DLRS), a form of incommunicado detention that the Chinese government frequently uses in sensitive cases involving endangering state security, terrorism, and corruption (known as “three type offenses”). Dui Hua has translated the regulations into English below (Chinese source text available here).

    The SPP adopted the regulations on October 13, 2015 with the apparent intention of curtailing abuse of DLRS. During public comment periods leading up to the 2013 revisions to the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) that established DLRS powers, many commentators heavily criticized DLRS for effectively legalizing the secret, incommunicado detentions that had existed for years in China due to ambiguities and blank spots in the law. In November 2011, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances had also objected to the proposed CPL revisions, arguing that they would amount to the legalization of enforced disappearances.

    Oversight Regulations Aim to Limit Arbitrary Detention Through On-Site Inspections

    Given the importance of DLRS oversight, it is tempting to speculate whether these rules, had they been in place just a few months earlier, might have helped mitigate if not avert the arbitrary detention of American citizen Phan (Sandy) Phan-Gillis—the only American currently in a Chinese detention facility on state secrets charges. On June 29, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) published an Opinion holding that Phan-Gillis’ detention is “arbitrary”, with US State Department officials urging China to consider the WGAD’s recommendation to release Phan-Gillis. Indicating the heightened US-China tensions resulting from the case, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei issued a swift reply, referring to the WGAD findings as “irresponsible” and calling for greater respect of China’s “judicial sovereignty”.

    Phan-Gillis (pictured left) was initially taken into custody by agents of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region’s state security bureau on suspicion of espionage on March 19, 2015. She was placed under DLRS until September 2015, when the six-month time limit on this coercive measure expired, and was then transferred to a detention center in Nanning and placed in solitary confinement. In March 2016, Newsweek reported on the one-year anniversary of her detention.

    Phan-Gillis has not received access to effective assistance of legal counsel and continues to be held in detention in Nanning, having never had charges brought against her in court. Had the SPP’s new oversight regulations been in place when Phan-Gillis was initially detained, procurators would have possessed clear authority under Article 19 to carry out on-site inspection of Phan-Gillis’ DLRS conditions and to conduct return inspection visits once per week.

    Other provisions of the oversight regulations raise the question whether procurators might also have been able to request her release or to otherwise curtail police powers. Article 20 of the regulations, for example, provides local procurators with authority to issue “rectification opinions” on procedural irregularities, several of which apply to the Phan-Gillis case: state security officials failed to notify Phan-Gillis’ family of her placement in a DLRS facility; probably failed to place her in a facility that meets the statutory requirements for DLRS (no one, including the American consular officials who conducted monthly visits, were allowed to visit Phan-Gillis in the detention facility where she is actually housed); and failed to allow her reasonable visits and correspondence with legal counsel and family as provided for under the relevant sections of the CPL, which grant discretion for the detaining authority to allow family and lawyer visits even in so-called “three type offenses.”

    Unfortunately, even these minimal oversight mechanisms were not in place at the time of Phan-Gillis’ DLRS confinement. The new rules came into force weeks after the end of her transfer to a detention facility. As it stands, the abuses of discretion that marked the first case of legalized disappearance after passage of CPL revisions in 2013 are eerily similar to those apparent in ongoing cases like Phan-Gillis’. It remains to be seen whether the oversight rules translated below will yield discernible changes in future police application of DLRS procedures.

    *

    Regulations on Oversight of Residential Surveillance in a Designated Location by People’s Procuratorates

    *

    Adopted at the 41st meeting of the 12th Procuratorial Committee of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on October 13, 2015

    Chapter 1: General Principles

    Article 1: In order to strengthen and standardize how people’s procuratorates carry out oversight regarding imposition and implementation of designated-location residential surveillance (DLRS), these regulations are hereby enacted in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (CPL) and in consideration of the realities of procuratorial work.

    Article 2: When DLRS is used against criminal suspects or defendants by public security organs, people’s procuratorates, or people’s courts, people’s procuratorates shall carry out oversight in accordance with law as to the legality of imposition and implementation of DLRS.

    Article 3: Oversight of decisions to impose DLRS shall be the responsibility of the investigation-oversight and prosecutorial units of people’s procuratorates; responsibility for oversight of implementation of DLRS shall reside with the criminal enforcement inspectorate units of people’s procuratorates.

    Article 4: Designated locations shall possess the conditions for ordinary daily life and rest and shall be separate from places of interrogation; they shall be equipped with surveillance equipment to facilitate monitoring and management; and they shall possess security measures to ensure the security of case handling.

    Chapter 2: Oversight of Decisions to Impose Designated-Location Residential Surveillance

    Article 5: When a public security organ decides to impose DLRS on a criminal suspect who has no fixed residence, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate at the same administrative level [as the public security organ] shall conduct oversight to determine whether that decision has been made lawfully.

    When a public security organ at a higher administrative level has approved a decision to place an individual suspected of endangering state security or terrorist activity under DLRS, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate at the same administrative level as the public security organ that issued approval shall conduct oversight as to whether that decision has been made lawfully.

    Article 6: When a people’s procuratorate decides to place a criminal suspect who has no fixed residence under DLRS, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate immediately above shall conduct oversight as to whether that decision has been made lawfully.

    When a people’s procuratorate at a higher administrative level has approved a decision to place an individual suspected of serious corruption under DLRS, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate that gave that approval shall conduct oversight as to whether that decision has been made lawfully.

    Article 7: When any of the following conditions apply, the people’s procuratorate shall initiate oversight into whether a decision to impose DLRS is lawful:

    (i) A criminal suspect or his/her legal representatives, close relatives, or defense counsel believe that the decision to impose DLRS is in violation of the law and file a complaint, report, or petition with the people’s procuratorate;

    (ii) When, in the course of its involvement in investigation, review of arrest or indictment requests, review of criminal enforcement, or filing review, the people’s procuratorate discovers that the investigating organ (unit) may have issued a decision to impose DLRS in violation of the law;

    (iii) A people’s supervisor believes that a decision to impose DLRS is in violation of the law and files an oversight opinion with the people’s procuratorate;

    (iv) Other circumstances requiring initiation of oversight.

    Article 8: When initiating oversight of a decision by a people’s procuratorate to place a criminal suspect who has no fixed residence under DLRS, the investigating unit shall furnish the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate at the administrative level immediately superior with copies of the case-filing decision, the decision to impose DLRS, and main pieces of evidence within three days.

    When initiating oversight of a decision to place an individual suspected of serious corruption under DLRS, the investigation unit of the people’s procuratorate that approved the decision shall furnish the aforementioned documents to its own investigation-oversight unit within three days.

    When the people’s procuratorate initiates oversight into a decision to impose DLRS by a public security organ, it may request that the public security organ provide the aforementioned documents.

    Article 9: Oversight into decisions to impose DLRS may be carried out in one of the following ways:

    (i) Review of the relevant case documents;

    (ii) Listening to the investigating organ (unit) present its reasons and factual basis for issuing the decision to impose DLRS;

    (iii) Listening to the opinions of the criminal suspect or his/her legal representatives, close relatives, or defense counsel;

    (iv) Other ways.

    Article 10: In reviewing the legality of a decision to impose DLRS, the people’s procuratorate shall check to see whether the decision satisfies the conditions set out in Articles 72 and 69(3) of the CPL, and further review whether the decision meets the following conditions:

    (i) The criminal suspect has no fixed residence in the city or county where the case-handling organ is located;

    (ii) The public security organ or people’s procuratorate at the administrative level immediately superior has approved the decision to impose DLRS on an individual suspected of endangering state security, terrorist activity, or serious corruption for whom implementation of residential surveillance in his/her own residence would impede the investigation.

    Article 11: The investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate should issue a decision within seven days of initiating oversight into whether a decision to impose DLRS was lawful.

    Article 12: When, having carried out its review, the people’s procuratorate finds that the public security organ’s decision to impose DLRS does not meet the conditions set out by the law, it shall report those findings to the head of the procuratorate and, upon his or her approval, issue a rectification notice to the public security organ and recommend that the public security organ revoke its decision to impose DLRS.

    When the procuratorate finds that a decision to impose DLRS issued by itself or the procuratorate at the next lower administrative level does not meet the conditions set out by the law, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate shall report to the head of the people’s procuratorate and, upon his or her decision, notify its own investigating unit or the people’s procuratorate at the next lower administrative level to revoke the decision to impose DLRS. When notifying the people’s procuratorate at the next lower administrative level to revoke the decision to impose DLRS, the procuratorate shall also circulate a notice to its own investigating unit.

    Article 13: Upon receiving a rectification opinion from the people’s procuratorate at the immediately superior administrative level, the people’s procuratorate shall immediately carry out the recommendation and report on the steps taken to the investigation-oversight unit of the immediately superior people’s procuratorate.

    If the people’s procuratorate believes that the rectification opinion from the immediately superior people’s procuratorate regarding its decision to impose DLRS is in error, it may request a new review by [that same superior] people’s procuratorate within three days of receiving the rectification opinion. The superior people’s procuratorate shall appoint a new procurator to review the case and issue a decision whether to amend its original opinion within five days.

    Article 14: Oversight of decisions by the people’s procuratorate to impose DLRS during the indictment phase shall be carried out in accordance with these provisions by the investigation-oversight unit of the same people’s procuratorate.

    Oversight of decisions by the people’s court to impose DLRS shall be carried out in accordance with these provisions by the prosecutorial unit of the people’s procuratorate at the same administrative level as the court.

    Chapter 3: Oversight of Implementation of Designated-Location Residential Surveillance

    Article 15: Oversight of implementation of DLRS is the responsibility of the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate at the same administrative level as the public security organ that implements the DLRS.

    Article 16: Oversight by people’s procuratorates as to implementation of DLRS shall include the following:

    (i) Whether legal paperwork, such as the DLRS decision or enforcement notice, is complete;

    (ii) Whether the place, term, and personnel are in accordance with regulation;

    (iii) Whether the lawful rights of the person under residential surveillance are being protected;

    (iv) Whether there is any unlawful behavior, such as interrogation in the designated location, corporal punishment, or abuse of the person under residential surveillance;

    (v) Other things that should be monitored in accordance with the law.

    Article 17: When carrying out oversight into the implementation of DLRS, the people’s procuratorate may employ the following measures:

    (i) Review of relevant legal documents; records of any meetings, correspondence, or outgoings by the person under residential surveillance; and physical examination records;

    (ii) On-site inspection of whether the designated location meets the legal conditions;

    (iii) Review of relevant surveillance video footage and, if necessary, physical examination of the person under residential surveillance;

    (iv) Interviews with the person under residential surveillance, enforcement personnel, investigators, or other relevant personnel in order to ascertain and understand relevant circumstances.

    Article 18: Within 24 hours of receiving a copy of a decision to impose DLRS from a public security organ or people’s court, the people’s procuratorate case management unit shall forward the decision to its criminal enforcement inspectorate unit.

    When the investigation unit or prosecution unit of a people’s procuratorate issues a DLRS decision in the name of the procuratorate, it shall send a copy of the DLRS decision to its criminal enforcement inspectorate unit within 24 hours and notify it of the address of the designated location.

    Article 19: Within 24 hours after receiving a copy of the DLRS decision, the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate shall appoint procurators to carry out on-site inspection and complete a record of oversight inspection. Monitoring of DLRS implementation should include return inspection visits by roving teams of no fewer than two procurators at least once per week. Inspection of the implementation of DLRS must not interfere with the ordinary work of criminal investigation.

    Article 20: When oversight of DLRS implementation by the people’s procuratorate uncovers one of the following, the people’s procuratorate shall issue a rectification opinion to the enforcement or investigating organ in accordance with the law:

    (i) Failure of the enforcement organ to appoint enforcement personnel or failure to appoint enforcement personnel in a timely manner upon receipt of the DLRS decision and implementation notice;

    (ii) Except when it is impossible to provide notice, failure to notify the family of the person under residential surveillance within 24 hours of implementing DLRS;

    (iii) Implementation of residential surveillance in a detention center, administrative jail, prison, holding cell, case-handling area, or other location not meeting the statutory conditions for a designated location;

    (iv) Arranging meetings or correspondence between defense lawyers and the person under residential surveillance in ways that violate regulations or illegally restricting the person under residential surveillance from meeting or corresponding with a defense lawyer;

    (v) Failure by a new case-handing organ to issue a new DLRS decision in a timely manner when there is a change in the phase of the criminal process;

    (vi) Failure of the enforcement organ to lift residential surveillance in a timely manner and notify the person under residential surveillance in a timely manner when the case-handling unit issues a decision to lift or change the DLRS conditions and notifies the enforcing organ of such;

    (vii) Demands for payment by the person under residential surveillance or his or her family;

    (viii) Other illegality.

    When the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate discovers that the investigation or prosecutorial unit of its own procuratorate has violated one of the above conditions, it shall seek approval from the head of the procuratorate to issue a rectification opinion.

    Article 21: When the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate finds irregularities in enforcement or security risks in the implementation of DLRS, it shall seek approval from the head of the procuratorate to issue a procuratorial recommendation to the enforcement organ or case-handling organ.

    Article 22: When a rectification notice or procuratorial opinion has been issued, a copy shall be sent to the procuratorate at the administrative level immediately superior as well as to the unit immediately superior to the enforcement unit or case-handling unit.

    Article 23: When a person under residential surveillance dies while under DLRS, the case shall be handled with reference to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate procuratorial procedures for death of a person in custody in a detention facility.

    Article 24: When a people’s court or people’s procuratorate assigns judicial police officers to assist the public security organ with implementation of DLRS, the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate shall carry out oversight of those officers’ assistance with implementation.

    Chapter 4: Additional Provisions

    Article 25: The people’s procuratorate shall process and provide responses in a timely manner to complaints, reports, or petitions regarding imposition or implementation of DLRS from criminal suspects or their legal representatives, close relatives, or defense counsel.

    Article 26: When the investigation-oversight or prosecutorial unit of the people’s procuratorate discovers the possibility of illegality in the implementation of DLRS, they shall report their findings in a timely manner to the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit. When the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit discovers the possibility of illegality in imposing a DLRS decision, it shall report its findings in a timely manner to the investigation-oversight or prosecutorial unit.

    Article 27: If, in the course of its oversight of imposition or implementation of DLRS, the people’s procuratorate discovers violations of disciplinary rules or the law by case-handling personnel or enforcement personnel, it shall seek a decision from the head of the procuratorate to send the case in a timely manner to be handled by the appropriate unit; if the wrongdoing constitutes a criminal offense, it shall pursue criminal responsibility in accordance with the law.

    Article 28: If there are violations of disciplinary rules or violations of the law by procuratorial personnel overseeing imposition or implementation of DLRS, responsibility shall be pursued in accordance with the relevant provisions; if the wrongdoing constitutes a criminal offense, responsibility shall be pursued in accordance with the law.

    Article 29: Oversight of imposition or implementation of DLRS by the people’s procuratorate shall be handled as part of the unified system of duties of the people’s procuratorate. The case-management unit of the people’s procuratorate shall conduct periodic statistical analysis and quality assessment and report results in a timely manner to the relevant units.

    Article 30: These measures take effect from the date of promulgation.

  • China Issues Oversight Rules for “Non-residential” Residential Surveillance

    The Supreme People’s Procuratorate building in Beijing.

    Not long after the draft of the amended Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) was released by China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) for public comment in August 2011, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances expressed concern that the provisions relating to the coercive measure known as “designated-location residential surveillance” (zhiding jusuo jianshi juzhu) would legalize enforced disappearances. In late 2015, the United Nations Committee against Torture (CAT) went further and called on China to abolish the measure.

    The Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) subsequently issued trial rules for determining the necessity of detention and rules to govern oversight of “designated-location residential surveillance” (DLRS), which had leapt back into the headlines in 2015 as part of a police crackdown against Chinese rights lawyers that intensified in July.

    A Coercive Measure

    Custodial detention or arrest takes place in detention centers, ordinary residential surveillance in one’s residence. DLRS happens someplace else, perhaps in a hotel or guesthouse, where law enforcement agents hold criminal suspects or defendants for up to six months while they investigate alleged crimes or prepare a case for trial.

    Authorities justify the lengthy six-month period by stating that residential surveillance is relatively lenient—not depriving people of their liberty, but merely restricting it. Nonetheless, individuals held under DLRS face an environment ripe with potential abuse and rights violations.

    When law enforcement uses the practice against people charged with endangering state security (ESS), terrorist activity, or serious corruption, the outcome is hard to distinguish from enforced disappearance or incommunicado detention. In these types of cases, investigators may use the law to deny families the knowledge of where their loved ones are being held and to deny detainees’ access to a lawyer. Within 24 hours of carrying out DLRS, investigators are only required to provide families with notice of detention and of the alleged offense.

    What a Difference Two Years Makes

    Faced with public opposition to the practice, legislators granted oversight powers to the procuratorate, but it has taken nearly two years for the SPP to define its role. In the meantime, as predicted, DLRS has become a routine part of handling politically sensitive cases. Though its high costs of facilities and manpower are somewhat prohibitive, DLRS is unparalleled in its long duration, ability to isolate detainees, option to delay intervention by legal counsel, and general capacity to exert psychological (and, in some cases, physical) pressure on suspects.

    Unfortunately, the new rules will do little to diminish these serious violations of due process. Procurators are concerned with whether DLRS is carried out lawfully, yet the most concerning aspects of the practice are themselves spelled out in the law.

    Focus on Decisions, Implementation

    The SPP has yet to publish their oversight regulations, but highly controlled media reporting sheds some light on their content. One thing is clear: the intention of the rules is bureaucratic oversight, not judicial oversight. Procurators will likely focus on examining paperwork, making the occasional inspection, and issuing instructions in case anything is out of the ordinary. People held under DLRS may initiate the oversight process by filing complaints independently or through their advocates. What appear to be missing are mechanisms for hearings to allow for the presentation of evidence or for appeals to challenge procuratorial decisions.

    Monitoring by the procuratorate will focus on two areas: (1) whether the decision to impose DLRS was lawful and (2) whether DLRS has been lawfully implemented. The former chiefly concerns whether the case involves a person who either (a) lacks a fixed residence in the county or city where the criminal investigation is taking place, or (b) is suspected of ESS, terrorism-related offenses, or serious corruption. In case of (b), the law requires investigators to substantiate a claim that ordinary residential surveillance would impede their investigation and obtain approval for DLRS from their immediately superior law-enforcement unit.

    The second area of focus involves ensuring that all paperwork is in order; necessary notices have been delivered; and the appropriate location, duration, and personnel are employed. Procurators would also ensure that detainees’ lawful rights are being protected, interrogations are held in separate locations, and no “physical punishment or abuse” is inflicted.

    Adding Inspections

    Oversight activities require procurators to make an on-scene inspection within 24 hours of receiving a copy of a decision to carry out DLRS. This inspection presumably enables inspectors to interview detainees and establish whether they have any allegations to make. It should also allow them to ascertain whether the designated location meets the lawful conditions for “ordinary living and rest” and to ensure that surveillance cameras and safety equipment are installed.

    The rules also appear to require procurators to visit the location at least once a week for the duration of DLRS. Periodic inspections should offer minimal guarantees against physical torture or ill treatment. They are inadequate, however, in preventing mental suffering and the use of other cruel and degrading treatment.

    Also troubling is the requirement that inspections be carried out in ways that do not interfere with investigations. This prioritizes the needs of investigators over the rights of detainees and may give investigators broad discretion to delay access to facilities.

    Missing the Mark

    This type of oversight, with its emphasis on ensuring adherence to applicable laws and regulations, will no doubt help to limit certain kinds of arbitrary and abusive behaviors. Other arbitrary practices and violations of due process will remain unaffected because they are legally sanctioned. For example, procurators are very unlikely to challenge investigators’ decisions to deny access to legal counsel to individuals charged with ESS or terrorism. The CPL empowers investigators to deny such access if they believe it might interfere with their investigation.

    In their attention to the legality of decision and implementation, procurators may also fail to scrutinize the legitimacy of charges made against detainees. Investigators can use flimsy evidence to initiate ESS investigations—thereby justifying the use of DLRS and exclusion of legal counsel—only to modify the charges when requesting approval of formal arrest after expiry of the six-month time limit.

    Ultimately, however well intentioned it might be, this kind of bureaucratic review cannot address the risks of DLRS. The measure grants law-enforcement investigators too much power over individuals, and the procuratorate lacks both power and incentive to challenge DLRS decisions, especially in the kinds of politically sensitive cases where abuse is most likely.

    The best solution would be for China to abolish DLRS, or at the very least, to restore detainees’ rights to full access to legal counsel and to communicate with the outside world. Anything less, and China is sanctioning enforced disappearances.

  • China: State Security Indictments Hit Record High in 2014

    Sources: Dui Hua; China Law Yearbook (various years)

    China indicted more people for endangering state security (ESS) crimes in 2014 than in any year since China Law Yearbook began reporting the figure in 1999. The number of people indicted rose to 1,411, up 2 percent from 1,384 in 2013. These indictments spanned 663 cases, compared with 608 cases in the previous year.

    With the uptick in indictments, the number of trials in the category that includes ESS jumped 20 percent. China Law Yearbook reports ESS trials in aggregate along with trials for dereliction of military duty and possibly other crimes. The number of trials in this category hit 1,074 in 2014, compared with 893 in 2013. Based on indictment statistics from previous years, Dui Hua has assumed that the number of trials attributed to dereliction of military duty and other crimes was negligible. Trial numbers are limited to trials of first instance that courts concluded during the year.

    The ESS trial that received the most international attention in 2014 was that of Uyghur activist and scholar Ilham Tohti. He was convicted of splittism in September 2014 and sentenced to life in prison for operating a Uyghur news website. Including Ilham Tohti, Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database has information on 18 people tried for ESS in 2014, down from 32 in 2013 and 26 in 2012. Thus far in 2015, Dui Hua has information on nine people tried for endangering state security.

    Chinese courts invariably convict and sentence those tried for ESS. Although acquittals are extremely rare, relatively light sentences are sometimes imposed. In 2014, at least three of those tried—Gu Yimin, Liang Haiyi, and Liu Benqi—were released by year end. All three were convicted of inciting subversion. Gu and Liu were tried for online posts that were critical of the Chinese government. Gu was sentenced to 1.5 years in prison and Liu to three years, but both were released due to time served in detention. Liang was likely tried for online posts and her involvement in public protests. Detained in 2011, Liang was released after a court sentenced her to a suspended sentence of two years.

    ESS covers a range of political crimes including subversion, inciting subversion, splittism, inciting splittism, espionage, and state secrets violations. While it is considered the most serious category of political crimes—and is the only category that carries a mandatory supplemental sentence of deprivation of political rights—ESS crimes are not the only legal avenue used to punish activists. In recent years, authorities have also used “disturbing social order” crimes like “picking quarrels and provoking troubles” and economic crimes like fraud and operating an illegal business to put away critics.

    “The number of individuals indicted for ESS crimes reached an all time high in 2014, a striking and troubling development,” said Dui Hua Executive Director John Kamm. “Given ongoing campaigns against protest and dissent, especially in the western region of Xinjiang, the number of ESS indictments and trials are unlikely to fall in 2015.”

  • Converting Cult Work: From 610 to Social Service

    Set up by the Gulou District 610 Office in 2009, the Loving Heart Home is a local experiment by Chen Dongxiao and his colleagues to try to raise the reentry rate for detained cult members. Photo credit: An Shu

    For more than 15 years, Chinese politico-legal authorities have carried out a wide-ranging campaign against so-called cult organizations that has been coordinated via a network of dedicated units known as “610” (read “six ten”) offices. (These offices are named after the date of the order that founded them: June 10, 1999.) Although the effort to wipe out organizations like Falun Gong or the Almighty God sect has, from time to time, featured prominently in Chinese news coverage, much less has been written about the anti-cult offices or the often-controversial measures they employ.

    That changed recently with a long feature published in the September 25, 2014, edition of Southern Weekly. The piece focuses on one particular 610 office in an urban district of Nanjing and the innovations its director, Cheng Dongxiao, has introduced to try to make the work of “converting” (or “de-programming”) cult members more effective and less coercive.

    Cheng’s main innovation is the establishment of a center in which “model converts” are responsible for helping to convert exisitng cult members. Mirroring trends in other areas of law enforcement and “comprehensive social management,” this is an example of how China might use a community corrections approach to deal with social problems that in the past have relied on detention measures like reeducation through labor (RTL) or legal education classes. Now that RTL has been eliminated and legal education has come under increased scrutiny for, among other things, its murky legal basis, new approaches like Cheng’s may gain some traction with reformers.

    As Cheng himself admits, even if less coercive measures are adopted, there is still an urgent need for clearer legislation to govern the practices associated with anti-cult “conversions,” particularly insofar as these practices involve deprivation of liberty. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the article pays no attention to the more fundamental question of whether China’s efforts to eliminate “cults” is justifiable from a human rights standpoint. This standpoint demands that freedoms of opinion be given due consideration in dealing with whatever harmful social consequences these organizations and their members may cause.

    As significant as the publication of this unusual article is, it is equally significant to note that it was removed from the Southern Weekly website soon after publication. The reason is not particularly obvious, though there are a number of possibilities. Perhaps this rare look behind the scenes of one of China’s most secretive institutions was simply too daring. Perhaps the softer community-based approach of the Loving Heart Home is considered discordant with recent efforts to strike hard against Almighty God. Perhaps Cheng Dongxiao’s candid assessment of an inconsistent anti-cult system or the article’s description of what takes place in anti-cult “study sessions” was deemed unfit for public consumption.

    Another possibility is that the article was pulled because there is, at present, insufficient consensus among the relevant authorities about the merits of Cheng’s approach to combatting organizations classified as cults. There may exist other competing community-corrections approaches or even more far-ranging proposals that would limit the state’s role in dealing with this issue altogether. Thanks to the story’s deletion, we are left to wonder not only where China’s anti-cult campaign might be headed but how much, if any, further sunlight will be allowed to shine on the issue.

    *
    In Conversion of “Cult Members,” “610” Goes from Secretive to Open

    Southern Weekly, 25 September 2014

    After five years, conversion work has begun to pay off at the Loving Heart Home, as attested by the award banners sent by many of the “cult members” who have graduated from its study classes. Photo credit: Liu Yanxun
    Past: Preaching the law had little effect. When they left the study sessions, they hadn’t changed deep down and remained cult members.
    Later: “Putting cult teachings in context and using cult teachings to undermine cult teachings.” For example, finding weak points and flaws in specific cult scripture and using them as evidence. This collapses a follower’s “sacred beliefs” and achieves double the results with half the effort.
    Present: Establish the Loving Heart Home and focus on the “reentry rate.” Implement “self-education and self-management.” It’s like a doctor treating a patient, a teacher treating a student, and a parent treating a child.
    Future: Conversion needs to be more public, brought out into the community, and turned into a public interest, and the 610 offices need to gradually recede into the background.

    It was raining with low hanging clouds in Nanjing on September 23, 2014. The radio said a typhoon was skirting the region.

    Cheng Dongxiao sat in a government office building just a few kilometers from the Yangtze River, his face sunny and full of laughter. Average in height, he spoke rhythmically and rather quickly. Cheng is the director of the 610 Office in Nanjing’s Gulou District. To the outside world, this is an extremely mysterious unit, the full name of which is the Gulou District Office for Prevention and Handling of Cult Problems.

    Cheng Dongxiao has been working to convert cult members for 15 years. Since 2009, he has been trying to find more effective conversion methods. The “Loving Heart Home,” which has been running for the past five years, is a product of that effort. “There are very few other countries in the world that have a huge, top-to-bottom anti-cult organizational system like we do,” he notes. “But the actual results from these years have demonstrated that severe anti-cult measures have not only failed to turn the problem around, they have actually made it even more serious.”

    “The fight against cults is, in the end, only a contradiction among the people,” Cheng Dongxiao says. “It’s nothing to be ashamed of and ought to be carried out with great fanfare!”

    “I’m Most Opposed to Coercive Methods”

    Cheng Dongxiao looks back fondly to the past: “Chairman Mao’s ideology is our most outstanding, most valuable possession.” But after more than 30 years of reform and opening, the emphasis on economic development has led to a kind of ideological slackening, he says. This, he feels, is unfortunate.

    “When I was first transferred here from the district’s bureau of industry, I didn’t understand at all,” he recalled. “Later, I slowly came to understand the difficult lives these people have experienced.” He said that even though some of them had enjoyed a good life materially, there was something lacking in their spiritual life. Perhaps they encountered some misery or sorrow in their lives and wanted to find a kind of spiritual support.

    On June 10, 1999, China set up a hierarchical system of anti-cult prevention organizations, which became commonly known as “610” offices.

    At that time, Nanjing was one of the areas hardest hit by the cult problem nationwide, and Gulou, Xiaguan, and Xuanwu districts were the areas of Nanjing most affected. There were large numbers of cult members living in these three districts, including many at high levels within cult organizations and many who created disturbances and spread rumors. The first cult organization to appear in Jiangsu originated in Xiaguan District. At that time, a total of eight cult members were coalesced around a university lecturer.

    For the first two years, Cheng Dongxiao says, “all we did was [detain people], and the RTL camps and similar places were all full.”

    Besides detention centers and RTL camps, another place for reforming cult members goes by the name of “study class.” With sessions in the spring and fall, each session of 10–20 people lasts for three months. Responsibility for attending to the students goes to government personnel, as well as laid-off workers who receive 100 yuan per day. Cheng says that before each class begins, “We advise these attendants to remain vigilant and take shifts irregularly.”

    Cult members sent to study classes stay in standard rooms with a toilet, similar to those found in guesthouses. If a cult member becomes over-excited or unruly, the number of attendants will immediately be increased. “To date,” [notes Cheng Dongxiao,] “there have been no homicides, generally only self-harm.” So [they need attendants with them] “24 hours a day, eating with them, living with them, watching television with them.”

    During the daytime, cult members attend classes in their rooms, with one or several instructors for each person. “To make a somewhat inapt comparison,” [Cheng Dongxiao says,] “it feels a bit like a graduate student meeting with his or her advisor.” Sometimes, they may go to a dedicated counseling room, with two instructors generally responsible for counseling as a team. These days, some locations also hold “lecture classes,” but only to deal with issues common to all cult members. Individual problems are harder to resolve, and “individual problems are more pronounced in cult members.”

    Cheng Dongxiao admits that they had little success at first trying to preach law to the cult members. Many former cult members who already been converted told Southern Weekly that merely being locked up and preached to about the law had little effect on them. Li He recalls that she wasn’t the least bit afraid back then: “Group solidarity ran high among us inside the RTL camp. We sang songs and recited our scripture, the sound reverberating in waves so much that we really raised the roof.”

    Generally, the study classes last three months, which can be adjusted according to each individual’s circumstances and consideration of whether they have fully converted and can successfully leave the study class. To date, there is in fact no clear set of quantitative indicators [used to make such determinations].

    For many years, the experience has involved the “three statements and five documents.” The “three statements” refer to the “statement of guarantee, statement of repentance, and statement of severed ties.” The “five documents” require the individual to write clearly on these five subjects: “how I got involved in cult activities in the past,” “past and current views on cults,” “why cults are a danger to society,” “in what ways cults have endangered me,” and “how I have endangered society.”

    Do some people fake it? It’s possible. One reason is “our instructors can’t actually teach.” Some cult members write their three statements and five documents, leave the study class, and go home. But they have not truly changed. They’re still cult members and still believe in those old cult ideas. Some even become more committed to the cult.

    “What I’m most opposed to are coercive methods,” says Cheng Dongxiao.

    Cheng picked up a stack of documents from the table, saying they were quantitative indicators proposed by a group of experts who had recently come up from Xiamen. He said they were currently working on a project to develop a comprehensive assessment form to measure cult-member conversion. The hope was that this would be more scientific and systematic than the artificial and subjective “three statements and five documents” and better at evaluating whether a cult member has truly transformed their thinking and beliefs.

    “It’s Hard to Change Beliefs or Souls”

    Cheng Dongxiao and his colleagues began looking for more effective methods in 2002, including “putting cult teachings in context” and “using cult teachings to undermine cult teachings.”

    “Besides the law, you also have to start from cult doctrines and scriptures,” [Cheng says]. The bookshelves in his office are completely filled with cult literature. “If I want to destroy the cults, I have to understand cult scripture and doctrine better than the cult members themselves, then compare it to orthodox Buddhism or scientific theories and look for weak points and flaws.”

    “I’ve read these several dozen times,” Cheng says. “I’m constantly going back to check things. We can’t neglect any areas.”

    When trying to undermine cult teachings, one ordinarily might seize upon some bad aspect of the cult leader. “On the surface, he’s telling you how to be a good person, but in fact he’s leading you toward a more self-centered, autocratic, and lawless realm in which you separate yourself from the government and society.” Then, you look for weak points in specific scriptural passages to back up your point. This is the way you collapse a follower’s “sacred beliefs” and get double the results with half of the effort.

    But it’s hard to avoid unexpected situations, and Cheng Dongxiao and his colleagues have their own methods for responding to such things. For example, one day when he is trying to break a cult member, he might forget a passage of scripture or get stumped. “I’ll just switch the subject to something else,” he said. “But I’ll remember to go back to that issue and immediately go look it up. You have to understand everything.”

    “It’s hard to change people’s beliefs or their souls,” admits Cheng Dongxiao. “Closed classes are what we’ve found to work the best.” To this date, they’re still in use.

    When they first started the study classes, many government officials looked down on cult members. But once they were sent to classes, these cult members would begin talking non-stop and even tried to “turn” some of the personnel assigned to them. Some of the cult members were intellectuals and could quote from the classics. “Occasionally, we couldn’t out-talk them,” Cheng laughs, “so they forced us to study.”

    As for those cult scriptures and theoretical books, Cheng says: “Once you feel it’s necessary to read these things to do your work, reading them won’t be too much of a headache.” But some personnel found it very difficult. “Once I had a deputy who said he really couldn’t keep reading—every time he tried, he’d doze off,” [recalls Cheng]. “I told him he wasn’t suited for this kind of work and was better off working for the neighborhood committee. Soon afterwards, he was transferred there.”

    “There’s not a lot of novelty in this kind of work,” says Cheng Dongxiao. “It’s not like you reporters, who get a new subject to work on every day. For us, it’s repetitive.”

    “Consolidated Reentry, Coordinated Education”

    The Loving Heart Home and the Care and Concern Association are both located in the same courtyard. There, 55 volunteers work hard together with Cheng Dongxiao to convert “cult members.” Photo credit: An Shu

    Once they leave the study classes, many cult members have nothing to do. They’re basically all theists who see gods and ghosts behind everything. If they get sick or have some complications in their lives, they will turn again to the cult. “It’s easy to relapse,” admits Cheng. The relapse rate among cult members is quite high, basically the same as with drug addicts at 70 to 80 percent.

    Some start reading books on Buddhism or Christianity. Sometimes they’ll get some of their former classmates to read along with them and discuss the books. But if they gather together for too long, outsiders will start to get nervous and report them. Then the neighborhood committee and police come to prevent them from meeting. This leads these former cult members to fall into a new trap of emptiness and depression.

    Cheng Dongxiao and his colleagues thought there had to be a better way than simply dispersing them. As the saying goes, “Damming the flow is not as good as dredging a new channel.” So, they planned to find a place where they could let former cult members openly and freely gather to chat. In the end, that’s why they set up the “Loving Heart Home,” a place inseparable from Zhang Jing’s research project.

    Zhang Jing was one of those “classic cases.” Zhang, 58, is a researcher in sociology at the local academy of social sciences. Around 2000, she lost herself in a cult. Like many other cult members, she went to Beijing to petition and was sent to RTL and study classes. Finally, under Cheng Dongxiao’s efforts to “undermine cult teachings with cult teachings,” she was successfully converted in 2002. After leaving the study class, she made cults the subject of her own research. In 2007, she received support from the Jiangsu 610 Office and the provincial academy of social science to work on a project titled “Present Situation and Countermeasures for Education and Conversion of Cult Members in Jiangsu.”

    Using the methods of sociology, she launched a study of 13 counties and cities in the province, ultimately producing a 50,000-character report of statistics and analysis and identifying several issues. Zhang Jing told Southern Weekly how government officials at all levels use follow-up strategies in which three or four officials take responsibility for individuals who complete study classes and, during major holidays or sensitive periods, go to their homes to follow up or “check in.” These methods make people who have already been “converted” feel uncomfortable. Zhang Jing describes these tactics as “pressure follow-ups” and “charitable check-ins.”

    Besides this, another clear problem is the way that units at all levels pay attention only to the “conversion rate” when it comes to cult members, “which is just like paying attention only to GDP figures in thinking about economic development.” This leads to false reporting and exaggeration of success. Zhang Jing suggests that instead of the “conversion rate,” we should be considering the “reentry rate” which would give a truer measure of effectiveness.

    The “Loving Heart Home,” set up by the Gulou District 610 Office in 2009, is a local experiment by Chen Dongxiao and his colleagues to try to raise the “reentry rate.”

    The Loving Heart Home is located in an abandoned school in Xiaguan District. Passing an alleyway piled high with discarded junk and stepping through a set of large metal double doors, you enter this spacious area, quiet and filled with tall, luxuriant parasol trees.

    Cheng Dongxiao says, “We’re like a doctor treating a patient, a teacher treating a student, a parent treating a child.”

    “Enrich Their Minds So They Won’t Go Back to the Cult”

    When the Loving Heart Home was first set up, Cheng Dongxiao and his colleagues still had their doubts.

    To that point, throughout the country the conversion of cult members had always taken place in closed classes, because the thinking was it was better to keep people separate rather than gather them together. But at the Loving Heart Home, they were actually all gathered together. At the time, some senior officials worried: “What if they repeatedly collude with each other and revolt en masse? What then?”

    Cheng Dongxiao firmly insisted that this would not happen. His confidence came from the “troops under his control,” a group of 22 former cult members whom he had successfully converted.

    “When I started running study classes and converting people in 2002,” [says Cheng,] “these people gradually joined me and started to help.” Back then, they were not called volunteers; instead, they were considered “model converts.”

    “The idea was to have them use their own experiences to illustrate the law,” says Cheng. “You needed to treat them like friends. Most of them were older then me, so I addressed them as ‘Big Sister.’”

    The Loving Heart Home practices “self-education and self-management.” Among the volunteers, a group of seven to nine forms an organization committee responsible for routine daily matters. “General matters are decided on their own, following discussion by the organization committee, while for important matters, they seek guidiance from the relevant government agencies.” Every Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday, a certain number of volunteers remain on duty. Each year, there is a meeting of volunteers and every two to three years there is an election of a new organization committee and revision of the Loving Heart Home charter.

    Li Zhonglan chairs the organization committee. Slightly plump, Li fell into a cult back in 1995 and once was a major figure in the local Nanjing cult organization who traveled widely “propagating the teachings.” When China outlawed the cult in 1999, she had a complete breakdown. Li Zhonglan told Southern Weekly that it was not until 2002, after study classes and “using cult teachings to undermine cult teachings,” that she was finally converted. “Now, at the Loving Heart Home, I can help others to clear up their confusion and help myself as well,” she said.

    Besides the organization committee, ther are three others that Cheng Dongxiao has selected to be permanently stationed at the Loving Heart Home to serve as liaisons between the home and the 610 office. In Cheng Dongxiao’s words, they’re there to “pour some sand in the mix” [that is, to ensure a bit of variety –Trans.].

    Qiao Zhanyu is one of those three. He came to the Loving Heart Home after retiring as principal and party-committee secretary at a middle school. He told Southern Weekly that, back when he was still a principal, there was an art teacher at his school who became mixed up with a cult. He decided to “take charge of his own children” and had teachers at the school rotate in shifts every day, two attendants per shift, to help the teacher convert. It was this experience that made Qiao the most successful candidate for this current work. But he says, “This is harder than managing a school, you know. You can’t rely on issuing compulsory orders or administrative sanctions. You have to put on a kind face and make people see the light through reasoning with them.” He says when he first arrived at the Loving Heart Home, the volunteers there considered him to be a government “mole” or “spy” and they didn’t want to have anything to do with him. But after a while, “I treated people with sincerity and people began to respond to that. Now, they often don’t call me ‘Secretary Qiao,” but call me ‘Brother Qiao’ instead.”

    Often, Loving Heart Home will show movies and programs on traditional culture. “We generally choose sentimental movies, like the Taiwanese movie My Beloved or Jane Eyre,” says Cheng Dongxiao with a laugh. “The cult took them away from ordinary human emotions, so we want to strengthen their sense of ethical sentiment and sympathy.”

    Sometimes they invite experts on religon and Confucianism to give lectures. They also run a quarterly magazine called Spirit Station. Cheng says, “We want to enrich their minds so that they won’t return to the cult.”

    “610 Office Needs to Gradually Recede into the Background”

    All sorts of people become members of cults. There are former senior police officers, a head of a university organization department, civil servants from government departments, and others. At Loving Heart Home, people generally stay for around three months. Once they’re educated and stable, they don’t need to return. Of course, some of those former believers who have been stabilized apply to become volunteers and continue participating in activities at the home.

    To date, the number of volunteers at the Loving Heart Home has grown from 22 to 55. Some of them are not former cult members but university students or concerned members of the public who have come purely to volunteer.

    “Each year we recruit a little, but we don’t dare recruit too much,” says Cheng. “Those who want to be volunteers must be reliable.” Recently, their work has received recognition from senior levels of the national 610 office. At the recent Loving Heart Home fifth anniversary meeting, a central official came to attend. Some of the local officials in attendance were even moved to tears.

    Volunteers don’t receive much remuneration, Cheng says. “Actually, no one is here for money. They’re here to educate and rescue people.”

    “But the current situation remains as serious as ever,” says Cheng. “Besides Falun Gong, Almighty God has become a main force. It is based on Christian scriptures so those doing conversion work must study new material.” Currently, his colleagues and the volunteers need to read the Bible and Almighty God doctrine. “[As Sun Tzu said:] If you know yourself and your enemy, you can win the battle every time.”

    When Cheng Dongxiao says “the current situation remains serious,” he also means “the state needs to standardize its anti-cult work. Currently, each locality has its own way of doing things and it’s all messed up.”

    “For example personnel is complicated, in some places the 610 office operates independently, rather than as part of the local government like we do here,” [he explains]. “In some places, it falls under the politico-legal committee, in others it falls under the public security bureau, and in others still it falls under the domestic security protection unit.” Not long ago, the relevant state authorities gathered directors of local 610 offices for a conference. Cheng Dongxiao was one of them. He said very straightforwardly that China’s current anti-cult efforts need to be regulated through legislation that clarifies the screening criteria for cults and the responsibilities of the governing authorities. “For example,” he asks, “should the the National People’s Congress Standing Committee authorize the Ministry of Public Security to take responsibility?”

    There’s also the problem of funding. “Our anti-cult work in Gulou District is part of the government budget,” he explains. “But many locations lack funding. How can they carry out cult conversion work?” Cheng said the problem is especially serious in northeast China. Once, at a meeting, he shared a room with a prefecture-level 610 Office director from somewhere in the northeast. As they chatted, that director began complaining about how he only had four people working for him in a city where there were more than 60,000 cult members. “In Nanjing,” Cheng notes for comparison “we only have just over 4,000 cult members in the entire city.”

    “The bottom line is [that anti-cult work needs] to be more public, brought out into the community, and turned into a public interest,” [says Cheng.] “As the government pays for more social services, the 610 Office needs to gradually recede into the background.”

    (Li He, Zhang Jing, Li Zhonglan are all pseudonyms)

  • MPS: China Has 116 Custody and Education Centers Nationwide

    Detainees participate in work training at a custody and education center in Nantong, Jiangsu Province. Image credit: Nandu.com

    As several recent posts have pointed out, the formal abolition of reeducation through labor (RTL) at the end of last year has prompted new scrutiny of other arbitrary forms of detention routinely used in China. Getting the most attention in recent months is the system known as “custody and education,” used to punish both prostitutes and their clients with up to two years of detention without any formal judicial process.

    A recent article from the Guangzhou newspaper Southern Metropolis Daily showed how critics of custody and education have successfully used requests for “open government information” to get details about the measure and its use in China. This summer, Beijing lawyer Zhao Yunheng received a reply to his request to the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) for information about custody and education. The reply included an acknowledgment that there are currently 116 custody and education facilities nationwide.

    Though Zhao did not get all of the detailed information he requested, the MPS response does reveal a number of interesting things. First, it is clear that, with only 116 facilities nationwide, there are many parts of China where custody and education is not being enforced at all. Thus, in addition to the arbitrary nature of the procedures used to send individuals to custody and education, there is also a serious problem of geographical inconsistency of enforcement—meaning that individuals accused of the same illegal behavior might receive very different degrees of punishment, for example up to 15 days of administrative detention in places where there are no custody and education facilities but a minimum of six months in custody and education in places where there are.

    Distribution of custody and education centers by province based on provincial public security department data obtained by Southern Metropolis Daily. Image credit: Nandu.com

    Second, there are some puzzling discrepancies between the data reported on the national level and information collected locally. The MPS report of 116 custody and education centers contrasts with an earlier figure of 90 facilities derived by Southern Metropolis Daily through open government information requests and reporting at the provincial level. Because the MPS did not provide details, such as the names of each facility or their relative distribution throughout the country, it is difficult to know how to reconcile the two different figures.

    Even though he did not get all of the information he requested, Zhao Yunheng expresses general satisfaction with the way the MPS handled his response and remains optimistic that custody and education will undergo substantial reform in the near future. The fact that the issue continues to receive periodic coverage in the national media suggests that changes to the system may indeed be on the reform agenda. Continued pressure from the media and civil society—including demands that the government reveal more details about the various ways it locks up its citizens—will undoubtedly help to further this process along.

    *
    MPS Replies to Open Government Information Request,
    Now 116 Custody and Education Centers Nationwide

    Wang Xing, Southern Metropolis Daily
    August 1, 2014

    In a recent reply to an open government information request, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) for the first time made public the number of custody and education facilities nationwide—116. The MPS also stated that China has not yet abolished custody and education and that public security units continue to enforce this measure.

    “I never imagined that the MPS Open Government Information Office would take such a conscientious attitude,” said lawyer Zhao Yunheng, who applied to have the information made public. “They acted fully in accordance with procedures, and even telephoned me to explain when they needed to extend the time limit.”

    Custody and Education Still Being Enforced

    In its July 22 reply entitled “MPS Open Government Information Response,” the MPS Open Government Information Office responded separately to each of Zhao Yunheng’s three questions.

    On the question of which provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions were still enforcing custody and education and which had effectively abolished or ceased enforcing the measure, the MPS reply stated: In 1991, the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee passed its Decision Concerning the Strict Prohibition of Prostitution and Visiting Prostitutes.” Article 4(2) of that decision states: “Public security organs, in cooperation with other relevant agencies, may subject those who engage in prostitution or visit prostitutes to between six months and two years of compulsory legal and moral education and productive labor so that they may change their bad habits. Detailed measures are to be enacted by the State Council.” In 1993, the State Council promulgated and put into effect the Measures for the Custody and Education of Prostitutes and Clients of Prostitutes. These measures specify that prostitutes and those who visit prostitutes are subject to custody and education and provide detailed provisions concerning the decision-making body, term of custody, testing and treatment for sexually transmitted disease, inmate education and management, and procedures for release and remedy. The reply added: “Currently, the state has not abolished custody and education and public security authorities continue to enforce the measure. We have no information about abolition of custody and education by local authorities.”

    According to an investigation by Southern Metropolis Daily (see the previous report in Weekly In-Depth Report, July 2 [Translator’s note: This report is no longer available on their website, but is available here.]), of the 31 provincial-level areas nationwide (excluding Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan), 26 have at least one custody and education center. Anhui, Jiangxi, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Tibet do not currently have custody and education centers. Of these, Ningxia, Qinghai, Tibet, and Jiangxi have never had custody and education centers, so abolition is not an issue there. Anhui once had 17 custody and education centers, but around 2005 they were ordered to close because the “conditions for custody no longer existed.” Even though there is no longer custody and education there, no one has ever said anything about formally “abolishing the custody and education system.”

    No Mention of Specific Designations or Distribution

    With respect to the number of custody and education centers nationwide, as well as their designations and locations, the MPS reply states: Article 4 of the Measures for the Custody and Education of Prostitutes and Clients of Prostitutes stipulates that: “Based on the need for custody and education work, public security organs at the level of the province, autonomous region, municipality or autonomous prefecture, or city district shall submit plans for the establishment of custody and education centers to the people’s government at the same level for approval.” According to figures from the MPS Detention Facility Administration Bureau, there are 116 custody and education centers nationwide.

    There are more than 330 cities or autonomous prefectures at the prefectural level in China. With 116 custody and education centers, that means that there is one center for every two prefectural cities on average.

    Between April and May of this year, public security departments in 19 provinces nationwide responded to requests for open government information, revealing a total of 55 custody and education centers. Southern Metropolis Daily reporters then visited the 12 other provincial-level public security departments, all of which apart from Guizhou provided figures on the number of local custody and education centers. Calculating from the 19 provincial replies to requests for open government information and the information provided during visits to 11 other provinces (excepting Guizhou), one gets a total of 90 custody and education centers.

    According to Zhao Yunheng’s analysis, perhaps the custody and education centers in some areas have already stopped operating in practice, but because they have not been formally abolished, this leads to the discrepancy in the data.

    The MPS reply did not provide the specific designations or distribution of the 116 custody and education centers. Based on previous investigations, the centers are distributed extremely unevenly. In some provinces, nearly every city has one, while in others the centers have been set up in only a few cities. Yesterday, Zhao Yunheng submitted another open government information request for additional information.

    Applicant: MPS Attitude Conscientious

    Zhao Yunheng, the person who made this application for open government information, is the director of the criminal defense division at the Dacheng Law Firm. In early June, he, Duan Wanjin, and other criminal defense lawyers at the Dacheng Law Firm met to discuss the problem of custody and education, out of which came the request for open government information. “A few days later, I got a call from the MPS Open Government Information Office,” said Zhao. “They said our request wasn’t formatted correctly and suggested that I go to the MPS website to download the correct form and reapply.” By default, the applicant on the standard open government information request form is a citizen or legal entity, so when Zhao Yunheng resubmitted the application it was in his capacity as an individual citizen.

    Zhao’s application requested information about the implementation of custody and education in each province; the names, numbers, and distribution of custody and education centers nationwide; and the number of people being held in custody and education. Zhao Yunheng believes that many delegates to the NPC and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, legal experts, lawyers, and others have already made a great effort and carried out a valuable investigation into the issue of custody and education. He and his colleagues wanted to approach the problem from the angle of open government information in hopes that they could provide a better basis for debate if they received more information.

    According to the regulations on open government information, the department receiving the request should furnish a reply within 15 working days. As the deadline was about to approach, Zhao Yunheng received a call from the MPS Open Government Information Office. “They said this information concerned a large number of bureaus and that they themselves did not have the information,” Zhao recalled. “They said they would have to coordinate with these agencies to collect statistics, so they hoped to extend the 15-day deadline. This was fully in keeping with the regulations, and I felt this was perfectly ordinary.” On July 23, a registered letter was delivered to the Dacheng Law Firm. It was dated July 22—a reply delivered within the statutory deadline.

    Zhao Yunheng said that in his many telephone interactions with them, the MPS Open Government Information Office took a very conscientious attitude, and he was personally satisfied with their attitude and the response they provided: “I believe the MPS took a positive attitude. I am relatively optimistic that custody and education will be reformed in the near future.”

  • To End Arbitrary Detention, Bring Officials to Justice

    Entrance to the reprimand center at the Luoyang City Police Station in Henan’s provincial capital. Photo credit: dzjjw.gov.cn

    The formal elimination of reeducation through labor (RTL) in the final days of 2013 was greeted with widespread approval among Chinese citizens. Following a series of high-profile cases involving controversial detentions of petitioners and critics of local officials, the public had grown skeptical of this decades-old system of administrative detention and intolerant of the stability-first mentality of the officials who made use of it.

    Given that little has been said so far about what, if any, measures might be put forward to replace RTL, there is an understandable concern among many that local authorities will come up with their own solutions and proliferate practices that are even more problematic—when it comes to due legal process and protection of individual rights—than RTL.

    This vigilance about preventing the emergence of new forms of arbitrary detention was behind the outrage that erupted recently after the Beijing News reported on a system of “reprimand centers” that had been set up in Henan Province to deal with petitioners perceived to be disruptive and troublesome. Individuals were reportedly held in these facilities for days or even months at the behest of local officials without any legal process. The practice began in 2008, when provincial authorities instructed the use of “education and reprimand” to deal with people who went to Beijing to petition.

    Henan government officials responded swiftly to the exposure of the reprimand centers, ordering that they be shut down. But many are concerned that the matter will end there, without further investigation or assignment of responsibility for those involved in this system of extrajudicial detention. To this end, a group of 31 rights lawyers from around China recently submitted a request for “open government information” regarding the reprimand centers, though there has so far been no response.

    In an opinion piece published in the Shenzhen Daily Sunshine, reporter and columnist Liu Xiandong explains that local authorities are liable to continue violating the rights of citizens unless there are more serious consequences for doing so. Reminding readers that abuse of power is another form of corruption, he writes that “rights and dignity are even more precious than taxpayer money or public funds”—suggesting that the high-profile anti-corruption campaign now underway should not ignore the more routine, non-economic abuses of power.

    *
    How Could Eliminating Reprimand Centers for Abnormal Petitioning Be Enough?

    Liu Xiandong, Daily Sunshine
    18 February 2014

    Faced with public condemnation over the establishment of reprimand centers for abnormal petitioning throughout Henan, the Henan Politico-Legal Committee and Office of Letters and Visits replied that the use of reprimand centers was not in accord with laws and regulations and sent out an overnight notice announcing the immediate launch of a province-wide inspection and elimination campaign to abolish all reprimand centers for abnormal petitioning. Given that reprimand centers were set up, there must have been violations of the law or even crimes committed. Accountability and punishment ought to be placed on the agenda. Last Saturday, a Daily Sunshine editorial called on officials in Hunan to hold executive agencies accountable for unlawful acts in this affair, but the relevant departments have so far said nothing.

    First, let’s discuss how the unauthorized establishment of “reprimand centers for abnormal petitioning” is unlawful. Even though the petitioning system is, in the view of Yu Jianrong and other scholars, a mechanism for rights remedy that acts as a supplement where rule of law is insufficient, in reality the existence of this system gives a shred of hope to people who have already lost hope in the ability of ordinary legal channels to uphold their rights as citizens. In particular, crossing administrative jurisdictions to petition has the potential to strike fear in the hearts of domineering local power-holders. For this reason, some insist on declaring the practice of reporting on problems to higher officials on the outside to be “abnormal petitioning” and try to use brute force to prevent it. Everyone knows the methods used in the past, such as setting up the interception mechanisms known as “black jails” or sending petitioners to psychiatric hospitals. The biggest “innovation” of “reprimand centers for abnormal petitioning” is their attempt to legalize and regularize the dedicated black jails and psychiatric hospitals for petitioners that were denounced in the past.

    There is no denying that some petitioners fabricate facts, slander, and disrupt public order in the course of their petitioning. Existing laws and regulations may be used to respond to these sorts of acts. It’s only that when ordinary legal channels are used to regulate petitioners, it is possible that some things that the authorities would rather keep secret might get revealed once the matter goes before a court. This is something that some local governments cannot stand. So, they are compelled to employ methods that “do not accord with law and regulations”—in other words, to use illegal measures to deal with petitioners.

    The internal operations of the reprimand centers for abnormal petitioning have not yet been revealed, so we aren’t clear about whether it involved intolerable mistreatment or humiliation. But locking up citizens without due process and depriving them of their fundamental liberty in order to reprimand them is already a gross abuse of power and a violation of rights. When expanding power gets out of control, it inevitably becomes a malignant force that not only violates the lawful rights of citizens but also seriously damages the foundations of a rule of law society.

    If the matter of setting up reprimand centers for abnormal petitioning were resolved merely by abolishing them, it would mean leaving open the question of whether unlawful acts by those with power can be effectively reckoned with. If there is nearly zero cost for violating the law, can the public expect that they won’t do something even worse next time? Can they be expected to lead everyone in the construction of a rule of law society? Can one have the extravagant hope that their rule will be fair and just?

    These days there is a consensus among officials and the public about the need to fight corruption, but our understanding of corruption cannot be limited to economic acts like embezzlement or accepting bribes. We also need to pay attention to corrupt exercise of power. Power is not the same as money, but when power exceeds the boundaries set by law, it becomes a kind of rights violation and a form of corruption. What is ultimately damaged is the rights and dignity of the public. These rights and dignity are even more precious than taxpayer money or public funds and must be protected from violation and plunder.

    It is based on these reasons that construction of a rule of law society must attach importance to restricting public power and must remedy and punish each unlawful act by the authorities.

  • Custody and Education Worse than Reeducation through Labor?

    Women detained in Ningbo Custody and Education Center await medical examination. Photo credit: Ningbo Daily.

    After the Chinese Communist Party announced that reeducation through labor (RTL) would be abolished, other compulsory extralegal measures seemed to move up on the human rights agenda of outside observers. Among them was custody and education, an administrative punishment targeting female sex workers and, to a lesser extent, their clients. The measures governing custody and education (translated below) were issued in 1993 and have remained largely unchanged.

    As with RTL, decisions to impose custody and education are in the hands of police and can lead to years of deprivation of liberty. Terms of custody and education last from six months to two years. In comparison, RTL terms were set at one to three years by 2002 regulations and generally revised down (in theory) to one to one and a half years by a 2005 opinion issued by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS).

    Public security organs are required to provide notice of RTL to an individual’s family members within two days of implementation. The notification period for custody and education is 15 days. (Last year’s revisions to the Criminal Procedure Law require notice of criminal detention within 24 hours, except in cases of endangering state security or terrorist activity.)

    A report released by Asia Catalyst earlier this month emphasized that people held in custody and education are not only forced to work without pay, but are also required to pay for their living expenses and for compulsory testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases. Last week, The Mirror (fazhi wanbao) reported that the Tianjin Municipality Custody and Education Center also charges 200 yuan per time for family visits, which are granted under Article 16 of the rules governing custody and education. Although one of the goals of the coercive measure is to “rescue” people from the sex industry, all 30 of the working women interviewed by Asia Catalyst returned to the sex trade immediately after their release. The high cost of serving sentences in custody and education centers is unlikely to deter such decisions.

    Police rules require that decisions to send juveniles to RTL be strictly controlled. In particular, first-time offenders or students with involved parents “must not be sent to RTL.” However, custody and education for children under the age of 14 and people who were abducted and forced into prostitution is at the discretion of police, who “may” choose to withhold punishment. Academic studies of custody and education detainees in Shenzhen and Fuzhou noted that the youngest detainees were 14 years old.

    Several cases indicate that custody and education has also been used against government critics. In April 2004, Xiao Xiangjin, a journalist suspected of encouraging farmers to petition the local government over corruption and abuse of power, was reportedly sentenced to one year of custody and education in Fujian Province. The following month, another journalist, Liu Shui, was sentenced to two years in Guangdong. Liu had previously served two prison sentences for “counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement,” and when arrested in 2004, was active in posting essays online calling for political reform.

    In 1992, the MPS affirmed that Chinese citizens from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao could be sentenced to custody and education despite prohibitions on placing them in RTL. Hong Kong Democratic Party member Alex Ho was placed in custody and education a month before Legislative Council elections in 2004.

    More recently, allegations of patronizing prostitutes tarnished the public image of Chinese American investor and popular social media personality Charles Xue. Global Times called Xue’s detention in August 2013 “perhaps one of the most important moments in the rise of Weibo, as the authorities tighten control over the ‘Big V’s’ [people with verified accounts on the Chinese micro blog tool] who could easily sway the public opinion.” He became popular by focusing on issues including child trafficking and poverty in China. His detention was highly publicized but no further announcements have been made regarding his legal fate. According to the 1992 MPS communique, custody and education may be applied to foreigners—Xue is a naturalized American citizen—although, in actual practice, the document says, it is rarely used for non-Chinese citizens. Instead, other punishments, such as administrative detention, revocation of residency permits, shortening of visas, or entry bans are applied.

    A review of the custody and education system is timely not only given the announced abolition of RTL, but in light of the recent visit to China by the Working Group on the Discrimination against Women in Law and in Practice (WGDAW). While commending China for the attention it has given to the needs of some groups of women, the working group noted that: “other categories of women who are vulnerable to discrimination and violence equally require effective and empowering protection measures, such as women in detention, refugee women, women living with HIV/AIDS, and women of diverse sexual orientation and gender identity.” Some of these groups clearly overlap with custody and education targets. Although men are sentenced to custody and education, the majority of detainees are female sex workers. According to an article published in the Journal of Zhangzhou Normal University in 2011, the male clients of female sex workers are more likely to receive fines than to lose their liberty. The article says that custody and education centers were originally called “women’s education centers” (fujiaosuo).

    WGDAW recommended a review of the gender impact of China’s existing policies, and the 20-year-old custody and education measures are a good candidate for scrutiny. In an interview with Southern Daily earlier this month, Vice President Yu Mingyong of the Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court said that “although custody and education is different than RTL, in the future, it too will exit the stage of history.”



    Measures for the Custody and Education of Prostitutes and Clients of Prostitutes: click to expand

    Measures for the Custody and Education of Prostitutes and Clients of Prostitutes
    State Council Decree of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
    No. 127

    Measures for the Custody and Education of Prostitutes and Clients of Prostitutes are hereby promulgated and shall go into effect as of the date of promulgation.

    Premier Li Peng
    September 4, 1993

    Article 1 In order to educate and rescue prostitutes and the clients of prostitutes and prevent the spread of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), these measures have been formulated in accordance with the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on the Strict Prohibition against Prostitution and the Patronage of Prostitutes.

    Article 2 In the context of these measures, the term “custody and education” refers to administrative compulsory educational measures for prostitutes and the clients of prostitutes that carry out centralized legal and moral education, organize participation in productive labor, and carry out STD screening and treatment. Custody and education work implements the policy of education, reform, and rescue.

    Article 3 The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) is in charge of custody and education work.

    Article 4 Based on the need for custody and education work, public security organs at the level of the province, autonomous region, municipality or autonomous prefecture, or city district shall submit plans for the establishment of custody and education centers to the people’s government at the same level for approval. Local planning committees and finance departments shall include the infrastructure investments and operation expenses of custody and education centers in construction plans and financial budgets.

    Article 5 Counseling, medical, accounting and other staff members shall be allocated to custody and education centers based on work requirements.

    Article 6 Custody and education centers shall be outfitted with rooms for shelter, as well as areas for education, labor, medical treatment, and cultural activities.

    Article 7 Public security organs may decide to send to custody and education those prostitutes and the clients of prostitutes, with the exception of those punished in accordance with Article 66 of the Public Order Administration Punishment Law of the PRC,* whose [actions] do not warrant reeducation through labor.

    In any of the following circumstances, prostitutes and the clients of prostitutes may be withheld from custody and education:

    1. They are under 14 years of age;
    2. They suffer from acute infectious diseases other than STDs;
    3. They are pregnant or breastfeeding their birth infant who is under the age of one;
    4. They were abducted and forced into prostitution.

    Article 8 County-level public security organs decide whether to impose custody and education on prostitutes and the clients of prostitutes. Where a decision has been made to implement custody and education, the relevant county public security organ shall fill out a written Decision of Custody and Education. A copy of the decision shall be given to the person subjected to custody and education, and within 15 days of the date of the decision, notification shall be given to the person’s family members, work unit, and the police station in their place of household registration.

    Article 9 The term of custody and education is from six months to two years and is counted from the commencement of custody and education.

    Article 10 Custody and education centers shall conduct STD testing and treatment of people taken into custody and education. The cost of examination and treatment is generally the responsibility of the individual or their family members.

    Article 11 Custody and education centers shall separately manage people held in custody and education according to their gender and whether they have STDs.

    Women who are held in custody and education shall be managed by female staff.

    Article 12 Custody and education centers shall manage in accordance with the law, establish and perfect all administrative systems, and strictly prohibit abuse, physical punishment, and other methods of humiliating people held in custody and education. People held in custody and education shall comply with all of the administrative systems of the custody and education center and obey the management.

    Article 13 People held in custody and education shall be given legal and moral education and organized to participate in productive labor, learn production skills, and strengthen their work ethic. Revenue earned by people in custody and education who participate in productive labor is used to improve their lives in custody and education and the custody and education facilities. People in custody and education who participate in productive labor may be paid a certain amount of labor remuneration in accordance with regulations. Custody and education centers shall keep separate accounts for labor income and expenses and strictly manage them. Custody and education centers shall implement civilized management and organize people in custody and education to engage in beneficial cultural and sporting activities.

    Article 14 The cost of living of a person in custody and education is generally the responsibility of the individual or their family members.

    Article 15 During intake, the personal items of people sent to custody and education must be stored by the custody and education center. The center shall make an inventory register, keep items in a safe place, and return items to their owners upon their discharge from custody and education.

    Article 16 Custody and education centers shall allow visits from family members of people in custody and education. If people in custody and education give birth, have a serious illness or death in the family, or another legitimate reason that necessitates leaving the facility, after their family or work unit acts as a guarantor and pays bond, and approval is received from the director of the center, they may leave the center. Time away from the center generally does not exceed seven days. The method for bond collection is determined by the MPS.

    Article 17 While serving their term, people in custody and education who show true repentance or perform meritorious services, or in other special circumstances, may receive commendation or early release from custody and education. Where a person needs to be released early from custody and education, the custody and education center shall write an opinion and send it for approval to the public security organ that originally decided to send that person to custody and education. But, where a person is released early, their actual term served in custody and education must not be less than half of their original term for custody and education.

    Article 18 People in custody and education who refuse to accept education or do not obey management may be given warnings or term extensions. Where a person requires a term extension, the custody and education center shall write an opinion and send it for approval to the public security organ that originally decided to send that person to custody and education. But, where a person’s term is extended, their actual term served in custody and education shall not exceed a maximum of two years. Where it is discovered that a person in custody and education has committed other illegal criminal acts that were not handled, they shall be handled in accordance with relevant laws and regulations.

    Article 19 Upon completion of their sentence, people shall be released on time and issued a certificate of release from custody and education. Their family members or work units shall be notified to pick them up.

    Article 20 People sent to custody and education who do not accept the decision against them may apply for administrative reconsideration in accordance with the law; those who do not accept the administrative reconsideration decision may file a lawsuit with a people’s court in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Law of the PRC.*

    Article 21 Where a person dies while serving their term of custody and education, the public security organ shall organize a forensic medical expert or appointed doctor to verify the cause of death; shall, after inspection by the people’s procuratorate at the same level, report to the public security organ and people’s procuratorate at the next highest level to put [the death] on record; shall fill out a death notice; and shall notify the family members, work unit, and police station in the person’s place of household registration. Persons not claimed by their family members will be handled by the public security organ after photographs are taken.

    Article 22 The MPS is responsible for the interpretation of these measures.

    Article 23 These measures go into effect on their date of promulgation.

    * Language revised in 2011 as per State Council Decree No. 588.

    Chinese Source(原文):
    《卖淫嫖娼人员收容教育办法》
    发布日期:1993年9月4日
    http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n1991360/n1991447/2142730.html
    Click on icon to expand


    卖淫嫖娼人员收容教育办法
    中华人民共和国国务院令

    (第127号)

    现发布《卖淫嫖娼人员收容教育办法》,自发布之日起施行。

    总理 李鹏
    一九九三年九月四日

    第一条 为了教育、挽救卖淫、嫖娼人员,制止性病蔓延,根据《全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于严禁卖淫嫖娼的决定》,制定本办法。

    第二条 本办法所称收容教育,是指对卖淫、嫖娼人员集中进行法律教育和道德教育、组织参加生产劳动以及进行性病检查、治疗的行政强制教育措施。收容教育工作实行教育、感化、挽救的方针。

    第三条 收容教育工作由公安部主管。

    第四条 收容教育所的设立,由省、自治区、直辖市或者自治州、设区的市的公安机关根据收容教育工作的需要提出方案,报同级人民政府批准。地方计委、财政部门应当将收容教育所的基本建设投资和所需经费列入基建计划和财政预算。

    第五条 收容教育所根据工作需要,配备辅导、医务、财会等工作人员。

    第六条 收容教育所应当设置收容室以及教育、劳动、医疗、文化活动等场所。

    第七条 对卖淫、嫖娼人员,除依照《中华人民共和国治安管理处罚条例》第六十六条的规定处罚外,* 对尚不够实行劳动教养的,可以由公安机关决定收容教育。

    对有下列情形之一的卖淫、嫖娼人员,可以不予收容教育:

    (一)年龄不满十四周岁的;
    (二)患有性病以外其他急性传染病的;
    (三)怀孕或者哺乳本人所生一周岁以内婴儿的;
    (四)被拐骗、强迫卖淫的。

    第八条 对卖淫、嫖娼人员实行收容教育,由县级公安机关决定。决定实行收容教育的,有关县级公安机关应当填写收容教育决定书。收容教育决定书副本应当交给被收容教育人员本人,并自决定之日起十五日内通知其家属、所在单位和户口所在地的公安派出所。

    第九条 收容教育期限为六个月至二年。收容教育日期自执行之日起计算。

    第十条 收容教育所对入所的被收容教育人员,应当进行性病检查和治疗。检查和治疗性病的费用一般由本人或者家属负担。

    第十一条 收容教育所对被收容教育人员,应当按照性别和有无性病实行分别管理。

    被收容教育的女性人员,应当由女性工作人员进行管理。

    第十二条 收容教育所应当依法管理,建立、健全各项管理制度,严禁打骂、体罚或者以其他方式侮辱被收容教育人员。被收容教育人员应当遵守收容教育所的各项管理制度,服从管理。

    第十三条 对被收容教育人员应当进行法律教育和道德教育,并组织他们参加生产劳动,学习生产技能,增强劳动观念。被收容教育人员参加生产劳动所获得的劳动收入,用于改善被收容教育人员的生活和收容教育所的建设。对参加生产劳动的被收容教育人员,可以按照规定支付一定的劳动报酬。收容教育所对劳动收入和支出应当单独建帐,严格管理。收容教育所应当实行文明管理,组织被收容教育人员开展有益的文化体育活动。

    第十四条 被收容教育人员在收容教育期间的生活费用一般由本人或者家属负担。

    第十五条 被收容教育人员入所时携带的物品需要由收容教育所保管的,收容教育所应当造册登记,妥善保管,在被收容教育人员离所时将原物交还本人。

    第十六条 收容教育所应当允许被收容教育人员的家属探访。被收容教育人员在收容教育期间,遇有子女出生、家属患严重疾病、死亡以及其他正当理由需要离所的,由其家属或者其所在单位担保并交纳保证金后,经所长批准,可以离所。离所期限一般不超过七日。保证金收取办法由公安部规定。

    第十七条 被收容教育人员在收容教育期间确有悔改表现或者有立功表现以及其他特殊情况的,可以给予表扬或者提前解除收容教育。需要提前解除收容教育的,由收容教育所提出意见,报原决定对其实行收容教育的公安机关批准。但是,提前解除收容教育的,实际执行的收容教育期限不得少于原决定收容教育期限的二分之一。

    第十八条 对拒绝接受教育或者不服从管理的被收容教育人员,可以给予警告或者延长收容教育期限。需要延长收容教育期限的,由收容教育所提出意见,报原决定对其实行收容教育的公安机关批准。但是,延长收容教育期限的,实际执行的收容教育期限最长不得超过二年。收容教育期间发现被收容教育人员有其他违法犯罪行为尚未处理的,依照有关法律、法规处理。

    第十九条 对收容教育期满的人员,应当按期解除收容教育,发给解除收容教育证明书,并通知其家属或者所在单位领回。

    第二十条 被收容教育人员对收容教育决定不服的,可以依法申请行政复议;对行政复议决定不服的,可以依照《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的规定向人民法院提起诉讼。*

    第二十一条 被收容教育人员在收容教育期间死亡的,应当由公安机关组织法医或者指定医生作出死亡鉴定,经同级人民检察院检验,报上一级公安机关和人民检察院备案,并填写死亡通知书,通知被收容教育人员家属、所在单位和户口所在地公安派出所;家属不予认领的,由公安机关拍照后处理。

    第二十二条 本办法由公安部负责解释。

    第二十三条 本办法自发布之日起施行。

    * 根据2011年《中华人民共和国国务院令(第588号)》第68、87条有修改。


    Collapse

  • Legal Education: Arbitrary Detention Doesn’t End with RTL

    A legal education class in Gansu province, March 15, 2013. Photo credit: Gzxw.com.cn

    Although much about China’s planned reform of reeducation through labor (RTL) remains uncertain, it seems quite likely that petitioning has been removed from the list of activities subject to RTL—or whatever new measure is chosen to replace it. On the surface, this looks like a victory for rule of law in China. For many years, individuals whose efforts to seek redress for grievances were deemed “abnormal” or “disruptive” faced being sent to RTL for one or two years without trial, legal representation, or effective means of appeal. However, even if petitioners no longer face RTL, the continuing imperative to “maintain stability” means that they still risk rights-violations through measures with even murkier basis in law.

    One of these measures are the “legal education classes” that have been used in China for more than a decade. Like RTL, they provide local authorities with a highly flexible means of dealing with certain individuals whose behavior is considered to be socially disruptive but that doesn’t meet the criteria for criminal prosecution or public-order punishment. Originally targeted at members of Falun Gong and other “cult organizations,” use of these classes has been more recently expanded to include those who engage in persistent, disruptive, or mass petitioning activity.

    For example, local authorities who believe that a person is planning to go to Beijing to petition can send him or her to a legal education class regardless of whether the person has taken any steps towards the capital. Compared with RTL, where the emphasis is on labor, legal education is primarily about “educating” attendees. Through a greater understanding of rules and regulations, participants are meant to be dissuaded from pursuing grievances through improper channels or pursuing matters that have officially been resolved.

    Like RTL, this period of “education” is compulsory. But unlike RTL, which despite its problematic legal foundation is still governed by a set of national rules and regulations, legal education classes appear to be based on a patchwork of local measures enacted in response to political directives. In 2006, Jiangsu Province designed a regime of education targeting petitioners called the “Three Make Clears.” Through this system, participants were meant to gain clarity on “national, provincial, and county circumstances”; the relevant legal provisions; and the serious social harm caused by abnormal petitioning.

    In some locations, legal education classes are held in fixed locations specially designated for the purpose. Other places hold classes in different venues depending on the number of “students,” which reportedly range from one or two to a dozen people.

    According to one man sent to a legal education class in Jiangsu in 2007, local authorities in charge of petitioning “tricked” him into attending the class by summoning him to discuss a matter related to his grievance. Held in an abandoned school dormitory for more than 10 days, he claims that he and his “classmates” were denied basic personal hygiene like bathing or tooth brushing, were not able to change their clothes, and were unable to contact family members. Each day, local officials would come to the school to lecture the “students,” who were forced to stay in the school for an indeterminate period—a matter of days in some cases, and months in others—ultimately dependent upon their “performance.”

    These deprivations of liberty are not implemented pursuant to any judicial decision and do not appear to be authorized by any duly enacted national legislation. There is no channel through which to challenge a decision to be “enrolled” in legal education. In other words, the system of legal education classes clearly violates China’s constitution and obligations under international human rights law.

    But legal education classes continue to play an important role in China’s “stability preservation” system. In Hebei Province’s Fengning Manchu Autonomous County, situated between Beijing’s northern suburbs and Inner Mongolia, plans were recently announced for establishing a legal education school. Though the plans do not reveal much about what happens at the institution, the involvement of a broad variety of law enforcement and social service agencies appears to reflect the recent shift towards a more comprehensive approach to “social management.”



    Implementation Plan for Establishing a Legal Education School: click to expand

    Fengning Manchu Autonomous County
    Implementation Plan for Establishing a Legal Education School

    The Fengning Manchu Autonomous County Legal Education School is a base established to resolve petitioning problems and carry out legal education for targeted petitioners from the county who either go to Beijing [to petition] or present the danger of going to Beijing to engage in abnormal petitioning. It [provides] centralized education for petitioners and an effective method for guiding them to resolve their problems through normal channels and ultimately preserving the stability of the petitioning [system]. In order to better realize the functions of this base for education and training and create beneficial conditions for stabilizing petitioning in the county, this implementation plan has been specifically drafted.

    I. Mission

    To set up a legal education school to strengthen legal education and publicity. To centralize resolution of the problems of a group of targeted persons who engage in persistent, disruptive, or long-term petitioning and who have the potential to go to Beijing or who have already gone to Beijing or the provincial capital to engage in abnormal petitioning. To employ all effective measures to achieve ultimate resolution of each case or matter and bring an end to each complaint and petition, in order to ensure that the work goal of the “six guarantees ” can be realized.

    II. Content of Study

    The [county] justice bureau shall take responsibility for inviting personnel to lecture people attending the [legal education school] from bodies such as the people’s congress committee on internal and judicial affairs, the government legal affairs office, the [local] people’s political consultative conference committee on social and legal affairs, the justice bureau, and the bureau of letters and visits on subjects such as the Regulations for Letters and Visits, the Public Order Administration Punishment Law, the Land Law, and the Policy on Rural Industries and arrange for enrollees to study such things as the relevant laws and policies, implementation regulations, and complaint procedures.

    III. Organization and Leadership

    A leadership small group is to be established for the Fengning Manchu Autonomous County legal education school, to be headed by county party committee standing committee member and politico-legal committee secretary Comrade Liu Haiping and with justice bureau chief Comrade Han Yiwen taking the leading role; this group takes full responsibility for all details of work at the school. The public security bureau, procuratorate, court, bureau of letters and visits, health bureau, finance bureau, and other relevant departments participate jointly and assist with the work of the school in accordance with their respective competencies. Of these, the public security bureau, justice bureau, bureau of letters and visits, and health bureau shall each arrange for a member of their [leadership] teams to direct classes at the school.

    IV. Personnel Arrangement

    The justice bureau is requested to assign six employees; the bureau of letters and visits is to assign three employees; the public security bureau, procuratorate, and court are to deploy 12 police officers [in total]; the health bureau is to assign two hygiene and epidemic-prevention workers; and for each student, two accompanying persons are to be deployed from [his or her] township, town, or unit. Beyond this, it will be necessary to hire five logistics service employees.

    V. Related Responsibilities

    1. The justice bureau is responsible for drawing up a corresponding work plan and a system and discipline [measures] for workers; responsible for the routine work of study classes such as organizing the study records and verifying the identities of enrolled persons, handling formalities for enrollment and discharge, and making arrangements for facilities; and responsible for the education and study of enrollees and arranging the content of the curriculum.
    2. The public security bureau is responsible for security and maintaining order within the legal education [school] and in the surrounding area. There should be a guaranteed contingent of 12 police officers (deployed from the public security bureau, procuratorate, and court) arranged to be on long-term duty at the school. They should also assist employees of the [school] to carry out such work as security screening and one-by-one inspection of persons participating in the courses.
    3. The bureau of letters and visits is responsible for coordinating with the relevant departments and township and town [governments] to resolve the problems of targeted petitioners participating in the courses.
    4. The health bureau is responsible for work related to hygiene and medical treatment for the legal education classes. Two health workers shall be permanently assigned to work at the [school] with supplies of routine and emergency medicines and essential medical equipment. They are responsible for health checks and routine medical treatment of enrollees. The epidemic-prevention unit shall carry out advance inspections of the school and be responsible for monitoring food service and hygiene and epidemic-prevention work in order to prevent the occurrence of food poisoning and other such incidents.
    5. The finance bureau is responsible for ensuring funding for the school.
    6. Township or town [governments] or relevant departments are responsible for transporting targeted petitioners to study at the school. They should strictly control the use of study classes to ensure that those sent to study classes are targeted people whose problems have been satisfactorily resolved but who insist on carrying out persistent or disruptive petitioning or who organize mass petitioning and those who present serious risk of going to Beijing to carry out abnormal petitioning. Township or town [governments] or departments shall assign two employees per enrollee to be responsible for accompanying the enrollee and keeping continual track of his or her progress, adjusting his or her attitude, and strictly preventing the occurrence of problems such as self-mutilation, suicide, or flight.

    VI. Related Institutions (Attached)

    Establish and improve rules and regulations. Establish a System of Employee Work, a System of Security Personnel Work, a System of Health Personnel Work, and a System of Accompanying Personnel Work.

    Chinese Source(原文):
    丰宁满族自治县法制教育学校建设实施方案
    发布日期:2012年5月30日
    http://wwww.fn.gov.cn/sfj/ShowInfo.asp?InfoID=3001
    Click on icon to expand

    丰宁满族自治县
    法制教育学校建设实施方案

    丰宁满族自治县法制教育学校是针对全县进京或有进京非正常上访隐患的重点信访人员建立的解决信访问题和进行法制教育的基地,是集中对信访人员进行教育,引导其通过正常途径解决问题、最终维护信访稳定的有效手段。为更好的发挥教育培训基地功能,为做好全县的信访稳定工作创造有利条件,特制订此实施方案。

    一、目标要求

    通过开办法制教育学校,加大法制教育宣传力度,要集中解决一批有进京非访苗头或已经进京赴省非访的重点缠访、闹访和老上访人员问题,要采取一切可行措施,最终实现案结事了,息诉罢访,确保实现“六个确保”工作目标。

    二、学习内容

    由司法局负责,聘请人大内务司法委、政府法制办、政协社会法制委、司法局、信访局等单位工作人员对入班学员讲解《信访条例》、《社会治安管理处罚法》、《土地法》、《农村产业政策》等课程,组织他们学习相关法律政策、法规细则、申诉程序等方面知识。

    三、组织领导

    成立丰宁满族自治县法制教育学校领导小组,由县委常委、政法委书记刘海平同志任组长,由司法局局长韩亦文同志牵头,全权负责学校的各项具体工作。公安局、检察院、法院、信访局、卫生局、财政局等相关部门共同参与,依照职责协助做好学校各项工作。其中,公安局、司法局、信访局、卫生局各安排一名班子成员在学校带班指挥。

    四、人员安排

    要求司法局安排6名工作人员,信访局安排3名工作人员,公检法抽调12名警力,卫生局安排2名卫生防疫人员,每名学员由乡镇或部门抽调两名陪护人员。除此以外,还需雇5名后勤服务人员。

    五、相关职责

    (一)司法局负责制定相应的工作方案及工作人员纪律和制度,负责做好进班人员的学习记录整理、身份核实、进出班手续办理、房间安排等学习班日常事务工作,负责进班人员学习教育、课程内容安排。

    (二)公安局负责法制教育学习班内部及周边的安全保卫和维持秩序工作。要保证安排12名警力(从公安局、检察院、法院抽调)长期值班,同时协助学习班工作人员做好进班人员的安检、排查等工作。

    (三)信访局负责协调相关部门、乡镇解决进班重点信访人员的问题。

    (四)卫生局负责法制教育学习班的医疗卫生等相关工作。要委派2名医务人员常驻学习班,配备常用及应急药品和必备的医疗器具,负责对入班学员体检和日常医护工作;防疫部门要提前到学习班进行检查,负责监餐和卫生防疫工作,防止食物中毒等事件发生。

    (五)财政局负责学校的资金保障工作。

    (六)各乡镇、有关部门负责输送重点信访人员进行学习。严把进班人员关口,要真正把那些问题已解决到位,但仍坚持缠访、闹访、组织串联集体上访并有重大进京非正常访隐患的重点人员送到学习班。各乡镇、部门要为每名进班学员安排2名工作人员、负责对学员进行陪护,随时掌握学员的动态,调整学员心态,严防自残、自杀、出走等问题的发生。

    六、相关制度(附后)

    建立健全规章制度。建立《工作人员工作制度》,《保卫人员工作制度》,《医护人员工作制度》,《陪护人员工作制度》。


    Collapse