Tag: accountability

  • How Transparency in Death Penalty Cases Can Reduce Wrongful Convictions

    He Jiahong (right) speaking on a forum at the “World Day Against Death Penalty”, October 2014.

    He Jiahong is a special kind of Chinese legal expert. He is a well-known legal scholar at Renmin University Law School in Beijing, where he specializes in criminal justice and the issue of wrongful convictions. He is also the author of detective novels and writes prolifically on legal subjects for popular audiences. He reportedly likes to describe himself as: “I am not only a jurist but a novelist, so I often have novel ideas about law.”

    One of the ways in which He Jiahong expresses those ideas is through his public WeChat channel—a blog distributed to anyone who subscribes via the social media platform. Recently, he posted a piece with the rather provocative title: “The Number of Executions Should be Made Public.”

    In China’s criminal justice discourse, public calls for greater transparency around the use of the death penalty are not unheard of but are nevertheless eye-catching when they do appear, especially from well-known legal experts such as He. Information related to the death penalty, including the number of executions carried out each year, continue to be treated as a closely guarded “state secret.” This is despite the fact that there are many indications that China has significantly reduced its use of capital punishment over the past decade—though it is still generally believed to be the world’s top executioner—and continues to face pressure from NGOs and United Nations human rights bodies to be more transparent about its use of the death penalty.

    Changsha Court public announcement of death sentences. Source: Hu Guiyun.

    He Jiahong raises some familiar arguments in support of greater transparency about capital punishment in China, including the importance of preventing wrongful executions, demonstrating the progress made in reducing the use of the death penalty, and the value of facilitating public discussion about the future of capital punishment. He clearly believes that openness and greater transparency will help build public trust in the judiciary and show respect for the public’s right to access such information.

    He notes that the trend towards online publicization of court documents is making secrecy about capital punishment irrelevant. On this point, he is perhaps overly optimistic. Dui Hua and other organizations that have tried to use online platforms like the Supreme People’s Court’s national database of court judgments have found it seriously lacking when it comes to information about cases involving the death penalty and other “sensitive” subjects.

    This suggests that the trend toward judicial transparency is already bound by pre-set limits on what information is considered “appropriate” for public disclosure. If the Chinese government were to do as He Jiahong recommends and make data about capital punishment public, it would first have to make the top-down decision to lift secrecy restrictions. The hope of a shortcut to judicial transparency through the release of court data is unlikely given such secrecy restrictions.

    *

    The Number of Executions Should be Made Public

    He Jiahong

    He Jiahong, professor at Renmin University School of Law. Source: Financial Times.

    On April 27, 1987, a dismembered female corpse was found in the Mianjiang River of Mayang County, Hunan. After searching missing-person’s reports, identification by family members, and blood-type analysis, the police confirmed that the deceased was a woman from Guizhou named Shi Xiaorong who had been missing for a month after working at a local hotel.

    After several months of investigation, police determined, based on the manner in which the culprit had dismembered the corpse that the killer was a butcher named Teng Xingshan… On December 6, police placed Teng Xingshan under custody and investigation. Following continuous interrogation, Teng finally “confessed.” On December 13, 1988, the Huaihua Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Teng Xingshan to death. On January 19, 1989, the Hunan Higher People’s Court rejected Teng’s appeal, upheld the original verdict, and approved his death sentence.

    In order to ensure that the death penalty is applied impartially and correctly, Chinese law mandates a special review and ratification procedure for death penalty cases, on the principle of a two-stage judicial process of trial and appeal. According to the provisions of the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law, death sentences with two-year reprieve were to be reviewed by high people’s courts and death sentences with immediate execution were to be reviewed by the Supreme People’s Court. Regardless of whether or not the defendant filed an appeal, cases involving the death penalty would all be subject to an automatic review process. In 1983, in an effort to “strike hard and fast” against criminal acts that seriously endangered public security and social order, the Supreme People’s Court delegated the power to review death sentences for homicide, rape, robbery, setting explosions, and other serious crimes to high people’s courts. To a certain degree, this led to a loosening of the review and control procedures over the death penalty. Since high people’s courts in provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions were generally the courts hearing appeals in death penalty cases, delegation of the power to review these cases meant that the same court became responsible for hearing the appeal and carrying out the final review. The review and ratification process that had been originally intended as a way to strictly control use of the death penalty became effectively meaningless.

    Teng Xingshan’s case was handled under the combined “two-in-one” process of appeal trial and death sentence approval that existed during that particular period of Chinese law. On January 28, 1989, Teng Xingshan was executed by gunshot. However, that wasn’t the end of the case, because the so-called “victim” was still alive and would later “come back to life.”

    In 1993, Shi Xiaorong finally made it home to Guizhou after having been abducted and trafficked to Shandong. When she heard about the Teng Xingshan case, she said that she didn’t even know Teng, and certainly did not have any “dubious relationship” with him. She even wrote to the Hunan court, asking it to revoke its mistaken judgment that she had “dubious relations” with Teng Xingshan, had been “murdered” by him, and demanded compensation for her reputation damage. But there was no response from the court. Shi now has a new life and no longer cares about an old case that has nothing to do with her.

    News that the “dead had come back to life” eventually reached Teng Xingshan’s family. Teng’s parents had both died not long after their son had been executed. His brother figured that because their family was poor and ordinary they should not oppose the government. Not wanting to make trouble for himself, he decided not to mention the matter to anyone outside the family. In 2004, Teng Xingshan’s daughter Teng Yan had already grown up and worked as a migrant laborer for many years. After she learned the truth about what had happened, she and her younger brother Teng Hui, with help from a lawyer, filed a motion for appeal with the Hunan Provincial Procuratorate and Hunan High People’s Court. On October 25, 2005, the Hunan Higher People’s Court ordered a retrial in Teng Xingshan’s homicide trial and formally acquitted him of the charges. Teng Yan and Teng Hui received state and other compensations in the amount of 666,660 yuan (approximately US$85,000 at the time).

    At the time, the National People’s Congress Legislative Affairs Commission was organizing experts and scholars to study ways of reforming the Criminal Procedure Law, and the death penalty review procedure was one of the areas that everyone was paying close attention to. There’s no question that the Teng Xingshan case played a role in pushing forward reform of the death penalty review system. The Supreme People’s Court decided from January 1, 2007, to take back the authority to review death sentences in all cases.

    It’s now been 10 years since the reform of the death penalty review system. I was recently asked how I’d evaluate this reform. I said that it’s certainly been very positive, but I would have a hard time saying for sure. I believe that, since the power to review death sentences was returned to the Supreme People’s Court, the death penalty has definitely been applied with much greater strictness, in greater accordance with the rules, and in a more uniform manner. And the number of executions has certainly also decreased by a great deal. But because I don’t know the specific details, it’s impossible to comment in an objective and precise way.

    In China, the number of executions seems to be treated as a kind of “state secret”. Those in the know remain tight-lipped on the subject, while those on the outside let their imaginations run wild. In my opinion, there’s no reason to treat the number of executions as a “state secret.” All death sentences in China are handed down and executed openly and in accordance with the law. It’s all perfectly open and aboveboard—executions are not carried out in secret or indiscriminately. Why does the government choose to be so secretive and why is it afraid of keeping the public informed? Disclosing the number of executions will not stain the reputation of the judicial organs or lead to social unrest. Tempered by their experience of numerous wars and disasters, Chinese people surely are psychologically resilient enough to face up to the number of executions!

    On this point, policymakers ought to abandon their antiquated ideas of closed-door justice and embrace the modern judicial norms of transparency. Practical experience shows that openness is the best publicity and offers the best route to foster public trust. Publishing execution numbers also demonstrates judicial organs’ respect for citizens’ right to access information (zhiqingquan).

    Actually, the Chinese judiciary has already made progress on this front, as court verdicts have begun to be published online! As a technical matter, when court verdicts are all online it won’t be that difficult to use “big data” technology to tally up the number of executions. Even if officials don’t make it public, the public can still find out. Therefore, I recommend that the Supreme People’s Court choose the right moment to begin publishing the number of executions. This can demonstrate the Chinese government’s resolve and sincerity in facing up to capital punishment and promoting civilized justice.

    At the present time, there are more than 140 countries and regions in the world that have abolished the death penalty either by law or in practice. This shows that abolishing the death penalty is the general trend of human society because it is in line with the general spirit of humanitarianism and civilized justice. Furthermore, abolishing the death penalty is an effective way to prevent wrongful executions of innocent people. For judicial personnel, “no unjust treatment, no indulging wrongdoings” is but a beautiful tale/lore. Police, prosecutors and judges aren’t supernatural beings, and making the incorrect decisions when evidence is lacking is something that cannot be entirely avoided. Therefore, to prevent further miscarriages of justice in which innocent people are mistakenly put to death, we should seriously consider abolishing capital punishment.

    I am deeply aware that China cannot abolish the death penalty at the current time, but we should have an earnest discussion about the issue and, through our efforts, make more of our fellow Chinese understand that the death penalty is not perfectly justified. Our government ought to make a solemn pledge to the world that China will make an effort to abolish the death penalty and that it will start by making the number of executions public so that the world can see the progress of China’s death penalty policies. After several years of continued hard work, China will go from “executing fewer” to “no executions” to full abolition of capital punishment, once again making China one of the most civilized, humane, and harmonious countries in the world!

  • The “Hidden Rules” of China’s Criminal Justice System

    Rule of Law was a centerpiece of the Fourth Plenum meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP in October 2014. Image Credit: Getty Images.

    Xi Jinping made judicial reform a priority item on his agenda after fully taking power in 2013. He promised to “construct a rule-of-law country” and repeatedly emphasized the need for governing with respect to Chinese law and the constitution. Legal institutions were the focus of the “Fourth Plenum” meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2014, which pledged to “strive to let the popular masses feel justice in every court case.” Since then, efforts have been undertaken to “deepen” reform of the country’s legal institutions and officials have been served notice to achieve their reform targets before the upcoming 19th Party Congress later this year.

    In the run up to the 19th Party Congress, we should expect to hear more talk of the great achievements and successful reforms of China’s judicial system. In February, the Supreme People’s Court released a white paper on judicial reform describing its progress in improving the efficiency, accountability, and transparency of the judicial system and declaring that 63 of the 65 reform goals it had set for itself to achieve by 2018 had already been basically accomplished by the end of 2016.

    The reform of China’s law-enforcement and judicial institutions has certainly made some progress in recent years, but are there problems in the country’s legal system that remain untouched by these reforms and continue to undermine the ability of those institutions to deliver justice?

    According to Professor Chen Ruihua, an expert on criminal procedure law at Peking University Law School, the answer is a resounding yes. In a recent blog post, widely circulated online, Chen observes that there are 17 “hidden rules” that govern how the Chinese criminal justice system “really” operates. These rules describe a system of collusion between institutions intended to check each other’s powers, courts that are fundamentally biased against defendants, and a coordinated effort to limit the impact of defense lawyers.

    A list like this is clearly not meant to be analytical, though Chen has spoken and written quite frankly and at length on the flaws he observes in China’s criminal justice system. At a time of renewed ideological attacks against judicial independence and separation of powers, it takes courage to even raise the possibility that the progress of Chinese legal reform is not everything it’s made out to be.

    *

    17 “Hidden Rules” of China’s Criminal Justice System

    In the Chinese criminal justice system, the “gong-jian-fa” institutions (public security, procuratorate, and courts) follow a set of “hidden rules” outside of the formal legal system. These “hidden rules” have great vitality and have operated over a long period of time, making it difficult to change them despite revisions to the criminal procedure law or even judicial reforms. Professor Chen Ruihua sums up these “hidden rules” as follows:

    1. The investigative organs will only file a case for investigation when that case has already been solved.
    2. Most of the public security organ’s criminal investigation activity is completed before issuing the decision to arrest.
    3. The vast majority of cases are only solved after obtaining a confession of guilt by the suspect.
    4. If it were not for the purposeful restriction of the rights of defense lawyers and the extralegal detention measures against suspects, solving criminal cases would be extremely difficult for the majority of investigative organs.
    5. Compared to plaintiffs in civil trials, the public prosecutor in a criminal trial has a far stronger appetite for “winning”.
    6. When a case lacks clear facts or evidence, the procuratorate would rather withdraw the prosecution than allow the court to acquit the defendant.
    7. Almost all police and procurators treat defense lawyers with a certain degree of hostility.
    8. When a case lacks clear facts or evidence, courts will generally issue decisions that “give lenient punishment when there is doubt” or “remand for retrial;” the “presumption of innocence” is an extremely rare exception.
    9. Nearly all first-instance trials proceed by reading the record of criminal investigation aloud.
    10. In cases where the defendant hasn’t put forward enough exculpatory evidence, the court’s judgement is basically a kind of process to affirm the conclusions of the investigators and prosecutors.
    11. The vast majority of criminal judges lean toward the side of prosecution and will do everything they can to avoid allowing a “guilty” defendant to escape justice.
    12. Judgments in the vast majority of cases are reached outside of the trial process.
    13. The vast majority of judges turn a blind eye to procedural violations of law made by police, procurators, and first-instance trial judges.
    14. When a defendant refuses to admit guilt during the investigation or trial phases, it becomes a significant basis for the court to impose a more severe punishment.
    15. In the vast majority of cases it is a “responsible” judge that makes the judgement decision.
    16. Judges would rather write extremely detailed “trial conclusion reports” than provide detailed reasoning for their judgments.
    17. Whether it is the individual police, procurator, judge, or the “gong-jian-fa” organs, each has a direct interest in how criminal cases are decided.
  • The “Hidden Rules” of China’s Criminal Justice System

    Rule of Law was a centerpiece of the Fourth Plenum meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP in October 2014. Image Credit: Getty Images.

    Xi Jinping made judicial reform a priority item on his agenda after fully taking power in 2013. He promised to “construct a rule-of-law country” and repeatedly emphasized the need for governing with respect to Chinese law and the constitution. Legal institutions were the focus of the “Fourth Plenum” meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2014, which pledged to “strive to let the popular masses feel justice in every court case.” Since then, efforts have been undertaken to “deepen” reform of the country’s legal institutions and officials have been served notice to achieve their reform targets before the upcoming 19th Party Congress later this year.

    In the run up to the 19th Party Congress, we should expect to hear more talk of the great achievements and successful reforms of China’s judicial system. In February, the Supreme People’s Court released a white paper on judicial reform describing its progress in improving the efficiency, accountability, and transparency of the judicial system and declaring that 63 of the 65 reform goals it had set for itself to achieve by 2018 had already been basically accomplished by the end of 2016.

    The reform of China’s law-enforcement and judicial institutions has certainly made some progress in recent years, but are there problems in the country’s legal system that remain untouched by these reforms and continue to undermine the ability of those institutions to deliver justice?

    According to Professor Chen Ruihua, an expert on criminal procedure law at Peking University Law School, the answer is a resounding yes. In a recent blog post, widely circulated online, Chen observes that there are 17 “hidden rules” that govern how the Chinese criminal justice system “really” operates. These rules describe a system of collusion between institutions intended to check each other’s powers, courts that are fundamentally biased against defendants, and a coordinated effort to limit the impact of defense lawyers.

    A list like this is clearly not meant to be analytical, though Chen has spoken and written quite frankly and at length on the flaws he observes in China’s criminal justice system. At a time of renewed ideological attacks against judicial independence and separation of powers, it takes courage to even raise the possibility that the progress of Chinese legal reform is not everything it’s made out to be.

    *

    17 “Hidden Rules” of China’s Criminal Justice System

    In the Chinese criminal justice system, the “gong-jian-fa” institutions (public security, procuratorate, and courts) follow a set of “hidden rules” outside of the formal legal system. These “hidden rules” have great vitality and have operated over a long period of time, making it difficult to change them despite revisions to the criminal procedure law or even judicial reforms. Professor Chen Ruihua sums up these “hidden rules” as follows:

    • The investigative organs will only file a case for investigation when that case has already been solved.

    • Most of the public security organ’s criminal investigation activity is completed before issuing the decision to arrest.

    • The vast majority of cases are only solved after obtaining a confession of guilt by the suspect.

    • If it were not for the purposeful restriction of the rights of defense lawyers and the extralegal detention measures against suspects, solving criminal cases would be extremely difficult for the majority of investigative organs.

    • Compared to plaintiffs in civil trials, the public prosecutor in a criminal trial has a far stronger appetite for “winning”.

    • When a case lacks clear facts or evidence, the procuratorate would rather withdraw the prosecution than allow the court to acquit the defendant.

    • Almost all police and procurators treat defense lawyers with a certain degree of hostility.

    • When a case lacks clear facts or evidence, courts will generally issue decisions that “give lenient punishment when there is doubt” or “remand for retrial;” the “presumption of innocence” is an extremely rare exception.

    • Nearly all first-instance trials proceed by reading the record of criminal investigation aloud.

    • In cases where the defendant hasn’t put forward enough exculpatory evidence, the court’s judgement is basically a kind of process to affirm the conclusions of the investigators and prosecutors.

    • The vast majority of criminal judges lean toward the side of prosecution and will do everything they can to avoid allowing a “guilty” defendant to escape justice.

    • Judgments in the vast majority of cases are reached outside of the trial process.

    • The vast majority of judges turn a blind eye to procedural violations of law made by police, procurators, and first-instance trial judges.

    • When a defendant refuses to admit guilt during the investigation or trial phases, it becomes a significant basis for the court to impose a more severe punishment.

    • In the vast majority of cases it is a “responsible” judge that makes the judgement decision.

    • Judges would rather write extremely detailed “trial conclusion reports” than provide detailed reasoning for their judgments.

    • Whether it is the individual police, procurator, judge, or the “gong-jian-fa” organs, each has a direct interest in how criminal cases are decided.
  • Leping 5.24 Murder Case: Wrongfully Convicted Seek Justice From Those Responsible

    In May 2015, lawyers and activists protesting outside of Jiangxi High Court for the right to review the Leping case file. Source: ifeng.com, China Digital Times

    On January 16, a group of lawyers filed a criminal complaint with prosecutors in Jiangxi Province against law-enforcement and judicial personnel responsible for one of China’s most infamous cases of wrongful conviction. There is yet no word on whether prosecutors will act on the complaint.

    Late last year in the city of Leping, four men were acquitted of murder and rape, charges dating back to a sensational case from May 2000 involving the murder and dismemberment of a man and a woman. Local police came under serious pressure to solve the case after it went unsolved for two years, leading them to arrest Huang Zhiqiang, Fang Chunping, Cheng Fagen, and Cheng Lihe in 2002. These men have spent most of the last decade and a half behind bars, many of those years awaiting execution.

    The former defendants in what became known as the “Leping 5.24 murder case” were convicted of murder, rape, and robbery and sentenced to death by the Jingdezhen Intermediate People’s Court. That verdict was overturned on appeal, and the case was sent back for retrial after the defendants alleged that their confessions had been obtained through torture. Despite the continued insistence that torture had taken place and inconsistencies in the defendants’ testimonies, death sentences were handed down again in 2004, only to be suspended by a two-year reprieve on appeal.

    In 2011, the allegations of torture gained more credibility after a suspect in another criminal case confessed to having committed the crimes for which the four men had been convicted. Despite this confession, it still took officials another four years to reopen the case, and even then the defendants’ lawyers were prevented from accessing necessary case files. Meanwhile, lawyers and family members held a weeklong demonstration outside the provincial court as well as nightly candlelight vigils.

    The lawyers’ protest took place amidst an ongoing crackdown of rights lawyers in China, who employ pressure tactics such as mobilizing public opinion to seek justice. In fact, an activist named Wu Gan—known more commonly by his online name, “Super Vulgar Butcher”—was detained in connection with the courthouse protest and now awaits trial on charges of subversion in Tianjin.

    Neither the lawyers’ protest nor the charges facing Wu Gan feature in a recent opinion piece in The Beijing News, in which lawyer Ruan Ziwen focuses on the justice still due these four men following their release. Victims of earlier cases of wrongful conviction and even wrongful execution have received state compensation following their exoneration. Ruan makes it clear that compensation is not enough; accountability is also needed if there is to be any hope of changing the behavior of law enforcement officials and judicial personnel and preventing wrongful convictions.

    The authorities in Jiangxi should be given credit for acknowledging past mistakes in the Leping case and righting the wrong that has been done. But it should not be forgotten that the four original defendants in the Leping case are free today largely because of the efforts of lawyers and others who continuously fought to challenge the conviction and demand justice. In China’s current legal environment, where questioning a court decision can be construed as a challenge to judicial authority or even be considered a politically subversive act, it remains to be seen how many lawyers will continue to stand up on behalf of defendants like those in the Leping case.

    *

    It is Right and Proper for Victims of Injustice to File Complaints

    Ruan Ziwen
    The Beijing News, January 17, 2017

    According to The Beijing Times social media channel, the five men wrongfully convicted in the “Leping 5.24 Murder Case”, together with their lawyers, have filed a criminal complaint with the Jiangxi Procuratorate, accusing police and procurators of “intentional homicide” and the Jiangxi High Court judge, who originally handed down the sentence against Huang Zhiqiang and three other defendants of “bending the law for personal interest”. The complainants have requested that their allegations be submitted to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and that provincial law enforcement and judicial authorities completely recuse themselves from the case.

    The difficult step, taken by these victims of wrongful conviction with the help of lawyers, to file these criminal complaints has immeasurable practical significance and social impact.

    The past few years have seen the reversal of a number of wrongful conviction cases with major national influence. Not too long ago, the defendants in the Leping case were acquitted by the Jiangxi High Court. According to the provisions of the State Compensation Law, victims of wrongful conviction may seek compensation ranging from a few million yuan to tens of millions. In cases ranging from the Huugjilt case, to the case of the uncle and nephew surnamed Zhang, to the Nie Shubin case, the victims or their immediate family members all applied for state compensation, however none filed criminal complaints against those responsible for the case.

    From a technical legal perspective, there are challenges involving discovery and making a legal case that must be overcome in order to prove criminal wrongdoing by someone carrying out their duties in the handling of a case. From a practical legal standpoint, without institutional safeguards or effective oversight mechanisms, it is also difficult to get law enforcement or judicial bodies to bring “their own” to justice. It is therefore not hard to understand the sense of helplessness that makes victims of injustice unwilling to initiate complaint procedures.

    Despite this environment, the victims of injustice in the Leping case were still willing to file their complaints. The key significance of their action is that they are claiming their inherent rights. At the present, when a country governed by laws [is advocated], there is long-lasting value in using an individual case such as this to force law-enforcement personnel and judicial authorities to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate in accordance with the law.

    If we take a moment to sift through the wrongful convictions that have been overturned in the past few years, we find that nearly all of them involved coercion of confessions through torture, insufficient evidence, or unclear facts. Nevertheless, contrary to the rule of law, the investigation, prosecution, and adjudication processes all managed to produce a guilty verdict and force victims to either die an unjust death or spend years in prison for crimes they didn’t commit. It’s hard to chalk this up simply to a lack of professional quality among those who handled the case; sometimes, the problem is that those handling the case perverted the course of justice.

    Reasonably speaking, the exercise of the Leping victims’ rights is both justified and normal. In compliance with the law, the Jiang Xi legal authorities should grant them adequate protection and response.

    Even though many wrongful convictions are connected to institutional problems, inadequacies of laws and regulations, or even human interventions and policies, these things cannot be used as excuses for legal officials to evade responsibility in handling cases. The legitimacy of how evidence is obtained, the proper finding of facts, and the proper application of the law have all been explicitly formulated in the provisions of both substantive and procedural law, even when we look at the legal provisions from 10 or 20 years ago.

    It’s possible that some of the people responsible for these miscarriages of justice lacked respect in the law or lacked faith in the idea of in judicial fairness. If that’s the case, the malicious intent behind their deliberate actions and perversions of the law will be relatively evident.

    No matter what the outcome will be, the fact that the victims of the Leping wrongful conviction case have filed their complaint ought to get the attention of those who design the legal system. It also ought to alert those in the judicial and law-enforcement agencies of the need, in the future operation of the legal system, to reduce and eliminate wrongful convictions and give due legal punishment to those legal personnel responsible for making those wrongful convictions.

  • Leping 5.24 Murder Case: Wrongfully Convicted Seek Justice From Those Responsible

    In May 2015, lawyers and activists protesting outside of Jiangxi High Court for the right to review the Leping case file. Source: ifeng.com, China Digital Times

    On January 16, a group of lawyers filed a criminal complaint with prosecutors in Jiangxi Province against law-enforcement and judicial personnel responsible for one of China’s most infamous cases of wrongful conviction. There is yet no word on whether prosecutors will act on the complaint.

    Late last year in the city of Leping, four men were acquitted of murder and rape, charges dating back to a sensational case from May 2000 involving the murder and dismemberment of a man and a woman. Local police came under serious pressure to solve the case after it went unsolved for two years, leading them to arrest Huang Zhiqiang, Fang Chunping, Cheng Fagen, and Cheng Lihe in 2002. These men have spent most of the last decade and a half behind bars, many of those years awaiting execution.

    The former defendants in what became known as the “Leping 5.24 murder case” were convicted of murder, rape, and robbery and sentenced to death by the Jingdezhen Intermediate People’s Court. That verdict was overturned on appeal, and the case was sent back for retrial after the defendants alleged that their confessions had been obtained through torture. Despite the continued insistence that torture had taken place and inconsistencies in the defendants’ testimonies, death sentences were handed down again in 2004, only to be suspended by a two-year reprieve on appeal.

    In 2011, the allegations of torture gained more credibility after a suspect in another criminal case confessed to having committed the crimes for which the four men had been convicted. Despite this confession, it still took officials another four years to reopen the case, and even then the defendants’ lawyers were prevented from accessing necessary case files. Meanwhile, lawyers and family members held a weeklong demonstration outside the provincial court as well as nightly candlelight vigils.

    The lawyers’ protest took place amidst an ongoing crackdown of rights lawyers in China, who employ pressure tactics such as mobilizing public opinion to seek justice. In fact, an activist named Wu Gan—known more commonly by his online name, “Super Vulgar Butcher”—was detained in connection with the courthouse protest and now awaits trial on charges of subversion in Tianjin.

    Neither the lawyers’ protest nor the charges facing Wu Gan feature in a recent opinion piece in The Beijing News, in which lawyer Ruan Ziwen focuses on the justice still due these four men following their release. Victims of earlier cases of wrongful conviction and even wrongful execution have received state compensation following their exoneration. Ruan makes it clear that compensation is not enough; accountability is also needed if there is to be any hope of changing the behavior of law enforcement officials and judicial personnel and preventing wrongful convictions.

    The authorities in Jiangxi should be given credit for acknowledging past mistakes in the Leping case and righting the wrong that has been done. But it should not be forgotten that the four original defendants in the Leping case are free today largely because of the efforts of lawyers and others who continuously fought to challenge the conviction and demand justice. In China’s current legal environment, where questioning a court decision can be construed as a challenge to judicial authority or even be considered a politically subversive act, it remains to be seen how many lawyers will continue to stand up on behalf of defendants like those in the Leping case.

    *

    It is Right and Proper for Victims of Injustice to File Complaints

    Ruan Ziwen
    The Beijing News, January 17, 2017

    According to The Beijing Times social media channel, the five men wrongfully convicted in the “Leping 5.24 Murder Case”, together with their lawyers, have filed a criminal complaint with the Jiangxi Procuratorate, accusing police and procurators of “intentional homicide” and the Jiangxi High Court judge, who originally handed down the sentence against Huang Zhiqiang and three other defendants of “bending the law for personal interest”. The complainants have requested that their allegations be submitted to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and that provincial law enforcement and judicial authorities completely recuse themselves from the case.

    The difficult step, taken by these victims of wrongful conviction with the help of lawyers, to file these criminal complaints has immeasurable practical significance and social impact.

    The past few years have seen the reversal of a number of wrongful conviction cases with major national influence. Not too long ago, the defendants in the Leping case were acquitted by the Jiangxi High Court. According to the provisions of the State Compensation Law, victims of wrongful conviction may seek compensation ranging from a few million yuan to tens of millions. In cases ranging from the Huugjilt case, to the case of the uncle and nephew surnamed Zhang, to the Nie Shubin case, the victims or their immediate family members all applied for state compensation, however none filed criminal complaints against those responsible for the case.

    From a technical legal perspective, there are challenges involving discovery and making a legal case that must be overcome in order to prove criminal wrongdoing by someone carrying out their duties in the handling of a case. From a practical legal standpoint, without institutional safeguards or effective oversight mechanisms, it is also difficult to get law enforcement or judicial bodies to bring “their own” to justice. It is therefore not hard to understand the sense of helplessness that makes victims of injustice unwilling to initiate complaint procedures.

    Despite this environment, the victims of injustice in the Leping case were still willing to file their complaints. The key significance of their action is that they are claiming their inherent rights. At the present, when a country governed by laws [is advocated], there is long-lasting value in using an individual case such as this to force law-enforcement personnel and judicial authorities to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate in accordance with the law.

    If we take a moment to sift through the wrongful convictions that have been overturned in the past few years, we find that nearly all of them involved coercion of confessions through torture, insufficient evidence, or unclear facts. Nevertheless, contrary to the rule of law, the investigation, prosecution, and adjudication processes all managed to produce a guilty verdict and force victims to either die an unjust death or spend years in prison for crimes they didn’t commit. It’s hard to chalk this up simply to a lack of professional quality among those who handled the case; sometimes, the problem is that those handling the case perverted the course of justice.

    Reasonably speaking, the exercise of the Leping victims’ rights is both justified and normal. In compliance with the law, the Jiang Xi legal authorities should grant them adequate protection and response.

    Even though many wrongful convictions are connected to institutional problems, inadequacies of laws and regulations, or even human interventions and policies, these things cannot be used as excuses for legal officials to evade responsibility in handling cases. The legitimacy of how evidence is obtained, the proper finding of facts, and the proper application of the law have all been explicitly formulated in the provisions of both substantive and procedural law, even when we look at the legal provisions from 10 or 20 years ago.

    It’s possible that some of the people responsible for these miscarriages of justice lacked respect in the law or lacked faith in the idea of in judicial fairness. If that’s the case, the malicious intent behind their deliberate actions and perversions of the law will be relatively evident.

    No matter what the outcome will be, the fact that the victims of the Leping wrongful conviction case have filed their complaint ought to get the attention of those who design the legal system. It also ought to alert those in the judicial and law-enforcement agencies of the need, in the future operation of the legal system, to reduce and eliminate wrongful convictions and give due legal punishment to those legal personnel responsible for making those wrongful convictions.

  • The Case of Feng Zhiming: A Question of Accountability

    Li Sanren and Shang Aiyun, parents of Huugjilt, who was wrongly executed for rape and murder at age 18. Image credit: China Daily

    On October 18, a court in Inner Mongolia sentenced the former deputy police chief of Hohhot, Feng Zhiming, to 18 years in prison. Feng’s conviction on charges of corruption, taking bribes, having large amounts of property that cannot be accounted for, and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition made national headlines, in part because of his connection to one of China’s most infamous cases of wrongful conviction and execution of an innocent person— the case of Huugjilt.

    Huugjilt was executed in 1996 for the rape and murder of a woman whose body he had reported finding in a public toilet. The case against the 18-year-old Huugjilt moved swiftly through the criminal justice system, taking just over two months from the time of his arrest to his execution. Law-enforcement authorities considered it an open-and-shut case, based mainly on the strength of the defendant’s confession, allegedly made while he was in custody. The key players responsible for steering Huugjilt’s case through the system went on to receive promotions and commendations. But in 2005, a serial murderer confessed to the crime. When authorities reviewed the case they determined that Huugjilt had been wrongly convicted.

    In the years that followed, judicial authorities were repeatedly ordered to reopen the case. But it was not until November 2014 that the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region High People’s Court held a new trial and posthumously exonerated Huugjilt of all charges.

    Days after the court’s decision, it was announced that Feng Zhiming, the police official who had led the original criminal investigation in 1996, had been placed under arrest by the local procuratorate and was being investigated for dereliction of duty, coercing confessions through torture, and taking bribes.

    To many Chinese, Huugjilt’s wrongful conviction and Feng Zhiming’s arrest were clearly connected. At the time of the arrest many hailed it as evidence of a new commitment to fighting wrongful convictions by demanding individual accountability from law-enforcement. However, Feng Zhiming’s conviction—despite the heavy prison sentence—left many disappointed when no mention was made of the Huugjilt case or Feng’s role in it. An online survey of more than 1,000 people conducted by the Beijing News found that nearly three quarters of respondents thought that Feng should have been held criminally responsible for his role in the Huugjilt case and 57 percent considered the verdict’s failure to mention the case “unreasonable.”

    It took 18 years to finally exonerate Huugjilt of the crime for which he was wrongly executed, so there’s a certain symbolic balance in a prison sentence of 18 years for the man widely believed to have been responsible for the miscarriage of justice. However, absent an official statement from judicial authorities connecting Feng’s many criminal misdeeds with Huugjilt’s specific case, the question of accountability and positive change in the legal system remains.

    Last February when authorities in Inner Mongolia announced the results of their investigation into 27 individuals being held in connection with Huugjilt’s wrongful conviction, Feng Zhiming was unique in that his case was being “handled separately” in the criminal justice system. But in the The Beijing Times of October 19, 2016, columnist Binglin observes that the earliest charges brought against Feng Zhiming dated from 2000—four years after Huugjilt’s execution—meaning that the question of his role in the case was never actually put before the court. Binglin asks:

    Does Feng Zhiming’s responsibility for this miscarriage of justice fall within the scope of criminal liability? Even if his responsibility is limited to the realm of administrative sanction or party discipline, the fact that he’s been held criminally responsible for other acts shouldn’t mean abandoning the pursuit of a clear explanation of personal accountability and punishment for his role in the miscarriage of justice.

    On the same day, in Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post, columnist Shen Bin points out that Feng Zhiming’s corruption has been documented “to two decimal points,” meaning that the investigation was conducted quite thoroughly. He asks: “Has the statute of limitations expired or has so much time passed since the Huugjilt case that it’s become too difficult to pin down the relevant evidence? I hope there will be an authoritative answer.”

    Ultimately, these discussions highlight the importance of transparency and accountability. While the arrest and sentencing of Feng Zhiming provides some consolation, without the specific accountability that a judicial judgment could bring, justice has yet to run its full course. And without a reasonable explanation for why Feng’s role in the Huugjilt case has so far gone unpunished, many will conclude that there has been some sort of cover-up.

  • China: SPC Issues New Regulations on the Release of Court Judgments Online

    Written judgments from criminal and civil cases in a Yunnan court. New regulations now state that digital copies of such judgments must be released online within a week of a court’s decision. Photo credit: ynfy.gov.cn

    [Updated: as of September 30, 2016, Dui Hua has obtained 117 judgments YTD.]

    In a bid to increase judicial transparency, including the adjudication of sensitive political cases, China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) recently released new regulations that unambiguously assign to courts throughout the country the responsibility for publicly releasing judgments (see translation of the regulations below). The SPC released similar regulations in 2013 and 2010, but the new regulations require courts to release more information, and with greater detail.

    Article 1 of the regulations states that “People’s courts should promptly release court judgments online.” The new regulations provide a stronger mechanism for making courts comply with this provision—if the court decides not to release a judgment to the public, it must make public the reasons for not releasing it (Article 6). Courts also have a new deadline for releasing judgments under the new regulations— “Legally effective court judgments should be posted online within seven working days of taking effect” (Article 7).

    The Discretion to Keep Secrets

    The new regulations provide more detailed guidance to courts when they determine that judgments should not be posted online. Article 4 states that judgments are not to be released if they (1) involve state secrets, (2) involve underage suspects, (3) are resolved by arbitration, (4) concern divorce, or (5) involve custody of underage children. The regulations give unfettered discretion to keep judgments secret if the court determines that a judgment is “unsuitable for online posting.” The meaning of “unsuitable” is not clarified in the regulations.

    The language of these regulations provides leeway to courts to restrict the release of court judgments in cases other than prosecutions of state secrets crimes under Article 111 of the PRC Criminal Law. Court cases that are not ostensibly political might be subject to restrictions on posting online, including but not limited to civil cases involving trade secrets (which might also be classified as state secrets), administrative cases of citizens against the government, financial fraud, and disturbing market order. The police or procuratorates, rather than courts, might possess practical authority to decide when certain cases sufficiently “involve” state secrets such that they are withheld from the public.

    Regulations Having the Intended Effect?

    Although the courts possess authority to block public release of judgments if they “involve” state secrets or are otherwise “unsuitable” for online posting, courts have been much more forthcoming with judgments since the previous set of regulations were issued in 2013. During the three-year period those regulations were in effect, the number of judgments involving endangering state security (ESS) cases that Dui Hua obtained from official websites increased each year: in 2014, 27 judgments were obtained, in 2015, 80 judgments, and, so far in 2016, 117 judgments [updated]. ESS crimes, which include subversion, inciting subversion, splittism, inciting splittism, espionage, and state secrets violations, are the most political in China’s Criminal Law. The decision to publicly release ESS judgments serves as a useful touchstone for assessing judicial transparency.

    Considering that the number of ESS trials has declined during the same three-year period, the increase in judgments posted online is all the more surprising. Dui Hua has estimated that Chinese courts concluded more than 500 ESS trials of the first instance in 2015, compared with more than 1,000 ESS trials in 2014 and 893 in 2013. The drop is attributed to judicial authorities trying cases that used to be considered ESS cases as cases of terrorism and disturbing social order.

    Restrictions on Redaction

    In addition to stipulating which judgments can be released, the new regulations provide some guidance on the content that must be provided in court judgments. Article 8 of the regulations states that courts should redact the names of crime victims, juveniles, and parties to certain types of family cases. Article 10 states that courts should redact certain types of information, primarily personal, private information. The rules also give courts broad authority to redact other information that they deem “inappropriate” for public release.

    The regulations’ drafters likely attempted to avoid issues surrounding the redacting of criminal defendants’ and prisoners’ names. In a change from the 2013 version, the new regulations no longer require the redacting of names of people who are not repeat offenders or who have been sentenced to three years in prison or less. Juvenile defendants should have their names redacted in online judgments owing to Article 8’s restriction on publishing juveniles’ names in general. Other than these changes, however, courts receive little guidance on how and when to publish the names of criminal defendants. Although redacting a defendant’s name can mitigate social stigma associated with a conviction, publicly releasing a defendant’s name can also help family and supporters advocate for greater judicial transparency and clemency.

    New Opportunities for Tracking Court Transparency

    On paper, the new regulations appear to be an improvement over the 2013 version, as they identify courts as the specific institution responsible for releasing judgments and require courts to publicly give reasons for refusing to release judgments. Judging by the increased number of ESS cases released to the public since the previous regulations took effect in 2013, regulations governing the release of judgments also appear to increase court transparency, which hopefully encourages public identification of suspects in most cases—including those involving ESS. Over the next months and years, Dui Hua plans to step up its monitoring of court websites to determine the extent to which courts are exercising their responsibility to release judgments online.

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    Regulations of the Supreme People’s Court of China Regarding the Release of Court Judgments Online

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    The Supreme People’s Court of China
    Legal Interpretation No. 19 [2016]

    August 29, 2016

    The “Regulations of the Supreme People’s Court of China Regarding the Release of Court Judgments Online” was passed on July 25, 2016 at the Meeting No. 1689 of the SPC Adjudication Committee, and will become effective on October 1, 2016.

    These regulations are formulated to implement and carry out the principle of public adjudication, standardize the people’s courts’ online judgment-releasing work, promote judicial fairness, raise the level of judicial credibility, bring together the practical experience of people’s courts, and they are in accordance with relevant regulations including the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, the PRC Civil Procedure Law, and the PRC Administrative Litigation Law.

    Article 1: People’s courts should promptly release court judgments online according to law, in a comprehensive manner, and in a standardized fashion.

    Article 2: The China Judgments Online website is the nationwide, centralized platform for releasing court judgments. People’s courts at all levels install links to China Judgments Online on their court political affairs websites and judicial transparency platforms.

    Article 3: The following types of court judgments should be released online:

    1. Criminal, civil, and administrative judgments;
    2. Criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement judgments;
    3. Payment orders;
    4. Criminal, civil, administrative, and enforcement notices rejecting petitions for review;
    5. State compensation decisions;
    6. Decisions for compulsory medical treatment or decisions rejecting applications for compulsory medical treatment;
    7. Decisions to enforce or amend criminal penalties;
    8. Decisions to detain or to issue fines for obstructionist litigation activities and enforcement behavior; decisions for early release from detention; and decisions on applications for reconsideration that have been filed against orders for detentions and fines;
    9. Administrative mediation decisions and civil public interest litigation mediation decisions;
    10. Other court judgments in which there is a discontinuation or completion of the litigation process, there is an influence on a party’s material rights and benefits, or there is a major influence on a party’s procedural rights.

    Article 4: People’s court judgments displaying one of the following types of characteristics should not be released online:

    1. Cases involved with state secrets;
    2. Juvenile crime cases;
    3. Cases resolved through mediation procedures or verifying the people’s mediatory agreements’ effectiveness, but not including those to protect state interests, the public interest, and other legal interests that need to be made public;
    4. Cases involved with divorce litigation or those involving the fostering or guardianship of minors;
    5. Other circumstances which cause people’s courts to believe internet release is not suitable.

    Article 5: People’s Courts should, in their notices accepting cases and responses, inform the parties of the scope of release of judgments online and publicly inform people’s courts, via government affairs websites, electronic touchscreens, litigation guides, and other methods, of the relevant regulations for issuing court judgments online.

    Article 6: Court judgments that are not released online should release the case number, the adjudicating court, the date of judgment, and the reasons for not releasing the judgment, except when releasing the above-described information could reveal state secrets.

    Article 7: Legally effective court judgments should be posted online within seven working days of taking effect. First-instance judgments and judgments which have been appealed, or regarding which a procuratorial protest has been brought according to law, should be released online within seven working days of the second-instance court’s adjudication taking effect.

    Article 8: People’s courts, when they release court judgments online, should redact the names of the following types of persons:

    1. Parties to marriage, family, and inheritance dispute cases, and their legal representatives;
    2. Crime victims and their legal representatives, collateral civil litigation plaintiffs and their legal representatives, witnesses, and expert witnesses;
    3. Juveniles and their legal representatives.

    Article 9: According to Article 8 of these regulations, the redacting of names in the following circumstances should be handled accordingly:

    1. When the surname is kept, replace the given name with “X”;
    2. Regarding the names of ethnic minorities, keep the first character and replace the rest of the name with “X”;
    3. Regarding foreigners and stateless people, keep the Chinese transliteration for the first character, with the rest of the name replaced by “X”; regarding the English names of foreigners and stateless people, keep the first English letter and eliminate the rest of the name.

    For repeat names resulting from redacting, use Arabic numerals after the names to distinguish them.

    Article 10: When people’s courts release court judgments online, they should redact the following kinds of information:

    1. Family addresses, contact information, identification numbers, bank account numbers, health situations, vehicle license plate numbers, movable or immovable property certificate serial numbers, etc., of natural persons;
    2. Information regarding bank accounts, vehicle license plates, moveable or immovable property certificate serial numbers, etc., of legal persons and other organizations;
    3. Information involving corporate secrets;
    4. Private personal information regarding ongoing disputes involving family affairs, individual rights, etc.;
    5. Information that involves technological investigation measures;
    6. Other information that a people’s court believes is not appropriate to make public.

    According to part (a.) of this Article, if redacted information influences the proper understanding of a court judgment, use the letter “X” as a partial replacement.

    Article 11: People’s courts judgments that are released online should contain the following types of information regarding parties, legal representatives, entrusted agents, and defenders:

    1. Other than the handling of redaction under Article 8 of these regulations, if parties and other legal representatives are natural persons, keep the name, date of birth, sex, district and/or the county of residence; regarding parties and their legal representatives, if they are legal persons or other organizations, keep the name, residential address, organization code, and legal representative or primary responsible persons’ name and occupation;
    2. If entrusted agents and defenders are lawyers or grassroots legal service workers, then maintain the name, the professional registration number, and law firm or grassroots legal service institution name; for entrusted agents and defenders that are other types of personnel, keep the name, date of birth, sex, county or district of residence, and relationship to the party.

    Article 12: If the judge handling the case believes that a court judgment involves circumstances pursuant to Article 4(e) of these regulations rendering inappropriate the release of the judgment online, then the judge should issue such opinion and the grounds for it in writing, and responsible staff from the relevant department, after conducting investigation, report to the managing court’s vice president for approval.

    Article 13: The PRC Supreme People’s Court supervises and guides the whole country’s courts in work on releasing court judgments online. High-level and intermediate-level people’s courts supervise and guide district-level people’s courts in their work on releasing court judgments online.

    Adjudication management offices of people’s courts at every level, or other institutions undertaking the function of adjudication management, have responsibility for the work of releasing their court’s judgments online and carry out the following duties:

    1. Organizing and guiding the release of court judgments online;
    2. Supervising and inspecting the work of releasing court judgments online;
    3. Coordinating and handling complaints and opinions from the public and society regarding court judgments;
    4. Coordinating technology departments to provide technological support and safeguarding;
    5. Other relevant management work.

    Article 14: Courts at every level should rely upon information technology to take court judgments and publicly enter them into the procedures for adjudication management, reducing the amount of work in publicizing court judgments, while realizing promptness, comprehensiveness, and streamlining in releasing court judgments.

    Article 15: In court judgments released online, other than the handling of technology implementation according to the requirements of these regulations, there should be consistency with the original court judgments.

    People’s courts that correct the written errors of court judgments should promptly release the corrected judgment online.

    The judge handling the case is responsible for the consistency between the court judgment that is released online and the original judgment, as well as the standardization of the technological processing.

    Article 16: Court judgments released online that are inconsistent with the original judgment or that exhibit inappropriate technological processing should be promptly removed and released again after they have been corrected.

    For court judgments that have been released online, if inspection reveals circumstances listed in Article 4 of these regulations, they should promptly be removed and then handled according to Article 6.

    Article 17: People’s courts information technology service centers are responsible for China Judgments Online’s functional maintenance and upgrading, providing convenience to all of society for the use according to law of this website’s public court judgments.

    In the application of different case numbers for different adjudication procedures, China Judgments Online cross-references court judgments with each other.

    Article 18: These regulations are effective starting October 1, 2016. The Supreme People’s Court previously issued interpretations and standardizing documents, and in case of inconsistency, these regulations will serve as the authoritative version.

  • Will China Retry Gao Qinrong in Light of Anti-Corruption Campaign?

    Gao Qinrong. Photo credit: bbc.com

    The case of Gao Qinrong harkens back to the earliest days of The Dui Hua Foundation, when his name was featured on many prisoner lists ahead of his early release in 2006. Ten years later, Gao is back in the news with a chance at a retrial that could clear his name.

    Gao, a former investigative reporter for the Xinhua News Agency based in Shanxi Province, was sentenced in 1999 to 12 years in prison for taking bribes, soliciting prostitution, and fraud. He has long alleged that he was framed by local officials in the city of Yuncheng in retaliation for his exposure of a corrupt irrigation project. Gao sent hundreds of appeal petitions to central and provincial authorities during his eight years in prison, but he never received a reply. Some even speculated that Gao’s letters might have been intercepted before they ever reached their intended recipients.

    Gao was released in December 2006 after several sentence reductions and was immediately greeted with sympathetic reports and interviews by some of southern China’s bolder news outlets—despite an apparent ban on reporting in Beijing. He continued to proclaim his innocence and petitioned for judicial authorities to reopen his case. Now, there is word that the Yuncheng Intermediate People’s Court has accepted his petition.

    It remains to be seen, however, whether Gao will get that new day in court. As Dui Hua recently wrote, China’s post-conviction appeal mechanism is not clearly defined under the Criminal Procedure Law, and courts have considerable discretion over reopening cases (and often little incentive to do so).

    A combination of factors connected with Xi Jinping’s assumption of power in 2012 may work in Gao Qinrong’s favor. Xi’s high-profile anti-corruption drive has brought down many current and former officials in coal-rich Shanxi, which appears to have been a particular target of the campaign. Officials with powerful backing have fallen in Yuncheng as well, possibly creating opportunities to revisit evidence of past corruption—including possible retaliation against Gao.

    Righting past wrongful convictions has been another theme of Xi Jinping’s administration. But, as noted by a recent Southern Metropolis Daily editorial (translated below), many of these overturned cases have involved death sentences or life imprisonment. The editorial echoes the call of leading Chinese legal scholars for a more formal post-conviction relief system that would make it easier to get cases of all types reviewed. It also points to something that positive coverage of recent retrials fails to acknowledge: given the systemic causes that have contributed to miscarriages of justice in the past, China needs to do much more than reopen a few selected high-profile cases.

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    Gao Qinrong’s Post-Conviction Appeal: Correcting Judicial Errors Should Address More Than Just Life-and-Death Cases

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    Southern Metropolis Daily editorial, July 29, 2016

    Jiemian News recently reported a new development in the case of reporter Gao Qinrong, whose story created quite a stir years ago. After 18 years of petitioning to have his case reopened, Gao Qinrong has had his post-conviction appeal petition accepted by Shanxi’s Yuncheng Intermediate People’s Court: “The case has been reported up the chain of command and is slated for review…The adjudication committee has to discuss whether to initiate a new trial or reject the appeal.”

    The court’s acceptance of Gao’s petition is a procedural development with next to no legal meaning. But to someone who has been unsuccessfully seeking an appeal for 18 years, this change can be seen as an exceptional, perhaps even hopeful, development.

    Gao Qinrong was a reporter for Reporter’s Notes magazine, published out of the Xinhua News Service’s Shanxi bureau. In the 1990s, he exposed shocking details of a scandal involving “fake irrigation projects” in Yuncheng, Shanxi. The story was followed up by CCTV’s “Focus” newsmagazine program and Southern Weekly, and “disciplinary actions” were taken against several local officials.

    Then, in December 1998 Gao Qinrong was arrested and subsequently sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment for taking bribes, soliciting prostitution, and fraud. On December 7, 2006, having lost eight years and four days of freedom, Gao Qinrong left prison insisting that his imprisonment had been an act of “retaliation.” Even in prison, Gao never gave up the effort to petition for post-conviction appeal, and several delegates to the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference put resolutions forward on his behalf. There was media reporting at the time of Gao’s release from prison, with an editorial in Southern Metropolis Daily calling for “truth in support of the right to speak truth.” Now, a decade later, we find that Gao Qinrong’s effort to reopen his case has been unusually difficult and progress has been slow.

    From today’s vantage point, there are still quite a few things that are strange about the circumstances of Gao’s case and uncertainties about the evidence that was brought against him. According to the lawyer handling Gao’s post-conviction appeal: “The evidence used to convict was unreliable and insufficient, and there were contradictions between the main pieces of evidence used to prove the facts in the case.” Key pieces of evidence were never cross-examined in court, and signatures on transcripts of witness testimony are suspected to be forgeries.

    Besides these doubts about the circumstances and evidence, it’s still worth looking into the question of whether Gao’s case had any relation to his exposure of how local government spent hundreds of millions of yuan on “fake irrigation projects.” When the man who tipped Gao off about the projects was released from prison, he was beaten nearly to death less than 100 meters from the prison gate and is still unable to care for himself to this day. The special team investigating Gao Qinrong focused a great deal of its questioning on his source for the “fake irrigation” report, rather than the three crimes for which he was subsequently charged. Li Xiaolin, who served as Gao Qinrong’s defense attorney, recalls: “They dug up some things from years earlier that didn’t amount to crimes and had never been the subject of any police report.” And they really started digging, he recalls, after Gao “uncovered and was the first of many media to report on fake projects that had cost the prefecture 270 million yuan.”

    Doubts about this particular case haven’t dimmed after 18 years. Neither have they been answered. The embarrassment surrounding Gao Qinrong’s case is not an isolated incident. So many miscarriages of justice that were eventually corrected were once mired in this same sort of procedural despair: one of the parties in a criminal case appeals over many years, making repeated claims but failing to make “effective progress” by getting procedurally significant review of his or her case. When it comes to miscarriages of justice, rectification or exoneration has become, to a great degree, an “unexpected moment of joy”—no one has any idea when or if it will ever come.

    It’s obvious that this is not the way that rule of law is supposed to work. Criminal procedure scholar Chen Weidong has proposed reforms based on changes to the case-filing system that require courts to accept cases as long as they meet certain technical requirements. The idea is that, by putting all post-conviction appeal petitions under a formal review procedure, the process would become more litigation-based and procedural and make correction of judicial errors more transparent and predictable. In other words, it would be an attempt to prevent this “late-arriving justice” from being purely a matter of luck.

    The latest round of judicial reforms has brought with it correction of judicial errors in a number of cases. From these cases, the public might get the impression that major criminal cases are being overturned all the time. But a conclusion that is consistent with judicial logic should recognize that errors occur not only in major life-and-death cases. There must also be a certain percentage of wrongly decided cases that are not so life-and-death but have similar implications for the guilt or innocence of citizens and the line between criminal behavior and non-criminal behavior.

    If you consider the imprint that social and judicial standards have left on individual cases during certain periods, wouldn’t you expect there to be similarity between major and minor cases in terms of the rate of judicial error and the particular experiences of procedural injustice on citizens? Does extraction of confessions through torture and falsification of evidence only take place in cases where there’s been loss of life but somehow vanish entirely in other cases? Not all miscarriages of justice involve such life-and-death cases, so when it comes to correcting judicial errors, normal judicial logic dictates that you should correct all errors, both major and minor.

    Rectifying errors in the judicial system is part of the process of seeking justice—an extremely important part. In this area, there should be no differences in the way that major cases and minor cases are handled. The process of correcting errors should look at the judicial errors in a particular case and not base the urgency or degree of rectification on the severity of the original verdict in that case.

    The post-conviction appeal process in cases like Gao Qinrong’s, with its long years of petitioning without initiation of any substantive judicial review procedure, is a good example of why there is urgent need for legal reform to the system of post-conviction relief. As more and more old cases from the past are corrected and the system of correcting judicial errors starts to become more routine and institutionalized, there is one question we must take seriously: can post-conviction appeals by citizens in non-life-and-death cases receive the same sort of timely, fair, and indisputable justice from our legal system?

  • Could China’s New Oversight Rules Have Avoided Arbitrary Detention of American Citizen?

    The United Nations Palais des Nations. On June 29, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recommended the release of American Sandy Phan-Gillis, who has been detained for over a year without having charges brought against her in court. Photo: www.unog.ch

    Dui Hua recently found a copy of Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) regulations that govern oversight of “designated-location residential surveillance” (DLRS), a form of incommunicado detention that the Chinese government frequently uses in sensitive cases involving endangering state security, terrorism, and corruption (known as “three type offenses”). Dui Hua has translated the regulations into English below (Chinese source text available here).

    The SPP adopted the regulations on October 13, 2015 with the apparent intention of curtailing abuse of DLRS. During public comment periods leading up to the 2013 revisions to the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) that established DLRS powers, many commentators heavily criticized DLRS for effectively legalizing the secret, incommunicado detentions that had existed for years in China due to ambiguities and blank spots in the law. In November 2011, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances had also objected to the proposed CPL revisions, arguing that they would amount to the legalization of enforced disappearances.

    Oversight Regulations Aim to Limit Arbitrary Detention Through On-Site Inspections

    Given the importance of DLRS oversight, it is tempting to speculate whether these rules, had they been in place just a few months earlier, might have helped mitigate if not avert the arbitrary detention of American citizen Phan (Sandy) Phan-Gillis—the only American currently in a Chinese detention facility on state secrets charges. On June 29, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) published an Opinion holding that Phan-Gillis’ detention is “arbitrary”, with US State Department officials urging China to consider the WGAD’s recommendation to release Phan-Gillis. Indicating the heightened US-China tensions resulting from the case, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei issued a swift reply, referring to the WGAD findings as “irresponsible” and calling for greater respect of China’s “judicial sovereignty”.

    Phan-Gillis (pictured left) was initially taken into custody by agents of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region’s state security bureau on suspicion of espionage on March 19, 2015. She was placed under DLRS until September 2015, when the six-month time limit on this coercive measure expired, and was then transferred to a detention center in Nanning and placed in solitary confinement. In March 2016, Newsweek reported on the one-year anniversary of her detention.

    Phan-Gillis has not received access to effective assistance of legal counsel and continues to be held in detention in Nanning, having never had charges brought against her in court. Had the SPP’s new oversight regulations been in place when Phan-Gillis was initially detained, procurators would have possessed clear authority under Article 19 to carry out on-site inspection of Phan-Gillis’ DLRS conditions and to conduct return inspection visits once per week.

    Other provisions of the oversight regulations raise the question whether procurators might also have been able to request her release or to otherwise curtail police powers. Article 20 of the regulations, for example, provides local procurators with authority to issue “rectification opinions” on procedural irregularities, several of which apply to the Phan-Gillis case: state security officials failed to notify Phan-Gillis’ family of her placement in a DLRS facility; probably failed to place her in a facility that meets the statutory requirements for DLRS (no one, including the American consular officials who conducted monthly visits, were allowed to visit Phan-Gillis in the detention facility where she is actually housed); and failed to allow her reasonable visits and correspondence with legal counsel and family as provided for under the relevant sections of the CPL, which grant discretion for the detaining authority to allow family and lawyer visits even in so-called “three type offenses.”

    Unfortunately, even these minimal oversight mechanisms were not in place at the time of Phan-Gillis’ DLRS confinement. The new rules came into force weeks after the end of her transfer to a detention facility. As it stands, the abuses of discretion that marked the first case of legalized disappearance after passage of CPL revisions in 2013 are eerily similar to those apparent in ongoing cases like Phan-Gillis’. It remains to be seen whether the oversight rules translated below will yield discernible changes in future police application of DLRS procedures.

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    Regulations on Oversight of Residential Surveillance in a Designated Location by People’s Procuratorates

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    Adopted at the 41st meeting of the 12th Procuratorial Committee of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on October 13, 2015

    Chapter 1: General Principles

    Article 1: In order to strengthen and standardize how people’s procuratorates carry out oversight regarding imposition and implementation of designated-location residential surveillance (DLRS), these regulations are hereby enacted in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (CPL) and in consideration of the realities of procuratorial work.

    Article 2: When DLRS is used against criminal suspects or defendants by public security organs, people’s procuratorates, or people’s courts, people’s procuratorates shall carry out oversight in accordance with law as to the legality of imposition and implementation of DLRS.

    Article 3: Oversight of decisions to impose DLRS shall be the responsibility of the investigation-oversight and prosecutorial units of people’s procuratorates; responsibility for oversight of implementation of DLRS shall reside with the criminal enforcement inspectorate units of people’s procuratorates.

    Article 4: Designated locations shall possess the conditions for ordinary daily life and rest and shall be separate from places of interrogation; they shall be equipped with surveillance equipment to facilitate monitoring and management; and they shall possess security measures to ensure the security of case handling.

    Chapter 2: Oversight of Decisions to Impose Designated-Location Residential Surveillance

    Article 5: When a public security organ decides to impose DLRS on a criminal suspect who has no fixed residence, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate at the same administrative level [as the public security organ] shall conduct oversight to determine whether that decision has been made lawfully.

    When a public security organ at a higher administrative level has approved a decision to place an individual suspected of endangering state security or terrorist activity under DLRS, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate at the same administrative level as the public security organ that issued approval shall conduct oversight as to whether that decision has been made lawfully.

    Article 6: When a people’s procuratorate decides to place a criminal suspect who has no fixed residence under DLRS, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate immediately above shall conduct oversight as to whether that decision has been made lawfully.

    When a people’s procuratorate at a higher administrative level has approved a decision to place an individual suspected of serious corruption under DLRS, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate that gave that approval shall conduct oversight as to whether that decision has been made lawfully.

    Article 7: When any of the following conditions apply, the people’s procuratorate shall initiate oversight into whether a decision to impose DLRS is lawful:

    (i) A criminal suspect or his/her legal representatives, close relatives, or defense counsel believe that the decision to impose DLRS is in violation of the law and file a complaint, report, or petition with the people’s procuratorate;

    (ii) When, in the course of its involvement in investigation, review of arrest or indictment requests, review of criminal enforcement, or filing review, the people’s procuratorate discovers that the investigating organ (unit) may have issued a decision to impose DLRS in violation of the law;

    (iii) A people’s supervisor believes that a decision to impose DLRS is in violation of the law and files an oversight opinion with the people’s procuratorate;

    (iv) Other circumstances requiring initiation of oversight.

    Article 8: When initiating oversight of a decision by a people’s procuratorate to place a criminal suspect who has no fixed residence under DLRS, the investigating unit shall furnish the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate at the administrative level immediately superior with copies of the case-filing decision, the decision to impose DLRS, and main pieces of evidence within three days.

    When initiating oversight of a decision to place an individual suspected of serious corruption under DLRS, the investigation unit of the people’s procuratorate that approved the decision shall furnish the aforementioned documents to its own investigation-oversight unit within three days.

    When the people’s procuratorate initiates oversight into a decision to impose DLRS by a public security organ, it may request that the public security organ provide the aforementioned documents.

    Article 9: Oversight into decisions to impose DLRS may be carried out in one of the following ways:

    (i) Review of the relevant case documents;

    (ii) Listening to the investigating organ (unit) present its reasons and factual basis for issuing the decision to impose DLRS;

    (iii) Listening to the opinions of the criminal suspect or his/her legal representatives, close relatives, or defense counsel;

    (iv) Other ways.

    Article 10: In reviewing the legality of a decision to impose DLRS, the people’s procuratorate shall check to see whether the decision satisfies the conditions set out in Articles 72 and 69(3) of the CPL, and further review whether the decision meets the following conditions:

    (i) The criminal suspect has no fixed residence in the city or county where the case-handling organ is located;

    (ii) The public security organ or people’s procuratorate at the administrative level immediately superior has approved the decision to impose DLRS on an individual suspected of endangering state security, terrorist activity, or serious corruption for whom implementation of residential surveillance in his/her own residence would impede the investigation.

    Article 11: The investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate should issue a decision within seven days of initiating oversight into whether a decision to impose DLRS was lawful.

    Article 12: When, having carried out its review, the people’s procuratorate finds that the public security organ’s decision to impose DLRS does not meet the conditions set out by the law, it shall report those findings to the head of the procuratorate and, upon his or her approval, issue a rectification notice to the public security organ and recommend that the public security organ revoke its decision to impose DLRS.

    When the procuratorate finds that a decision to impose DLRS issued by itself or the procuratorate at the next lower administrative level does not meet the conditions set out by the law, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate shall report to the head of the people’s procuratorate and, upon his or her decision, notify its own investigating unit or the people’s procuratorate at the next lower administrative level to revoke the decision to impose DLRS. When notifying the people’s procuratorate at the next lower administrative level to revoke the decision to impose DLRS, the procuratorate shall also circulate a notice to its own investigating unit.

    Article 13: Upon receiving a rectification opinion from the people’s procuratorate at the immediately superior administrative level, the people’s procuratorate shall immediately carry out the recommendation and report on the steps taken to the investigation-oversight unit of the immediately superior people’s procuratorate.

    If the people’s procuratorate believes that the rectification opinion from the immediately superior people’s procuratorate regarding its decision to impose DLRS is in error, it may request a new review by [that same superior] people’s procuratorate within three days of receiving the rectification opinion. The superior people’s procuratorate shall appoint a new procurator to review the case and issue a decision whether to amend its original opinion within five days.

    Article 14: Oversight of decisions by the people’s procuratorate to impose DLRS during the indictment phase shall be carried out in accordance with these provisions by the investigation-oversight unit of the same people’s procuratorate.

    Oversight of decisions by the people’s court to impose DLRS shall be carried out in accordance with these provisions by the prosecutorial unit of the people’s procuratorate at the same administrative level as the court.

    Chapter 3: Oversight of Implementation of Designated-Location Residential Surveillance

    Article 15: Oversight of implementation of DLRS is the responsibility of the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate at the same administrative level as the public security organ that implements the DLRS.

    Article 16: Oversight by people’s procuratorates as to implementation of DLRS shall include the following:

    (i) Whether legal paperwork, such as the DLRS decision or enforcement notice, is complete;

    (ii) Whether the place, term, and personnel are in accordance with regulation;

    (iii) Whether the lawful rights of the person under residential surveillance are being protected;

    (iv) Whether there is any unlawful behavior, such as interrogation in the designated location, corporal punishment, or abuse of the person under residential surveillance;

    (v) Other things that should be monitored in accordance with the law.

    Article 17: When carrying out oversight into the implementation of DLRS, the people’s procuratorate may employ the following measures:

    (i) Review of relevant legal documents; records of any meetings, correspondence, or outgoings by the person under residential surveillance; and physical examination records;

    (ii) On-site inspection of whether the designated location meets the legal conditions;

    (iii) Review of relevant surveillance video footage and, if necessary, physical examination of the person under residential surveillance;

    (iv) Interviews with the person under residential surveillance, enforcement personnel, investigators, or other relevant personnel in order to ascertain and understand relevant circumstances.

    Article 18: Within 24 hours of receiving a copy of a decision to impose DLRS from a public security organ or people’s court, the people’s procuratorate case management unit shall forward the decision to its criminal enforcement inspectorate unit.

    When the investigation unit or prosecution unit of a people’s procuratorate issues a DLRS decision in the name of the procuratorate, it shall send a copy of the DLRS decision to its criminal enforcement inspectorate unit within 24 hours and notify it of the address of the designated location.

    Article 19: Within 24 hours after receiving a copy of the DLRS decision, the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate shall appoint procurators to carry out on-site inspection and complete a record of oversight inspection. Monitoring of DLRS implementation should include return inspection visits by roving teams of no fewer than two procurators at least once per week. Inspection of the implementation of DLRS must not interfere with the ordinary work of criminal investigation.

    Article 20: When oversight of DLRS implementation by the people’s procuratorate uncovers one of the following, the people’s procuratorate shall issue a rectification opinion to the enforcement or investigating organ in accordance with the law:

    (i) Failure of the enforcement organ to appoint enforcement personnel or failure to appoint enforcement personnel in a timely manner upon receipt of the DLRS decision and implementation notice;

    (ii) Except when it is impossible to provide notice, failure to notify the family of the person under residential surveillance within 24 hours of implementing DLRS;

    (iii) Implementation of residential surveillance in a detention center, administrative jail, prison, holding cell, case-handling area, or other location not meeting the statutory conditions for a designated location;

    (iv) Arranging meetings or correspondence between defense lawyers and the person under residential surveillance in ways that violate regulations or illegally restricting the person under residential surveillance from meeting or corresponding with a defense lawyer;

    (v) Failure by a new case-handing organ to issue a new DLRS decision in a timely manner when there is a change in the phase of the criminal process;

    (vi) Failure of the enforcement organ to lift residential surveillance in a timely manner and notify the person under residential surveillance in a timely manner when the case-handling unit issues a decision to lift or change the DLRS conditions and notifies the enforcing organ of such;

    (vii) Demands for payment by the person under residential surveillance or his or her family;

    (viii) Other illegality.

    When the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate discovers that the investigation or prosecutorial unit of its own procuratorate has violated one of the above conditions, it shall seek approval from the head of the procuratorate to issue a rectification opinion.

    Article 21: When the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate finds irregularities in enforcement or security risks in the implementation of DLRS, it shall seek approval from the head of the procuratorate to issue a procuratorial recommendation to the enforcement organ or case-handling organ.

    Article 22: When a rectification notice or procuratorial opinion has been issued, a copy shall be sent to the procuratorate at the administrative level immediately superior as well as to the unit immediately superior to the enforcement unit or case-handling unit.

    Article 23: When a person under residential surveillance dies while under DLRS, the case shall be handled with reference to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate procuratorial procedures for death of a person in custody in a detention facility.

    Article 24: When a people’s court or people’s procuratorate assigns judicial police officers to assist the public security organ with implementation of DLRS, the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate shall carry out oversight of those officers’ assistance with implementation.

    Chapter 4: Additional Provisions

    Article 25: The people’s procuratorate shall process and provide responses in a timely manner to complaints, reports, or petitions regarding imposition or implementation of DLRS from criminal suspects or their legal representatives, close relatives, or defense counsel.

    Article 26: When the investigation-oversight or prosecutorial unit of the people’s procuratorate discovers the possibility of illegality in the implementation of DLRS, they shall report their findings in a timely manner to the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit. When the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit discovers the possibility of illegality in imposing a DLRS decision, it shall report its findings in a timely manner to the investigation-oversight or prosecutorial unit.

    Article 27: If, in the course of its oversight of imposition or implementation of DLRS, the people’s procuratorate discovers violations of disciplinary rules or the law by case-handling personnel or enforcement personnel, it shall seek a decision from the head of the procuratorate to send the case in a timely manner to be handled by the appropriate unit; if the wrongdoing constitutes a criminal offense, it shall pursue criminal responsibility in accordance with the law.

    Article 28: If there are violations of disciplinary rules or violations of the law by procuratorial personnel overseeing imposition or implementation of DLRS, responsibility shall be pursued in accordance with the relevant provisions; if the wrongdoing constitutes a criminal offense, responsibility shall be pursued in accordance with the law.

    Article 29: Oversight of imposition or implementation of DLRS by the people’s procuratorate shall be handled as part of the unified system of duties of the people’s procuratorate. The case-management unit of the people’s procuratorate shall conduct periodic statistical analysis and quality assessment and report results in a timely manner to the relevant units.

    Article 30: These measures take effect from the date of promulgation.

  • China Issues Oversight Rules for “Non-residential” Residential Surveillance

    The Supreme People’s Procuratorate building in Beijing.

    Not long after the draft of the amended Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) was released by China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) for public comment in August 2011, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances expressed concern that the provisions relating to the coercive measure known as “designated-location residential surveillance” (zhiding jusuo jianshi juzhu) would legalize enforced disappearances. In late 2015, the United Nations Committee against Torture (CAT) went further and called on China to abolish the measure.

    The Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) subsequently issued trial rules for determining the necessity of detention and rules to govern oversight of “designated-location residential surveillance” (DLRS), which had leapt back into the headlines in 2015 as part of a police crackdown against Chinese rights lawyers that intensified in July.

    A Coercive Measure

    Custodial detention or arrest takes place in detention centers, ordinary residential surveillance in one’s residence. DLRS happens someplace else, perhaps in a hotel or guesthouse, where law enforcement agents hold criminal suspects or defendants for up to six months while they investigate alleged crimes or prepare a case for trial.

    Authorities justify the lengthy six-month period by stating that residential surveillance is relatively lenient—not depriving people of their liberty, but merely restricting it. Nonetheless, individuals held under DLRS face an environment ripe with potential abuse and rights violations.

    When law enforcement uses the practice against people charged with endangering state security (ESS), terrorist activity, or serious corruption, the outcome is hard to distinguish from enforced disappearance or incommunicado detention. In these types of cases, investigators may use the law to deny families the knowledge of where their loved ones are being held and to deny detainees’ access to a lawyer. Within 24 hours of carrying out DLRS, investigators are only required to provide families with notice of detention and of the alleged offense.

    What a Difference Two Years Makes

    Faced with public opposition to the practice, legislators granted oversight powers to the procuratorate, but it has taken nearly two years for the SPP to define its role. In the meantime, as predicted, DLRS has become a routine part of handling politically sensitive cases. Though its high costs of facilities and manpower are somewhat prohibitive, DLRS is unparalleled in its long duration, ability to isolate detainees, option to delay intervention by legal counsel, and general capacity to exert psychological (and, in some cases, physical) pressure on suspects.

    Unfortunately, the new rules will do little to diminish these serious violations of due process. Procurators are concerned with whether DLRS is carried out lawfully, yet the most concerning aspects of the practice are themselves spelled out in the law.

    Focus on Decisions, Implementation

    The SPP has yet to publish their oversight regulations, but highly controlled media reporting sheds some light on their content. One thing is clear: the intention of the rules is bureaucratic oversight, not judicial oversight. Procurators will likely focus on examining paperwork, making the occasional inspection, and issuing instructions in case anything is out of the ordinary. People held under DLRS may initiate the oversight process by filing complaints independently or through their advocates. What appear to be missing are mechanisms for hearings to allow for the presentation of evidence or for appeals to challenge procuratorial decisions.

    Monitoring by the procuratorate will focus on two areas: (1) whether the decision to impose DLRS was lawful and (2) whether DLRS has been lawfully implemented. The former chiefly concerns whether the case involves a person who either (a) lacks a fixed residence in the county or city where the criminal investigation is taking place, or (b) is suspected of ESS, terrorism-related offenses, or serious corruption. In case of (b), the law requires investigators to substantiate a claim that ordinary residential surveillance would impede their investigation and obtain approval for DLRS from their immediately superior law-enforcement unit.

    The second area of focus involves ensuring that all paperwork is in order; necessary notices have been delivered; and the appropriate location, duration, and personnel are employed. Procurators would also ensure that detainees’ lawful rights are being protected, interrogations are held in separate locations, and no “physical punishment or abuse” is inflicted.

    Adding Inspections

    Oversight activities require procurators to make an on-scene inspection within 24 hours of receiving a copy of a decision to carry out DLRS. This inspection presumably enables inspectors to interview detainees and establish whether they have any allegations to make. It should also allow them to ascertain whether the designated location meets the lawful conditions for “ordinary living and rest” and to ensure that surveillance cameras and safety equipment are installed.

    The rules also appear to require procurators to visit the location at least once a week for the duration of DLRS. Periodic inspections should offer minimal guarantees against physical torture or ill treatment. They are inadequate, however, in preventing mental suffering and the use of other cruel and degrading treatment.

    Also troubling is the requirement that inspections be carried out in ways that do not interfere with investigations. This prioritizes the needs of investigators over the rights of detainees and may give investigators broad discretion to delay access to facilities.

    Missing the Mark

    This type of oversight, with its emphasis on ensuring adherence to applicable laws and regulations, will no doubt help to limit certain kinds of arbitrary and abusive behaviors. Other arbitrary practices and violations of due process will remain unaffected because they are legally sanctioned. For example, procurators are very unlikely to challenge investigators’ decisions to deny access to legal counsel to individuals charged with ESS or terrorism. The CPL empowers investigators to deny such access if they believe it might interfere with their investigation.

    In their attention to the legality of decision and implementation, procurators may also fail to scrutinize the legitimacy of charges made against detainees. Investigators can use flimsy evidence to initiate ESS investigations—thereby justifying the use of DLRS and exclusion of legal counsel—only to modify the charges when requesting approval of formal arrest after expiry of the six-month time limit.

    Ultimately, however well intentioned it might be, this kind of bureaucratic review cannot address the risks of DLRS. The measure grants law-enforcement investigators too much power over individuals, and the procuratorate lacks both power and incentive to challenge DLRS decisions, especially in the kinds of politically sensitive cases where abuse is most likely.

    The best solution would be for China to abolish DLRS, or at the very least, to restore detainees’ rights to full access to legal counsel and to communicate with the outside world. Anything less, and China is sanctioning enforced disappearances.

  • China Mulls Ranking System for Lawyers

    The Chinese government appears poised to launch a ranking system for lawyers, which could limit lawyers with “limited experience or who lack dedication” from appearing before intermediate or higher courts, where many defendants lack legal representation. Photo: Southern Weekend

    Rumors of a new central government policy to issue a system of professional ranks for lawyers have put Chinese legal professionals on the defensive. The system could be used to limit lawyers’ ability to represent defendants in trials heard by higher-level courts or in major or complex cases, such as those involving the death penalty.

    Observers say that central authorities are promoting the system in part to increase professional standards. As a recent article (translated below) in Southern Weekly makes clear, however, lawyers, academics, and even judges have their doubts. Many worry that the policy may have a negative impact by limiting access to legal representation and hindering the professional development of new lawyers.

    The recent crackdown against human rights lawyers like Pu Zhiqiang, Tang Jingling, and those at Fengrui Law Firm has re-focused attention on the role played by lawyers in a legal system dominated by the party-state. While emphasizing the need to restore the credibility and authority of the judicial process, central authorities have made sweeping statements about the importance of lawyers and protecting lawyers’ rights. At the same time, steps are being taken to regulate the behavior of lawyers, inside and outside the courtroom. The stepped-up use of criminal prosecution and other sanctions against lawyers for being “disruptive” or “challenging authority” sends a message that new lines are being drawn.

    Perhaps, then, the greatest source of anxiety about a ranking system is that central authorities may intend for it to increase regulation of the legal profession. Some fear it would become a tool to penalize “disobedient” lawyers and create more possibilities for corruption. Chinese lawyers have struggled for decades to eke out the limited autonomy they currently enjoy, and many—even those disinclined to take on controversial cases or strategies—fear returning to a system in which they are considered “state legal workers.”

    *

    Lawyer Ranking System Provokes Fierce Debate
    Ren Zhongyuan
    Southern Weekly, December 5, 2015

    Chen Weidong: Central Government Has No Concrete Plan Yet

    Over the past couple of weeks, opinions have suddenly started to form regarding a ranking system that would limit the ability of certain lawyers to appear in court. This follows word that pilot trials of such a system are set to launch sometime next year.

    On November 14, 2015, Professor Chen Weidong of China’s Renmin University Law School spoke on this development at the “Innovation Forum on Legal Services under the New Normal,” sponsored by the Guangzhou Lawyers Association and the Lawyers College at Guangzhou University Law School. His comments quickly sparked heated discussion.

    The new policy could employ a ranking system to place restrictions on which lawyers can appear in court. Lawyers with limited experience or who lack dedication would not be able to represent clients in major or complex cases, such as those involving the death penalty, and they would not be able to appear before intermediate or higher courts.

    Many lawyers have expressed firm opposition to such a plan. They say that there is no legal basis for a ranking system and that it would infringe upon the right of lawyers to practice freely and right of clients to make their own choices.

    Chen Weidong has also become a target for criticism, about which he feels extremely aggrieved. “I didn’t recommend this policy,” he points out. “On the contrary, I have my reservations. When central authorities proposed this reform and initially began seeking comments, we told them all the arguments that [critics] are making. I saw that people hadn’t been paying enough attention to this issue, so I took the opportunity to explain what was going on.”

    Back on August 20, the chairman of the Central Politico-Legal Commission, Meng Jianzhu, addressed the National Lawyers Work Conference. He said, “We can begin looking into a ranking system to govern court appearances for new lawyers who take up criminal defense cases.”

    Chen Weidong told Southern Weekly that the “Opinion on Deepening Institutional Reform of Lawyers,” passed on September 15 by the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, also made clear mention of a ranking system. The full text of that document has not been made public.

    “Central authorities have two main goals in pushing this reform,” says Chen. “First is to regulate the legal services market and the other is to raise lawyers’ professional capabilities. There is a certain justification for this. However, it’s hard to say how to evaluate professional capability and who should do the evaluating. Since it’s a pilot scheme, it can be used as a test and the quality of the results can be used to decide whether or not to push the system forward.”

    He noted that local Guangdong media had reported that many lawyers expressed support for a ranking system at the Guangdong Lawyers Work Conference held November 9–10. These supporters even said that Guangdong should take the lead in any pilot trials.

    As far as Chen Weidong knows, however, central authorities currently have no specific locations in mind and, for the time being, have no concrete plan.

    Two vice presidents of the All-China Lawyers Association (ACLA) confirmed to Southern Weekly that the organization had not yet settled on a specific view towards a lawyer ranking system due to major disagreements among lawyers and a lack of consensus. They said the issue was still rather sensitive and that it was inconvenient to comment further.

    Tian Wenchang, chair of the ACLA Criminal Law Professional Committee, and Wang Cailiang, deputy chair of the Administrative Law Professional Committee, both said that none of the ACLA’s professional committees had even been made aware of this matter. The ACLA has not issued any notices on the subject and people had only heard about it individually.

    In 2010, the Hainan Judicial Administration Department issued a consultation draft of “(Draft Revisions) to Regulations for the Legal Profession in the Hainan Special Economic Zone.” One provision in the document proposed a court-appearance system for lawyers based on ranking. Professional lawyers would be divided into junior, intermediate, and senior ranks. Apart from length of professional service, the ranking would also depend on “certain examinations and assessments.”

    Due to vocal opposition, the proposed provisions were not ultimately passed. Aside from [Hainan], no other local governments have put forward similar provisions. Chen Weidong told Southern Weekly that Hainan came up with its regulations on its own initiative, not as part of any plan by central authorities.

    In Hiring Lawyers, Don’t Defendants Have the Final Say?

    One of the biggest reasons cited for opposing a court-appearance ranking system for lawyers is that it infringes upon defendants’ freedom to choose. Many lawyers and academics, including Chen Weidong, all believe that the state should exercise caution when it comes to interfering with individual choice.

    Wang Cailiang argues: “According to the Administrative License Law, when it is possible to make adjustments through market mechanisms and professional organizations are capable of self-governance, there is no need for administrative licensing. Moreover, administrative licenses should only be used in situations in which licensing cannot be done through law, regulation, or other norms.”

    Wang notes: “There’s the Lawyers Law, the three procedural laws, the Arbitration Law—none of these put any restrictions on lawyers’ ability to appear in court. So a trial scheme of this nature lacks any legal basis.”

    Chen Weidong’s takes a more moderate position, believing that, for certain types of cases, there is something to placing restrictions on lawyers based on qualifications. The key is to pay attention to balance when setting up the system and give full consideration to the right of individuals to make their own choices.

    “For example,” Chen says, “the death penalty is a life-or-death matter. If a young lawyer lacking criminal trial experience takes on a death penalty case and, because of his lack of experience, fails to ask necessary questions or remind the judge of certain things, once the death penalty is handed down it is a result that cannot be undone.”

    Wang Zhaofeng, a member of the ACLA Criminal Law Professional Committee and one of the defense attorneys for Bo Xilai, holds a similar opinion. He told Southern Weekly that a lawyer’s professional abilities and experience matter a great deal. In major and complex cases, inexperienced lawyers can truly fail to grasp certain issues. Moreover, there is often a serious asymmetry of information between lawyers and the individuals who retain them. These things cannot be resolved through the market.

    “A defendant can of course hire a lawyer without much experience, but when there are real interests at stake and some cases receive a lot of public attention it is hard to say whether the final result will be satisfactory,” Wang Zhaofeng warns. “If you set up a barrier to entry, you of course cannot eliminate the possibility of excluding some young lawyers who are extremely talented in favor of some older lawyers who are merely mediocre. It’s not completely satisfactory, but overall I think it should make things better.”

    But in the view of people like Wang Cailiang, these are nothing but self-interested pretexts being put forward by older lawyers. Defendants will consider experience in choosing a lawyer, so there’s no reason to use administrative measures to totally exclude certain lawyers.

    A judge who handles death penalty review cases for the Supreme People’s Court confirmed to Southern Weekly that very few junior lawyers actually handle death penalty review cases and that he has rarely encountered any during his nearly 10 years at the highest court. He says: “Even senior lawyers are uneven in their levels of ability. As far as the current quality of defense is concerned, basically junior and senior lawyers are equally effective.”

    Another point is that current law allows ordinary citizens, such as a defendant’s friend or relative, to appear in court to handle civil or even criminal defense. Wang Cailiang believes that it is thus illogical to place restriction on lawyers alone.

    “You might say that junior lawyers don’t have enough experience to appear before a high court. But at least they have passed the judicial examination and interned for a year, so they can practice law better than an ordinary person,” Wang reasons. “As long as the party to the case is willing, there’s no problem with an ordinary person appearing in court at any level on their behalf. So why place restrictions only on lawyers?”

    Who Ranks on What Basis?

    A rational ranking system is necessary as a prerequisite for restricting lawyers from appearing in court. But it is difficult to say who is capable and qualified to evaluate the professional abilities of China’s 270,000 lawyers in a way that ensures professionalism while at the same time remaining neutral and fair.

    “Administrative bodies can’t do it, as it’s impossible for them to grasp the information necessary to make reasonable judgments,” says Professor Wang Jianxun, of the Law School at China University of Political Science and Law. “They are also prone to the corruption of power and undermined by arbitrary standards. It’s also dangerous to have fellow lawyers do the evaluations, because that can easily lead to infighting and become an excuse for some lawyers to suppress others.”

    In his view, the attempt to match lawyers and courts through a ranking system raises the specter of central planning, under which the people in charge of the economy assumed that they could possess the necessary information to match supply and demand. But the universal failure of planned economies has already proven that no person is better than the market at accomplishing this.

    “There are certainly discrepancies between lawyers in terms of their abilities,” admits Wang Jianxun. “But don’t judges and procurators also vary in ability despite having a ranking system? Are judges and procurators more capable just because they are in court or procuratorate at a higher level?”

    Past experience supports this judgment. Beginning in 1987, the Ministry of Justice enacted Provisional Regulations for the Lawyer Profession and a set of other associated norms. Through this, lawyers were to be divided into five ranks, the lowest being “assistant lawyer” and the highest being “grade one lawyer.”

    These rankings were largely a kind of honor and had no effect on a lawyer’s ability to appear in court. Now the market has largely replaced them.

    Beijing Lawyers Association (BLA)—which includes more than 20,000 lawyers and covers the largest share of the market in the country—has not handed out professional ranks for more than a decade. “Nobody recognizes them,” explains Han Jiayi, secretary-general of the ACLA Criminal Law Professional Committee.

    Wang Cailiang recalls that a group of Beijing lawyers once collectively boycotted the rankings, so the BLA stopped issuing them. Most of those lawyers had returned from living overseas. They were highly educated and after a few years were able to play important roles in the profession. But according to the standards then in place, they would have had to start from the lowest professional grade and work their way up one rank at a time. They couldn’t compete with the older lawyers, and it truly wasn’t very fair. By the time Wang got to Beijing, the BLA had already stopped reviewing lawyers and assigning professional ranks.

    Wang Cailiang told Southern Weekly that his experience going through these ridiculous evaluations is the reason he’s now so firmly opposed to them. He doesn’t want to see young lawyers repeat this past experience. For example, it took him two tries before passing the second-grade lawyer examination. He satisfied all the other criteria, but English held him up. The English part was simpler the time he passed, with multiple-choice and true-false questions allowing him to concentrate on one answer and bluff his way through.

    As Chen Weidong and Wang Zhaofeng see it, however, these are all issues of how the system is designed. Whether or not to test English, whether there should be different types of cases, or whether the requirement for number of years in practice should be uniform—all of these things can be studied and improved upon. For certain types of cases, it would be best to have some sort of a threshold, something depending on the nature of the case itself.

    “After all, there are some objective standards there,” says Wang Zhaofeng. “How many times have you handled this type of case? Have there ever been any complaints or disciplinary sanctions? Once you’ve met the threshold, it shows that you’ve reached a decent standard. But there’s no point in turning these rankings into a kind of honor and making it seem like first-grade means you’re better than second-grade. This isn’t a contest to see which lawyer is better. That’s something on which opinions will differ, so there’s even less reason to use rankings in connection with what fees are charged.”

    More than ranking, Wang Zhaofeng and Chen Weidong both prefer a kind of categorization or specialization. For example, you can divide lawyers between those who do litigation and those who don’t, according to their specific type of practice. This would be a more workable system and would facilitate lawyers’ ability to accumulate professional experience.

    But there are some judges and lawyers who think that, considering the current stage of development of China’s legal profession, it’s not the right time to categorize them into specializations.

    “In cities like Beijing and Shanghai, you might be able to see clear specialization within the professional space,” observes Han Jiayi. “Some lawyers have settled into doing only litigation, while others do non-litigation work or focus on one kind of case. But in the provinces—even in provincial capitals—many lawyers are still doing it all. How can you categorize them? It’s inappropriate to divide them up by years of experience, and case volume is probably no good either because of the differences between cases. For a Beijing lawyer to handle 20–30 cases a year might be considered quite a heavy load, but in the provinces you typically have lawyers handling 60–70 cases a year.”

    In his view, a ranking system might actually make it more difficult for younger lawyers to get established and develop themselves. For the sake of making the grade, they will not only have to focus on their professional space but also pay attention to their case volume.

    Liu Shibi, a former judge who worked in the courts for more than 20 years, also thinks: “Perhaps in 10 years’ time it’ll be more appropriate to talk about this kind of categorization.”

    Once Ranked, Will Enough Defense Lawyers Remain?

    Even if he doesn’t clearly oppose setting a threshold for lawyers to appear in court, Wang Zhaofeng still has concerns. He notes that only around 20 percent of defendants are represented by defense lawyers overall, and that in areas where this figure is relatively high, it barely surpasses 30 percent. If you add a ranking system and restrict some more inexperienced lawyers from appearing in intermediate or higher courts, there might be some cases that senior lawyers aren’t willing to take on. If junior lawyers are unable to take these cases, then the problem of low defense representation will become even more acute.

    Chen Weidong does not believe this is likely to happen. “The low representation rate is primarily in trials of first instance. To my knowledge, the representation rate in second-instance trials can reach about 80 percent. A ranking system would mainly restrict lawyers to appear in basic-level courts. Courts at the intermediate level and above mainly handle trials of second instance.”

    But in Han Jiayi’s view, the 80 percent representation rate in trials of second instance shouldn’t be considered high. Clear-cut cases basically don’t go beyond a trial of first instance. When a case reaches a court of second instance, it means that there remain relatively large disagreements and there is very much a need for lawyers to be involved.

    “We should recognize that 20 percent of these cases are still are without any defense representation!” Han says. “What’s more, this is just the rate of representation at the trial stage. Individuals also need lawyers during the investigation and indictment stages, but the rate of representation in those stages of the case is even lower.”

    Han says: “Things have been moving in a very bad direction, and as the legal environment worsens, many lawyers are unwilling to handle litigation. We should be thinking about how to attract lawyers to return to the courtroom, not forcing them out.”

    Criminal court judges—especially those who handle death penalty cases—are also worried about the number of lawyers.

    The aforementioned SPC judge who handles death penalty review told Southern Weekly that there is a serious problem with legal aid lawyers who provide formulaic defense opinions in death penalty cases. On the whole they are not able to have much of an impact. “Maybe it’s because legal aid lawyers lack a sense of responsibility, but I personally haven’t seen a case in which they’ve been able to help check the use of the death penalty,” he said. “Even though it’s a major responsibility to handle death penalty cases, they’re mainly being handled through legal aid. Even when defendants hire their own lawyers, these lawyers tend to be the less expensive lawyers.”

    Liu Shibi, who spent 10 years hearing death penalty cases in second instance, agrees that ranking lawyers will not necessarily raise the quality of defense in death penalty cases. In his experience, the most effective lawyers in death penalty cases are those between the ages of 30 and 40. Older lawyers are not necessarily better or more responsible. And since death penalty cases generally don’t result in high fees, a large portion of older lawyers is not too willing to take them on.

    “Society has been developing very rapidly, and the law has also undergone many changes,” notes Liu. “Some older lawyers can’t really keep up. Lawyers who are too young aren’t appropriate either, as they lack social experience. The vast majority of defendants in death penalty cases come from the lower strata of society, so a defense lawyer must be in touch with the masses and have a reverence and sympathy for human life. Young people might not yet understand this. But if older lawyers spend too much of their time doing high-end work, they, too, can lose touch with the lives and concerns of ordinary people.”

    At the same time, Liu Shibi worries that if a ranking system restricts younger lawyers from handling death penalty cases, defendants won’t necessarily be able to fully take advantage of the services of older lawyers. Once cases start to be concentrated in the hands of older lawyers, the dilution of their energies may mean a decrease in their effectiveness.

    “It’s quite likely that reading case files, case analysis, and preparation of defense statements will be handled by younger assistants and that the older lawyers will get involved in the case only just before trial,” Liu warns. “Some might even bring their assistants with them to trial, simply making an appearance at court and then leaving the trial to be handled by the assistant. On the other hand, younger lawyers who are trying to establish names for themselves might work a lot harder.”

  • China Mulls Ranking System for Lawyers

    The Chinese government appears poised to launch a ranking system for lawyers, which could limit lawyers with “limited experience or who lack dedication” from appearing before intermediate or higher courts, where many defendants lack legal representation. Photo: Southern Weekend

    Rumors of a new central government policy to issue a system of professional ranks for lawyers have put Chinese legal professionals on the defensive. The system could be used to limit lawyers’ ability to represent defendants in trials heard by higher-level courts or in major or complex cases, such as those involving the death penalty.

    Observers say that central authorities are promoting the system in part to increase professional standards. As a recent article (translated below) in Southern Weekly makes clear, however, lawyers, academics, and even judges have their doubts. Many worry that the policy may have a negative impact by limiting access to legal representation and hindering the professional development of new lawyers.

    The recent crackdown against human rights lawyers like Pu Zhiqiang, Tang Jingling, and those at Fengrui Law Firm has re-focused attention on the role played by lawyers in a legal system dominated by the party-state. While emphasizing the need to restore the credibility and authority of the judicial process, central authorities have made sweeping statements about the importance of lawyers and protecting lawyers’ rights. At the same time, steps are being taken to regulate the behavior of lawyers, inside and outside the courtroom. The stepped-up use of criminal prosecution and other sanctions against lawyers for being “disruptive” or “challenging authority” sends a message that new lines are being drawn.

    Perhaps, then, the greatest source of anxiety about a ranking system is that central authorities may intend for it to increase regulation of the legal profession. Some fear it would become a tool to penalize “disobedient” lawyers and create more possibilities for corruption. Chinese lawyers have struggled for decades to eke out the limited autonomy they currently enjoy, and many—even those disinclined to take on controversial cases or strategies—fear returning to a system in which they are considered “state legal workers.”

    *

    Lawyer Ranking System Provokes Fierce Debate
    Ren Zhongyuan
    Southern Weekly, December 5, 2015

    Chen Weidong: Central Government Has No Concrete Plan Yet

    Over the past couple of weeks, opinions have suddenly started to form regarding a ranking system that would limit the ability of certain lawyers to appear in court. This follows word that pilot trials of such a system are set to launch sometime next year.

    On November 14, 2015, Professor Chen Weidong of China’s Renmin University Law School spoke on this development at the “Innovation Forum on Legal Services under the New Normal,” sponsored by the Guangzhou Lawyers Association and the Lawyers College at Guangzhou University Law School. His comments quickly sparked heated discussion.

    The new policy could employ a ranking system to place restrictions on which lawyers can appear in court. Lawyers with limited experience or who lack dedication would not be able to represent clients in major or complex cases, such as those involving the death penalty, and they would not be able to appear before intermediate or higher courts.

    Many lawyers have expressed firm opposition to such a plan. They say that there is no legal basis for a ranking system and that it would infringe upon the right of lawyers to practice freely and right of clients to make their own choices.

    Chen Weidong has also become a target for criticism, about which he feels extremely aggrieved. “I didn’t recommend this policy,” he points out. “On the contrary, I have my reservations. When central authorities proposed this reform and initially began seeking comments, we told them all the arguments that [critics] are making. I saw that people hadn’t been paying enough attention to this issue, so I took the opportunity to explain what was going on.”

    Back on August 20, the chairman of the Central Politico-Legal Commission, Meng Jianzhu, addressed the National Lawyers Work Conference. He said, “We can begin looking into a ranking system to govern court appearances for new lawyers who take up criminal defense cases.”

    Chen Weidong told Southern Weekly that the “Opinion on Deepening Institutional Reform of Lawyers,” passed on September 15 by the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, also made clear mention of a ranking system. The full text of that document has not been made public.

    “Central authorities have two main goals in pushing this reform,” says Chen. “First is to regulate the legal services market and the other is to raise lawyers’ professional capabilities. There is a certain justification for this. However, it’s hard to say how to evaluate professional capability and who should do the evaluating. Since it’s a pilot scheme, it can be used as a test and the quality of the results can be used to decide whether or not to push the system forward.”

    He noted that local Guangdong media had reported that many lawyers expressed support for a ranking system at the Guangdong Lawyers Work Conference held November 9–10. These supporters even said that Guangdong should take the lead in any pilot trials.

    As far as Chen Weidong knows, however, central authorities currently have no specific locations in mind and, for the time being, have no concrete plan.

    Two vice presidents of the All-China Lawyers Association (ACLA) confirmed to Southern Weekly that the organization had not yet settled on a specific view towards a lawyer ranking system due to major disagreements among lawyers and a lack of consensus. They said the issue was still rather sensitive and that it was inconvenient to comment further.

    Tian Wenchang, chair of the ACLA Criminal Law Professional Committee, and Wang Cailiang, deputy chair of the Administrative Law Professional Committee, both said that none of the ACLA’s professional committees had even been made aware of this matter. The ACLA has not issued any notices on the subject and people had only heard about it individually.

    In 2010, the Hainan Judicial Administration Department issued a consultation draft of “(Draft Revisions) to Regulations for the Legal Profession in the Hainan Special Economic Zone.” One provision in the document proposed a court-appearance system for lawyers based on ranking. Professional lawyers would be divided into junior, intermediate, and senior ranks. Apart from length of professional service, the ranking would also depend on “certain examinations and assessments.”

    Due to vocal opposition, the proposed provisions were not ultimately passed. Aside from [Hainan], no other local governments have put forward similar provisions. Chen Weidong told Southern Weekly that Hainan came up with its regulations on its own initiative, not as part of any plan by central authorities.

    In Hiring Lawyers, Don’t Defendants Have the Final Say?

    One of the biggest reasons cited for opposing a court-appearance ranking system for lawyers is that it infringes upon defendants’ freedom to choose. Many lawyers and academics, including Chen Weidong, all believe that the state should exercise caution when it comes to interfering with individual choice.

    Wang Cailiang argues: “According to the Administrative License Law, when it is possible to make adjustments through market mechanisms and professional organizations are capable of self-governance, there is no need for administrative licensing. Moreover, administrative licenses should only be used in situations in which licensing cannot be done through law, regulation, or other norms.”

    Wang notes: “There’s the Lawyers Law, the three procedural laws, the Arbitration Law—none of these put any restrictions on lawyers’ ability to appear in court. So a trial scheme of this nature lacks any legal basis.”

    Chen Weidong’s takes a more moderate position, believing that, for certain types of cases, there is something to placing restrictions on lawyers based on qualifications. The key is to pay attention to balance when setting up the system and give full consideration to the right of individuals to make their own choices.

    “For example,” Chen says, “the death penalty is a life-or-death matter. If a young lawyer lacking criminal trial experience takes on a death penalty case and, because of his lack of experience, fails to ask necessary questions or remind the judge of certain things, once the death penalty is handed down it is a result that cannot be undone.”

    Wang Zhaofeng, a member of the ACLA Criminal Law Professional Committee and one of the defense attorneys for Bo Xilai, holds a similar opinion. He told Southern Weekly that a lawyer’s professional abilities and experience matter a great deal. In major and complex cases, inexperienced lawyers can truly fail to grasp certain issues. Moreover, there is often a serious asymmetry of information between lawyers and the individuals who retain them. These things cannot be resolved through the market.

    “A defendant can of course hire a lawyer without much experience, but when there are real interests at stake and some cases receive a lot of public attention it is hard to say whether the final result will be satisfactory,” Wang Zhaofeng warns. “If you set up a barrier to entry, you of course cannot eliminate the possibility of excluding some young lawyers who are extremely talented in favor of some older lawyers who are merely mediocre. It’s not completely satisfactory, but overall I think it should make things better.”

    But in the view of people like Wang Cailiang, these are nothing but self-interested pretexts being put forward by older lawyers. Defendants will consider experience in choosing a lawyer, so there’s no reason to use administrative measures to totally exclude certain lawyers.

    A judge who handles death penalty review cases for the Supreme People’s Court confirmed to Southern Weekly that very few junior lawyers actually handle death penalty review cases and that he has rarely encountered any during his nearly 10 years at the highest court. He says: “Even senior lawyers are uneven in their levels of ability. As far as the current quality of defense is concerned, basically junior and senior lawyers are equally effective.”

    Another point is that current law allows ordinary citizens, such as a defendant’s friend or relative, to appear in court to handle civil or even criminal defense. Wang Cailiang believes that it is thus illogical to place restriction on lawyers alone.

    “You might say that junior lawyers don’t have enough experience to appear before a high court. But at least they have passed the judicial examination and interned for a year, so they can practice law better than an ordinary person,” Wang reasons. “As long as the party to the case is willing, there’s no problem with an ordinary person appearing in court at any level on their behalf. So why place restrictions only on lawyers?”

    Who Ranks on What Basis?

    A rational ranking system is necessary as a prerequisite for restricting lawyers from appearing in court. But it is difficult to say who is capable and qualified to evaluate the professional abilities of China’s 270,000 lawyers in a way that ensures professionalism while at the same time remaining neutral and fair.

    “Administrative bodies can’t do it, as it’s impossible for them to grasp the information necessary to make reasonable judgments,” says Professor Wang Jianxun, of the Law School at China University of Political Science and Law. “They are also prone to the corruption of power and undermined by arbitrary standards. It’s also dangerous to have fellow lawyers do the evaluations, because that can easily lead to infighting and become an excuse for some lawyers to suppress others.”

    In his view, the attempt to match lawyers and courts through a ranking system raises the specter of central planning, under which the people in charge of the economy assumed that they could possess the necessary information to match supply and demand. But the universal failure of planned economies has already proven that no person is better than the market at accomplishing this.

    “There are certainly discrepancies between lawyers in terms of their abilities,” admits Wang Jianxun. “But don’t judges and procurators also vary in ability despite having a ranking system? Are judges and procurators more capable just because they are in court or procuratorate at a higher level?”

    Past experience supports this judgment. Beginning in 1987, the Ministry of Justice enacted Provisional Regulations for the Lawyer Profession and a set of other associated norms. Through this, lawyers were to be divided into five ranks, the lowest being “assistant lawyer” and the highest being “grade one lawyer.”

    These rankings were largely a kind of honor and had no effect on a lawyer’s ability to appear in court. Now the market has largely replaced them.

    Beijing Lawyers Association (BLA)—which includes more than 20,000 lawyers and covers the largest share of the market in the country—has not handed out professional ranks for more than a decade. “Nobody recognizes them,” explains Han Jiayi, secretary-general of the ACLA Criminal Law Professional Committee.

    Wang Cailiang recalls that a group of Beijing lawyers once collectively boycotted the rankings, so the BLA stopped issuing them. Most of those lawyers had returned from living overseas. They were highly educated and after a few years were able to play important roles in the profession. But according to the standards then in place, they would have had to start from the lowest professional grade and work their way up one rank at a time. They couldn’t compete with the older lawyers, and it truly wasn’t very fair. By the time Wang got to Beijing, the BLA had already stopped reviewing lawyers and assigning professional ranks.

    Wang Cailiang told Southern Weekly that his experience going through these ridiculous evaluations is the reason he’s now so firmly opposed to them. He doesn’t want to see young lawyers repeat this past experience. For example, it took him two tries before passing the second-grade lawyer examination. He satisfied all the other criteria, but English held him up. The English part was simpler the time he passed, with multiple-choice and true-false questions allowing him to concentrate on one answer and bluff his way through.

    As Chen Weidong and Wang Zhaofeng see it, however, these are all issues of how the system is designed. Whether or not to test English, whether there should be different types of cases, or whether the requirement for number of years in practice should be uniform—all of these things can be studied and improved upon. For certain types of cases, it would be best to have some sort of a threshold, something depending on the nature of the case itself.

    “After all, there are some objective standards there,” says Wang Zhaofeng. “How many times have you handled this type of case? Have there ever been any complaints or disciplinary sanctions? Once you’ve met the threshold, it shows that you’ve reached a decent standard. But there’s no point in turning these rankings into a kind of honor and making it seem like first-grade means you’re better than second-grade. This isn’t a contest to see which lawyer is better. That’s something on which opinions will differ, so there’s even less reason to use rankings in connection with what fees are charged.”

    More than ranking, Wang Zhaofeng and Chen Weidong both prefer a kind of categorization or specialization. For example, you can divide lawyers between those who do litigation and those who don’t, according to their specific type of practice. This would be a more workable system and would facilitate lawyers’ ability to accumulate professional experience.

    But there are some judges and lawyers who think that, considering the current stage of development of China’s legal profession, it’s not the right time to categorize them into specializations.

    “In cities like Beijing and Shanghai, you might be able to see clear specialization within the professional space,” observes Han Jiayi. “Some lawyers have settled into doing only litigation, while others do non-litigation work or focus on one kind of case. But in the provinces—even in provincial capitals—many lawyers are still doing it all. How can you categorize them? It’s inappropriate to divide them up by years of experience, and case volume is probably no good either because of the differences between cases. For a Beijing lawyer to handle 20–30 cases a year might be considered quite a heavy load, but in the provinces you typically have lawyers handling 60–70 cases a year.”

    In his view, a ranking system might actually make it more difficult for younger lawyers to get established and develop themselves. For the sake of making the grade, they will not only have to focus on their professional space but also pay attention to their case volume.

    Liu Shibi, a former judge who worked in the courts for more than 20 years, also thinks: “Perhaps in 10 years’ time it’ll be more appropriate to talk about this kind of categorization.”

    Once Ranked, Will Enough Defense Lawyers Remain?

    Even if he doesn’t clearly oppose setting a threshold for lawyers to appear in court, Wang Zhaofeng still has concerns. He notes that only around 20 percent of defendants are represented by defense lawyers overall, and that in areas where this figure is relatively high, it barely surpasses 30 percent. If you add a ranking system and restrict some more inexperienced lawyers from appearing in intermediate or higher courts, there might be some cases that senior lawyers aren’t willing to take on. If junior lawyers are unable to take these cases, then the problem of low defense representation will become even more acute.

    Chen Weidong does not believe this is likely to happen. “The low representation rate is primarily in trials of first instance. To my knowledge, the representation rate in second-instance trials can reach about 80 percent. A ranking system would mainly restrict lawyers to appear in basic-level courts. Courts at the intermediate level and above mainly handle trials of second instance.”

    But in Han Jiayi’s view, the 80 percent representation rate in trials of second instance shouldn’t be considered high. Clear-cut cases basically don’t go beyond a trial of first instance. When a case reaches a court of second instance, it means that there remain relatively large disagreements and there is very much a need for lawyers to be involved.

    “We should recognize that 20 percent of these cases are still are without any defense representation!” Han says. “What’s more, this is just the rate of representation at the trial stage. Individuals also need lawyers during the investigation and indictment stages, but the rate of representation in those stages of the case is even lower.”

    Han says: “Things have been moving in a very bad direction, and as the legal environment worsens, many lawyers are unwilling to handle litigation. We should be thinking about how to attract lawyers to return to the courtroom, not forcing them out.”

    Criminal court judges—especially those who handle death penalty cases—are also worried about the number of lawyers.

    The aforementioned SPC judge who handles death penalty review told Southern Weekly that there is a serious problem with legal aid lawyers who provide formulaic defense opinions in death penalty cases. On the whole they are not able to have much of an impact. “Maybe it’s because legal aid lawyers lack a sense of responsibility, but I personally haven’t seen a case in which they’ve been able to help check the use of the death penalty,” he said. “Even though it’s a major responsibility to handle death penalty cases, they’re mainly being handled through legal aid. Even when defendants hire their own lawyers, these lawyers tend to be the less expensive lawyers.”

    Liu Shibi, who spent 10 years hearing death penalty cases in second instance, agrees that ranking lawyers will not necessarily raise the quality of defense in death penalty cases. In his experience, the most effective lawyers in death penalty cases are those between the ages of 30 and 40. Older lawyers are not necessarily better or more responsible. And since death penalty cases generally don’t result in high fees, a large portion of older lawyers is not too willing to take them on.

    “Society has been developing very rapidly, and the law has also undergone many changes,” notes Liu. “Some older lawyers can’t really keep up. Lawyers who are too young aren’t appropriate either, as they lack social experience. The vast majority of defendants in death penalty cases come from the lower strata of society, so a defense lawyer must be in touch with the masses and have a reverence and sympathy for human life. Young people might not yet understand this. But if older lawyers spend too much of their time doing high-end work, they, too, can lose touch with the lives and concerns of ordinary people.”

    At the same time, Liu Shibi worries that if a ranking system restricts younger lawyers from handling death penalty cases, defendants won’t necessarily be able to fully take advantage of the services of older lawyers. Once cases start to be concentrated in the hands of older lawyers, the dilution of their energies may mean a decrease in their effectiveness.

    “It’s quite likely that reading case files, case analysis, and preparation of defense statements will be handled by younger assistants and that the older lawyers will get involved in the case only just before trial,” Liu warns. “Some might even bring their assistants with them to trial, simply making an appearance at court and then leaving the trial to be handled by the assistant. On the other hand, younger lawyers who are trying to establish names for themselves might work a lot harder.”