Tag: stability

  • Kneeling Down to Stand Up: Petitioning China’s Premier

    Petitioners kneel on a highway in Yunnan Province in 2010. Photo credit: Xinhua

    Earlier this month, the national newspaper Legal Weekly published an essay by commentator Xie Yuhang that reflects on the phenomenon of “kneeling petitions” in light of a recent incident involving Premier Wen Jiabao.

    Following a deadly September earthquake in Yunnan Province, Wen visited the epicenter in Yiliang County to inspect the damage and recovery efforts. There, his motorcade was blocked by a group of farmers seeking redress for local land seizures. Wen reportedly stopped to speak with the petitioners and promised that their concerns would be handled to their satisfaction. More than two months later (shortly after the close of the 18th Party Congress), one of the petitioners, Liang Yonglan, was abruptly taken into custody by local police and given a seven-day administrative detention for “disrupting public order.” She was released the following day after paying a 1,000 yuan bond, but soon thereafter the detention order was revoked and the county police chief dispatched to deliver an apology.

    Xie’s essay follows a conventional praise-and-blame model in which the patient and generous manner displayed by China’s premier is contrasted with not only the particular attempts by Yiliang police to punish Liang but also with the more general tendency of some local officials to punish petitioners on the pretext of “abnormal petitioning.”

    Aside from its rather fawning portrayal of Premier Wen, Xie’s essay accepts, rather uncritically, the value of petitioning as an institution. The system of “letters and visits,” which offers citizens a chance to protect their rights by communicating grievances to higher authorities, serves many functions in the Chinese governance system. As one of many alternative channels for dispute resolution, the petitioning system helps reduce the burden on China’s courts. In theory, it can also help to resolve disputes before they turn into violent or destructive “mass incidents.” And by channeling information about local corruption or misconduct upward through the bureaucracy, it gives senior officials an opportunity to deal with problematic cadres.

    But the petitioning system is also widely seen as being overburdened and ineffective. Observers have long noted that the system tends to push petitioners towards larger and more dramatic actions in hopes of getting the attention of high officials, a tendency reflected in the popular saying: “A big disturbance leads to a big solution, a small disturbance leads to a small solution, and no disturbance leads to no solution.” And because petitioning activity tends to reflect badly on the performance of local officials, there is a natural incentive for them to use a mixture of “carrot and stick” techniques to prevent local grievances from reflecting poorly upon their chances of promotion.

    In practice, the petitioning system serves more often as a way of containing grievances (rather than resolving them), in part by fostering expectations of the possibility for official intervention and remedy. If the system functioned as intended, it might not be necessary for someone like Liang Yonglan to take the drastic step of blocking the premier’s motorcade to resolve local problems. Xie may be right that kneeling petitions are designed to minimize risks of retaliation and that Liang’s “kneeling petition” (and the act of petitioning in general) reflects a degree of faith in senior leaders, but one can also read the incident more cynically as a calculated strategy designed to maximize publicity and pressure. As another commentator opined in response to a previous case of kneeling petitioner Zhang Yanhui: “good fortune wasn’t won through her humiliating kneeling but relied instead on the expanded channels for online oversight and the questioning of government brought about by the microblog era.”

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    Full Trust Lies Behind Kneeling Petitions

    Xie Yuhang, Legal Weekly
    December 4, 2012

    When Premier Wen Jiabao arrived in Yiliang County, Yunnan, to inspect the damage after the September earthquake, Liang Yonglan and dozens of other local residents knelt at the village entrance to petition and present their complaints about land seizures to the premier. On November 19, Liang Yonglan was given a seven-day administrative detention by local police on what was called suspicion of disrupting public order. Afterwards, on the 20th, she was released ahead of schedule. Recently, the Zhaotong Public Security Bureau revoked the administrative detention order against Liang Yonglan, and Yiliang County Deputy Mayor and Public Security Bureau Chief Li Jiajun went to Liang Yonglan’s home to apologize.

    Kneeling in petition is also a kind of petitioning. Petitioning makes many people unhappy, and thus makes the fate of petitioners rather unfortunate. If you want to petition but also minimize as much risk as possible, kneeling in petition may be a way to make the best of a bad situation.

    It’s easy for petitioners to get hit with all sorts of “labels.” Certain locations have issued comprehensive regulations concerning various types of “abnormal petitioning” behavior—such as wearing clothing upon which one’s grievances are written, holding sit-ins, self-maiming, attempting suicide, carrying banners, and displaying petition documents—all of which are equated with deliberately causing trouble and are prohibited. Given this exhaustive list, as long as one petitions, it will be difficult not to “step on a landmine.” Kneeling in petition is probably the best way of avoiding punishment on pretext because it doesn’t come across as malicious or confrontational and shows respect and trust in leaders. Perhaps it’s because of this that Zhang Yanhui, a woman from Huaiyang, Henan, who knelt in petition before [her local] county party secretary, was to some extent “successful.”

    But kneeling in petition before the premier is not a small matter. Even if Liang Yonglan were bolder, she wouldn’t dare kneel before the premier’s vehicle if she didn’t have a deep trust in Wen Jiabao.

    The facts prove that Liang Yonglan and the others made the right judgment and their trust was not mistaken. Faced with Liang and the other farmers kneeling in petition, the premier not only got out of his car himself, [he also] shook hands with the farmers, asked them about their problems, and indicated that a satisfactory response would be given. Most importantly, it should be pointed out that in judging the nature of the kneeling petitioners’ actions, the premier said: “This is the farmer’s fundamental right and should not be obstructed.”

    However, some people have different ideas. They think that blocking the premier’s motorcade obstructs the premier’s official business and “disrupts public order.” To be sure, the premier’s vehicle cannot be blocked for any old reason. A country’s highest administrative leader has many important responsibilities that most of the time cannot afford the least bit of delay. If ordinary people were to block [the premier’s] vehicle over every little matter, how could he handle larger national affairs? But [these defenders of public order] perhaps overlook the special nature of the premier’s itinerary on this occasion—the premier went to inspect Yiliang precisely in order to understand the [local] people’s situation. Even though he went on account of an earthquake, this does not mean that he can only understand the situation relating to the disaster and that other matters cannot be raised. What’s more, Liang Yonglan and the others were not completely ignorant of the “rules”: their kneeling petition only took just over two minutes of the premier’s time.

    If the kneeling petition by Liang Yonglan and the others had any adverse effect, it was a loss of face for local officials. If ordinary people resort to kneeling petitions, it shows that they have major grievances—if there is local disharmony, it is because [local] officials have not governed well. That ordinary people don’t turn to local officials when they have grievances shows that they either have no way to protect their rights or do not trust local officials. This is perhaps why some local officials are particularly unwelcoming towards petitioning. In some places, local officials even take repressive measures against petitioners, mobilizing public power to strike back against petitioners on all sorts of pretexts in an effort to “kill a chicken to warn the monkeys.”

    Actually, it’s extremely unwise to try to eliminate petitioning through repression. Repression carries extremely high costs. Whether it’s enacting all sorts of rules against petitioners so that they will be punished at the slightest move or tracking and intercepting petitioners … all of these require huge investments of human and material resources. Moreover, even if these prevention measures are stronger, it’s hard to avoid loopholes. One ought to realize that if ordinary people have grievances, there must be some way to resolve them. Either officials keep rights-protection channels open in the localities they govern so that ordinary people’s rights get sufficient relief, or ordinary people will petition—petitioning is a good thing, because it shows that [people] believe in the government and believe in the ability of the vertical oversight system to resolve problems.

    Different attitudes toward petitioning will result in different outcomes. Being generous like the premier and showing a bit more tolerance, more understanding, and, when possible, more patience will not only help to resolve conflicts in a timely manner and preserve social harmony but also help to garner positive credibility and win the respect and trust of average people. [Acting] conversely may add insult to injury, allowing the situation to continue to get worse, and as was the case among some people in Yiliang County, infringing upon the rights and interests of petitioners will only make one more reactive.

    The Zhaotong Public Security Bureau’s revocation of the administrative detention order against Liang Yonglan and the Yiliang County Public Security Bureau’s personal apology have already rejected the methods earlier applied by certain people. This acknowledgement of fault and willingness to change has earned much praise. But a more ideal situation would be to avoid making mistakes as much as possible, especially mistakes that could have been avoided in the first place.

  • China’s “Almighty God” Rises with Threat of Apocalypse

    People in Gansu Province carry a banner warning that Almighty God is coming to save believers and destroy the people and nations that resist, December 11, 2012. Photo credit: gscn.com.cn

    All across the world, people have been anxiously awaiting the arrival of December 21, 2012, a date some believe has been prophesied to mark the end of the world. China has apparently not been immune from these rumors, and a recent report from Shaanxi Province suggests that authorities there are engaged in a serious crackdown against a persistent “cult” organization that has been using the doomsday rumors to recruit new members.

    For several decades, authorities in China have been trying to eliminate a quasi-Christian group that calls itself the “Church of the Almighty God.” Known also as the “Real God” church or “Eastern Lightning,” this group believes that divine revelation has identified a “female Christ” who will reign over a new age in which humankind will be judged and only believers will survive. The group apparently has an extensive organization both inside and outside China and has reportedly been involved in a number of violent attacks on Christian house church organizations. In 2001, Time magazine published a short profile of the organization describing some of these allegations.

    Translated below, the recent report out of Shaanxi does not offer much detail on the group’s latest activities. (According to China Digital Times, propaganda officials have put Chinese media under strict orders not to report on recent cult activities.) It does, however, provide a useful view of how Chinese authorities define “cults” and perceive their various social harms.

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    “Almighty God” Cult Appears in Shaanxi, Incites Believers to Wage Decisive Battle against Party

    Chinese Business View
    December 14, 2012

    Recently in some places in our province, members of the “Almighty God” cult have been taking advantage of the “2012 end-of-the-world prophecy” to gather illegally and disseminate propaganda in the streets to spread the end-of-the-world rumor and claim that “only believers will be saved.”

    Also Known as “Eastern Lightning,” “Real God”

    This reporter has learned that the “Almighty God” cult is also called “Eastern Lightning” and “Real God.” Its doctrines are selections and perversions from the Christian Bible, [and the group] mainly exploits the name of “Christianity” to conduct illegal activities. The State Religious Affairs Bureau first made a note of its cult nature long ago and banned the group in accordance with the law; [the bureau] is now striking hard against [Almighty God].

    This organization originated as an offshoot of the “Shouters,” a cult which entered our country from the United States in the late 1970s. Its founder, Zhao Weishan, was a core member of the “Shouters” who left to set up his own group because of disagreements with fellow members. “Almighty God” carries the banner of Christianity and disseminates absurd, illegal cult teachings adapted from Christianity such as The Word Appears in the Flesh; Lightning from the East; Almighty God, How Great You Are (also known as Sing a New Song with the Lamb); Christ’s Words (also known as Judgment Begins with the Family of God); Works of the Spirit; Kingdom of Praise; Hymns of Truth; and New Songs.

    This group teaches that the “Age of Law” ruled over by Jehovah and the “Age of Grace” ruled over by Jesus have both passed and that the “Age of the Kingdom” ruled over by “Almighty God” is approaching. [It teaches that] God took human form a second time as an Eastern woman and descended to China to pass judgment on humankind. It claims that “the end of the world is approaching” and that only those who believe in “Almighty God” can be saved, whereas all who reject and do not believe will be killed by “lightning.” It says slanderously that “present-day China is a great imperial family in decline that is dominated by a great red dragon (i.e., the Communist Party)” and incites followers to launch a decisive battle against the “great red dragon” under God’s leadership and “to destroy the great red dragon and establish the Kingdom of the Almighty God.”

    Striking Hard against Its Destructive Activities

    “Almighty God,” which originated in Henan in the 1990s and spread to many provinces, is a cult with political overtones.

    There have been instances of the cult’s money-making scams in many places throughout the country, bringing great harm to more than a few members of the public who were “lured” by the cult into joining. The cult even encourages its members to leave their homes, devoting their body, soul, and property to the church leader. This has led to the shattering of many formerly prosperous and happy families and compounded the problems of many families that were already poor and suffering.

    The spread of this cult has seriously interfered with the normal religious beliefs of some members of the public in our province and has disrupted the order of people’s work and daily life. It has deceptively attracted [members of the] public who do not understand the true situation, led to disharmony in many families, and caused great social harm. As December 21, 2012, approaches, the destructive activities of “Eastern Lightning” groups everywhere may grow even more apparent and virulent. The relevant authorities are presently striking hard [against them] and remind the public to resolutely resist.

    Readers who discover illegal or criminal activities of the “Almighty God” [cult] are requested to report them to police immediately by phoning 110 and to assist the public security authorities in combating and punishing [the group].

    Operation Style of the “Almighty God” Cult

    Beginning in the 1990s, “Eastern Lightning” (also known as “Almighty God”) spread northward from Henan. In 1998 it spread to places including Yan’an and Yulin, and in 2004 it reached the region of Inner Mongolia and Shanxi, making pervasive inroads towards Xinjiang, Ningxia, Gansu, and other areas. The group’s internal organizational structure is extremely tight and its ability to resist detection is quite strong. At the very top of its internal organizational structure is a female God, below which are priests. The churches are divided into large-area, small-area, and branch churches, with the persons responsible known as “leaders.” Proselytization is similar to a pyramid marketing scheme, employing “rolling personal networks” and one-way relationships. Once you have joined the church, you are not allowed to ask others’ names. Only pseudonyms such as “Little White Rabbit” or “Doggy” are used in communication with others. Each church member only knows the several other members of their branch church, and members rarely meet in groups exceeding seven. New members are known as “newcomers.” Those who have been discovered by the public security authority or government agencies are said to have “left the surroundings,” and either don’t talk or talk nonsense [to those who discovered them]. Proselytizers are typically not allowed to carry any means of communication and, when they need to make contact, make varied use of local pay-per-use telephone services to call people to meet them.

    How to Identify Cults

    [With respect to] Article 300 of the Criminal Law, cults are defined as “illegal organizations established in the name of religion, qigong, or other pretexts that, having deified its most important members, uses the creation and dissemination of superstition and heresies, among other means, to bewitch and deceive others, recruit and control members, and harm society.” [Note: Article 300 discusses cult-related crimes, but “cults” are not defined anywhere in the Criminal Law—Trans.]

    In other words, [cults] make people miss work, neglect their fields, abandon their homes, and give up their studies to believe in “God”; claim that joining their “religion” can heal the sick and ward off calamity and serve as a refuge; spread word that the “end of the world” is coming and that only those who join their organization can be saved; deceive and coerce women into humiliation by church leaders; say that traditional religion is out of date and that one must believe in a new “God”; hold illegal and furtive gatherings where they shout, sing, and dance wildly; make people use deceptive means to get others to join; refuse to allow [people to] leave the group after joining; incite members to defy the government in the name of “God”; treat society, the government, and ordinary people as “demons”; concoct ridiculous heresies under the guise of religion and science; unscrupulously collect money through fraudulent means; and establish underground organizations and carry out illegal activities.

  • China Outlines Criminal Punishments for Tibetan Self-Immolations

    Monestary in Aba [Ngawa] County of Sichuan Province, where many self-immolations occurred. Photo credit: sc157.com

    Since February 2009, more than 90 Tibetans have reportedly set themselves on fire in protest against Chinese government policies. These self-immolations, which because of restrictions on reporting have been difficult to confirm, have largely been carried out by young Tibetan men and women in the eastern Tibetan regions that are divided between the provinces of Sichuan, Qinghai, and Gansu. Most of the protesters are known or believed to have died as a result of injuries sustained during these incidents.

    The frequency of self-immolation, a form of protest that was previously unknown in Tibet, has accelerated in recent weeks. Some analysts suggest that this represents a new phase of protest, one aimed at forcing China’s new party leaders to confront grievances about tightened political control over religious institutions and policies that further weaken the cultural autonomy to which Tibetans and other ethnic groups are entitled under Chinese law.

    In the face of growing protest in Tibetan and Uyghur regions in recent years, the Chinese government has held on firmly to its two-pronged effort to assimilate its western ethnic populations economically and culturally, even though many of these policies—such as relocation of nomadic herders into settled villages and “bilingual education” that places primary emphasis on Mandarin Chinese—have tended to further intensify grievances.

    In an effort to curb self-immolations, local governments in Tibetan areas have also instituted a heavy security crackdown and intensified propaganda efforts aimed at demonizing protesters and the “black hands” who allegedly incite them. Both of these tactics are on display in an editorial recently published in the Gannan Daily, the newspaper published by the local party committee in Gannan [Kanlho] Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu Province. The editorial introduces guidelines issued by China’s top judicial and law-enforcement authorities aimed directly at criminalizing a wide variety of activities related to the protests. (Three of the activities mentioned in the report are to be considered intentional homicide, as was the case for at least three people detained in Sichuan last year.) It also features classic examples of the language associated with political campaigns—language that emphasizes the treachery of “splittist” forces inside and outside China who “cloak their illegal criminal acts in religion” while “bewitching” protesters to go against the interests of the “broad masses” and undermine ethnic unity.

    It is unlikely that either the criminalization of self-immolation or heavy-handed propaganda will lead to the resolution of the longstanding grievances that underlie the protests. Recent government policies appear aimed at integrating these peripheral ethnic regions more firmly into the dominant economic, social, and cultural order of China, without giving due consideration to the desires of inhabitants there. Though self-immolation may appear to some as a senseless act, for those who choose this form of protest such sacrifice may reflect the relative lack of other means to express the suffering and indignity experienced by Tibetans.

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    Those Who Incite Self-Immolations Must be Severely Punished Under the Law

    Gannan Daily
    December 3, 2012

    Gannan Daily commentator

    Just as cadres and the masses of all ethnic groups in our prefecture are studying how to carry out the spirit of the 18th Party Congress by wholeheartedly seeking development and making concerted efforts in pursuit of moderate prosperity, splittist forces inside and outside our borders have bewitched and incited [people to carry out] a series of self-immolation incidents that have seriously affected the overall social situation of unity and stability in our prefecture.

    So that the recent self-immolation cases that have occurred in Tibetan areas may be handled in accordance with the law and in order to ensure social stability, the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have, based on relevant laws and regulations, jointly issued an “Opinion on Handling Self-Immolation Cases in Tibetan Areas in Accordance with the Law.”

    The Opinion points out that the recent self-immolations that have occurred in Tibetan areas are cases of significant evil that result from collusion between hostile forces inside and outside our borders whose attempts to use premeditated, organized plots to incite splittism, undermine ethnic unity, and seriously disrupt social order. [The cases] have seriously affected the present overall situation of ethnic unity and social stability in Tibetan areas. Those who carry out self-immolations in these cases are unlike the ordinary world-weary person who commits suicide. Their common motivation is to split the nation and they endanger public safety and social order, classifying their self-immolations as illegal criminal acts. Organizing, plotting, inciting, coercing, enticing, abetting, or assisting others to carry out self-immolations is, at its essence, a serious criminal act that intentionally deprives another of his or her life.

    Tibetan Buddhism emphasizes compassion and not killing as fundamental precepts. However, those who plot self-immolations cloak their illegal criminal acts with religion and have desecrated the faith of the broad masses of believers in Tibetan Buddhism. The Opinion makes clear that those criminals who act as principal culprits behind the scenes to organize, direct, and plot [self-immolations], as well as those who actively participate in inciting, coercing, enticing, abetting, or assisting others to carry out self-immolations, will be held criminally liable for intentional homicide in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Criminal Law of the PRC and targeted for severe punishment in accordance with the law. As for self-immolators themselves, once the nature of their illegal acts has been clarified, they should be treated differently depending on specific circumstances such as the extent of their malign intentions and the degree of the harm caused by their acts. If the circumstances are serious and major harm has been caused, they should also be held legally liable in accordance with the law.

    The Opinion indicates that anyone who organizes, plots, incites, coerces, entices, abets, or assists others to commit self-immolations shall be held criminally liable for intentional homicide in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who actively commits self-immolation in which the circumstances are serious and that causes major harm or serious danger to society shall be held criminally liable in accordance with the law. Anyone who commits self-immolation in a public space and endangers public safety shall be held criminally liable for using dangerous methods to endanger public safety in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who prepares implements or creates conditions for committing self-immolations shall be treated as if he or she were preparing to commit a crime. Anyone who commits self-immolation and, while burning, grabs hold of another person, shall be held criminally liable for intentional homicide in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who commits self-immolation in a public place who does not endanger public safety but gathers many people to seriously disrupt public order or traffic order shall be held criminally liable for gathering a crowd to disrupt public order or traffic order in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who, in order to commit self-immolation, illegally carries gasoline or other flammable items into a public space or onto a public transportation vehicle shall be held criminally liable for illegally carrying dangerous items that endanger public safety in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who has been enticed, tricked, or coerced into committing self-immolations may be given lenient or mitigated [punishment] or exempted from criminal punishment in accordance with the law.

    The Opinion further indicates that anyone who creates disturbances at the scene of a self-immolation and creates serious chaos in a public place shall be held criminally liable for creating a serious disturbance in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who gathers crowds to disrupt social order, public order, or traffic order by means such as parading around with a corpse or summoning a group to gather and watch shall be held criminally liable for gathering a crowd to disrupt social order or gathering a crowd to disrupt public order or traffic order in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who obstructs public security officers, medical personnel, or others from rescue efforts shall be held criminally liable for intentional homicide in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who commits beating and smashing at the scene [of an immolation] or damages or steals public or private property shall be held criminally liable for robbery or intentional destruction of property in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who prevents public security officers or other employees of state organs from carrying out their duties in accordance with the law, if the circumstances are rather serious, shall be held criminally liable for obstructing public service in accordance with the Criminal Law. Anyone who summons a group to mourn or collect funds for a self-immolator shall be prevented from doing so in accordance with the law; anyone who refuses to obey and gathers a crowd to disrupt social order, public order, or traffic order or who obstructs public service shall be held criminally liable in accordance with the law.

    Civilized society requires rule of law, and the construction of a harmonious and beautiful society necessitates even more the safeguards of rule of law. The issuance of this Opinion is extremely necessary and extremely timely, not only because it provides a strong legal basis for handling various self-immolation cases in accordance with the law, but also because it serves as a strong deterrent for self-immolation incidents. It leads us to understand that laws are norms that every person must obey in a modern society, that absolutely no organization or individual may be allowed to operate above the law, that no one can enjoy extralegal privileges, and that all must be in awe before the law. In particular, those black hands behind the scenes who plan, direct, and incite others to commit self-immolation, [have committed] serious, illegal crimes that are extremely inhuman and they have violated human society’s most basic standards of conscience and morality. They must be subject to the law’s severe punishment and moral condemnation.

    Throughout these recent years, the prefectural party committee and government have always shared joys and hardships together with the people of all ethnic groups in the prefecture, made improving livelihood and promoting the people’s well-being their fundamental goals, and continually improved the education system and extended public health and social security systems throughout urban and rural areas. Steady progress has been made toward the construction of new agricultural and pastoral villages as breakthroughs of the resettlement project, the incomes of farmers and herders have continued to increase, and the conditions of agricultural and pastoral villages have been completely improved. This has earned praise from cadres and the masses at all levels in the prefecture and received broad support from all segments of society.

    Splittist sabotage does not enjoy popular support and self-immolations will not win people over. The facts prove that the fundamental interests of cadres and masses of all ethnic groups in Gannan rest on a unified nation, ethnic unity, and a harmonious and stable society and that these same conditions serve as fundamental assurance of breakthroughs to harmony and stability in pursuit of moderate prosperity and construction of a prosperous and beautiful new Gannan. Criminals who incite and bewitch with self-immolation must be brought to justice. Cadres and masses from all ethnic groups must have a deep understanding of the truth of “unity and stability lead to prosperity; splittism and rioting lead to disaster” and stand firm in drawing a clear line between [themselves and] all hostile forces and not be tricked or deceived. They must develop self-awareness of [the necessity of] upholding the good situation of ethnic unity and social stability and cherishing and protecting the good life that has not come easily.

  • Call for Constitutionalism at the 18th Party Congress

    18th National Party Congress Press Conference Center. Photo: Xinhua

    At a press conference on the eve of the 18th Party Congress, a spokesman told reporters that the delegates assembled in Beijing to select China’s newest leadership group “brought with them the wishes of the Chinese people.” Indeed, as they did at the time of China’s last leadership transition 10 years ago, many in and outside China have high expectations for China’s incoming leadership, looking to them to push forward all sorts of much-needed economic, legal, and political reform.

    In a recent interview with the Economic Observer newspaper, Shanghai-based constitutional scholar Tong Zhiwei expresses his own hopes that China’s coming decade will bring a renewed commitment to the principles of constitutional governance. As Tong explains, such a commitment to limiting state power and protecting individual rights would have profound ramifications for China’s economy, its legal institutions, and especially its political system.

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    Constitutional Rule: Current Realities and Future Visions
    Meng Lei
    Economic Observer, November 3, 2012

    Conscientiously Protect Citizens’ Fundamental Rights

    Economic Observer [hereafter, EO]: A few days from now, the Chinese Communist Party will hold its 18th Party Congress and there will be a transition of the party’s central leadership. This year is also the 30th anniversary of the promulgation of the 1982 constitution. As a constitutional scholar, what prospects do you see for “ruling the country according to the constitution” in the coming decade?

    Professor Tong Zhiwei. Photo: 21CCOM.net

    Tong Zhiwei: It’s great that you’ve chosen to discuss things from the angle of ruling the country according to the constitution! To rule according to the constitution is a concrete requirement of constitutionalism; ruling according to the constitution means implementing constitutionalism, and implementing constitutionalism requires ruling according to the constitution. Governance is not an issue for ordinary citizens; it’s only a problem for state leaders and the ruling party. So, during the 18th Party Congress, it is necessary to discuss this fundamental issue.

    Essentially speaking, the most important aspects of constitutionalism are, first, the need to implement the restrictions and checks on [the exercise of] supreme power provided for in the constitution and, second, the need to conscientiously protect all of the fundamental rights of citizens that are affirmed by the constitution.

    In the 30 years since the current constitution took effect, constitutional implementation has made major achievements overall, but has also encountered some fairly major problems. We don’t lack for self-praise, so with respect to ruling according to the constitution I think I’ll focus on what hasn’t been done well and where it is necessary to exert significant effort to improve.

    Whether one is talking about rule according to the constitution or constitutionalism, the first requirement is the need to place all public power under the regulation or restriction of the constitution and not allowing [the existence of] any power that is unchecked or not subject to restriction by the constitution. But in our country, there are some basic issues of constitutionalism that have yet to be resolved. For starters, have a look at the power [enjoyed by] the party secretaries in some cities and counties—how are they restrained by the constitution? The most extreme [example] is Bo Xilai when he was in Chongqing. There he was called a leader of the ruling party, but the constitution and laws that were established in accordance with party proposals were simply unable to restrain him. He was called the leader of the municipal party committee, but in fact [he ran] a personal dictatorship where local institutions of state power and other state institutions set forth in the constitution were only for show. Under these circumstances, how can it be acceptable not to reform?

    Another requirement of rule according to the constitution or constitutionalism is the conscientious protection of citizens’ fundamental rights. Citizens’ fundamental rights refer to those individual rights affirmed in the constitution; rights that the state is obliged to protect. Over the past 30-plus years, our citizens’ fundamental rights have received fuller protection than they ever did in the past, but unfortunately, obvious defects exist. China is a country that strictly adheres to a statutory-law system in which the fundamental rights provided in the constitution generally must first be expressed through legislation before they can actually be protected. In reality, it remains an open question how to implement and how to use the law to protect these constitutional rights of citizens.

    EO: Without special legislation, these specific constitutional rights cannot be protected. In other words, when these rights are subjected to restriction, the constitution is not enough to be used as a “shield.”

    Tong: You’re a reporter, you’ve certainly heard sayings such as “there is freedom to research, but expression must be disciplined.” But can citizens’ fundamental rights be restricted through discipline? If so, it is the same as the deprivation of relevant fundamental rights.

    Citizen’s fundamental rights can only be restricted by laws. Moreover, laws restricting fundamental rights cannot protect these fundamental rights in form but negate them in practice. Also, laws restricting citizens’ fundamental rights cannot violate the constitution, because laws that violate the constitution are invalid. Of course, this necessitates an effective system of constitutional review, or, as our constitution puts it, a system to “oversee constitutional enforcement.”

    Here, it’s crucial to understand why all norms that are not laws, like administrative regulations, have no power to restrict citizens’ fundamental rights. The logic is simple. Taking China’s constitution as an example, if a fundamental right affirmed in a constitution that was passed by more than two thirds of all of the delegates to the National People’s Congress (NPC) could be restricted arbitrarily by central state organs like the State Council or by local state organs, it would effectively mean a veto over this right’s essence as a fundamental right and be no different in consequence from the constitution not affirming this right.

    Of course, this is not to say that without legal protections citizens are entirely unable to enjoy these rights. Without corresponding legal provisions, citizens more or less still enjoy some fundamental rights affirmed in the constitution, but this kind of enjoyment lacks stable, reliable protection.

    EO: Just now you were discussing constitutional rights that are not yet protected through specific laws. But in reality, there are some fundamental rights for which there is already specific legislation but the protection [of these rights] is still not ideal. What causes this?

    Tong: There are many reasons that can lead to this kind of situation.

    The first situation is that the legislation itself is problematic. Even though there are legal protections, things like violations of the principles of rule of law mean that the legislation doesn’t meet the standards of effective protection that are commonly necessary. For example, there are procedures in the Criminal Procedure Law that protect the right to personal liberty. According to rule-of-law principles, criminal coercive measures and investigative methods taken by investigative departments should be reviewed and approved by a court. But in the majority of situations our laws do not require review or approval by a court; rather, the public security departments decide and implement [these decisions] on their own. This is the case for residential surveillance, release on guarantee pending further investigation, seizure of property, monitoring, etc.

    The second scenario is when laws exist but are not followed. This has been particularly noticeable in recent years. I won’t discuss this in detail; readers can recall some of the more notorious cases from recent years.

    The third situation is when laws or administrative regulations violate the constitution. From a certain perspective, the system of reeducation through labor, which we have all had enough of, can be put in this category.

    The fourth situation is when a law’s derivative laws or normative documents violate the constitution or the law but cannot be reviewed in order to remedy the situation.

    Aside from this, there are also outrages committed by state agencies or officials who don’t follow any rules at all. These are even more terrifying.

    Exercise Power, Rule in Accordance with the Constitution

    EO: Besides protection through dedicated legislation, I’d like to ask you to discuss why courts can’t directly apply the constitutional provisions protecting fundamental rights. In this regard, didn’t we once discuss “judicialization of the constitution”?

    Tong: Constitutional adjudication is different from ordinary judicial discretion. Valid constitutional rulings must effectively restrain all state agencies and officials, otherwise they cannot be considered constitutional rulings and would have no significance. Our courts have a lower status than the people’s congresses and their standing committees. It would be unimaginable for a Chinese court ruling to restrain the NPC and its standing committee or even the people’s congress and standing committee at its own administrative level. So, there is no way to accomplish this so-called “judicialization of the constitution.” However, even if we cannot judicialize the constitution, it is possible to implement constitutional review, or, as provided for in our constitution, the oversight of constitutional enforcement. Oversight of constitutional enforcement is a power of the NPC and its standing committee. A dedicated body ought to be established to deal with this matter. We’ve discussed this issue for decades, ever since 1982 when the constitution was promulgated. Unfortunately, it has yet to be resolved. What we can strive for at the moment is to establish a dedicated constitutional oversight body.

    There has been much discussion of this subject. One of the more radical ideas is to have the NPC establish a constitutional committee, equal in status to the NPC Standing Committee, that would be able to review the constitutionality of all legislation except that passed by the NPC. A more moderate proposal is to establish a dedicated state agency under the NPC and its standing committee equal in rank to the State Council and the Supreme People’s Court. The most modest reform would involve setting up a special committee under the NPC, not an independent organ of the state, that would carry out specific review work related to oversight of constitutional enforcement and provide consultative opinions to the NPC and its standing committee. Whether it’s a constitutional court or constitutional committee, the most important thing is that it must not be all talk and no action.

    EO: On September 15, 2004, Comrade Hu Jintao said in a speech at the “50th anniversary commemoration of the establishment of the National People’s Congress”: “In order to rule the country in accordance with the law, we must first rule in accordance with the constitution. In order to exercise power in accordance with the law, we must first exercise power in accordance with the constitution.” Nevertheless, when Lu Yongxiang, vice chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, said last week that China’s fundamental [task] going forward would be to “exercise power and rule the country in accordance with the constitution,” the media and the public still treated it as a major, noteworthy event. Why do you think that some comrades, like theoreticians and leading cadres, treat this subject as taboo?

    Tong: If the constitution and laws are properly utilized, they can be used to resolve all problems. However, because many leading cadres are not familiar with the constitution, they don’t have a clear understanding about how to resolve problems within the framework of the constitution or law. When there is no effective implementation of the constitution or laws, much of the time it is mainly because of poor use by institutions of public power and their officials.

    Moreover, it’s much easier to talk about doing things or governing in accordance with the constitution than it is to have correct understandings. A fundamental requirement of ruling in accordance with the constitution is, first, that those bodies that exercise constitutional state authority are themselves based in the constitution. In other words, the name of that body or official position can be found in the constitution. Bodies or official positions that are not named in the text of the constitution cannot exercise constitutional state power—that is most important. A big problem we currently face is that some party and governmental bodies commonly exceed their authority and exercise state power. All state power derives from the people, and the people express themselves legally through voting. Only organizations or persons that are directly or indirectly elected by voters are those that have been granted state power by the voters. At present, there are still many matters with which there is a gap from this standard.

    EO: Returning to the constitution itself, how do you assess the results of constitutional amendments over the years?

    Tong: I normally divide constitutional amendments into comprehensive and partial amendments. The 1982 constitution was a comprehensive amendment of the 1978 Constitution, while since 1982 the constitution has undergone four partial amendments. Without question, the 1982 Constitution is more advanced than the 1978 Constitution, and the current constitution is a relatively good one.

    No matter whether one is talking about comprehensive or partial amendments, the biggest problem that has emerged in our country over the course of all previous amendments remains an insufficient mentality regarding constitutional enforcement. The constitution is emblematic of [the state of] democracy and rule of law, and without a constitution you cannot even speak of these things. So, in the past, consideration mostly went to creating a constitution in order to represent [these things], whereas relatively little consideration was given to how to seriously enforce it. This can be seen in the way that amended constitutions have immediately taken effect after their promulgation. Never once at the time of promulgating and implementing a new constitution was a thorough constitutional review of existing law, regulations, and other normative documents conducted and the results of it released.

    The 1954 constitution was like this, and the 1982 constitution and the four subsequent amendments were each handled this way as well. In order to seriously enforce the constitution, there definitely needs to be a transitional period before it takes effect, during which time two things must be done in earnest: first, the enactment of necessary laws as concrete protections of the new fundamental rights affirmed in the new constitution; and, second, the weeding out of legal and regulatory provisions that contradict [the new constitution] and the announcement of [these provisions] as in violation of the constitution and abolished. You cannot say that this kind of new basic law can take effect immediately after it is announced. That’s impossible.

    EO: Can you give a few examples of old laws or regulations that were in conflict with the new constitution or constitutional amendments at the time they were announced that should have been reviewed and abolished but never were?

    Tong: There are too many. For example, the Methods for Custody and Repatriation of Urban Migrants and Beggars that led to the Sun Zhigang affair count as an administrative regulation that should have been sorted out and abolished at the time the 1982 constitution was promulgated and implemented, but it never was. Similarly, the State Council Decision on the Issue of Reeducation through Labor and its Supplementary Regulations, as well as the NPC Standing Committee’s Decision Regarding the Handling of Offenders Undergoing Reform through Labor and Persons Undergoing Reeducation through Labor who Escape or Commit New Crimes are normative documents that should at least have already been sorted out and abolished when constitutional amendments were promulgated to respect and protect human rights [in 2004] and to establish a socialist country under rule of law [in 1999].

    EO: Just now you mentioned institutional regulations, which definitely include administrative regulations. This makes me think of some rules of government and administrative bodies, such [as those involving] so-called property tax, about which there has been furious speculation of late. I’d like your opinion: if the State Council or local governments pass new rules or revise old rules to levy a tax, would it satisfy constitutional principles?

    Tong: The State Council is a state administrative body. Even though it is the highest state administrative body, for it to decide to levy a tax would not satisfy constitutional principles. The right to private property is a citizen’s fundamental right protected in the constitution. Moreover, the levying of taxes on citizens is a major state issue. Looking from these two perspectives, levying of taxes can only be decided through legislation passed by the NPC. I believe that the next amendment to the constitution should add some new provisions regarding taxation and financial budgeting in order to more fully protect citizens’ private property rights and the effective control over budgeting by people’s congresses at all levels.

    Constitutionalism and the Economy

    EO: Turning to look at economic development, how do you see the relationship between constitutionalism and economic development?

    Tong: There is an extremely close relationship between constitutionalism and economic development. We need long-term, sustainable development. The American legal scholar [Richard] Posner once suggested that a state structured on separation of powers and the principle of checks and balances is the lowest-cost, most efficient constitutional system there is. In saying this he pretties-up their political system, but he makes a significant point about the relationship between constitutionalism and healthy, sustainable economic development. Historically, some totalitarian, dictatorial governments have sometimes appeared more efficient and able to make rapid and timely decisions about various matters. But they often make big mistakes and, once having made them, it is extremely difficult to rectify them, which leads to especially major economic waste. With a system of constitutionalism and rule of law, the situation is precisely the opposite. These days, we all talk about “low-carbon economics” and “green economics.” I think that constitutionalism is the rule-of-law low-carbon and green environment that most suits economic development.

    There are many counterexamples in China. For example, during our history the Great Leap Forward and “Cultural Revolution” were economic disasters seldom seen in world history. Everyone knows that more than 10 million people starved to death during the Great Leap Forward and that the “Cultural Revolution” brought China’s national economy to the brink of disaster. These problems were all caused by China’s lack of constitutionalism and rule of law. They were economic disasters caused by flaws in the political and legal [systems].

    EO: Since reform and opening, some constitutional changes such as provisions to establish a market economy and emphasize the status and role of the non-state-sector economy have fundamentally pushed forward our country’s economic development or, at least, played an irreplaceable role.

    Tong: The state-sector economy certainly played an important role in the rapid economic development over the past 30 years, but first and foremost we must recognize that it was [the introduction of] new elements that brought about this sort of high-speed development, starting with the private economy and then the market economic system and the introduction of foreign capital through reform and opening. Under 30 years of the state-owned, planned economy, things didn’t go well. Then, after the constitution provided for the co-existence of a variety of economic actors and the implementation of the market economy, growth immediately picked up. But after things picked up, many people forgot [the reasons for this]. The [policy of] advancing the state sector and shrinking the private sector is, on some level, that is, to a real degree, following the old path and, it ought to be said, has no future. We will see that none of the modern economic powers with reasonably balanced development rely on a state-run economic sector, and some countries, such as the United States, can almost be said to have no state-sector economy. These are things we should consider but not necessarily replicate. I’m not advocating privatization but advancing the state sector and shrinking the private sector is definitely no good. China’s economic future mainly rests on the strong growth of the non-state economy. Our current economy is still a kind of “identity economy” in which things are unequal and [success] depends on the identity of the actor. We need to devise a way to fix this.

    EO: What concrete reform measures could be [implemented] next to realize rule and governance according to the constitution? Put another way, in the next 10 years, in what areas should constitutional rule and governance be promoted?

    Tong: I’ll make a few simple points:

    1. Institutions of the state and ruling-party organization, along with their powers, should return to the constitution. The ruling party ought to use its political leaders to have its positions written into the constitution and the laws, and recommend its trusted party-member cadres to positions in state organs through legal procedures. State institutions must truly take up the duties of state institutions and handle matters strictly according to the constitution and laws, rather than doing things according to speeches or temporary [policy] documents issued by one body or another. There should be a true separation.

    2. Enact necessary constitutional legislation. First of all, this includes a News Law and Publication Law to protect citizens’ freedom of speech and publication, an Association Law to protect the people’s right to form associations, and a Protection of Religious Freedom Law to protect citizen’s freedom of religious beliefs. The highest organ of state power should establish legislation to protect the fundamental citizens’ rights provided for in the constitution.

    3. Step-by-step, planned implementation of direct, competitive elections of people’s congress delegates at all levels. Even if for the time being we still cannot have direct elections of NPC delegates, we should at least gradually introduce direct election of local people’s congresses at all levels. There should be no problems with having direct competitive elections for local people’s congress delegates. If there are no competitive elections, the people’s congresses serve no representative function.

      Presently, people’s congresses clearly serve no representative function. For instance, consider the example of the recent incident in Ningbo, as well as those in Qidong and Shifang. We can see that in these incidents, people’s congresses did not participate substantively in making major local decisions, not to mention make those decisions themselves. Even if they had participated, they wouldn’t reflect public opinion. When there are matters that ought to be discussed before decisions are made and people’s congresses don’t even engage in substantive discussion, the results will be conflict appearing in the streets.

    4. Effective protection of judicial independence. An independent judicial system is an important sign of a modern nation. All types of disputes in society ultimately rely on resolution through the judicial system, but today, because courts and judges are not independent, judicial rulings lack the authority they ought to have. For this reason, the party and government always have to face social conflicts directly. This is extremely harmful to China’s stability and sustained development.

    5. Set up a body dedicated to constitutional review (or constitutional oversight and protection) and properly deal with review of the constitutionality and legality of derivative legislation and normative documents. It is because the 1954 constitution had no system for constitutional review that [the idea] silently died. In response to this lesson, the 1982 constitution specially enacted some provisions with the hopes that they would remedy the unfortunate deficiencies of the 1954 constitution. However, because for more than 30 years it has been all talk and no action, constitutional review today remains something relegated to paper only. In more than 30 years the highest organ of state power has not enacted the necessary procedural law and has not carried out a thorough review of the constitutionality or legality of laws or relevant administrative regulations. This is a major problem that concerns the unity of the state legal institutions, and one that ought to be resolved in a timely manner.

      I hope that the 18th Party Congress can set out an encouraging blueprint for the construction of constitutionalism for the coming decade. This would have profound significance for China.

    Tong Zhiwei: Vice president of the China Constitutional Studies Association and professor at East China University of Political Science and Law

  • Party Paper Lists Six Errors in Chinese Social Management

    A 2011 panel meeting on social management in Beijing. Photo: Xinhua

    During the past two years, “social management” (社会管理) has emerged as an important new concept under which China’s leadership hopes to deal with the growing tensions in Chinese society, reflected in recent years in an increasing number of “mass incidents.” As articulated by Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao and Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang, social management involves such things as “developing, managing, and supervising” social organizations; building a “service-oriented” government; and establishing “social-stability risk and evaluation mechanisms.” By becoming more proactive and extending its leadership over civil society, the party aims to limit the risks associated with the social transformations attendant to economic development.

    The emphasis on social management was reflected one year ago when the name of the party’s key body responsible for “maintaining stability” was changed to the Central Comprehensive Social Management Commission (from the Central Comprehensive Public Order Management Commission). This change has been accompanied by a gradual shift in the leaders and members of the commission and its subordinate bodies nationwide. Altogether, these moves appear to be asserting more direct party control over the mechanisms of social management, while broadening the range of associated interests from its traditional focus on law enforcement to include things like public services, crisis response, healthcare, education, social security, and mental health.

    Although the language of social management encourages a more holistic, less repressive approach to preserving social stability and appears to place more emphasis on developing the capacity for civil-society development, skeptics worry that the effect of social management policies will not be the liberation of autonomous social forces but, rather, more effort to assert control over the processes of civil-society formation that are already underway. Some of these concerns can be seen in a recent article (translated below) by Gong Weibin, a professor at the National Academy of Governance, who identifies six misconceptions about social management among Chinese officials.

    The article appeared in the October 15 edition of Study Times, a newspaper published under the auspices of the Central Party School. It is replete with the kind of jargon commonly seen in articles dealing with party policies and pronouncements, but behind all the buzzwords lies a genuine concern about striking a proper balance between government control and individual and group autonomy—as well as an implicit warning that if this balance is not struck properly, there could be serious consequences for the legitimacy of the political regime.

    *
    Six Errors in Contemporary Social Management
    Gong Weibin, Study Times
    October 15, 2012

    At present, innovations in social management are being launched throughout [China] with great vigor, achieving positive results and accumulating a great deal of good experience and methods. However, there are some errors in understanding and practice.

    Error One: A Rigid “Stability-Maintenance Perspective”

    Our country is in a crucial period of its reform and development, a period in which there are both important development opportunities and obvious contradictions. It has become more important to correctly manage the relationship between reform, development, and stability. Therefore, “development is the number one task” and “stability is the number one responsibility” have become two important matters for local party committees and governments.

    However, some people understand social stability in a one-sided way, thinking of it as everyone getting along, as songbirds in spring, without any “noise” and without social conflicts or contradictions. Guided by this type of thinking, [they] cannot tolerate the slightest expression of different opinions, unreasonably obstruct people’s [ability to make] ordinary appeals on behalf of their interests, and spare no expense to tightly guard against some “so-called abnormal behaviors.” In the name of “maintaining stability,” some will even go so far as to suppress different opinions and impose a patriarchal system in which their word is law.

    The essence of social stability is political stability or, in other words, the stability of the political system. Stability of the political system depends upon the level of trust that the public has in the political system. Petitioning by the public is actually an expression of trust in the party and the government, not an attempt to create instability. Historical experience shows that social stability is relative. A harmonious and stable society is not totally without contradictions or conflict; rather, social contradictions and conflicts are kept within the bounds of what society is able to endure. It should be clear that society has the ability to endure a certain amount of social contradictions and conflict, as well as the ability to clear up such contradictions and conflicts on its own.

    No society in the world can achieve stability that lasts forever. Social stability is realized dynamically by continually regulating [stakeholder] relations and [through the use of] “safety valve” mechanisms that continually release the discontent and grievances [pent up] in society. In the current stage of frequently erupting social contradictions, leading cadres at all levels must increase their awareness of hardship, risk, and responsibility. They must be neither aloof and indifferent nor too tense and must adopt a flexible, dynamic “stability-maintenance perspective” and increase the level of inclusiveness and tolerance in society.

    Error Two: One-Sidedly Emphasizing Government Control

    Traditional ideas, habits, and methods persist in current social management, and in many places social management means only an emphasis on efforts at government control. Rather than positively focusing on bringing [problems] under control at their source, there is a negative focus on remaining on guard and asserting control when trouble breaks out. The emphasis is not on improving people’s livelihoods, improving methods of service, and raising the quality and standards of service. [Leaders] aren’t looking to safeguard the public’s lawful rights and interests or making efforts to unblock channels for expressing demands and expanding citizens’ orderly participation in politics. Rather, [they] focus on protecting themselves to the death and surrounding, pursuing, and intercepting [citizens]. [They] aren’t looking at transforming government functions and ways of governing, at fully utilizing the power of people and markets, or at realizing a cooperative management in the common interest; rather, [they] are used to taking complete charge and putting on a one-man show.

    Modern social management should entail diverse participation and shared control. Government should properly carry out its responsibilities of social management and public service; it can neither be absent nor substandard, nor can it be in the wrong place or exceed its bounds. At the same time, all social forces should be fully mobilized to jointly participate in social management through the promotion of neighborhood self-management and corporate responsibility for social management and the realization of new models for [achieving] a good interaction between government administrative control and social self-adjustment and residents’ self-management, organic integration between neighborhood management and workplace management, comprehensive involvement of a variety of methods, integration between management and service, and the orderly and vital integration of diverse control with joint establishment and enjoyment.

    Error Three: Unwillingness to Develop Social Organizations

    It has been repeatedly shown that social organizations [contribute] positive functions and important impacts in the development of modern society. Since the 16th Party Congress, social organizations have undergone definite development, and, as of year-end 2011, there were more than 450,000 social organizations of various types nationwide playing positive roles in [activities] such as providing public services, dealing with unemployment, protecting people’s legitimate rights and interests, and coordinating social relationships.

    However, the present number of social organizations and their [combined] scale is extremely unsuited to the needs of a large nation with a population of more than 1.3 billion. Social organizations are developing at a slow pace, and some are not thriving and have imperfect internal control structures and poor management and service capacities. The status of some social organizations is not clear, with [these organizations] becoming “alternative governments” that, overly relying on government budgetary support, have a weak capacity to develop on their own. There are also some social organizations that deviate from their missions and seek profit.

    There are a variety of reasons for this: there are problems of understanding as well as problems with institutional policies and law, and problems with the quality and capacity of those engaging in the work. At the root [of the problem] are some leaders who have a mistaken understanding of social organizations. Although the great majority of leading cadres say that they attach importance to the development of and role played by social organizations, deep down many still carry profound concerns that social organizations will, if they grow big and strong, become the opponents of the party and government and, if they’re not [managed properly], will turn into rivals that will vie for public [support]. [These cadres] set up obstacles to the development of social organizations. [But] faced with the increasing diversity of social groups and interest structures, the party and government cannot run everything and need to provide public services and social management through social organizations. Thus, with the exception of a need to exert more control over a small number of social organizations of special types, [leading cadres] ought to loosen entry conditions for economic, public interest, charitable, and neighborhood social organizations; improve relevant laws; increase the degree of government support; and promote and standardize the rapid, healthy development of social organizations. Social management is about both “managing society” and “having society manage.” A variety of actors are needed, including social organizations, to realize the self-management of “society.”

    Error Four: Stressing Stability, Ignoring Rights

    For a relatively long time in the past, people commonly thought of social management as social control and of maintaining social stability as managing, controlling, suppressing, and fining; restricting people’s freedom; and placing prohibitions on this and that. Guided by this negative view of maintaining stability, some cadres frequently focus on asserting control after an incident in order to avoid getting in trouble, and pay less attention to pre-incident prevention and controlling [problems] at their source. This kind of thinking and way of doing things still persists in some locations. What [adherents to these beliefs] don’t realize is that, as a result of the opening and progress of society, protecting the lawful rights and interests of the public is at the root of realizing long-term peace and stability in society.

    The prerequisite and basis for maintaining stability is protecting rights. First, [we] must respect and protect the public’s rights to information, to participation, to expression, and to [government] oversight. [We must] actively open up mechanisms for public opinion, widen channels for the expression of public demands, and allow mass organizations like the [All-China Federation of Trade] Unions, the Communist Youth League, and the All-China Women’s Federation as well as all types of social organizations to fulfill their function of safeguarding the rights and interests of the broader public. The protection and realization of the lawful rights and interests of the masses is an important means of ensuring social harmony and stability, stimulating social vitality, and promoting social development and progress.

    Error Five: Stressing Livelihood, Ignoring Democracy

    Since the 17th Party Congress, the pace of social construction has sped up across the country with an emphasis on improving people’s livelihoods. Issues like employment, education, healthcare, housing, and social security have all received unprecedented attention. The mission to improve people’s livelihoods has seen rapid progress and development, and the standard and quality of people’s basic needs have seen relatively large improvements.

    However, in the course of improving people’s livelihoods, there have arisen a series of social problems and contradictions associated with livelihood issues. Looking at the reasons, the principal [cause] is that there has not been sufficient attention to the opinions of the public, and what the government has done on behalf of people’s livelihoods has not necessarily met public need. Livelihood policies themselves cannot resolve questions of how to engender more scientific and rational decision-making on livelihood issues, and how to allow livelihood policies to gain the understanding and support of vast majorities of the stakeholding public.

    Although some places have made great efforts and large investments [to improve] people’s livelihoods, the results have not been apparent, public discontent has not abated, and some contradictions and disputes have even arisen during the roll out of livelihood projects. The root cause [of all of this] is that they discuss livelihood without mentioning democracy. On the other hand, some local leaders have integrated democracy and livelihood and used democracy to promote people’s livelihoods. At the same time that they strengthen grassroots party organization, they conscientiously develop self-governance by village and urban residents; follow through on village (urban) residents’ rights to democratic elections, democratic decision-making, democratic management, and democratic oversight; allow the public to participate in discussions of livelihood issues; and mobilize the public to offer advice and make suggestions.

    Public participation in the enactment of policies concerning livelihood issues enables the gathering of public knowledge and the optimization of the decision-making process. It is also a way of ensuring that policies concerning livelihood issues are understood and supported by the public. Public participation in the decision-making process enables people to understand matters in a complete and correct way and to understand the various considerations behind decisions and the difficulties faced by decision-makers.

    Once they understand the difficulties that decision-makers face, the public will also understand when some things cannot be done all at once. The integration of democracy and livelihood avoids the embarrassing situation in which leading cadres make decisions on behalf of the people and, despite their best intentions to do the right thing, do not get the understanding and approval of the public. As the structure of societal needs changes, the democratic consciousness of the masses will increasingly grow stronger. Therefore, democracy is an important safeguard of improving people’s livelihoods and is an important measure for promoting social management.

    Error Six: Abusing Grid Management

    Grid management is a new management method adopted in recent years by cities across the country in which urban communities are divided into several management grid units according to a certain standard. After clarifying the scope of management and the responsibilities of [social management] personnel, information is proactively gathered about people, events, and things [in order] to build a database of urban components and events. [This database] forms [the basis of] an urban management work platform through which relevant departments and work units can proactively uncover problems in a timely manner, respond quickly, and resolve problems in a timely manner. [All of this represents] the informatization and refinement of urban management and is a kind of innovation in social-management service.

    The idea of grid management has spread rapidly, and methods of grid management have been promoted rapidly, so that now party and government departments in many cities are exploring grid management. However, if within one city various agencies like those responsible for politico-legal work, public security, civil affairs, social security, family planning, and city management and law enforcement each pursue grid management separately and for their own purposes such that information cannot be shared effectively, it can potentially result in duplicated investment and wasted resources. In the name of grid management, some cities divide communities or buildings into grid units of five or 10 households, appointing a “grid captain” and setting up [a system of] collective responsibility. This way of doing things either tends towards the formalistic, producing no real effects, or it results in excessive control that infringes on personal space. Attention needs to be paid to these problems in the course of establishing and managing grids. Good things need to be done well.

  • Consensus Building on RTL Reform, Cases Highlight Abuse

    Tang Hui was sentenced to 18 months of RTL for accusing police of misconduct following her daughter’s kidnapping and rape. Source: Sanxiang Metropolis Daily
    The plight of 39-year-old mother Tang Hui recently catapulted the controversial system of reeducation through labor (RTL) back into Chinese headlines. Tang was sentenced to 18 months of RTL—a system that enables police to punitively detain individuals without trial for periods that generally range from one to three years—in August after she accused police of misconduct while handling of the case of her fifth-grade daughter. The 11-year-old had been kidnapped, repeatedly raped, and sold into prostitution, circumstances that rallied public support for Tang’s successful appeal of the RTL decision. Not long after her vindication, a group of Chinese lawyers circulated an open letter to the Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of Justice calling for reforms to the system.
    This was not the first call for reform. The fiercest critics advocate abolition of RTL, calling it unconstitutional, a violation of the Legislation Law, and incompatible with China’s expressed goal to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China signed in 1998. Since 2003, lawmakers have twice placed a new Law on Education and Correction for Illegal Acts (违法行为教育矫治法) on the legislative agenda, but each time police opposition has prevented it from going much farther.
    There are, however, signs of new momentum, including the recent announcement of a pilot project in four Chinese cities that promises to reduce the scale of RTL and introduce more reasonable procedural guarantees. Overall, consensus appears to be forming around the idea that the RTL system cannot continue in its present form and some changes will have to be made.
    As the future of RTL approaches this turning point, an account from Caijing magazine (translated below) offers an inside look at the experiences of several men who were detained in Chongqing’s Fuling RTL and Drug Treatment Center for online expression. In the battle to preserve social stability, the reform of RTL might take a favored weapon out of the hands of Chinese police but, by reducing the degree of arbitrariness and abuse of citizen’s rights implicit in the system, it might also make stability more possible.
    *RTL, Twice
    Xu Kai
    Caijing, August 26, 2012

    Gong Hanzhou, sentenced twice to RTL, and his RTL “classmates” show how local government abuses RTL as a tool of maintaining stability
    On March 29, 2012, 32-year-old Gong Hanzhou received some good news while in the RTL facility. But “after a moment of elation, I grew angry enough to curse someone,” because this was followed immediately by some bad news.
    The good news was he had won his second lawsuit. In his appeal against the Chongqing RTL Committee, the Chongqing Municipality High People’s Court had upheld the Chongqing No. 3 Intermediate People’s Court’s earlier decision to annul the RTL decision against him on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient and the facts were not clear.
    The bad news was he received a second RTL decision from the Chongqing RTL Committee, sending him to RTL a second time based on the same facts, albeit for 18 months instead of the original two years. Counting from the date of his criminal detention on January 4, 2011, he still had more than three months to go before he would be released from the RTL facility.
    Two weeks earlier, someone from Chongqing’s Qianjiang District Public Security Bureau came to talk to him and to deliver to him a RTL hearing notice in the name of the Chongqing RTL Committee, saying that he would be sent to RTL for 15 months. As far as public security was concerned, even though the first RTL decision had been annulled by the court, it could rely on the second decision without mishandling the case.
    So that he could leave earlier, around March 16, 2012, Gong Hanzhou came to a written agreement with the public security authority: he would not stir up public opinion or seek state compensation. “It was only after I received the decision notice that I realized that three months had been added to the 15 months we had discussed earlier!” [Gong said.] But it was no use: he had to spend three more months in the Fuling RTL and Drug Treatment Center.
    Reposting
    Gong Hanzhou had once worked four years in the Qianjiang Vehicle Administration Office, and before his troubles began he had been working in a computer sales center. His RTL started with the online reposting of a photo of a naked man.
    On the night of December 28, 2010, Qianjiang resident Ni Zhenhua and his girlfriend got into an argument with a street vendor after they had been drinking. Ni Zhenhua overturned the vendor’s table and smacked his refrigerator. A Qianjiang district traffic police officer responded to the call and took Ni Zhenhua to the traffic police podium at the Qianjiang District Stadium, handcuffing him to a nearby railing. In resisting his restraints, Ni Zhenhua struggled so much that he came out of his clothes.
    This scene was spotted by a passerby named Chen Wei, who in turn related it to a local man named Liu Yong whom he met for dinner. Three hours later, Liu Yong passed the scene and discovered that Ni Zhenhua was still handcuffed in the same spot, so he went back to his friend’s house to grab a camera to take a photo of Ni Zhenhua. As he was leaving, Liu left his phone number with Ni Zhenhua’s girlfriend, saying: “Give me a call if you want the photo.”
    One afternoon three days later, Liu Yong posted an item entitled “Qianjiang District Stadium Traffic Police Podium—Traffic Police Abuse a Drunken Man” to his Qzone [a social networking platform], attaching eight photographs. The post read: “On December 28 at 9:48 p.m., a drunken man was taken back to the Qianjiang District Stadium traffic police podium, where he was first beaten by several traffic police (see photo), then stripped of all his clothing (see photo), and handcuffed, naked, to a small iron post nearby for nearly four hours (see photo). This is a clear humiliation of his personhood!! I hope the relevant authorities will take notice! Please repost!” Then, Liu Yong sent the post URL to several QQ [on online chat tool] groups.
    On January 1, 2011, Liu Yong’s brother-in-law Gong Hanzhou reposted the item to his own Qzone [page] and sent the new web address to many other friends on QQ, generating a great deal of attention and reposting.
    Two days later, having heard that the police were investigating the aforementioned posts, Gong Hanzhou told Liu Yong that he was willing to share responsibility: “We’ll take the blame together.” He and Liu Yong went to the public security bureau, saying that the photographs, the text, and the posting were done by them together.
    The next day, the Qianjiang District Public Security Bureau filed a case for investigation against Gong Hanzhou on suspicion of creating a serious disturbance and placed him under criminal detention. On the 7th, the bureau told Gong that his detention would be extended to February 3, 2011. On January 11th, the Chongqing RTL Committee issued RTL decision number 164, finding that Gong Hanzhou and Liu Yong “retaliated against the public security authority by using the Internet to disseminate the photos they had taken and fabricate a story to attack a functional department of the government, thereby deceiving members of the public who did not know the facts and creating an extremely bad impact on society.”
    At the same time that Gong Hanzhou was being sent to RTL, the drunk and disorderly Ni Zhenhua was also sent to RTL for 18 months and Liu Yong was sent to RTL for two years. Because of the Ni Zhenhua photo incident, Qianjiang District Public Security Bureau Chief Song Zhijun and Traffic Patrol Unit head Liu Yonghua were removed from duty and transferred out of the public security system; the political commissar of the Traffic Patrol Unit was given an internal party warning; and the officer involved, Li Yongjiu, was placed under public order detention for seven days and transferred out of the police force.
    “Classmates”
    The Fuling RTL and Drug Treatment Center where Gong Hanzhou was sent is managed by the Chongqing Justice Bureau. There are two main buildings at the RTL center. One is a dormitory, with each floor housing 84 individuals; two floors making up a squadron and four floors making up a brigade. The other building is a workshop—a very long factory building.
    At the beginning, Gong Hanzhou and Liu Yong underwent training with the 4th Brigade, consisting of marching and lining up in formation. This was supposed to last for 40 days, but they did it for more than three months.
    Since Gong Hanzhou was considered to have been a victim of injustice, his days inside were relatively easy. He didn’t work in the workshop and didn’t spend even a single day there. Instead, he helped cadres in the dormitory to organize the files on people sent to RTL. He also didn’t need to study. “I had the privilege of not having to study because I was working for the cadres,” he said.
    RTL is a form of compulsory education, and people sent to RTL address each other as “classmates.” Because he was helping the guards to organize documents, Gong Hanzhou made a tally and found that the majority of his “classmates” were there for theft or fighting: half for theft, 30 percent for fighting, and the rest for things like petitioning and having one’s home demolished. He learned that one “classmate,” because of his previous record of being sent to RTL and placed under public order detention, had been sent for one year of RTL after stealing a packet of instant noodles. Also, because the facility served both as an RTL facility and as a drug treatment center, there were many people there in drug rehabilitation.
    Other than his brother-in-law Liu Yong, he encountered other “classmates” who were there for online expression. One of them was thorny Fang Hong. Fang Hong, known online as “Bamboo-Shoot Fang,” had lampooned Chongqing’s then-senior leader on his Tencent microblog, for which he was sent to one year of RTL for spreading rumors.
    In the RTL facility, Gong Hanzhou also came to know a university student known as Ren Jianyu the “Village Official,” who had been sent to two years of RTL for harmful speech after posting a large number of microblog posts on his Tencent microblog and Qzone. Earlier in July 2009, after graduating from the Chongqing University of Arts and Sciences, Ren Jianyu had been selected by Chongqing Municipality to serve as a university student “village official” in Yushan Town, Pengshui County. His performance was very good during this time, and at the end of his term, in August 2011, he was hired as a civil servant by Pengshui County. But during the “public notice period” after his hiring, he was sent for RTL by the Chongqing RTL Committee.
    Labor
    The main components of the RTL system are labor and education. But the great majority of those sent to RTL slack off during their labor. When Gong Hanzhou’s “classmate” Fang Hong didn’t want to work, there wasn’t much the RTL facility could do about it.
    Fang Hong, age 45, is a resident of Fuling District, Chongqing, and an internally retired employee of the Fuling District Forestry Bureau. His brigade produced Christmas lights for a Shenzhen lighting company, with 27 people assigned to a team. Each day, each person was responsible for soldering 6,500 lights, and points would be deducted if they did not meet their target. Fang Hong said only two or three of the 27 were able to meet the target, and the rest were all docked points. The regulations say that for each 10 points docked, RTL will be extended by one day.
    Fang Hong told the RTL guards that he didn’t care about an extension and that they were welcome to dock his points. But in the end his RTL was not extended. “The RTL guards were relatively lenient,” he said.
    Liu Yong also produced lights for three months, and before that he spent seven or eight months making packaging for drinking straws and paper-based packaging for a pharmaceutical company.
    These companies that cooperate with the RTL facility would send representatives to be stationed there and take responsibility for quality control. “Before, when things were better, the center could earn tens of thousands of yuan each day,” said Fang Hong. “But now I think they’re lucky if they don’t lose money, the losses are so great. Each person only gets paid a stipend of eight yuan each month, whether or not they do a good job.”
    According to regulations, RTL facilities should pay wages to people in RTL. Fang Hong, Gong Hanzhou, and Liu Yong only received the eight-yuan monthly stipend. Cash cannot be used to make purchases in the RTL facility, instead a stored-value card is used, to which a maximum of 500 yuan may be added each month. The RTL facility provides meals, alternating daily between meat and eggs. Payment is necessary for extra portions.
    Here, relatives can visit once every two weeks, and one phone call is allowed every two weeks.
    So-called “reeducation” is the compulsory study that people sent to RTL are required to do. According to Liu Yong and others, there are two main parts to the education. One is political study, where they talk about revolutionary heroes like Pan Dongzi [a character in a 1974 film depicting the life of a 10-year-old boy determined to join the Red Army], Liu Hulan [a young woman who carried out secret operations on behalf of the Communist Party during the Civil War], and Qiu Shaoyun [a soldier with the Chinese Volunteer Army during the Korean War who is considered a martyr for deciding to remain hidden during an attack rather than betray the location of his fellow soldiers]. The second is legal education, including the constitution and criminal law. The classes are taught by instructors who are hired by the RTL facility according to police hiring quotas.
    Time spent in the classroom is minimal compared to that spent laboring. Fang Hong only went to one class, Gong Hanzhou never went to class, and in more than a year Liu Yong only went to class three times.
    Besides the instructors, there are also RTL police who are primarily there to maintain order in the dormitory and the workshop.
    Fang Hong discovered that the police in the RTL facility also feel as if there’s something fundamentally wrong with the system, making it difficult to manage. What’s more, they get paid less than other police and there are no opportunities for promotion, so there’s a lot of grumbling.
    Maintaining Stability
    Gong Hanzhou’s ability to win two lawsuits was due in no small part to the help of police at the RTL facility.
    “From top to bottom, these cadres all knew about the injustice that had been done to me,” [said Gong.] After he went in, cadres and police officers actively helped him to file suit with the Chongqing No. 3 Intermediate People’s Court. When the second RTL decision was handed down, they said: “We’ve never seen this kind of second RTL before.”
    In order to deal with his case, the number of telephone calls Gong Hanzhou made each month far exceeded the limit, and cadres and police officers helped him to the best of their ability.
    With the help of his father, in November 2011 Gong filed suit against the Chongqing RTL Committee, requesting that the RTL decision against him be annulled. The defendant in this administrative lawsuit was the Chongqing RTL Committee, but the actual respondents were the heads of the Legal Affairs Unit and the Letters and Visits Section of the Qianjiang District Public Security Bureau. After the Chongqing No. 3 Intermediate People’s Court, which is located in Fuling, accepted the case, it issued a ruling in favor of Gong Hanzhou. When the other side appealed, the Chongqing Municipality High People’s Court upheld the lower court’s ruling.
    But the arbitrary nature of the RTL system revealed itself: Gong Hanzhou was sent to RTL a second time, being released only on June 25 of this year (after reductions).
    After his release, Gong Hanzhou sought out a lawyer and made plans to file suit challenging the legality of the second RTL decision. Earlier, after his own release from RTL, Fang Hong had, with the help of a lawyer, filed a successful administrative lawsuit against the Chongqing RTL facility.
    Afterwards, Chongqing police sought out Gong Hanzhou, saying: “We’ll fix our own mistakes; there’s no need to get other people involved.” The police promised to annul the second RTL decision and provide compensation in accordance with the State Compensation Law. Gong Hanzhou demanded that his “brother-in-law Liu Yong be released,” and on August 9, with four and a half months left to serve, Liu Yong was allowed to serve his RTL outside the facility. The decision stated: In light of the real difficulties faced by Liu Yong’s family, he is hereby immediately released to serve outside the facility.
    On August 19, after [online] calls made by lawyers and other legal professionals on microblogs, Ren Jianyu called his father and girlfriend from the detention center, saying: the police had come to discuss his terms for release.
  • Yunnan Bombing: Exonerating Land Grabs, Losing Public Trust

    Last Thursday morning, dozens of local residents gathered at a government office in southwestern China to sign paperwork entitling them to compensation for land requisitioned by the local government. Dozens more were outside the office, reportedly to raise objections about the standard of compensation.
    Similar scenes can be found throughout China, as the logic of economic development transforms farmland into industrial or manufacturing zones, and older urban neighborhoods are torn down to make way for new housing, office buildings, and shopping malls.
    But that morning in Qiaojia County, Yunnan, did not proceed according to script. At around 9 a.m., an explosion ripped through the office, killing four and injuring more than a dozen. Early reports identified the explosion as the work of a local woman surnamed Li. After arguing with an official over the amount of compensation, she reportedly detonated explosive material concealed in a basket she was using to carry a baby just over one year old.

    (Top) The Site of the bombing as seen from a distance.
    Photo credit: Chen Xiayun, yn.people.com.cn

    (Left) The scene of the bombing as shot by an unknown Internet user.

    Witnesses claimed the woman believed that local officials were reaping huge profits by buying up agricultural land cheaply and then transferring it to developers at much higher prices. On account of these suspicions, local residents had been petitioning for several years to no avail. Such stories are not unique, either, and among Beijing’s petitioners there are many bearing similar tales of victimization by rapacious local officials who collude with greedy developers.
    Most of these stories don’t end with acts of violence, but here, too, there are precedents. One year ago, in the city of Fuzhou, Jiangxi, a 52-year-old man named Qian Mingqi allegedly set off three explosions outside local government offices. He had also called for adequate compensation for the demolition of his house.
    These rare acts of desperation have a certain resonance with the broader Chinese public. Instead of seeing the bombings as acts of “terrorism”—the label given to similar bombings carried out by ethnic Uyghurs or Tibetans in the past—many Chinese express sympathy for the perpetrators of violence. Such sympathy is likely grounded in the belief that these acts are inevitable in a society with so few effective channels to redress injustice.
    The resonance of such narratives and the deep mistrust that many Chinese feel toward government officials, especially at the local level, have led to many questions about the Qiaojia bombing. Local police are now disassociating the blast from land disputes and the discordant woman and blaming a man named Zhao Dengyong.
    Zhao, who police say died in the blast, is reportedly shown in surveillance video carrying a backpack around the time of the explosion. Police claim that Zhao carried out the bombing as an act of “revenge against society,” using as evidence his “withdrawn personality” and past “criminal record.” Reporters who have interviewed Zhao’s family and acquaintances, however, have expressed doubt about these characterizations.
    Is Zhao Dengyong a scapegoat or did he emerge as a suspect in the course of further police investigation? The lack of trust of local government reporting on the case is palpable. It is also natural, argues commentator Shen Bin in a recent opinion piece (translated below) published in the Shanghai newspaper Oriental Morning Post. Shen argues that when local officials prioritize the control of information and opinion over the supply of clear facts based on compelling evidence, it only creates the conditions for further mistrust and suspicion that the government has something to hide.
    *
    Bombing in Zhaotong, Yunnan: Only Releasing the Truth Can Gain Public Trust
    Shen Bin, Oriental Morning Post
    May 14, 2012
    On the morning of May 10, there was an explosion in the Huaqiao Community Services Hall in Baihetan Town, Qiaojia County, Zhaotong, Yunnan. Four people were killed and more than 10 injured.
    At first, the media quoted local residents as saying that the explosion was carried out by a local woman who was unsatisfied with the amount of compensation offered for land that had been requisitioned. By the evening of May 11, a Xinhua reporter who viewed video surveillance footage at the Qiaojia County Public Security Bureau confirmed that the perpetrator was Zhao Dengyong, from Qiaojia County’s Baogu’nao Township, that the case had nothing to do with land requisitioning or resettlement and was suspected to be an act of revenge against society. The following morning, the local [government] issued another notice, saying that, according to the police investigation and interviews with relevant people, Zhao not only had a “criminal record” but had a mind to take revenge on society, [characterized by] a withdrawn personality, radical words and actions, and profound pessimism.
    The “killer” is already dead, but the crux of the official notice is not specific evidence like what explosives the killer used or how the bombing was carried out, but rather that the deceased had nothing to do with local land-requisition problems. This “shifting of focus” is worth mulling over. There is only one truth, but different answers have emerged that have widely divergent implications. If Zhao truly was taking revenge on society, then this bombing is an individual case of extremism, like the many cases involving the stabbing of schoolchildren that took place in 2010. But if this case was caused by inadequacies in the local government’s handling of compensation for land requisitions and related petitioning by the public—like last year, when Qian Mingqi’s string of bombings in Fuzhou, Jiangxi, were caused by inappropriate resettlement activity by the local government—then relevant local government officials must be held accountable.
    It is even more interesting to note that, according to the local government notice, Zhaotong Party Secretary Ye Libin said that besides “going all out to treat the wounded and deal properly with the families of the dead and wounded,” the chief of the Zhaotong Public Security Bureau must also “be responsible for taking full command of dealing with the aftermath and controlling public opinion.”
    By “public opinion,” he means, of course, the earlier reports that the incident was a suicide bombing by a woman dissatisfied with compensation for land requisition—reports that put great pressure on the local [government]. But these were not baseless “online rumors,” they were descriptions given by some of the injured and other local residents on the day of the bombing. Moreover, the local government is currently requisitioning land, something that has led to rather big conflicts: just days before the bombing, a motorcycle was intentionally set on fire. Perhaps those describing the incident reconstructed events based on faulty memories. Later, the official notice emphasized Zhao’s “withdrawn personality,” “revenge on society,” and “criminal record.” These form a neat “chain of logic,” but this chain of logic is, by itself, not without gaps.
    With regard to Zhao’s personality, for example, some media reported that Zhao’s teachers said “he was not at all polite and was not popular at school.” But other media quoted teachers and neighbors as having called him “simple and honest,” a “pragmatic and humble rural student,” and an “honest person who loved his family.” [The latter] found it hard to believe that [Zhao] was deeply unhappy or had the mindset of someone wanting to take “revenge on society.” Which of these is the truth? Actually, none of what neighbors or teachers have to say is sufficient to confirm or refute that Zhao really wanted “revenge against society.”
    Police in Qiaojia County also said that Zhao “has a criminal record.” But local residents say that Zhao was merely given a public-order detention by police for a few days because of a fight he had with a co-worker. Since the police did not provide any details, residents are not sure what “criminal record” they are referring to. If what the police are calling Zhao’s “criminal record” actually refers to the public-order detention for fighting, then this goes against basic legal common sense. A public-order detention is a record of a transgression but not a “criminal record.” Such a notice creates suspicion that local police are trying to mislead the public, further exposing the gaps in the theory of “revenge against society.”
    What to do when the facts are not clear? The most honest and publically responsible thing that government agencies could do is first conduct a thorough investigation of the case—leaving no stone unturned; get clarity as to the facts, causes, and consequences of the crime, such as how Zhao obtained explosives, what sort of detonating device was used, and whether there were any accomplices; and, based on evidence, reveal speculation about the criminal motivations of Zhao or his co-conspirators. Only by doing so will the level of public trust be sufficient to defeat the various rumors in the marketplace of opinion.
    According to related reports, the only evidence the police have at the moment is video from that time showing that Zhao was wearing thick clothing not suitable for local weather conditions, that he was wearing a black backpack that might have contained explosives, that the explosion occurred in mid-air (the bomb was not detonated on the ground), and that the explosion left Zhao’s body beyond recognition. Is this evidence enough for a bombing case to meet the [standards of] clear facts and exclusion of reasonable doubt required by the Criminal Procedure Law? According to Chinese law, where a criminal dies, it is not necessary to pursue criminal responsibility. But in this case the victims’ families, the injured, and even society at large demand that police uncover the truth and provide an explanation. A bombing incident with such an impact absolutely must not be left unresolved.
    The public’s concern for Zhao Dengyong is by no means the same as support for alleged radical actions. Rather, it is based on a thirst for the truth, because if you want to thoroughly put an end to extremist incidents, you must go to the truth, or root, of the matter. Otherwise, if the full truth about the case remains uninvestigated and the relevant authorities bring out a word or two about the perpetrator’s radical personality as grounds for treating the case as “revenge against society,” thereby avoiding any possible responsibility of the government, the result will be adding fuel to the fire or stirring the soup to keep it from boiling—covering up the real issues. The key point is that it will be impossible for the local government to gain the trust of the people.
  • Yunnan Bombing: Exonerating Land Grabs, Losing Public Trust

    Last Thursday morning, dozens of local residents gathered at a government office in southwestern China to sign paperwork entitling them to compensation for land requisitioned by the local government. Dozens more were outside the office, reportedly to raise objections about the standard of compensation.
    Similar scenes can be found throughout China, as the logic of economic development transforms farmland into industrial or manufacturing zones, and older urban neighborhoods are torn down to make way for new housing, office buildings, and shopping malls.
    But that morning in Qiaojia County, Yunnan, did not proceed according to script. At around 9 a.m., an explosion ripped through the office, killing four and injuring more than a dozen. Early reports identified the explosion as the work of a local woman surnamed Li. After arguing with an official over the amount of compensation, she reportedly detonated explosive material concealed in a basket she was using to carry a baby just over one year old.
    (Top) The Site of the bombing as seen from a distance.
    Photo credit: Chen Xiayun, yn.people.com.cn(Left) The scene of the bombing as shot by an unknown Internet user.
    Witnesses claimed the woman believed that local officials were reaping huge profits by buying up agricultural land cheaply and then transferring it to developers at much higher prices. On account of these suspicions, local residents had been petitioning for several years to no avail. Such stories are not unique, either, and among Beijing’s petitioners there are many bearing similar tales of victimization by rapacious local officials who collude with greedy developers.
    Most of these stories don’t end with acts of violence, but here, too, there are precedents. One year ago, in the city of Fuzhou, Jiangxi, a 52-year-old man named Qian Mingqi allegedly set off three explosions outside local government offices. He had also called for adequate compensation for the demolition of his house.
    These rare acts of desperation have a certain resonance with the broader Chinese public. Instead of seeing the bombings as acts of “terrorism”—the label given to similar bombings carried out by ethnic Uyghurs or Tibetans in the past—many Chinese express sympathy for the perpetrators of violence. Such sympathy is likely grounded in the belief that these acts are inevitable in a society with so few effective channels to redress injustice.
    The resonance of such narratives and the deep mistrust that many Chinese feel toward government officials, especially at the local level, have led to many questions about the Qiaojia bombing. Local police are now disassociating the blast from land disputes and the discordant woman and blaming a man named Zhao Dengyong.
    Zhao, who police say died in the blast, is reportedly shown in surveillance video carrying a backpack around the time of the explosion. Police claim that Zhao carried out the bombing as an act of “revenge against society,” using as evidence his “withdrawn personality” and past “criminal record.” Reporters who have interviewed Zhao’s family and acquaintances, however, have expressed doubt about these characterizations.
    Is Zhao Dengyong a scapegoat or did he emerge as a suspect in the course of further police investigation? The lack of trust of local government reporting on the case is palpable. It is also natural, argues commentator Shen Bin in a recent opinion piece (translated below) published in the Shanghai newspaper Oriental Morning Post. Shen argues that when local officials prioritize the control of information and opinion over the supply of clear facts based on compelling evidence, it only creates the conditions for further mistrust and suspicion that the government has something to hide.
    *
    Bombing in Zhaotong, Yunnan: Only Releasing the Truth Can Gain Public Trust
    Shen Bin, Oriental Morning Post
    May 14, 2012
    On the morning of May 10, there was an explosion in the Huaqiao Community Services Hall in Baihetan Town, Qiaojia County, Zhaotong, Yunnan. Four people were killed and more than 10 injured.
    At first, the media quoted local residents as saying that the explosion was carried out by a local woman who was unsatisfied with the amount of compensation offered for land that had been requisitioned. By the evening of May 11, a Xinhua reporter who viewed video surveillance footage at the Qiaojia County Public Security Bureau confirmed that the perpetrator was Zhao Dengyong, from Qiaojia County’s Baogu’nao Township, that the case had nothing to do with land requisitioning or resettlement and was suspected to be an act of revenge against society. The following morning, the local [government] issued another notice, saying that, according to the police investigation and interviews with relevant people, Zhao not only had a “criminal record” but had a mind to take revenge on society, [characterized by] a withdrawn personality, radical words and actions, and profound pessimism.
    The “killer” is already dead, but the crux of the official notice is not specific evidence like what explosives the killer used or how the bombing was carried out, but rather that the deceased had nothing to do with local land-requisition problems. This “shifting of focus” is worth mulling over. There is only one truth, but different answers have emerged that have widely divergent implications. If Zhao truly was taking revenge on society, then this bombing is an individual case of extremism, like the many cases involving the stabbing of schoolchildren that took place in 2010. But if this case was caused by inadequacies in the local government’s handling of compensation for land requisitions and related petitioning by the public—like last year, when Qian Mingqi’s string of bombings in Fuzhou, Jiangxi, were caused by inappropriate resettlement activity by the local government—then relevant local government officials must be held accountable.
    It is even more interesting to note that, according to the local government notice, Zhaotong Party Secretary Ye Libin said that besides “going all out to treat the wounded and deal properly with the families of the dead and wounded,” the chief of the Zhaotong Public Security Bureau must also “be responsible for taking full command of dealing with the aftermath and controlling public opinion.”
    By “public opinion,” he means, of course, the earlier reports that the incident was a suicide bombing by a woman dissatisfied with compensation for land requisition—reports that put great pressure on the local [government]. But these were not baseless “online rumors,” they were descriptions given by some of the injured and other local residents on the day of the bombing. Moreover, the local government is currently requisitioning land, something that has led to rather big conflicts: just days before the bombing, a motorcycle was intentionally set on fire. Perhaps those describing the incident reconstructed events based on faulty memories. Later, the official notice emphasized Zhao’s “withdrawn personality,” “revenge on society,” and “criminal record.” These form a neat “chain of logic,” but this chain of logic is, by itself, not without gaps.
    With regard to Zhao’s personality, for example, some media reported that Zhao’s teachers said “he was not at all polite and was not popular at school.” But other media quoted teachers and neighbors as having called him “simple and honest,” a “pragmatic and humble rural student,” and an “honest person who loved his family.” [The latter] found it hard to believe that [Zhao] was deeply unhappy or had the mindset of someone wanting to take “revenge on society.” Which of these is the truth? Actually, none of what neighbors or teachers have to say is sufficient to confirm or refute that Zhao really wanted “revenge against society.”
    Police in Qiaojia County also said that Zhao “has a criminal record.” But local residents say that Zhao was merely given a public-order detention by police for a few days because of a fight he had with a co-worker. Since the police did not provide any details, residents are not sure what “criminal record” they are referring to. If what the police are calling Zhao’s “criminal record” actually refers to the public-order detention for fighting, then this goes against basic legal common sense. A public-order detention is a record of a transgression but not a “criminal record.” Such a notice creates suspicion that local police are trying to mislead the public, further exposing the gaps in the theory of “revenge against society.”
    What to do when the facts are not clear? The most honest and publically responsible thing that government agencies could do is first conduct a thorough investigation of the case—leaving no stone unturned; get clarity as to the facts, causes, and consequences of the crime, such as how Zhao obtained explosives, what sort of detonating device was used, and whether there were any accomplices; and, based on evidence, reveal speculation about the criminal motivations of Zhao or his co-conspirators. Only by doing so will the level of public trust be sufficient to defeat the various rumors in the marketplace of opinion.
    According to related reports, the only evidence the police have at the moment is video from that time showing that Zhao was wearing thick clothing not suitable for local weather conditions, that he was wearing a black backpack that might have contained explosives, that the explosion occurred in mid-air (the bomb was not detonated on the ground), and that the explosion left Zhao’s body beyond recognition. Is this evidence enough for a bombing case to meet the [standards of] clear facts and exclusion of reasonable doubt required by the Criminal Procedure Law? According to Chinese law, where a criminal dies, it is not necessary to pursue criminal responsibility. But in this case the victims’ families, the injured, and even society at large demand that police uncover the truth and provide an explanation. A bombing incident with such an impact absolutely must not be left unresolved.
    The public’s concern for Zhao Dengyong is by no means the same as support for alleged radical actions. Rather, it is based on a thirst for the truth, because if you want to thoroughly put an end to extremist incidents, you must go to the truth, or root, of the matter. Otherwise, if the full truth about the case remains uninvestigated and the relevant authorities bring out a word or two about the perpetrator’s radical personality as grounds for treating the case as “revenge against society,” thereby avoiding any possible responsibility of the government, the result will be adding fuel to the fire or stirring the soup to keep it from boiling—covering up the real issues. The key point is that it will be impossible for the local government to gain the trust of the people.
  • Translation: The Machinery of Stability Preservation

    There is widespread agreement in China, from high officials to ordinary people, about the importance of maintaining social stability. There is rather less consensus, though, about how best to ensure and promote stability. Considering the costs, both fiscal and human, of continued pursuit of the policy of “stability above all else,” some have begun to question whether, perhaps, the effort might actually be counterproductive.

    In a recent article (translated below) posted on the website of
    Caijing magazine, two reporters who have been covering China’s social stability problem offer an excellent introduction to the organizational structure behind China’s stability management effort. Their detailed portrait of this structure as it exists at both the central and local levels leads into a trenchant analysis of China’s paradoxical pursuit of stability and a look at how that structure actually undermines that effort. Their conclusion—that the only escape from this paradox is to accelerate the pace of political and judicial reform—is a clear articulation of an aspiration that is gathering momentum in China but that will still have to overcome much resistance if it is to be realized.

     

    *

    The Machinery of Stability Preservation
    By
    Caijing reporters Xu Kai & Li Weiao
    June 6, 2011

     

    It was five o’clock in the morning, and the sky had just begun to turn light. After driving 17 hours non-stop on the Beijing-Zhuhai Expressway, a beige, medium-sized passenger bus with Beijing license plate “AF1217” had just entered Chibi, Hubei Province.Liu Hua, who was on the bus, recalls that there were 28 other passengers on that 19-seater bus, which had no operating license. Besides 11 petitioners from Changsha, there was one driver, three petitioning officials from Changsha, and 14 security guards from Beijing. All the way from Beijing to Hunan, the bus drove along at speeds above 100 km/h.

    After passing through the Chibi toll booth, there was a loud crash as the bus rammed into a truck from behind at almost 60 km/h. The driver went into shock and eight others suffered serious injuries.

    This was March 8, 2011, the time when the national “two meetings” were being held. Before the accident, Liu Hua had gone to Beijing to petition for a fourth time. He and the more than 10 other Changsha petitioners had visited the petitioning office of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission to report on illegal activities by local government. They were told their issues would be resolved appropriately but that they could not stay in Beijing during the “two meetings” period. That day, personnel from the Changsha Capital Liaison Office took them to a location in the south of Beijing and a young man who said he was from the “Beijing Security Unit” escorted the petitioners onto the rented bus.

    After the accident, those who could continued home on their own. The eight who suffered serious injuries received short-term treatment at the Chibi People’s Hospital and then were escorted away by government officials from their localities. After Liu Hua returned to Changsha, the deputy head of the Xueyuan Subdistrict Office where he lived in Tianxin District came accompanied by patrol squad officers to take him to a place called the “Carefree Mountain Villa” until the conclusion of the “two meetings.” These patrol squad officers, who belong to the subdistrict office’s comprehensive social order management unit, are the most basic-level personnel [responsible for] stability preservation.

    In their four round-trips of petitioning between Beijing and Changsha, Liu Hua and the other petitioners came into contact with each level of the national stability-maintenance system. At the central level, they were looked after by the National Office of Letters and Petitions and the Central Discipline Inspection Commission’s Office of Letters and Petitions. At the local level, they were looked after by the Changsha and Tianxin District governments, as well as the Xueyuan Subdistrict Office and its comprehensive social order management unit. In between, they were transported by the Capital Liaison Office and security companies.

    In the summer of 2010, Liu Hua became acquainted with Shen Youbin, who was petitioning the Changsha government because he did not accept a court decision. If Shen Youbin’s story offers a glimpse at the financial structure of the stability-preservation system, then Liu Hua’s story offers a view of that system at each level.

    The Central HubEver since the idea of “preserving social stability” was put forth, there has been a steady expansion of the relevant government agencies concerned with this work. This can be clearly seen in the history of the vertical system of politico-legal committees.

    The Politico-Legal Committee of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter, CPLC) is a functional department through which the Central Committee leads and manages law-enforcement work. Its primary tasks are to preserve social stability and guide, coordinate, supervise, and inspect the work of public security, the procuratorate, the courts, judicial administration organs, and state security. Committees are established at the central, provincial, prefectural, and county levels, but generally they do not exist at the grassroots township level or within [other] institutions.

    Maintaining stability is one of the most important functions of the CPLC. In 1980, when the Central Committee first established the CPLC, Peng Zhen was its first secretary. It was briefly abolished in at the beginning of the 1990s.

    In April 1991, the Central Committee issued a “Circular on Strengthening Law Enforcement Work for Maintaining Social Stability” (hereafter “Circular”), making clear that preserving stability is a political task of utmost importance to the entire Party and to all people of the nation and that strengthening law-enforcement work plays an important role. The “Circular” announced the re-establishment of the CPLC and made appropriate adjustments to its responsibilities and tasks. Law-enforcement leadership organs under each local party committee were enhanced and given the uniform name of politico-legal committee.

    At that time, stability preservation was primarily seen in the coordinated “strike hard” effort of public security, the procuratorates, and the courts. Each of the three large-scale “strike hard” campaigns from 1983 to 1987, from 1996 to 1997, and from 2001 to 2002, were all led by the CPLC.

    In July 1999, party committees added a “610 Office,” operating under the same roof as the politico-legal committees. From that time on, preventing and dealing with cults became a focus of stability-preservation work.

    Thereafter, in order to preserve social stability, the Central Committee also set up a Central Leadership Small Group for Stability Preservation. This is one of the coordinating bodies of the Central Committee and operates within the CPLC. There is also the Central Comprehensive Management Committee, which also operates within the CPLC and is primarily responsible for domestic public order.

    Ever since the CPLC announced its “Three Key Tasks” (social conflicts resolution, social management innovation, and clean and fair law enforcement) in 2008, central-level stability preservation work has turned towards the construction of a stability-preservation network and the search for new modes of stability preservation.

    Some of the things that have been explored include: mechanisms to manage and provide social services to migrant populations through “[temporary residence] permits, rental agreements, and workplaces”; a risk-assessment system for social stability; new grid-based models of [population] management and social-service provision; placement, help, and education provided to those released from prison and re-education through labor; cracking the “two new organizations” (new economic organizations and new social organizations); and management of virtual online communities. By the end of 2010, 35 prefectural cities and counties (including county-level cities and districts) had been selected by the central government for national pilot studies in comprehensive social-management innovation.

    In summary, at the central level the CPLC is the leading organization for stability preservation, with supreme authority given to the Central Leadership Small Group for Stability Preservation. Through attached bodies such as the Central Comprehensive Management Committee, it exerts unified management over law-enforcement organs such as public security, the courts, the procuratorates, and state security.

    Organizations for the Preservation of Social Stability in China (Chart)
    [Image] Organization Chart
    Click on the image to enlarge


    The Local Network

    Compared to the central level, local governments are on the front lines facing social conflicts and thus [their stability preservation system] exhibits a more complex structure. In the subdistrict office in Tianxin District, Changsha, where Liu Hua lives, there is a comprehensive management unit for social stability that is specifically in charge of these matters. There are similar institutions at the grassroots level of government throughout the nation, not just in Hunan. Take as an example Yun’an County in Guangdong Province, which has a comprehensive stability preservation network featuring “three levels of defense” at the “county, town, and village” [levels].

    In Yun’an County, this comprehensive stability preservation network specifically consists of: a county-level office for comprehensive management of petitioning and stability that handles “difficult issues”; town-level offices for comprehensive management of petitioning and stability in eight towns that handle “major issues”; and village-level centers for comprehensive management of petitioning and stability in 121 villages and neighborhoods that handle “minor issues.”

    Yun’an County has more than 6700 individuals, including village cadres, who receive budget allocations; more than 1800 of them are involved with stability preservation. There are around 20 fixed employees at the county office, as well as a 200-plus-strong emergency response team to coordinate the response to mass incidents or emergencies. There are more than 10 persons at each of the eight town stability-preservation offices. Wang Shuxiong, deputy secretary of the county party committee, concurrently heads the county stability-preservation office.

    Personnel numbers for each village stability-preservation center are determined according to population. For instance, in Yalou Village, Qianfeng Town, which has 1380 people in 345 households, there are four people responsible for [stability-preservation] work. One is village committee member Kang Mulin, who heads the center.

    “Development is the top priority, and stability is the top responsibility,” explains Wang Shuxiong. Development is a strategy, and stability is a tactic, but as far as the actual operations of the party committee and government, stability has actually already become the number one task.

    In Yun’an County, they rely on external fiscal allocations to run the government. This agricultural county in western Guangdong has a population of 317,000, of whom about 80,000 are not involved in agriculture). In 2009, GDP in Yun’an was 4.03 billion yuan, with local general budget revenue of 199 million yuan and 80 million yuan in annual fiscal allocations from higher levels of government. Even so, each year there is dedicated funding for stability preservation: in 2010, the county office received 600,000 yuan, the town offices received around 288,000 yuan, and the village centers received more than 30,000 yuan. There is also investment in fixed-capital: in 2009, there was a one-time investment of 1 million yuan, which went toward the purchase of vans, motorcycles, computers, and office furniture for the eight town offices.

    In addition, Yun’an employs a rewards incentive policy used widely by local governments. When the village office successfully handles an incident, it will be awarded 50 to 100 yuan; for the town office, the reward is 200 to 300 yuan. If there is no destabilizing incident in the whole year, the rewards grow larger. Wang Shuxiong says that this incentive system is a good way of generating enthusiasm among village and town cadres.

    In 2010, Yun’an County issued around 20,000 yuan in rewards. On the surface, it would seem as if this was an extra expense for the local government, but in reality, it saves money. “It costs at least 20,000 yuan to deal with a single petitioning case in Beijing,” says Wang Shuxiong. “Sometimes much more.”

    The Gray Market

    As Wang Shuxiong, deputy party secretary of Yun’an County, says, as soon as someone goes petitioning in Beijing, the costs start to increase.

    In response, local governments have at least three ways to “spend for stability.” The first is to dispatch personnel to Beijing to intercept petitioners. For a long time, this work has been centered in the capital liaison offices, where the funds and personnel of local governments and courts go to support stationing people for this purpose. On three of Liu Hua’s four trips to Beijing to petition, he was escorted home by personnel from the [local] capital liaison office.

    The head of a basic-level court told Caijing that all young, male judges in his court have to take turns being stationed in the capital, where their primary task is intercepting petitioners at the petitioning office of the Supreme People’s Court.

    But capital liaison offices created management and administrative headaches in Beijing, leading the central government to abolish them. As of today, besides the 50 connected to provincial-level and special-economic-zone governments and 296 connected to prefectural-level governments, another 625 local and institutional capital liaison offices have already been closed.

    The abolition of capital liaison offices has obviously made it more expensive for local governments to send personnel to intercept petitioners, leading them to pursue a second method: contracting out petitioner interception to security companies. For example, the Anyuanding Company once had petitioner-interception contracts with the relevant departments of 19 provincial-level governments.

    Security companies set out clear and detailed fees for intercepting, detaining, and transporting petitioners on behalf of local governments: 200 to 400 yuan per person for stability control and 200 to 400 yuan per person for restraining measures. Fees for transport vary according to the method of transport, the number of individuals to be transported, and the distance involved.

    And if interception is unsuccessful and the petitioner manages to register [a complaint] with the relevant authorities, local governments need to pursue a third path: “payoffs.”

    When a petitioner registers a petition with higher-level agencies, the petitioning office will establish a file record that can be tallied. According to public records, in 2009 Hebei had the most petitioners go to Beijing of any province (15,700 petitions), followed by Henan (5,700) and Liaoning. But since 2009, the relevant authorities changed their rules and no longer report [statistics for] ordinary petitioning. Instead, they report figures for “abnormal petitioning” and deliver national rankings to provincial party committees and governments.

    These rankings are closely connected to assessment of local government performance, but their impact on political evaluations can be taken care of if the right payments are made.

    On March 14, 2007, the politico-legal committee secretary of Song County, Henan, said in a work conference on stability-preservation: “From now on, you must pay for any petitioning. Payoffs are only an economic expense, but failing to make payments will damage one’s political future.” Correspondingly, [he continued]: “From January to March of 2007, there were 25 incidents involving 65 petitioners going to Beijing. One of these managed to register [a complaint], placing us ninth in the ranking of all counties and districts in the prefecture. There were 41 incidents involving 55 petitioners going to the provincial capital to petition. Seven of these were registered, placing us third (actually, first) in the ranking. There were also 30 incidents involving 111 petitioners at the prefectural level and 216 incidents involving 1180 petitioners at the county level.”

    Local governments’ fear of petitioning has led to a huge stability-preservation “market” that includes capital liaison offices, security contracts, and “payoffs” and results in all types of rent-seekers, brokers, and thugs out foraging for themselves. Appetites whetted by the favors that can be had in this rent-seeking arena, the capital liaison offices, security companies, and petitioning officials all [seek ways to] protect and expand the “stability-preservation pie.” As this “market” continues to grow, even things that have nothing to do with “stability preservation” can be categorized as “stability preservation” in order to “collect more rents.”

    The Petitioning Paradox

    The stability-preservation system is itself largely to blame for this gray market of petitioner-interception, security contracts, and payoffs. For example, if we look at the way that petitioning is actually conducted, its original purpose of reporting information up through the government gets canceled out, whether through “interception” or “payoffs.” However, if we look to the way the system is set up, we see that the system is in a paradoxical position because of the delicate relationship between the central and local governments.

    According to the analysis of Ying Xing, chair of the Department of Sociology at the Chinese University of Political Science and Law, the (Draft) Provisional Regulations for Letters and Visits Work in Party and Government Organs passed in 1982 marked a transition in the petitioning system. Unlike during the era of Mao Zedong, when the petitioning system was in service to mass mobilization and class conflict, the purpose of the petitioning system in the new era was to serve the overall goal of economic development, peace, and unity.

    In Ying Xing’s view, the problem of “stability preservation” inevitably surfaced as [society] transformed from [one focused on] mass mobilization and class conflict to [one focused on] economic development, peace, and unity. Since many local governments are driven by economic development, when it comes to the burden on farmers, land disputes, laid-off state employees, or compensation for housing demolition and relocation they pursue their own interests rather than acting as representatives of public interest. For this reason, they inevitably come into direct conflict with the interests of affected parties.

    At the same time, as the communes were dismantled and state-owned enterprises underwent reform, the ability of grassroots work-units to control people began to weaken and both urban and rural residents increasingly had the ability and space to articulate their personal interests. Even more important, as reform and opening has progressed, citizens have become more cognizant of their rights, and the administrative measures of the past seem to have lost their effectiveness.

    Ying Xing believes that, on the one hand, petitioning highlights the need for stability, unity, and order and demands that conflicts remain at the grassroots level. On the other hand, as a way for the central government to check [the activity] of local grassroots government, petitioning also encourages the “rightful resistance” of petitioners under certain circumstances. These two conflicting goals put petitioning in a paradoxical situation in which it is difficult to justify itself: on the one hand the central government retains the petitioning system because it wants a path whereby the masses can oversee local [government]; on the other hand, it calls on local governments to strictly control petitioning and “nip sources of instability in the bud” at the local level so as not to negatively impact the work of the central government. With “obstruction” foremost and no effort made to open up new paths to resolve conflicts, whenever there are destabilizing incidents like collective petitioning, local governments are forced to resort to extraordinary measures.

    Yu Jianrong believes that the petitioning system’s lack of procedure and legal force make it difficult for it to end conflicts and disputes effectively, but the deeper reason lurking in the background is the arbitrary nature of political power. At the same time, the conflict resolution mechanism of the judicial system is weak and ineffective because it is controlled by political power.

    The “stability-preservation” system has adapted to the problems faced by China in transition, expanding in response to the intensification of social conflict. In order to escape the vicious cycle of “stability preservation leading to more instability,” we must do as Tsinghua University Professor Sun Liping suggests: transform the function of government to establish a limited government, improve rule of law mechanisms to resolve conflicts and disputes in society, establish mechanisms to balance interests under the conditions of a market economy, and promote the development of civic organizations.

    The most essential of these is rule of law. Ruling by law and creation of a socialist rule-of-law nation were part of the political reform agenda set out in the report of the 15th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. On March 10, 2011, National People’s Congress Standing Committee Chairman Wu Bangguo announced that the socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics had been established.

    But the pace of political reform—especially reform of the judicial system—needs to speed up. If you want society to be truly stable, you must first promote reform of the judicial system. Society’s “pressure valve” is a judicial system that is just, highly effective, publicly trusted, and able to check public power. If we promote reform of the judicial system and enable courts to truly carry out their role independently in accordance with the law, social conflict can come within the orbit of the law.

    Second, we should gradually expand democracy. Democracy means that citizens are in charge. Matters as great as the changing of administrations and as small as the price of water all get decided at the ballot box or through participation in public hearings. With the right to vote and channels for expression, the great majority of sources of instability can be eliminated naturally.

    Finally, the ruling party ought to change its thinking and enhance its abilities as far as governing is concerned. Based on the experiences of the countries of the world, social conflict in today’s society is not only difficult to avoid but also a natural phenomenon of a healthy functioning society. On the one hand, the government should make a personal commitment not to exceed its bounds, violate the law, or create elements of instability. On the other hand, civic organizations should be set free and civil society fostered so that, when there are conflicts, there are courts to adjudicate independently and non-governmental organizations to mediate independently. This will naturally lead to peace and unity and long-term social stability.

    With the establishment of a socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics, we have reason to hope that the law will not only become a “shield” for people but can also turn into a symbolic representation of a peaceful, stable society.

  • Translation: “Escaping the Stability Quagmire Starts with Desensitization”

    On January 3, the International Herald Leader, a publication of the Xinhua News Agency typically focused on international issues, published an interview with two leading experts on social problems in China, Professor Yu Jianrong, director of the Center for Studies on Social Conflicts at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of Rural Development, and Wang Yukai, a political scientist who serves as secretary general of the China Society for Administration Reform.In this interview (translated in full below) the two experts discuss the negative effect that the Chinese government’s current focus on “maintaining stability” is having on Chinese society. They suggest that the time is right to rethink reliance on “stability above all else” and open up alternative channels to resolve conflicts in society. In so doing, they make a strong case for the universality of individual rights and the importance of creating space for autonomous civil society organizations in China.

    (Thanks to the China Media Project for first bringing this article to our attention.)

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    Escaping the Stability Quagmire Starts with Desensitization
    Reported by Liang Yifei & Gao Li
    International Herald Leader
    January 3, 2010
    Interview PrefaceIn 2010, “maintaining stability” became a keyword of Chinese governance. For each major event or important period, governments at all levels become highly tense. For example, during the Shanghai Expo or the Asian Games in Guangzhou, ensuring social stability was the first priority of local government. It is hard to estimate the amount of money being spent on maintaining stability.

    The subtext of all of this emphasis on maintaining stability is that society is unstable. But is Chinese society really at the point of extreme instability? Many researchers say that it is, but they target their criticism at the government’s efforts to maintain stability. There are even scholars who say that the source of the social instability is the government’s [efforts to] maintain stability.

    In the eyes of many, stability maintenance has become a fig leaf for some local governments, even acting as a protective shield behind which some local officials hide abuse of power and bend the rules for personal interest. The facts are right in front of our eyes. In August [2010], when high levels of carcinogens were found in Jin Hao tea oil, local government departments in Hunan hid test results on the grounds of social stability. In September, a tick-borne disease led to 18 deaths in Shangcheng County, Henan, but the local government there refused to release a list of the dead, again on grounds of stability maintenance. Some localities even call violent property demolition and relocation “maintaining stability.”

    Clearly, these current methods of maintaining stability cannot continue. The idea of “stability above all else” must be updated.

    Excessive Use of Methods to Maintain Stability Counterproductive

    International Herald Leader [IHL]: Recently, central and local governments alike have been emphasizing maintaining stability. What’s the special social background for this?

    Yu Jianrong [YJR]: Since the 1990s, as reform has progressed, social problems such as the gap between rich and poor, the urban-rural divide, poverty and inequality, and vulnerable groups have become increasingly prominent. There has been a sudden increase in mass incidents, especially exceptionally large-scale mass incidents.

    Wang Yukai [WYK]: This is because sources of instability in society are increasing and tensions within society are coming to the surface at what appears to be an intensifying pace. The number of mass incidents increases each year, and a clear evolution is emerging. Before, most people used legal methods to protect their rights and pursue their interests; lately, this has turned into social dissatisfaction, which at its most extreme erupts into mass rioting.

    In other words, in the past the public used more moderate methods to pursue their interests; now, their methods are more radical. This social background is the reason why the government is placing such emphasis on stability maintenance.

    IHL: Lately, the government has been putting a great deal of effort into stability maintenance work. Why, then, is society becoming increasingly unstable?

    YJR: In response to these risks [to society], governments often employ various methods to maintain systemic stability, which ends up forming a rigid stability structure. The departure point for maintaining stability at present is maintaining a rigid stability in society.

    Rigid stability is when, taking absolute social peace and stability as the goal of control, [authorities] treat all protest as disorder and chaos that need to be suppressed and controlled by any means. Under rigid stability, the methods of social control are always simplified and absolute.

    In many instances, local government can even hold the central government for ransom in the name of “maintaining stability.” Sometimes, in the name of “maintaining stability,” even if the actions of lower-level government are illegal, higher levels of government are forced to forgive it. One can say that [the extent to which] local governments use “maintaining stability” as an excuse to violate people’s lawful rights and undermine the most fundamental social rules has reached an extremely serious level in China, and the threats to society this has produced are very great.

    WYK: The biggest mistake governments make in the course of maintaining stability is over-reliance on police force and external measures. I believe we shouldn’t be thinking this way about maintaining stability, but this is currently the dominant way of thinking about stability within the government. [The number of] public security and armed police officers is increasing extremely fast, and the cost of maintaining stability is rising sharply.

    Actually, the root of many mass incidents in society is the unfairness and injustice of policies. If new policies increasingly benefit the rich and monopolies, then there will be less benefit in policies for disadvantaged groups like workers, farmers, and laborers. If these disadvantaged groups, who make up the great majority of the population, don’t have the right to express themselves or channels to express their interests, how can our society be stable?

    Don’t Treat Stability Maintenance and Rights Defense as Antagonistic

    IHL: When so-called “mass incidents” occur overseas, such as the labor strikes in France [in 2010] or British students’ protests against rising education fees, those governments don’t talk about “maintaining stability.” How are these situations different from that of China?

    WYK: In other countries, such incidents are seen as ordinary expressions of interests, [part of] people’s freedom. They’re not so-called mass incidents, nor is there any concept of “maintaining stability.” We have demonized mass incidents. Actually, many popular expressions of interest are normal, and we shouldn’t use the notion of stability maintenance to suppress people’s pursuit of their interests. I believe that the idea of maintaining normal social order is better than the idea of “maintaining stability.”

    IHL: If the government wants to maintain stability and the public wants to defend their rights, aren’t the two in conflict with each other?
    WYK: On the surface, the two are in conflict, but they are essentially consistent. This is because maintaining stability must proceed on the basis of protecting ordinary people’s individual rights, otherwise there is no foundation for maintaining stability. Ordinary people are the possessors of rights in society, the masters of the state. Government exists to serve those who are rightful subjects. Governance only has a legal foundation if it protects the rights of ordinary people. Only when we talk about harmony on the precondition of protecting individual rights can we have a truly harmonious society. Maintaining stability and preserving social order are aimed at attacking behavior that undermines the public interest, not [activities] that can undermine public interest as collateral damage. Therefore, rights defense is the foundation of maintaining stability and maintaining stability is the purpose of rights defense. The two complement each other and are essential to constructing a harmonious society.

    YJR: In this transitional period in society, a great number of what would ordinarily be considered “normal” collective action in expression of popular goals gets deliberately twisted by local government into “illegal activity.” Governments could ordinarily take a very “detached” position, but influenced by the technical problem of handling contradictions and systemic pressure, they end up in a control dilemma. The consequence is that governments must directly face these “illegal incidents” and are left with no buffer or room to maneuver, not to mention any opportunity to make use of social intermediary organizations to mediate conflicts and resolve disputes.

    IHL: Why does the government presently make more use of coercive methods of maintaining stability?

    WYK: Yes, the government is too tough in the process of maintaining stability. It doesn’t seek to persuade with policy but rather uses repression and police, which creates confrontation between the public and the government. Not only is this not helpful to resolving the problem; it complicates the problem. Given the speed with which [information is] disseminated on the Internet, it’s easy for a small problem to become larger.

    YJR: Rigid stability is based on a system of pressures. The central government demands that local [governments] maintain peace and stability. To this end, it uses all sorts of accountability systems and makes social stability the principal factor in determining the promotion or demotion of local officials. For this reason, whenever grassroots social protest becomes an “incident,” some local power-holders feel the pressure of these various accountability systems and, in the interest of their own political [futures], use violence or buy people off without principle in order to resolve the issue.

    IHL: Is it necessary to rethink the government’s “stability above all else” concept of social control?

    YJR: For a long time, our work has been guided by the idea of “stability above all else.” It is now time we rethink this notion. I’ve continually called for the ruling party to rethink the concept of “stability above all else.” This is an idea that Deng Xiaoping put forth at a particular period in our nation’s history. At the same time, Deng also said “reform above all else” and “development above all else.”

    Now, we’re overlooking other problems because of “stability above all else.” In the name of stability, we’re willing to sacrifice people’s livelihood. In the name of stability, some places have even revived “Cultural Revolution”-era practices such as parading and public denunciations. In the name of stability, we’re willing to abuse police authority. “Stability above all else”—what, in the end, is the “else”? [Stability] takes priority over people’s livelihood, over human rights, over rule of law, over reform, but it hasn’t done away with corruption, with mining disasters, with illegal demolitions and relocations.

    China Needs to “Desensitize”

    IHL: How can we escape this dilemma of “maintaining stability”?

    WYK: First, we must change our entire way of thinking about maintaining stability. We mustn’t treat expressions of interest by members of society as expressions of social instability.

    Second, there may be gaps in our stability-maintenance policies themselves. The real way to reduce social contradictions and conflicts is to revise policies to integrate the structure of society’s interests and enable the expression of interests.

    Finally, besides channels for expressing interests, [we need to] establish institutions to balance the structure of medical care and education between urban and rural areas—we cannot have dual-track policies. Policies concerning the requisition of land and demolition and relocation must protect farmers’ rights in order to protect the interests of the entire society.

    YJR: Chinese society has too many “sensitive” things, “sensitive” people, “sensitive” topics, and “sensitive” periods. We even treat issues concerning national welfare and people’s livelihood as “sensitive” issues. Everyone avoids [these issues] and doesn’t dare face them squarely and discuss them. In fact, this is nothing but government overreaction and a serious display of lack of confidence. I believe that an important task for China at this moment is “desensitization.”

    What’s more, we need to open the gates of the judicial system and resolve conflicts and disputes through the law. In theory, petitioning is only one of many administrative remedies, including administrative litigation and administrative review. Judicial remedies are the most important way for citizens to remedy [infringement of] their rights. We should note that one serious consequence of using administrative remedies to replace judicial remedies is the diminution of the authority of the state’s judicial institutions, the basis of social control in modern societies. Our courts find themselves in an embarrassing situation at present, where “the Party secretary controls posts, the mayor controls the purse, and the political and legal committee controls the cases.” The localization of the judicial system is an increasingly serious [problem].

    At the same time, we can set up full-time people’s congress deputies and put petitions under people’s congresses at each level in order to have representatives of the people oversee the work of the government, the procuratorates, and the courts. And we should establish organizations for the expression of popular interests. I’ve discovered that people’s congress deputies have a particular trait: they dare to “curse your mother.” When they encounter “rascals” who deliberately stir up trouble, people’s congress deputies can give them a good scolding and the person being scolded won’t mind too much. This shows that a full-time people’s congress institution can act as a buffer between the government and society.

    Reform can start at the county level. For example, we can select a few counties and experiment with reforms for a few years and see what happens. If the results are good,  expand to the provincial level and experiment for a few more years. In this way, we can at least trade “time” for “space.” If the reform fails, at least it won’t have much of an impact on the overall situation.

  • Op-Ed: “A Savage Lesson in Eroding Stability on the Mainland”

    The opinion piece below by Joshua Rosenzweig, Dui Hua’s senior manager of research and Hong Kong operations, was published in the July 24 edition of the South China Morning Post. Rosenzweig observes that recent incidents involving Chinese police forces—and official responses to them—have damaged the image of the country’s law-enforcement system. Even worse, the scandals reflect that official goals that strive for a hard line against perceived threats may do more to jeopardize social and political order than to achieve it.
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     A Savage Lesson in Eroding Stability on the MainlandJoshua Rosenzweig
    Senior Manager, Research & Hong Kong Operations
    The Dui Hua Foundation

    The image of the police force on the mainland has taken a beating over the past few months with the domestic media exposing scandal after embarrassing scandal. The public’s patience for the nation’s unaccountable law enforcement system is growing thin.First there was the series of unnatural deaths of criminal suspects in police-run detention centres, with officials offering increasingly outrageous explanations for the causes of death—”death by nightmare”, “death by picking at acne”, or “death by drinking water”. Then there was the incredible tale of Zhao Zuohai , a man who spent nearly 11 years in prison for a murder he didn’t commit—all because police investigators found torture to be the most expedient way to get a confession, and law enforcement authorities who were anxious to solve the case turned a blind eye to Zhao’s claims of innocence.

    The latest incident occurred in Wuhan , Hubei , where six plain-clothes police officers stationed outside a government building savagely beat a woman in her 50s named Chen Yulian , who had come to discuss a grievance with officials. Such violence against so-called “petitioners”—many of whom are, like Chen, middle-aged women—would normally not be newsworthy, so commonplace has it become on the mainland today.

    The difference in this instance is the fact that Chen’s husband is an official on the provincial “politics and law commission”—an institution of the Communist Party charged with overseeing all aspects of law enforcement. As if that weren’t ironic enough, Chen’s husband is responsible for “maintaining stability”—in the pursuit of which, acts of brutal violence and violations of individual rights are routinely carried out, including against petitioners seeking redress for personal grievances.

    Wuhan police officials immediately apologised to Chen and her family, saying that the officers in question hadn’t realised she was the wife of such a high-level official. Their explanation—with its implicit acceptance of violence towards the “common folk”—and the relatively light disciplinary action that has been taken against the officers in question, have fuelled public outrage over this latest example of officers of the law acting lawlessly.

    Beijing has repeatedly rejected international criticism of its human rights record, pointing, for example, to strict laws prohibiting the extraction of confessions by torture and claiming that independent mechanisms exist to root out police wrongdoing. Yet laws and institutions are only effective if they are fully and consistently implemented, and it is growing increasingly difficult to argue that oversight over law enforcement is effective.

    This lack of accountability is closely tied to the emphasis the leaders place on stability. Chen was beaten because local officials see petitioners as sources of social instability. Police use coercion to get confessions and limit access by defence lawyers because having a high conviction rate is a more visible index of stability than guaranteeing a suspect’s procedural rights.

    Meanwhile, arrests and convictions for vaguely defined state security offences have skyrocketed over recent years, and those convicted sentenced to longer prison terms, all in the name of stability.

    Maintaining social stability is a worthy goal for a government, and it’s a challenge on the mainland where economic growth has far outpaced development in society and political institutions, and where income, status and power are so unevenly distributed. The danger, as Professor Yu Jianrong of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has warned, is that relying on “rigid stability” will probably do more to destroy the “harmonious society” than build it.

    As long as “stability above all else” remains the fundamental principle of governance on the mainland, security forces there will feel empowered to flout laws and regulations intended to safeguard individual rights. When rights are not protected and people lack faith in the fairness and independence of the judicial system, grievances fester and eventually erupt into full-blown unrest.

    Part of the solution is to provide effective channels for resolving grievances before they develop into destabilising factors. But restoring faith in the institutions of law enforcement—especially mainland police—may require sacrificing some stability in exchange for something equally valuable: accountability.