Tag: residential surveillance

  • Three Years On: The Anti-Domestic Violence Law

    It’s been more than three years since China’s Anti-Domestic Violence Law came into effect on March 1, 2016. The law was celebrated as an achievement for women’s rights activists who spent decades fighting for legislative reform. The law introduced safety mechanisms for domestic violence victims through the introduction of protection orders and warning systems that involve employers, local governments, social workers, and law enforcement in the effort to better protect women from the scourge of domestic violence. However, three years since the law’s passage, its shortcomings are troublingly evident.

    On November 25, 2018, International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, People’s Daily reported several shocking statistics: of a sample of 270 million families, 30% of women suffer domestic violence; domestic violence is a cause of 60% of female suicide deaths annually; of women who die from homicide, more than 40% experienced domestic violence; and that women report domestic violence to police only after suffering an average of 35 incidents. Domestic violence is certainly not unique to China – one in three women suffer domestic violence globally. A study conducted by the All-China Women’s Federation and National Statistical Bureau in 2010 found that 24.7 percent of the population experiences domestic violence in their lifetime.

    “Cooling off Period” in Divorce Cases

    In June 2018, a Sichuanese woman by the name of Dong Fang (pseudonym) filed for divorce to a Chengdu court after suffering repeated domestic abuse from her husband. Dong applied for a personal safety protection order to the court after unsuccessfully filing for divorce. After three trials, the court finally permitted Dong’s request. After the initial hearing, Judge Zhang Yinbin claimed that it was necessary to give the parties a “cooling-off period” before he approved their divorce. Zhang claimed that because the abuse was not “chronic” it could not be considered domestic violence, even though the Anti-Domestic Violence Law does not require that abuse be chronic in order to constitute domestic violence and the Marriage Law mandates that domestic violence is grounds for divorce. Dong’s case received heavy media attention after she released a video describing her experience and called for “the rule of law to provide reasonable protections for vulnerable groups.” Dong’s video garnered more than ten thousand messages from supporters. The concept of a “cooling-off period” was originally designed to prevent “flash divorces” (闪离), divorces that were thought to be impulsive because of their swiftness. The fact that the concept has been applied to divorce cases involving domestic violence is a worrying sign. It reinforces the idea that victims’ testimonies are untrustworthy and that disputes should be resolved privately in the home, a dangerous message for judicial authorities to be sending to the public.

    Female Incarceration

    Although a number of Chinese courts have released guiding opinions that call for lighter sentences and sentence reductions for women who “fight violence with violence,” nationwide, most women who fight back still receive severe punishments including up to 10 years’ imprisonment, life sentences, death with reprieve, and, death sentences, as in the case of Li Yan (李彦) whose death sentence was eventually overturned. These harsh sentences do not take seriously the realities of domestic violence and do not account for the fact that women who have committed offenses while defending themselves against a family member tend not to pose a threat to society. They also fail to recognize the equal status of women by accepting domestic violence as a private affair for which the victim deserves at least some blame.

    On September 14, 2017, after suffering more than 31 years of domestic abuse, 52-year-old Li Fang (pseudonym) killed her husband. In the early morning of that day, Li’s husband beat and kicked her. When Li’s husband fell asleep, she cut his feet with a knife. When Li’s husband awoke in shock, he attempted to chase her and died shortly after from blood loss. The Changshou Hanshou County Procuratorate charged Li with intentional assault and sentenced her to eight years in prison.

    Li’s daughter later told reporters that said she understood why her mother reacted the way she did. Reporters discovered that Li had gone to the county women’s federation for help in the past and that she had visited the People’s Mediation Committee in October 2016 to apply for mediation for a divorce. On September 11, 2017 Li reported the abuse to police to no avail. The next day, Li visited her husband’s workplace community service hall to confront him in front of his colleagues. The next afternoon, two days before the incident, the community service hall leader, instead of taking Li’s complaints seriously, gave her three hours of “ideological education.”

    Domestic Violence Against Children

    The issue of domestic violence against children presents unique complications for reformers and those seeking to use the Anti-Domestic Violence Law to protect child victims. The case of fifth grader Wenwen (pseudonym) from Hangzhong, Shaanxi province who died at the hands of her abusive father illustrates the difficulty in protecting children from domestic violence.

    Wenwen was eleven years old when she died on April 4, 2016. Neighbors and teachers of Wenwen’s were interviewed by media following her death; all of them were aware of the abuse against Wenwen and had confronted her father in the past on multiple occasions pleading him to stop his behavior. In one instance, the property manager of the housing compound in which Wenwen resided, confronted her father about the abuse. One neighbor, a woman surnamed Zhang, recounted a time when she found Wenwen kicked out of her home by her father and forced to stand on the street in the pouring rain without shoes and little clothes on. While neighbors and teachers were concerned for Wenwen’s well-being, the interviews suggest that they excused her father’s behavior due to his “high expectations” of Wenwen and his time spent in the military.

    Wenwen’s case is not unique – violence against children inflicted by parents is often excused as “discipline” or as an effect of one’s parenting style. Violence takes many forms and is not always physical; neglect, abandonment, threats of intimidation, restrictions of personal freedom, witnessing violence, and mental abuse are all forms of domestic violence.

    Verbal and mental abuse can be difficult for victims and outsiders to identify. In Wenwen’s case there was no question that she was being abused; her suffering was visible and her father admitted his actions. It was Wenwen’s community and school that failed to advocate for her. Underlying the silence of those who fail to advocate on behalf of domestic violence victims, particularly child victims, is the outdated belief that domestic violence is a “family matter” to be resolved privately and that children are in effect their parent’s property.

    Media analysis by Huike News found 216 media reports about domestic violence cases involving children from September 2014 to September 2018. Of the 216 cases:

    Dating Violence

    In November 2018, Japanese model Haruka Nakaura released photos on social media revealing that her boyfriend, Jiang Jinfu, a Chinese model and actor, had been physically abusing her. Jiang admitted to beating her.

    The reaction to the story on social media in China was unexpected – netizens applauded Jiang for his honesty and bravery. Lu Pin, a prominent Chinese feminist activist criticized the reaction stating, “People are always trying to find many reasons to justify violence and one reason they’ve found is ‘This woman is not one of us,’” alluding to Nakaura’s Japanese ethnicity.

    China’s Anti-Domestic Violence Law is not limited to marriages, it also includes “persons living together other than family members.” However, in practice police are less likely to register cases where the victim and perpetrators are seen as “just dating.” In such cases, the violence inflicted is treated as a form of regular personal assault, which carries a lighter penalty. Harassment within relationships is often dismissed by authorities as simply an “emotional entanglement” (情感纠纷) and when they are brought to court, judges often treat the cases as no different from a form of intentional assault, ignoring the familial and domestic context within which the abuse occurred.

    Social Credit System

    Lü Xiaoquan, a Chinese lawyer who has represented victims in several high-profile domestic violence cases, proposes that “dating violence” should be included in the personal social credit system. Lü cites progress made in Shandong’s provincial Anti-Domestic Violence Regulations to implement this practice.

    The social credit system is a state-run national reputation management project that is due to come into full effect in the summer of 2020. The system rewards and punishes citizens depending on certain behaviors. For example, citizens can earn points for volunteering, donating blood, or practicing “family virtues” which they can exchange for benefits like discounts on public tolls or priority enrollment to schools for their children. On the other hand, citizens can lose points for tax evasion, failure to pay bills, and in some cities for domestic violence. A loss of points bars citizens from benefits like staying at luxury hotels or buying real estate. Whether including domestic violence in the social credit system will be a more effective deterrent than criminal punishment has yet to be determined. Given the obstacles that victims face in obtaining evidence of domestic abuse and in applying for protection safety orders, the social credit system – which is very controversial as it can be seen as infringing on personal freedoms – may prove to be a more accessible method for victims to report abuse.

    Progressive Reforms Underway in Yunnan

    On January 3, 2019 Yunnan province became the first province to implement a “mandatory domestic violence reporting system.” This is a significant development because under Article 260 of the Criminal Law, courts can only accept domestic violence cases under procedures for private prosecution (自诉) of criminal cases. By implicating government authorities as responsible parties in collecting and reporting evidence of domestic violence, the reporting system brings greater protection to individuals who face difficulty in filing private prosecutions such as the elderly, children, people with disabilities, or people in financially dependent relationships with their abusers.

    The reporting system was the result of Measures promulgated by the Yunnan Provincial Women’s Federation, the Provincial Department of Education, the Provincial Public Security Department, the Provincial Civil Affairs Department, and the Provincial Health Committee. The Measures stipulate that “schools, kindergartens, medical institutions, residents’ committees, village committees, social work agencies, rescue management agencies, welfare agencies and their staff” are all responsible parties in the mandatory reporting system for domestic violence. A highlight of the implementation method includes defining domestic violence to include an array of actions such as sexual violence, neglect, abandonment, forced marriage, forced begging, forced drug use, drug trafficking, and theft. The measure also includes the establishment of a risk assessment tool for victims and states that the Women’s Federation should be involved in informing the courts’ decision-making.

    The implementation of the measures has been spearheaded by the Kunming Wuhua District Mingxin Social Work Service Center. In an interview, the Center’s Director Liu Ping stated “according to the experience of our institutional services, more than 70% of women who have suffered domestic violence have experienced sexual violence, and this is difficult for them to express. The Provincial Women’s Federation is seeing the harm and prevalence of sexual violence, so it is included [in the measures].” Liu reiterated the importance of including rarer cases such as forced marriages, where domestic violence is prevalent, into the measures. Liu stressed that police should be better trained in identifying and collecting evidence and issuing warning letters and handing down administrative punishments in the many cases where the actions of perpetrators do not constitute a legal violation.

    The Yunnan implementation measures suggest incremental progress in bolstering the Anti-Domestic Violence Law and addressing the barriers victims face in reporting incidents. But simply having measures on paper is not enough. Public education that tackles the deep-rooted assumptions that normalize domestic violence must be addressed. Given that most victims of domestic violence suffer in silence, local actors must actively educate community members about how to identify signs of domestic violence, connect survivors with resources, and increase public awareness about domestic violence.

    In Shanghai, the Shanghai West Road Police Station in Jinfeng District established a complaint station for domestic violence cases however from 2016 to 2017, the station received only 63 complaints of domestic violence, which resulted in 61 criticism and education cases, one administrative detention and fine, and one warning. In 2016, the Yuzhong District Court in Chongqing received 53 cases of family disputes involving domestic violence. Of the cases, 41 were dismissed for lack of evidence and of the remaining 12 cases that provided evidence of domestic violence in the form of photographs, police records, witness testimonies or medical records, six cases were dismissed. The fact that two cities with populations as large as Shanghai and Chongqing have recorded such low numbers points to the growing need for reformers to focus on the forceful implementation of the Anti-Domestic Violence Law.

  • Dui Hua Book Review: The People’s Republic of the Disappeared

    Michael Caster’s The People’s Republic of the Disappeared: Stories from Inside China’s System for Enforced Disappearances. Image Credit: RSDLMonitor.Com


    Dui Hua examines the stories of dissidents held under the coercive measure “residential surveillance in a designated location” in Michael Caster’s The People’s Republic of the Disappeared: Stories from Inside China’s System for Enforced Disappearances (Safeguard Defenders, 2017).

    As the waves of repression in China have intensified over the past decade, one encounters the strange phrase “residential surveillance in a designated location” (RSDL) with greater frequency.

    It was memorably employed (though by no means for the first time) against the late Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, after the publication of “Charter 08” in December 2008. Later, it was used in the crackdown against the so-called “Jasmine Revolution” in the spring of 2011. Most recently, it has been a prominent feature of the ongoing crackdown against rights lawyers and activists that began in July 2015.

    This measure, with its relatively benign-sounding name, has been examined critically before, both inside and outside China. The new book The People’s Republic of the Disappeared makes an important contribution to this critique by collecting vivid accounts from those who have been subjected to the measure. Together, these accounts paint a damning portrait of how Chinese law enforcement agents are using the power they have been given under the law to violate human rights with impunity in the name of safeguarding state security.

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    What exactly is RSDL? At first glance, it looks like it might be a form of house arrest, although “designated location” suggests that it might involve something other than being confined in one’s own home. “Surveillance” only adds to the mystery, suggesting some sort of monitoring without making exactly clear how intrusive it might be.

    In China’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), RSDL is what’s known as a “coercive measure.” Simply put, coercive measures authorize law enforcement agents to restrict a person’s liberty in the course of a criminal investigation. The degree and duration of that restriction depends on a variety of factors, but coercive measures are meant to serve a rather limited set of aims: preventing suspects from posing further threats to society or obstructing the investigation process and ensuring their availability to face questioning or stand trial. Coercive measures are not meant to be punitive or to be used as tools of investigation in their own right.

    In Chinese criminal procedure, “residential surveillance” exists alongside other coercive measures such as custodial detention (seen as the most restrictive measure) and “release on guarantee pending further investigation” (qubao houshen, which is much less restrictive). The ordinary form of residential surveillance—which, as the name suggests, permits suspects to remain in their homes under certain restrictions—is a relatively lenient, non-custodial measure. For that reason, the CPL allows it to be imposed for up to six months.

    Six months spent under house arrest is no picnic, but it is likely to be a more comfortable experience than being sent to a detention center. For this reason, reformers have promoted the greater use of non-custodial measures like residential surveillance as a way of reducing overuse of custodial detention.

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    The book features eleven accounts, all but one of them presented in the first-person, from lawyers and political activists who were subjected to RSDL or similar measures between 2011 and 2016. These include well-known human rights lawyers, such as Tang Jitian, Liu Shihui, Sui Muqing, and Wang Yu. It also includes an account by Peter Dahlin, a Swedish human rights activist detained in 2016 for his connection with some of these lawyers and activists. Though each account is distinct, the victims’ experiences under RSDL share some key features. It is difficult to ignore how the measure of RSDL has become an integral part of a systematic regime used by authorities to target particular individuals.

    Though regulations require that the locations used for RSDL “possess conditions for ordinary living and rest,” it is clear from these accounts that disruption of routine daily activities is key to how the system operates. Sleep deprivation and the withholding of food and personal hygiene products are common practice. Detainees are cut off from communication with family, friends, and lawyers. Guards and interrogators use humiliation, enforced discipline, physical and verbal abuse, and threats to friends and family members. Family members of victims are also subject to varying degrees of surveillance, including house arrest, such as in the case of Wang Yu’s family. International law recognizes family members of victims of enforced disappearances as full victims.

    The victims’ accounts of confinement and interrogation becomes at times indistinguishable, since most detainees are subjected to questioning in the same place they are held—contrary to the provisions of RSDL. Invisible, alone, and at the mercy of guards and investigators who act with impunity, it is unsurprising that, in almost every case included in this book, involuntary confession is what brings the ordeal to an end.

    Lawyer Liu Shihui, who describes his 2011 confinement under RSDL, calls the measure “a system designed for prisoners of conscience [and] a place designed for torture.” Time and torment essentially ensure that any resistance gives way to capitulation. However, some accounts reveal that even in their acts of forced “confessions”, victims attempt to resist the abuse of state power. For example, lawyer Sui Muqing recounts the importance he placed in maintaining a degree of personal integrity and dignity by refusing to incriminate others in his confession.

    In reading these accounts one cannot escape the recurring sense that authorities use the brutal conditions of confinement in RSDL for the purpose of obtaining these confessions—the veracity and voluntariness of which does not necessarily matter. In this sense, one can certainly see how useful investigators would find RSDL—especially as a tool in sweeping crackdowns with multiple, linked suspects. Even if, as in most of the cases in this book, confessions do not lead to direct criminal prosecution, the authorities can still use them against other suspects. And by recording and broadcasting these forced confessions, the authorities can attempt to bring public discredit on both the individuals and the causes they promoted.

    Beyond confessions, the brutal confinement of RSDL constitutes a form of punishment in itself, especially when stretched to its six-month limit. Even the mere existence of RSDL seems designed to spread fear, and threat of its use can be enough, in some cases, to achieve the desired outcome.

    ***

    Of course, no matter how well RSDL might serve the aims of the Chinese authorities in terms of maintaining stability and political control, it doesn’t justify the use of torture and many other violations of individual human rights that it enables. Liu Shihui’s judgment that RSDL is a “place where law doesn’t exist” is amply backed up by the other accounts in this book.

    The similarities in these accounts unquestionably demonstrate a pattern of abuse. Yet, there may still be some who will claim that these stories are exceptional and do not represent the entirety of RSDL. For every instance of abuse under RSDL, there are sure to be examples in which the measure is being used in more benign ways. Even if these cases are exceptional, this is precisely why RSDL is so insidious. By labeling these acts a form of “residential surveillance,” Chinese authorities are engaged in a deliberate effort to obscure their use of torture and enforced disappearance. Through publishing these accounts, The People’s Republic of the Disappeared is attempting to shatter the veneer behind which these severe violations have tried to hide and expose them for the world to see. And given that the accounts are diverse in both the time frames and geographical regions they represent, it is unlikely that they are simply exceptional cases. The accounts come from two separate sweeps, one carried out in 2011 and the other in 2015-2016 and they take place across four distinct locations: Beijing, Guangzhou, Tianjin, and Changsha.

    Of all the people who should read this book, which has also recently been released in Chinese, it can only be hoped that it will be read by all of the Chinese academic legal experts who have been so instrumental in directing the reform of China’s criminal justice system. In the past, many of these experts had publicly criticized the ways Chinese investigators used residential surveillance. Yet these same experts stood by and even defended the inclusion of RSDL measures in the most recent revision to the CPL, rejecting predictions that the measure would be abused. In a perfect world, this book would prod their consciences and, in the name of human rights and rule of law, lead these influential experts to turn their efforts to stopping the outrageous abuses exercised under RSDL.

  • Could China’s New Oversight Rules Have Avoided Arbitrary Detention of American Citizen?

    The United Nations Palais des Nations. On June 29, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recommended the release of American Sandy Phan-Gillis, who has been detained for over a year without having charges brought against her in court. Photo: www.unog.ch

    Dui Hua recently found a copy of Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) regulations that govern oversight of “designated-location residential surveillance” (DLRS), a form of incommunicado detention that the Chinese government frequently uses in sensitive cases involving endangering state security, terrorism, and corruption (known as “three type offenses”). Dui Hua has translated the regulations into English below (Chinese source text available here).

    The SPP adopted the regulations on October 13, 2015 with the apparent intention of curtailing abuse of DLRS. During public comment periods leading up to the 2013 revisions to the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) that established DLRS powers, many commentators heavily criticized DLRS for effectively legalizing the secret, incommunicado detentions that had existed for years in China due to ambiguities and blank spots in the law. In November 2011, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances had also objected to the proposed CPL revisions, arguing that they would amount to the legalization of enforced disappearances.

    Oversight Regulations Aim to Limit Arbitrary Detention Through On-Site Inspections

    Given the importance of DLRS oversight, it is tempting to speculate whether these rules, had they been in place just a few months earlier, might have helped mitigate if not avert the arbitrary detention of American citizen Phan (Sandy) Phan-Gillis—the only American currently in a Chinese detention facility on state secrets charges. On June 29, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) published an Opinion holding that Phan-Gillis’ detention is “arbitrary”, with US State Department officials urging China to consider the WGAD’s recommendation to release Phan-Gillis. Indicating the heightened US-China tensions resulting from the case, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei issued a swift reply, referring to the WGAD findings as “irresponsible” and calling for greater respect of China’s “judicial sovereignty”.

    Phan-Gillis (pictured left) was initially taken into custody by agents of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region’s state security bureau on suspicion of espionage on March 19, 2015. She was placed under DLRS until September 2015, when the six-month time limit on this coercive measure expired, and was then transferred to a detention center in Nanning and placed in solitary confinement. In March 2016, Newsweek reported on the one-year anniversary of her detention.

    Phan-Gillis has not received access to effective assistance of legal counsel and continues to be held in detention in Nanning, having never had charges brought against her in court. Had the SPP’s new oversight regulations been in place when Phan-Gillis was initially detained, procurators would have possessed clear authority under Article 19 to carry out on-site inspection of Phan-Gillis’ DLRS conditions and to conduct return inspection visits once per week.

    Other provisions of the oversight regulations raise the question whether procurators might also have been able to request her release or to otherwise curtail police powers. Article 20 of the regulations, for example, provides local procurators with authority to issue “rectification opinions” on procedural irregularities, several of which apply to the Phan-Gillis case: state security officials failed to notify Phan-Gillis’ family of her placement in a DLRS facility; probably failed to place her in a facility that meets the statutory requirements for DLRS (no one, including the American consular officials who conducted monthly visits, were allowed to visit Phan-Gillis in the detention facility where she is actually housed); and failed to allow her reasonable visits and correspondence with legal counsel and family as provided for under the relevant sections of the CPL, which grant discretion for the detaining authority to allow family and lawyer visits even in so-called “three type offenses.”

    Unfortunately, even these minimal oversight mechanisms were not in place at the time of Phan-Gillis’ DLRS confinement. The new rules came into force weeks after the end of her transfer to a detention facility. As it stands, the abuses of discretion that marked the first case of legalized disappearance after passage of CPL revisions in 2013 are eerily similar to those apparent in ongoing cases like Phan-Gillis’. It remains to be seen whether the oversight rules translated below will yield discernible changes in future police application of DLRS procedures.

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    Regulations on Oversight of Residential Surveillance in a Designated Location by People’s Procuratorates

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    Adopted at the 41st meeting of the 12th Procuratorial Committee of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on October 13, 2015

    Chapter 1: General Principles

    Article 1: In order to strengthen and standardize how people’s procuratorates carry out oversight regarding imposition and implementation of designated-location residential surveillance (DLRS), these regulations are hereby enacted in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (CPL) and in consideration of the realities of procuratorial work.

    Article 2: When DLRS is used against criminal suspects or defendants by public security organs, people’s procuratorates, or people’s courts, people’s procuratorates shall carry out oversight in accordance with law as to the legality of imposition and implementation of DLRS.

    Article 3: Oversight of decisions to impose DLRS shall be the responsibility of the investigation-oversight and prosecutorial units of people’s procuratorates; responsibility for oversight of implementation of DLRS shall reside with the criminal enforcement inspectorate units of people’s procuratorates.

    Article 4: Designated locations shall possess the conditions for ordinary daily life and rest and shall be separate from places of interrogation; they shall be equipped with surveillance equipment to facilitate monitoring and management; and they shall possess security measures to ensure the security of case handling.

    Chapter 2: Oversight of Decisions to Impose Designated-Location Residential Surveillance

    Article 5: When a public security organ decides to impose DLRS on a criminal suspect who has no fixed residence, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate at the same administrative level [as the public security organ] shall conduct oversight to determine whether that decision has been made lawfully.

    When a public security organ at a higher administrative level has approved a decision to place an individual suspected of endangering state security or terrorist activity under DLRS, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate at the same administrative level as the public security organ that issued approval shall conduct oversight as to whether that decision has been made lawfully.

    Article 6: When a people’s procuratorate decides to place a criminal suspect who has no fixed residence under DLRS, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate immediately above shall conduct oversight as to whether that decision has been made lawfully.

    When a people’s procuratorate at a higher administrative level has approved a decision to place an individual suspected of serious corruption under DLRS, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate that gave that approval shall conduct oversight as to whether that decision has been made lawfully.

    Article 7: When any of the following conditions apply, the people’s procuratorate shall initiate oversight into whether a decision to impose DLRS is lawful:

    (i) A criminal suspect or his/her legal representatives, close relatives, or defense counsel believe that the decision to impose DLRS is in violation of the law and file a complaint, report, or petition with the people’s procuratorate;

    (ii) When, in the course of its involvement in investigation, review of arrest or indictment requests, review of criminal enforcement, or filing review, the people’s procuratorate discovers that the investigating organ (unit) may have issued a decision to impose DLRS in violation of the law;

    (iii) A people’s supervisor believes that a decision to impose DLRS is in violation of the law and files an oversight opinion with the people’s procuratorate;

    (iv) Other circumstances requiring initiation of oversight.

    Article 8: When initiating oversight of a decision by a people’s procuratorate to place a criminal suspect who has no fixed residence under DLRS, the investigating unit shall furnish the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate at the administrative level immediately superior with copies of the case-filing decision, the decision to impose DLRS, and main pieces of evidence within three days.

    When initiating oversight of a decision to place an individual suspected of serious corruption under DLRS, the investigation unit of the people’s procuratorate that approved the decision shall furnish the aforementioned documents to its own investigation-oversight unit within three days.

    When the people’s procuratorate initiates oversight into a decision to impose DLRS by a public security organ, it may request that the public security organ provide the aforementioned documents.

    Article 9: Oversight into decisions to impose DLRS may be carried out in one of the following ways:

    (i) Review of the relevant case documents;

    (ii) Listening to the investigating organ (unit) present its reasons and factual basis for issuing the decision to impose DLRS;

    (iii) Listening to the opinions of the criminal suspect or his/her legal representatives, close relatives, or defense counsel;

    (iv) Other ways.

    Article 10: In reviewing the legality of a decision to impose DLRS, the people’s procuratorate shall check to see whether the decision satisfies the conditions set out in Articles 72 and 69(3) of the CPL, and further review whether the decision meets the following conditions:

    (i) The criminal suspect has no fixed residence in the city or county where the case-handling organ is located;

    (ii) The public security organ or people’s procuratorate at the administrative level immediately superior has approved the decision to impose DLRS on an individual suspected of endangering state security, terrorist activity, or serious corruption for whom implementation of residential surveillance in his/her own residence would impede the investigation.

    Article 11: The investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate should issue a decision within seven days of initiating oversight into whether a decision to impose DLRS was lawful.

    Article 12: When, having carried out its review, the people’s procuratorate finds that the public security organ’s decision to impose DLRS does not meet the conditions set out by the law, it shall report those findings to the head of the procuratorate and, upon his or her approval, issue a rectification notice to the public security organ and recommend that the public security organ revoke its decision to impose DLRS.

    When the procuratorate finds that a decision to impose DLRS issued by itself or the procuratorate at the next lower administrative level does not meet the conditions set out by the law, the investigation-oversight unit of the people’s procuratorate shall report to the head of the people’s procuratorate and, upon his or her decision, notify its own investigating unit or the people’s procuratorate at the next lower administrative level to revoke the decision to impose DLRS. When notifying the people’s procuratorate at the next lower administrative level to revoke the decision to impose DLRS, the procuratorate shall also circulate a notice to its own investigating unit.

    Article 13: Upon receiving a rectification opinion from the people’s procuratorate at the immediately superior administrative level, the people’s procuratorate shall immediately carry out the recommendation and report on the steps taken to the investigation-oversight unit of the immediately superior people’s procuratorate.

    If the people’s procuratorate believes that the rectification opinion from the immediately superior people’s procuratorate regarding its decision to impose DLRS is in error, it may request a new review by [that same superior] people’s procuratorate within three days of receiving the rectification opinion. The superior people’s procuratorate shall appoint a new procurator to review the case and issue a decision whether to amend its original opinion within five days.

    Article 14: Oversight of decisions by the people’s procuratorate to impose DLRS during the indictment phase shall be carried out in accordance with these provisions by the investigation-oversight unit of the same people’s procuratorate.

    Oversight of decisions by the people’s court to impose DLRS shall be carried out in accordance with these provisions by the prosecutorial unit of the people’s procuratorate at the same administrative level as the court.

    Chapter 3: Oversight of Implementation of Designated-Location Residential Surveillance

    Article 15: Oversight of implementation of DLRS is the responsibility of the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate at the same administrative level as the public security organ that implements the DLRS.

    Article 16: Oversight by people’s procuratorates as to implementation of DLRS shall include the following:

    (i) Whether legal paperwork, such as the DLRS decision or enforcement notice, is complete;

    (ii) Whether the place, term, and personnel are in accordance with regulation;

    (iii) Whether the lawful rights of the person under residential surveillance are being protected;

    (iv) Whether there is any unlawful behavior, such as interrogation in the designated location, corporal punishment, or abuse of the person under residential surveillance;

    (v) Other things that should be monitored in accordance with the law.

    Article 17: When carrying out oversight into the implementation of DLRS, the people’s procuratorate may employ the following measures:

    (i) Review of relevant legal documents; records of any meetings, correspondence, or outgoings by the person under residential surveillance; and physical examination records;

    (ii) On-site inspection of whether the designated location meets the legal conditions;

    (iii) Review of relevant surveillance video footage and, if necessary, physical examination of the person under residential surveillance;

    (iv) Interviews with the person under residential surveillance, enforcement personnel, investigators, or other relevant personnel in order to ascertain and understand relevant circumstances.

    Article 18: Within 24 hours of receiving a copy of a decision to impose DLRS from a public security organ or people’s court, the people’s procuratorate case management unit shall forward the decision to its criminal enforcement inspectorate unit.

    When the investigation unit or prosecution unit of a people’s procuratorate issues a DLRS decision in the name of the procuratorate, it shall send a copy of the DLRS decision to its criminal enforcement inspectorate unit within 24 hours and notify it of the address of the designated location.

    Article 19: Within 24 hours after receiving a copy of the DLRS decision, the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate shall appoint procurators to carry out on-site inspection and complete a record of oversight inspection. Monitoring of DLRS implementation should include return inspection visits by roving teams of no fewer than two procurators at least once per week. Inspection of the implementation of DLRS must not interfere with the ordinary work of criminal investigation.

    Article 20: When oversight of DLRS implementation by the people’s procuratorate uncovers one of the following, the people’s procuratorate shall issue a rectification opinion to the enforcement or investigating organ in accordance with the law:

    (i) Failure of the enforcement organ to appoint enforcement personnel or failure to appoint enforcement personnel in a timely manner upon receipt of the DLRS decision and implementation notice;

    (ii) Except when it is impossible to provide notice, failure to notify the family of the person under residential surveillance within 24 hours of implementing DLRS;

    (iii) Implementation of residential surveillance in a detention center, administrative jail, prison, holding cell, case-handling area, or other location not meeting the statutory conditions for a designated location;

    (iv) Arranging meetings or correspondence between defense lawyers and the person under residential surveillance in ways that violate regulations or illegally restricting the person under residential surveillance from meeting or corresponding with a defense lawyer;

    (v) Failure by a new case-handing organ to issue a new DLRS decision in a timely manner when there is a change in the phase of the criminal process;

    (vi) Failure of the enforcement organ to lift residential surveillance in a timely manner and notify the person under residential surveillance in a timely manner when the case-handling unit issues a decision to lift or change the DLRS conditions and notifies the enforcing organ of such;

    (vii) Demands for payment by the person under residential surveillance or his or her family;

    (viii) Other illegality.

    When the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate discovers that the investigation or prosecutorial unit of its own procuratorate has violated one of the above conditions, it shall seek approval from the head of the procuratorate to issue a rectification opinion.

    Article 21: When the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate finds irregularities in enforcement or security risks in the implementation of DLRS, it shall seek approval from the head of the procuratorate to issue a procuratorial recommendation to the enforcement organ or case-handling organ.

    Article 22: When a rectification notice or procuratorial opinion has been issued, a copy shall be sent to the procuratorate at the administrative level immediately superior as well as to the unit immediately superior to the enforcement unit or case-handling unit.

    Article 23: When a person under residential surveillance dies while under DLRS, the case shall be handled with reference to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate procuratorial procedures for death of a person in custody in a detention facility.

    Article 24: When a people’s court or people’s procuratorate assigns judicial police officers to assist the public security organ with implementation of DLRS, the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit of the people’s procuratorate shall carry out oversight of those officers’ assistance with implementation.

    Chapter 4: Additional Provisions

    Article 25: The people’s procuratorate shall process and provide responses in a timely manner to complaints, reports, or petitions regarding imposition or implementation of DLRS from criminal suspects or their legal representatives, close relatives, or defense counsel.

    Article 26: When the investigation-oversight or prosecutorial unit of the people’s procuratorate discovers the possibility of illegality in the implementation of DLRS, they shall report their findings in a timely manner to the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit. When the criminal enforcement inspectorate unit discovers the possibility of illegality in imposing a DLRS decision, it shall report its findings in a timely manner to the investigation-oversight or prosecutorial unit.

    Article 27: If, in the course of its oversight of imposition or implementation of DLRS, the people’s procuratorate discovers violations of disciplinary rules or the law by case-handling personnel or enforcement personnel, it shall seek a decision from the head of the procuratorate to send the case in a timely manner to be handled by the appropriate unit; if the wrongdoing constitutes a criminal offense, it shall pursue criminal responsibility in accordance with the law.

    Article 28: If there are violations of disciplinary rules or violations of the law by procuratorial personnel overseeing imposition or implementation of DLRS, responsibility shall be pursued in accordance with the relevant provisions; if the wrongdoing constitutes a criminal offense, responsibility shall be pursued in accordance with the law.

    Article 29: Oversight of imposition or implementation of DLRS by the people’s procuratorate shall be handled as part of the unified system of duties of the people’s procuratorate. The case-management unit of the people’s procuratorate shall conduct periodic statistical analysis and quality assessment and report results in a timely manner to the relevant units.

    Article 30: These measures take effect from the date of promulgation.

  • China Issues Oversight Rules for “Non-residential” Residential Surveillance

    The Supreme People’s Procuratorate building in Beijing.

    Not long after the draft of the amended Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) was released by China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) for public comment in August 2011, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances expressed concern that the provisions relating to the coercive measure known as “designated-location residential surveillance” (zhiding jusuo jianshi juzhu) would legalize enforced disappearances. In late 2015, the United Nations Committee against Torture (CAT) went further and called on China to abolish the measure.

    The Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) subsequently issued trial rules for determining the necessity of detention and rules to govern oversight of “designated-location residential surveillance” (DLRS), which had leapt back into the headlines in 2015 as part of a police crackdown against Chinese rights lawyers that intensified in July.

    A Coercive Measure

    Custodial detention or arrest takes place in detention centers, ordinary residential surveillance in one’s residence. DLRS happens someplace else, perhaps in a hotel or guesthouse, where law enforcement agents hold criminal suspects or defendants for up to six months while they investigate alleged crimes or prepare a case for trial.

    Authorities justify the lengthy six-month period by stating that residential surveillance is relatively lenient—not depriving people of their liberty, but merely restricting it. Nonetheless, individuals held under DLRS face an environment ripe with potential abuse and rights violations.

    When law enforcement uses the practice against people charged with endangering state security (ESS), terrorist activity, or serious corruption, the outcome is hard to distinguish from enforced disappearance or incommunicado detention. In these types of cases, investigators may use the law to deny families the knowledge of where their loved ones are being held and to deny detainees’ access to a lawyer. Within 24 hours of carrying out DLRS, investigators are only required to provide families with notice of detention and of the alleged offense.

    What a Difference Two Years Makes

    Faced with public opposition to the practice, legislators granted oversight powers to the procuratorate, but it has taken nearly two years for the SPP to define its role. In the meantime, as predicted, DLRS has become a routine part of handling politically sensitive cases. Though its high costs of facilities and manpower are somewhat prohibitive, DLRS is unparalleled in its long duration, ability to isolate detainees, option to delay intervention by legal counsel, and general capacity to exert psychological (and, in some cases, physical) pressure on suspects.

    Unfortunately, the new rules will do little to diminish these serious violations of due process. Procurators are concerned with whether DLRS is carried out lawfully, yet the most concerning aspects of the practice are themselves spelled out in the law.

    Focus on Decisions, Implementation

    The SPP has yet to publish their oversight regulations, but highly controlled media reporting sheds some light on their content. One thing is clear: the intention of the rules is bureaucratic oversight, not judicial oversight. Procurators will likely focus on examining paperwork, making the occasional inspection, and issuing instructions in case anything is out of the ordinary. People held under DLRS may initiate the oversight process by filing complaints independently or through their advocates. What appear to be missing are mechanisms for hearings to allow for the presentation of evidence or for appeals to challenge procuratorial decisions.

    Monitoring by the procuratorate will focus on two areas: (1) whether the decision to impose DLRS was lawful and (2) whether DLRS has been lawfully implemented. The former chiefly concerns whether the case involves a person who either (a) lacks a fixed residence in the county or city where the criminal investigation is taking place, or (b) is suspected of ESS, terrorism-related offenses, or serious corruption. In case of (b), the law requires investigators to substantiate a claim that ordinary residential surveillance would impede their investigation and obtain approval for DLRS from their immediately superior law-enforcement unit.

    The second area of focus involves ensuring that all paperwork is in order; necessary notices have been delivered; and the appropriate location, duration, and personnel are employed. Procurators would also ensure that detainees’ lawful rights are being protected, interrogations are held in separate locations, and no “physical punishment or abuse” is inflicted.

    Adding Inspections

    Oversight activities require procurators to make an on-scene inspection within 24 hours of receiving a copy of a decision to carry out DLRS. This inspection presumably enables inspectors to interview detainees and establish whether they have any allegations to make. It should also allow them to ascertain whether the designated location meets the lawful conditions for “ordinary living and rest” and to ensure that surveillance cameras and safety equipment are installed.

    The rules also appear to require procurators to visit the location at least once a week for the duration of DLRS. Periodic inspections should offer minimal guarantees against physical torture or ill treatment. They are inadequate, however, in preventing mental suffering and the use of other cruel and degrading treatment.

    Also troubling is the requirement that inspections be carried out in ways that do not interfere with investigations. This prioritizes the needs of investigators over the rights of detainees and may give investigators broad discretion to delay access to facilities.

    Missing the Mark

    This type of oversight, with its emphasis on ensuring adherence to applicable laws and regulations, will no doubt help to limit certain kinds of arbitrary and abusive behaviors. Other arbitrary practices and violations of due process will remain unaffected because they are legally sanctioned. For example, procurators are very unlikely to challenge investigators’ decisions to deny access to legal counsel to individuals charged with ESS or terrorism. The CPL empowers investigators to deny such access if they believe it might interfere with their investigation.

    In their attention to the legality of decision and implementation, procurators may also fail to scrutinize the legitimacy of charges made against detainees. Investigators can use flimsy evidence to initiate ESS investigations—thereby justifying the use of DLRS and exclusion of legal counsel—only to modify the charges when requesting approval of formal arrest after expiry of the six-month time limit.

    Ultimately, however well intentioned it might be, this kind of bureaucratic review cannot address the risks of DLRS. The measure grants law-enforcement investigators too much power over individuals, and the procuratorate lacks both power and incentive to challenge DLRS decisions, especially in the kinds of politically sensitive cases where abuse is most likely.

    The best solution would be for China to abolish DLRS, or at the very least, to restore detainees’ rights to full access to legal counsel and to communicate with the outside world. Anything less, and China is sanctioning enforced disappearances.

  • China Ushers in Non-Residential Residential Surveillance

    Zhu Chengzhi (right) visits his friend, deceased democracy activist Li Wangyang. Photo credit: Deutsche Welle

    Considerable public controversy erupted in China in late 2011 and early 2012 over proposed amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) that would have allowed police to detain certain suspects without notifying the suspects’ family. One of the most troubling examples was the proposal concerning the measure known as “residential surveillance,” which—in spite of the name—was revised to include certain circumstances under which police could choose to carry out the coercive measure in a “designated residence” that was not the suspects’ home for up to six months. Critics argued that the ability to employ this measure without family notification would be tantamount to enforced disappearance and, therefore, a violation of international human rights law.

    Public criticism over the “disappearance clauses” may have ultimately contributed to some salutary changes to the legislation, including the removal of exemptions for providing notification of residential surveillance (but not carrying out residential surveillance in a designated residence). Under the revised CPL, which took effect on January 1, 2013, police are thus required to give notice to relatives within 24 hours of all individuals being subjected to “non-residential residential surveillance.” This limits the ability of police to make an individual disappear without a trace, but the practice of non-residential residential surveillance remains deeply problematic, even though its inclusion in the CPL has given it a veneer of legitimacy.

    This situation is illustrated by the case of Zhu Chengzhi, who, according to Zhu’s defense lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan, is likely to be the first person in China to be placed in this form of residential surveillance (the number of the notice issued by local police is “A01”) since the new CPL took effect earlier this month. Zhu, age 62, was detained in June 2012 by police in Shaoyang, Hunan, after he allegedly disseminated information that raised doubts about local authorities’ official finding of suicide in the death of his friend and long-time political prisoner Li Wangyang (李旺阳). After reportedly refusing to sign a guarantee that he would cease his efforts to draw attention to suspicions surrounding Li’s death, Zhu was placed under criminal detention on suspicion of “inciting subversion,” charges for which he was formally arrested on July 25, 2012.

    After five months of incommunicado detention, Zhu’s case was transferred to prosecutors on December 25. On January 4 (the first day of business for Chinese government offices following the New Year’s Day holiday), Zhu’s wife, Zeng Qiulian, retained Liu Xiaoyuan to represent her husband. That same day, the Shaoyang People’s Procuratorate handed the case back to police for additional investigation, and police decided to place Zhu under residential surveillance and delivered an official notification (translated below) to his wife.

    Even though Zhu Chengzhi has a legal residence in Shaoyang, police have chosen to carry out residential surveillance in a designated location under the provisions of Article 73 of the CPL, which allows for use of this measure “in cases involving crimes of endangering state security, terrorist activity, or especially serious bribery, if carrying out [residential surveillance] in the residence [of the criminal suspect or defendant] has the potential to interfere with the investigation.” The official notice of residential surveillance provided to Zhu’s wife does not identify the location where he is being held, meaning that his current whereabouts are unknown. The new CPL does not specify what information is to be included on notices of residential surveillance. Stipulations included in the August 2011 draft of CPL revisions said that the grounds and whereabouts of detention should be disclosed, but these clarifications were removed for residential surveillance and other coercive measures in the final law. Zeng told Reuters that police were moving her husband to a hotel but that they did not provide an exact location.

    On January 5, Liu Xiaoyuan met with Shaoyang police and filed a request to meet with his client. Article 37 of the CPL gives lawyers the right to meet with clients who are under residential surveillance but also gives police discretion to deny lawyers’ requests when the client’s alleged offense falls under the category of “endangering state security,” which includes inciting subversion. Liu told Voice of America that he suspects Zhu was placed under non-residential residential surveillance precisely in order to prevent him from having access to a lawyer.

    Under the new CPL, will this kind of long-term, incommunicado detention for people charged with state security crimes become more routine? It is still too early to say, but Zhu Chengzhi’s example is a very worrying sign.


    Shaoyang Public Security Bureau
    Notice of Residential Surveillance in a Designated Residence

    SY PSB (     ) Res. Surv. Not. (2013) No. A01

    Zeng Qiulian:

            In accordance with the provisions of Article 73 of the Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC, our bureau on January 4, 2013 at 11 a.m. carried out residential surveillance in a designated residence against Zhu Chengzhi (sex male, birthdate 1950.10.18, residence 1469 Baoqing East Road, Shuangqing District, Shaoyang, Hunan Province) on suspicion of the crime of inciting subversion of state power.

    Shaoyang Public Security Bureau (chop)
    January 4, 2013

    This notice is given to the family member of the person under residential surveillance.