Tag: reeducation through labor

  • Wrongful Conviction for Counterrevolutionary Incitement Resurfaces

    After the Cultural Revolution, workers at Shanghai No. 1 Textile Factory gathered to denounce the crimes of the “Gang of Four.” Image credit: zgdsw.org.cn

    When China emerged from the Cultural Revolution and set off on its path of “reform and opening,” the country’s judicial system was enlisted to address many of the politically motivated judgments that had been handed down during the Mao era. Courts throughout the country overturned verdicts against former “counterrevolutionaries,” clearing away their status as “enemies of the people.”

    This effort took place as China worked to rebuild its shattered legal institutions and put a new legal framework in place that would help to reduce some of the arbitrariness and injustice that had characterized the preceding era. Notably, a new Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law took effect on January 1, 1980. Counterrevolutionary crime continued to be punished, but punishment would henceforth be handed down in accordance with laws and would follow prescribed legal procedures.

    Of course, not everyone could benefit from the political rehabilitation of past political crimes. Those associated with the “Gang of Four,” pinned with blame for the violence and destruction of the Cultural Revolution and deemed to oppose the Communist Party of China and its leaders, were among the first “counterrevolutionaries” sentenced in accordance with the new laws. It didn’t matter much that most of them had been sitting in jail for years without access to any legal counsel or even anticipation of any formal legal proceeding. And though the courts that handed down judgments were now technically bound to do so “in accordance with the law,” the law was still primarily an instrument of the state’s political power that offered defendants little as far as protection of their rights was concerned.

    Lingering Stigma: Counterrevolutionary Incitement

    Concern for wrongful convictions and miscarriages of justice might lead one to take another look at some of these cases from the early 1980s. One example of residual injustice from this period recently came to light via Liu Xiaoyuan, a Beijing-based criminal defense lawyer who has been actively involved in rights-protection cases. Liu recently blogged about being contacted by an 80-year-old man from Henan who has spent most of the past four decades trying to get his elder brother’s 1980 conviction for “counterrevolutionary incitement” overturned.

    Ren Ruixiang (任瑞祥) was 17 years old when the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949. Though he came from a “rich peasant” background, his middle-school education made him a valuable asset for building a “New China.” He served as a local government cadre in the city of Luoyang and joined the Communist Youth League.

    But Ren’s “bad class background” would eventually catch up with him. In 1959, in the fevered final months of the Anti-Rightist Movement, he was accused of having concealed his membership in a Nationalist Party youth organization and stripped of his position. Most likely he was also sent for re-education. He would eventually be transferred to Mianchi County, where he spent the tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution labelled as a “bad element.”

    At the end of the Cultural Revolution, local authorities accused Ren of having been a follower of the “Gang of Four” and sent him for compulsory “re-education” in what was euphemistically known as a “study session” (xuexi ban). During his time there, in December 1977, Ren allegedly jotted down a short piece of counterrevolutionary verse in a notebook and then shouted it aloud. The verse read:

    “China’s troubles aren’t through—
    Bandit Hua* has risen again!
    My fellow Chinese brothers—
    You must eliminate Bandit Hua!”

    Ren was arrested and sent to the county detention center in January 1978, where he was alleged to have continued shouting counterrevolutionary slogans calling for the ouster of central party leaders, including Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, and Deng Xiaoping. China’s procuratorate system had not yet been restored after the Cultural Revolution, so the county public security authorities sent the case to the local court for prosecution the following month. But no trial was held and Ren spent the next two years in a detention center.

    At the time, China had few trained legal professionals. Therefore, it’s surprising to learn that Ren Ruixiang was able to be represented by a defense lawyer named Bo Xiping. When Bo went to meet with his client at the detention center, he found his behavior odd and reported this to the court. As a result, the court arranged for Ren Ruixiang to be evaluated by the Kaifeng Psychiatric Hospital. The hospital’s assessment report stated that Ren Ruixiang’s mental state was fine and that he had been feigning illness to avoid criminal responsibility.

    Imprisonment & Release

    China’s new Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law took effect just days after the completion of Ren’s psychiatric evaluation. The Mianchi County People’s Court proceeded to find Ren Ruixiang guilty of “counterrevolutionary incitement” and sentenced him to seven years in prison. According to Ren’s brother, however, the court held no trial hearing and did not notify the defense lawyer of Ren’s conviction. By the time anyone knew what had happened, the deadline for appeal had already passed.

    Ren was sent to a “reform through labor” camp at a glue factory in the city of Jiaozuo. Doubts about his mental state persisted, and family members again called upon Bo Xiping to file a petition for post-conviction relief. Bo also met with Ren Ruixiang and was shocked to hear the detainee insist that he “spoke with Chairman Mao every night.”

    Bo reviewed Ren’s medical file at the Kaifeng Psychiatric Hospital and found in the entrusted letter that the court had sent the hospital several statements detailing Ren’s past and his alleged “counterrevolutionary speech”. Bo considered the court’s behavior to be prejudicial and noted that the hospital had not employed modern diagnostic tests, such as an EEG, in assessing whether Ren was mentally ill and instead conducted only blood and urine tests.

    By this time Bo had become a senior legal figure in the province, and doubts about the case had begun to reach other senior provincial and central officials. In 1983, the Jiaozuo People’s Procuratorate arranged for Ren Ruixiang to undergo another psychiatric evaluation at the provincial psychiatric hospital in Xinxiang. This time, doctors performed an EEG and found abnormalities in his frontal cortex. They also reported that Ren Ruixiang frequently suffered from auditory hallucinations in which voices told him to say or do certain things. They diagnosed Ren as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, and he was soon released on medical parole.

    Erasing Stigma

    Of course, Ren Ruixiang’s release is not the end of the story. His brother told Liu Xiaoyuan that the family’s limited resources meant that Ren was never able to receive the medical treatment needed for his illness. He has spent most of the past four decades unsuccessfully trying to clear his brother’s name. Now at the age of 85, Ren’s mental illness is unaddressed and the stigma of his conviction for “counterrevolution” remains.

    In the early days of “reform and opening”, courts across the nation overturned a number of counterrevolution cases handed down at a time when China’s criminal justice system did not operate under the boundaries of law. Ren’s case was decided after the Gang of Four was purged from leadership and his “reactionary” verse was cited as evidence of him being a remnant of the cadre population. The highly political nature of the case barred him from exoneration, or pingfan, that allowed many of the former “counterrevolutionaries” to escape stigma.

    There was no hope of a legal remedy until February 2012 when the Sanmenxia Intermediate People’s Court offered to pay Ren monthly subsidies so long as his family acknowledged his involvement with the Gang. Ren’s brother nevertheless rejected the offer and insists that Ren should never have been criminally responsible as he became mentally ill during his incarceration in the “study session” back in 1977. The family continued to file petitions until 2011, but the Mianchi County People’s Court formally rejected the family’s petition and upheld its original findings and the psychiatric assessment that Ren was “mentally sound” at the time of committing the crimes and had “feigned illness.”

    Setting aside the question of Ren Ruixiang’s mental illness, as Liu Xiaoyuan points out there are several substantive and procedural issues that arise because of the way that Ren’s case straddles a moment in history when Chinese criminal justice began to be implemented “in accordance with the law.” On the substantive side, it is unclear whether Ren’s statements against central government leaders amounted to “incitement to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system,” the standard under the Criminal Law at the time. And given the restrictive space (a “re-education” class) and the limited audience that heard Ren’s comments, the decision to classify his speech as a “serious offense” appears arbitrary. These objections about the arbitrary and harsh criminalization of political speech in China persist to the current day, however, as “counterrevolutionary incitement” is replaced with “inciting subversion” and “inciting splittism,” both crimes of “endangering state security.”

    Ren’s trial also seems to have violated several procedural protections that should have come into force with the new legal provisions. Under the Criminal Law, Ren’s case should have been handled by an intermediate court and not by the Mianchi County People’s Court. (In the county court’s 2011 appeal decision, it states that the Luoyang Prefecture Intermediate Court had granted it jurisdiction to try the case on its behalf, but no mention of this was made in the original court document.) The case should have been tried in open court, with Ren Ruixiang’s lawyer there to represent him. And by 1980 the prosecution should have been handled by the county procuratorate, but the record only shows that the case had been sent for prosecution by the county public security bureau.

    Double Standard

    There was nothing magical about the “legalization” of criminal justice in 1980 that would make Ren Ruixiang’s case any less deserving of re-evaluation than the cases that came before. But by the same token, a decision to re-evaluate a case like Ren’s could open the door for re-evaluation of other counterrevolution convictions that came afterwards, say in 1983 or 1989.

    Under Xi Jinping, China’s judicial system has made a point of its efforts to prevent and remedy wrongful convictions, and there have been some notable instances in which longstanding convictions have been overturned. But the victims of past political persecutions are clearly not meant to be included among the cases subject for review. Though willing, on occasion, to acknowledge the contribution of police abuse and procedural violations to miscarriages of justice in “ordinary” criminal cases involving rape and homicide, it is easier to pretend that these same things don’t happen in cases involving purported threats to the security of the regime. Perhaps it’s worth asking those who want to strengthen the credibility and legitimacy of China’s judiciary whether a system that maintains this sort of double standard and blindness to past injustice can ever be considered “fair.”


    * “Bandit Hua” likely was referring to the then Chairman Hua Guofeng.

  • Wrongful Conviction for Counterrevolutionary Incitement Resurfaces

    After the Cultural Revolution, workers at Shanghai No. 1 Textile Factory gathered to denounce the crimes of the “Gang of Four.” Image credit: zgdsw.org.cn

    When China emerged from the Cultural Revolution and set off on its path of “reform and opening,” the country’s judicial system was enlisted to address many of the politically motivated judgments that had been handed down during the Mao era. Courts throughout the country overturned verdicts against former “counterrevolutionaries,” clearing away their status as “enemies of the people.”

    This effort took place as China worked to rebuild its shattered legal institutions and put a new legal framework in place that would help to reduce some of the arbitrariness and injustice that had characterized the preceding era. Notably, a new Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law took effect on January 1, 1980. Counterrevolutionary crime continued to be punished, but punishment would henceforth be handed down in accordance with laws and would follow prescribed legal procedures.

    Of course, not everyone could benefit from the political rehabilitation of past political crimes. Those associated with the “Gang of Four,” pinned with blame for the violence and destruction of the Cultural Revolution and deemed to oppose the Communist Party of China and its leaders, were among the first “counterrevolutionaries” sentenced in accordance with the new laws. It didn’t matter much that most of them had been sitting in jail for years without access to any legal counsel or even anticipation of any formal legal proceeding. And though the courts that handed down judgments were now technically bound to do so “in accordance with the law,” the law was still primarily an instrument of the state’s political power that offered defendants little as far as protection of their rights was concerned.

    Lingering Stigma: Counterrevolutionary Incitement

    Concern for wrongful convictions and miscarriages of justice might lead one to take another look at some of these cases from the early 1980s. One example of residual injustice from this period recently came to light via Liu Xiaoyuan, a Beijing-based criminal defense lawyer who has been actively involved in rights-protection cases. Liu recently blogged about being contacted by an 80-year-old man from Henan who has spent most of the past four decades trying to get his elder brother’s 1980 conviction for “counterrevolutionary incitement” overturned.

    Ren Ruixiang (任瑞祥) was 17 years old when the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949. Though he came from a “rich peasant” background, his middle-school education made him a valuable asset for building a “New China.” He served as a local government cadre in the city of Luoyang and joined the Communist Youth League.

    But Ren’s “bad class background” would eventually catch up with him. In 1959, in the fevered final months of the Anti-Rightist Movement, he was accused of having concealed his membership in a Nationalist Party youth organization and stripped of his position. Most likely he was also sent for re-education. He would eventually be transferred to Mianchi County, where he spent the tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution labelled as a “bad element.”

    At the end of the Cultural Revolution, local authorities accused Ren of having been a follower of the “Gang of Four” and sent him for compulsory “re-education” in what was euphemistically known as a “study session” (xuexi ban). During his time there, in December 1977, Ren allegedly jotted down a short piece of counterrevolutionary verse in a notebook and then shouted it aloud. The verse read:

    “China’s troubles aren’t through—
    Bandit Hua* has risen again!
    My fellow Chinese brothers—
    You must eliminate Bandit Hua!”

    Ren was arrested and sent to the county detention center in January 1978, where he was alleged to have continued shouting counterrevolutionary slogans calling for the ouster of central party leaders, including Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, and Deng Xiaoping. China’s procuratorate system had not yet been restored after the Cultural Revolution, so the county public security authorities sent the case to the local court for prosecution the following month. But no trial was held and Ren spent the next two years in a detention center.

    At the time, China had few trained legal professionals. Therefore, it’s surprising to learn that Ren Ruixiang was able to be represented by a defense lawyer named Bo Xiping. When Bo went to meet with his client at the detention center, he found his behavior odd and reported this to the court. As a result, the court arranged for Ren Ruixiang to be evaluated by the Kaifeng Psychiatric Hospital. The hospital’s assessment report stated that Ren Ruixiang’s mental state was fine and that he had been feigning illness to avoid criminal responsibility.

    Imprisonment & Release

    China’s new Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law took effect just days after the completion of Ren’s psychiatric evaluation. The Mianchi County People’s Court proceeded to find Ren Ruixiang guilty of “counterrevolutionary incitement” and sentenced him to seven years in prison. According to Ren’s brother, however, the court held no trial hearing and did not notify the defense lawyer of Ren’s conviction. By the time anyone knew what had happened, the deadline for appeal had already passed.

    Ren was sent to a “reform through labor” camp at a glue factory in the city of Jiaozuo. Doubts about his mental state persisted, and family members again called upon Bo Xiping to file a petition for post-conviction relief. Bo also met with Ren Ruixiang and was shocked to hear the detainee insist that he “spoke with Chairman Mao every night.”

    Bo reviewed Ren’s medical file at the Kaifeng Psychiatric Hospital and found in the entrusted letter that the court had sent the hospital several statements detailing Ren’s past and his alleged “counterrevolutionary speech”. Bo considered the court’s behavior to be prejudicial and noted that the hospital had not employed modern diagnostic tests, such as an EEG, in assessing whether Ren was mentally ill and instead conducted only blood and urine tests.

    By this time Bo had become a senior legal figure in the province, and doubts about the case had begun to reach other senior provincial and central officials. In 1983, the Jiaozuo People’s Procuratorate arranged for Ren Ruixiang to undergo another psychiatric evaluation at the provincial psychiatric hospital in Xinxiang. This time, doctors performed an EEG and found abnormalities in his frontal cortex. They also reported that Ren Ruixiang frequently suffered from auditory hallucinations in which voices told him to say or do certain things. They diagnosed Ren as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, and he was soon released on medical parole.

    Erasing Stigma

    Of course, Ren Ruixiang’s release is not the end of the story. His brother told Liu Xiaoyuan that the family’s limited resources meant that Ren was never able to receive the medical treatment needed for his illness. He has spent most of the past four decades unsuccessfully trying to clear his brother’s name. Now at the age of 85, Ren’s mental illness is unaddressed and the stigma of his conviction for “counterrevolution” remains.

    In the early days of “reform and opening”, courts across the nation overturned a number of counterrevolution cases handed down at a time when China’s criminal justice system did not operate under the boundaries of law. Ren’s case was decided after the Gang of Four was purged from leadership and his “reactionary” verse was cited as evidence of him being a remnant of the cadre population. The highly political nature of the case barred him from exoneration, or pingfan, that allowed many of the former “counterrevolutionaries” to escape stigma.

    There was no hope of a legal remedy until February 2012 when the Sanmenxia Intermediate People’s Court offered to pay Ren monthly subsidies so long as his family acknowledged his involvement with the Gang. Ren’s brother nevertheless rejected the offer and insists that Ren should never have been criminally responsible as he became mentally ill during his incarceration in the “study session” back in 1977. The family continued to file petitions until 2011, but the Mianchi County People’s Court formally rejected the family’s petition and upheld its original findings and the psychiatric assessment that Ren was “mentally sound” at the time of committing the crimes and had “feigned illness.”

    Setting aside the question of Ren Ruixiang’s mental illness, as Liu Xiaoyuan points out there are several substantive and procedural issues that arise because of the way that Ren’s case straddles a moment in history when Chinese criminal justice began to be implemented “in accordance with the law.” On the substantive side, it is unclear whether Ren’s statements against central government leaders amounted to “incitement to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system,” the standard under the Criminal Law at the time. And given the restrictive space (a “re-education” class) and the limited audience that heard Ren’s comments, the decision to classify his speech as a “serious offense” appears arbitrary. These objections about the arbitrary and harsh criminalization of political speech in China persist to the current day, however, as “counterrevolutionary incitement” is replaced with “inciting subversion” and “inciting splittism,” both crimes of “endangering state security.”

    Ren’s trial also seems to have violated several procedural protections that should have come into force with the new legal provisions. Under the Criminal Law, Ren’s case should have been handled by an intermediate court and not by the Mianchi County People’s Court. (In the county court’s 2011 appeal decision, it states that the Luoyang Prefecture Intermediate Court had granted it jurisdiction to try the case on its behalf, but no mention of this was made in the original court document.) The case should have been tried in open court, with Ren Ruixiang’s lawyer there to represent him. And by 1980 the prosecution should have been handled by the county procuratorate, but the record only shows that the case had been sent for prosecution by the county public security bureau.

    Double Standard

    There was nothing magical about the “legalization” of criminal justice in 1980 that would make Ren Ruixiang’s case any less deserving of re-evaluation than the cases that came before. But by the same token, a decision to re-evaluate a case like Ren’s could open the door for re-evaluation of other counterrevolution convictions that came afterwards, say in 1983 or 1989.

    Under Xi Jinping, China’s judicial system has made a point of its efforts to prevent and remedy wrongful convictions, and there have been some notable instances in which longstanding convictions have been overturned. But the victims of past political persecutions are clearly not meant to be included among the cases subject for review. Though willing, on occasion, to acknowledge the contribution of police abuse and procedural violations to miscarriages of justice in “ordinary” criminal cases involving rape and homicide, it is easier to pretend that these same things don’t happen in cases involving purported threats to the security of the regime. Perhaps it’s worth asking those who want to strengthen the credibility and legitimacy of China’s judiciary whether a system that maintains this sort of double standard and blindness to past injustice can ever be considered “fair.”


    * “Bandit Hua” likely was referring to the then Chairman Hua Guofeng.

  • Detained Actor Spotlights Custody and Education, Censors Intervene

    Huang Haibo. Photo credit: sohu.com

    On May 15, police in Beijing detained well-known Chinese actor Huang Haibo for soliciting a prostitute. He and the prostitute were each subjected to 15 days of administrative detention, after which police decided to send them both to custody and education—a custodial measure targeting sex workers and their clients—for an additional six months. Reversing an earlier decision, Huang’s Weibo account announced on June 8 that he will not appeal. On June 9, he terminated the contract with his lawyer Mo Shaoping.

    The Chinese public has largely responded with sympathy for Huang and a sense that his punishment is excessive. Since the abolition of reeducation through labor (RTL) in 2013, the Chinese public seems to have become less tolerant for measures that enable police to detain individuals for extended periods without proper legal basis or due process. This has led some to push for abolition of “quasi-RTL” measures like custody and education.

    In fact, there were signs of a healthy public debate over custody and education even before Huang’s case helped put the measure in the spotlight. In early May, more than 100 individuals signed a petition calling on the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee to abolish custody and education. After Huang’s arrest, on June 7, a group of legal experts, scholars, and lawyers met in Beijing leading to another proposal recommending formal abolition of the custody and education system.

    Like the debate over RTL in 2012, many of the controversies surrounding custody and education have received widespread attention from the Chinese media. One article, however, appears to have crossed an invisible line. On June 4, an article entitled “What is the Legal Basis for Custody and Education?” was published on the front page of Procuratorate Daily, the official newspaper of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, one of China’s main law-enforcement bodies. According to a report received by the China Digital Times website, media outlets were later instructed not to republish this article and immediately delete it from their online sites. On the website of Procuratorate Daily, the article is visible on an image of the front page of the June 4 edition, but links have been broken to both that article (available via web cache) and a more legible image of the front page.

    It is not clear why this particular article was singled out for censorship. One possibility might be its concluding emphasis on the need for more effective ways for Chinese citizens to challenge the constitutionality or legality of measures or legislation. Although popular discontent over measures like “custody and repatriation” or RTL eventually led officials to abolish these detention measures, the initiative for action has very much remained in the hands of Chinese authorities. Establishing a routine mechanism for constitutional review—like the one suggested in this article—is liable to shift some of that initiative to society, and to give citizens a channel through which to assert the supremacy of constitutional principles and rule of law. China’s current leaders have expressed a certain degree of hostility to a system of constitutional checks and balances, and this article may have tested the limits of that attitude.

    *
    What is the Legal Basis for “Custody and Education”?

    Xiao Rong
    Procuratorate Daily, June 4, 2014

    Experts believe that custody and education is unlawful and unjustified and that those sent for custody and education can protect their rights in accordance with the law

    Recently, the decision to send actor Huang Haibo to custody and education has put the Measures for the Custody and Education of Prostitutes and Clients of Prostitutes [hereafter, “Custody and Education Measures”] in public view. It has also raised many questions: Is custody and education lawful and justified? Does sending a prostitute or client of prostitutes to custody and education after [they serve] administrative detention violate the prohibition against “double jeopardy”? How should a review mechanism be initiated for “evil laws” that violate the constitution and Legislation Law? On June 3, Procuratorate Daily interviewed legal scholars regarding these questions.

    Back on September 4, 1993, the State Council issued the Custody and Education Measures in response to the NPC Standing Committee’s 1991 Decision on the Strict Prohibition of Prostitution. According to these measures, which the State Council revised in 2010, “Prostitutes and the clients of prostitutes, in addition to the penalties provided for under Article 66 of the Public Order Management Penalty Law of the People’s Republic of China, in those cases in which RTL is not yet necessary, may be placed under custody and education by the public security organ.” Custody and education, which can last from six months to two years, primarily involves collective legal and moral education, arrangement of productive labor, and testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases for prostitutes and the clients of prostitutes.

    “Custody and education is a compulsory measure restricting personal liberty that falls between general administrative penalties and RTL. However, the Administrative Compulsion Law does not have any provision for this kind of compulsory measure,” says Qi Dongwen, assistant professor at Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications Law School. Qi believes that the custody and education system is unlawful, both in terms of its legislative status and content.

    According to China’s constitution, the personal freedom of citizens is inviolable. According to Article 8 of the Legislation Law, enacted in 2000, compulsory measures and penalties that deprive citizens of their political rights or restrict their personal freedom may only be enacted by law. Jiang Ming’an, director of the Center for Constitution and Administrative Law Studies at Peking University, told Procuratorate Daily that the provisions of the Decision on the Strict Prohibition of Prostitution involving restriction of personal freedom are in conflict with the aforementioned provision of the Legislation Law because that decision is not an act of law. Moreover, Article 9 of the Legislation Law states: “If laws have not been enacted regarding the matters specified in Article 8 of this law, the NPC or its Standing Committee has the power to make a decision to authorize the State Council to formulate administrative regulations first for some of those matters, based on actual needs, excluding criminal offenses and their punishment, compulsory measures and penalties involving deprivation of citizens’ political rights or restriction of the freedom of their persons, and the judicial system.” Therefore, the Custody and Education Measures are also in conflict with the Legislation Law. Qi Dongwen adds: “Custody and education also conflicts with the 2005 Public Order Management Penalty Law, which provides for detention or fines for prostitutes and their clients and makes no mention of custody and education.”

    In the view of Fu Dalin, assistant professor at the Xi’an Institute of Political Studies [a unit of the People’s Liberation Army], custody and education is a coercive measure that took shape as part of China’s social management process that specifically targets prostitutes and their customers. In light of its own particular background, it has a certain degree of justification. However, since the enactment of the Legislation Law and Administrative Compulsion Law, the illegal and contradictory nature of this system has become increasingly apparent, and there is no further need for it to exist.

    Does it violate the prohibition against “double jeopardy” to send prostitutes and their clients to custody and education after placing them under administrative detention? Fu Dalin told Procuratorate Daily that if you look simply at legal statute, custody and education following administrative detention does not count as “double jeopardy” because custody and education is not an administrative penalty. But looking from the perspective of law enforcement, administrative compulsion involves placing temporary restrictions on a citizen’s personal freedom in accordance with the law or taking temporary control of property belonging to a citizen, legal person, or other organization in accordance with the law, all for the purpose of preventing unlawful behavior, avoiding harm from occurring, and controlling the spread of danger. In prostitution cases, administrative detention or fines should be sufficient, and there is no need to impose additional custody and education.

    Given that custody and education lacks clear lawfulness or justification, can Huang Haibo and others sent to custody and education protect their rights [through legal channels]? Fu Dalin says they can: “No matter whether it is an administrative coercive measure or an administrative penalty, if the person concerned believes the measure is unlawful he or she may file administrative litigation in accordance with the law in order to protect his or her own lawful rights and interests.”

    Qi Dongwen says: “The Sun Zhigang incident led to the abolition of the custody and repatriation system. Complaints by petitioning mother Tang Hui led to the abolition of RTL. I believe that Huang Haibo’s case is a good chance to initiate the constitutional review mechanism and call an immediate halt to the custody and education system.” Fu Dalin recommends that there ought to be a regular channel within the state’s institutional arrangement for resolving difficult questions of constitutional review. “The review process established in the current Legislation Law only involves the ‘Part One’ issues of raising requests or recommendations for review,” says Fu. “There needs to be additional content added for the more crucial stage of ‘Part Two.’ Review of the Legislation Law is in the works, and I hope that it will establish an appropriate mechanism for constitutional review and oversight.”

  • RTL End Pushes Kids into Prison, Procurator Calls for Reform

    Inside Shaanxi Province Juvenile Reformatory, December 2010. Photo credit: Liang Meng, Sunshine Daily

    Last year’s decision to eliminate the decades-old measure of reeducation through labor (RTL) required a number of institutional adjustments. It has also left open a number of questions about other forms of detention and how to deal with the kinds of individuals previously held in RTL.

    The disappearance of RTL has left one particular group in a kind of institutional limbo: juvenile delinquents who have been sent for “custody and rehabilitation” (shourong jiaoyang) by the government. Like RTL, custody and rehabilitation is a practice that has been around since the 1950s. Aimed at dealing with juveniles who cannot be held criminally responsible for offenses under the law, custody and rehabilitation has also been the subject of scrutiny because of its relatively vague standards and non-judicial decision process. Since 1996, youths sent for custody and rehabilitation were held in RTL facilities, but the closure of those sites has left local authorities to improvise solutions.

    As a recent opinion piece in the Procuratorate Daily notes, some of these youths have been transferred to prison facilities. In the piece (translated below), an official at the Supreme People’s Procuratorate warns that housing juvenile delinquents in prisons is a violation of Chinese law, a violation of their human rights, and potentially counterproductive from the perspective of turning teens away from crime. Instead, it is argued, China should make use of other facilities—such as the correctional work-study schools that proponents argue have helped lower China’s juvenile recidivism rate—to take in youths sent for custody and rehabilitation.

    *
    Inappropriate to Move Youth to Prison from Custody & Rehabilitation

    Chen Mengqi, Prison Procuracy Division, Supreme People’s Procuratorate
    Procuratorate Daily, March 19, 2014

    On December 28, 2013, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed a “Resolution on the Repeal of Regulations Related to Reeducation through Labor,” formally abolishing the RTL system. After the closure of RTL facilities, those persons who had been under RTL were released without having to serve the remainder of their terms. It has been a more difficult question, however, as to how to deal with the juveniles who had been sent to the RTL centers for custody and rehabilitation. Recently, some locations have been sending these youths to serve their custody and rehabilitation terms in juvenile reformatories (guanjiaosuo) or women’s prisons. I believe that this is inappropriate, as it is a violation of the relevant laws and regulations and infringes upon the lawful rights and interests of the juveniles who have been sent for custody and rehabilitation.

    Sending youth to prisons for custody and rehabilitation is incompatible with the concept of respect and protection of human rights. According to Article 17 of the Criminal Law, juveniles under the age of 16 may not be subject to criminal penalties. Their parents or guardians should be instructed to discipline them or, when necessary, the government may subject them to custody and rehabilitation.

    The subject of where juveniles should be held for custody and rehabilitation has gone through a process of historical development. In general, there has been a trend towards rule of law, mitigated punishment, and humane treatment, demonstrating the general policy toward juvenile [offenders] of education, reform, and rescue. China’s custody and rehabilitation system was created in the 1950s and was formally established with passage of the Criminal Law in 1979. In 1982, under the provisions of the Ministry of Public Security’s Notice on the Scope of Custody in Youth Reformatories, youth offenders serving criminal sentences and youths sent for custody and rehabilitation were both held for custody and rehabilitation in juvenile reformatories. After the Prison Law was promulgated in 1994, the Ministry of Justice issued a Notice on Transfer of Youths Sent for Government Custody and Rehabilitation to RTL Facilities for Custody and Rehabilitation in 1996 in order to implement the Prison Law correctly, and youths sent for custody and rehabilitation were transferred to RTL facilities. In 2013, the RTL system was eliminated, and some locations have transferred youths sent for custody and rehabilitation to prisons, violating the principle of respect and protection of human rights.

    Transferring youths subject to custody and rehabilitation to prisons violates the Prison Law. According to Articles 2 and 16 of the Prison Law, prisons are state organs for the enforcement of criminal penalties and offenders who have been sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment, life imprisonment, or death sentences with two-year reprieve are to serve those penalties in prisons. Offenders to be imprisoned must have the “three documents and one form”: namely, copies of the procuratorate’s indictment, court verdict, and enforcement notice, along with the case-closure registration form. Otherwise, they may not be imprisoned. However, under the Criminal Law youths who have been sent for custody and rehabilitation are not subject to criminal penalty and do not bear criminal responsibility. They have a completely different status relative to criminal offenders. Transferring youths subject to custody and rehabilitation to prisons is a clear violation of the Prison Law and infringes on the lawful rights and interests of juveniles.

    Sending youths subject to custody and rehabilitation to prisons does not benefit the education and protection of juveniles. All of the youths sent for custody and rehabilitation are juveniles under the age of 16. Some are even under the age of 14. These juveniles are undergoing physical growth, learning, and forming moral character. According to the provisions of the Juvenile Protection Law and the Law for Prevention of Juvenile Crime, the state shall protect the physical and mental health of juveniles, educate juveniles, and promote the moral, intellectual, and physical development of juveniles in order to protect their lawful rights and interests. Prisons are a place for the state to lock up and reform offenders serving criminal sentences. These offenders are vicious and pose a major threat to society. Locking up juveniles bearing no criminal responsibility in the same facility with offenders serving criminal penalties and having the same unit carry out management and education is not only unhelpful for the education, reform, and rescue of youths subject to custody and rehabilitation; it also has the potential to infect them with even worse vices or learn more criminal techniques.

    To resolve the problem of where to house youths sent for custody and rehabilitation after the abolition of RTL, I have the following recommendations. First, we should retain the youth correctional centers (jiaoyang guanlisuo). Currently, each province, autonomous region, and direct-administered municipality typically has a youth correctional center in which youths sent for custody and rehabilitation can be held. We can also borrow from the foreign system of youth correctional schools and reform our youth correctional centers so that they are dedicated to the education and correction of youths sent for custody and rehabilitation. Second, we should make more use of work-study schools (gongdu xuexiao). Work-study schools are schools for the education and rescue of middle-school students who have violated the law or committed minor criminal offenses. These schools provide specialized half-work, half-study education for juveniles between the ages of 12 and 17. Currently, there are 67 work-study schools in China. If we send youths sent for custody and rehabilitation to work-study schools in accordance with the nature of work-study schools and the special characteristics of juveniles, it would be beneficial to the education and protection of juveniles.

  • To End Arbitrary Detention, Bring Officials to Justice

    Entrance to the reprimand center at the Luoyang City Police Station in Henan’s provincial capital. Photo credit: dzjjw.gov.cn

    The formal elimination of reeducation through labor (RTL) in the final days of 2013 was greeted with widespread approval among Chinese citizens. Following a series of high-profile cases involving controversial detentions of petitioners and critics of local officials, the public had grown skeptical of this decades-old system of administrative detention and intolerant of the stability-first mentality of the officials who made use of it.

    Given that little has been said so far about what, if any, measures might be put forward to replace RTL, there is an understandable concern among many that local authorities will come up with their own solutions and proliferate practices that are even more problematic—when it comes to due legal process and protection of individual rights—than RTL.

    This vigilance about preventing the emergence of new forms of arbitrary detention was behind the outrage that erupted recently after the Beijing News reported on a system of “reprimand centers” that had been set up in Henan Province to deal with petitioners perceived to be disruptive and troublesome. Individuals were reportedly held in these facilities for days or even months at the behest of local officials without any legal process. The practice began in 2008, when provincial authorities instructed the use of “education and reprimand” to deal with people who went to Beijing to petition.

    Henan government officials responded swiftly to the exposure of the reprimand centers, ordering that they be shut down. But many are concerned that the matter will end there, without further investigation or assignment of responsibility for those involved in this system of extrajudicial detention. To this end, a group of 31 rights lawyers from around China recently submitted a request for “open government information” regarding the reprimand centers, though there has so far been no response.

    In an opinion piece published in the Shenzhen Daily Sunshine, reporter and columnist Liu Xiandong explains that local authorities are liable to continue violating the rights of citizens unless there are more serious consequences for doing so. Reminding readers that abuse of power is another form of corruption, he writes that “rights and dignity are even more precious than taxpayer money or public funds”—suggesting that the high-profile anti-corruption campaign now underway should not ignore the more routine, non-economic abuses of power.

    *
    How Could Eliminating Reprimand Centers for Abnormal Petitioning Be Enough?

    Liu Xiandong, Daily Sunshine
    18 February 2014

    Faced with public condemnation over the establishment of reprimand centers for abnormal petitioning throughout Henan, the Henan Politico-Legal Committee and Office of Letters and Visits replied that the use of reprimand centers was not in accord with laws and regulations and sent out an overnight notice announcing the immediate launch of a province-wide inspection and elimination campaign to abolish all reprimand centers for abnormal petitioning. Given that reprimand centers were set up, there must have been violations of the law or even crimes committed. Accountability and punishment ought to be placed on the agenda. Last Saturday, a Daily Sunshine editorial called on officials in Hunan to hold executive agencies accountable for unlawful acts in this affair, but the relevant departments have so far said nothing.

    First, let’s discuss how the unauthorized establishment of “reprimand centers for abnormal petitioning” is unlawful. Even though the petitioning system is, in the view of Yu Jianrong and other scholars, a mechanism for rights remedy that acts as a supplement where rule of law is insufficient, in reality the existence of this system gives a shred of hope to people who have already lost hope in the ability of ordinary legal channels to uphold their rights as citizens. In particular, crossing administrative jurisdictions to petition has the potential to strike fear in the hearts of domineering local power-holders. For this reason, some insist on declaring the practice of reporting on problems to higher officials on the outside to be “abnormal petitioning” and try to use brute force to prevent it. Everyone knows the methods used in the past, such as setting up the interception mechanisms known as “black jails” or sending petitioners to psychiatric hospitals. The biggest “innovation” of “reprimand centers for abnormal petitioning” is their attempt to legalize and regularize the dedicated black jails and psychiatric hospitals for petitioners that were denounced in the past.

    There is no denying that some petitioners fabricate facts, slander, and disrupt public order in the course of their petitioning. Existing laws and regulations may be used to respond to these sorts of acts. It’s only that when ordinary legal channels are used to regulate petitioners, it is possible that some things that the authorities would rather keep secret might get revealed once the matter goes before a court. This is something that some local governments cannot stand. So, they are compelled to employ methods that “do not accord with law and regulations”—in other words, to use illegal measures to deal with petitioners.

    The internal operations of the reprimand centers for abnormal petitioning have not yet been revealed, so we aren’t clear about whether it involved intolerable mistreatment or humiliation. But locking up citizens without due process and depriving them of their fundamental liberty in order to reprimand them is already a gross abuse of power and a violation of rights. When expanding power gets out of control, it inevitably becomes a malignant force that not only violates the lawful rights of citizens but also seriously damages the foundations of a rule of law society.

    If the matter of setting up reprimand centers for abnormal petitioning were resolved merely by abolishing them, it would mean leaving open the question of whether unlawful acts by those with power can be effectively reckoned with. If there is nearly zero cost for violating the law, can the public expect that they won’t do something even worse next time? Can they be expected to lead everyone in the construction of a rule of law society? Can one have the extravagant hope that their rule will be fair and just?

    These days there is a consensus among officials and the public about the need to fight corruption, but our understanding of corruption cannot be limited to economic acts like embezzlement or accepting bribes. We also need to pay attention to corrupt exercise of power. Power is not the same as money, but when power exceeds the boundaries set by law, it becomes a kind of rights violation and a form of corruption. What is ultimately damaged is the rights and dignity of the public. These rights and dignity are even more precious than taxpayer money or public funds and must be protected from violation and plunder.

    It is based on these reasons that construction of a rule of law society must attach importance to restricting public power and must remedy and punish each unlawful act by the authorities.

  • Criminal Detention as Punishment in Post-RTL Era

    Abuse of criminal detention in duration and scope made headlines when it befell (clockwise from top left) Xue Manzi, Wang Gongquan, Wang Peng, and Wu Hongfei. Photo credits: CCTV, Southern People, China.com, and Xinhua

    One of the big uncertainties facing China’s legal system at present is how matters formerly handled with reeducation through labor (RTL) will be dealt with once RTL has been abolished. Police and local authorities have grown accustomed to the quick and flexible manner in which threats to public order and social stability could be neutralized with extended incarceration without formal judicial process. While some fear that police will cope by simply taking advantage of other kinds of extra-legal measures, such as “custody and education” and “legal education classes,” there are also good reasons to worry about the abuse of measures that are, strictly speaking, legal.

    One such measure that has recently been put under the spotlight is “criminal detention” (xingshi juliu). As reporter Ye Zhusheng explained recently in the magazine South Reviews, the routine practice of locking up criminal suspects for up to 30 days before seeking approval for arrest is quite far removed from the “emergency measure” originally envisioned in China’s Criminal Procedure Law. Though the letter of the law sets limits on both the duration and conditions under which the measure may be employed, both have been expanded broadly in practice thanks to a lack of rigorous institutional oversight or significant consequences for improper application.

    Criminal detention has been used on dissidents and activists such as Wang Gongquan, a billionaire who is a founder of the New Citizens Movement alongside Xu Zhiyong. It was announced today that Wang, who has been under criminal detention since September 13, 2013, has signed a confession and been released on bail. His admission could have implications for Xu who had his final defense hearing in court yesterday.

    It is under similar circumstances that the measure known as “residential surveillance” (jianshi juzhu) has been able to evolve into a measure encompassing two almost completely different types of measures—one lenient and non-custodial and the other arguably the most severe and restrictive measure possible under China’s Criminal Procedure Law. In both cases, the tendency has been to use compulsory measures instrumentally to further investigators’ goals of obtaining confessions, and this instrumental orientation has enabled the use of compulsory measures as leverage in non-criminal disputes or even as a form of punishment itself.

    Ye’s article ends on an optimistic note, however, suggesting that police discretion to abuse such measures without consequence is slowly being reformed. For one thing, the abolition of RTL is seen as a clear signal of Chinese society’s demand that police operate under rule of law. This will involve continued oversight of all types—institutional oversight by the procuratorate, external pressure by the media and public opinion, and the checks associated with more robust approval procedures and channels for appeal. In this respect, the ability of lawyers to intervene earlier in criminal cases—something granted on paper by the revised Criminal Procedure Law that took effect a year ago—has the potential to play an important role in reducing police use of detention and ensuring that when detention is used, it is used properly.

    *
    Criminal Detention in the “Post-RTL Era”

    Ye Zhusheng, South Reviews
    December 8, 2013

    In the “post-RTL era,” public security units will be increasingly expected to combat unlawful and criminal activity under rule of law. Criminal detention, standing at the front lines of the criminal procedure, will bear the brunt of these expectations.

    At the end of June of this year, the Hunan Politico-Legal Committee and all of the provincial legal authorities jointly issued Several Rules Concerning All-Province Politico-Legal Organs Serving Enterprises and Optimizing the Development Environment, calling on local [authorities] to “use discretion in detaining.” For legal representatives or senior management of enterprises suspected of criminal activities, non-custodial compulsory measures are to be employed as often as possible except when it is truly necessary to do otherwise. For those already under criminal detention or arrest, when it is necessary for the enterprise’s production or operations and the facts of the case have already basically been investigated, they may, in light of the circumstances, be transferred to non-custodial compulsory measures in accordance with the law.

    Criminal detention is the most commonly employed custodial measure used by public security organs against criminal suspects. In news reports, the phrase “case was uncovered” is typically accompanied by word that a criminal suspect has been placed under criminal detention.

    The reform program of the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Central Committee calls for construction of a rule-of-law business environment, improved operating mechanisms for judicial powers, and perfection of the system of human rights and legal protections. Abolition of re-education through labor (RTL) is a major step in this reform direction. In the “post-RTL era,” public security units will be increasingly expected to combat unlawful and criminal activity under rule of law. Criminal detention, standing at the front lines of the criminal procedure, will bear the brunt of these expectations.

    Broad Standards

    Just what sort of procedure is criminal detention? Though “criminal detention” is already a hot topic, ordinary members of the public don’t necessarily have a clear understanding of it and even possess many misunderstandings.

    According to the law, public security organs may “initially detain an active criminal or major suspect” under one of seven conditions, such as when he or she is “preparing to commit a crime, is in the process of committing a crime, or is discovered immediately after committing a crime,” or “if there is likelihood of his or her destroying or falsifying evidence or coordinating confessions [with other suspects].”

    A procurator in the criminal investigation supervision office of a procuratorate in a Guangdong county told South Reviews that a considerable portion of the criminal suspects placed under criminal detention do not understand the measure: “They have no idea what criminal detention is, so even those who have been improperly detained have no understanding of how to protect their own rights and interests.”

    According to the prevailing interpretation among legal scholars, criminal detention ought to be applied in emergency situations and is not a compulsory measure for routine use. According to a report by Fei Zhiguo and Hu Junce, two procurators from the Xiacheng District Procuratorate in Hangzhou who analyzed problems in the use of criminal detention, “in actual implementation many local investigators are under the mistaken impression that, as long as a criminal case is involved, they may place criminal suspects under criminal detention no matter whether it is necessary or whether they meet the criteria.”

    Li Xiujiao, a criminal defense lawyer who previously worked for many years as a procurator, told South Reviews that, despite the existence of threshold standards in theory, in practice these standards are extremely flexible. Basically, so long as the police believe that a crime may be demonstrated [to have taken place], they may use criminal detention. Inside public security bureaus, criminal detention is typically approved by the legal affairs office. A police officer in the legal affairs office of a public security bureau in a district of Guangzhou told South Reviews that the standards for approval are quite broad and only a minority of criminal detentions fail to be approved.

    This situation can be demonstrated empirically. South Reviews obtained a copy of a report prepared by a procuratorate in a coastal city that had conducted a special monitoring of the use of criminal detention by units under its jurisdiction. According to the report, from 2009 to the first half of 2011, public security units in that area apprehended 11,393 criminal suspects. Of these, 8,551 were placed under criminal detention, or 75.1 percent. According to Zhang Chao, a researcher at the Henan Police and Rule of Law Research Center who collected statistics from 10 public security bureaus in 2010, nearly 90 percent of criminal suspects had been placed under criminal detention.

    Obviously, the over-application of criminal detention is rarely ever called into question. Besides the gaps in public understanding, there are legislative roots as well. The seven circumstances set out under the law are extremely broad and difficult to narrow down in practice, so it is extraordinarily easy for them to be distorted.

    Scholars who have investigated the historical development of the statutory conditions for criminal detention have found that two situations in which the now-abolished practice of “shelter and investigation” was once used—“refusal to tell his or her true name and address and his or her identity is unknown” and “strong suspicion of committing crimes from one place to another, repeatedly, or in a gang”—became “grafted” onto the criminal detention system. Fei Zhiguo and Hu Junce report that, in practice, these standards are often given expansive interpretation by police, who, for example, “consider those from other areas suspected of committing crimes while in a place to work, study, or visit friends and family as cases of ‘committing crimes from one place to another.’”

    Another reason contributing to the over-broad interpretation of the standards for criminal detention is the lack of oversight mechanisms over the police process for approving detentions. In theory, the procuratorate oversees the criminal process, including criminal detention, but the law provides for no specific way or manner for oversight of criminal detention. The county-level procurator from the criminal investigation oversight office quoted above told South Reviews that, aside from cases involving confessions extracted through torture, there is “basically no oversight” by the procuratorate over criminal detention. In Li Xiujiao’s view, even though the procuratorate oversees case-filing by police, the focus of that work is on cases “not filed that should be filed” with “much less attention paid” to determining whether criminal detention has been used in cases “filed that ought not have been filed.”

    Detention as Punishment

    Besides the extremely high rate of criminal detention, detention in excess of statutory time limits is also a common problem. According to the law, under ordinary circumstances the period of criminal detention should last from one to three days. If the case is extremely complex, that can be extended to one week, and in special circumstances defined by statute the period may be extended up to 30 days. Extension approval is handled within the public security organ. In Zhang Chao’s view, there are two types of extended detention. The first is when the period of detention is extended arbitrarily without meeting statutory criteria; the other is criminal detention beyond the maximum time limit allowed by law. In the 10 public security bureaus for which he collected statistics, as many as 44.47 percent of detainees were detained beyond the time limit, with the longest time a suspect was detained reaching three years and 155 days.

    In countries with developed rule of law, police can generally only detain criminal suspects for one or two days before a court needs to formally approve arrest. Usually, a complex approval process is required before the detention period may be extended. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Home Secretary’s personal approval is necessary before extending detention to five days.

    According to the procurator quoted earlier, there are two main circumstances in which the period of criminal detention gets extended beyond its limits. The first is when police repeatedly impose new criminal detention measures on the same person every time a new piece of evidence or new detail is discovered. The second probably involves detention in a location different from the place of initial apprehension, because it is currently unclear when the criminal detention period begins under those circumstances. Police might have a criminal suspect apprehended in a different location “hosted” in that location’s detention center for a long period, and there is often a lot of debate over whether that time should be counted toward the criminal detention time limit. The procurator revealed a case involving a criminal suspect apprehended in a different location who was “forgotten about” by the police officer handling the case and was only released after half a year had passed.

    The police officer in the legal affairs office quoted above told South Reviews that, other than individuals who commit solo crimes, the majority of those under criminal detention have their time limits extended, with a considerable number of those detained for the full 30 days. In the past, this sort of thing was particularly common. According to an investigation by the Nanchong procuratorate into use of criminal detention by public security organs there, between 2001 and 2003, three-quarters of all persons arrested had been detained for the full 30 days prior to arrest. The procurator quoted above told South Reviews that, in practice, the percentage of cases meeting the standard for extending the period of criminal detention is not really that high.

    According to the law, “for major suspects involved in crimes committed from one place to another, repeatedly, or in a gang, the time limit for submitting a request for examination and approval of arrest may be extended to 30 days with approval of the responsible person from a public security organ at the county level or above.” But according to the research by Fei Zhiguo and Hu Junce, this standard is also easy to interpret loosely. According to the observation of these two procurators, police can in practice use non-statutory reasons such as “the need to investigate and verify other suspected cases,” “complex case circumstances,” or “the need to travel to other places to obtain evidence” in order to extend the period of criminal detention.

    Why is it so common to expand both the scope and duration of criminal detention? There are many interpretations. Li Xiujiao told South Reviews that, in the past, confession was the main form of investigation in the public security system. Currently, that idea of investigation has not completely changed: “Locking someone up is the best way to get them to confess. Police often wait for a confession before going out to collect other evidence to support it.”

    In terms of getting a confession before arrest, there is also the measure known as criminal summons, but the maximum duration for that is 24 hours. In the view of legal scholars, the original intent of criminal detention was to prevent the effects of a crime from spreading and to avoid obstruction of the investigation. But for all sorts of reasons, the emergency measure of criminal detention has come to replace criminal summons and has, contrary to the original intent, become the routine investigative measure used in practice.

    In Li Xiujiao’s view, suspects under criminal detention are held in the detention center, where the special environment imposes a serious kind of mental pressure on them. According to his understanding, people are packed more tightly together and the facilities and conditions are worse in detention centers than in prisons. After being held in a detention center for a while, one of Li’s clients began to display serious mental problems. The endless stream of incidents like the “death by ‘blind man’s bluff’” and “death by showering” confirm this point. Under these circumstances, in Li Xiujiao’s view, many criminal suspects would rather “confess” early and be convicted sooner so that they might serve their sentence in a prison “where the conditions are better.”

    It is precisely because of the detention center’s “special effectiveness” that release on guarantee pending further investigation and residential surveillance—functionally similar to criminal detention but involving lower degrees of restriction on personal liberty—are used infrequently by police.

    Within the [criminal procedure] system, criminal detention is not a punishment but only an emergency measure used in the course of investigation. But because it can be easily extended to 30 days, even longer than the administrative detention measure used for public-order punishment (which generally is limited to 15 days), criminal detention also has the potential to be abused as a purely punitive measure. Paradoxically, even though the period of criminal detention is twice as long as that for administrative detention, the approval process and standards for the former are much simpler than those for the latter. Additionally, a person wrongly placed under criminal detention may pursue remedies through administrative reconsideration or litigation, but interviewees from different agencies all told South Reviews that it is very difficult for persons under criminal detention to get a remedy. According to Fei Zhiguo and Hu Junce, “some investigators, not wanting the trouble [of getting approval for an administrative punishment], use the compulsory measure of criminal detention instead of administrative punishment in cases where there is no need for criminal detention.”

    Researchers have discovered that police also use criminal detention as a tool and employ it to intervene in civil disputes: “In some cases involving minor injuries or traffic accidents, investigators use criminal detention against the party at fault to encourage quick civil mediation or payment of compensation to the victim. When a mediated settlement has been reached or compensation has been paid, they revoke [the detention decision] on grounds of ‘no criminal liability should be pursued.’”

    Li Xiujiao told South Reviews that he once had a client who ran a business who got in a dispute over an unpaid debt. He was placed under criminal detention for “contract fraud” and, upon release, police only paid state compensation of slightly more than 100 yuan per day. In fact, this was a case of someone using criminal detention to interfere in ordinary economic interactions.

    Perhaps it is precisely because of the indiscriminate use of criminal detention that Hunan issued the regulations mentioned above emphasizing the need to “use discretion in detaining.” In fact, similar documents have been issued in Guangdong, Jiangxi, and other locations.

    Reform

    One consequence of the expanded use of criminal detention is that a large number of criminal detention cases do not meet the standards for arrest approval, so they have to be “digested” inside the public security organ. According to the special report on criminal detention issued by the procuratorate in that coastal city that was cited above, nearly half of the individuals placed under criminal detention in that city never made it to the arrest approval process, meaning that these cases clearly did not constitute crimes or meet the conditions for prosecution. But this does not mean that the remaining half smoothly passed through the procuratorate for arrest approval. According to the statistics collected in 2010 by Zhang Chao, of the cases sent by the 10 public security bureaus to the procuratorate for review, not even 40 percent were ultimately approved for arrest.

    Considering these two sets of data together, this means that a relatively small proportion of criminal suspects placed under criminal investigation by police are ultimately approved for arrest. According to statistics obtained by South Reviews showing the percentage of those arrested but not prosecuted by procuratorates in the districts of Shenzhen during the first three quarters of this year, the rate of non-prosecution after arrest in each district in Shenzhen varied between 1 and 10 percent. Considering that, after a case is sent to the court for trial, there remains the possibility that the court will ultimately acquit, the proportion of cases involving criminal detention that do not result in conviction is even higher.

    In the view of Li Xiujiao, even though public security bureaus have accountability systems to deal with improperly handled cases, police set a relatively high standard for finding that a case has been handled improperly, generally only involving cases involving “human error or serious mistakes.” Moreover, the law places only loose limits on criminal detention. According to Article 15 of the State Compensation Law, a person wrongly detained can be compensated for “wrongful detention of a person without incriminating facts or proof substantiating a strong suspicion of the commission of a crime.” The standard for state compensation is generally calculated according to the average salary in a given location; in practice, even such minor compensation can often be easily circumvented. According to the report from the coastal procuratorate cited above, not quite 15 percent of those for whom the police chose not to pursue arrest were released directly; the rest were shifted to other measures such as administrative detention, guaranteed release pending investigation, or even RTL.

    Looking at all of the data, police currently still have a relatively great degree of freedom and room for discretion when it comes to criminal detention, but there are signs of reform. This reporter learned from procuratorates in different locations that some procuratorates have begun exercising more oversight in practice. For example, beginning in 2004 Nanchong, Sichuan Province, launched a “Special Procuratorial Oversight of Public Security Criminal Detention.” According to statistics, in 2001 the number of criminal detentions and arrests approved in Nanchong was 3,726 cases and 1,802 cases, respectively—a difference of nearly one half. In 2006, the numbers were 2,207 and 1,571, respectively, representing a significant decrease in the gap between the two.

    Looking at it from a professional perspective, Li Xiujiao sees signs of progress. In his analysis, after the new Criminal Procedure Law passed, the role of lawyers was enhanced during the detention phase, enabling them to represent suspects in petitions and allegations regarding all of the potential problems related to criminal detention and to submit defense opinions at the time the procuratorate approves arrest. Li Xiujiao told South Reviews that currently many lawyers are still not accustomed to engaging in active defense during the detention period, but he has already handled cases in which successful defense during the detention phase led to release. He therefore believes that active defense by lawyers during the detention phase will help to improve the state of criminal detention.

  • Community Correction Expands as RTL Contracts

    People sentenced to community correction take a test on community correction implementation measures in Guangyuan, Sichuan, August 8, 2013. Photo credit: Guangyuan Justice Bureau

    When details of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s latest reform resolution were made public last month, the spotlight focused on the long-awaited announcement that the system of administrative detention known as reeducation through labor (RTL) would finally be abolished. A less noticed clause of the same item in the resolution, which was issued following the Third Plenum of the 18th Congress of the Central Committee, was an imperative to “enhance the community correction system.”

    The juxtaposition of these two items led many observers both inside and outside China to conclude that a system of community correction would at least partially replace RTL—a supposition stoked by the lack of any clear signal regarding what, if anything, might replace the soon-to-be defunct system. Deputy Justice Minister Zhao Dacheng told reporters on November 29 that community correction was not, in fact, being proposed as a replacement. However, if part of the reform process involves expanding the scope of the Criminal Law to absorb some of the illegal behavior formerly handled by RTL, this will likely mean an expansion in use of community correction.

    While relatively little is known about this newer system—first introduced to China through pilot projects in select locations in 2003—the number of people affected by it is growing fast. The number of people in community correction in China has more than tripled from about 400,000 in May 2012 to 1.4 million in 2013 (the latest figure appeared in China’s national report to its 2013 Universal Periodic Review).

    Community correction is an important part of the “lenience” side of the current penal policy known as “combining lenience with severity” (kuan-yan xiangji). Currently, the system is applied to people sentenced to parole, suspended sentences, or “control” (guanzhi) in accordance with provisions introduced into the Criminal Law in 2010, as well as to people granted approval to temporarily serve custodial sentences outside a facility in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Law. The system is also seen as an important part of dealing with juvenile offenders without resorting to incarceration.

    Before the implementation of the community correction system, parolees or those serving suspended sentences were subject to supervision by their local police station. Now, judicial administrative departments supervise the community correction system that relies in part on “social organizations,” contractors, and volunteers. Targets remain in the community but must report on their activities; get approval to travel or receive visitors; attend study sessions related to public morality, current affairs, and legal knowledge; and perform social service. Notably, while local community correction authorities are required to ensure that those under their supervision complete minimum monthly quotas of study and community service, the implementation measures do not set any maximum limits for either requirement.

    People sentenced to deprivation of political rights (DPR) are also subjected to community corrections, not in accord with either of the aforementioned laws, but as a result of implementation measures (translated below) that took effect in March 2012. Citizens serving DPR—a supplemental sentence which is invariably applied to persons convicted of “endangering state security” crimes—cannot write articles or give interviews, cannot vote, cannot stand for office, and cannot hold a position in a state-owned company.

    The Ministry of Justice is currently in the process of drafting a proposed Community Correction Law that would presumably incorporate and elaborate on the provisions of these national implementation measures as well as the many local implementation rules that have been put into place to govern this developing institution. Community correction will be an area to watch as China’s system for maintaining social order and stability continues to evolve.

    *
    Notice of the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate,
    Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of Justice Regarding Issue of
    Implementation Measures for Community Correction

    To: The High People’s Courts, People’s Procuratorates, Public Security Departments (Bureaus), and Justice Departments (Bureaus) of each province, autonomous region, and directly administered municipality, the Production and Construction Corps Branch Court of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and the People’s Procuratorate, Public Security Bureau, Justice Bureau, and Prison Administration Bureau of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps:

    In order to further standardize community correction work, strengthen and innovate in the management of special populations, according to the overall arrangements made by the Center with respect to deepening reform of the legal system and mechanisms of legal work, and on the basis of deeper research and demonstration and broad solicitation of opinions, the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of Justice have jointly enacted these Implementation Measures for Community Correction. We hereby issue and distribute [these measures] and request their earnest and thorough implementation. Please report promptly to the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, or Ministry of Justice, respectively, regarding implementation or if you encounter any problems.

    Supreme People’s Court
    Supreme People’s Procuratorate
    Ministry of Public Security
    Ministry of Justice
    January 10, 2012

    Article 1: To standardize the implementation of community correction in accordance with the law and allow those under community correction to reform themselves into law-abiding citizens, these measures are enacted based on the Criminal Law of the PRC, Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC, and other relevant laws and regulations and in light of the realities of community correction work.

    Article 2: Judicial administration organs shall be responsible for guidance, management, organization, and implementation of community correction work.

    People’s courts shall issue verdicts, rulings, or decisions in accordance with the law with respect to defendants or offenders who meet the conditions for use of community correction.

    People’s procuratorates shall conduct legal oversight in accordance with the law with respect to all areas of implementation of community correction.

    Public security organs shall handle individuals sent to community correction in a timely manner and in accordance with the law when they violate public order management regulations or re-offend.

    Article 3: Community correction units of county-level judicial administration organs shall supervise, manage, educate, and assist individuals sent to community correction. Judicial affairs centers shall be responsible for the daily work of community correction.

    Social workers and volunteers shall participate in community correction work under the organization and guidance of community correction units.

    The relevant departments, village (neighborhood) committee, and the work unit or school of the person under community correction, as well as his or her family members, guardians, or guarantors, shall assist the community correction unit in carrying out community correction.

    Article 4: In considering whether to send a defendant or offender to community correction, the people’s court, people’s procuratorate, public security organ, or prison shall investigate what impact doing so would have on the community where the individual resides; to do this, they may enlist the county-level judicial administration organ to conduct an investigation and assessment.

    A judicial administration organ enlisted [to carry out an investigation and assessment] shall, according to the request of the initiating organ, thoroughly investigate the residential circumstances of the defendant or offender, his or her family or social relations, consistent behavior, the consequences and impact of his or her criminal behavior, the views of the village (neighborhood) committee in his or her place of residence, the views of the victims, and the things he or she has been prohibited from doing and put together an assessment opinion to be delivered to the initiating organ in a timely manner.

    Article 5: When community correction is used for a criminal offender, the people’s court, public security organ, and prison shall verify his or her place of residence and, at the time of sentencing or prior to his or her departure from the place of detention, notify him or her in writing regarding the deadline for reporting to the county-level judicial administration organ in his or her place of residence and the consequences of reporting late; the county-level judicial administration organ in his or her place of residence should also be notified. Within three working days of the verdict or ruling taking effect, copies of the verdict, ruling, or decision, enforcement notice, certificate of parole or other [relevant] legal documents shall be delivered [to the local judicial administration organ] and copies sent to the county-level people’s procuratorate and public security organ in his or her place of residence. A receipt shall be sent by the judicial administration bureau within three working days of receiving the legal documents.

    Article 6: A person under community correction shall report to the county-level judicial administration organ in his or her place of residence within 10 days of a people’s court verdict or ruling becoming effective or leaving the place of detention. The county-level judicial administration organ shall promptly carry out intake registration procedures and notify him or her to report to a specified judicial affairs center to undertake community correction. If it is discovered that a person sent to community correction fails to report at the appointed time, the county-level judicial administration organ shall immediately organize a search and notify the deciding authority.

    Individuals under community correction while temporarily serving their sentences non-custodially, shall be delivered to their place of residence by the responsible prison or detention center and handed over to the county-level judicial administration organ in accordance with procedures. When the offender’s place of imprisonment and place of residence are not in the same province, autonomous region, or municipality, and it is necessary for him or her to temporarily serve his or her sentence non-custodially under community correction, the prison administration bureau or detention administration unit at the provincial level in the place of imprisonment shall notify the prison administration bureau or detention administration unit at the same level in the place of residence [so that it may] appoint a prison or detention center to receive the offender’s case file and take responsibility for handling the intake and release procedures for the offender. When a people’s court decides on a sentence involving temporary non-custodial enforcement, it shall notify the county-level judicial administration organ in the individual’s place of residence to dispatch personnel to handle transfer paperwork with the court.

    Article 7: After the judicial affairs center takes in a person for community correction, it shall promptly read aloud the main parts of the verdict, ruling, decision, enforcement notice, or other relevant legal documents; the time limits for community correction; the rules that the person under community correction shall obey; the things he or she has been prohibited from doing and the legal consequences for violating the rules; the rights that a person under community correction has and the rights that have been restricted in accordance with the law; and the composition of the corrections team and its responsibilities.

    These announcements shall be led by an employee of the judicial affairs center in the presence of members of the corrections team and other relevant personnel and in accordance with regulations and procedures.

    Article 8: The judicial affairs center shall confirm a special corrections team for the person under community correction. The corrections team shall be headed by an employee of the judicial affairs center and composed of other persons listed in Articles 3(2) and 3(3) of these measures. When the person under community correction is female, the corrections team shall have female members.

    The judicial affairs center shall establish a corrections responsibility agreement with the corrections team, setting out the responsibilities and duties of each team member according to his or her work-unit and background and ensuring that each corrections measure is carried out.

    Article 9: The judicial affairs center shall devise a corrections plan for each individual under community correction and, on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation of the type of offense the person under community correction was convicted of, the circumstances of his or her crime, his or her display of remorse, personality traits, and daily life environment, establish targeted measures for monitoring, education, and assistance. The corrections plan shall be adjusted in a timely manner based on its effectiveness.

    Article 10: The county-level judicial administration organ shall establish a community-corrections enforcement file for each person under community correction, including the legal documents applying community correction and other legal documents related to the enforcement of community corrections, such as those related to intake, monitoring approval, punishment, remand to custodial enforcement, and lifting of community correction.

    The judicial affairs center shall establish archives related to community correction work, including records of the community correction work carried out by the judicial affairs center and corrections team and relevant documents related to the community correction undergone by individuals sent to community correction. It shall also maintain copies of the community correction enforcement files.

    Article 11: Persons under community correction shall report to the judicial affairs center at the appointed time; obey disciplinary rules and laws; submit to monitoring and control; and participate in education, study, community service, and social activities. When there are changes in residence or work, major unforeseen events in the family, or encounters with persons with harmful influence on his or her correction, the person under community correction shall report this at once.

    Persons in community correction while under medical parole shall provide a health report to the judicial affairs center once per month. Every three months, he or she shall present the results of a medical checkup to the judicial affairs center.

    Article 12: When a person under community correction has a legitimate need to enter an area or location subject to an “entry-by-permission-only” prohibition order of a people’s court, he or she shall enter only after approval from the county-level judicial administration organ and notice shall be given to the people’s procuratorate.

    Article 13: Persons under community correction may not leave the city, county, or banner of their residence.

    When a person under community correction has a legitimate need to leave the city, county, or banner of his or her residence in order to seek medical treatment, or because of family emergency or other reason, he or she shall seek approval from the judicial affairs center if the absence is for seven days or less. For absences exceeding seven days, approval shall be sought from the county-level judicial administration organ after getting a signed opinion from the judicial affairs center. Upon returning to his or her place of residence, he or she shall immediately report to the judicial affairs center. Persons under community correction may not leave the city, county, or banner of their residence for more than one month.

    Article 14: A person under community correction may not move his or her residence to another county, city, district, or banner.

    When a person under community correction has a legitimate need to move his or her residence, he or she shall make written application one month in advance for approval of the county-level judicial administration organ after getting a signed opinion from the judicial affairs center. The county-level judicial administration organ shall make its decision after seeking input from the county-level judicial administration organ in the new place of residence.

    For those with approval to move their place of residence, the county-level judicial administration organ shall transfer all legal documents and corrections files to the county-level judicial administration organ in the new place of residence within three working days of issuing a decision. Copies of the relevant legal documents shall be sent to the people’s procuratorates and public security organs in both the current and new places of residence. The person under community correction shall report to the county-level judicial administration organ in the new place of residence within seven days of receiving the decision.

    Article 15: Persons under community correction shall participate in educational study activity related to public morality, legal knowledge, and current affairs in order to improve their legal understanding, moral character, and thinking about remorse and rehabilitation. Persons under community correction shall participate in no less than eight hours of educational study each month.

    Article 16: Persons under community correction who are able to work shall participate in community service in order to re-establish social ties and cultivate a sense of social responsibility, the collective, and discipline. Persons under community correction shall participate in no less than eight hours of community service each month.

    Article 17: Based on the psychological status and behavioral characteristics of each person under community correction, targeted measures shall be taken to carry out individualized educational and psychological counseling to correct his or her law-breaking or criminal mindset and enhance his or her ability to adapt to society.

    Article 18: The judicial administration organ shall, according to the needs of the person under community correction, coordinate between the relevant departments and work units to undertake vocational training and employment guidance and assist in the arrangement of social security measures.

    Article 19: The judicial affairs center shall, based on the actual circumstances of the life, work, and community of the individual under community correction, employ targeted measures such as on-the-spot inspection, correspondence and contact, or information verification in order to remain actively aware of the activities of the person under community correction. During key periods or times around major events, or under other special circumstances, the judicial affairs center shall immediately ascertain the relevant circumstances of persons under community correction and may, according to necessity, require persons under community correction to report to its office and provide explanations.

    When a person under community correction evades supervision, the judicial affairs center shall immediately report to the county-level judicial administration organ to organize a search.

    Article 20: Judicial affairs centers shall periodically visit the homes, work units, schools, and communities of individuals under community correction in order to investigate and check the thinking and actual behavior of individuals under community correction.

    For individuals under community correction who are on medical parole, the judicial affairs center shall periodically make contact with the hospital providing treatment and promptly understand his or her physical condition and illness treatment and check-up and communicate this information back to the prison or detention center that issued the approval or decision [for medical parole].

    Article 21: Judicial affairs centers shall promptly record details of how individuals under community correction accept oversight and control and participate in educational study and community service and periodically evaluate how well they are accepting correction. Individuals under community corrections shall be managed differently according to the results of their evaluations.

    Article 22: When a person under community correction is found to have violated the regulations for oversight and control or a prohibition ordered by a people’s court, the judicial administration organ shall promptly send someone to investigate the situation, collect relevant evidence, and make a recommendation for handling the matter.

    Article 23: When a person under community correction commits one of the following infractions, the county-level judicial administration organ shall give a warning and produce a written decision:

    1. Failure to report at the appointed time;
    2. Violation of the provisions regarding reporting, meeting with visitors, travel, or change of residence;
    3. Failure to participate in educational study or community service according to regulation despite repeated attempts at correction;
    4. Failure by individuals under community correction who are on medical parole to provide details of their illness or medical checkups without legitimate reason or engaging in social activities other than medical treatment despite repeated attempts at correction;
    5. Violation of a prohibition ordered by a people’s court, when the circumstances are minor;
    6. Other violations of regulations on oversight and control.

    Article 24: When a person under community correction violates a regulation on oversight and control or a prohibition made by a people’s court and that violation ought to be punished with a public-order management penalty in accordance with the law, the county-level judicial administration organ shall promptly request the public security organ at the same level to issue the penalty. The public security organ shall notify the county-level judicial administration organ of its decision.

    Article 25: When a person under community correction who is serving a suspended sentence or who has been granted parole commits one of the following infractions, the county-level judicial administration organ in his or her place of residence shall issue a written recommendation to revoke the suspension or parole to the people’s court that made the original ruling and attach relevant supporting documents. The people’s court shall issue a ruling in accordance with the law within a month of receiving [the recommendation]:

    1. Violation of a prohibition ordered by a people’s court, when the circumstances are serious;
    2. Failure to report at the appointed time or eluding control during the period of community correction for longer than one month;
    3. Failure to correct behavior after having been given a public order management penalty for a violation of regulations on oversight and control;
    4. Failure to correct behavior after having been given three warnings by the judicial administration organ;
    5. Other violations of the relevant laws, administrative regulations, or rules on oversight and control, where the circumstances are serious.

    The judicial administration organ’s recommendation to revoke suspension or parole shall be sent together with the people’s court ruling to the people’s procuratorate and public security organ at the same level in the place of residence of the person under community correction.

    Article 26: When a person under community correction who is temporarily serving outside of custody commits one of the following infractions, the county-level judicial administration organ in his or her place of residence shall send a written remand recommendation to the unit that approved or decided the non-custodial enforcement and attach relevant supporting documents. The approving or deciding unit shall issue its decision within 15 days of receiving [the recommendation]:

    1. Discovery that the individual does not meet the conditions for non-custodial enforcement;
    2. Unauthorized departure from the city, county, or banner that is the place of residence without prior permission from the judicial administration organ and refusal to correct after being warned or refusal to report whereabouts and evasion of supervision;
    3. Failure to correct behavior after having been given public order management penalty for a violation of regulations on oversight and control;
    4. Failure to correct behavior after having been given two warnings by the judicial administration organ;
    5. Failure to provide details of illness and checkup in accordance with the rules during the medical parole period and refusal to correct this behavior after being warned;
    6. When the circumstances justifying temporary non-custodial enforcement no longer exist and the sentence has not concluded;
    7. When the guarantor ceases to meet the conditions of a guarantor or has had his or her qualifications as a guarantor cancelled for failure to fulfill his or her duties and a new guarantor cannot be produced within the statutory time period;
    8. Other violations of the relevant laws, administrative regulations, or rules on oversight and control, where the circumstances are serious.

    Copies of the judicial administration organ’s recommendation to remand for custodial enforcement shall be sent together with the decision from the deciding unit to the people’s procuratorate and public security organ at the same level in the place of residence of the person under community correction.

    Article 27: When a people’s court rules to revoke a suspended sentence or parole or decides to remand to custody an offender who had temporarily been serving a non-custodial sentence, the county-level judicial administration organ in the individual’s place of residence shall, with the assistance of the public security organ, promptly deliver the offender to the prison or detention center.

    When the prison administration organ decides to remand to custody an offender who had temporarily been serving a non-custodial sentence, the prison shall immediately go to the place of custody and return the offender to prison to serve his or her sentence.

    When the public security organ decides to remand to custody an offender who had temporarily been serving a non-custodial sentence, the detention center in the offender’s place of residence shall take custody of the offender.

    Article 28: When a person under community corrections meets to statutory conditions for sentence reduction, the county-level judicial administration organ in his or her place of residence shall prepare a written recommendation for sentence reduction and attach related evidentiary documents and, after the prefectural judicial administration organ inspects and approves, submit the request for a ruling by the intermediate people’s court in the individual’s place of residence. The people’s court shall issue its ruling in accordance with the law within one month of receiving the request; when the case involves sentence reduction for a person serving a non-custodial sentence and the circumstances are complex or special, the deadline may be extended by one month. Copies of the judicial administration organ’s recommendation for sentence reduction and the people’s court ruling on sentence reduction shall be sent together to the people’s procuratorate and public security organ at the same administrative level for the place of residence of the person under community correction.

    Article 29: Prior to the end of their community correction period, individuals under community correction shall produce a personal summary report and the judicial affairs center shall prepare a written evaluation based on his or her behavior during the period of community correction, assessment results, and community opinions, and make recommendations for placement, help, and education.

    Article 30: At the end of an individual’s period of community correction, the judicial affairs center shall arrange to announce the lifting of community correction. The announcement shall be led by an employee of the judicial affairs center and carried out publicly and in accordance with statutory procedures.

    The judicial affairs center shall, based on the different circumstances of each person under community correction, notify the relevant departments, village (neighborhood) committee, local public representatives, the individual’s work unit, members of his or her family or guardian or guarantor to attend the announcement proceedings.

    The announcement proceedings shall include: a reading of the evaluation of the person under community correction; an announcement that the community correction period has concluded and community correction is being lifted in accordance with the law; for those sentenced to public surveillance, an announcement that the sentence has concluded and public surveillance is being lifted; for those sentenced to suspended sentences, an announcement that the period of suspension and probation is complete and the original sentence will no longer be enforced; for those who were released on parole, an announcement that the period of probation has concluded and the original sentence has been fully served.

    The county-level judicial administration organ shall issue a certificate of completion of community correction to the person under community correction and notify the deciding organ in writing and send a copy to the county-level people’s procuratorate and public security organ.

    When the sentence has concluded for a person under community correction serving a temporary non-custodial sentence, the prison or detention center shall carry out sentence-completion and release procedures in accordance with the law.

    Article 31: Community correction shall terminate when a person under community correction dies, is remanded for custodial enforcement, or is sentenced to a custodial penalty.

    When a person under community correction dies during the period of community correction, the county-level judicial administration organ shall promptly give written notice to the unit that approved or ordered [the community correction] and notify the county-level people’s procuratorate.

    Article 32: For offenders who have been sentenced to deprivation of political rights as a stand-alone punishment, the judicial administration organ shall assist the public security organ in monitoring compliance with Article 54 of the Criminal Law and keeping abreast of relevant information promptly. Offenders who have been deprived of their political rights may voluntarily participate in psychological counseling, vocational training, and employment guidance activities organized by the judicial administration organ.

    Article 33: When carrying out community correction for juveniles, the policy of education, reform, and rehabilitation shall be followed and correction enforced according to the following provisions:

    1. Community correction for juveniles shall be conducted separately from that for adults;
    2. To protect the identities of juveniles under community correction, decisions to impose correction shall not be announced publicly and their correction files shall be kept confidential;
    3. Correction teams for juveniles under community correction shall include members who are familiar with the special characteristics of adolescent development;
    4. Measures taken for monitoring and controlling juveniles shall be beneficial to their physical and mental health and take his or her age, psychological characteristics, and needs of physical and mental development into consideration;
    5. Provide ideological, legal, and moral education and psychological counseling in a manner that is easy for juveniles to accept;
    6. Coordinate with the relevant departments to provide juveniles under community correction with education and employment assistance;
    7. Urge the guardians of juveniles under community correction to carry out their guardianship responsibilities and assume their custodial and disciplinary duties;
    8. Employ other necessary measures that will help juveniles under community correction to mend their ways and re-enter normal social life.

    The above provisions apply to individuals under community correction who were under 18 years old at the time of their criminal offense and were sentenced to penalties of five years’ imprisonment or less.

    Article 34: When the period of community correction is finished, the judicial affairs center shall notify the person under community correction of the relevant regulations concerning placement, help, and education, liaise with the units responsible for placement, help, and education and transfer the relevant files.

    Article 35: Judicial administration organs shall set up systems for regular meetings, circular notices, professional training, information reporting, statistics, records management, as well as systems for evaluating law-enforcement, open law-enforcement, and oversight and investigation in order to ensure that community corrections work is carried out in a standardized manner.

    Judicial administration organs shall establish mechanisms for handling emergency situations. When individuals under community correction are found to have died unnatural deaths, engaged in criminal activity, or participated in mass incidents, [judicial administration organs] shall immediately coordinate efforts with public security organs and other relevant departments to handle the matter appropriately and promptly report all relevant details to their superior judicial administration organ and other relevant departments.

    Judicial administration organs shall, together with public security organs, people’s procuratorates, and people’s courts, establish a platform for information exchange regarding individuals under community correction in order to promote sharing of data on developments in community correction work.

    Article 36: Persons under community correction may not suffer any infringement of their personal safety, lawful property, rights to defense, appeal, complaint, and impeach, or any other rights that have not been subject to deprivation or restriction in accordance with the law. Persons under community correction shall suffer no discrimination with regard to education, employment, or enjoyment of social security benefits.

    Judicial administration personnel shall conscientiously listen to and appropriately handle problems raised by persons under community correction in order to protect their lawful rights and interests in accordance with the law.

    Article 37: When a people’s procuratorate discovers that community correction work violates the law or these measures, it may, based on different circumstances, issue verbal rectification opinion or issue a written notice to correct illegality or a procuratorial recommendation. The sending organ and the enforcement organ shall make corrections at once and give appropriate notice to the people’s procuratorate.

    Article 38: In the course of community correction work, judicial administration personnel who engage in behavior that violates the law such as dereliction of duty, favoritism, or abuse of office shall be given the appropriate punishment in accordance with the law; when the behavior constitutes a criminal offense, criminal responsibility shall be pursued.

    Article 39: People’s courts, people’s procuratorates, public security organs, and judicial administration organs at all levels shall earnestly strengthen their organizational leadership over community correction work, strengthen work mechanisms, clarify work structures, provide personnel, ensure funding, and ensure that community correction work is able to be undertaken smoothly

    Article 40: These measures take effect from March 1, 2012. In case of any conflicts between these measures and provisions concerning community corrections previously issued by the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, or Ministry of Justice, these measures shall take precedence.

  • Petitioner’s Account of RTL Reforms

    Jiang Jiawen rents a place in the Beijing suburbs, far from the bustling city center. He remains there as he seeks his own vision of justice. (Photo credit: Zhou Xifeng)

    As part of a major new set of proposals intended to set the agenda for reform under new Chinese leader Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee recently announced its endorsement of plans to eliminate the controversial system of administrative detention known as reeducation through labor (RTL). The announcement has been expected for many months, since party and government leaders first suggested that RTL would be abolished or reformed late last year in the wake of a series of controversial cases involving the practice.

    However, it remains to be seen what will be put in place of an RTL system that, despite its many serious flaws, authorities used as a tool for maintaining the all-important tenets of social order and stability. In November 2012, a reporter from Changsha’s Xiaoxiang Morning News attempted, with limited success, to get details about pilot projects in four Chinese cities which were studying possible reform measures. One year later, the details of RTL reform remain hazy. Despite clear signs the existing system is to be eliminated, there exists little information about what sort of institutions and legislation might be introduced to fill the perceived “gap” between the system of public-order penalties and criminal punishment.

    Earlier this week, the same reporter from Xiaoxiang Morning News greeted the news of RTL’s impending demise by featuring the story of a man who has spent much of the past eight years locked up in an RTL facility. Jiang Jiawen, was sent to RTL five separate times in connection with his petitioning activity in Beijing—something that local authorities in his hometown of Dandong, Liaoning, take very seriously given the negative impact petitioning has on official evaluations of their performance in maintaining social stability.

    The account of Jiang’s experience inside RTL is not as detailed as that published earlier this year about conditions inside Liaoning’s RTL facility for women at Masanjia. Yet his experience confirms the way that, in anticipation of ending RTL, law-enforcement authorities throughout the country had quietly stopped sending people into the camps and began releasing inmates ahead of schedule this past year. By the time he was released in September, Jiang was one of six inmates still remaining in a facility that had once held several hundred.

    Jiang says that the facility he was at in Dandong will be devoted to compulsory drug treatment in the future, a shift that has already been undertaken in many RTL facilities throughout the country. But he also notes that guards from his facility were being trained in preparation for their transfer to a system providing “legal education classes,” which hints at one possible method that local authorities may use to detain some of the individuals who would have been sent to RTL in the past.

    These “legal education classes” currently have an ambiguous status under Chinese law and, like RTL, have been criticized for arbitrarily depriving individuals of their freedom without due process. Recently, a group of Chinese human rights lawyers called on officials to, among other things, eliminate “detention places used for the illegal deprivation of liberty that have all along been operated outside the legal system.”

    This serves as a reminder that, as the Xiaoxiang Morning News put it, “This is not the end, but rather a new beginning.” While China’s new commitment to eliminate RTL is welcome step in the right direction, it is important to remain aware of and to closely examine all forms of unlawful and arbitrary detention in China, as these measures could very well become the new tools with which authorities impose stability in violation of individual rights.

    *
    Sent to RTL Five Times, Six Times in the RTL Facility: RTL Inmate Recounts His Past

    Zhou Xifeng
    Xiaoxiang Morning News, November 19, 2013

    Editor’s note: On November 12, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee passed a “Resolution of the CCP Central Committee Concerning Some Major Issues in Comprehensively Deepening Reform,” comprising 60 items in 16 areas. On November 15, the full text of the decision was published. The decision put forward [a plan to] abolish the reeducation through labor (RTL) system, perfect the laws for the punishment and correction of unlawful and criminal acts, and strengthen the community correction system.

    Although RTL played a positive role historically, in recent years it has been widely criticized for a series of problems in its implementation.

    Amid many years of calls from legal experts and members of the public, this institution of more than half a century is finally to be abolished. But this is not the end, rather a new beginning.

    In fact, prior to the decision to abolish RTL, RTL facilities everywhere had already been undergoing quiet changes. How exactly have RTL facilities changed or transformed? Where will the targets of RTL and the RTL guards go? Once RTL has been abolished, how will the community corrections system develop? It has been one year since this paper published a major series of reports entitled “RTL: Retention or Reform” on November 21–22, 2012. Xiaoxiang Morning News reporters have been carrying out new interviews and analysis in an attempt to think about the work that will be needed in the “post-RTL era.”

    Of the past eight years, Jiang Jiawen spent nearly five in an RTL facility.

    If it had not been for the abolition of RTL, Jiang’s time in the RTL facility would have been set to end on November 7, 2013. In fact, he was “released” early on September 18.

    At the National Conference on Politico-Legal Work held on January 7 of this year, news emerged that “the RTL system would cease [operations] this year.” Nevertheless, Jiang Jiawen was still sent to RTL in March.

    As a petitioner, Jiang has been detained in an RTL facility six times over the past eight years and sentenced to RTL five times. This rare experience has led him to be known among petitioners as the “RTL champion.”

    Jiang’s story confirms a kind of dissimilation of the RTL system: as an instrument of stability maintenance, it has continually been abused.

    And, now, in its specific operational form, the RTL system is about to die a natural death.

    Sent to RTL Five Times, Six Times in the RTL Facility

    On March 15, 2013, police took Jiang Jiawen from Shijingshan District, Beijing, back to his hometown of Dandong. The next day, he was sent to the Dandong RTL facility.

    The RTL decision found the “facts of unlawful [behavior]” as follows: Between October 22 and 27, 2012, JJW incited petitioners diverted to the Dandong Processing Center for Letters and Visits to go to Beijing to petition and create disturbances, disrupting the normal work order. It was decided to send him to RTL for one year, from November 8, 2012, to November 7, 2013.

    How, then, was it that Jiang Jiawen came to be in Beijing during his RTL sentence? “I was sent to the RTL center on November 8, 2012,” he recalled, explaining how he was sentenced five times to RTL but sent to RTL six times. “Then, 20 days later, I was released for carrying out a hunger strike in protest. There was never any paperwork when I was sent in and out of RTL, so they actually combined these two times to make a year of RTL.”

    On January 7 of this year, Jiang was in a small room in the Beijing suburbs when he heard news from the National Politico-Legal Work Conference that “the RTL system would cease [operations] this year.”

    He was therefore indignant when he was again sent to the RTL facility. “RTL has been abolished,” he thought, “so why am I being sent to RTL?” Moreover, his health was not good, as he suffered from high blood pressure and heart disease.

    On March 17, Jiang learned that State Council Premier Li Keqiang, while answering reporters’ questions at a press conference during the meeting of the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC). stated that the relevant departments were intensively studying how to enact a reform plan for RTL and that plans hopefully would be unveiled by year-end.

    This led Jiangto realize that RTL was about to become history. As he counted the days, although he was uncertain when he would be released, one thing was for certain: this would be the last time he would be sent to RTL.

    Fight Becomes a Turning Point in Life

    Jiang Jiawen is 58 years old this year and is a resident of Yuanbao District, Dandong, Liaoning. One verbal argument was the turning point in his life.

    According to Jiang’s account, at 9:30 a.m. on November 3, 2001, a man was repairing a farming tricycle under the streetlight ten meters in front of his house. He went over to have a look, and several men from the car repair shop inexplicably began to hurl insults at him. The two sides began to argue verbally, and this led to a fight. Someone grabbed a brick from Jiang’s hand and struck him with it in the face, breaking his cheekbone and leaving it dented and dislocated, fracturing his maxillary sinus and membrane, and resulting in internal bleeding in his left eye and abrasions on the left side of his face.

    Jiang spent 55 days in the Dandong Public Security Hospital. His injuries resulted in paralysis on the left side of his face, frequent headaches, and difficulty swallowing.

    Unsatisfied with the public security organ’s handling of the case, Jiang began to petition. Later on, police arrested two of the assailants, both surnamed Yu. In August 2005, a court sentenced each of the two men to prison terms for intentional assault.

    But Jiang maintains that the true attacker escaped justice. He has always alleged that the owner of the repair shop, Zhang X, was the one who attacked him with the brick. “It’s as if ‘X’ hit me with the brick, but it was ‘Y’ and ‘Z’ who were arrested and convicted.”

    In August 2005, public security organs across the country launched a major campaign to centralize the process for receiving petitions and addressing issues raised by petitioners. Jiang Jiawen went to the Liaoning Public Security Department, but it still left him dissatisfied: “The public security organ upheld the original review opinion because: one, there was insufficient evidence to pursue criminal responsibility against Zhang and two, the Jiudao Police Station did not err in enforcing the law, and this case should be considered closed.”

    Jiang was unable to provide this reporter with the case files from the assault case, and the truth [of his account] is difficult to confirm. But what is certain is that it was his dissatisfaction with the results that led him to begin petitioning in Beijing and caused his fate to become entwined with RTL.

    At that time, RTL had already begun to be criticized from all sides. In March of that year, at the Third Session of the 10th NPC, a Law on Correction for Illegal Acts, which intended to replace RTL, was included in the legislative plan of the NPC Standing Committee.

    Jiang’s final RTL decision referred to all five of his sentences: one year of RTL each in 2005, 2007, 2008, 2011, and 2012.

    Cycle of “Petitioning, Stability Maintenance, RTL”

    Originating in the 1950s, RTL was originally designed as a measure for compulsory education and reform, as well as a way of placing [individuals] into employment. After several decades of evolution, the scope of RTL expanded dramatically. Peking University law professor Jiang Ming’an calls it “+X,” explaining, “RTL became a big basket, into which anything could be placed.”

    “In fact, RTL has been dissimilated into a tool of stability preservation,” says lawyer Chi Susheng, a former NPC delegate. Criticizing RTL, she notes that some officials treat RTL like a “magic weapon” against petitioners and use it with a high degree of frequency and effectiveness to cover up social conflict and block the voices of common people. When they encounter long-term petitioners, they get the RTL committees located inside the Public Security Bureau to affix their chop and immediately send them to the RTL facility.

    Shortly after being released from RTL in March 2008, Jiang Jiawen again went to Beijing. During that year’s “two meetings,” NPC delegate and Shaanxi People’s Congress Standing Committee member Ma Kening formally made a recommendation calling for the abolition of RTL. Ma Kening held that the State Council’s administrative regulations concerning RTL ought to be abolished for violating provisions of the constitution and the Legislation Law, as well as the Administrative Penalties Law and the Public Order Management Penalty Law.

    However, Jiang faced another term of RTL. On the eve of the 2008 Olympics, when police took him to the hall of a Beijing hotel, he used a razor blade to slit his wrists. After being taken into custody back to Dandong, he was found to have disrupted the normal order of the hotel and sentenced to RTL.

    “From that point on, I basically stopped petitioning. I have no home and am just staying in Beijing.” Jiang says that each RTL has been because of petitioning; he has become a stability-maintenance headache for the local government.

    RTL, Beijing, RTL—over these years, it’s as if Jiang were shuttling back and forth between these two stations. He is almost fixated on continuing to live in Beijing and seeking what he considers to be justice.

    His rented room is in the Beijing suburbs, far from the bustling city center. It’s nearly a one-hour bus ride past the terminus of one of the city’s metro lines. Not even 10 square meters, he pays a monthly rent of 200 yuan for the room. Adding other costs, his monthly expenses total nearly 1500 yuan. For a laid-off worker such as Jiang, this is a serious economic burden.

    However, this is an unstable life. He has moved more than a dozen times. “Each time, the landlord has come under pressure from the police,” he says. “They raise the rent so we can no longer pay and have no choice but to move elsewhere, further and further from the city center.”

    After several stints in RTL, Jiang says that he no longer goes to the relevant departments seeking justice like he used to four years ago. He has just grown accustomed to staying in Beijing. After divorcing in 2003, he lives alone and no longer has a home. Support from his family is limited. When his son married at 32, he was in RTL and was unable to attend the banquet.

    Changes in the RTL Facility: Labor Time Shrinks

    As a veteran petitioner, Jiang has become accustomed to paying attention to high-level trends and policy directions. He was able to watch television and read newspapers at the RTL facility. His focus on external events, particularly policy trends, made him especially sensitive to the smallest changes in the RTL facility.

    Having been sent to the RTL facility so many times, he came to know nearly everyone who worked there. “Some really sympathized with me,” he said, “but I warned them not to lose their jobs by having too much contact with me.” On the outside, Jiang never telephoned any of the guards inside the RTL facility. “I didn’t want to get them involved.”

    At the RTL facility, labor was the primary means of “reform.” Jiang still remembers the two slogans posted on the wall of the RTL facility: “Fertile Soil for Ideological Reform and Correction” and “Harbor for Rehabilitation and Education.” In fact, when he was first sent to RTL in 2005, he was sent out to dig ditches and lay foundations. By 2008, he began to do manual labor indoors: “making watches, [plastic] flowers and the like—whatever work was at hand.”

    This year, after it was announced that RTL would cease operations within the year, the RTL facility he was at underwent a series of changes. One noticeable change was that the time spent on production shrank. “When there was no work, they had us study—legal knowledge, moral education, and so on,” he recalled. “Of course, labor still came first.”

    “I heard they set up a legal education class and even put up a new building,” he said. “Young officers at the RTL facility were being trained for transfer to the legal education class.” Jiang thinks that the methods of control and education in the RTL facility are much better than they were before. This past year, no one was sent to solitary confinement or beaten for failing to complete a work assignment.

    When he was released early, Jiang learned that the RTL faciliy was to become a drug treatment center. “In the past, those sent for RTL and those sent for compulsory drug treatment were all mixed together; later, the two were separated.”

    In the Third Plenum decision, abolishing RTL was an important aspect of the clearly proposed plan to improve the system of human rights and legal protections. In the view of experts, elimination of an old system that restricted individual liberty without legal process or judicial decision is in itself a huge contribution to the protection of human rights.

    Jiang has previously written essays criticizing RTL and posted them online. “Evil law” and “human rights” are words that appear frequently in these pieces, and the influence [of these articles] was significant.

    Some of the officers in the RTL facility were angry when they saw [the essays] and rebuked him, saying: “How can you write things like that?” But other officers expressed their agreement with his articles.

    2013: Last Days inside RTL

    “There’s an unwritten rule at the RTL facility,” says Jiang. “New arrivals are first sent to the strict-control unit and held separately there under strict control for three months before being transferred to other brigades.” Jiang explained that he was an exception: since he did not obey the guards and was a “frequent visitor” at the RTL facility, he stayed in the strict-control unit the entire time.

    This year, he noticed something strange. After his arrival, nobody new was being added to the strict-control unit. “This meant that the RTL committee wasn’t deciding any new RTL cases,” he concluded. This is consistent with reports emerging from locations across the country of public security organs stating that this year they would no longer approve any new RTL cases, signalling that RTL was no longer being used.

    The RTL facility where Jiang Jiawen was held is medium-sized. Over the past few years, he estimates that it housed at most several hundred men. In March of this year, there were approximately 90 or so at the RTL facility. At the end of June, the RTL facility began releasing people, many before their scheduled time. In early June, 16 men were transferred from an RTL facility in Dalian, including six who were sent to the strict-control unit. Less than a month later, those six had been released early. Over the next three months, others were gradually released from RTL.

    On September 18, the day before the Mid-Autumn Festival, the Dandong RTL facility gave Jiang and the other men there each a mooncake. The guards bought fruit, chicken, fish, and beverages. There were only six men remaining at the RTL facility: “The four remaining in the Fourth Brigade were combined with the strict-control unit. At that time, I was the only one left in strict control, and there was another guy in the Second Brigade.”

    But the inmates refused to accept the treats provided by the RTL facility and threw the mooncakes on the floor. Jiang said that he refused to eat as a protest against RTL.

    It all happened very suddenly, but it was all within reason. At 2 p.m. on the 18th, the head of the brigade told Jiang and the other inmates to gather their belongings and go to the management office to complete paperwork because they were all being released. Jiang did not sign the paperwork; in his mind, he never accepted that he should have been sent to RTL in the first place.

    Jiang did not take any items, such as quilts or sweaters. Carrying only a few items of seasonal clothing, he left the RTL facility. Behind him was an iron gate, four meters high.

  • RTL Detainees Pressed to Work, Paying to Leave, Officers Say

    Men assemble Ethernet cables at the Shijiazhuang RTL Center, May 23, 2012. Photo credit: He You/CFP

    Individual miscarriages of justice have helped to turn Chinese public opinion against the decades-old form of administrative detention known as reeducation through labor (RTL or laojiao). Most scrutiny has been focused on the arbitrary manner in which police determine sentencing. Considerably less attention has been paid to the myriad problems inside RTL facilities.

    The veil was briefly lifted earlier this year when a Chinese magazine published a lengthy article exposing the dehumanizing conditions in a women’s RTL center in Masanjia, Liaoning Province. Domestic censors quickly attempted to minimize the impact of the article that revealed torture, frequent hunger strikes, and exploitative labor practices.

    Coercive labor got fuller exposure in May in an article published by Southern Weekly (translated below). Providing accounts from several former correctional officers, the article looks at the way in which “unwritten rules” conditioned the labor experience at one RTL facility in Sichuan Province and ultimately demonstrates how economic incentives are behind a number of forms of corruption and mistreatment endemic within the RTL system. Stamping out low-level corruption is one of many reasons for central authorities to thoroughly reform RTL, but the abundance of licit and illicit economic opportunities for local authorities also helps explain why there has been longstanding resistance to reform.

    *
    Confessions of Disgraced RTL Officers

    RTL Centers: Labor First?
    Chai Huiqun
    Southern Weekly, May 2, 2013

    [Indented, italic text is in the voice of the interviewed officers.—Trans.]

    Editor’s note: The criminal prosecution of five police officers for embezzling “state-owned assets”—actually, the revenues produced by people laboring in RTL—revealed problems such as revenue targets, overtime labor, and bribery at one RTL facility. Under the influence of interests, the function of “education and reform first, labor and production second” was turned on its head. Southern Weekly found three of the officers and conducted separate interviews with them, cross-checking their accounts against each other and verifying those accounts against the relevant legal documents.

    “‘Laojiao’ puts labor first and education second. This idea clearly violates RTL policies but everyone thinks this way. [They] probably felt that the name ‘laojiao’ wasn’t so good so they changed it to ‘apprenticeship.’ But this is only a change in name, like calling a prostitute a ‘sex worker’ instead of a ‘whore.’”

    On April 26, 2013, the final verdict was handed down in a case involving a “den” of corruption inside an RTL facility in Luzhou, Sichuan. Five RTL officers from the Luzhou RTL Center were held criminally responsible for embezzling state assets, corruption, and taking bribes. Earlier, the appeal of another RTL officer given a suspended sentence for “taking bribes” was rejected by a court of second instance.

    All six RTL officers appealed. Three officers involved confirmed the facts of the case to Southern Weekly and said that, to a certain degree, the problems involved were universal.

    RTL Detainee Death by Drinking “Alcohol”

    The incident came about because of the death of an RTL detainee. The person was named Hu Minghong; he died after drinking industrial alcohol. Perhaps you might find it odd: how does a person in RTL come upon industrial alcohol? There are clear regulations strictly forbidding alcohol from being brought into detention facilities. The underlying reason [that alcohol got into the facility] is actually economic interest—the RTL facility’s own economic interest.

    At the time, the facility was processing liquor boxes for a company. At first, they used sparkling wine as a cleaning agent, but later they felt that was too expensive. In order to reduce costs, they switched to industrial alcohol. This accident occurred as a consequence.

    After the six officers got in trouble, an official from the provincial justice department was overheard at a meeting lamenting that Luzhou “was not unified.” There was profound meaning behind this. Although similar incidents are very sensitive, generally speaking, as long as people “are unified” internally and do not make a big fuss, it will not lead to anything. Take our Luzhou RTL Center for example, as early as 2003 a detainee died while being “hired out,” and in 2005 a man named Xia Tian unsuccessfully tried to commit suicide by jumping off a building. Neither case led to anything. Last year, a person detained at the [Luzhou] Public Security Bureau’s drug treatment center died under unnatural circumstances. Three officers were indicted for dereliction of duty, which seems quite serious, but not a single officer received criminal punishment.

    Originally, what happened to Hu Minghong was also kept under wraps. After a “humanitarian compensation” payment of over 20,000 yuan, his family did not complain. Because “effective measures” were taken and there were no public consequences, people in charge of the Luzhou RTL Center even applied for a commendation. After nearly a year, it was said that there was a dispute between higher-ups and facility officials over personnel appointments, which led to the disclosure of this incident. Subsequently, out came [the news] of collective corruption and bribe-taking by officers.

    The Luzhou RTL Center was established in 1998, one of two RTL facilities in Sichuan to be run by prefectural-level cities. In 2009, it added the sign “Luzhou Compulsory Drug Treatment Center.” There are more than 50 correctional officers at the facility. Before the incident, there were around 200 people in RTL, the vast majority of whom were there for compulsory drug treatment.

    The procuratorate found that at the beginning of 2011 the Luzhou Compulsory Drug Treatment Center signed a liquor-box production contract with Luzhou Texing Printing Company Ltd whereby the people in drug treatment would process liquor boxes. The enterprise used industrial alcohol to replace the cleaning agent. Hu Minghong took some industrial alcohol back to his cell, mixed it with water, and drank it, leading to his death by poisoning. Three others in drug treatment were treated in the hospital for poisoning.

    One year after the incident, Chen Jinrui, the former head of the Luzhou RTL Center’s Second Brigade, was indicted for dereliction of duty. He told Southern Weekly that, according to regulations, alcohol, as a flammable and explosive material, cannot be brought into detention facilities. But, for the sake of production, “we did this for several years.”

    After the death of Hu Minghong, there was no autopsy. The local hospital issued a diagnosis report listing five causes of death, none of which included alcohol poisoning. The family did not “make a fuss.”

    In the trial of first instance, the prosecution’s charges against Chen Jinrui were not accepted by the court because Hu Minghong’s cause of death was never ascertained. Chen Jinrui was not the officer on duty at the time of the incident. He believes that even if Hu Minghong really did die as a result of alcohol poisoning, he should only be held responsible as the person in charge and not be indicted as the only officer involved in the case. In his view, things turned out as they did because of “competing relationships.”

    Wages Defined as “State Assets”

    I’m confident that concealing funds is a common phenomenon among low-level officers inside the RTL system. The only differences are in form and degree. You could call it “corruption,” you could also call it a “bonus,” because no one knows for sure how to classify this money. Put simply, the funds are actually earned by the RTL detainees, but they’re treated as “finances.” As far as whom the “finances” belong to—the finance bureau, the RTL facility, the production brigade, or a particular official—this is a gray area and it is uncertain. This uncertainty then becomes a hole that can be exploited.

    At the Luzhou RTL Center, according to regulations, “labor payments” made by enterprises must be handed over by the basic-level production brigades to the center, the center must hand it over to the finance bureau; then the finance bureau returns a portion to the center, and the center returns a portion to the production brigades. From the perspective of the production brigades, they always hope to receive a little bit more because they’re the ones with the most worries and who take on the risk. So, when they complete their production tasks, they reserve a portion [of the revenues]. Besides using some for activity fees of the production brigade, the rest is distributed to officers in the form of a bonus in order to reward them for working actively. This is an unwritten rule.

    Originally, the enterprise signs a production agreement with the RTL center, but it’s the brigade that manages things concretely and the labor payments must pass through the brigade on the way to the RTL center. The bosses of the enterprises are all smart guys who understand that the “county official is not as good as the person really in charge.” If I get you, an official at an RTL center, on my side in order to sign a production agreement, this is only the first step. You are not the one in charge of production, effectiveness, and quality. So, I have to win over the people below who are truly overseeing the production line and arranging production in order for [them] to get things done for me. By “get things done,” I mean pressing the RTL detainees to work and make money. To [the enterprises] and from the perspective of production, the brigade head is more important than the head of the RTL center, so they acquiesce in and even take the initiative to help the brigade conceal revenue. This is definitely not an isolated phenomenon.

    In the corruption of the two production brigades in this instance, basically every officer got a cut. In the Second Brigade, each person got more than 10,000 [yuan], and in the Compulsory Drug Treatment Center it was over 20,000. It’s unclear how much each person got specifically. This is because there are no account books, the officers did not sign a note of receipt when they took their money, the two sides didn’t see each other, and the payments were made very quietly. The brigade leaders purposefully manufactured these circumstances, seemingly out of [concerns about] “security,” but it was actually also to make it possible for the higher-ups to be even more corrupt. This makes it even easier for them to line their own pockets.

    You think that during this entire process the superiors at these centers don’t know what’s going on? I don’t believe it. As far as the brigade is concerned, the center never allocated any funds for office expenses or any other expenses. If an RTL detainee gets sick, the brigade has to find the money for him to see a doctor. Now that the problem’s come out, they call it “reserving” and “concealing.” But don’t forget this fact: the brigade must be prepared to invite higher-ups to a meal, to a banquet, to [watch detainees] doing drills. This is a huge expense, even the primary expense. Last time, the audit bureau asked us, “Do you know how much your brigade head spent inviting center higher-ups to a meal?” I said the brigade head told us afterwards it was 5,000 yuan. The audit bureau said: “5,000 yuan? It was more than 20,000 yuan! There were two tables, 10,000 yuan per table.” That’s three months of my salary.

    I’m someone at the brigade level with no other source of funding. You’re an RTL center official always having these meals. How much per meal? How much per bottle of liquor? How many bottles? Roughly how much are we spending? Add it up and you’ll understand. Did [I] come by this money legally? Can a person with ordinary logical thinking not be clear about this? I can’t believe that officials are not as smart as me—they’re definitely smarter. You just have to analyze it a bit and you’ll discover that the source of the money is problematic. Police officers wouldn’t use their wages to invite officials out to eat, and we don’t have any office funds. As an official, it should be easy for you to figure it out. Once you’ve figured it out, you tacitly acquiesce or at least you don’t raise any objections.

    The procuratorate found that the Luzhou RTL Center signed a contract with Luzhou Meishun Packaging Materials Ltd (hereafter “Meishun”) in February 2011 to produce liquor boxes. The Luzhou RTL Center assigned the production tasks to two “production brigades”—the drug treatment center and the Second Brigade. The heads of the two production brigades had talks with Meishun Deputy Manager Gong Junming and decided to conceal a portion of the product from the RTL facility each month and hand it over to Meishun under a false name in exchange for cash payments. In total, they held back and embezzled more than 700,000 yuan. Aside from a portion that was used for the office expenses of the two brigades, the rest was privately divided up between the 18 RTL officers of the two brigades. Each of the officers from the Second Brigade took in over 10,000 yuan, and the officers from the drug treatment center each got more than 30,000 yuan. Full- and deputy brigade leaders at the drug treatment center each got an additional 40,000 yuan on top of the over 30,000 yuan. Other than the five who were prosecuted and convicted for having primary responsibility, none of the other officers who divided the money were sanctioned in any way and merely had to refund some of the money.

    In the course of the trial, there was a major argument between the prosecution and defense over how to characterize these embezzled “labor payments.” The defense attorneys maintained that the so-called “labor payments” were income from operations involving production by persons in compulsory drug treatment and arranged in violation of relevant RTL regulations and in the absence of a business license by the Luzhou RTL Center and others. It therefore constituted illegal proceeds, and the prosecution’s charge of “corruption” was not tenable.

    The court of first instance agreed with the defense and convicted the five RTL corrections officers of embezzling state assets, which carries a lighter sentence. The defendants and their attorneys rejected the idea of treating “illegal proceeds” as “state assets” and appealed. The prosecution stuck to its charge of corruption and also appealed.

    The court of second instance chose to split the difference by upholding the first-instance verdict against the three RTL officers but added on three years’ imprisonment for corruption to the sentences given to the two drug treatment center officials who split the more than 40,000 yuan in additional payments.

    According to revelations from several RTL officers connected to the case, the office funds held back by the brigades were primarily used to invite officials from the facility and other functional offices to meals and recreation. An official from the RTL center also used the funds to pay his party dues.

    “Production Definitely Comes First”

    Whether it’s money given to compensate the relatives of Hu Minghong or money gotten through corruption and embezzling by officers, at the end of the day this is money that is being made by RTL detainees. There’s a deep-seated mentality in the RTL system: “Laojiao” puts labor first and education second. This idea clearly violates RTL policies but everyone thinks this way. Later, those up above probably felt that the name “laojiao” wasn’t so good, so they changed it to “apprenticeship.” But the reality hasn’t changed. This is only a change in name, like calling a prostitute a “sex worker” instead of a “whore.” The reality is that we force RTL detainees to work and make money [for us]; that’s what every RTL center does.

    Whether it’s the RTL centers or the officers, they all lack money. Even if they didn’t lack money, there’s so much idle labor in the RTL centers, who wouldn’t want to use it to make some money? The only questions are how much to make and how to make it. There have never been clear regulations, or there are regulations but they have never been seriously implemented. For example, the Ministry of Justice long ago prohibited RTL facilities from setting revenue targets and required them to spend half of their time on education and half on labor. But none of the RTL facilities I know of can do that. How can you not have revenue targets? Labor by RTL detainees is passive labor—who would do it voluntarily? And once you have revenue targets, it’s impossible [to spend] “half the day on labor and half the day on education.”

    For the RTL centers, production definitely comes first. Every unit puts its pursuit of economic interests first. Under this sort of policy, the lawful rights and interests of RTL detainees inevitably cannot be protected.

    Once there are production targets, the management of the RTL centers becomes intimately entwined with production. The RTL facility gives a target to the brigade. If they can’t meet it, the officers get their allowances docked; if they surpass it, they get a bonus. The brigade gives a target to the RTL detainees. If they can’t meet it they get docked points, and docked points means “term extensions.”

    Each time there’s a production task, the center will give the basic-level brigades production targets. For example, according to a 2011 facility document, in processing liquor boxes for a Luzhou liquor company, the minimum production target was set at 350, which means that, calculating per person, each month each person must complete 350 yuan of production. This figure doesn’t look very high, but, on the one hand, the factory will set the unit price very low and, on the other hand, detainees who serve as group- or team leaders or who run the warehouse don’t participate in production or generate value. But that 350-yuan target is calculated per person, so it must be equalized through [the work of] others, raising their targets to compensate. If the RTL detainees in the facility want to make this target, on average they must work seven or eight hours per day. In all of Sichuan, a production target of 350 is probably rather low. In RTL facilities in more developed areas, the target might be 800 to 1,000.

    Of the surplus exceeding the 350-yuan production target, the facility returns 10 percent to us in the basic-level brigades to serve as the production withholding bonus. Of that, a portion is to be distributed among the RTL detainees to allow them to improve their food. This is only symbolic—each person gets an average of eight to 10 yuan, and it’s not in cash. For the amount exceeding 500 yuan, the facility returns 20 percent. We later calculated that according to the facility’s return policies, each officer got 200 yuan each month. We felt that was too little, so the brigade began concealing part of the revenues so that everyone could get a bigger cut.

    A target of 350 yuan is only the lowest requirement. Whether it’s the RTL centers or the brigades, we all encouraged the RTL detainees to produce more, because producing more was in the interest of the center, the brigades, and the officers. Of course it was even more in the company’s interest. Why did these companies cooperate with the RTL facilities? In order to reduce their labor costs. For example, on this project if the company wanted to hire workers to produce the liquor boxes, they would have to pay wages of at least 1,500 yuan—plus, they’d be responsible for social security and worker’s compensation insurance: that’s 2000 yuan at least. But the company could hire four RTL detainees for that 2,000 yuan. The value created by an RTL detainee and an ordinary worker is the same. That means that the actual cost is only one quarter as much. You can imagine how huge this makes the profits. So, it’s the system that makes things this way.

    The problems would get exposed sooner or later. The only way for the RTL facility to pursue even greater profits is to extend the detainees’ working hours. On this point, the detainees understand things very clearly. They’ve analyzed how many hours they work in a day and can calculate how much output value they create. They might learn a little about the unit price of the product from people at the factory and then figure out how much money [the company] is making and compare that to how much they are actually making. For instance, this year we brought in 100,000 yuan in revenue. According to the 10 percent ratio, that’s 10,000 yuan. The officers take a cut, probably leaving 5,000. If there’s some underreporting, some of that cut won’t get returned, probably meaning a return of only 2,500. There’s a gap there, and they can figure out the problem. Even more important, since you’ve exaggerated the detainees’ labor strength, they might start to feel resentment, [thinking that if you work us] too hard we’ll join together and report the problem which may lead to exposure.

    Since its birth, the RTL system, which is based on the idea of “education, reform, and rescue,” has added another important function—getting detainees to make money for RTL facilities. There are many ways to make money—some set up their own enterprises, others work for [existing] enterprises doing processing. The Luzhou RTL Center falls under the latter category.

    The two production brigades involved in the corruption case at the Luzhou RTL Center were considered the facility’s “backbone” whose “contributions” to the facility reached their peak in 2011. Together, they brought in a total of 1 million yuan in revenue for the facility, each exceeding their targets and more than doubling their performance in the previous year.

    Driven by interest, the RTL detainees were compelled to work overtime. One former detainee surnamed Qiu who was at the Luzhou RTL Center’s Compulsory Drug Treatment Center from 2010 to 2011 told Southern Weekly that he had to process 3,000 to 4,000 [sic] liquor boxes per day, with average work hours of more than nine hours and up to 12 hours per day at the most. (The Ministry of Justice requires that work hours not exceed six hours per day.) If they didn’t complete their tasks, they would be beaten. As for living conditions, he summed it up with [an idiom referring to food that means]: winter melon, tomatoes, pumpkin, and cabbage. Besides this, medication and items for daily use were much more expensive inside the RTL Center. “Outside, Liu Wei Di Huang Pills are eight yuan a bottle. Inside, they’re 20 yuan a bottle.” According to Qiu, detainees in the compulsory drug treatment center once carried out a collective hunger strike to protest the labor and living conditions, but they were ultimately unsuccessful.

    Among the six RTL officers implicated in the case, the one considered to have been most “wronged” is Chen Jinrui, who was given a suspended sentence. As the brigade leader, his cut of the revenues was no more than the other ordinary corrections officers, but because he was in charge of the brigade, he was sentenced.

    Unwritten Rules for Release

    Since there are production targets and these targets are directly linked to officers’ incomes, this of course leads to RTL detainees working overtime. Working overtime of course causes the detainees to react and this reaction leads to the employment of high-pressure policies such as beatings and [other] corporal punishment. This forms a vicious cycle. Thus, as soon as [one] is sent to RTL he or she begins to think about getting out early, which gives birth to another sort of corruption.

    In the RTL facility, it’s been a longstanding and relatively common unwritten rule that corrections officers help detainees to be released early in exchange for benefits. This also occurs in prisons, but it’s much harder to carry out [in prison] because [sentence reductions] require a court ruling. It’s easier in the RTL facilities, which mostly use medical parole or non-custodial forms—for example, shifting (someone in drug treatment) from compulsory drug treatment to community drug treatment.

    This time, two corrections officers at the Luzhou RTL Center were convicted of taking bribes. Actually, it would be more accurate to call it fraud than taking bribes. In fact, some RTL detainees are eligible for release according to the regulations but they don’t realize it. So, when you come to find me and ask whether I can help get you out, I’m happy to take full advantage of the opportunity. The guys who drank industrial alcohol with Hu Minghong were like that. After one person died, the people in charge of the center worried that others were going to die in the detention center [sic] and wished they could get rid of them quickly. But the detainees, themselves, were unaware of this and were willing to pay money [to get released early]. From the perspective of the officers who did this kind of thing, it became a habit to accept money from people because it was always being done. They wouldn’t let you leave without paying, even if it was time for you to leave.

    Transferring people who used drugs to community drug treatment was always done on the grounds of illness, and it required a very complex process. You needed to get diagnoses from the RTL center’s clinic and the Luzhou People’s Hospital and then get final approval from the public security bureau. This was a complicated process involving people in charge as well as public security, because public security was in charge of both sending you to RTL and releasing you. There were only two RTL officers implicated in this case for taking bribes, which shows they didn’t investigate very deeply: this only scratches the surface.

    At the time of investigating Hu Minghong’s death, the Luzhou Justice [Bureau] accidentally got a lead that these two RTL officers were taking bribes. The Matan District People’s Procuratorate in Luzhou found that between February 2011 and January 2012, Luzhou RTL Center Drug Treatment Center Director Li X and corrections officer Yuan XX conspired to use their positions and employ measures like fabricating medical records to enable four people in compulsory drug treatment to be shifted to community drug treatment, for which they received a total of 78,700 yuan.

    The den of corruption concealed for many years inside the RTL facility was thus finally exposed. Eighteen officers were suspected of collectively embezzling revenues, with six ultimately being convicted.

    After the case was uncovered, the Luzhou RTL Center was for a time unable to operate normally, and it was only recently that it again began accepting people for drug treatment. Southern Weekly learned through investigation that in the 15 years since the Luzhou RTL Center was established, three different facility directors have been removed from their posts for various reasons. (Among them, the first facility director “got into trouble” for accepting 1.68 million yuan in “drug treatment fees.”) But as far as pursuing criminal responsibility, this collective “den [of corruption] case” is a first.

  • RTL Reform Underway, but Undercover

    Photo credit: 21st Century Business Herald

    China’s leaders have made clear that reform of the current reeducation through labor (RTL) system will be rolled out some time in 2013, but there has been a noticeable lack of detail regarding what sort of institution, if any, might be put forward as a replacement. Yet RTL facilities in at least four provinces (Liaoning, Jiangsu, Jilin, and Hunan) have been quietly taking formal steps to transition into compulsory drug treatment centers, 21st Century Business Herald reports. All of those sent for non-drug-related offenses to one Liaoning RTL facility were released earlier this month—regardless of their time left to serve, according to a petitioner released from the facility and quoted in the Guangzhou newspaper.* Prominent rights lawyer and free speech advocate Pu Zhiqiang told the paper that he has not discovered any new RTL cases this year.

    The report says that by May Jiangsu had transitioned all of its RTL facilities into drug treatment centers but that an employee at one Jiangsu facility denied it would stop accepting people sentenced to RTL this year. Underscoring the low-key nature of these transformation efforts, the report notes that officials in Jiangsu warned about the need to prevent media speculation and manage public opinion in order to facilitate the process of reforming RTL.

    Writing in Xi’an’s Chinese Business View, commentator Han Fudong expresses exasperation about this low-key approach and wonders why officials would not be more willing to use the reform process—which has widespread public support—to burnish the government’s legitimacy. One reason behind the reticence, he argues, is that officials may worry that the discussion could extend beyond the particular institution of RTL and touch on other, more sensitive subjects—the overriding priority given to stability, for example, or the need for deeper political reform.

    In many ways, this fear is itself realized by Han’s essay (translated below), which concludes with a pointed critique of the current political system and its failure to be more democratic and accountable. The “real issue that needs to be faced,” he writes, is the need for a new “institutional design,” one that would inspire officials to take more risks in reform in order to satisfy public desires and expectations.


    * [Updated on June 20, 2013] The petitioner, 63-year-old Zhao Zhenjia (赵振甲), has reportedly been held incommunicado since June 9.

    *
    Why Cover Up the Abolition of RTL?

    Han Fudong, Chinese Business View
    June 19, 2013

    Following the exposure of several notorious cases, it seems that RTL has reached the point where it’s like a rat scurrying in the street, with everyone shouting to kill it. Its flaws of illegality, the disproportionate [nature of its punishment], and the ways it can be abused in the interests of stability preservation and politics have already been given a full airing by public opinion and highlighted its true nature as an over-reach of power. According to media reports, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Jilin, Hunan, and other provinces have all begun to transition RTL facilities into compulsory drug treatment centers, and Jiangsu has made clear that it completed this reform process at the end of May. In Liaoning’s Chaoyang RTL Center, individuals whose RTL commitments were not yet up have all been released early. Lawyers say that they haven’t seen any RTL cases so far this year.

    The abandonment of RTL should be a good thing, something that public opinion supports and that helps the government build legitimacy. But ever since the beginning of this year, when Yunnan took the lead to stop making RTL decisions for acts involving endangering state security, persistent and disruptive petitioning, and damaging leaders’ image, decision-makers seem to have no intention of making public declarations about reform or reveal even once that those in charge have an impulse to reform themselves. It’s been said that behind Yunnan’s abolition of RTL is a “timetable” and “roadmap” on unified arrangements from the Central Politico-Legal Commission, but to date we don’t have a complete picture of these plans. Reform of RTL in Jiangsu and other provinces has also been carried out in a low-key way. In a quarterly meeting on unified political work in Jiangsu RTL (drug rehab) [centers] held in April, it was emphasized that “we must highlight positive guidance, play close attention to online public sentiment concerning the police, guard against malicious speculation by the media, and construct a conducive environment for positive, stable promotion of reform of the RTL system.”

    Just like petitioners, media and public opinion have become targets for prevention. For certain public authorities that do not know how to control their power, the laziest method is just to conceal all of their activities. They don’t need outside praise, so they try to avoid any sort of criticism. Since they lack confidence, they fear that the antennas of the media will tap in to other areas external to reform and stimulate a series of unimaginable troubles. The deeper reason is that they have no need to be accountable to public opinion. Those in charge lack effective dialogue with the public, and orders from the center are the only things that fill them with awe.

    This is a cause of current crisis in China. Many times, certain agencies rely on a series of figures and formalities to showcase their achievements and show that “everything looks great.” But they don’t make full use of specific reform measures to enhance their own legitimacy.

    By restricting citizens of their liberty without a judicial decision, RTL violates the constitution and the Legislation Law. People are sent to RTL because of violations that don’t meet the threshold for criminal punishment (the lightest of which is three months of public supervision) but can instead by locked up for three years of forced labor. This is clearly disproportionate. Many localities rely on this illegal and disproportionate RTL system to crack down on petitioners and dissidents (like the three groups that Yunnan has stopped sending to RTL). It became common long ago to use RTL to solidify the authority and interests of individual officials in the name of maintaining stability. The anger and grievances [directed at RTL] should be cause for an immediate decision to abolish it and take the opportunity to showcase the courage to rectify officials and respect human rights. Why is it necessary to be so secretive?

    Besides the reasons stated above, the more fundamental crux of the problem may be that it is difficult to make a complete break with the history of the RTL system. There is an organic continuity between past and present, so the abandonment of RTL would naturally be seen as a kind of accountability for certain activities of RTL facilities at various levels. Perhaps we need to consider a kind of institutional design that would allow those in charge to be both full of confidence and also responsible to public opinion. This is a real issue that needs to be faced.

  • Tang Hui Case: Why the Focus Should Be on Judicial Independence

    Tang Hui weeps outside the courtroom after her lawsuit was rejected. Photo credit: Ycwb.com

    Last Friday, the Yongzhou Intermediate People’s Court in Hunan Province rejected a much-anticipated administrative lawsuit brought by “Petitioning Mother” Tang Hui against the local reeducation through labor (RTL) management committee. Tang is seeking a written apology and about 2,500 yuan (approximately US $400) in compensation and damages for the controversial RTL decision issued against her in August 2012. The decision sentenced her to one and a half years of RTL in response to the tenacious petitioning she lodged to bring perpetrators and police to justice in her daughter’s case of sexual abuse and exploitation.

    Influenced by strong public sympathy for a mother whose 11-year-old child was repeatedly raped and forced into prostitution, the provincial RTL Committee annulled the local committee’s decision shortly after Tang applied for administrative reconsideration. The annulment was issued on the grounds that, under the circumstances, admonition and education would be “more appropriate.”

    At issue during this month’s trial was whether the Hunan Province RTL Committee’s revocation of the RTL decision against Tang means that the original decision should be considered “unlawful,” and therefore eligible for compensation. Tang’s lawyers argued that the annulment clearly implied that the decision was unlawful. Although the Yongzhou RTL Committee acknowledged in court that the RTL decision had been “clearly inappropriate,” it countered that the decision to release Tang had been made out of “humanitarian concern” (namely, in light of her need to care for her traumatized daughter), without questioning the legality of the underlying RTL decision.

    If the Yongzhou RTL Committee’s action against Tang Hui was “clearly inappropriate,” then it could be argued that the RTL decision represented an abuse of official power, which would be grounds for compensation under Chinese law. But instead of undertaking its own examination of the legality of the original RTL decision—an authority it has under the revised State Compensation Law—the court ultimately accepted the argument that the decision had been “inappropriate,” but not “unlawful.” The result is a seemingly paradoxical conclusion in which both the RTL decision against Tang and the subsequent revocation of that decision were found to be proper and lawful.

    Images of an inconsolable mother circulated widely on the Internet after the intermediate court’s decision, followed by numerous expressions of public sympathy and outrage at the perceived unwillingness of local authorities to admit their mistakes. The inability of the judicial system to achieve a just outcome in Tang’s case threatens to lead to further erosion of trust in the judicial system, a dangerous loss of legitimacy, and a potential source of instability.

    But whereas the majority of commentators see Tang’s case as a consequence of the flawed RTL system, Hainan University Law School Professor Wang Lin, a frequent commentator on legal matters, places blame on the strained relationship between China’s judiciary and the system of “letters and visits” (or xinfang, a system that gives Chinese citizens an extra-judicial channel through which to make complaints and petition for redress of grievances). Lack of faith in the judicial system’s ability to produce justice leads people like Tang Hui to petition, but seeing them as threats to social stability, authorities take measures against petitioners and thereby exacerbate a broader sense of injustice.

    This vicious cycle exists independently of specific countermeasures, meaning that reform or abolition of RTL is unlikely to break the cycle. Writing in Monday’s Oriental Morning News, Wang opines that the solution lies in the promotion of an independent judiciary, one that would restore citizens’ faith and confidence in the legal system and make alternative channels like petitioning less necessary.

    *
    Use Tang Hui Case to Rebuild Relationship of Judiciary, Petitions
    Wang Lin, Oriental Morning News
    April 15, 2013 

    On March 25, the first-instance decision was issued in the suit brought by Lanzhou’s “Petitioning Mother” Zhao Meifu[*] against the Lanzhou RTL Committee. The court rejected Zhao’s litigation demands on the grounds that the deadline for litigation had already passed. On April 12, a first-instance decision was issued in the suit brought by Yongzhou, Hunan’s “Petitioning Mother” Tang Hui against the Yongzhou RTL committee. The court found that plaintiff Tang Hui’s demands could not be accepted because they lacked a factual and legal basis.

    It is no coincidence that both of these “petitioning mothers” lost their respective lawsuits against RTL committees. Public opinion expects the tears of these “petitioning mothers” to be the final blow prevailing over the RTL system. Judging from the statements made by the relevant central authorities, this is no extravagant hope. Major changes are in the works for RTL; it’s just a matter of time.

    With the Tang Hui and Zhao Meifu cases as points of departure, attention to the reform or even abolition of the RTL system is a natural public reaction. But hidden in the background of these two cases is not simply a debate over the legality of the RTL system, but [a need to] rethink the relationship between petitioning and the judicial system. Why were the “petitioning mothers” sent to RTL? Because of their “petitioning.” Why did they “trust the petitioning system rather than the judicial system”? Because they believed that they had already exhausted all channels for a judicial remedy and felt that they were unable to defend their rights effectively. So, they tied their hopes to the petitioner’s path.

    For example, in the Tang Hui case, this mother was an ordinary citizen who became a “victim’s relative” because of a sudden calamity from heaven. In October 2006, her 11-year-old daughter was repeatedly raped and then forced into prostitution. Ordinarily, in a society with rule of law, the police ought to launch an investigation soon after receiving a report [of a crime]. But, ironically, in this major case, it was the victim’s mother who went undercover to collect evidence and then asked two relatives to pose as brothel customers in order to save her daughter. Afterwards, only after Tang Hui threatened to kill herself were the police motivated to file the case for investigation. Then after that, at many key stages in the judicial process, action was only “compelled” through some stirringly desperate rights-defense measures pursued outside the legal system. Whenever there are problems with the rule of law, petitioning naturally replaces rule-of-law channels.

    And as we can observe from media descriptions [of the case], it wasn’t actually the “petitioning” that led to the case being handled in accordance with the law; rather it was the “impact” that impelled the relevant accommodations. That “impact” Tang Hui made by petitioning was also the cause of her being sent to RTL.

    Let’s look at how the “case of the Yongzhou girl forced into prostitution” evolved into the “case of Tang Hui v. Yongzhou RTL Committee”: On August 2 of last year, the Yongzhou RTL Committee decided to send Tang Hui to one and a half years of RTL for disturbing social order. Tang Hui did not accept the RTL decision and applied for administrative reconsideration by the Hunan Province RTL Committee on August 7. Three days later, amid the focus of public opinion, the Hunan Province RTL Committee annulled the RTL decision.

    After being released from RTL, Tang Hui then applied for state compensation. On January 5 of this year, the Yongzhou RTL Committee rejected her request and issued a decision not to pay state compensation. On January 22, Tang Hui sued the [committee] in the Yongzhou Intermediate [People’s] Court. After losing in the court of first instance, media flocked to report that Tang Hui would appeal the case to the Hunan High People’s Court.

    Assuming that rejection is still the ultimate outcome of this case, will Tang Hui accept the decision and drop her lawsuit? If Tang Hui does not accept the final verdict, at that point the only channel for judicial remedy would be the even more uncertain path of appealing to reopen the case. This could perhaps send Tang Hui once more on the old path of petitioning.

    If the judicial system is unable to end disputes, then the path of abnormal petitioning becomes viable again, and in the worst case scenario, RTL measures that exist out of a need to maintain stability would inevitably befall Tang Hui yet again. In order to prevent petitioners from falling into this vicious cycle, it is imperative to reconsider the petitioning system. Even if the RTL system is brought to an end within the year, if profound reforms aren’t made to the petitioning system, then replacement measures will inevitably be put in [RTL’s] place. This is practically a vicious cycle.

    Thus it is just as important to use Tang Hui’s case as an opportunity to reconsider the relationship between the judiciary and petitioning as it is to reconsider the RTL system. If it is rare that a person sent to RTL is successful in a suit against an RTL committee, it’s definitely not solely because of “malicious litigation”; in reality, much of the time it’s because of the “mutual cooperation” of relevant departments.

    If rights defenders are deprived of their personal liberty because they use “inappropriate” measures to “force state organs to perform their duties in accordance with the law,” I fear this will only force rights defenders onto the path of no return. As a victim, Tang Hui did not set out to choose petitioning. She once believed in the local police and judicial bodies and exhausted her energies urging the local functional departments to perform their duties in accordance with the law. Her “petitioning” was because the actions at the “lower levels” made her lose that belief.

    Resolving this difficult situation rests on rebuilding the relationship between the judiciary and petitioning and making it ordinary for parties’ lawful rights and interests to be protected within legal channels. It is essential to let judicial independence pave the way for judicial fairness. Only by protecting citizens’ lawful rights and interests can we ensure the stability of localities and rights; this is an undisputable truth.

    (The author is an assistant professor at Hainan University Law School.)


    * Zhao Meifu has reportedly been involved in petitioning activities for 20 years. In November 2012, she went to Beijing to visit her son, a postgraduate student studying in the capital, and was intercepted by police under suspicion for petitioning. Lanzhou, Gansu, police escorted Zhao back home where, without being granted access to her family, she was sentenced to one year of RTL. The case received media attention after Zhao’s son posted it on Weibo (a Chinese version of Twitter), and 18 days after being sent to RTL, Zhao was released citing medical reasons. ⇑

  • Tang Hui Case: Why the Focus Should Be on Judicial Independence

    Tang Hui weeps outside the courtroom after her lawsuit was rejected. Photo credit: Ycwb.com

    Last Friday, the Yongzhou Intermediate People’s Court in Hunan Province rejected a much-anticipated administrative lawsuit brought by “Petitioning Mother” Tang Hui against the local reeducation through labor (RTL) management committee. Tang is seeking a written apology and about 2,500 yuan (approximately US $400) in compensation and damages for the controversial RTL decision issued against her in August 2012. The decision sentenced her to one and a half years of RTL in response to the tenacious petitioning she lodged to bring perpetrators and police to justice in her daughter’s case of sexual abuse and exploitation.

    Influenced by strong public sympathy for a mother whose 11-year-old child was repeatedly raped and forced into prostitution, the provincial RTL Committee annulled the local committee’s decision shortly after Tang applied for administrative reconsideration. The annulment was issued on the grounds that, under the circumstances, admonition and education would be “more appropriate.”

    At issue during this month’s trial was whether the Hunan Province RTL Committee’s revocation of the RTL decision against Tang means that the original decision should be considered “unlawful,” and therefore eligible for compensation. Tang’s lawyers argued that the annulment clearly implied that the decision was unlawful. Although the Yongzhou RTL Committee acknowledged in court that the RTL decision had been “clearly inappropriate,” it countered that the decision to release Tang had been made out of “humanitarian concern” (namely, in light of her need to care for her traumatized daughter), without questioning the legality of the underlying RTL decision.

    If the Yongzhou RTL Committee’s action against Tang Hui was “clearly inappropriate,” then it could be argued that the RTL decision represented an abuse of official power, which would be grounds for compensation under Chinese law. But instead of undertaking its own examination of the legality of the original RTL decision—an authority it has under the revised State Compensation Law—the court ultimately accepted the argument that the decision had been “inappropriate,” but not “unlawful.” The result is a seemingly paradoxical conclusion in which both the RTL decision against Tang and the subsequent revocation of that decision were found to be proper and lawful.

    Images of an inconsolable mother circulated widely on the Internet after the intermediate court’s decision, followed by numerous expressions of public sympathy and outrage at the perceived unwillingness of local authorities to admit their mistakes. The inability of the judicial system to achieve a just outcome in Tang’s case threatens to lead to further erosion of trust in the judicial system, a dangerous loss of legitimacy, and a potential source of instability.

    But whereas the majority of commentators see Tang’s case as a consequence of the flawed RTL system, Hainan University Law School Professor Wang Lin, a frequent commentator on legal matters, places blame on the strained relationship between China’s judiciary and the system of “letters and visits” (or xinfang, a system that gives Chinese citizens an extra-judicial channel through which to make complaints and petition for redress of grievances). Lack of faith in the judicial system’s ability to produce justice leads people like Tang Hui to petition, but seeing them as threats to social stability, authorities take measures against petitioners and thereby exacerbate a broader sense of injustice.

    This vicious cycle exists independently of specific countermeasures, meaning that reform or abolition of RTL is unlikely to break the cycle. Writing in Monday’s Oriental Morning News, Wang opines that the solution lies in the promotion of an independent judiciary, one that would restore citizens’ faith and confidence in the legal system and make alternative channels like petitioning less necessary.

    *
    Use Tang Hui Case to Rebuild Relationship of Judiciary, Petitions
    Wang Lin, Oriental Morning News
    April 15, 2013 

    On March 25, the first-instance decision was issued in the suit brought by Lanzhou’s “Petitioning Mother” Zhao Meifu[*] against the Lanzhou RTL Committee. The court rejected Zhao’s litigation demands on the grounds that the deadline for litigation had already passed. On April 12, a first-instance decision was issued in the suit brought by Yongzhou, Hunan’s “Petitioning Mother” Tang Hui against the Yongzhou RTL committee. The court found that plaintiff Tang Hui’s demands could not be accepted because they lacked a factual and legal basis.

    It is no coincidence that both of these “petitioning mothers” lost their respective lawsuits against RTL committees. Public opinion expects the tears of these “petitioning mothers” to be the final blow prevailing over the RTL system. Judging from the statements made by the relevant central authorities, this is no extravagant hope. Major changes are in the works for RTL; it’s just a matter of time.

    With the Tang Hui and Zhao Meifu cases as points of departure, attention to the reform or even abolition of the RTL system is a natural public reaction. But hidden in the background of these two cases is not simply a debate over the legality of the RTL system, but [a need to] rethink the relationship between petitioning and the judicial system. Why were the “petitioning mothers” sent to RTL? Because of their “petitioning.” Why did they “trust the petitioning system rather than the judicial system”? Because they believed that they had already exhausted all channels for a judicial remedy and felt that they were unable to defend their rights effectively. So, they tied their hopes to the petitioner’s path.

    For example, in the Tang Hui case, this mother was an ordinary citizen who became a “victim’s relative” because of a sudden calamity from heaven. In October 2006, her 11-year-old daughter was repeatedly raped and then forced into prostitution. Ordinarily, in a society with rule of law, the police ought to launch an investigation soon after receiving a report [of a crime]. But, ironically, in this major case, it was the victim’s mother who went undercover to collect evidence and then asked two relatives to pose as brothel customers in order to save her daughter. Afterwards, only after Tang Hui threatened to kill herself were the police motivated to file the case for investigation. Then after that, at many key stages in the judicial process, action was only “compelled” through some stirringly desperate rights-defense measures pursued outside the legal system. Whenever there are problems with the rule of law, petitioning naturally replaces rule-of-law channels.

    And as we can observe from media descriptions [of the case], it wasn’t actually the “petitioning” that led to the case being handled in accordance with the law; rather it was the “impact” that impelled the relevant accommodations. That “impact” Tang Hui made by petitioning was also the cause of her being sent to RTL.

    Let’s look at how the “case of the Yongzhou girl forced into prostitution” evolved into the “case of Tang Hui v. Yongzhou RTL Committee”: On August 2 of last year, the Yongzhou RTL Committee decided to send Tang Hui to one and a half years of RTL for disturbing social order. Tang Hui did not accept the RTL decision and applied for administrative reconsideration by the Hunan Province RTL Committee on August 7. Three days later, amid the focus of public opinion, the Hunan Province RTL Committee annulled the RTL decision.

    After being released from RTL, Tang Hui then applied for state compensation. On January 5 of this year, the Yongzhou RTL Committee rejected her request and issued a decision not to pay state compensation. On January 22, Tang Hui sued the [committee] in the Yongzhou Intermediate [People’s] Court. After losing in the court of first instance, media flocked to report that Tang Hui would appeal the case to the Hunan High People’s Court.

    Assuming that rejection is still the ultimate outcome of this case, will Tang Hui accept the decision and drop her lawsuit? If Tang Hui does not accept the final verdict, at that point the only channel for judicial remedy would be the even more uncertain path of appealing to reopen the case. This could perhaps send Tang Hui once more on the old path of petitioning.

    If the judicial system is unable to end disputes, then the path of abnormal petitioning becomes viable again, and in the worst case scenario, RTL measures that exist out of a need to maintain stability would inevitably befall Tang Hui yet again. In order to prevent petitioners from falling into this vicious cycle, it is imperative to reconsider the petitioning system. Even if the RTL system is brought to an end within the year, if profound reforms aren’t made to the petitioning system, then replacement measures will inevitably be put in [RTL’s] place. This is practically a vicious cycle.

    Thus it is just as important to use Tang Hui’s case as an opportunity to reconsider the relationship between the judiciary and petitioning as it is to reconsider the RTL system. If it is rare that a person sent to RTL is successful in a suit against an RTL committee, it’s definitely not solely because of “malicious litigation”; in reality, much of the time it’s because of the “mutual cooperation” of relevant departments.

    If rights defenders are deprived of their personal liberty because they use “inappropriate” measures to “force state organs to perform their duties in accordance with the law,” I fear this will only force rights defenders onto the path of no return. As a victim, Tang Hui did not set out to choose petitioning. She once believed in the local police and judicial bodies and exhausted her energies urging the local functional departments to perform their duties in accordance with the law. Her “petitioning” was because the actions at the “lower levels” made her lose that belief.

    Resolving this difficult situation rests on rebuilding the relationship between the judiciary and petitioning and making it ordinary for parties’ lawful rights and interests to be protected within legal channels. It is essential to let judicial independence pave the way for judicial fairness. Only by protecting citizens’ lawful rights and interests can we ensure the stability of localities and rights; this is an undisputable truth.

    (The author is an assistant professor at Hainan University Law School.)


    * Zhao Meifu has reportedly been involved in petitioning activities for 20 years. In November 2012, she went to Beijing to visit her son, a postgraduate student studying in the capital, and was intercepted by police under suspicion for petitioning. Lanzhou, Gansu, police escorted Zhao back home where, without being granted access to her family, she was sentenced to one year of RTL. The case received media attention after Zhao’s son posted it on Weibo (a Chinese version of Twitter), and 18 days after being sent to RTL, Zhao was released citing medical reasons. ⇑