Tag: custody and education

  • Call for Constitutional Review of Custody and Education

    Zhu Zhengfu, Vice President of the All-China Lawyers Association and member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Image Credit: Weibo.

    In the lead up to this year’s session of the National People’s Congress (NPC), prominent Chinese lawyer, Zhu Zhengfu, called on the NPC to review the constitutionality of the system of custody and education (收容教育). Zhu is the Vice President of the All-China Lawyers Association and a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Custody and education is a form of administrative detention designed to punish both sex workers and their clients.

    Those who find themselves in one of these centers can be detained for up to two years without judicial process. Similar to previous debates over the system of “re-education through labor,” which was abolished in 2013, calls for the abolition of custody and education have been made ahead of the annual NPC meeting. The detention of well-known Chinese actor Huang Haibo in 2014 for soliciting a sex worker also helped put a spotlight on the coercive measure.

    During the 2016 NPC session, Taiwanese delegate Zhang Xiaodong proposed to the NPC, on similar grounds as Zhu, that custody and education be abolished. In this years’ proposal, Zhu emphasized the weak legal basis of the system, specifically citing its inconsistency with the Constitution and the Legislation Law.

    As a form of administrative detention, custody and education is exclusively overseen and carried out by public security organs and is beyond the supervision of procuratorates and courts. Public security organs have comprehensive control over the investigation and incarceration process as well as the operation of the custody and education centers, an environment in which abuse of power thrives. The centers were originally created with the goal of educating and rehabilitating sex workers and treating sexually transmitted diseases (STD). The education detainees receive is intended to direct them towards other occupations upon release and treatment of STDs is designed to help contain ongoing public health issues such as the prevalence of HIV/AIDS.

    Instead, the centers are often riddled with stories of arbitrary arrests, forced and unpaid labor, and charging detainees fees for their living and medical expenses as well as their rehabilitation treatments. Detainees undergo compulsory testing and treatment for STDs, which they must bear the costs of; many are not informed about the results of their tests or provided adequate counselling. The centers not only violate detainees’ right to health and privacy, but critics argue that they have also been counterproductive at achieving their goal. Detainees frequently return to sex work upon release, having failed to obtain an education, new professional skills, or the health services and counselling needed to protect themselves as they reenter the sex work industry.

    Experts estimate that somewhere between 18,000 to 28,000 individuals are sent to custody and education centers each year. From 1987 to 2000, more than 300,000 people had been housed in custody and education centers across China and as of 2014 there were more than 116 custody and education centers in the country.

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    Discussing the System of Custody and Education

    Restricting the Personal Freedoms of Individuals Through Administrative Regulations Goes Against the Spirit of the Constitution

    Beijing News (BJ News): Why does your proposal focus on custody and education? What are the current problems with this system?

    Zhu Zhengfu (Zhu): The system of custody and education has many facets, including legislation passed at the 1991 National People’s Congress (NPC) Decision on the Strict Prohibition Against Prostitution, the State Council’s Measures on the Custody and Education of Prostitutes and Clients of Prostitutes, and the Ministry of Public Security’s regulations governing the sites of custody and education centers. The thrust of the legislations targets sex workers and their clients. Around the time of 1991, societal conditions were decadent and sex work was on the cusp of spreading. In hindsight, we cannot say that those who hired sex workers were right or wrong. However, following constitutional amendments and the passage of the Legislation Law, problems underlying custody and education’s legislative process, its legislative jurisdiction, and its enforcement began to gradually surface. The main problem is that as an administrative penalty, custody and education can restrict the personal freedoms of an individual from six months up to two years prior to trial and without judicial process before the punishments take effect. In other words, there is no legal defense and no cross-examination of evidence. Long periods of restricting personal freedoms under administrative penalties, without corresponding procedural safeguards, clearly demonstrates that the measure violates [the principle] of procedural fairness.

    BJ News: In other words, when you punish by limiting the personal freedoms of an individual, it should not be governed by administrative regulations.

    Zhu: Yes, Article 8(5) of the Legislation Law clearly stipulates that coercive measures and penalties that restrict personal freedoms must be governed by law. Article 9 of the Legislation Law also stipulates that if laws have not been formulated regarding this matter [Article 8(5)], the NPC or its Standing Committee can authorize the State Council to formulate administrative regulations, except for when it involves regulations that restrict personal freedoms. However, the 1991 NPC Decision on the Strict Prohibition Against Prostitution authorized the State Council to formulate specific measures for custody and education, which is legally at odds with the Legislation Law.

    Besides its inconsistency with the Legislation Law, custody and education also touches on the issue of the inconsistency of legislative jurisdiction. Custody and education is now regarded as a measure carried out by public security organs. Administrative penalties can be appealed and litigated on. The Law on Administrative Penalties covers different types of administrative penalties, however it does not include custody and education. Even as the most serious form of an administrative penalty, the system of custody and education is inconsistent with the Law on Administrative Penalties.

    Furthermore, the Criminal Law provides exemption from criminal punishment in cases where there is a sentence of less than two years’ imprisonment; in cases involving six-months [or less] criminal detention or control; and in cases where the circumstances are minor, even though the action constitutes a criminal offence. The Criminal Law targets and punishes those who commit criminal offences, however sex work is merely an administrative offence, yet it carries a punishment that is more severe than a criminal offence. In doing so, [custody and education] has disrupted the order set forth by the various measures stipulated in the Criminal Law.

    BJ News: You have repeatedly proposed abolishing the system of custody and education at the time of the Two Meetings, why are you so closely committed to ridding this system?

    Zhu: In 2003, I joined several members of the Guangdong People’s Consultative Conference and proposed to abolish the system of Re-education Through Labor (RTL); through many calls for action, media spotlight, and several important RTL cases, RTL was finally abolished in 2013. Custody and education and RTL are similar, on a legislative basis they have clear flaws and they both work through administrative organs that enforce punishments to restrict personal freedoms. Thus in 2014, [I proposed to] abolish custody and education, and again in 2016 and 2017.

    Prior proposals have all tackled the issue from an abolitionist perspective, this year’s proposal takes a constitutional review angle. In the 19th Party Congress work report, it clearly states the importance of “strengthening the implementation and supervision of the constitution, advancing constitutional review, and maintaining the authority of the constitution.” Because the work report has such a focus on this area and because I believe that the era of conducting constitutional reviews and establishing constitutional authority has come, I made the proposal to conduct a constitutional review of custody and education.

    BJ News: There are many vocal supporters of abolishing custody and education. At present, what do you regard as the hardest part in abolishing this system?

    Zhu: The hardest part is that [custody and education] has already become an established system that is well-embedded into mutually beneficial relationships; law enforcement organs may believe that the existing system could aid in problem solving – once you get rid of it, you are also removing a tool of law enforcement.

  • Bullying Ignites Calls to Lower Age of Criminal Responsibility in China

    Juvenile Prison Library. Image credit: Xin Hua Sichuan.

    In recent months, we have seen weekly, sometimes daily, media coverage of violent bullying amongst children in Chinese schools. Prompted by such reports, the Ministry of Education, Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and five other central party and government bodies issued a guiding opinion last month on the prevention of school bullying and violence among primary and secondary school students.

    With disturbing and viral videos of such incidents circulating throughout Chinese social media and lurid media reports of deadly assaults and other crimes committed by children, there is a growing sense of moral panic about the rise in juvenile crime and the inadequacy of existing laws and institutions to handle the problem.

    Public sentiment on the issue of juvenile crime spiked last August, following a pair of news reports that attracted widespread attention. In one, a 13-year-old Guangxi boy was sentenced to three years of “custody and education” after brutally killing three young children with rocks and a knife. In another, a 13-year-old boy from Sichuan was released into the custody of his father after using gasoline to set a young teacher on fire in order to steal her iPhone.

    Stories like these have garnered vocal support for lowering the age of criminal responsibility, currently set at 14 years old, for violent and other serious crimes. One online poll showed 85 percent of respondents agreeing that the age limit should be lowered. Some lawyers and other commentators have taken up the issue, calling for immediate legislative reform.

    Commentators cite societal and cultural factors—such as decreased parental supervision and excessive exposure to violent video games and movies—as the major contributing factors to the apparent rise in juvenile crime. As such they see stricter legal sanctions as the only way to control the rise and criticize recent reform trends towards non-custodial measures and diversion from punishment as only further contributing to juvenile delinquency.

    Despite popular pressure, there are signs of official support for reforms from Chinese legal experts who are skeptical about adopting a more punitive juvenile justice regime. Last month, People’s Daily, the official Communist Party’s newspaper, published an essay by Beijing Normal University Law School Professor Song Yinghui warning that lowering the age of criminal responsibility ran counter to the evidence-based, “scientific” approach that has guided the development of juvenile justice in China in recent years. Song advocates for treating the root social causes of juvenile delinquency, rather than turning to a more punitive system that seemingly promises quick fixes and the “instant gratification” of seeing more children tried as adults.

    The gradual pace of juvenile justice reform and the nature of sensational and viral media coverage on juvenile crime will all but guarantee that the debate over lowering the age of criminal responsibility will continue for some time to come.

    Looking Rationally at the Age of Criminal Responsibility in China

    Song Yinghui

    People’s Daily, November 16, 2016

    In recent years, there has been report after report involving incidents of school violence and socially harmful, terrible acts carried out by young juveniles. Some advocate lowering the age of criminal responsibility, but this proposal lacks empirical data and scientific basis. Such a suggestion could potentially make things worse, rather than better. We should take an objective and rational approach to the problem of juvenile criminal behavior and should not have scientific and professional judgements influenced by extreme individual cases or public opinion.

    Chinese legal provisions on the age of criminal responsibility are in line with global trends of criminal law and correspond with circumstances in our country. At the present time, a majority of countries set the age of criminal responsibility at 14 years old or above. Although some countries set a lower age limit, these countries all have separate legal provisions and judicial processes for juvenile crime. In the vast majority of cases in these countries, minors who have committed harmful acts are handled through non-criminal or non-punitive interventions; only a small number of juveniles are convicted and punished using the adult criminal procedure.

    Ever since China’s first modern criminal code, the Great Qing New Criminal Law of 1911, we have gradually adopted a dual standard for the age of criminal responsibility at 14 years [Ed.: for certain serious offenses] and 16 years [Ed.: for all other offenses]. This assessment has taken a number of factors into consideration, including China’s historical and cultural traditions, geographical and climatic conditions, criminal justice policies, child development, amount of time spent in school, and social experience. This standard has endured the test of time and is in line with the physical and mental characteristics of juveniles and the patterns regarding the occurrence and development of crime.

    The argument in favor of lowering the age of criminal responsibility lacks support from empirical data and risks becoming victim to the fallacious idea that as humans become more civilized the age of criminal responsibility ought to be lowered.

    To this point in time, I have seen no systematic set of statistics or research on harmful behavior by minors under the age of 14, and there is no uniform system for reporting acts of school violence. Therefore, we shouldn’t simply make sweeping generalizations from extreme, terrible incidents exposed by the media and conclude that that the number of criminal acts by minors under the age of 14 is rising dramatically. If we were to use these reports as the empirical basis for amending the universal legal standard and thereby lowering the age of criminal responsibility, it would violate the spirit of scientific and cautious legislation.

    Today’s juveniles are maturing more quickly than their age-peers of 30 years ago, but the social environment in which they are living has also undergone tremendous change. There has been no shortening of the growth period in which they learn, practice, and engage in trial and error, and their mental states are not maturing any earlier. In fact, when young juveniles commit harmful acts, it demonstrates that they do not yet possess the ability to discern situations or control themselves. Otherwise, as civilization progressively advances the age of criminal responsibility would get lower and lower.

    Lowering the age of criminal responsibility does nothing to resolve the problems that lead young juveniles to commit harmful acts. A great deal of empirical evidence and research shows that the root of illegal acts by juveniles are problems with families or guardians, education, and social governance. For example, most of the detainees in juvenile detention centers come from broken homes, or are “left behind” children with precarious living situations, marked by idleness, homelessness, and upbringings surrounded by the negative influences of entertainment venues like Internet cafés, bars, or karaoke parlors.

    Simply punishing juveniles is not only ineffective at preventing juvenile crime; it actually is a way of avoiding problems and shifting responsibility. Sentencing juveniles to prison not only leads to cross-infection from others; it also does nothing to help repair social relations. Once extremely malleable juveniles are labeled as criminals, it is easy for them to develop a mentality of hatred and even become antisocial and prone to re-offend. Research in psychology, sociology, psychiatry, and behavioral science all shows that juvenile psychology is highly susceptible and volatile. If provided appropriate education and intervention, the vast majority of problematic juvenile behavior or psychological deviations can be corrected.

    When we maximize the interests of children, we are also maximizing the interests of society. Only by enabling juveniles who have committed socially harmful acts to return to society do we truly protect society.

    The most urgent task is to establish a system of early intervention separate from the adult system that distinguishes between minor and serious harmful behaviors; to use educational preventative measures, targeted to address the problems facing juveniles; and to change the current situation where we “lock them up and forget them.” At the same time, we should immediately improve the legal system and establish measures that strengthen family monitoring. We need to strengthen responsibility of schools and educators and improve mechanisms to prevent and manage school violence. We should better regulate harmful social environments that have a negative influence on the education and daily life of juveniles. And we must increase government assistance and support for juveniles and their families who live in extreme poverty.

    In other words, we must solve the problem at its root. This is the only true path to responding to and preventing illegal criminal acts by juveniles.

    (Song Yinghui is Director of the Juvenile Justice Expert Committee of the Criminal Procedure Law Research Association, China Law Society)

  • MPS: China Has 116 Custody and Education Centers Nationwide

    Detainees participate in work training at a custody and education center in Nantong, Jiangsu Province. Image credit: Nandu.com

    As several recent posts have pointed out, the formal abolition of reeducation through labor (RTL) at the end of last year has prompted new scrutiny of other arbitrary forms of detention routinely used in China. Getting the most attention in recent months is the system known as “custody and education,” used to punish both prostitutes and their clients with up to two years of detention without any formal judicial process.

    A recent article from the Guangzhou newspaper Southern Metropolis Daily showed how critics of custody and education have successfully used requests for “open government information” to get details about the measure and its use in China. This summer, Beijing lawyer Zhao Yunheng received a reply to his request to the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) for information about custody and education. The reply included an acknowledgment that there are currently 116 custody and education facilities nationwide.

    Though Zhao did not get all of the detailed information he requested, the MPS response does reveal a number of interesting things. First, it is clear that, with only 116 facilities nationwide, there are many parts of China where custody and education is not being enforced at all. Thus, in addition to the arbitrary nature of the procedures used to send individuals to custody and education, there is also a serious problem of geographical inconsistency of enforcement—meaning that individuals accused of the same illegal behavior might receive very different degrees of punishment, for example up to 15 days of administrative detention in places where there are no custody and education facilities but a minimum of six months in custody and education in places where there are.

    Distribution of custody and education centers by province based on provincial public security department data obtained by Southern Metropolis Daily. Image credit: Nandu.com

    Second, there are some puzzling discrepancies between the data reported on the national level and information collected locally. The MPS report of 116 custody and education centers contrasts with an earlier figure of 90 facilities derived by Southern Metropolis Daily through open government information requests and reporting at the provincial level. Because the MPS did not provide details, such as the names of each facility or their relative distribution throughout the country, it is difficult to know how to reconcile the two different figures.

    Even though he did not get all of the information he requested, Zhao Yunheng expresses general satisfaction with the way the MPS handled his response and remains optimistic that custody and education will undergo substantial reform in the near future. The fact that the issue continues to receive periodic coverage in the national media suggests that changes to the system may indeed be on the reform agenda. Continued pressure from the media and civil society—including demands that the government reveal more details about the various ways it locks up its citizens—will undoubtedly help to further this process along.

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    MPS Replies to Open Government Information Request,
    Now 116 Custody and Education Centers Nationwide

    Wang Xing, Southern Metropolis Daily
    August 1, 2014

    In a recent reply to an open government information request, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) for the first time made public the number of custody and education facilities nationwide—116. The MPS also stated that China has not yet abolished custody and education and that public security units continue to enforce this measure.

    “I never imagined that the MPS Open Government Information Office would take such a conscientious attitude,” said lawyer Zhao Yunheng, who applied to have the information made public. “They acted fully in accordance with procedures, and even telephoned me to explain when they needed to extend the time limit.”

    Custody and Education Still Being Enforced

    In its July 22 reply entitled “MPS Open Government Information Response,” the MPS Open Government Information Office responded separately to each of Zhao Yunheng’s three questions.

    On the question of which provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions were still enforcing custody and education and which had effectively abolished or ceased enforcing the measure, the MPS reply stated: In 1991, the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee passed its Decision Concerning the Strict Prohibition of Prostitution and Visiting Prostitutes.” Article 4(2) of that decision states: “Public security organs, in cooperation with other relevant agencies, may subject those who engage in prostitution or visit prostitutes to between six months and two years of compulsory legal and moral education and productive labor so that they may change their bad habits. Detailed measures are to be enacted by the State Council.” In 1993, the State Council promulgated and put into effect the Measures for the Custody and Education of Prostitutes and Clients of Prostitutes. These measures specify that prostitutes and those who visit prostitutes are subject to custody and education and provide detailed provisions concerning the decision-making body, term of custody, testing and treatment for sexually transmitted disease, inmate education and management, and procedures for release and remedy. The reply added: “Currently, the state has not abolished custody and education and public security authorities continue to enforce the measure. We have no information about abolition of custody and education by local authorities.”

    According to an investigation by Southern Metropolis Daily (see the previous report in Weekly In-Depth Report, July 2 [Translator’s note: This report is no longer available on their website, but is available here.]), of the 31 provincial-level areas nationwide (excluding Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan), 26 have at least one custody and education center. Anhui, Jiangxi, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Tibet do not currently have custody and education centers. Of these, Ningxia, Qinghai, Tibet, and Jiangxi have never had custody and education centers, so abolition is not an issue there. Anhui once had 17 custody and education centers, but around 2005 they were ordered to close because the “conditions for custody no longer existed.” Even though there is no longer custody and education there, no one has ever said anything about formally “abolishing the custody and education system.”

    No Mention of Specific Designations or Distribution

    With respect to the number of custody and education centers nationwide, as well as their designations and locations, the MPS reply states: Article 4 of the Measures for the Custody and Education of Prostitutes and Clients of Prostitutes stipulates that: “Based on the need for custody and education work, public security organs at the level of the province, autonomous region, municipality or autonomous prefecture, or city district shall submit plans for the establishment of custody and education centers to the people’s government at the same level for approval.” According to figures from the MPS Detention Facility Administration Bureau, there are 116 custody and education centers nationwide.

    There are more than 330 cities or autonomous prefectures at the prefectural level in China. With 116 custody and education centers, that means that there is one center for every two prefectural cities on average.

    Between April and May of this year, public security departments in 19 provinces nationwide responded to requests for open government information, revealing a total of 55 custody and education centers. Southern Metropolis Daily reporters then visited the 12 other provincial-level public security departments, all of which apart from Guizhou provided figures on the number of local custody and education centers. Calculating from the 19 provincial replies to requests for open government information and the information provided during visits to 11 other provinces (excepting Guizhou), one gets a total of 90 custody and education centers.

    According to Zhao Yunheng’s analysis, perhaps the custody and education centers in some areas have already stopped operating in practice, but because they have not been formally abolished, this leads to the discrepancy in the data.

    The MPS reply did not provide the specific designations or distribution of the 116 custody and education centers. Based on previous investigations, the centers are distributed extremely unevenly. In some provinces, nearly every city has one, while in others the centers have been set up in only a few cities. Yesterday, Zhao Yunheng submitted another open government information request for additional information.

    Applicant: MPS Attitude Conscientious

    Zhao Yunheng, the person who made this application for open government information, is the director of the criminal defense division at the Dacheng Law Firm. In early June, he, Duan Wanjin, and other criminal defense lawyers at the Dacheng Law Firm met to discuss the problem of custody and education, out of which came the request for open government information. “A few days later, I got a call from the MPS Open Government Information Office,” said Zhao. “They said our request wasn’t formatted correctly and suggested that I go to the MPS website to download the correct form and reapply.” By default, the applicant on the standard open government information request form is a citizen or legal entity, so when Zhao Yunheng resubmitted the application it was in his capacity as an individual citizen.

    Zhao’s application requested information about the implementation of custody and education in each province; the names, numbers, and distribution of custody and education centers nationwide; and the number of people being held in custody and education. Zhao Yunheng believes that many delegates to the NPC and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, legal experts, lawyers, and others have already made a great effort and carried out a valuable investigation into the issue of custody and education. He and his colleagues wanted to approach the problem from the angle of open government information in hopes that they could provide a better basis for debate if they received more information.

    According to the regulations on open government information, the department receiving the request should furnish a reply within 15 working days. As the deadline was about to approach, Zhao Yunheng received a call from the MPS Open Government Information Office. “They said this information concerned a large number of bureaus and that they themselves did not have the information,” Zhao recalled. “They said they would have to coordinate with these agencies to collect statistics, so they hoped to extend the 15-day deadline. This was fully in keeping with the regulations, and I felt this was perfectly ordinary.” On July 23, a registered letter was delivered to the Dacheng Law Firm. It was dated July 22—a reply delivered within the statutory deadline.

    Zhao Yunheng said that in his many telephone interactions with them, the MPS Open Government Information Office took a very conscientious attitude, and he was personally satisfied with their attitude and the response they provided: “I believe the MPS took a positive attitude. I am relatively optimistic that custody and education will be reformed in the near future.”

  • Detained Actor Spotlights Custody and Education, Censors Intervene

    Huang Haibo. Photo credit: sohu.com

    On May 15, police in Beijing detained well-known Chinese actor Huang Haibo for soliciting a prostitute. He and the prostitute were each subjected to 15 days of administrative detention, after which police decided to send them both to custody and education—a custodial measure targeting sex workers and their clients—for an additional six months. Reversing an earlier decision, Huang’s Weibo account announced on June 8 that he will not appeal. On June 9, he terminated the contract with his lawyer Mo Shaoping.

    The Chinese public has largely responded with sympathy for Huang and a sense that his punishment is excessive. Since the abolition of reeducation through labor (RTL) in 2013, the Chinese public seems to have become less tolerant for measures that enable police to detain individuals for extended periods without proper legal basis or due process. This has led some to push for abolition of “quasi-RTL” measures like custody and education.

    In fact, there were signs of a healthy public debate over custody and education even before Huang’s case helped put the measure in the spotlight. In early May, more than 100 individuals signed a petition calling on the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee to abolish custody and education. After Huang’s arrest, on June 7, a group of legal experts, scholars, and lawyers met in Beijing leading to another proposal recommending formal abolition of the custody and education system.

    Like the debate over RTL in 2012, many of the controversies surrounding custody and education have received widespread attention from the Chinese media. One article, however, appears to have crossed an invisible line. On June 4, an article entitled “What is the Legal Basis for Custody and Education?” was published on the front page of Procuratorate Daily, the official newspaper of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, one of China’s main law-enforcement bodies. According to a report received by the China Digital Times website, media outlets were later instructed not to republish this article and immediately delete it from their online sites. On the website of Procuratorate Daily, the article is visible on an image of the front page of the June 4 edition, but links have been broken to both that article (available via web cache) and a more legible image of the front page.

    It is not clear why this particular article was singled out for censorship. One possibility might be its concluding emphasis on the need for more effective ways for Chinese citizens to challenge the constitutionality or legality of measures or legislation. Although popular discontent over measures like “custody and repatriation” or RTL eventually led officials to abolish these detention measures, the initiative for action has very much remained in the hands of Chinese authorities. Establishing a routine mechanism for constitutional review—like the one suggested in this article—is liable to shift some of that initiative to society, and to give citizens a channel through which to assert the supremacy of constitutional principles and rule of law. China’s current leaders have expressed a certain degree of hostility to a system of constitutional checks and balances, and this article may have tested the limits of that attitude.

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    What is the Legal Basis for “Custody and Education”?

    Xiao Rong
    Procuratorate Daily, June 4, 2014

    Experts believe that custody and education is unlawful and unjustified and that those sent for custody and education can protect their rights in accordance with the law

    Recently, the decision to send actor Huang Haibo to custody and education has put the Measures for the Custody and Education of Prostitutes and Clients of Prostitutes [hereafter, “Custody and Education Measures”] in public view. It has also raised many questions: Is custody and education lawful and justified? Does sending a prostitute or client of prostitutes to custody and education after [they serve] administrative detention violate the prohibition against “double jeopardy”? How should a review mechanism be initiated for “evil laws” that violate the constitution and Legislation Law? On June 3, Procuratorate Daily interviewed legal scholars regarding these questions.

    Back on September 4, 1993, the State Council issued the Custody and Education Measures in response to the NPC Standing Committee’s 1991 Decision on the Strict Prohibition of Prostitution. According to these measures, which the State Council revised in 2010, “Prostitutes and the clients of prostitutes, in addition to the penalties provided for under Article 66 of the Public Order Management Penalty Law of the People’s Republic of China, in those cases in which RTL is not yet necessary, may be placed under custody and education by the public security organ.” Custody and education, which can last from six months to two years, primarily involves collective legal and moral education, arrangement of productive labor, and testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases for prostitutes and the clients of prostitutes.

    “Custody and education is a compulsory measure restricting personal liberty that falls between general administrative penalties and RTL. However, the Administrative Compulsion Law does not have any provision for this kind of compulsory measure,” says Qi Dongwen, assistant professor at Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications Law School. Qi believes that the custody and education system is unlawful, both in terms of its legislative status and content.

    According to China’s constitution, the personal freedom of citizens is inviolable. According to Article 8 of the Legislation Law, enacted in 2000, compulsory measures and penalties that deprive citizens of their political rights or restrict their personal freedom may only be enacted by law. Jiang Ming’an, director of the Center for Constitution and Administrative Law Studies at Peking University, told Procuratorate Daily that the provisions of the Decision on the Strict Prohibition of Prostitution involving restriction of personal freedom are in conflict with the aforementioned provision of the Legislation Law because that decision is not an act of law. Moreover, Article 9 of the Legislation Law states: “If laws have not been enacted regarding the matters specified in Article 8 of this law, the NPC or its Standing Committee has the power to make a decision to authorize the State Council to formulate administrative regulations first for some of those matters, based on actual needs, excluding criminal offenses and their punishment, compulsory measures and penalties involving deprivation of citizens’ political rights or restriction of the freedom of their persons, and the judicial system.” Therefore, the Custody and Education Measures are also in conflict with the Legislation Law. Qi Dongwen adds: “Custody and education also conflicts with the 2005 Public Order Management Penalty Law, which provides for detention or fines for prostitutes and their clients and makes no mention of custody and education.”

    In the view of Fu Dalin, assistant professor at the Xi’an Institute of Political Studies [a unit of the People’s Liberation Army], custody and education is a coercive measure that took shape as part of China’s social management process that specifically targets prostitutes and their customers. In light of its own particular background, it has a certain degree of justification. However, since the enactment of the Legislation Law and Administrative Compulsion Law, the illegal and contradictory nature of this system has become increasingly apparent, and there is no further need for it to exist.

    Does it violate the prohibition against “double jeopardy” to send prostitutes and their clients to custody and education after placing them under administrative detention? Fu Dalin told Procuratorate Daily that if you look simply at legal statute, custody and education following administrative detention does not count as “double jeopardy” because custody and education is not an administrative penalty. But looking from the perspective of law enforcement, administrative compulsion involves placing temporary restrictions on a citizen’s personal freedom in accordance with the law or taking temporary control of property belonging to a citizen, legal person, or other organization in accordance with the law, all for the purpose of preventing unlawful behavior, avoiding harm from occurring, and controlling the spread of danger. In prostitution cases, administrative detention or fines should be sufficient, and there is no need to impose additional custody and education.

    Given that custody and education lacks clear lawfulness or justification, can Huang Haibo and others sent to custody and education protect their rights [through legal channels]? Fu Dalin says they can: “No matter whether it is an administrative coercive measure or an administrative penalty, if the person concerned believes the measure is unlawful he or she may file administrative litigation in accordance with the law in order to protect his or her own lawful rights and interests.”

    Qi Dongwen says: “The Sun Zhigang incident led to the abolition of the custody and repatriation system. Complaints by petitioning mother Tang Hui led to the abolition of RTL. I believe that Huang Haibo’s case is a good chance to initiate the constitutional review mechanism and call an immediate halt to the custody and education system.” Fu Dalin recommends that there ought to be a regular channel within the state’s institutional arrangement for resolving difficult questions of constitutional review. “The review process established in the current Legislation Law only involves the ‘Part One’ issues of raising requests or recommendations for review,” says Fu. “There needs to be additional content added for the more crucial stage of ‘Part Two.’ Review of the Legislation Law is in the works, and I hope that it will establish an appropriate mechanism for constitutional review and oversight.”

  • Limits of Public Outrage: RTL and Custody and Education

    Women assemble ball point pens at the Zhejiang Nantong Custody and Education Center, March 10, 2011.
    Photo credit: Zhou Quan

    The system of reeducation through labor (RTL) has persisted since the 1950s despite its increasingly evident inconsistencies with domestic legislation, constitutional rights guarantees, and international human rights law. Yet over the past year, consensus on the need to reform RTL has swiftly coalesced. This is due in large part to widespread expressions of sympathy and outrage by the Chinese public over several cases involving individuals sent to RTL for criticizing government policies or alleging wrongdoing by government agents.

    But what are the limits to public sentiment as a driver of reform? Is public intolerance of RTL limited to sympathetic individuals like Tang Hui or Ren Jianyu, or does it expand to encompass the hundreds of thousands of people who, without due judicial process, lose their liberty for months and years in RTL and other institutions for things like drug use, petty theft, and sex work?

    Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Daily raises this question in a recent editorial (translated below) that shines a light on measures like “custody and education” (shourong jiaoyu 收容教育), which targets sex workers and their patrons, and “custody and rehabilitation” (shouyang jiaoyang 收容教养), which targets juvenile delinquents. The editorial argues that these measures suffer from the same concentration of police discretion and lack of due process rights that have been identified for RTL, but suggests that the purpose of these measures—to target individuals who engage in socially undesirable and even illegal activity—has kept them from garnering widespread public support for reform.

    Public sympathy can exert an important force in promoting legal reform, but where deprivation of freedom is concerned, all individuals—no matter how sympathetic—should be entitled to the same basic procedural rights. Constitutional review of RTL could establish generalized principles about the exercise of administrative power with respect to personal freedom, and conceivably invalidate other practices. But if structural changes are made only to RTL while other measures like custody and education are left intact, any claims about major strides toward rule-of-law development will have to be qualified.

    *
    In the Name of Rule of Law, Sort out “Quasi-RTL Measures” as One Package

    Southern Metropolis Daily
    June 29, 2013

    According to reports, police sent 28-year-old Cui X to two years of custody and education for engaging in prostitution in a hair salon in Chancheng District, Foshan, Guangdong Province. Recently, after receiving the decision, Cui’s family felt that the punishment by police was too heavy and applied to the Legal Affairs Bureau of the Chancheng District [People’s Government] for administrative reconsideration. The police maintain that their decision was made in accordance with law and that “custody and education has always been used.”

    Compared to the illustrious reputation of reeducation through labor (RTL), custody and education remains relatively unknown to the public; other similar [measures] include custody and rehabilitation. The targets for both custody and education and custody and rehabilitation are relatively unitary. The former, which originates from the State Council’s 1993 Measures for the Custody and Education of Prostitutes and Clients of Prostitutes, is an “administrative compulsory measure” targeting prostitutes and their clients. Its aim is for these groups of people to be “centralized for legal and moral education, organized to participate in productive labor, and screened and treated for sexually transmitted diseases.” Terms of custody and education range from six months to two years. Similarly, custody and rehabilitation is a means of administrative punishment of between one and three years for “juveniles under the age of 16 who cannot be given criminal punishment.”

    In reality, the main substance of these three types of punishments is the deprivation of citizens’ freedom of person. Even though custody and education is defined as an “administrative compulsory measure,” from the length of its term one can see that this measure does not have the immediacy and temporary nature of administrative compulsory measures (such as sequestration, impounding, or freezing [an account]) and displays more characteristics of an administrative punishment. For these three punishments, including custody and education, the most evident characteristic is the prison-like custody and management through which citizens are deprived of their personal freedom. The next [most obvious characteristic] is the procedure whereby decisions are made, insofar as each measure actually leaves primary responsibility to the public security organs and does not involve any procedures for check and balance by the procuratorate or courts. It is also difficult for the procuratorates or courts to exercise any systematic oversight. In fact, the ease with which citizens’ freedom can be restricted for several years without sentencing by a court puts [these measures] within the realm of discretion by administrative power and makes them a systematic violation of the spirit of the rule of law.

    Article 7 of the Measures for the Custody and Education of Prostitutes and Clients of Prostitutes states that, aside from the punishments provided for in Article 66 of the Public Security Administration Penalty Law, persons who engage in prostitution or who consort with prostitutes but who do not [meet the criteria for] RTL may be sent for custody and education by the public security organ. Here, custody and education is treated as a transitional measure between public security administration punishments and RTL. But to take the same illegal behavior that under the Public Security Administration Penalty Law has been punished with less than five days or between 10 and 15 days of detention along with corresponding fines and then, under other regulations, issue a punishment of custody and education or even RTL is a clear violation of the administrative punishment principle prohibiting “double jeopardy.” Furthermore, custody and education can punish a citizen by depriving his or her freedom for as long as two years.

    The same legal principles and statutes raised during discussion of reform of the RTL system must also be used now to examine the legality of custody and education and custody and rehabilitation. Article 37 of the current Constitution gives citizens a sacred right whereby “freedom of the person … is inviolable” and [states that] citizens shall not be deprived of this freedom except pursuant to statute and legal process. Moreover, Article 8 of the Legislation Law states that “mandatory measures and penalties involving deprivation of citizens of their political rights or restriction of the freedom of their person” are absolute reservations explicitly requiring [that they] “shall only be governed by law.” Article 10 of the Administrative Penalty Law grants the power to enact nearly any form of punishment through administrative rules and regulations but includes a reservation regarding “restricting freedom of the person.” Citizens’ freedom of person, which the Constitution declares to be the most fundamental right to be protected, inevitably receives the highest level of legal recognition and its desecration must not be tolerated.

    Seen in this light, even though they have a certain historical rationality, in a situation where the ruling party has many times professed its commitment to the gradual improvement of law and rule of law principles, it is truly impossible to continue implementing various quasi-RTL measures including custody and education; [these measures] must be comprehensively reviewed and reformed according to rule of law. The issue of RTL reform arose because of a number of cases involving citizens being punished for expression, but the issue is not only [connected to] the specific nature of those cases but also in the way that [RTL] seriously violates the spirit of the rule of law. Although the persons targeted by custody and education and custody and rehabilitation may not have the most reputable images and their acts may require punishment, the manner and procedure in which they are punished must conform to the principles of rule of law.

    The situation is already changing and reform of RTL is imminent. As this system evolves, the measures of custody and education and custody and rehabilitation appear increasingly incompatible with the spirit of the rule of law. There is no reason to focus discussion only on questions of reforming RTL, while ignoring the existence of other similar measures and allowing them to continue to be used. All provisions that violate and run counter to the rule of law should undergo a comprehensive review with an eye towards rule of law and be dealt with together as a single package. In order to build a rule-of-law country, we must face this problem head-on.