Xinjiang’s State Security Prisoners: Failing to Reform (Part 1 of 2)

1. Complex and changing international environment, rising terrorist threat, and new expressions of hegemonism and power politics. “American Factor” is a constant threat to Xinjiang’s social and political stability.In recent years, the United States has paid increasingly direct and increasingly specific attention to the so-called “Xinjiang Question.” [The issue has been raised] at higher and higher levels, the scope has been increasingly broad, and knowledge has continuously increased, with the main focus involving Xinjiang’s human rights, ethnic, and religious problems. [The United States] is scheming to integrate ethnic separatist forces, increase the intensity of infiltration and sabotage in Xinjiang, and quicken the pace of “internationalizing the Xinjiang Question.” It is attempting to carry out a “peril from the east.”[1] Since 2005, the nations bordering Xinjiang have experienced a series of “color revolutions” carried out with planning and support from the United States. In these countries, social control has become weaker, religious extremist ideology has prevailed, and violent terrorist activity has been rampant, making the situation more and more complex in the area surrounding Xinjiang.
2. “Three forces” remain fully active inside and outside ChinaAt present, the activities of the “three forces” [i.e., ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism] inside and outside China are most evident in three areas: first, further acceleration of the pace of uniting together, nationalizing, and politicizing; second, active plots of violent terrorist sabotage activity; and third, intensified incitement of public opinion and ideological infiltration. Each provides evidence that the “three forces” inside and outside China are currently plotting more sinister criminal activities and are capable of carrying out violent terrorist acts at any time, with prisons serving as one of their main targets of attack and sabotage.
4. Renewed Activity of “Hizb ut-Tahrir”“Hizb ut-Tahrir” [Party of Liberation] is a transnational extremist political organization pursuing Islamic fundamentalism. While our government has struck back at its organized infiltration efforts numerous times, [Hizb ut-Tahrir] has been unwilling to accept defeat and has unceasingly engaged in sabotage activities in Xinjiang. Compared to the past, its organization has undergone a number of major changes, with increasingly apparent [efforts at] “localization,” “party building,” and “violence.”
5. Serious lack of correctional officers, serious imbalance of officer-prisoner ratioThe seriously insufficient [number] of correctional officers has already become a major factor influencing the security and stability of prisons and hindering the improved quality of prisoner reform. The contradiction of an insufficient officer force is particularly evident considering the unique nature of reforming ESS prisoners. We are a long way from meeting the Ministry of Justice requirement that “the ranks of prison correctional officers shall not fall below 18 percent of the prisoner population.” In our region, the ratio of assigned correctional officers to the prisoner population is only 15.1 percent.
7. Shortage of funds and outdated facilitiesIn recent years, with the hearty support of superior departments, the work of outfitting and making adjustments at Xinjiang prisons has proceeded smoothly, bringing some improvement to the outdated nature of basic prison facilities. But with pressure on prison management and reform work continually on the rise, the problems created by insufficient prison technological equipment and outdated techniques are increasingly obvious. We can wait no longer to establish a relatively complete technological prevention system for prison security.

1. General Profile
   1. Reactionary Political Thinking
      1. After entering prison, some ESS prisoners do not recognize their own crimes and stubbornly maintain their reactionary stances, refusing to acknowledge guilt or accept the verdict. They maintain that they “obey the commands of Allah and have broken no laws”; that “the laws of the Communist Party do not apply to them”; or that their “crimes were not committed for themselves but on behalf of the independence and liberation of their ethnic group.” They even believe things such as that their actions were “[acts of] resistance under pressure.”
      2. They pretend to have been tricked and resist thought reform. In order to avoid criminal responsibility, some ESS prisoners mistakenly believe that their crimes were instigated by others and that their ignorance led them to be tricked. They thus adopt a passive attitude toward political thought education during the reform process.
   2. Stubborn Resistance to Reform
      1. Most ESS prisoners harbor great feelings of resentment; avoid, and even treat as enemies, people of other ethnicities; and curse Uyghur police as the “scum of the ethnic group” and “running dogs of the Communist Party.” They willfully distort Xinjiang’s history, spread rumors, and incite ethnic hatred. They use acts like hunger strikes, suicide, “namaz” [the Turkish word for prayer], and feigned illness to disobey management and refuse reform.
      2. They create serious disturbances and oppose management by correctional officers. Some ESS prisoners, once their fantasies of being “rescued” by people outside the prison are dashed, become desperate and openly defiant towards correctional officers. They refuse to obey orders and beat other prisoners. Some spread comments about refusing to reform and incite other prisoners to cause disturbances. Some directly take aim at correctional officers. Some ESS prisoners, in response to guards’ efforts to educate them, frequently shout things like: “I only act in accordance with the Quran. I will always follow Allah and never follow the Communist Party. I only obey Islamic law. If you become a Muslim, I will obey you.” Or they shout: “According to Chinese law I am guilty, but according to Islamic law I am innocent. I believe I have a duty to spread the tenets of Islam broadly. All that I have done is correct, and I shall never repent.”
   3. Bigoted Ethnic Mentality, Inciting Religious Fervor, and Ethnic Opposition
      1. The majority of ESS prisoners have a rather strong, bigoted ethnic mentality and see themselves as an “elite ethnicity” and “superior race” [2]. At the same time, they are unable to have a correct understanding of objective realities of other ethnic groups’ populations or levels of economic or cultural development, which leads them to develop psychological imbalances and spiritual distortions.
      2. They incite religious fervor and engage in illegal religious activities. Investigation has found that the great majority of ESS prisoners have been deeply influenced by religion and that nearly 30 percent of them have even been educated in religious schools. They often use their common ethnicity and common religion to incite religious fervor among prisoners and try to use illegal religious methods to continue carrying out their separatist activities.
      3. They stir up trouble and incite ethnic antagonism. They instigate and encourage prisoners newly admitted to prison to oppose management by correctional officers and deliberately manufacture trouble. They incite ethnic antagonism and manufacture ethnic contradictions in order to sabotage the ordinary reform order within the prison. Some brazenly announce: “Out with the Han!” or “Destroy the infidels!”
   4. Weak Legal Knowledge and Resistance to New ThingsThe majority of ESS prisoners have a low level of education and suffer from “small peasant mentality” and narrow thinking. They neither study nor understand the law and are unwilling to accept the restraint of national law. They judge true and false and right and wrong only on the basis of the Quran, the “Hadith,” and the “commandments.” They know extremely little about the historical development of Xinjiang and do not understand the relationships between the nation, ethnic groups, and religion. Many of them believe that “nations should be integral units formed by a single ethnic group.”[3] For these reasons, they do not care about new things and even resist them. They have no interest in the “three courses” [i.e., ideology, civilization, and technology] and lack a consciousness to reform.
2. Categorical Profiles
   1. The great majority of newly admitted ESS prisoners do not acknowledge guilt or accept the verdict and stubbornly maintain their reactionary positions. They believe that all they have done is in obedience to Allah’s decrees. Under the strict controls of prison, they continue to openly write reactionary journals, reactionary poetry, or publicly express reactionary comments, searching for opportunities to incite and recruit other prisoners.
   2. The great majority of those serving short-term sentences pass the time by going through the motions and refusing to accept thought reform. A few ESS prisoners serving short terms will frequently observe the area surrounding the prison or the correctional officer deployment situation. There are some who intentionally commit crimes so that they may scout out the situation in the prison and make reports to ethnic separatist forces after leaving prison.
   3. Some ESS prisoners serving long sentences believe that they have no hope of sentence reductions and lose faith in reform. A few even attack correctional officers or rush for the prison gates, taking these desperate measures without any concern for the consequences.
   4. A few ESS prisoners who are about to be released seek out opportunities to make contact with other ESS prisoners, asking them about their “friends and relatives” outside of prison or giving other prisoners their contact details so that they might make contact after they leave prison and continue pursuing their so-called “endeavors.”
   5. A few ESS prisoners who were leaders or core members possess extremely strong powers to draw people to them and incite them, making these prisoners ongoing risks. Periodically, former Hizb ut-Tahrir members will engage in separatist and sabotage activities in prison, such as making contact with each other, gathering together, recruiting [new members], and engaging in incitement.

内容提要：目前，改造危安犯任务繁重艰巨，新疆监狱危安犯表现出新的反改造特点，他们转变策略，从公开抗改，转变为伪装积极，服从管理，行动更加隐蔽，性质更加恶劣，危害更加严重。因此，我们决不能掉以轻心，要有针对性地制定一系列行之有效的对策和措施，使我们的工作从被动转变为主动，从根本上保障监狱的安全稳定。

关键词：危安犯、个别教育、“四防”、完善、稳定

多年来，新疆监狱在对危安犯的改造工作中，按照中央和自治区的指示和要求，紧紧围绕监狱工作宗旨，以提高罪犯教育改造质量为中心，以确保监狱安全稳定为重点，不断研究新形势下对危安犯教育改造的方法、手段，成功地转化了一大批危安犯头目和骨干分子，维护了狱内正常的改造秩序，保证了监狱的安全稳定，实现了“收得下”、“管的住”的目标。但就目前的现状而言，新疆监狱工作面临的形势仍然十分严峻，不容乐观。特别是改造危安犯的任务，非常艰巨，出现了许多必须予以充分重视，急待解决的新情况、新问题。

一、新疆监狱工作面临的形势

多年来新疆监狱民警通过不断学习培训，各族民警的执法能力和水平有了明显的提高。在监管改造方面采取强有力措施和手段，相继破获了多起狱内危安犯、刑事犯以及企图脱逃、暴狱、越狱案件，狱内改造秩序良好。但是，影响新疆监狱安全稳定的因素仍然存在，且呈现相互交织、复杂多变的特点，给维护监狱稳定工作带来了巨大的压力和挑战。

（一）国际环境复杂多变，恐怖主义危害上升，霸权主义和强权政治有新的表现。“美国因素”始终是威胁新疆社会政治稳定的总根源。

近年来，美国对所谓“新疆问题”的关注越来越直接、越来越具体，层面越来越高，范围越来越广，知识力度不断加大，重点关注涉及新疆的人权、民族、宗教等问题。图谋通过整合民族分裂势力，加大对新疆的渗透和破坏力度，加快“新疆问题国际化”的步伐。企图实现“祸水东引”的阴谋[1]。在美国的策划和支持下，2005年以来，新疆周边的国家，先后发生了“颜色革命”。这些国家的社会控制能力愈加消弱，宗教极端思想盛行，暴力恐怖活动猖獗，新疆周边形势变的越来越复杂。

（二）境内外“三股势力”仍十分活跃

当前，境内外“三股势力”的活动突出表现在三个方面：一是进一步加速谋求联合化、国家化、政治化；二是积极谋划暴力恐怖破坏活动；三是加大舆论煽动力度，进行思想渗透。各种迹象表明，境内外“三股势力”正在预谋更加险恶的犯罪活动，随时都有实施暴力恐怖活动的可能，其中监狱被他们列为袭击破坏的重点。

（三）“伊扎布特”组织的活动再次活跃

“伊扎布特”组织是一个跨国的奉行伊斯兰原教旨主义的极端政治组织。在多次被我政府打掉其有组织的渗透活动中，不甘心失败，一直没有停止对我区的破坏活动。其组织也与以往发生很大变化，“本土化”、“政党化”、“暴力化”更加明显。

（四）在职民警严重缺编，警犯比例严重失调

警力的严重不足已成为影响监狱安全稳定、制约改造质量提高的主要因素。尤其是改造危安犯工作的特殊性与警力不足的矛盾十分突出，与司法部提出的“监狱人民警察编制应不低于押犯数的18%”的要求相差很远，我区民警编制数占押犯比例仅为15.1%。

（五）经费不足，装备落后

近年来，在上级部门的大力支持下，新疆监狱布局调整工作进展顺利，监狱基本建设落后的局面有所改善。但随着监管改造工作压力的不断增大，监狱技术装备不配套、技术手段落后的矛盾越来越突出，建设一个相对完善的监狱安全技术防范系统的任务刻不容缓。

二、危安犯的心理特点

（一）总体特点

（二）分类特点

【第二部分将在稍后刊登。】

注释：

1. 1. 参见张华中《当前暴力恐怖犯罪的特点、趋势与决策》载《暴力恐怖犯罪研究》。新疆人民出版社，1999年4月。
   2. 参见钱诗武、孙新民《浅议新疆在押暴力恐怖罪犯的特点和监管改造对策》载《暴力恐怖犯罪研究》。新疆人民出版社，1999年4月。
   3. 参见易正《新疆暴力恐怖活动的政治取向》载《暴力恐怖犯罪研究》。新疆人民出版社，1999年4月。

参考文献：

1. 扬征，《暴力恐怖犯罪研究》。新疆人民出版社，1999年4月。
2. 王吉业，《以社会主义法制理念统领监狱各项工作》载《中国监狱》。2006年第5期
3. 新疆监狱学会，《新疆监狱系统改造危安犯交流》专辑载《监狱研究》。2005年第12期。
4. 李卫国、孙新民《新时期“危安犯”监管工作现状及深化途径探析》载《监狱研究》。2006年第5期。

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