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Dialogue is written by the staff of The Dui Hua Foundation, a non-profit organization dedicated to advancing the protection of universally recognized human rights in China and the United States.

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UN Rapporteur: “Torture in China Widespread, but Declining”

Since assuming the post of United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture in December 2004, Manfred Nowak has been a busy man, undertaking missions to four countries—Georgia, Mongolia, Nepal and China—and negotiating (to date unsuccessfully) access to detainees at the American naval base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. He was a leader in the calls for investigation into the June 2005 killings of protesters in Uzbekistan and was sharply critical of the Mugabe government’s forced evictions in Zimbabwe and the Iranian government’s treatment of imprisoned journalists.

In his statements following each country visit, Nowak, an Austrian- and American-trained legal scholar with many years of experience fighting human rights abuses, has pulled no punches. In short order, he has become a key spokesman in the global struggle against torture and other cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment.

In Georgia, the special rapporteur (hereafter SR) found that torture exists, but welcomed positive developments since the November 2003 “Rose Revolution.” At the end of his visit to Mongolia, the SR reported that torture persisted, especially in police detention centers, and he expressed concern about the situations of prisoners on death row and those serving 30-year prison sentences. He was harshest about the government of Nepal, whose police, armed police, and army practice systematic torture; at the same time he condemned “shocking cases of particularly cruel punishments” carried out by Maoist rebels there.

From November 21 to December 2, Nowak and a team of UN experts visited China. During the visit, which took 10 years to negotiate, the SR examined detention centers and prisons (as well as one reeducation-through-labor facility) in Beijing, Urumqi, and Lhasa, and he was able to interview, in private, many detainees—including several of the country’s best known political prisoners. He was received by the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs responsible for China’s human rights diplomacy, Shen Guofang, and held meetings with senior officials of the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Ministry of Justice. (Shen was transferred to a job in a ministry-affiliated publishing house about three weeks after the SR’s visit; there does not appear to be a connection between the two events.)

“A Palpable Level of Fear”

At the end of his visit, Nowak issued a statement that he amplified several weeks later in his first report to the Human Rights Commission. Torture, the SR concluded, was widespread in China but on the decline, particularly in the urban areas. He expressed special concern about the practice, both in prisons and in “reeducation through labor” facilities, of “reeducating” persons with dissident or non-conformist opinions, labeling the practice a “systematic form of inhuman and degrading treatment.”

Nowak thanked China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its assistance throughout the trip and stated that “in principle” his

terms of reference were respected. However, he complained of “impediments and restrictions” imposed on his activities by the public security and state security ministries, including heavy surveillance of his team and intimidation of human rights defenders and relatives of detainees he wished to interview. He was unable to meet with some people because they were forced to leave Beijing while he was there. Despite these problems, Nowak was able to hold meetings with independent monitors and relatives of detainees.

China adhered to a strict interpretation of the SR’s terms of reference, but Nowak was disappointed that he was not able to make unannounced visits, take pictures or make recordings during interviews, or bring along physicians and psychiatrists. Wardens were unwilling to extend the hours prisoners were allowed to have visitors, thus precluding the opportunity of interviews during the evening. Nowak observed a “palpable level of fear and self-censorship” on the part of detainees he interviewed, which he had not experienced on his other missions in 2005. Many detainees refused to be interviewed, and most of those who agreed to be interviewed demanded strict confidentiality.

A Laundry List of Reforms

The SR’s list of 17 recommendations for the Chinese government, announced in Beijing to the international press, is a veritable laundry list of things that Beijing must do to improve respect for human rights and the abolition of torture. Not surprisingly, they are all advocated by lead-

ers of legal reform within China.

The recommendations range from amending the criminal law by adding the crime of torture as defined in the Covenant Against Torture (to which China was an early signatory) to reforming the criminal procedure law to insure defendants fair trials, from doing away with “reeducation through labor” to abolishing the death penalty for non-violent crimes. He urged ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the establishment of an independent complaints mechanism for torture and a national human rights institution in accordance with UN principles.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not wait long to reject the SR’s conclusion that torture is widespread and claimed in response that the country has made effective efforts against torture. In a December 6, 2005 press conference, foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang suggested that the SR had jumped to his conclusions based on “a two-

week trip to only three cities.” The spokesman added: “As far as we know, there were no public security or state security personnel impeding family members of detainees from having meetings with the rapporteur. There were no such staff stalking and monitoring the activities of Mr. Nowak. The general principles of the visit were fully respected.”

While both the SR and the Chinese government have staked out opposing positions on what conclusions can be drawn from the visit, it is clear that both sides see the mission as a success. The trip, China’s spokesman said, “had enhanced mutual trust and created favorable conditions for later cooperation.” Nowak called his visit “a major step of mutual cooperation between the United Nations and the PRC.” It is likely that the visit will be seen as a landmark event in the fight against torture in China, and it will be useful to those both inside and outside of the Chinese government committed to legal and penal reform. ■



The main gate of Tibet Autonomous Region (Drapchi) Prison in Lhasa. UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Manfred Nowak visited three of Tibet’s four prisons, including Drapchi, Lhasa (Utritru) Prison, and the newly opened Qushui (Chushur) Prison.

Photo Credit: www.house.gov

An Interview with Manfred Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture

After completing his visit to China, Manfred Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture (SR), gave a wide-ranging interview to Dui Hua's John Kamm and Joshua Rosenzweig (DH).

DH: In Beijing you stated that the Chinese had "in principle" respected the terms of your mandate, but you brought up a number of restrictions and obstructions.

SR: Yes. That's not unusual: governments accept the terms of reference and then still try to interfere. It didn't get to the point where they violated the terms of reference. But I have the right to freedom of inquiry, and every interference with my counterparts—be they victims, lawyers, human rights defenders, whoever—is in principle an infringement of the terms of reference. It was not such a serious violation that I [would have] quit the whole exercise, but on several occasions I really had to protest to my main counterpart, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA]. The problem was that the MFA was very helpful and concerned that my mission go ahead without any major interference, but on the other hand the Ministry of State Security did obstruct.

DH: Shortly after you left Beijing, an MFA spokesman insisted that there were no security personnel impeding family members of detainees from meeting with you [and] there were no staff stalking or monitoring your activities.

SR: I have proof, which I have provided to the MFA. For instance in my conversations with [Beijing human rights lawyer] Gao [Zhisheng], I counted a total of nine secret service agents in the very hotel where we were meeting. . . . The government knew, of course, that I met him because I protested the circumstances of our meeting. When we were meeting on the first evening in a public restaurant, it was clearly filled with people who put us under surveillance. We had to leave the restaurant and go to the hotel in order to continue without being directly observed. There were a couple of other instances. In particular, there were family members of detainees whom we wanted to meet where we have evidence that people were actually prevented by force—taken out of Beijing in order to prevent them from meeting me. I shall make these individual cases public in my report.

DH: How far in advance did the people who run the detention centers and prisons know that you were coming? Some have speculated that they had one or two hours notice before you would show up at a detention center, is that correct?

SR: Yes. Again, I would not call this a violation of my terms

of reference because they actually don't say anything about unannounced visits, they just say "visits to all places of detention." So, legally speaking, [the Chinese] could still say you have to announce. There was pressure on me to announce, and I refused up until the beginning of the mission.

What I usually do is ask the respective ministries for a letter authorizing me to visit any place of detention that I can just show. Usually, I never announce; I just go to a particular place and say who I am and if they make problems then I show this letter, which usually opens the doors. Now, I could not receive such a letter [in China]. Again, the letter is not mentioned in the terms of reference, so the fact that I did not receive one is not a violation; it's just that it's my normal method of work.

I was told that the only way that the MFA could ensure unrestricted access to places of detention was if they accompanied me. I have not done this in any other country. If I were to meet the president or the prime minister or any other high-level governmental people, for example, I would typically be accompanied by the protocol officer or someone else from the foreign ministry, but of course I would not usually have anybody with me when I visit prisons. This was different in China.

In practice, of course, that means that I have to tell them at a certain point where we are going. They would have liked it if I announced it the day before so that they could prepare, but I said no. In the end it worked out quite well. We said, "Okay, we'll meet at 9 AM in the hotel lobby and then I'll tell you where we're going." If the facility was an hour away, then they had an hour's advance notice; if it was just half an hour driving, then they had a half-hour notice. When the MFA escort stepped into the car, [I'd tell them]. They would get on the mobile phone and announce that we were coming.

In principle, I would still call these unannounced visits. In half an hour you can't totally change the situation. There was not one prison where I did not have access, and within the prisons I could meet whomever I wanted to meet, if the people were there. Usually those I had on my list and was looking for, I could meet.

DH: You were not allowed to bring any cameras or any sound recording devices with you into the prisons. In your country visits prior to going to China, were such restrictions placed on you?

SR: Again, the terms of reference are very general. There's nothing written that says I have the right to bring a camera. On the other hand, it says that I have the full right to carry out my investigation. Now, in my interpretation, that means that I have to bring a camera. But that's [something] I understand my predecessors never did.

I also like to take doctors—again, my predecessors have to my knowledge not had doctors accompanying them. In my opinion, if I really want to take evidence on persons who have been subjected at least to physical torture, but partly also [to] mental torture, it's the doctor who is in a much better position [to make an assessment.] It's my opinion that I need to take photos and [in the past] I've just insisted and it has worked. In China, it didn't work, but again I would not call this a violation of the terms of reference. I call it an obstruction because it made it more difficult for me to obtain evidence. If someone has a scar on his or her body and you take a photo then this is of course stronger evidence than if you just write it down.

It's not just signs of torture on the body; it's also the whole atmosphere—if you take a photo of an overcrowded cell, that describes it ten times better than a whole page of description. So, I am just used—and I will continue in the future—to take cameras and other equipment in order to take evidence, but it is kind of on the margin of interpreting the terms, so I want to be very careful: this is not what I would call a violation of my terms of reference.

DH: In the area of transparency and statistics, was any progress made, for instance, on getting the number of executions in China?

SR: No, they haven't told me. I haven't really insisted, because, strictly speaking, the death penalty as such does not fall under my mandate. Of course, if there are certain methods of execution or if there are kinds of punishment in addition—like the way people are treated on death row—then that definitely falls under my mandate. There is now a decision that the Supreme People's Court has the unrestricted right to review every death sentence and that is a major improvement. In my conversations, and I will also make this recommendation, I have said that we should take this improvement as a starting point for better monitoring of death sentences and hopefully for the government to make statistics public. In principle, those proceedings before the Supreme People's Court are public, so if people take the time to monitor this we should know how many cases the court approves.

DH: Prior to your visit, you collected what few statistics on torture the Chinese government has released. Did you get any new statistics

that might support your principal conclusion that torture remains widespread although apparently in decline in certain areas? Did they give statistics on torture that they have not already released publicly?

SR: I asked wherever I went for regional or local statistics about complaints, cases brought before the courts, and cases in which people have actually been prosecuted. The information I received, however, is in my opinion more proof that these kinds of complaints mechanisms are not taken very seriously or are not working very well rather than evidence that there's quite a high amount of cases where the government is admitting torture.

The information from the Supreme People's Procuratorate that I cited in my press release is not very strong. In a country the size of China, the cases that they admit would not prove the allegation of widespread torture. If you compare that with most other countries, it would not be high—probably in my country [Austria], compared to the population, the cases of ill-treatment that are proven are probably higher there than (what the Chinese government) claims take place in China.

DH: You detected a "palpable fear" that you hadn't seen elsewhere.

SR: I have been on four country visits during my first year in office, but in these four cases the only one where I concluded that torture is systematic is Nepal. Why did I conclude that? Partly because—and this might sound like a contradiction—although torture is systematic, prisoners, detainees, and, in particular, convicted prisoners—are fairly easy in telling you torture stories. The fear of repercussion is not that strong. In China, it was difficult—in pre-trial detention facilities, in reeducation-through-labor camps, and in prisons—to find people who would talk to me. Going into a cell and trying to find one person who would be willing to talk to me was often difficult or even impossible. But this is not necessarily only fear. This is also a certain culture of being disciplined, a culture of obedience. At one point I said it's not only the communist past but it's also the Confucianist past. It's this very strict disciplinary regime that I found in every place of detention in which people behave in a manner that is different from all the other places that I have seen.

DH: We understand from media accounts that you met with at least two individuals, He Depu and Yang Jianli.

SR: Yes.

DH: He Depu described torture suffered not in Beijing Number Two Prison but in the detention facility, is that correct?

SR: Yes.

DH: Generally speaking, in China are instances of torture for which we have credible accounts taking place primarily in detention centers as opposed to prisons?

SR: Yes, it's true. From the evidence that I've received, I would say that for torture in the classical sense, that is to extract confessions, there are definitely more instances in which people said it occurred in pre-trial detention facilities or in police lock-ups. But I am also very much concerned about—whether one qualifies it as torture or inhumane treatment, that's a legal question—punishments or what I would call brainwashing or breaking the will of a person for the mere fact that people didn't confess. And this is not just a question of pre-trial detention, it is also a question of post-trial or post-conviction sentencing [in which] people are put under different regimes simply because they didn't confess—and I'm talking primarily about political prisoners, prisoners of ethnic communities, etc.

There is a very strong pressure, and that is actually one of my main concerns—what I call breaking the will of a person. Even when prior to and during trial people remain strong in saying, “No, I didn't do anything wrong, I stand behind what I did, I'm not a counterrevolutionary” or “I stand behind the Dalai Lama,” after conviction at a certain point they give up and say, “I just want to get out of here.”

DH: Our foundation is not just focused on China; we also work on US questions. Where do things stand with your visit to Guantánamo?

SR: The visit was not agreed upon. We responded to the US invitation by announcing that we would visit on December 6, but [only] on the condition that the US complies with our terms of reference. The only point that was controversial was [with respect to] interaction with the detainees. We needed their assurances in order to proceed with preparations and set a November 18 deadline. Since we didn't receive those assurances we canceled the visit.

I'm not expecting to visit Guantánamo before we present our report to the [Human Rights] Commission. The report as such was presented to the [US] government at the beginning of January, and we have received their reply and are in the process of finalizing our report. None of this means that I'm closing any doors; I would still be happy to have access to Guantánamo but only [in full compliance with our terms]. This is non-negotiable.

My last public or official encounter with a US representative was, I believe, on December 22 when I spoke before the Permanent Council of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Vienna, on which occasion the Russian

representative reiterated his invitation to the Russian Federation, including Chechnya, and the US representative said that she hoped that I would reconsider and still accept the invitation on the old condition of non-interaction with detainees. I said clearly that I would not. So I hope the US government changes their position.

That was the last official interaction that I have had, so my expectation is that there will be no visit until we present our report to the commission. Then it is in principle up to the commission how to act upon our recommendations, whether there will be a resolution or not, but irrespective of that I still hope that the US government will cooperate, not only on Guantánamo but also on other places of detention for which I receive allegations of ill-treatment, and that there will be more transparency. Actually, I'm fairly confident that there will be more openness in the future.

DH: A federal judge has instructed the US government to release the names of detainees in Guantánamo.

SR: That's just one of the positive signs. There are a number of positive signs. The McCain Amendment as such is a positive sign, irrespective of the presidential “signing statement” and of the Graham Amendment. Some of the statements that [Secretary of State] Condoleeza Rice made during her Europe trip gave me some hope and confidence that there is a certain opening-up. Also on the judicial front, as you just said, there are certain positive tendencies.

DH: Finishing up with China, aside from the reporting taking place in March, do you have plans for a follow-up visit?

SR: It's premature to think about that now. The normal procedure is first a written follow-up. I'm hoping that some of my recommendations will be implemented. And of course it depends on the Commission and whether it will take up a resolution, either a general one or a country-specific one.

We are now in the process of reforming the UN human rights machinery. The Human Rights Council will hopefully work in a different manner than the Commission, [which would mean] not just having country resolutions but having what is called peer-review or interactive dialogue. Expert bodies—be they treaty-monitoring bodies or special procedures or fact-finding bodies—should come up with their reports and their recommendations, but then it's up to the political bodies—and that will be the Human Rights Council in the future—who should then do the follow-up. ■

NEW RESEARCH & PRISONER INFORMATION

China Confirms Release of Tibetan Nuns

According to recent information provided by the Chinese government, Tibetan nuns **Chogdrub Drolma** (曲珠卓玛) and **Jangchub Drolma** (强久卓玛) were both released from prison on April 30, 2004. This information, which gave no details other than the release date, corroborates unconfirmed reports that surfaced last year suggesting that the two women had been released early. The official information provided no details other than the date of release.

The two nuns, who are both believed to be 33 years old, were arrested in separate incidents after carrying out brief pro-independence protests in Lhasa in February 1995. Most accounts state that Chogdrub Drolma was sentenced to six years' imprisonment for "counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement" and that Jangchub Drolma received a five-year sentence. Both were transferred to Drapchi Prison, which is now known as the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Prison.

According to reports, the two nuns were among three women who received sentence extensions for taking part in demonstrations inside the prison in May 1998. Prison officials had organized some of the women prisoners to sing patriotic songs during a flag-raising ceremony, but the women shouted pro-independence slogans and expressed support for the Dalai Lama instead. Jangchub Drolma was reportedly given a six-year sentence extension and Chogdrub Drolma appears to have received a five-year extension.

Following these long-awaited releases and the recently confirmed March 22, 2005 release of **Anu** (阿努), an amputee seamstress sentenced to four years' imprisonment for "inciting splittism," the only known female political prisoner in the TAR is **Nyima Choedron** (尼玛曲珍), who after reductions to her 10-year sentence for "splittism" is now due for release on February 26, 2007. (She was visited in TAR Prison by UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Manfred Nowak in late November.) It is possible, however, that there have been new imprisonments of which we are not yet aware.

Sentence Reduction for Veteran Activist

Dui Hua has learned from information provided by the Chinese government that veteran activist **He Zhaohui** (何朝辉) received a one-year sentence reduction in December 2004. Sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment in 1999 for "illegally providing state secrets or intelligence to foreign entities," He is now due for release from Hunan Province's Chishan Prison on October 10, 2007.

He Zhaohui spent time in prison following the crackdown on the 1989 pro-democracy demonstrations, during which he participated as a member of the Changsha Workers' Autonomous Federation. Sentenced to four years in prison for "gathering a crowd to disrupt traffic," He appears to have been released ahead of schedule in January 1993. In October 1998, He was again detained by police on suspicion of providing information about local labor unrest in Hunan Province. Police allege that He received US\$300 from an American university professor in exchange for information about protests by workers laid off from local state-run factories.

According to the Chinese government, the Yiyang Intermediate People's Court granted He's sentence reduction on account of his display of repentance.

Another Uyghur "Splittism" Case Uncovered

The following case uncovered by Dui Hua researchers was reported in part by Agence France-Presse in August 1999, but not all of the names were given in that account.

On July 23, 1999, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) Fourth Agricultural Division Intermediate Court held a sentencing rally in the open-air movie theater of the 64th Corps, which is located in Korgas [Huocheng] County, a multiethnic area near the border with Kazakhstan. There, in front of more than 1,300 spectators, the court sentenced 18 defendants accused of splittism to prison terms of up to 15 years.

According to an August 12, 1999 report in *Xinjiang Legal News* (新疆法制报), the 18 defendants were ac-

cused of “joining together to split the country, destroy national unity, and undermine the Party’s religious policies.” Lead defendants **Shirmehmet Abdureshid** (西尔买买提·阿不都热西提), **Ekrem Qurbantai** (艾克热木·库尔班太), and **Abdurazaq Abdureshid** (阿不都热扎克·阿不都热西提) were sentenced to 15 years, 14 years, and 13 years’ imprisonment, respectively, each with subsequent deprivation of political rights for five years. The remaining 15 defendants, who were not named in the article, received prison sentences of 10 years or fewer.

In the coming months, The Dui Hua Foundation will request updates on these three prisoners’ situations from the Chinese government.

Another Obscure Prisoner Identified

Over the past year, Dui Hua has been trying to learn more about the identities of some of the obscure political prisoners whose sentence reductions were reported by the Chinese government in an unprecedented release

of information in January 2005. We recently tracked down another of these prisoners, **Chen Jianguo** (陈建国) from Shandong Province.


According to a November 10, 1999 China News Service report, Chen Jianguo was arrested on subversion charges by police in the provincial capital Ji’nan in late 1999. A 34-year-old employee of a technology company at the time of his arrest, Chen had been sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for “counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement” in March 1996. After being released early from prison in September 1998, Chen secretly established the “China National Freedom Party” (中国国家自由党) in July of the following year and began recruiting members. He allegedly planned to travel to Hong Kong in order to visit the United States consulate there and introduce his party in a bid to obtain financial support.

According to information received from the Chinese government in January 2005, Chen Jianguo was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment in 2000. After receiving a one-year sentence reduction in 2004, he is now due to be released from prison in November 2010.

“Endangering State Security” Arrests Rise More Than 25% in 2004

With the recent publication of *Law Yearbook of China 2005*, China has revealed new statistics for prosecutions in state security crimes for 2004. After dropping sharply in 2003, it appears that both formal arrests and indictments for crimes of “endangering state security” may be rebounding. (Formal arrests are authorized by the procuratorate in cases for which there is believed to be sufficient evidence to hold a suspect for further investigation beyond the initial 30-day detention limit. Under China’s legal system, indictments for state security crimes almost always result in trial and conviction.)

Individuals Arrested and Indicted for Endangering State Security in China, 1998-2004



Sources: *Law Yearbook of China* 中国法律年鉴, 1999-2005 editions.

Kamm Speaks in Beijing, Hong Kong

In October 2005, Dui Hua's Executive Director John Kamm gave a number of speeches in mainland China and Hong Kong, several of which received international media attention.

On October 21, Kamm gave two speeches in Beijing. The first, given to the Foreign Correspondents' Club of China was entitled "The Business of Human Rights: 15 Years of Dialogue with the Chinese Government." Kamm's remarks were widely published in newspapers around the world.

Later in the day, Kamm spoke before more than 120 students, faculty members, and interested individuals at Renmin University. Entitled "Human Rights and US-China Relations: What the Polls Say," Kamm's talk was a detailed presentation of American perceptions of China over the past decade as seen through the eyes of the general public, politicians, businesspeople, opinion leaders, and members of the general public. Kamm explored the impact of trade, military issues, politics, and human rights on Sino-American relations and concluded that human rights is still the biggest issue in US-China relations. After the speech, Kamm was made an honorary visiting professor of the university.

In Hong Kong, Kamm addressed the Vision 2047 Foundation, the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, and the Asia Society.

Dui Hua Statement on Observing Trials

On October 27, 2005, Dui Hua's Executive Director John Kamm issued a statement regarding attendance by foreigners at Chinese trials. The statement followed months of meetings and exchanges between Dui Hua and Chinese officials concerning remarks made by Xiao Yang, president of China's Supreme People's Court, during an October 2004 speech in San Francisco. In his speech, President Xiao stated that,

aside from the three types of cases explicitly required to be heard in closed sessions (cases involving juveniles, state secrets, or individual privacy issues), all Chinese trials are open to the public—including foreigners.

Chinese officials confirmed to Kamm that foreigners may attend all trials except those in the aforementioned categories and have asserted that foreigners may attend trials of endangering state security not involving state secrets. However, officials stated that even though as a matter of law foreigners should be allowed to attend Chinese trials, as a matter of practice, generally only trials involving foreigners as defendants or claimants have to date been open to foreigners.

Kamm has been told that he will be allowed to attend a trial of endangering state security or disturbing the social order involving protests by workers in labor disputes or others involved in illegal demonstrations on a future trip to China.

MFA Confirms Release of Jiang Weiping

In a January 3, 2006 e-mail from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dui Hua received confirmation of the release earlier that day of Jiang Weiping, an investigative journalist who angered powerful government officials with his exposés of corruption in China's northeast.

Jiang, who had been serving a six-year sentence for "illegally providing state secrets to foreign entities" and "inciting subversion," left Dalian's Nanguanling Prison one year ahead of schedule after receiving word that the remainder of his sentence had been commuted by the Dalian Intermediate People's Court.

Jiang's high-profile arrest in December 2000 led to outpourings of support from organizations concerned with human rights and press freedoms, and his case was repeatedly raised by nearly all foreign governments that conduct human rights dialogues with China.