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POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS CRIME  
IN ZHEJIANG PROVINCE

浙江省政治宗教  
案件专辑

中

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对

话

Occasional Publications of  
The Dui Hua Foundation

NUMBER TWENTY

December 2005

## Chapter Four: Selected Documents and Cases

Location: 象山县  
Xiangshan County

Source: 象山县公安志, 1993年, 第110—111页  
*Xiangshan County Public Security Records*, pp. 110–111

### 象山县人民政府

#### 关于取缔反动组织“呼喊派”的布告

查禁几年来, 我县少数反动分子, 在国外对势力的支持和资助下, 打着宗教旗号, 蒙骗一部分群众, 建立所谓“呼喊派”的反动组织, 进行反革命和违法犯罪活动, 妄图颠覆人民民主专政, 推翻社会主义制度。他们秘密接受流亡在国外的原基督教聚会处中反动分子李常受等的指令, 从国外偷运传播反动宣传品, 散布反动传单, 进行反革命煽动, 利用宗教形式, 举行非法聚会, 欺骗、愚弄不明真相的群众, 呼喊反动口号, 侮辱爱国宗教人士和信教公民, 哄闹政府机关, 围攻公职人员, 扭打群众, 破坏社会秩序。“呼喊派”的活动, 严重危害社会治安, 危害四化建设, 危害国家和人民的利益, 激起了人民群众的公愤。

本政府据宪法第三十六条关于“国家保护正常的宗教活动, 任何人不得利用宗教进行破坏社会秩序, 损害公民身体健康, 妨碍国家教育制度的活动。宗教团体和宗教事务不受外国势力的支配”的规定, 决定宣布“呼喊派”为反动组织, 予以取缔。自即日起, 解散其所有组织, 禁止一切非法活动, 收缴反动宣传品。对该组织的首要分子, 由司法机关依法惩处。凡“呼喊派”组织中非法聚会场所负责人以上的人员, 接到本通知二十天内, 向本府设立的登记处登记, 交出反动宣传品和活动经费, 并声明退出反动组织, 停止非法活动。被蒙骗参加过“呼喊派”活动的公民, 应当自动脱离, 一律不予追究, 不加歧视。凡属正常的宗教活动, 政府依法予以保护。

本布告仰我县全体公民一律遵照执行, 违者必究。

象山县人民政府  
一九八三年八月十五日

**Xiangshan County People's Government**  
**Notice on the Suppression of the Reactionary "Shouters" Organization**

In recent years a small number of reactionary elements in this county, with support and funding from hostile forces overseas, have waved the banner of religion to cheat a portion of the public, establish the so-called "Shouters" reactionary organization, and carry out counterrevolutionary and illegal criminal activities in a futile attempt to subvert the people's democratic dictatorship and overthrow the socialist system. They have received secret orders from the reactionary Li Changshou and others formerly [active] in Christian house churches in China and now in exile overseas. They have smuggled and disseminated reactionary propaganda, distributed reactionary leaflets, and incited counterrevolution. Using the forms of religion, they have held illegal gatherings, cheating and duping the public who do not know the truth of the matter. They shout reactionary slogans, insult patriotic Christian personages and believing citizens, cause disturbances at government bodies, attack government employees, grapple with members of the public, and disrupt social order. The "Shouters'" activities do serious harm to social peace and order, to the construction of the four modernizations, and to the interests of the nation and people and have roused the people's indignation.

This government has decided to ban the "Shouters" as a reactionary organization on the basis of Article 36 of the Constitution, which stipulates: "The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens, or interfere with the state educational system. Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign control." Effective today, its entire organization shall be disbanded, all illegal activities shall be prohibited, and reactionary propaganda shall be confiscated. The judicial organs shall punish the leaders of the organization according to the law. All illegal house churches personnel at the level of "responsible person" and above shall, within twenty days of receiving this notice, register at the registration location(s) established by this government, hand over reactionary propaganda and activity funds, and shall moreover declare their withdrawal from the reactionary organization and cessation of illegal activities. Citizens who were hoodwinked into taking part in "Shouters" activities who drop out voluntarily shall, without exception, be subject to no investigation or discrimination. All normal religious activities will be protected by the government.

This bulletin relies on the compliance of the entire citizenry of this county for its execution; violators will be investigated.

Xiangshan County People's Government  
August 15, 1983



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STATISTICS ON POLITICAL CRIME  
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

VOLUME 3

中华人民共和国  
政治犯罪数据统计  
第三卷

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Occasional Publications of  
The Dui Hua Foundation

NUMBER TWENTY-THREE

December 2006

## PUBLIC SECURITY

A main focus of Dui Hua's research continues to be uncovering sources that describe the work of the political security (*zhengzhi baowei*) section of China's public security apparatus. We have examined hundreds of open-source publications that describe the law-enforcement methods of local police throughout China, through which we continue to gain a better understanding of how they handle political and religious crime.

### The Targeted Population

Dui Hua has uncovered the names of thousands of individuals who have been detained since 1980 by Chinese authorities for the expression of their political and religious beliefs. Many of these individuals are known to have been imprisoned for their activities, but in many instances we know only that someone has been detained by police at some point in time without knowing exactly how his or her case was ultimately handled.

Despite not knowing the outcome of such cases, all of these names are nevertheless entered into Dui Hua's database out of certainty that these individuals form a significant portion of the so-called "targeted population" (*zhongdian renkou*)—a group we have discussed in previous volumes in this series. The practice of keeping files on certain "targets" dates at least from 1985, when the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) issued regulations on the subject. We have not seen a copy of the regulations themselves, but some of their content can be inferred from other documents describing the system. For example, there are four broad categories of targets:

- Individuals suspected of engaging in activities that threaten state security, engaging in other criminal activity, or being a threat to public order;
- Individuals who, because of civil disputes, are believed to have a potential for engaging in reckless activities such as committing a violent act or creating a disturbance;
- Individuals sentenced by a court to public surveillance, deprivation of political rights, suspended sentence, parole, or a sentence to be served outside of prison, or those whom police have placed under residential surveillance or released on bail pending further investigation; and,
- Individuals recently released from prison, "reeducation through labor" (RTL), or "custody and education."

A file on each targeted person is kept at his or her local precinct police station (*paichusuo*), which is responsible for "managing" the targets under its jurisdiction. The content of these files can include legal documents as well as unverified police intelligence, although "verified" and "unverified" items are supposed to be filed separately. According to a 2004 article discussing implementation of the targeted population system, MPS regulations were requiring each police station to maintain at least two targets per 1,000 persons in its jurisdiction, but in many locations police had failed to meet their quotas. However, the limited statistical evidence that Dui Hua has collected on this subject suggests that, at least in the 1990s, police were exceeding this standard. (It is possible, of course, that the two-

**Table 1: Targeted Population Compared to Total Population, Heilongjiang Provincial Forest District, 1985–2000**

Year	Total Population	Targeted Population	Ratio (%)
1985	757,418	5,482	7.2
1986	792,035	5,410	6.8
1987	790,901	4,777	6.0
1988	795,755	4,581	5.8
1989	803,448	4,853	6.0
1990	791,744	5,198	6.6
1991	786,532	8,355	10.6
1992	772,823	8,762	11.3
1993	N/A	7,402	N/A
1994	776,996	6,792	8.7
1995	647,739	6,157	9.5
1996	674,453	6,067	9.0
1997	719,575	5,813	8.1
1998	744,400	5,064	6.8
1999	744,400	4,296	5.8
2000	738,100	3,645	4.9

Source: *Heilongjiang Provincial Forest District Public Security Records* 《黑龙江省林业公安志》(2002)

per-thousand requirement came into effect more recently and that a much higher quota was in place during the period for which we have statistics.)

As shown in Table 1, for the period from 1985 to 2000, the public security bureaus under the Heilongjiang General Bureau of Forest Industry (which have jurisdiction over the province’s many state-owned timber cultivation areas) managed a target population of more than seven targets per 1,000 persons on average. Table 2 reveals an average annual rate of nearly five per thousand in Panlong District, an urban section of Kunming in Yunnan Province, from 1990 to 1996. In Hangzhou, as shown in Table 3 (p. 6), the ratio remained relatively steady at just under four per thousand for the 1995–2001 period.

**Table 2: Targeted Population Statistics for Panlong District (Kunming), 1990–95**

Year	Year-End Total	Ratio vs. Total Population (%)	Individuals Added		Individuals Removed			"Help & Education" (H&E)				Leads Provided	Cases Solved
			Newly Added	Other	Withdrawn	Target of Criminal Investigation	Other	H&E Small Group	H&E Member	H&E Target	Ceased Activities		
1990	2,439	6.4	537	38	354	56	79	103	351	120	115	152	384
1991	2,614	6.9	978	38	522	220	99	162	155	299	158	171	441
1992	2,073	5.3	880	41	916	418	128	47	144	47	45	297	319
1993	1,428	3.6	518	13	710	406	60	33	124	34	25	292	276
1994	1,295	3.2	558	32	366	299	58	23	70	28	19	172	198
1995	1,477	3.6	522		177	163		33	98	25	25	219	118

Source: *Panlong District Public Security Records, Vol. 3* 《盘龙区公安志续二》(1998)

As we see in Table 2, an important police function with respect to the targeted population is the carrying out of “help and education” (*banjiao*). This is defined as a form of non-coercive guidance, assistance, education, and supervision administered by police on former offenders within the first five years after release from prison and the first three years after release from RTL. Targets are visited at least four times a year by members of “help and education small groups” (*banjiao xiaozu*). Particularly targeted are ex-prisoners without registered housing, employment, or other means of

support after their release; individuals believed to be likely re-offenders; and juvenile offenders. In addition, Falun Gong practitioners have also been a particular focus of the “help and education” program.

Table 2 and Table 3 also reveal the importance of the targeted population for police with respect to solving crime. Being under close police scrutiny means that individuals who are suspected of re-offending can be dealt with more swiftly by the authorities. Targets are also known to be recruited and used as informants, becoming the source of leads that assist in solving other cases.

**Table 3: Targeted Population Statistics for Hangzhou, 1995–2001**

Year		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Individuals Added	Total	8,902	7,470	8,906	8,314	4,969	7,471	7,747
	Urban	6,320	2,224	7,022	2,699	1,109	1,774	4,917
	Suburban	2,582	5,246	1,884	5,615	3,860	5,697	2,830
Individuals Removed	Total	7,960	7,417	6,723	8,560	4,098	5,000	6,313
	Urban	5,558	2,325	5,745	3,310	1,088	1,340	3,960
	Suburban	2,402	5,042	978	5,250	3,010	3,660	2,353
Year-End (Ratio vs. Total Population [‰])	Total	23,227 (3.88)	23,334 (3.87)	23,043 (3.79)	23,998 (3.92)	18,568 (3.01)	21,040 (3.38)	22,492 (3.58)
	Urban	17,334 (12.08)	8,221 (4.93)	18,160 (10.73)	8,415 (4.90)	5,632 (3.21)	6,090 (3.40)	12,993 (3.42)
	Suburban	5,893 (1.30)	15,113 (3.46)	4,883 (1.11)	15,583 (3.54)	12,936 (2.93)	14,950 (3.38)	9,499 (3.80)
Targeted Individuals Subject to Criminal Investigation	Total	1,592	2,229	1,545	1,575	1,387	1,436	1,540
	Urban	1,091	544	1,244	453	313	332	1,122
	Suburban	501	1,685	301	1,122	1,074	1,104	418
Leads Provided	Total	2,562	2,999	1,881	2,132	1,467	1,358	2,323
	Urban	1,544	773	1,461	724	370	379	971
	Suburban	1,018	2,226	420	1,408	1,097	979	1,352
Cases Solved	Total	2,150	2,515	2,041	2,126	1,427	1,255	11,292
	Urban	1,427	450	1,767	482	255	304	10,892
	Suburban	723	2,065	274	1,644	1,172	951	400

Source: *Hangzhou Public Security Yearbook 1995–2001* 《杭州公安年鉴 1995-2001》(2002)

## Defining Political Crime

In previous volumes we have tried to define the category “political crime” by looking at the different types of activities targeted by Chinese political security police. We noted that the categories used to record political offenses did not always correspond neatly with crimes as specified in the criminal code and concluded that “political cases are, for the most part, whatever the political security police at the local level say they are.”

The “political security” police—the importance of which has always been signified by its organizational designation as the “first” department or section within the public security apparatus—was given the new title of “domestic security protection” (*guojia anquan baowe*) police after a set of sweeping organizational changes in 1998 designed to give local police stations a larger role in the prevention of political disturbances and incidents. As part of the institutionalization of

**Table 4: Types of Cases Investigated by China's Domestic Security Protection Police**

**Crimes of Endangering State Security (危害国家安全案)**

Art. 102:	Treason (背叛国家案)
Art. 103(1):	Splittism (分裂国家案)
Art. 103(2):	Inciting Splittism (煽动分裂国家案)
Art. 104:	Armed Rebellion or Riot (武装叛乱、暴乱案)
Art. 105(1):	Subversion (颠覆国家政权案)
Art. 105(2):	Inciting Subversion (煽动颠覆国家政权案)
Art. 107:	Funding Activities That Endanger State Security (资助危害国家安全犯罪活动案)
Art. 108:	Defection to the Enemy and Turning Traitor (投敌叛变案)
Art. 109:	Defection (叛逃案)
Art. 110:	Espionage (间谍案)*
Art. 111:	Trafficking in State Secrets or Intelligence for Foreign Entities (为境外窃取、刺探、收买、非法提供国家秘密、情报案)
Art. 112:	Aiding the Enemy (资敌案)

**Crimes of Infringing on the Personal and Democratic Rights of Citizens (侵犯公民人身权利、民主权利案)**

Art. 246:	Defamation (诽谤案)**
Art. 249:	Inciting Ethnic Hatred or Discrimination (煽动民族仇恨、民族歧视案)
Art. 250:	Publishing Materials That Discriminate Against or Defame Minority Ethnic Groups (出版歧视、侮辱少数民族作品案)
Art. 251:	Illegally Depriving Citizens of Their Right to Free Religious Belief (非法剥夺公民信仰自由案)
Art. 251:	Infringement Upon the Customs of Minority Ethnic Groups (侵犯少数民族风俗习惯案)

**Crimes of Disturbing Social Order Administration (妨害社会管理秩序案)**

Art. 282(1):	Illegally Obtaining State Secrets (非法获取国家秘密案)
Art. 282(2):	Illegal Possession of State Secrets (非法持有国家绝密、机密文件、资料、物品案)
Art. 283:	Illegal Production or Sale of Espionage Equipment (非法生产、销售间谍专用器材案)
Art. 284:	Illegal Use of Equipment for Eavesdropping or Secret Photography (非法使用窃听、窃照专用器材案)
Art. 299:	Desecrating the National Flag or Seal (侮辱国旗、国徽案)
Art. 300(1):	Organizing or Using a Sect or Cult or Using Superstition to Undermine Implementation of the Law (组织、利用会道门、邪教组织、利用迷信破坏法律实施案)
Art. 300(2):	Organizing or Using a Sect or Cult or Using Superstition Leading to Death (组织、利用会道门、邪教组织、利用迷信致人死亡案)
Art. 311:	Refusing to Provide Evidence of Espionage Crimes (拒绝提供间谍犯罪证据案)

**Crimes of Endangering National Defense (危害国防利益案)**

Art. 377:	Intentionally Providing False Enemy Intelligence During Wartime (战时故意提供虚假敌情案)
Art. 378:	Spreading Rumors to Disturb Soldier Morale During Wartime (战时造谣扰乱军心案)

\* Only investigated by domestic security police in locations where no state security police organ has been established.

\*\* Excepting cases accepted as complaints only (*gaosu cai chuli de anjian*).

Source: *Encyclopedia of Public Security Police Station Work in the New Era* 《新时期公安派出所工作全书》(2005)



political security work at this local level (and reflecting the adoption of the revised criminal code in October 1997), new guidelines were established to delineate the operational scope of the new political security organization. If we continue to think of “political crime” as those cases that are investigated by the new domestic security protection police, we need to update our perception to reflect these new definitions. Table 4 (p. 7) shows the crimes designated by MPS regulation to be the responsibility of the domestic security protection police. Besides the 12 crimes that fall under the category of endangering state security, an additional 15 crimes fall under the categories of “infringing on the personal and democratic rights of citizens,” “disturbing social order administration,” and “endangering national defense.” The most common of these non-ESS crimes are Article 300—China’s anti-“cult” law—and Article 282’s provisions covering state secrets.

### Counting Political Cases

Ever since Dui Hua first began publishing these volumes of statistical data in 2001, we have attempted to extrapolate annual totals of political cases discovered by Chinese police based on the limited local figures we have been able to collect. In OP7, our “sample” comprised eight locations representing roughly 1.5 percent of the total population (based on 1990 census figures); in OP15, the sample grew to include 26 locations, or approximately 8 percent of the total. Continuing the same exercise here, we present data in Table 5 from 62 locations, which taken together represent about 11.2 percent of China’s total population.

Data in Table 5 was taken from 16 different provinces and autonomous regions, including figures for an entire province (Heilongjiang, 1980–85), 17 prefecture-level (*diji*) units, and 44 county-level (*xianji*) units. Because many of the materials collected by Dui Hua stop reporting figures around 1990, the data continue to be concentrated in the period from 1980 to 1985, where coverage equates to nearly 9 percent of China’s total population. (Coverage drops to 6 percent for the period from 1986 to 1990 and to 2.4 percent for the period from 1991 to 1995.)

Our estimates are computed by comparing the total number of cases recorded with the total population covered by the sample for a given year (fixing the population at 1990 levels for the entire 15-year period) and then calculating a case-per-million ratio that can be used to estimate the incidence of political crime for the entire population. These estimates are given in Table 6 (p. 10).



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SELECTION OF CASES FROM  
THE CRIMINAL LAW

刑 事 案 件 选 编

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Occasional Publications of  
The Dui Hua Foundation

NUMBER TWENTY-FOUR

May 2007

## Case No. 24-19

Name: 石清 商京宗  
Shi Qing Shang Jingzong  
喻安民 计坤兴  
Yu Anmin Ji Kunxing

Location: 云南省  
Yunnan Province

Source 1: 云南日报, 1989年9月28日  
*Yunnan Daily*, September 28, 1989

Source 2: 五华区公安志, 1996年, 第173-174页  
*Wuhua District Public Security Records*, 1996, pp. 173-174

### Source 1:

## 昆明市公安机关破获 一起反革命集团案件

**本报讯** 昆明市公安局新闻发言人在昨天召开的新闻发布会称, 昆明市公安机关在人民群众的协助下, 于9月16日破获了一起有组织、有纲领、有行动、妄图推翻共产党和社会主义制度的反革命集团案件。目前, 有8名为首分子和骨干分子被依法收审, 并缴获了大批反革命罪证。

这个反革命集团是今年7月组织起来的, 7名成员都是从外地流窜来昆明的社会闲散人员和劳改释放人员。主犯石清, 男, 27岁, 江苏赣榆县人。今年五、六月间, 全国一些地区发生政治动乱, 北京发生反革命暴乱, 他错估形势, 认为“时机终于等到了”。6月9日, 他窜到湖南株洲市, 当天在火车站广场公开发表攻击诬蔑平息反革命暴乱的演讲。接着流窜来昆, 企图参加昆明的动乱。但赶到时, 动乱已被制止。于是, 他拉拢了从山东流来昆明算命骗钱的商京宗、四川流窜来昆明卖劣质字画喻安民、江苏流窜来昆明搞缝纫的计坤兴, 经过秘密策划, 决定成立一反革命“党”。由石犯起草了这个反革命“党”的“纲领”、“章程”,

明确提出要“打倒现政权，推翻共产党的领导”。随后，他们分头进行了一系列猖狂的反革命活动，利用算命看相，拉拢了几名卖假药、修脚、卖花奔的外地人参加他们的反革命组织。并先后书写了反革命标语、反革命小字报四处张贴。向一些单位投寄，恶毒攻击党和社会主义制度，还油印出版了反革命刊物《拓荒报》，为筹集反革命经费，他们阴谋抢劫某个体户现款，但未得逞。他们还企图与国外反动势力贵挂钩，千方百计寻找门路，并企图派骨干分子予偷越国境。正当他们制定的反革命“纲领”、“章程”、“党印”、“党徽”、“党歌”以及炮制的各种反动宣传品，均被公安机关当场查获。

(方学东 郑斌)

### **Kunming Public Security Organs Solve Counterrevolutionary Group Case**

A spokesperson for the Kunming Public Security Bureau announced at a press conference yesterday that on September 16 public security organs in Kunming, with the assistance of the general public, solved the case of a counterrevolutionary group possessing organization, program, and operations aimed at toppling the Communist Party and the socialist system. Currently, eight leading and principal members have been taken into custody in accordance with the law, and a large body of incriminating counterrevolutionary evidence has been seized.

This counterrevolutionary group was organized in July [1989], and its seven members are all idlers and ex-convicts who came to Kunming from other parts of the country. Principal culprit Shi Qing, male, age 27, is from Ganyu County in Jiangsu Province. In May and June, when political disturbances occurred in a number of places around the country and a counterrevolutionary riot broke out in Beijing, he mistakenly assessed the situation and decided that “the opportunity I’ve waited for has finally arrived.” On June 9, Shi Qing fled to Zhuzhou in Hunan. That same day, in the square in front of the railway station, he publicly gave a speech attacking and vilifying the suppression of the counterrevolutionary riot. Subsequently, he fled to Kunming in an attempt to join in the disturbances there. But by the time he arrived, the disturbances in Kunming had already been curtailed. So he recruited Shang Jingzong, a fortune-telling swindler from Shandong, Yu Anmin, a purveyor of inferior calligraphy and paintings from Sichuan, and Ji Kunxing, a tailor from Jiangsu, and, following secret planning, they decided to establish a counterrevolutionary “party.” Shi drafted a “program” and “charter” for the counterrevolutionary “party,” clearly proposing to “overthrow the current regime and topple the leadership of the Communist Party.” Afterwards, they separately carried out a series of wild counterrevolutionary activities, using palm-reading and fortune-telling to recruit a group of outsiders engaged in selling fake medicines, pedicures, and flowers to join their counterrevolutionary organization. They wrote counterrevolutionary banners and big-character posters viciously attacking the Party and the socialist system, which they posted all over and sent to a few organizations. They also mimeographed a counterrevolutionary publication entitled “Trailblazer News.” In order

to gather funds for their counterrevolutionary activities, they conspired to rob cash from a self-employed entrepreneur, but the plot was never carried out. They even thought of various schemes to link up with reactionary hostile forces overseas and attempted to smuggle principal members out of the country. Just as they were attempting to carry out the aforementioned counterrevolutionary plots, the Kunming public security organs hauled them in in one fell swoop and recovered at the scene their counterrevolutionary “program” and “charter,” the “party seal,” “party insignia,” and “party song,” along with all kinds of reactionary propaganda materials that they had concocted.

**Source 2:**

1989年春夏之交，国内外敌对势力趁国内发生“政治风波”之际，推波助浪，进行捣乱破坏，妄图颠覆社会主义国家制度。分局在政治斗争的严峻时刻，精心组织、周密安排部署，配合省、市有关部门，准确地掌握社会面上的情况和重点人的动态，采取有效措施严加防范、控制，适时地捕获混入全全队伍中的反革命分子5人。破获以石清为首有6名成员的“中国民主共产党”反革命集团，为斗争的胜利走出了贡献。

In the late spring of 1989, hostile forces in China and abroad seized upon the domestic “political turmoil” then taking place in China to cause trouble and carry out sabotage in an effort to topple the socialist state system. In this dire time of political struggle, the [Wuhua] branch [public security] bureau established careful and comprehensive measures to assist the relevant bureaus at the provincial and municipal level in correctly taking the pulse of the social situation and grasping the tendencies of targeted persons. Effectively exerting strict caution and control, [the bureau] managed just in time to take into custody five counterrevolutionaries who had infiltrated the ranks of the masses. In solving the case of the “China Democratic Communist Party,” a six-member counterrevolutionary group led by Shi Qing, [the bureau] contributed to the success of the [political] struggle.